Islamic Fundamentalism
George R. Trumbull IV



US foreign policy must take into account the fact that Islamic fundamentalism will not
    disappear until the underlying socio-political issues that gave rise to fundamentalist movements are addressed.

Violence at tourist attractions in Egypt has brought Islamic
fundamentalism to the attention of the American public once again.
Support for brutal repression in Algeria and Egypt has not eliminated
fundamentalism. American hostility has not softened Iran's government.
Washington's willful ignorance has not removed the threat of the Taliban
in Afghanistan. American foreign policy's reactions to Islamic
fundamentalism have not removed the specter of the establishment of
another radical state. Despite America's steadfastness, the current
direction of policy will not result in the amelioration of fundamentalist
violence until Washington accepts the social and political motivations
behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism does not result from a particular theological
interpretation of the Koran. Rather, a theological interpretation serves
and responds to socio-political discontent. The 1992 Algerian elections,
had the military-bureaucratic alliance not invalidated them, would have
returned an Islamic fundamentalist majority to power. The results
reflected a widespread discontent with corruption within, and the
inefficacy of, the two main secular parties. Because of the lack of a third,
viable, secular party, protest voters turned to Islamic fundamentalist
parties who promised honesty and efficiency.

In Egypt, too, fundamentalism arises in response to social problems.
Egyptian fundamentalism finds its strongest supporters among the urban
poor. In Egypt, as in much of Africa and the Middle East, there is a vast
difference between the rich and poor. The poverty-stricken slums of
Cairo produce many young men and women who reject the class-based
social consensus of Egypt and the political parties and bureaucracy that
enforce it. As a result, they turn to fundamentalist organizations to
express their views.

The 1979 Iranian revolution also illustrates the link between
socio-political structures and fundamentalism. The rallying cries of
Khomeini's revolution were not only "Allahu akbar" but also vehement
anti-American sloganeering. Islamic fundamentalism in Iran responded to
a gross inequality in the distribution of wealth as well as to a forceful
infringement of American-led Western culture. Fundamentalism offered a
means of expressing dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime and with the
encroachment of Western-influenced modernization.

The current situation in Afghanistan offers a contemporary example of the
relationship between socio-political conditions and the development of
fundamentalism. The Taliban, unlike Khomeini's supporters or the
Egyptian malcontents, did not develop spontaneously. Rather, Pakistan
intentionally created a radical group to further its own aims in
Afghanistan. However, the Taliban's success comes from its adoption of
the issues raised by socio-political discontent: the Taliban responds to
years of anarchy, secularism and, for much of the 1980s, communist
government. Whether the Taliban addresses these issues for the majority
of Afghanis or for a small number remains to be seen.

At present, American policy focuses on supporting the repression of
fundamentalism and alienating fundamentalist regimes through sanctions
against Iran and by refusing to recognize the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Some of this policy can be justified by the infringements of human rights
inflicted by the Iranian government and the Taliban. However, Islamic
fundamentalism will not disappear until the prevailing political and societal
structure addresses the underlying socio-political issues that create it.
America must encourage governments experiencing fundamentalist
disturbances to first address the issues that spawn this response. Until we
encourage free elections, the establishment of real, secular, alternative
parties, and the enfranchisement of those who live on the outskirts of the
dominant societal systems, Islamic fundamentalism will remain a threat to
stability in North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.