US-Canadian Fishing Wars
Lilith Wood

---

In 1897, the Klondike Gold Rush brought Canada and the United States
into a heated border conflict. The line between British Columbia and
Southeast Alaska would determine who controlled the Inside Passage,
the quickest route to gold. There was some ambiguity: Great Britain and
Russia had drawn boundaries in the 1860s, but the lines had not been
redrawn since the creation of the Canadian confederation and the
American purchase of Alaska. Great Britain, Russia, and the United
States all agreed where the border should be, and Canada was defeated.
One hundred years later, the border between British Columbia and
Alaska is a source of trouble once again, this time because migrating
salmon refuse to acknowledge it.
 

Pacific Salmon Dispute

The long-running Pacific salmon dispute stumbled into the spotlight on 19
July 1997 when the blockade of the M/V Malaspina, an Alaskan state
ferry, began. One hundred and ninety British Columbian fishermen
blocked the M/V Malaspina from leaving Prince Rupert's harbor for
three days. The ferry was carrying 328 passengers, 71 vehicles and,
most significantly, two vans of frozen sockeye salmon.1

In 1985, after fifteen years of negotiation, the US and Canada signed the
Pacific Salmon Treaty. The treaty provides management guidelines based
on notions of conservation and equity. Numbers of salmon returning to
spawn in rivers vary from year to year so the details of implementation
must be worked out annually and annexed to the treaty. However, there
have been no annexes to the treaty since negotiations broke down in
1994, and although talks resumed, they were never successful. Due to
this failure to reach an agreement, quotas have been based on previous
annexes and abundance of salmon stocks.2 Both governments claim to
abide by tenets of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and each asserts that it has
made the most sacrifices for conservation.
 

Negotiations

In February 1997, the Pacific Salmon Commission brought fishermen
from each side of the conflict to the bargaining table. The US believes
these stakeholder talks offer the best chance for a resolution to the
conflict. While the government-to-government talks had difficulty moving
beyond the assertion of positions, the stakeholders were able to propose
solutions fairly quickly.3 Unfortunately, Canada called off the talks on 9
May 1997 before an agreement could be reached. US stakeholders
were frustrated by what they perceived to be a last-minute inability to
focus by Canadian fishermen.4 Canada's Fisheries Minister David
Anderson cited American inflexibility as the obstacle to resolution.5
Canadian Ambassador Raymond Chretien stressed that Canada did not
"walk out" of talks but simply reacted in the only way possible to the
"chaos" of the US negotiations team.6

Summer was approaching quickly, and many stakeholders wanted to fish
halibut before the advent of the salmon season. The two governments
decided to pick up the negotiations where the stakeholders had left off.7
However, government-to-government talks broke off on 21 May 1997.
The following day, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans
stepped up enforcement of measures requiring foreign vessels to contact
Canadian authorities when passing through Canadian waters.8 Four
American fishing vessels traveling from Washington to Alaska were
detained in Port Hardy. Alaska's Senator Frank Murkowski called for
the Coast Guard to act as escorts for fishing boats making the trip up to
Alaska.9 Most US officials did not react so melodramatically, believing
British Columbia's June election had accounted for the recent rise in
political tough-talk.10 But when talks resumed after the election, they
broke off again in a matter of days. British Columbia Premier Glen Clark
accused the United States of violating the Pacific Salmon Treaty and
over-fishing with impunity.
 

1997 Salmon Season

The 1997 salmon season was difficult for nearly everyone. Alaska's
Bristol Bay sockeye fishery faced a huge disappointment; fifteen million
of the predicted thirty-four million fish failed to arrive. In northern
Southeast Alaska, runs were weak and arrived later than in previous
years. Although fishermen grimly hoped the dearth of sockeyes in Bristol
Bay would boost prices, sockeye prices were down 50% from 1996,
and prices for the other four species of Pacific salmon were down as
well. The United States fishermen went on strike against Alaskan
processors demanding a higher pink salmon price, while a Canadian
dispute between indigenous and non-indigenous commercial fishermen
led to resentment and, on at least one oc
casion, poaching.11 There was anxiety and very little net profit in both
camps.

In July, attention was riveted on Alaska's District 104/Noyes Island
fishery, center stage for an issue left dangling by stakeholders and their
governments alike. Although this fishery targets pink salmon
(approximately 12 million pinks are caught annually), thousands of
Canadian sockeyes bound for the Skeena River are intercepted by
American nets. A Canadian fishery targeting these sockeyes adjoins
District 104. Sockeyes, called "money fish" within the industry, are
historically the most lucrative of all Pacific salmon. Both Canadian and
US fishermen in the area had caught more sockeyes than usual by July
1997, and according to Alaska Governor Tony Knowles' office, this
increase in sockeye bycatch was the result of a strong, early run and
favorable climatic conditions. When it became apparent that there was to
be a large catch of Canadian sockeyes, the steps the US took to reduce
fishing time were not as drastic as Canada would have liked. Ottawa
retaliated by encouraging Canadian fishermen to intercept fish returning to
American rivers.12

In July Canadian Premier Glen Clark told newspapers, "Alaskan
fishermen are currently engaging in one of the most aggressive attacks on
British Columbian sockeye salmon ever witnessed."13 Senator
Murkowski rejoined by saying, "The fish the American fishermen are
taking are US pinks."14 US fishermen were not "attacking Canadian
sockeyes," but they were not catching exclusively pinks either. While
scientists from both countries agree that one-third of the sockeyes caught
by Alaskans were Alaskan salmon, the fact remains that more sockeyes
than usual were harvested in that fishery. 15 British Columbia M.P. John
Cummins explained the treaty's stipulation that the US would not fish
more than 120,000 sockeyes in District 104 beyond the thirty-first week
of the year.16 By mid-July however, Americans had caught 470,000
sockeyes.17 Governor Knowles' office maintains that Cummins was
referring to an annex that expired in 1991, and even then the 120,000
figure had never been stated. The annex had mandated that District 104
be managed so that the US harvest of Skeena River sockeye would not
exceed 480,000 in four years.18

The impassioned rhetoric of Clark coupled with the economic hardship
British Columbian fishermen faced prevented passions from cooling.
Instead, what had been an inconvenient impasse was elevated to what
the media began to call a war. Cummins emphasized that neither he nor
Clark were in favor of the blockade, saying "it was the spontaneous
reaction of ordinary people."19 Many Alaskans feel that Clark's
inflammatory comments created a climate that made the blockade
possible particularly when he likened Alaskan fishermen to pirates and
brigands. With boat payments to make and bills to pay, British
Columbian fishermen listened when Clark told them, "They're stealing
Canadian fish."20 Clark referred to the blockade as "courageous" and
said if he were a fisherman he would have participated.21, 22 Cummins
remarked that "all British Columbians" felt the fish on the ferry belonged
to Canada.23
 

British Columbia-Ottawa Rift

Although the blockade appeared to be the result of friction between
British Columbia and Alaska, it also illuminated the rift between British
Columbia and Ottawa. Cummins felt that the blockade could have been
ended at least 24 hours earlier if Federal Fisheries Minister David
Anderson had been more prompt in returning fishermen's calls or if he
had not waited two days before flying to Prince Rupert.24 The blockade
may have been as much a cry for help aimed at Ottawa as it was an act
of aggression against Alaska.

Unlike the United States, where each state has its own Fish and Game
department, Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans has
jurisdiction over all the provinces. Ottawa, not British Columbia, holds
Canada's one seat at the bargaining table, while Alaska, Washington, and
Oregon hold three separate seats. This remote management of resources
has caused tension in the federal-provincial relationship. Ottawa has
regarded Clark's efforts, seen as heroic by some British Columbians and
quixotic by others, without a great deal of approval.

In 1994, Brian Tobin, now Newfoundland's premier, had gained
popularity for taking a firm stand against the US when, as Fisheries
Minister, he imposed a transit fee on US fishing vessels traveling through
Canadian waters. At first Clark was congratulated for following in
Tobin's footsteps, but most felt he had gone too far when he decided to
sue the state of Alaska for violation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Four
premiers, led by Tobin and Saskatchewan's Roy Romanow, criticized
British Columbia's tactics.25 Cummins lauded Clark for getting the
salmon issue into the headlines and bringing it to Ottawa's attention, but
Cummins could not support the suit. "My understanding of the US court
system is that [Clark] doesn't have a snowball's chance in hell,"26
Cummins commented. Ottawa
argued that lawsuits are fruitless and jeopardize Ottawa's quiet diplomacy
with Washington, provoking many British Columbians who already
wondered which side Ottawa supported. Robert Wright, a member of
the US/Canadian commission since 1985, resigned in September 1997
saying the province was "sabotaging" by its "ill-conceived law suit"
against the United States any hope of settling the salmon dispute.
Because he felt that the British Columbian government had inflamed
relations with the US simply to boost Clark's popularity, he also resigned
from his role as Clark's advisor.27 On 2 October 1997, Prime Minister
Jean Chretian reprimanded Clark in an address to 1,200 Liberals in
Vancouver, calling his actions "very irresponsible" and "not very helpful."
"It's nice to tell Americans to go away," Chretian remarked, "but it's very
nice to pick up their dollars when they come here."28 Ottawa managed to
quash Clark's threats to terminate the lease of the Nanoose Bay torpedo
testing range to the United States Navy, saying that the province does not
have jurisdiction over the Navy's lease.29, 30

In September 1997, Alaskan politicians gained support from
Washington, D.C., in a letter from President Clinton. Clinton wrote, "Any
recurrence of illegal and inexcusable actions on the West Coast will
necessitate our taking appropriate counter-measures."31 In October,
Ambassador Chretien represented Ottawa's position in a
sharply-worded briefing paper addressed to Congress. Ottawa reminded
the US in no uncertain terms that it was the US, not Canada, that had
precipitated the salmon war. British Columbia, still not satisfied with
Ottawa's treatment of the issue, sent its own lengthy list of complaints and
accusations.32
 

Souring of US-Canadian Relations

Relations between Washington, D.C. and Ottawa may still fall under the
auspices of "quiet diplomacy," but since this summer the relationship
between the two countries has become increasingly tense. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was
written in a way that would have required Canadian nationals to carry
"smart cards" containing passport information. Congress assured
Ambassador Chretien that it had not intended to inconvenience Canada
by imposing new regulations on Canadian nationals, and an exemption
amendment was approved to the now enacted law. 33 The incident
makes it look as though Canada may have slipped Washington's mind.
One wonders if Senator Pat Leahy (D-VT) was speaking the truth when
he said of Canada, "the State Department forgets it's there."34 Indeed,
Canadian resentment of the US
has grown in connection with several recent policy issues. Canadian
Trade Minister Sergio Marchi is not backing down to US Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky's accusation that Canada is illegally
subsidizing its dairy exports and squeezing US processors out of key
foreign markets in Asia and Mexico. Marchi says he will defend
Canada's $3.7 billion dairy industry.35 In foreign policy, the two nations
have not always seen eye-to-eye. Both Prime Minister Chretian and
Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy expressed their displeasure
when Clinton refused to back an accord that would ban anti-personnel
landmines. Clinton's refusal threatened to sour the feeling of
accomplishment evident in national headlines like "Mine pact Canada's
triumph."36

As tempers flare over salmon, officials on one side of the border or the
other have threatened to scrap the Pacific Salmon Treaty altogether. The
barely-civilized scuffle between Canada and the US over money, assets
and legal details make it easy to forget everything the two countries
share. They have successfully coexisted for over a century, boasting the
longest unarmed border in the world. Canada is a larger market for US
goods than all fifteen members of the European Union combined; the two
nations have the largest trading relationship between any two nations in
the world. This two-way trade of goods and services across the border
amounts to nearly one billion US dollars each day.37 Officials from both
countries would be wise to remember the words of President Kennedy in
his 17 May 1961 address to Parliament in Ottawa: "Geography has
made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us
partners. And necessity has made us allies. Those whom nature hath so
joined together, let no man put asunder."38 Maintaining a larger picture of
Canada's relationship with the United States will be essential to resolving
the Pacific salmon issue.
 

Prospects for a Settlement

Both sides of the salmon war believe an agreement can be reached
before the 1998 fishing season. The resolution of the Pacific salmon issue
has become a top priority for the highest levels of Canadian and
American government. Both sides have hired a prominent citizen to help
reinvigorate the stakeholder negotiating process on the Pacific Salmon
Treaty. Dr. David Strangeway, President and Vice Chancellor of the
University of British Columbia will report to the prime minister and
minister of foreign affairs. William Ruckelhaus, former head of the US
Environmental Protection Agency and now a Seattle-based businessman,
will report to the president and secretary of state.38 Everyone is placing
their hopes on the fishermen themselves.

Stakeholder talks will be most effective if the representative fishermen are
allowed to negotiate without the distraction of counter-productive
political rhetoric. Irrational rabble-rousing comments from the likes of
Premier Clark and Senator Murkowski, along with incidents of
flag-burning, have led the press to write off these protests as
"long-dormant nationalism." The fishermen of this region divide
themselves along many lines, but the distinction of nationality has never
been the most important. If British Columbian fishermen have displayed
nationalist tendencies recently, it is a new development and the result of
politicians' speeches. To finally have a working treaty, the stakeholders
on both sides must concentrate on solving the problem incrementally,
concentrating on one sub-region at a time.

Casual onlookers often suggest that the way to solve this problem is to
confine the fishing grounds to the mouths of rivers. Canadians would fish
just off-shore from Canadian rivers, while Americans cast their nets at the
openings of American rivers. However, it is important to remember that
these rivers do not flow into the open ocean but into a complicated
system of islands and straits. The implementation of this suggestion might
lead to a cramped derby-style fishery that would be difficult to manage in
a way that would prevent obliteration of returning runs. In light of the
disastrous state of the Atlantic fishery and some unexpectedly small runs
in the Pacific fishery, the US and Canada should be even more
concerned about conserving Pacific salmon stocks. Until a better system
of predicting returns and calculating sustainable yield can be found, all
parties should err more decisively on the side of caution. Diminished
quotas would undoubtedly put a financial burden on the fishermen and
processors, but this could be alleviated if the industry were given a
long-needed overhaul. A shift to value-added processing, away from
canned salmon and toward higher quality products could yield substantial
profits with fewer fish caught. It is more likely, though, that the
family-owned fishing boats will go the way of small farms in the United
States. The combination of farmed-salmon's rising success on the market,
the increasing presence of large foreign-owned corporations, and the
dropping value of canned salmon may eventually put an end to
independent skippers in the Pacific Northwest.

It is clear that both Canadian and American Pacific salmon fishermen will
have to adapt to new circumstances. If their lifestyle is to survive, they
must begin with unity and cooperation, namely, a viable Pacific Salmon
Treaty. Many will nervously await the outcome of the negotiations as
stakeholders sit down together in one more attempt to reach a lasting
agreement on the region's most valuable resource.

Notes:

1 Robert Matas, "Alaska ups the ante over salmon," The Globe and
Mail, July 29, 1997.

2 Bob King, Press Secretary, Governor Tony Knowles' office, interview,
October 14, 1997.

3 David Benton, Deputy Salmon Commissioner, "Alaska is not targeting
Canadian salmon," Alaska Department of Fish and Game.

4 King.

5 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada calls
for binding dispute settlement following US rejection of final offer," June
26, 1997, No. 108.

6 Ross Howard, "Ottawa rebuts fish-war claims," The Globe and Mail,
October 22, 1997.

7 Mary Beth West, Deputy Assistant Undersecretary to the House of
Representatives Fisheries Subcommittee, United States Information
Service, <http://www.usis-canada.usia.gov/>, File ID: 97091907.ECO.
Title: 19-09-97, Text: State Department Official on Pacific Salmon
Dispute, September 1997.

8 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and
US to resume salmon talks," May 23, 1997, No. 95.

9 Timothy Egan, "Salmon war in Northwest spurs wish for good fences,"
The New York Times, September 12, 1997.

10 Carey Goldberg, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com>,
June 5, 1997.

11 Ross Howard, "B.C. Fishermen vow another raid," The Globe and
Mail, August 27, 1997.

12 Ross Howard, "B.C. sues US for overfishing," The Globe and Mail,
September 9, 1997.

13 Anthony de Palma, The New York Times,
<http://www.nytimes.com>, July 22, 1997.

14 Ibid.

15 King.

16 John Cummins, member of Parliament, interview, October 7, 1997.

17 Matas.

18 King.

19 Cummins.

20 Matas.

21 Egan.

22 Ross Howard, "Clinton letter heats up fish war," The Globe and Mail,
September 17, 1997.

23 Matas.

24 Cummins.

25 Edward Greenspan, "Clark's fish war lures few recruits," The Globe
and Mail, August 12, 1997.

26 Cummins.

27 Miro Cernetig, "Salmon treaty member quits," The Globe and Mail,
September 11, 1997.

28 The Globe and Mail, <http://www.TheGlobeAndMail.com>,
October 3, 1997.

29 Howard.

30 Egan.

31 Howard.

32 Ibid.

33 Remarks by LaFalce (D-NY) on H.R. 2481, "1996 immigration
reform bill needs correction," C.R. page 1765, September 16, 1997.

34 Andrew Cohen, "Leahy: a capital conscience," The Globe and Mail,
September 29, 1997.

35 Barrie MacKenna, "US steps up pressure in agricultural trade
skirmishes," The Globe and Mail, October 2, 1997.

36 Paul Knox, "Mine pact Canada's triumph," The Globe and Mail,
September 18, 1997.

37 The US Embassy, Ottawa, United States Information Service,
<http://www.usis-canada.usia.gov/>

38 President John F. Kennedy's address before Parliament, May 17,
1961.

39 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada-US
Pacific salmon representatives to begin work immediately," July 25,
1997, No. 122.