Islamic Fundamentalism
George R. Trumbull IV
Violence at tourist attractions in Egypt has brought
Islamic
fundamentalism to the attention of the American
public once again.
Support for brutal repression in Algeria and
Egypt has not eliminated
fundamentalism. American hostility has not softened
Iran's government.
Washington's willful ignorance has not removed
the threat of the Taliban
in Afghanistan. American foreign policy's reactions
to Islamic
fundamentalism have not removed the specter of
the establishment of
another radical state. Despite America's steadfastness,
the current
direction of policy will not result in the amelioration
of fundamentalist
violence until Washington accepts the social
and political motivations
behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
Islamic fundamentalism does not result from a
particular theological
interpretation of the Koran. Rather, a theological
interpretation serves
and responds to socio-political discontent. The
1992 Algerian elections,
had the military-bureaucratic alliance not invalidated
them, would have
returned an Islamic fundamentalist majority to
power. The results
reflected a widespread discontent with corruption
within, and the
inefficacy of, the two main secular parties.
Because of the lack of a third,
viable, secular party, protest voters turned
to Islamic fundamentalist
parties who promised honesty and efficiency.
In Egypt, too, fundamentalism arises in response
to social problems.
Egyptian fundamentalism finds its strongest supporters
among the urban
poor. In Egypt, as in much of Africa and the
Middle East, there is a vast
difference between the rich and poor. The poverty-stricken
slums of
Cairo produce many young men and women who reject
the class-based
social consensus of Egypt and the political parties
and bureaucracy that
enforce it. As a result, they turn to fundamentalist
organizations to
express their views.
The 1979 Iranian revolution also illustrates the
link between
socio-political structures and fundamentalism.
The rallying cries of
Khomeini's revolution were not only "Allahu akbar"
but also vehement
anti-American sloganeering. Islamic fundamentalism
in Iran responded to
a gross inequality in the distribution of wealth
as well as to a forceful
infringement of American-led Western culture.
Fundamentalism offered a
means of expressing dissatisfaction with the
Shah's regime and with the
encroachment of Western-influenced modernization.
The current situation in Afghanistan offers a
contemporary example of the
relationship between socio-political conditions
and the development of
fundamentalism. The Taliban, unlike Khomeini's
supporters or the
Egyptian malcontents, did not develop spontaneously.
Rather, Pakistan
intentionally created a radical group to further
its own aims in
Afghanistan. However, the Taliban's success comes
from its adoption of
the issues raised by socio-political discontent:
the Taliban responds to
years of anarchy, secularism and, for much of
the 1980s, communist
government. Whether the Taliban addresses these
issues for the majority
of Afghanis or for a small number remains to
be seen.
At present, American policy focuses on supporting
the repression of
fundamentalism and alienating fundamentalist
regimes through sanctions
against Iran and by refusing to recognize the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
Some of this policy can be justified by the infringements
of human rights
inflicted by the Iranian government and the Taliban.
However, Islamic
fundamentalism will not disappear until the prevailing
political and societal
structure addresses the underlying socio-political
issues that create it.
America must encourage governments experiencing
fundamentalist
disturbances to first address the issues that
spawn this response. Until we
encourage free elections, the establishment of
real, secular, alternative
parties, and the enfranchisement of those who
live on the outskirts of the
dominant societal systems, Islamic fundamentalism
will remain a threat to
stability in North Africa, the Middle East and
Central Asia.