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Giri Parameswaran Ph.D
Candidate in Economics Princeton
University Contact Details Department
of Economics Fisher
Hall Princeton,
NJ 08544-1021 (609)
933-5639 Research Interests [PDF] Political
Economy, Applied Microeconomics, Public Finance, Law and Economics, Judicial
Politics Advisors Curriculum Vitae [PDF] |
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Teaching
Lecturer/Instructor for Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Intermediate
Economics, ‘Junior Summer Institute’ Program, 2009-2012
Introductory
Economics, Master
of Public Affairs ‘Math Camp’, 2008-2009
Review of
Economics, Joint Ph.D. Program in Social Policy, 2011-12
Teaching Assistant for Economics Department, Princeton
University
Legal and
Regulatory Approaches to Markets (WWS523), 2012
Introduction to
Microeconomics (ECO100), 2010-2012
History of
Economic Thought (ECO386), 2010
Law & Economics (ECO324), 2009
Teaching Prizes
Twobes Prize for
Outstanding Teaching, 2011 (for role as Teaching Assistant in ECO100 -
Introduction to Microeconomics)
Teaching Evaluations [PDF]
Teaching Statement [PDF]
Sample Syllabus [PDF]
Working Papers
Psychological Belief Distortions and Debt (Economics Job Market Paper) [PDF]
Abstract: Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that voters
are unduly pessimistic about the duration of recessions, and unduly optimistic
about the duration of booms. Under these conditions, political competition will
cause parties to choose fiscal policy that under-accumulates debt during
recessions, and under-accumulates savings during booms - giving fiscal policy a
procyclic flavor. Belief misalignment results in
endogenous time inconsistent fiscal policy, even if all actors are rational and
time consistent, and share common stage preferences. Equilibrium taxes will be
more volatile than planner taxes. Moreover, equilibrium taxes will be higher
than planner taxes during recessions, and lower during booms, as long as the
long run level of optimism or pessimism is not unduly large. The distorted
economy nevertheless converges to the same long run equilibrium as the
planner’s economy, although the transition path is different.
Ruling Narrowly: Learning, Experimenting and Law Creation (Politics Job Market Paper) [PDF]
Abstract: I develop a dynamic model of law
creation, in which the court learns about the ideal legal rule through the
cases it hears. Cases result from the rational choices of agents responding to
the court's previous decisions. Learning requires experimentation, and so is
only possible if experimentation is incentive compatible for the agent. The court provides these incentives by
setting penalties, and writing opinions that commit the court to sanctioning or
punishing various actions.
The model generates several predictions. First, the
efficacy of opinion writing is asymmetric - the court has an incentive to write
broad permissive opinions, but narrow restrictive opinions. Second, the court's
learning is inefficient - it does not induce learning that minimizes the
expected future cost of uncertainty. Third, the court will often preemptively
write broad opinions, to hedge against the risk of not being able to revise its
opinion soon enough in the future.
Less
Representation is Better: How Big States Benefit from
Bicameralism [PDF]
Abstract: A common wisdom is that bicameralism, by
over-representing small states in the upper chamber, protects small states, in
a federation, from policy usurpation by big states. Using a standard model of
legislative bargaining, I show that this wisdom may not be well founded - and
that bicameralism may actually exacerbate the inequalities that may otherwise
arise under unicameralism. Contrary to many other
models, I assume that the preferences of upper and lower house agents from the
same state are correlated. This complementarity skews the equilibrium in favour of big states, by reducing the number of lower house
agents that must be `purchased' by an upper house proposer from a big state -
allowing big states to retain a larger surplus, and to exclude small states
from the coalition more frequently. This effect is robust to moderate increases
in proposal power that bicameralism may afford to small states.
‘Suiting’
Yourself in the Foot: How Frivolous Law Suits Can Harm Opportunistic Litigants [PDF]
Abstract: When there is asymmetric information about the extent
of a harm, an opportunistic litigant may initiate
legal proceedings and extract a settlement offer from a defendant, even if the
plaintiff knows she cannot prevail in court. Such frivolous litigation is
generally assumed to cause potential tortfeasors to
under-engage in the tortious activity, and has generated calls for various
reforms of tort law. In this paper, I argue that, in fact, the opposite outcome
may be true - that potential tortfeasors may increase
the level of tortious activity anticipating opportunistic entry - and that this
will reduce the likelihood of frivolous suits being filed. Moreover, I show
that the threat of future nuisance litigation actually harms potential
litigants, even if they do not file suit. The paper suggests a novel
justification for various tort reforms, as enabling a Pareto improvement - that
benefits both the defendant and potential plaintiffs.
Restricted
Least Squares Estimator in Under-identified Models [PDF]
Abstract: The need often arises to estimate linear models whose regressors do not satisfy the standard rank conditions -
for example in models with dummy variables. The problem of singularity is not
that the model cannot be estimated, but rather that it cannot be done so
uniquely. A common practice is to omit sufficiently many regressors
as is required to alleviate the rank deficiency. However, under such an
approach, the interpretation of the estimates of the remaining parameters is
often found wanting. An alternative approach is to impose appropriate
restrictions upon the parameter space that help identify a unique solution
(from the many). This note provides conditions on the set of such parametric
restrictions that are sufficient for a unique solution to exist, and provides
an explicit characterization of the restricted least square estimators.