

Supplementary Information for
Policy Deliberation and Voter Persuasion:
Experimental Evidence from an Election in the
Philippines

Gabriel López - Moctezuma* Leonard Wantchekon[†]
Daniel Rubenson[‡] Thomas Fujiwara[§] Cecilia Pe Lero[¶]

For Online Publication Only

*California Institute of Technology. Corresponding Author. e-mail: glmoctezuma@caltech.edu

[†]Princeton University and African School of Economics.

[‡]Ryerson University & Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

[§]Princeton University, NBER, and CIFAR.

[¶]University of Notre Dame.

Contents

A	Sample Selection	3
B	Balance in Aggregate and Individual Data	4
B.1	Balance at the Barangay Level	4
B.2	Balance at the Individual Level	5
C	Additional Tables and Figures	9
D	ITT Effects with Pre-treatment Covariates	15
E	ITT Effects with Balanced Panel	21
F	ITT Effects (Unweighted Results)	22
G	Correlates of Attendance	25
H	Survey Questions Used in the Individual-level Analysis	26
H.1	Demographics	26
H.2	Turnout and Vote Choices	27
H.3	Town-Hall Meeting Attendance	27
H.4	Gender Attitudes	28
H.5	Poverty Attitudes	29
H.6	Political Information	29

A Sample Selection

City	Barangay	Status	Turnout (National)	Turnout (Party-list)	Vote Share (Treatment)
Luisiana	Barangay Zone VI	Control	-	65.05	11.57
Luisiana	San Diego/San Antonio	Treated	82.47	29.32	12.22
Luisiana	San Salvador	Control	78.17	55.28	1.59
Malate	Barangay 190	Control	72.39	60.83	3.51
Malate	Barangay 609	Control	75.84	63.32	3.45
Malate	Barangay 738	Treated	76.62	67.82	6.83
Marikina	Barangka	Treated	73.62	76.68	3.66
Marikina	Concepcion Dos	Control	73.83	55.18	5.13
Marikina	Parang	Control	74.34	75.71	4.46
Quezon City	Escopa 4	Control	82.25	66.86	10.56
Quezon City	Payatas	Treated	72.76	59.97	4.44
Quezon City	Tatalon	Control	69.79	60.67	8.41
Sta Maria	Cabooan	Control	-	55.24	2.68
Sta Maria	Masinao	Control	83.92	53.33	1.47
Sta Maria	Tungkod	Treated	79.63	54.86	5.91
Taguig	Hagonoy	Control	-	55.28	4.28
Taguig	Upper Bicutan	Control	55.96	50.03	3.13
Taguig	Ususan	Treated	60.36	92.74	6.59
Mean			74.13	61.01	5.55
S.D.			7.7	13.12	3.25

Note: No available general election figures for the barangays of Cabooan, Zone VI and Hagonoy.

Table A.1: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Akbayan Barangays)



Selected Regions

Selected Cities

Figure A.1: Experiment’s Design. Sample Selection of Cities and Barangays.

City	Barangay	Status	Turnout (National)	Turnout (Party-list)	Vote Share (Treatment)
Baras	Concepcion	Control	80.30	62.51	1.70
Baras	San Juan	Treated	76.13	54.83	0.78
Baras	Santiago	Control	79.98	58.81	0.00
Imus	Alapan II-A	Control	77.16	42.84	0.00
Imus	Anabu II-F	Treated	62.30	52.75	0.13
Imus	Mariano Espeleta II	Control	55.88	47.92	0.00
Los Banos	Bayog	Control	83.64	66.86	0.00
Los Banos	Lalakay	Treated	81.32	66.25	1.00
Los Banos	Putho	Control	83.93	68.50	0.00
Paranaque	B.F Homes	Control	72.75	58.54	0.18
Paranaque	Baclaran	Treated	68.04	58.79	0.15
Paranaque	San Dionisio	Control	72.81	62.33	0.05
Pasay	Barangay 178	Treated	73.92	59.76	0.00
Pasay	Barangay 183	Control	72.12	92.04	0.00
Pasay	Barangay 191	Control	78.13	64.11	0.00
Pateros	San Pedro	Control	76.66	128.44	0.09
Pateros	San Roque	Control	77.34	62.87	0.07
Pateros	San Rosario-Silangan	Treated	73.76	59.61	2.25
Valenzuela	Isla	Control	57.91	74.56	0.00
Valenzuela	Karuhatan	Control	77.82	68.14	0.09
Valenzuela	Punturin	Treated	79.63	68.83	1.36
Mean			74.36	65.68	0.37
S.D.			7.68	17.48	0.65

Table A.2: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Umalab Ka Barangays)

B Balance in Aggregate and Individual Data

B.1 Balance at the Barangay Level

We show evidence that the randomization of town-hall meetings successfully achieved balance across treatment and control barangays given available pre-treatment official statistics, including barangays’ registered voters, the proportion of female voters, as well as to whether the barangay is classified as urban or rural.¹ First, we run a regression of the assigned treatment on all of the covariates and calculate the joint F -statistic. We calculate the p -value of the F -statistic via randomization inference under the null that no covariates have any effect on the assigned treatment. Figure B.1 shows a large p -value

¹Registered voters is in thousands. Female voters is estimated as a proportion of barangay population. *urban* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 2010 Philippines Census denotes the barangay as urban and zero as rural.

for the F -statistic with respect to the null distribution (p -value= 0.89), indicating that pre-treatment covariates cannot explain assignment to deliberative campaigns. Table B.1 shows additional evidence of balance, by providing evidence of small and statistically insignificant ITT estimates of town-hall meetings on each pre-treatment covariate.²

B.2 Balance at the Individual Level

We implement a matching estimation of respondents from barangays assigned to treatment and respondents from barangays assigned to control. We include all sociodemographic characteristics included in the survey questionnaire, such as *gender*, *income*, *education*, *age*, *religion*, *marital status*, and *linguistic* group. In particular, *gender* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is female. *income* is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the monthly income is above 10K pesos, and zero otherwise. *education* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if education is above a high school diploma, and zero otherwise. *age* is a categorical variable with 4 brackets, [18-29 years old], [30-39 years old], [40-49 years old], [50 years old and older]. *religion* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is Roman Catholic. *status* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is married. *linguistic* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is from the Tagalog linguistic group.

As a summary measure of potential imbalances, we compute the density of a propensity score of the treatment assignment conditional on pre-treatment covariates. We match individuals in treatment and control barangays using a “nearest-neighbor” matching technique with replacement and a probit model for the probability of assignment conditional on covariates. This technique is helpful because if treatment and control groups

²Although ideally we would like to show balance on a broader set of pre-treatment covariates, such as previous turnout and vote shares, the COMELEC does not have publicly available electoral data at the barangay level for past party-list elections. Similarly, census data besides population is not available for lower units of disaggregation than municipalities.

have identical propensity score distributions, the pre-treatment covariates will be balanced between the two groups (Ho et al. 2007). Table B.2 shows summary statistics for the propensity score and all the pre-treatment covariates by treatment assignment. The left panel of Figure B.2 plots the estimated propensity scores by assigned treatment, while the right panel shows a scatterplot of the propensity scores' quantiles for treatment and control observations. Overall, the propensity score densities of control and treatment groups look very similar to each other. If anything, there is a slight discrepancy in the low end of the quantile range.




Figure B.1: Joint Pre-treatment Balance Test. The dashed red line depicts the F-statistic of a regression of the assigned treatment on all pre-treatment covariates. The distribution of the F-statistic is obtained through randomization inference with 1000 within-municipality resamples of the assigned treatment.

Table B.1: Pre-treatment Balance Test at the Barangay Level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Population	Registered Voters	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ITT	0.158 p = 0.949	-0.014 p = 0.626	-0.038 p = 0.425
Control	1.552 p = 0.738	0.317 p = 0.00001	1.269 p = 0.000
Observations	39	39	39
R ²	0.652	0.375	0.916

Note: Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment. Permutation p -values for the ITT.

Table B.2: Pre-treatment Balance Test at the Individual Level

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff	eQQ Med
distance	0.35	0.34	0.06	0.01	0.01
gender	0.59	0.59	0.49	-0.00	0.00
income	0.07	0.10	0.30	-0.03	0.00
age	2.55	2.68	1.12	-0.13	0.00
religion	0.91	0.89	0.32	0.02	0.00
status	0.62	0.68	0.47	-0.06	0.00
linguistic	0.92	0.87	0.34	0.05	0.00
education	0.30	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.00

Note: The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included. The variables gender, religion, status, and linguistic are matched exactly.

Assigned Units




Figure B.2: Kernel Density and Q-Q Plot of the Survey Sample. On the left panel, the red line depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals from barangays assigned to the control group, whereas the blue line depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals from barangays assigned to the treatment group. On the right panel, the red dots represent empirical Q-Q estimates for the survey sample. The 45-degree line indicates identical distribution and the dotted lines indicate the width of the propensity score range.

C Additional Tables and Figures

Table C.1: Treatment Effect on Electoral Returns by Municipality

City	Control	Treatment	ITT
Aklayan			
Luisiana	6.58	12.22	5.64
Malate	3.48	6.83	3.35
Marikina	4.06	5.13	1.07
Quezon City	9.48	4.44	-5.04
Sta Maria	2.08	5.91	3.83
Taguig	3.71	6.59	2.89
Umalab Ka			
Baras	0.85	0.78	-0.07
Imus	0.00	0.13	0.13
Los Banos	0.00	1.00	1.00
Paranaque	0.12	0.15	0.03
Pasay	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pateros	0.08	2.25	2.17
Valenzuela	0.73	0.00	-0.73
Mean	0.25	0.61	0.36

Table C.2: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	-2.637 p = 0.542	13.218 p = 0.00002	16.512 p = 0.00000	6.668 p = 0.203
CACE	-3.528 p = 0.512	17.653 p = 0	17.652 p = 0	17.658 p = 0.028
Control	80.944 p = 0.000	10.880 p = 0.034	18.713 p = 0.023	0.989 p = 0.215
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,081	890	476	414
R ²	0.060	0.254	0.209	0.051

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

Table C.3: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Poverty

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Akabayon Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.496	0.643	0.401	0.565	0.379
	p = 0.017	p = 0.0003	p = 0.069	p = 0.076	p = 0.102
CACE	0.609	0.901	0.615	0.721	0.536
	p = 0.091	p = 0.063	p = 0.132	p = 0.187	p = 0.253
Control	-0.316	-0.146	-0.539	-0.254	-0.149
	p = 0.208	p = 0.528	p = 0.00001	p = 0.477	p = 0.601
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No	
Observations	640	664	682	651	665
R ²	0.255	0.162	0.066	0.189	0.160

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Umalab Ka Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.126	0.088	0.235	0.055	0.031
	p = 0.048	p = 0.571	p = 0.00002	p = 0.651	p = 0.617
CACE	0.378	0.265	0.703	0.165	0.093
	p = 0.375	p = 0.676	p = 0.13	p = 0.722	p = 0.7
Control	0.122	0.183	0.246	-0.199	0.035
	p = 0.00001	p = 0.032	p = 0.00002	p = 0.000	p = 0.611
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No	
Observations	568	576	575	578	578
R ²	0.092	0.051	0.073	0.050	0.033

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

Table C.4: ITT Effect and CACE on Attitudes on Gender

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Index (1)	Female Rep. (2)	Female Pol. (3)	Equality (4)	Discrimination (5)	Harassment (6)
	<i>Akbayan Treatment:</i>					
ITT	0.450 p = 0.032	0.498 p = 0.00003	0.258 p = 0.062	0.351 p = 0.445	0.879 p = 0.0001	0.301 p = 0.429
CACE	0.674 p = 0	0.762 p = 0	0.391 p = 0.171	0.536 p = 0.341	1.352 p = 0	0.456 p = 0.317
Control	-0.146 p = 0.530	-0.309 p = 0.014	-0.238 p = 0.044	-0.061 p = 0.903	-0.131 p = 0.586	-0.039 p = 0.924
Observations	644	675	674	676	673	664
R ²	0.254	0.142	0.174	0.086	0.150	0.069
	<i>Umalab Ka Treatment:</i>					
ITT	0.095 p = 0.079	-0.310 p = 0.173	-0.694 p = 0.005	0.678 p = 0.010	0.318 p = 0.144	0.510 p = 0.051
CACE	0.265 p = 0.4	-0.853 p = 0.46	-1.914 p = 0.313	1.907 p = 0.33	0.897 p = 0.445	1.435 p = 0.384
Control	0.166 p = 0.00002	0.346 p = 0.000	0.203 p = 0.000	-0.064 p = 0.730	0.217 p = 0.000	0.081 p = 0.028
Observations	542	571	569	558	576	571
R ²	0.030	0.055	0.131	0.085	0.097	0.045
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No		

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*








Figure C.1: Permutation Distribution for the ITT Effect. The dashed red line indicate the observed ITT. The distribution is constructed from 1000 within-municipality resamples from the observed outcomes.

Vote (Akabayn)



Vote (Umalabka)



Registered Voters

Meeting Attendance

Figure C.2: Heterogenous Effects by Registered Voters and Attendance

D ITT Effects with Pre-treatment Covariates

Table D.1: Intention to Treat Effect on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Covariates)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	3.101 p = 0.549	11.666 p = 0.0001	18.954 p = 0.000	6.412 p = 0.190
CACE	4.568 p = 0.596	17.363 p = 0	21.457 p = 0	15.404 p = 0.029
income	-0.609 p = 0.925	-2.446 p = 0.339	-5.568 p = 0.107	-0.216 p = 0.786
gender	-2.346 p = 0.558	-1.180 p = 0.699	0.898 p = 0.881	-2.068 p = 0.235
education	4.789 p = 0.083	2.993 p = 0.133	5.914 p = 0.056	-0.779 p = 0.380
age	-0.973 p = 0.618	-1.372 p = 0.264	-2.812 p = 0.196	0.406 p = 0.330
religion	2.054 p = 0.758	1.722 p = 0.594	1.926 p = 0.774	2.423 p = 0.310
status	4.411 p = 0.300	5.103 p = 0.250	9.446 p = 0.185	0.371 p = 0.670
linguistic	-9.671 p = 0.037	1.783 p = 0.659	13.281 p = 0.058	-2.006 p = 0.154
Constant	83.313 p = 0.000	-4.934 p = 0.604	-6.211 p = 0.701	-0.142 p = 0.891
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No
Observations	848	695	332	363
R ²	0.061	0.297	0.242	0.068

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

Table D.2: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Poverty

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Akabay Treatment:				
	Index (1)	Poverty (2)	CCT (3)	Gap (4)	Corruption (5)
ITT	0.471	0.676	0.177	0.882	0.312
	p = 0.054	p = 0.002	p = 0.083	p = 0.002	p = 0.281
CACE	0.631	1.046	0.296	1.242	0.488
	p = 0.197	p = 0.124	p = 0.274	p = 0.094	p = 0.428
income	0.076	0.427	-0.138	0.042	0.186
	p = 0.520	p = 0.048	p = 0.205	p = 0.777	p = 0.305
gender	0.144	0.028	0.308	0.034	0.064
	p = 0.001	p = 0.709	p = 0.008	p = 0.611	p = 0.478
education	-0.005	-0.010	0.057	0.091	-0.191
	p = 0.931	p = 0.936	p = 0.541	p = 0.340	p = 0.236
age	-0.042	0.004	-0.065	-0.010	0.007
	p = 0.346	p = 0.926	p = 0.406	p = 0.820	p = 0.834
religion	0.160	0.168	0.182	0.008	0.119
	p = 0.023	p = 0.180	p = 0.145	p = 0.953	p = 0.527
status	0.073	0.051	0.168	-0.044	-0.048
	p = 0.410	p = 0.525	p = 0.227	p = 0.622	p = 0.646
linguistic	0.106	0.152	-0.296	0.261	0.375
	p = 0.455	p = 0.189	p = 0.203	p = 0.445	p = 0.039
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Pre-treatment Vars.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	447	469	484	457	470
R ²	0.217	0.131	0.083	0.217	0.109

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Umalab Ka Treatment:				
	Index (1)	Poverty (2)	CCT (3)	Gap (4)	Corruption (5)
ITT	0.109	0.059	0.241	0.005	-0.009
	p = 0.092	p = 0.713	p = 0.00001	p = 0.964	p = 0.785
CACE	0.296	0.159	0.652	0.014	-0.026
	p = 0.39	p = 0.761	p = 0.148	p = 0.965	p = 0.758
income	0.024	0.155	-0.091	-0.139	0.096
	p = 0.896	p = 0.591	p = 0.747	p = 0.046	p = 0.616
gender	-0.082	-0.090	0.005	-0.165	-0.147
	p = 0.042	p = 0.100	p = 0.963	p = 0.002	p = 0.100
education	-0.069	-0.165	-0.098	0.028	-0.010
	p = 0.167	p = 0.002	p = 0.338	p = 0.732	p = 0.916
age	0.003	-0.071	0.103	-0.077	-0.064
	p = 0.884	p = 0.128	p = 0.014	p = 0.024	p = 0.051
religion	0.169	-0.020	0.348	0.098	0.120
	p = 0.014	p = 0.876	p = 0.019	p = 0.372	p = 0.293
status	-0.113	-0.112	-0.180	-0.022	-0.016
	p = 0.011	p = 0.168	p = 0.026	p = 0.801	p = 0.874
linguistic	-0.143	-0.030	-0.252	-0.103	-0.097
	p = 0.0001	p = 0.607	p = 0.031	p = 0.381	p = 0.151
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Pre-treatment Vars.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	506	511	512	514	513
R ²	0.130	0.084	0.111	0.090	0.056

Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.

Table D.3: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Gender

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Akabayan Treatment:						
	Index	Equality	Discrimination	Harassment	Female Rep.	Female Pol.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ITT	0.303	0.398	0.470	0.031	0.712	0.002
	p = 0.123	p = 0.032	p = 0.00001	p = 0.911	p = 0.001	p = 0.996
CACE	0.504	0.661	0.777	0.052	1.209	0.003
	p = 0.002	p = 0	p = 0	p = 0.907	p = 0	p = 0.995
income	0.203	0.362	0.007	0.289	0.268	0.138
	p = 0.0005	p = 0.00005	p = 0.955	p = 0.119	p = 0.140	p = 0.394
gender	-0.054	0.002	0.023	0.284	-0.720	-0.136
	p = 0.072	p = 0.992	p = 0.863	p = 0.146	p = 0.026	p = 0.089
education	-0.017	-0.153	-0.046	0.124	-0.156	-0.055
	p = 0.454	p = 0.107	p = 0.697	p = 0.294	p = 0.023	p = 0.410
age	0.067	0.027	0.092	0.081	0.027	0.029
	p = 0.0004	p = 0.696	p = 0.139	p = 0.199	p = 0.417	p = 0.525
religion	-0.143	-0.076	-0.211	-0.155	-0.051	-0.167
	p = 0.013	p = 0.721	p = 0.372	p = 0.279	p = 0.739	p = 0.099
status	0.044	0.009	0.003	0.002	0.223	0.097
	p = 0.070	p = 0.888	p = 0.957	p = 0.979	p = 0.005	p = 0.033
linguistic	-0.027	0.086	0.227	-0.122	-0.301	0.104
	p = 0.744	p = 0.741	p = 0.326	p = 0.592	p = 0.079	p = 0.728
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Pre-treatment Vars.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	463	483	482	485	481	476
R ²	0.375	0.192	0.199	0.181	0.273	0.063

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Umalab Ka Treatment:						
	Index	Equality	Discrimination	Harassment	Female Rep.	Female Pol.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ITT	0.073	-0.267	-0.673	0.591	0.324	0.466
	p = 0.229	p = 0.219	p = 0.007	p = 0.014	p = 0.182	p = 0.128
CACE	0.18	-0.658	-1.657	1.48	0.819	1.176
	p = 0.466	p = 0.471	p = 0.298	p = 0.315	p = 0.451	p = 0.42
income	-0.090	-0.134	-0.355	0.048	0.034	-0.179
	p = 0.221	p = 0.335	p = 0.028	p = 0.749	p = 0.798	p = 0.252
gender	-0.005	-0.100	-0.002	0.041	-0.164	0.045
	p = 0.924	p = 0.311	p = 0.982	p = 0.638	p = 0.266	p = 0.697
education	0.013	0.255	0.223	-0.275	-0.034	-0.078
	p = 0.815	p = 0.122	p = 0.046	p = 0.003	p = 0.753	p = 0.528
age	0.026	0.078	0.075	-0.011	0.016	-0.026
	p = 0.359	p = 0.261	p = 0.253	p = 0.840	p = 0.740	p = 0.681
religion	-0.014	0.256	0.077	-0.140	-0.188	0.202
	p = 0.766	p = 0.264	p = 0.690	p = 0.578	p = 0.392	p = 0.008
status	-0.023	0.094	-0.154	-0.039	0.013	-0.026
	p = 0.612	p = 0.435	p = 0.044	p = 0.662	p = 0.940	p = 0.742
linguistic	0.075	0.031	0.024	0.135	0.014	-0.013
	p = 0.016	p = 0.830	p = 0.869	p = 0.330	p = 0.875	p = 0.901
Constant	0.060	-0.158	0.090	-0.001	0.293	0.081
	p = 0.588	p = 0.629	p = 0.731	p = 0.997	p = 0.269	p = 0.826
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Pre-treatment Vars.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	480	506	505	494	511	507
R ²	0.034	0.081	0.167	0.106	0.110	0.046

Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.










Figure D.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Covariates). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.

Vote for Akbayan



Vote for Umalab Ka




Effect by Gender

Effect by Income


Effect by Education

Figure D.2: Marginal effect of town-hall meetings on outcomes by income, gender and education (With Covariates).

Vote for Akbayan



Vote for Umalab Ka



Gender Discrimination

Poverty and Income Inequality

Figure D.3: ITT Effects and CACE of Attitudes on Poverty and Gender (with Covariates). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.

E ITT Effects with Balanced Panel

Table E.1: Intention to Treat Effect on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Balanced Panel)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	-0.056 p = 0.773	13.435 p = 0.004	20.135 p = 0.0003	7.097 p = 0.120
CACE	-0.103 p = 0.769	24.801 p = 0.02	31.121 p = 0.041	21.601 p = 0.071
gender	-1.843 p = 0.523	-0.164 p = 0.683	1.053 p = 0.617	-1.948 p = 0.291
income	-1.426 p = 0.709	-1.335 p = 0.474	-3.560 p = 0.371	-0.125 p = 0.394
education	2.946 p = 0.243	1.515 p = 0.478	3.859 p = 0.333	-0.473 p = 0.393
religion	-1.217 p = 0.748	1.715 p = 0.463	3.180 p = 0.410	2.292 p = 0.345
age	-0.461 p = 0.688	-0.828 p = 0.372	-1.329 p = 0.362	0.062 p = 0.488
status	5.089 p = 0.155	4.918 p = 0.117	7.077 p = 0.152	1.053 p = 0.413
linguistic	-9.115 p = 0.022	4.960 p = 0.193	14.369 p = 0.043	-0.874 p = 0.485
Constant	80.903 p = 0.000	13.500 p = 0.0003	20.372 p = 0.001	2.813 p = 0.009
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,313	1,313	699	614
R ²	0.051	0.123	0.150	0.051

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*




Figure E.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Balanced Panel). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.

F ITT Effects (Unweighted Results)

Table F.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (Un-weighted Results)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	1.965 p = 0.579	23.242 p = 0.00001	31.729 p = 0.00000	14.057 p = 0.029
CACE	2.411 p = 0.576	28.822 p = 0	33.73 p = 0	21.263 p = 0.01
Control	83.769 p = 0.000	12.151 p = 0.011	19.186 p = 0.011	3.019 p = 0.160
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,039	869	476	393
R ²	0.046	0.298	0.283	0.158

Note: * $p < 0.05$.

Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.

Permutation p-values.

The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.






Figure F.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (Un-weighted Results). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.

G Correlates of Attendance



Attendance in Treatment Barangays



Attendance to Town-Halls vs Rallies

Figure G.1: Correlates of Attendance. This plot graphs the change in attendance probability in treatment barangays as a function of a change in each covariate from the 1st to it 99th percentile.

H Survey Questions Used in the Individual-level Analysis

H.1 Demographics

The enumerator will ask the respondent and circle the corresponding choice number.

- (Income) What is your monthly household income in pesos?
 1. Below 10K
 2. Up to 60K
 3. Up to 100K
 4. Over 100K
- (Female) Indicate your gender
 1. Male
 2. Female
- (Age) What is your age?
 1. 18-29
 2. 30-39
 3. 40-49
 4. 50 and up
- (Religion) Do you belong to any particular religion?
 1. Roman Catholic
 2. Protestant
 3. Islam
 4. Others
- (Status) What is your marital status?
 1. Married
 2. Single
 3. Widowed
 4. Separated
 5. Other
- (Linguistic) What is the ethnic or linguistic group you identify with?

1. Tagalog
 2. Cebuano
 3. Hiligaynon
 4. Waray
 5. Bikol
 6. Ilokano
 7. Kapampangan
 8. Pangasinense
 9. Others
- (Education) What is your highest level of education?
 1. None
 2. Elementary
 3. High School
 4. College
 5. Post-Graduate

H.2 Turnout and Vote Choices

- (Turnout) We would like to ask you about the last national elections that happened on May 13. Did you go to a polling station?
 1. Yes
 2. No
 - (Vote) If yes, which party-list did you vote for in the election of party-list representatives? (Open Answer).

H.3 Town-Hall Meeting Attendance

For the enumerator in treatment barangays, please ask the next question:

- (Attendance) During the campaign, did you attend town-hall meetings enabled for you by the party-list (PL NAME) in favor of its candidates?
 1. Yes
 2. No

H.4 Gender Attitudes

- (Female Rep.) Who would do a better job in the House of Representatives? A representative who is Male, a representative who is Female, or would they do an equally good or bad job?
 1. Male
 2. Female
 3. Both

- (Female Pol.) Would you say that women have too much influence in Philippines politics, just about the right amount of influence in Philippines politics, or too little influence in Philippines politics?
 1. Too much
 2. Too little
 3. Just the right amount

- I am going to read several statements. After each one, I would like you to tell me how strongly you agree or disagree
 - (Equality) “When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors”. Do you:
 1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree somewhat or
 5. Disagree Stronglywith this statement?

 - (Discrimination) “Women often miss out of good jobs because of discrimination”. Do you:
 1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree somewhat or
 5. Disagree Stronglywith this statement?

 - (Harassment) “Women who complain about sexual harassment cause more problems than they solve”. Do you:
 1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat

- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 - 4. Disagree somewhat or
 - 5. Disagree Strongly
- with this statement?

H.5 Poverty Attitudes

- For each of the following issues, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that it is one of the Philippines' main problems:
 - Poverty.
 - Wide income gap between rich and poor.
 - Corruption and graft.
 1. Agree strongly
 2. Agree somewhat
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree somewhat or
 5. Disagree Strongly
- (CCT) Please read the following three options of government policies in the Philippines.
 1. Conditional Cash Transfers or CCT (like the Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program)
 2. Anti-Corruption Drive
 3. Increased Investments (including Public-Private Partnership, or PPP)

Which of these options would you most like to see implemented?

H.6 Political Information

- Do you receive information from the radio?
 1. Yes
 2. No
 - If yes, during a typical week, how many days do you listen to news from the radio, not including sports?
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
- Do you receive information from television?

1. Yes

2. No

– If yes, during a typical week, how many days do you watch news on the television, not including sports?

[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

• Do you receive information from the internet?

1. Yes

2. No

– If yes, during a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on the internet, not including sports?

[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

• Do you receive information from family?

1. Yes

2. No

• Do you receive information from other people?

1. Yes

2. No

References

Ho, Daniel E, Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Elizabeth A Stuart. 2007. "Matching as non-parametric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference." *Political analysis* 15(3):199–236.