HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY

Decisions on Vietnam 1954 & 1965

APSA Neustadt Book Award 1990

How Presidents Test Reality

Just as battles and plaques can provide opportunities for medical research, the unhappy course of United States relations with Vietnam is a prime source of evidence for students of American political institutions. How Presidents Test Reality draws on the record of American decision making about Vietnam to explore the capacity of top government executives and their advisors to engage in effective reality testing.

Authors Burke and Greenstein compare the Vietnam decision of two presidents whose leadership styles and advisory systems diverged as sharply as any in the modern presidency. Faced with a common challenge -- an incipient Communist take-over of Vietnam -- presidents Eisenhower and Johnson engaged in intense debates with their aides and associates, some of whom favored intervention and some of whom opposed it.  In the Dien Bien Phu Crisis of 1954, Eisenhower decided not to enter the conflict; in 1965, when it became evident that the regime in South Vietnam could not hold out much longer, Johnson intervened. By July, 1965, American involvement had escalated from an advisory force to an open-ended military commitment that would eventually divide the nation and undermine Johnson's capacity to lead.

How Presidents Test Reality uses declassified records and interviews with participants to assess in depth the adequacy of each president's use of advise and information.  This important book advances our historical understanding of the American involvement in Vietnam and illuminates the preconditions of effective presidential leadership in the contemporary world.

Praise for How Presidents Test Reality

"[Burke and Greenstein] make a substantial contribution to the literature on both Vietnam and the role of advisory systems.  Through thorough research and careful analysis, they have provided one of the most useful works on decision making.." -- Public Administration Review

"The authors use a rich array of materials to provide insightful narratives of five presidential decisions concerning Vietnam . . . . [The] book makes an important contribution to the literature on presidential decisionmaking, particularly by highlighting the values of formal structure and concommitant risks of informality." -- American Political Science Review

"Serious students of the Vietnam War and of the larger issue of presidential decisionmaking will welcome this significant addition to the literature." -- Choice

"Burke and Greenstein have written what amounts to an owner's manual for operating the National Security Council . . . . This is a book Reagan's people could have used and George Bush ought to read." -- Bob Schieffer, The Washington Monthly


Russell Sage Foundation

September 1989 (February 1991)

337 pages, cloth, paper

ISBN 87154-175-0 (cl), 87154-176-9 (pb)

$42.50 (cl), $16.95 (pb)

Table of Contents