Subjectivity in Language

If language is, as they say, the instrument of communication, to what does it owe this property? The question may cause surprise, as does everything that seems to challenge an obvious fact, but it is sometimes useful to require proof of the obvious. Two answers come to mind. The one would be that language is in fact employed as the instrument of communication, probably because men have not found a better or more effective way in which to communicate. This amounts to stating what one wishes to understand. One might also think of replying that language has such qualities as make it suited to serve as an instrument; it lends itself to transmitting what I entrust to it—an order, a question, an announcement—and it elicits from the interlocutor a behavior which is adequate each time. Developing a more technical aspect of this idea, one might add that the behavior of language admits of a behaviorist description, in terms of stimulus and response, from which one might draw conclusions as to the intermediary and instrumental nature of language. But is it really language of which we are speaking here? Are we not confusing it with discourse? If we posit that discourse is language put into action, and necessarily between partners, we show amidst the confusion, that we are begging the question, since the nature of this “instrument” is explained by its situation as an “instrument.” As for the role of transmission that language plays, one should not fail to observe, on the one hand, that this role can devolve upon nonlinguistic means—gestures and mimicry—and, on the other hand, that, in speaking here of an “instrument,” we are letting ourselves be deceived by certain processes of transmission which in human societies without exception come after language and imitate its functioning. All systems of signals, rudimentary or complex, are in this situation.

In fact, the comparison of language to an instrument—and it should necessarily be a material instrument for the comparison to even be comprehensible—must fill us with mistrust, as should every simplistic notion about language. To speak of an instrument is to put man and nature in opposition. The pick, the arrow, and the wheel are not in nature. They are fabrications. Language
is in the nature of man, and he did not fabricate it. We are always inclined to
that naive concept of a primordial period in which a complete man discovered
another one, equally complete, and between the two of them language was
worked out little by little. This is pure fiction. We can never get back to man
separated from language and we shall never see him inventing it. We shall
never get back to man reduced to himself and exercising his wits to conceive of
the existence of another. It is a speaking man whom we find in the world, a man
speaking to another man, and language provides the very definition of man.

All the characteristics of language, its immaterial nature, its symbolic
functioning, its articulated arrangement, the fact that it has content, are in
themselves enough to render suspect this comparison of language to an
instrument, which tends to dissociate the property of language from man.
Ceritably in everyday practice the give and take of speaking suggests an
exchange, hence a "thing" which we exchange, and speaking seems thus to
assume an instrumental or vehicular function which we are quick to
hypostasis as an "object." But, once again, this role belongs to the individual act
of speech.

Once this function is seen as belonging to the act of speech, it may be
asked what predisposition accounts for the fact that the act of speech should
have it. In order for speech to be the vehicle of "communication," it must be
so enabled by language, of which it is only the actualization. Indeed, it is
in language that we must search for the condition of this aptitude. It seems
to us that it resides in a property of language barely visible under the evidence
that conceals it, which only sketchily can we yet characterize.

It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject,
because language alone establishes the concept of "ego" in reality, in its
reality which is that of the being.

The "subjectivity" we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker
to posit himself as "subject." It is defined not by the feeling which everyone
experiences of being himself (this feeling, to the degree that it can be taken
note of, is only a reflection) but as the psychic unity that transcends the
totality of the actual experiences it assembles and that makes the permanence
of the consciousness. Now we hold that that "subjectivity," whether it is
placed in phenomenology or in psychology, as one may wish, is only the
emergence in the being of a fundamental property of language. "Ego" is he
who says "ego."" That is where we see the foundation of "subjectivity,"
which is determined by the linguistic status of "person."

Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use
I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is
this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that
reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn desig-
the use of periphrases or of special forms between certain groups of individuals in order to replace the direct personal references. But these usages only serve to underline the value of the avoided forms; it is the implicit existence of these pronouns that gives social and cultural value to the substitutes imposed by class relationships.

Now these pronouns are distinguished from all other designations a language articulates in that they do not refer to a concept or to an individual.

There is no concept "I" that incorporates all the I's that are uttered at every moment in the mouths of all speakers, in the sense that there is a concept "tree" to which all the individual uses of tree refer. The "I," then, does not denominate any lexical entity. Could it then be said that I refers to a particular individual? If that were the case, a permanent contradiction would be admitted into language, and anarchy into its use. How could the same term refer indifferently to any individual whatsoever and still at the same time identify him in his individuality? We are in the presence of a class of words, the "personal pronouns," that escape the status of all the other signs of language. Then, what does I refer to? To something very peculiar which is exclusively linguistic: I refers to the act of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the speaker. It is a term that cannot be identified except in what we have called elsewhere an instance of discourse and that has only a momentary reference. The reality to which it refers is the reality of the discourse. It is in the instance of discourse in which I designates the speaker that the speaker proclaims himself as the "subject." And so it is literally true that the basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language. If one really thinks about it, one will see that there is no other objective testimony to the identity of the subject except that which he himself thus gives about himself.

Language is so organized that it permits each speaker to appropriate to himself an entire language by designating himself as I.

The personal pronouns provide the first step in bringing out subjectivity in language. Other classes of pronouns that share the same status depend in their turn upon these pronouns. These other classes are the indicators of deixis, the demonstratives, adverbs, and adjectives, which organize the spatial and temporal relationships around the "subject" taken as referent: "this, here, now," and their numerous correlatives, "that, yesterday, last year, tomorrow," etc. They have in common the feature of being-defined only with respect to the instances of discourse in which they occur, that is, in dependence upon the I which is proclaimed in the discourse.

It is easy to see that the domain of subjectivity is further expanded and must take over the expression of temporality. No matter what the type of language, there is everywhere to be observed a certain linguistic organization of the notion of time. It matters little whether this notion is marked in the inflection of the verb or by words of other classes (particles, adverbs, lexical variations, etc.); that is a matter of formal structure. In one way or another, a language always makes a distinction of "tenses"; whether it be a past and a future, separated by a "present," as in French [or English], or, as in various Amerindian languages, of a preterite-present opposed to a future, or a present-future distinguished from a past, these distinctions being in their turn capable of depending on variations of aspect, etc. But the line of separation is always a reference to the "present." Now this "present" in its turn has only a linguistic fact as temporal reference: the coincidence of the event described with the instance of discourse that describes it. The temporal referent of the present can only be internal to the discourse. The Dictionnaire générale defines the "present" as "le temps du verbe qui exprime le temps où l'on est." But let us beware of this; there is no other criterion and no other expression by which to indicate "the time at which one is" except to take it as "the time at which one is speaking." This is the eternally "present" moment, although it never relates to the same events of an "objective" chronology because it is determined for each speaker by each of the instances of discourse related to it. Linguistic time is self-referential. Ultimately, human temporality with all its linguistic apparatus reveals the subjectivity inherent in the very use of language.

Language is accordingly the possibility of subjectivity because it always contains the linguistic forms appropriate to the expression of subjectivity, and discourse provokes the emergence of subjectivity because it consists of discrete instances. In some way language puts forth "empty" forms which each speaker, in the exercise of discourse, appropriates to himself and which he relates to his "person," at the same time defining himself as I and a partner as you. The instance of discourse is thus constitutive of all the coordinates that define the subject and of which we have briefly pointed out only the most obvious.

The establishment of "subjectivity" in language creates the category of person—both in language and also, we believe, outside of it as well. Moreover, it has quite varied effects in the very structure of languages, whether it be in the arrangement of the forms or in semantic relationships. Here we must necessarily have particular languages in view in order to illustrate some effects of the change of perspective which "subjectivity" can introduce. We cannot say what the range of the particular phenomena we are pointing out may be in the universe of real languages; for the moment it is less important to delimit them than to reveal them. English provides several convenient examples.

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In a general way, when I use the present of a verb with three persons (to use the traditional nomenclature), it seems that the difference in person does not lead to any change of meaning in the conjugated verb form. I eat, you eat, and he eats have in common and as a constant that the verb form presents a description of an action, attributed respectively and in an identical fashion to "I," "you," and "he." Similarly, I suffer, you suffer, he suffers have the description of the same state in common. This gives the impression of being an obvious fact and even the formal alignment in the paradigm of the conjugation implies this.

Now a number of verbs do not have this permanence of meaning in the changing of persons, such as those verbs with which we denote dispositions or mental operations. In saying I suffer, I describe my present condition. In saying I feel (that the weather is going to change), I describe an impression which I feel. But what happens if, instead of I feel (that the weather is going to change), I say I believe (that the weather is going to change)? The formal symmetry between I feel and I believe is complete. Is it so for the meaning? Can I consider I believe to be a description of myself of the same sort as I feel? Am I describing myself believing when I say I believe (that . . .)? Surely not. The operation of thought is not at all the object of the utterance; I believe (that . . .) is equivalent to a mitigated assertion. By saying I believe (that . . .), I convert into a subjective utterance the fact asserted impersonally, namely, the weather is going to change, which is the true proposition.

Let us consider further the following utterances: "You are Mr. X., I suppose." "I presume that John received my letter." "He has left the hospital, from which I conclude that he is cured." These sentences contain verbs that are verbs of operation: suppose, presume, and conclude are all logical operations. But suppose, presume, and conclude, put in the first person, do not behave the way, for example, reason and reflect do, which seem, however, to be very close. The forms I reason and I reflect describe me as reasoning and reflecting. Quite different are I suppose, I presume, and I conclude. In saying I conclude (that . . .), I do not describe myself as occupied in concluding; what could the activity of "concluding" be? I do not represent myself as being in the process of supposing and presuming when I say I suppose, I presume. I conclude indicates that, in the situation set forth, I extract a relationship of conclusion touching on a given fact. It is this logical relationship which is materialized in a personal verb. Similarly, I suppose and I presume, are very far from I pose and I resume. In I suppose and I presume, there is an indication of attitude, not a description of an operation. By including I suppose and I presume in my discourse, I imply that I am taking a certain attitude with regard to the utterance that follows. It will have been noted that all the verbs cited are followed by that and a proposition; this proposition is the real utterance, not the personal verb form that governs it. But on the other hand, that personal form is, one might say, the indicator of subjectivity. It gives the assertion that follows the subjective context—doubt, presumption, inference—suited to characterize the attitude of the speaker with respect to the statement he is making. This "manifestation of subjectivity does not stand out except in the first person. One can hardly imagine similar verbs in the second person except for taking up an argument again verbatim; thus, you suppose that he has left is only a way of repeating what "you" has just said: "I suppose that he has left." But if one removes the expression of person, leaving only "he supposes that . . .," we no longer have, from the point of view of I who utters it, anything but a simple statement.

We will perceive the nature of this "subjectivity" even more clearly if we consider the effect on the meaning produced by changing the person of certain verbs of speaking. These are verbs that by their meaning denote an individual act of social import: swear, promise, guarantee, certify, with locutional variants like pledge to . . ., commit (oneself) to . . . In the social conditions in which a language is exercised, the acts denoted by these verbs are regarded as binding. Now here the difference between the "subjective" utterance and the "nonsubjective" is fully apparent as soon as we notice the nature of the opposition between the "persons" of the verb. We must bear in mind that the "third person" is the form of the verbal (or pronominal) paradigm that does not refer to a person because it refers to an object located outside direct address. But it exists and is characterized only by its opposition to the person I of the speaker who, in uttering it, situates it as "non-person." Here is its status. The form he . . . takes its value from the fact that it is necessarily part of a discourse uttered by "I."

Now I swear is a form of peculiar value in that it places the reality of the oath upon the one who says I. This utterance is a performance; "to swear" consists exactly of the utterance I swear, by which Ego is bound. The utterance I swear is the very act which pledges me, not the description of the act that I am performing. In saying I promise, I guarantee, I am actually making a promise or a guarantee. The consequences (social, judicial, etc.) of my swearing, of my promise, flow from the instance of discourse containing I swear, I promise. The utterance is identified with the act itself. But this condition is not given in the meaning of the verb, it is the "subjectivity" of discourse which makes it possible. The difference will be seen when I swear is replaced by he swears. While I swear is a pledge, he swears is simply a description, on the same plane as he runs, he smokes. Here it can be seen that, within the conditions belonging to these expressions, the same verb, according as it is assumed by a "subject" or is placed outside "person," takes on a different value. This is a consequence of the fact that the instance of
discourse that contains the verb establishes the act at the same time that it sets up the subject. Hence the act is performed by the instance of the utterance of its "name" (which is "swear") at the same time that the subject is established by the instance of the utterance of its indicator (which is "I").

Many notions in linguistics, perhaps even in psychology, will appear in a different light if one reestablishes them within the framework of discourse. This is language in so far as it is taken over by the man who is speaking and within the condition of intersubjectivity, which alone makes linguistic communication possible.

From *Journal de psychologie* 55 (July–September 1958): 267ff