Greek-Turkish Tensions
Lucas Cadena
Conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other territorial issues threaten both the NATO alliance and regional peace.
Greek-Turkish Tensions
Lucas Cadena
NATO is poised at a crossroads. Three former Warsaw
Pact nations
were invited to join the alliance at the Madrid
summit in July 1997. The
success of NATO's Implementation Force/Stabilization
Force
(IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia has proven NATO's ability
to evolve from a
collective defense organization to a proactive
international actor.
However, despite bright prospects for the future,
there lurks the distinct
possibility of a serious rift in the alliance.
The problem does not lie
outside of the alliance but comes from within;
there is a serious threat of a
military crisis between Greece and Turkey, two
long-time NATO
members.
Such a disaster would put the future of the alliance
in jeopardy. With the
end of the Cold War and the corresponding disappearance
of the Soviet
threat, the relationship between Greece and Turkey
has become more
volatile; the frequency of serious conflicts
between the two nations has
increased over the last two years.1 Conflict
in the Aegean and events in
Cyprus such as the Cypriot purchase of an advanced
S-300 air defense
system and EU accession talks for Cyprus have
created time bombs with
clearly timed fuses.
Historical Enmities
The trouble between Greece and Turkey is not recent
but is rather a
continuation of older enmities that have resurfaced
after the Cold War.
Both countries have a history of invading the
other. Turkey's predecessor
state, the Ottoman Empire, ruled Greece until
the first half of the 19th
century when the bloody Greek War of Independence
led to the creation
of the modern Greek state. After World War I,
Greece invaded the
remnants of the Ottoman Empire hoping to annex
Anatolia (now Turkey)
and began a war which led to the defeat of Greece
and the creation of
modern Turkey. Echoes of these conflicts still
roil the waters in
Greek-Turkish relations.
During most of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey
set aside their
differences in order to confront the common menace
posed by the
Warsaw Pact. Both countries joined NATO to protect
themselves from
the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its
allies. Since the fall of the
USSR, ancient tensions once again threaten stability
between the two
nations. To understand the problems that plague
the Greek-Turkish
dyad, however, we must look not only at their
shared history but also at
their shared border in the Aegean Sea and at
the Cyprus issue.
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea
The Aegean Sea has given rise to many of the problems
between Greece
and Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in
1923 by both nations,
attempted to settle all outstanding ethnic and
territorial questions created
by the Greek-Turkish war, but new issues have
since arisen which have
had a deleterious effect on the Greek-Turkish
relationship. In 1973
Turkey and Greece became embroiled in a quarrel
over the proper
division of the continental shelf in the Aegean.2
In addition to this dispute,
after Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus quarrels
arose over the size of
the airspace claimed by Greece and the delimitation
of the Athens Flight
Information Region. The extension of Greek territorial
waters also
became an issue when Turkey proclaimed that this
extension would
constitute a casus belli.3 Greece maintains that
it has a right to extend its
territorial sea to twelve miles under international
law, although it does not
currently plan to exercise this right. Greece
also claims that Turkey has
no legitimate right to impede this exercise of
national sovereignty.
One of the most visible and intractable problems
between Greece and
Turkey is the issue of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus
and its aftermath. In
1974, in response to a Greek-inspired coup on
the island, Turkey
invaded the northern half of Cyprus. To this
day, Turkey maintains a
significant military presence in the northern
half of the island which
proclaimed itself the Turkish Republic of Cyprus;
only Turkey recognizes
it as such. Greece, in turn, is closely allied
with the Greek Cypriot
government in the southern half of the island
and has signed a mutual
defense pact with Cyprus which aims to counter
any Turkish moves in
the area. The crises of the 1980s, which included
flare-ups over Turkish
attempts to send an oil prospecting ship into
disputed waters in the
Aegean, demonstrated "the explosive potential
of the Aegean dispute and
the intractability of differences which were
as much rooted in deeply
embedded historical memories as in current realities."4
New Tensions
Since the end of the Cold War, incidents on Cyprus
and in the Aegean
occurred with disturbing frequency. In January
1996 the simmering
conflict nearly exploded into war over the uninhabited
rocks of
Imia/Kardak.5 These small islets, which are claimed
by both countries,
became a catalyst for crisis when Greek and Turkish
nationalists engaged
in a highly publicized competition to enforce
sovereignty over
Imia/Kardak. Both nations adamantly defended
their positions in the
dispute and threatened the use of force. Only
intense diplomatic pressure
from the United States averted an armed encounter
between the two
NATO allies.6
Greece and Turkey's shared history has exacerbated
the conflict. Even
though, or perhaps because, they have much in
common culturally and
historically, the peoples of both countries are
deeply suspicious
of each other. On several occasions both countries
have attempted to
smooth over their differences only to have their
mutual distrust derail
these efforts. Comments such as Greek Foreign
Minister Theodoros
Pangalos' recent reference to unnamed Turkish
officials as "thieves,
assassins, and rapists" are illustrative of the
destructive power of
Greek-Turkish shared memories.7 If it were not
for the deep enmity
between these two countries, it is possible that
the conflict would have
been resolved through established international
mechanisms.
International Response
The US and NATO have had to formulate policies
toward Greece and
Turkey that would both further alliance goals
and minimize the likelihood
of conflict. A factor that has shaped American
policy toward Greece and
Turkey is the influence of the Greek lobby in
Congress. The Greek lobby
has made Congress a powerful, Greek-biased player
in formulating US
policy toward the dispute. The Greek lobby's
power was manifested in
1978 when, under heavy pressure from the lobby,
Congress enacted a
law setting a 7:10 ratio of military aid to Greece
and Turkey. American
military aid has been designed to facilitate
the interoperability of the
military in both countries with that of America
and other NATO allies.
Given the tenuous state of relations between Greece
and Turkey, it is
notable that American and NATO military aid did
not worsen the
situation. Rather, aid has kept both regimes
friendly toward the United
States and has placed America and NATO in a position
in which each
wields sufficient influence to mediate disputes
between the two nations.
Military Balance
US and NATO arms transfers to both countries have
been carried out in
such a way as to ensure that the existing power
distribution is not
disturbed and that both armies are modernized.
Maintaining the existing
power distribution is of paramount importance
because any change or
perceived change in the balance could lead to
crisis. Any alteration of the
distribution of military power would escalate
the conflict and have serious
consequences, especially given the increased
volatility of the situation in
the post-Cold War era. Given that the distribution
of relative power
between the two remains the same, the cost-benefit
calculations of a war
remain the same in each country and do not lead
to a higher probability
of war.8
NATO and the US cannot maintain this careful balancing
act forever.
The recent crisis over Imia/Kardak highlighted
the resurgence of
Greek-Turkish conflict in the post-Cold War era.
In addition, the January
1997 purchase of a Russian S-300 air defense
system by Cyprus has
heightened tensions in the region.9 Turkey has
vowed not to allow
deployment of the system on the island, but Cyprus
has committed it self
to purchasing the system and receiving it by
1998. The S-300 purchase
has created a deadline after which a conflict
could occur because of the
aggressive and unyielding stance of both parties.
Additionally, the
governments in both Greece and Turkey are not
as receptive to peace
initiatives as in they have been in the past;
in Turkey's case because of the
need to protect nationalist principles in the
face of an internal Islamist
challenge to the nationalist-secular order and
in Greece because of the
loss of face the government suffered after the
Imia/Kardak crisis.
Turkey's coalition government is faced with internal
turmoil which further
decreases the possibility of an accord and increases
the likelihood of an
escalation. Such a government cannot hope to
remain in power by
compromising on what are popularly perceived
to be vital interestssuch
as sovereignty over Imia/Kardakand must therefore
adopt rigid
nationalistic positions. These factors have given
the crisis between
Greece and Turkey an urgency which it did not
possess earlier in the
decade.
Solutions
So far, neither NATO nor the US has been able
to bring the parties to
agreement on any significant issues. The problem
for NATO lies in the
fact that both Greece and Turkey hold an effective
veto power over
important alliance decisions such as the acceptance
of new members.
Thus a quarrel between the two has a distinct
possibility of spilling over
into the alliance and disrupting this process.
The other critical
issue that NATO faces if there is an armed conflict
between Greece and
Turkey is the applicability of the treaty to
such a conflict. Would NATO
countries be obligated to defend the victim against
the aggressor? If so,
how would that square with the alliance's integrated
command structure?
What would the implications be for the treaty
signatories' commitment to
solve their differences peacefully? Would this
then set a precedent for
non-negotiated conflict resolution between NATO
allies? It is imperative
for NATO and its members, particularly the US,
to undertake a
concerted effort to solve the problems that beset
the Greek-Turkish dyad
or, conversely, to distance the alliance from
the conflict and attempt to
contain the effects of a Greek-Turkish crisis.
Both of these policy options
are highly problematic; however, they are the
only viable and realistic
options.
Policy Options
A concerted diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict
would encounter the
same problems that have rendered previous peace
initiatives
unsuccessful. Historical enmity is the most important
factor working
against a peaceful settlement. It is highly unlikely
that a high-profile
high-energy effort on the part of the US and
NATO would overcome this
potent obstacle because no diplomatic initiative
has succeeded in doing
so for the past fifty years. Even when Greek
and Turkish governments
have attempted to compromise on various aspects
of the conflict, their
respective publics have expressed outrage at
the "surrender" of national
interests and have severely limited the negotiating
ability of the parties. As
the Greek and Turkish governments discovered
in the aftermath of the
Imia/Kardak crisis, temporary measures designed
to avert war are
subject to public scorn and vilification.
The second optiondistancing NATO from the conflict
and isolating the
Greek-Turkish conflict sufficiently to enable
the NATO institution to
survive a war with minimal damagealso has significant
drawbacks, but it
could well be the best option available. NATO
could start by following
the lead of the Western European Union (WEU)
and make it clear to
both parties that a conflict between them would
not be covered under the
North Atlantic Treaty and that the allies would
therefore not be bound by
treaty obligations in such a situation. This
would limit the internal
disruption within NATO in the event of a war,
but it would strike at the
very heart of the alliancethe idea that any attack
on a member state is an
attack upon all and will be countered by the
alliance as a whole. Such a
policy would also alienate both Greece and Turkey,
possibly to the point
of leading them to drop out of NATO which would
be disastrous for the
alliance, regional stability and US foreign policy
in the region.
A more subtle implementation of the second policy
option would have
fewer drawbacks but at the same time would have
a smaller positive
impact. This approach would entail reducing NATO
dependency on
Greek and Turkish forces, reducing the role that
Greek and Turkish
officers play within the integrated command structure,
and, more
generally, preparing the alliance for a future
in which either one or neither
of these two countries would be active members
of NATO's military
structure or of the alliance itself. Such practical
contingency planning
would reduce the disruptive impact of a Greek-Turkish
conflict on the
institutions of the alliance, but it would do
nothing to ameliorate the
political impact of such a situation.
Given the severe drawbacks of all the possible
policy options, the vexing
question of which policy to follow remains. All
the possible solutions are
unpalatable either because they are likely to
fail to properly address the
problem or because they will have significant
drawbacks. The best option
for NATO and the US lies in a combination of
the two approaches. By
simultaneously pressing for a negotiated settlementpreferably
outside of
the media spotlight to give both countries more
room to maneuverand
working to prepare the alliance for an eventual
conflict, NATO and the
US would hedge their bets on the Greek-Turkish
conflict. Even this
approach, however, is unlikely to properly safeguard
NATO or to lead
to a negotiated settlement, but it is currently
the best option. However,
Greece and Turkey will ultimately decide whether
a crisis will boil over
into war with the consequences such an action
would entail for their
nations and for the alliance.
Notes:
1 Strategic Assessment, National Defense University,
October 29,
1997, <http://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch3.html>
2 Richard Clogg. A Concise History of Greece,
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 174.
3 "Background on Aegean Disputes," Embassy of
the Republic of
Turkey, website, October 12, 1997,
<http://www.turkey.org/turkey/p_aege00.ht>
4 Clogg. p. 191.
5 For the sake of consistency, we will use Imia/Kardak
when referring to
these islets. Imia is the Greek name; Kardak
is the Turkish name.
6 "Greece, Turkey avert war over islet, but tension
remains," The
Washington Times, February 2, 1996, p. A13.
7 "Turkey blasts Greek FM Pangalos over insults,"
AFP newswire,
September 26, 1997.
8 Since there was no shift towards power parity,
there was no increase in
the likelihood of war. This analysis is based
on the analysis of empirical
data in Daniel Geller, "Power differentials and
War in Rival Dyads,"
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No.
2, (Ann Arbor, MI:
International Studies Association, June 1993),
pp. 173-194. In this
study, Geller finds empirical evidence for an
increased likelihood of war
in enduring rivalries when there is military
parity or there is a shift in
power towards parity. A situation of power preponderance
(like the
Greek-Turkish conflict) has a lower probability
of war associated with it.
9 "Greeks and Turks raise fears of war; Aegean
disputes are alarming the
West," The Independent, January 9, 1997, p. 11.
