Pinochet Resigns
Ilya Shapiro


After initiating the social and economic changes that have led to Chile's prosperity, General Augusto Pinochet will end his controversial tenure on 11 March 1998.

By 11 March 1998 the last remaining link to the South American
dictatorships of the late 1970s and early 1980s will be severed when
General Augusto Pinochet resigns. In a position of power guaranteed by
the a clause of the Chilean constitution, Pinochet is one of the few Cold
War era leaders still at the head of a nation. From 1973, when he
overthrew Salvador Allende's popularly elected socialist government, to
1990, when he voluntarily surrendered his duties as head of state,
Pinochet's rule survived longer than Ronald Reagan's, Margaret
Thatcher's, and the neighboring autocratic regimes of Argentina,
Paraguay, and Brazil. It was a highly controversial tenure, notable both
for wide-spread human rights violations and for a complete economic
restructuring of the nation. On 11 September 1997 during the lavish
celebrations and violent protests marking the anniversary of his 1973
coup, Pinochet announced that he would respect the constitution and
leave office by the designated date.1 Pinochet's departure, which is
constitutionally mandated to occur on or before 11 March 1998, marks a
symbolic step into the next century.
 

A Controversial Legacy

The controversial military commander is widely respected for initiating the
social and economic changes that have led to Chile's prosperity. Its
free-market economy has experienced 12 straight years of record growth
with low inflation and low unemployment. The nation's semi-privatized
social security system is hailed around the world as the model to follow
for reforming entitlement spending. Its modernized industries were
denationalized long before hyperinflation and financial crises forced
similar courses in democratic Argentina and Brazil, and Chile began
competing effectively with the United States, Japan, and Europe long
before talk of NAFTA and Mercosur. Indeed, the "Chilean miracle" has
long been synonymous with the "Chicago Boys," whose school of
economics has continued to produce Nobel Prize winners since they
were given free reign to redesign Chile's economy.

Despite Pinochet's economic success, his retirement is widely considered
a necessary move toward the final consolidation of democracy in a
country that suffered grave atrocities under his rule. More than 2,000
political opponents disappeared or were killed during his reign. Under a
law imposed as a condition for agreeing to democratic elections in 1990,
amnesty from prosecution was granted to anyone accused of human
rights abuses during Pinochet's regime.2 However, human rights groups
maintain that Pinochet's withdrawal will do little to change the privileges
and freedom from prosecution that Chile's military enjoys.

Pinochet's pending abdication also brings to the fore the issue of the
convoluted and wary relationship between military and civilian leaders
that persists in differing degrees in the Cono Sur.3 General Rafael
Villarroel, a leading candidate to replace Pinochet as head of the military,
said in an interview that the relations between the civilian government and
the military had never been better and that the military had no desire to
interfere in politics.4
 

Return to Civilian Government

The Chilean political situation has remained stable since the nation's
return to civilian rule in March 1990, first under the leadership of Patricio
Aylwin and since March 1994 under a new administration led by
President Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The
PDC dominates a center-left coalition (the concertación) that will serve
a six-year term until 2000 with little risk of disbanding before the 1999
presidential election. A strong pro-democracy consensus has kept
coalition disputes to a minimum during recent years, and right-wing
parties have remained quiet.5 For the most part, the military has kept out
of politics although one cannot ignore the influence that it still wields.
While direct army intervention is no longer a significant threat, there is
always the prospect that a change in the political climate and a prolonged
period of uncertainty could change matters. As the current
pro-democracy consensus, which has served to stabilize the democratic
transition, erodes over time, a less predictable political environment will
develop in the next few years.

However, despite recent indications that the popularity of Frei's
government has decreased slightly, there is little reason to suspect that the
political future of the nation will not remain stable. The coalition
anticipated improving its control of the legislature in the congressional
elections that took place in December 1997; however, to make headway
with its reform agenda, it needs to secure a two-thirds majority. In the
senate, the 1998 expiration of the term of eight "institutional senators"
appointed by the Pinochet regime should mean that opposition control
will be reduced, most likely in favor of Frei's Christian Democratic Party
(PDC). The risk of Pinochet's retirement proving a destabilizing event
becomes ever more remote because of his waning health and the
increasing institutionalization of the coalition parties and their
constituencies.
 

The Future of the Military

The legacy of the military, and of Pinochet in particular, will continue to
diminish in the next few years. A new man at the head of the armed
forces will instill confidence in a civilian government despite the heavily
militarized constitution.7 New constitutional amendments are being drawn
up although Frei's past efforts at such reform have yielded little success.
In his annual State of the Nation address on 21 May 1997 Frei did not
make proposals for any major constitutional changes for the immediate
future. However, the task should become easier once the conservative
opposition loses its conferred dominance in the senate.8 Despite steps
taken since 1990 to consolidate democracy, Pinochet is still able to
invoke authoritarian rule as was clearly illustrated on 29 October 1996
when the police arrested and jailed Gladys Marin, the leader of the
communist party, to answer to slander and defamation charges. At a
memorial service in September 1996 for 3,200 people who were killed
by security forces during Pinochet's presidency and which included
Marin's husband, Marin allegedly described the general as a blackmailer
and psychopath. The arrest drew widespread criticism within Chile and
embarrassed Frei just before the country hosted an Ibero-American
summit meeting which brought together 20 heads of state. However, the
arrest also prompted a show of unity within the ruling coalition and
created a wave of popular support in defense of Marin. Defense Minister
Edmundo Perez Yoma approached Pinochet to ask him to withdraw the
charges against Marin; the general complied on 31 October 1996 and
Marin was released.9

On 2 March 1997, Pinochet confirmed that at the end of his term as
army commander he intended to assume the position of senator-for-life,
to which he is constitutionally entitled. In the same speech, he observed
that Frei is intent upon removing this provision from the constitution and
that Frei also proposes to discontinue all appointed positions in otherwise
elected bodies. While Pinochet regards this as a mistake, he appears
resigned to the fact that the change will take place soon.10

In late September 1997, in an interview with the local magazine, Cosas,
Pinochet appeared enthused about the prospect of serving his country in
his birthplace of Valparaiso where the Chilean Congress is located.
When questioned about his democratic credentials, he protested that
"I've always been a democrat! I was born under democracy, I lived
under democracy, and I worked under democracy. What else do you
expect from me?"11 Aware of the impudent tone of his comment, he then
declined to criticize the civilian government, praised President Frei and
Defense Minister Perez Yoma, and had a few kind words for socialist
Public Works Minister Ricardo Lagos who many believe will succeed
Frei in 2000.12

Pinochet will be replaced by a senior general chosen by Frei, the first
time since 1973 that a democratically elected Chilean president will
exercise that prerogative. But military subordination to civilian rule in
Chile continues to be limited by several articles of the constitution. The
main restriction on the executive branch is that the president cannot
remove armed forces chiefs, and he has limited influence over the military
high command. Regarding the race to succeed the ex-dictator at the top
of the military hierarchy, Pinochet has said that he sent the president a list
of five generals who could succeed him which would include the officers
occupying the top posts as of November 1997. Of the five, the most
logical choice, current Deputy Army Chief Guillermo Garin, may retire,
depending upon the applications of a peculiar ad
ministrative rule. One of the norms governing the armed forces during the
dictatorship was that the heads of the army, navy, air force, and police
were exempt from retirement based on years of service a provision which
led to the current military gerontocracy.13

Whoever does win the dubious honor and responsibility of marching in
Pinochet's boots will have a monumental act to follow. "Pinochet has
been the most important figure in Chile's history," said Guillermo
Holtzman, politics professor at the University of Chile. "His departure will
finally allow this country to begin to practice democracy without the huge
shadow that [he] casts over politics and everyday life, whether it be
intentional or not."14

Augusto Pinochet will leave a nation that harbors mixed feelings toward
him and is unable to forget his tenure. Unlike the politically
polarized climate surrounding the fall of the Argentine triumvirate in 1983,
or the anticlimactic withdrawal of Brazil's less-violent military later that
decade, the departure of Chile's strongman creates feelings of resignation
and relief. As gardener Miguel Tornado, a man who lived through
Pinochet's rule, said, "I'm sorry to see Pinochet go, because he's changed
this country for the better. But he killed my favorite uncle, and I don't feel
comfortable having him remain in such a high position."15 Nobody doubts
that Chile which was already the most democratic in Latin America
before Pinochet and one of the more successful economically, is in a
better state now than it has been in the past.

 

Notes:

1 Calvin Sims. "Chile's Pinochet era nearly over: Leader stepping down
as head of army to go into retirement," The New York Times, October
5, 1997, p. 62A.

2 Ibid: A macabre humor has emerged during this dark time, one that is
often tied to the region's other passion aside from politics, fútbol
(soccer). One wry barb fans use against their team's greatest rival is to
compare their rival to Pinochet because both fill stadiums with tens of
thousands of people and torture them.

3 The term Cono Sur (Southern Cone) refers to Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Uruguay and sometimes Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru. In Latin American
social science, the term Cono Sur is used much more frequently in
discussing the region than it is in North America.

4 Ibid.

5 "Chile: July 1997," Hilfe Country Report, Janet Matthews Information
Services, July 1997, (Nexis file).

6 Ibid.

7 The phrase "to the winner go the spoils" applies neatly to the creation of
the Chilean constitution which was written by loyal apparatchiks at the
height of Pinochet's power in 1980. Aside from provisions to ensure
military over-representation in the congress and other state structures, the
military budget had preferential treatment written into the highest law of
the land. For example, an inflation-indexed sum (or 10%, whichever is
greater) of profits from the copper industry, Chile's greatest mineral
resource, goes directly into defensean entitlement unmatched in the
Pentagon's wildest dreams. [In a recent shift, all military expenditures
must now be approved by the civilian-controlled defense ministry.
(Sims)].

8 In June 1997, the government attempted to push through a reform
proposal which, if approved, would have ensured the removal of the
eight senators in question. The lower chamber approved the measure in
May but the senate rejected it following tactical moves by the opposition.
The defeat was not major, since the campaign to remove non-elected
members has kept the issue in the public eye and some 75% of voters
are in favor of the move. Moreover, since the term of the appointed
senators ended in December 1997, Frei will be able to make his own
appointments. The expected addition of several coalition senators after
the congressional elections means that the government should have a
comfortable majority to push reforms through early in 1998. ("Chile: July
1997").

9 Ibid.

10 Providing the elections for the chamber of deputies also yields an
improved majority; 1998 will bring renewed efforts to reform other
aspects of the 1980 constitution that have historically been blocked. This
might make for a livelier political environment as the right-wing parties
will begine to feel marginalized and adopt a more confrontational stance.
("Chile: July 1997").

11 "Chile's strongman to become senator-for-life," Rocky Mountain
News (Denver), October 5, 1997, 62A. (Nexis file).

12 Ibid.

13 Gustavo Gonzalez. "Chile: Who will succeed Pinochet?", Inter Press
Service, September 18, 1997. (Nexis file). The list of possible "heirs"
also includes chief of staff Rafael Villarroel (previously mentioned);
inspector-general of the army, Patricio Acevedo; the head of the
Santiago garrison, Luis Cortes; the head of the Administrative Command,
Guillermo Sanchez; chief of defense staff Ricardo Izurieta; and the
commander of the first army corps, Sergio Moreno.

14 Sims.

15 Ibid.