

Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped Government Responses to AIDS
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Summary of Revisions (As of December 10, 2007)

Since the June 2007 version of *Boundaries of Contagion*, I have completed some additional research and analysis that will figure in the final revisions of the book. In this memo, I describe some specific revisions to be incorporated into chapter 6 that may be of interest to readers with that version of the manuscript.

First, I detail additional systematization of the coding of my “ethbound” variable. Second, I consider aggregates of the World Values Survey data as yet another measure of ethnic boundaries.

Collectively, these analyses simply reinforce the main findings already presented, while providing some additional confidence in the validity of the measures and the robustness of the results.

“ETHBOUND”

I have attached below a coding appendix for “ethbound.” There are some slight operational modifications from the June draft, and as a result, and in light of some additional evidence I gathered, 12 countries were re-scored. The substantive findings of the effects of ethbound are unchanged in terms of direction of coefficients and levels of statistical significance, but there are some very slight changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients, and the histograms/correlations will be slightly different in the final version. But there is no change in the overall interpretation of the results.

Coding Ethnic Boundaries Index

My goal was to develop a classification scheme for sorting countries in terms of the extent of their ethnic boundaries as contained in the book manuscript. This cannot be done from a single, consistent set of directly observable measures alone since the notion of boundaries includes both formal and informal institutions that operate across heterogeneous contexts. Even the recognition of “ethnic” groups requires a sensitivity to context – i.e., “Christian” is an ethnic group in Nigeria, but not in South Africa. The ethbound index is an alternative to existing fractionalization indexes, which are only weakly sensitive to socio-political salience. In my index, boundaries (formal and informal institutions that separate “us” from “them”) *and* fractionalization (the size and distribution of groups) are considered together.

This is a “Fuzzy Set” classification scheme (see, Ragin 2000), which means that a country is either “fully in” (1) the group with strong and multiple ethnic boundaries; “mostly in” (.75) the group; “fully out” (0); “mostly out” (.25); or “neither in nor out” (.5) Following Ragin, I pursue a “case-classification” approach – which is to say that I have gathered relevant evidence for sorting cases, and attempted to place them in the relevant sets based on their conceptual fit, rather than starting with a strict set of coding rules. Thus, the framework described below was developed through the process of classifying cases, serving as a justification for decisions made in the classification process. Extreme cases turned out to be very easy to sort; intermediate cases were more difficult.

1 – Clearly strong and multiple ethnic boundaries: Strong institutions and patterns of behavior reinforce the importance of ethnic identity

*ANCHORING CASES: Nigeria; India; South Africa

.75 – Mostly strong and/or multiple ethnic boundaries: Strong boundaries, but some observable mitigating institutions, and/or qualitatively lower levels of ethnic heterogeneity than in 1

.5 – Neither clearly weak, nor clearly strong ethnic boundaries: Conflicting evidence and/or borderline cases.

.25 – Mostly weak ethnic boundaries: Boundaries exist, but they are highly permeable and/or only very weakly relevant in political life. Mostly cases of social discrimination and legacies, but with minor salience/organization in everyday life.

0 – Extremely permeable or non-existent ethnic boundaries: No consistent, internal ethnic boundaries

*ANCHORING CASES: Swaziland; Uruguay; Argentina; North Korea

ETHBOUND Fuzzy Set Classification Framework

A) Is either of the following true? - There are ethnic minorities >5% - Ethnic fragmentation is so great, that there are no groups > 5%	No à	à (logic: homogeneous country/no boundaries by defn.)	à	Code as "0"
Yes?				
B1) Any of the following true? - Manifest ethno-political violence; ethnic party mobilization; rebel group mobilization. - Organized competition for public goods by ethnic groups? - Direct evidence of state political institutions that distinguish citizens in terms of their ethnic identities (not including the census)? - Consistent public discourse about ethnic groups in terms of fairness, power, etc.?	No à	C) Any evidence that ethnic difference has some recognizable social meaning, in the form of persistent social discrimination?	No à (logic: ethnic diversity but no boundaries)	Code as "0"
Yes?		Yes?		
B2) Any of the following true? - The conflict or competition described in B1 is largely contained to a single geographically isolated group (e.g. Casamance). - Group definitions are inconsistent; difficult to identify membership criteria.	Yes à (suggests boundaries are less central)	D) Any of the following true: - There is significant and obvious mixing between the groups - There exists strong and effective assimilationist institutions (universal language; widely reported nation-building).	Yes à (logic: boundaries are informal, permeable and/or very isolated)	Code as ".25"
No?		No à (logic: weak or peripheral boundaries; but no bridging institutions)	à	Code as ".5"
D) Any of the following true? - There is significant and obvious mixing between the groups - There exists strong and effective assimilationist institutions (universal single language; widely reported nation-building).	Yes à	à (logic: stronger or more central boundaries; but significant bridging)	à	Code as ".5"
No?				
E) Any of the following true? - The maximum level of fractionalization is moderate, less than .7. - Conflict or competition in B is clearly episodic, not constant/regular part of political life	Yes à	à (logic: some modification of the extreme case set, reducing the relative likelihood of any given issue being associated with ethnic conflict)	à	Code as ".75"
No à	à	à	à	Code as "1"

Paths to various scores:

0: (A=no) or (A=yes; B=no; C=no)

.25 (A=yes; B=no; C=yes; D=no) or (A=yes; B=yes; B1=yes; D=yes)

.50 (A=yes; B1=yes; B2=yes; D=no) or (A=yes; B1=yes; B2=no; D=yes) or CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS

.75 (A=yes; B1=yes; B2=no; D=no; E=yes)

1 (A=yes; B1=yes; B2=no; D=no; E=no)

EVIDENCE BASE:

CIA World Factbook

Ethnic fractionalization indexes

US Department of State Country Reports

Freedom House, Polity, and Minorities at Risk Database qualitative reports

Scholarly journals, Book chapters

Lexis-Nexis searches

...And when no evidence of something, assumed "No"

(Overwhelming majority of documentation in English, but also consulted French- and Portuguese-language docs)

CLARIFICATIONS

B1) Any of the following true (for cleavages where largest minority is >5%)?

- Manifest ethno-political violence; ethnic party mobilization; rebel group mobilization.

- Organized competition for public goods by ethnic groups?

- Direct evidence of state political institutions that distinguish citizens in terms of their ethnic identities (not including the census)?

Are there any well publicized ethnic parties and/or ethnic rebel organizations (does not include cultural groups)?

Is there any widely reported ethnic violence during this period?

Are there any major secondary sources that describe ethnicity as a central political cleavage in the country?

A PREG score greater than .1 is prima facie evidence that there is some relevance to ethnic political competition

More than 5% of the population is MAR.

*Evidence of socio-economic inequality alone does not constitute evidence of mobilization/competition. Key is some active expression of ethnic group identity in the political arena.

B2 – to answer "Yes" this would have to be true for all relevant cleavages. If this is not the case for any minorities, should respond, "No."

C) Any evidence that ethnic difference is a salient dimension of political life (only for "No's" to B1)

Are there any secondary accounts that refer to ethnicity as a salient dimension of social life, in subtle ways – hiring, residential, socio-economic, but in an uncoded and unsystematic manner.

*Or code no when a credible source says that ethnicity is not salient.

D) Any of the following true:

- There is significant and obvious mixing between the groups

- There exists strong and effective assimilationist institutions (universal single language; widely reported nation-building).

Reported in primary and secondary sources.

Existence of longstanding and still working "mestizaje" institutions or their analytical equivalents.

Repeated and not easily contradicted claims of enduring nation-building legacy (e.g. Tanzania).

E) Any of the following true?

- The maximum level of fractionalization is moderate, less than .7.

In order to be a "1" the maximum ethnic fractionalization score must be >.7, indicating that for any random problem, there is an extremely plausible story, that there is some "other" group.

- Conflict or competition in B is clearly episodic, not constant; obviously tempered/mediated

For example, there are ethnic parties, but some disagreement about this classification; violence is sporadic/not significant or highly violent. Generally, good reason to believe that ethnic boundaries are effectively tempered from particular issues. But

NOT from balancing/consociationalism (which would be a strong boundary), but from integration or the minimization of ethnic salience, for example, through the effective banning of ethnic labels in party competition and/or the successful formation of broad, multi-ethnic coalitions.

ETHBOUND Country classifications from Lieberman Database:

1	.75	.5	.25	0
Cameroon	Angola	Guinea Bissau	Bhutan	Argentina
Central African Republic	Benin	Laos	Brazil	Bangladesh
Chad	Bolivia	Madagascar	Colombia	Botswana
Congo	Burundi	Mali	Gabon	Burkina Faso
Congo, DR	Dominican Republic	Mexico	Gambia	Cambodia
Cote d'Ivoire	Ecuador	Mozambique	Honduras	Chile
Djibouti	Guatemala	Somalia	Nicaragua	China
Ethiopia	Indonesia	Tanzania	Panama	Comoros
Fiji	Malawi	Zambia	Peru	Costa Rica
Ghana	Mauritania		Philippines	Cuba
Guinea	Nepal		Senegal	El Salvador
Guyana	Rwanda		Thailand	Eritrea
India	Sierra Leone		Venezuela	Haiti
Kenya	Sri Lanka			Jamaica
Liberia	Trinidad and Tobago			Korea, Dem. Rep.
Malaysia	Uganda			Lesotho
Myanmar	Zimbabwe			Mongolia
Namibia				Paraguay
Niger				Swaziland
Nigeria				Uruguay
Pakistan				Vietnam
Papua New Guinea				
South Africa				
Sudan				
Togo				

World Values Survey Data

All of the fractionalization indexes, and my ethbound variable, rely on the judgments of the analyst to determine the salience of ethnic divisions based on available information. I think this is a defensible position, but I have now verified that survey responses from many of those countries largely confirm the coding of the boundary variables, and on their own, are good predictors of AIDS policies in the predicted direction.

Originally, I had opted not to use these data because World Values surveys were fielded in only 16 of the countries in my dataset. Nonetheless, given the ready availability of these data, it seemed prudent to assess their effects. Moreover, while the countries with surveys tend to be larger and wealthier than the average in my dataset, there is still a wide range of variation in all relevant variables, particularly in terms of the explanatory variables, so it is not unreasonable to use these data to test the hypotheses. Of particular value, because the WVS asked questions about ethnicity as well as sexual orientation, we can get some reasonable traction on the latter, which is not the case in the current version of the manuscript.

I constructed two variables based upon responses to the question “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”

*I took more mentions of a group as evidence of stronger boundaries.

Antirace: % of population indicating they would not like someone of a different race group (or the local translation) as a neighbor.

Antigay: % of population indicating they would not like a homosexual as a neighbor
-- If there was more than one survey in the 1990s, I used the figure from the most “anti-group” survey under the assumption that there is a normative bias towards under-reporting, and the most anti-group sentiment is the best proxy of the relevance of group boundaries.

I attached the results – antirace correlates with my ethnic boundary variable at .56; but if I throw out one outlying country – Ghana, where the translation of the survey may have picked up something else (i.e., a group not inside the country) – the bivariate correlation is .68, which is quite re-assuring that ethbound is a valid measure. Fearon’s CDIV index is also correlated at .71; by comparison, the correlation with “ELF” is much weaker and not statistically significant, highlighting that only the former two measures are doing a good job of picking up salience. It is also worth noting that the correlation between “antigay” and ethbound is much weaker than ethbound and “antirace,” which highlights that ethbound is more precise as a measure of ethnic boundaries, rather than just a catchall for intolerance or social boundaries.

On the attached printout, in a very simple model, “antirace” has twice as big an effect on spending as “antigay.” In models controlling for GDP/capita the effects lose statistical significance, which is not surprising with so few cases, but the magnitude of the antirace variable is much bigger. Similar results are obtained when considering ARV coverage, and the “antirace” variable has a stronger effect than “antigay.”

In sum, the attitudinal data provide additional confirmation for the findings that pre-existing inter-racial boundaries are strong, negative predictors of AIDS policy aggressiveness.

Additional Regressions using World Values Survey aggregated data (First 3 waves)



```
log: C:\Documents and Settings\csl\My Documents\Research\AIDS Work\AIDS Book\additions.sm
> cl
log type: smcl
opened on: 7 Dec 2007, 14:03:49
```

```
*partial correlations
- pwcorr ethbound antirace antigay elf1985 cdiv preg if (year==1990) & aslproj==1, sig obs
```

	ethbound	antirace	antigay	elf1985	cdiv	preg
ethbound	1.0000					
	83					
antirace	0.5611	1.0000				
	0.0237	16				
antigay	0.4211	0.5776	1.0000			
	0.1043	0.0039	16			
elf1985	0.6172	0.2849	0.6396	1.0000		
	0.0000	0.2848	0.8843	83		
cdiv	0.6978	0.5692	0.6200	0.6798	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0046	0.0104	0.0000	83	
preg	0.7222	0.6758	0.3398	0.5642	0.5228	1.0000
	0.0000	0.3207	0.6370	0.0002	0.0006	39
		39	3	3	39	39

```
**partial correlations without Ghana
- pwcorr ethbound antirace antigay elf1985 cdiv preg if (year==1990) & aslproj==1 & country=="Gha
> na", sig obs
```

	ethbound	antirace	antigay	elf1985	cdiv	preg
ethbound	1.0000					
	84					
antirace	0.6812	1.0000				
	0.0052	15				
antigay	0.3614	0.7495	1.0000			
	0.1656	0.0013	15			
elf1985	0.6104	0.3565	-0.0461	1.0000		
	0.0000	0.1922	0.8703	82		
cdiv	0.7019	0.7107	0.6069	0.6830	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0030	0.0164	0.0000	82	
preg	0.7261	1.0000	1.0000	0.5646	0.5250	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0007	38
		38	2	2	38	38

```

. *** Expenditure regressions
. *effects of WVS aggregate variables on AIDS expenditure with minimal controls
.
. *ANTIRACE
. regress expgovmaxpol antirace adtprvqlagn51 year if year>1994 & eslproj==1, robust cluster(cid)
> )

```

Linear regression Number of obs = 69
F(3, 14) = 16.93
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.5484
Root MSE = 1.8346
Number of clusters (cid) = 15

expgovmaxpol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
antirace	-11.44386	3.202923	-3.57	0.003	-16.31345	-4.574274
adtprvqlagn51	.7061822	.3820914	2.01	0.065	-.0489787	1.461343
year	2635487	1166389	2.26	0.040	.0133831	.5137142
_cons	-526.5401	233.8432	-2.25	0.041	-1028.084	-24.99633

```

. *ANTI GAY
. regress expgovmaxpol antigay adtprvqlagn51 year if year>1994 & eslproj==1, robust cluster(cid)

```

Linear regression Number of obs = 69
F(3, 14) = 34.51
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.5812
Root MSE = 1.7667
Number of clusters (cid) = 15

expgovmaxpol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
antigay	-5.821802	1.594245	-3.65	0.003	-9.241118	-2.402486
adtprvqlagn51	.8756056	.3297453	2.66	0.019	-.1683722	1.582839
year	.2510956	.1206778	2.08	0.056	-.0077325	.5099238
_cons	-500.3205	241.2018	-2.07	0.057	-1017.647	17.00598

```

. *effects of WVS aggregate variables on AIDS expenditure with minimal controls, but including GD
> P/Capita
. *ANTIRACE
. regress expgovmaxpol antirace adtprvqlagn51 gdpocaplag81 year if year>1994 & eslproj==1, robust
> cluster(cid)

```

Linear regression Number of obs = 69
F(4, 14) = 49.32
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8420
Root MSE = 1.0935
Number of clusters (cid) = 15

expgovmaxpol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
antirace	-2.667531	2.294952	-1.16	0.265	-7.589713	2.254652
adtprvqlagn51	.7414814	.1293822	5.73	0.000	.4639843	1.018979
gdpocaplag81	1.582245	.2028092	7.80	0.000	1.147262	2.017227
year	.1738039	.070963	2.45	0.028	.0216034	.3260045
_cons	-360.2313	141.7837	-2.54	0.024	-664.3271	-56.13544