

**Communism's Shadow:
Historical Legacies, and Political Values and Behavior**

Grigore Pop-Eleches
Princeton University
gpop@princeton.edu

Joshua A. Tucker
New York University
joshua.tucker@nyu.edu

Note: This document contains drafts of chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the book manuscript. Chapter 6 is a partially revised version of a conference paper we presented at the APSA meeting in Washington DC in September 2010 and as such its formatting has not yet been completely harmonized with the rest of the book manuscript. Therefore, the two empirical chapters may contain some repetitive sections, especially in the description of the data sources and variables. These sections describing the data and variables will eventually be included in a separate data and indicator section (or chapter) immediately following the theoretical chapter.

Table of Contents

Chapters included in this document:

Chapter 1.	Communism's Shadow	1
Chapter 2.	Theoretical Frameworks: Citizen Politics and Legacy Effects	44
Chapter 3.	Democratic Conceptions and Attitudes	73
Chapter 6.	Left-Right Ideological Orientations.....	141
Bibliography	193

Additionally planned chapters (not included here)

Chapter 4.	Economic Preferences
Chapter 5.	Social Policy Preferences
Chapter 7.	Evaluations of Incumbent Governments and Politicians
Chapter 8.	Evaluation of State Institutions and Political Parties
Chapter 9.	Systemic Evaluation of Democracy
Chapter 10.	Voting
Chapter 11.	Additional forms of participation
Chapter 12.	Conclusion

Chapter 1. Communism's Shadow

1.1 Introduction

In the world outside of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined citizens tend to have a left-wing bias in terms of their self-placement on a standard left-right scale. In the post-communist countries, however, it is just the opposite: younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined citizens all tend to have a right-wing bias (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2010b). Why might this be the case? One could point to the fact that older citizens in these countries had largely been socialized under communist – and hence leftwing – regimes. Or one could point to the fact that communism – a non-democratic regime – had a leftist orientation, and thus democratic opposition and a propensity to self-identify on the right hand side of the political spectrum could seem like natural bedfellows. Alternatively, it is conceivable that those who are less educated might still expect the state to provide for all their basic social welfare needs, precisely as the communist state had done previously. In Chapter 6 we actually test these different explanations against each other, and find stronger support for the second and third hypotheses than for the early socialization explanation, but for now the key point is that it is difficult to imagine an answer to that question that did not somehow invoke the specter of the communist past shared by these countries.

In order to answer the above question, and a range of other similar questions about the underlying causes of post-communist exceptionalism in political attitudes and behavior, we really have to tackle three main analytical tasks. First, we have to establish the key features that distinguished the communist experience from the social, political, and economic experiences of other countries in the world. Second, we need to formulate a set of theoretical arguments that

link these distinctive features of communist regimes and societies to the political attitudes and behavior of the citizens who now live in these “post-communist” societies. Finally, we need a rigorous, falsifiable method for ascertaining whether or not our assertions about the effects of the communist past on political attitudes and behavior in post-communist countries.

The purpose of our manuscript is to do just this. In the remainder of this chapter we will highlight the most salient features of communism in terms of affecting the behavior of citizens in the post-communist era, propose four alternative theoretical mechanisms by which these features of the past can impact political attitudes and behavior in the present, and lay out a set of attitudes and behavior on which we will test these mechanisms. We do so for the following three primary reasons.

First, we want to understand the nature of post-communist politics better. Originally, the collapse of communism led observers to suggest that the region would be a *tabula rasa* on which new institutions could be painted and politics and economics would result accordingly. Since that time however, study after study has demonstrated the fact that we can not hope to understand post-communist politics without first taking account of what was left behind by communism (Bunce 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Grymala-Busse 2002, 2006; Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Tucker 2006; Wittenberg 2006; Pop-Eleches 2007). However, the most of this literature has focused on how the communist past has shaped either institutions (e.g. post-communist party systems) or the interests and choices of political elites. By comparison, the political attitudes and behavior of citizens, which are the main focus of the present study, have received much less attention.

Even more importantly, while several previous studies have made important theoretical contributions to our conceptual understanding of legacies (Crawford and Lijphart 1997, Ekiert

and Hanson 2003, Kopstein 2003), we lack a unified framework for studying how the past systematically affects the nature of post-communist political attitudes and behavior. It is always possible to tell a “just so story” about the effect of some particularly relevant element of the past, but repeatedly doing so does not really allow us to engage in a cumulative exercise of gaining additional understanding through the research of many different scholars. Thus we hope to improve our overall understanding of post-communist politics by providing a common theoretical framework and structure by which the study of legacies effects can move forward as a unified theoretical enterprise. Doing so should ultimately give us a better understanding of how politics functions in post-communist countries by illuminating how the communist past structures the political process in post-communist countries. This is crucially important because, as we will demonstrate in Chapters 3-10 of this manuscript, there are indeed many peculiarities of post-communist political attitudes and behavior. Understanding these patterns of behavior without taking account of the communist past seems at this point to be an almost fruitless pursuit; thus by providing a means for leveraging and understanding the effects of the past, we are very confident that this can ultimately help us to understand the post-communist present better.

Second, moving beyond the post-communist political sphere, we are also hoping to make a contribution to the more general topic of how the past can influence contemporary political behavior. For a long time in political science, the effects of the past on the present have been largely been in the domain of historical institutionalism (Thelen 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Consequently, most of the theorizing related to the influence of the past has been located in the tradition of path dependence, and most of the questions asked have focused on the evolution of, not surprisingly, institutions. As a result, correspondingly less attention has been

paid to the subject of how the past affects political attitudes and behavior, a set of topics not particularly amenable to path dependent theorizing. Thus, we also hope to make a more general contribution to understanding how to incorporate a country's political past into the study of its citizens' political behavior in the present.

Third, and perhaps most ambitiously, we are hoping to help bridge the artificial divide between "area studies" and deductively driven forms of comparative politics that tend to rely on quantitative methods and often span multiple regions of the world. We have often seen members of these different camps cast scorn at each other, with one side accused of being methodological luddites who do little more than tell stories, while the other is castigated for testing theories in order to demonstrate technical competence while missing the real questions that drive politics on the ground. In this manuscript, we hope to join a growing research agenda that builds on the recognition that it is not only possible – but often even essential – to combine rigorous, theoretically oriented hypothesis testing with a thorough knowledge of a particular regional and historical context.¹

The theoretical framework we propose in the first part of this manuscript consists of four separate – but not necessarily mutually exclusive – causal mechanisms through which communist legacies can shape post-communist political attitudes and behavior. The first two mechanisms posit that post-communist citizens approach politics differently than individuals elsewhere because of the experience of having lived under communism. We consider two variants of this approach. In one version, we assume citizens' attitudes are essentially fixed following an initial communist era *socialization*, whereas in a second version, for which we

¹ While much of our previous research, and indeed most of the analysis in this manuscript, relies heavily on quantitative methods, we try to complement this methodological approach with careful attention to the history and current politics of this region – indeed, one of us grew up in Romania and between the two of us we have conducted field research in almost half of the post-communist countries.

adopt Fiorina (1981)'s moniker of the *running tally*, this original communist-era socialization is updated by subsequent post-communist experiences. Alternatively, our second set of causal mechanisms posits that at the individual level post-communist citizens react to politics in a very similar fashion to people elsewhere but that this can still result in different aggregate level patterns in post-communist countries than found elsewhere. Again, we consider two mechanisms for such an outcome. First, the patterns may be caused by *different socio-demographic landscapes* in post-communist societies that were left behind by communism. Second, it may be that post-communist citizens have been exposed to *differential economic and political stimuli* since the collapse of communism.

In the following eight chapters of the book we apply this theoretical framework to a number of central aspects of post-communist attitudes and behavior in order to test the relative explanatory power of the four legacy mechanisms. [Based on the very preliminary empirical evidence of the limited tests we have run so far, we do find fairly strong evidence that the patterns of post-communist attitudes towards democracy and self-placements on a left-right scale are compatible with the predictions of the *Running tally* theory. The predictive power of some of the other theories varied more substantially across different types of attitudes, with communist socialization having a lasting impact on democratic attitudes but not on left-right placement and party trust, while demographics mattered more for ideological placement than for democratic attitudes. NOTE: This section will obviously updated to reflect the full set of empirical findings once they are available]

1.2 Why Study Post-communism?

Post-communism is not the only analytically useful category for understanding the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Indeed, as we will discuss at various points in our analysis,

depending on the specific aspect of political behavior it may be theoretically preferable to move up or down the ladder of generality e.g. by further subdividing ex-communist countries as a function of their pre-communist or communist developmental trajectories or by analyzing transition countries as part of even broader categories such as post-totalitarian or post-authoritarian. What, then, are our reasons for studying post-communism?

Aside from the intrinsic interest of understanding the legacy of what was arguably the largest-scale social and political experiment of the 20th century, studying political behavior in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia has a number of theoretical justifications and presents certain methodological advantages over studying the legacies of other types of political regimes or economic systems. These advantages, which will be discussed in greater detail below, include: (1) a distinctive set of shared political and economic institutions, which set ex-communist countries apart from other post-authoritarian and developing countries; (2) significant differences in pre-communist economic, political and cultural legacies, which help disentangle communist legacies from alternative explanations; (3) a fairly high degree of exogeneity in both the rise and the fall of communism for most of the Soviet bloc countries; (4) an uninterrupted exposure to communism ranging from 45 years in the case of most of Eastern Europe to 70 years for the interwar Soviet republics; (5) significant divergence in the economic and political trajectories after the fall of communism; (6) several instances of significant within-country variation in the exposure to Communism (Germany, Ukraine and Belarus).

1.2.1. Institutional similarities

Due to the powerful influence of the Soviet Union as both an institutional model and an (implicit or explicit) enforcer of communism in the region, the East European and Eurasian

communist countries shared several crucial economic and political institutional features, which set them apart from many developmentally comparable countries. While we defer a more detailed discussion of the attitudinal and behavioral legacies of these institutions until the hypothesis section, we will here discuss a few of the most salient institutional features that put ex-communist countries into a category of their own. First – and perhaps most clearly – all the communist regimes were either de jure or at least de facto *one-party regimes*,² led by a Marxist-Leninist political party whose organization was closely intertwined – and often fused – with the state apparatus. The prominent role of the Party in communist regimes differed from the patterns of post-war authoritarian regime in other regions, such as military regimes in Latin America (and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa), monarchies (in the Middle East) or regimes with partially free multi-party competition (in parts of Latin America and Asia). While one party regimes were not limited to the Communist bloc, with a few notable exceptions³ the non-communist one-party regimes were much less institutionalized (and were often not much more than the personal vehicles of authoritarian leaders.)⁴ Moreover, while the role and nature of ideology varied across both time and space among the countries of the Soviet bloc, the efforts to reshape individuals and society along ideological lines, and the central role of the Party in these efforts, were much more prominent in communist regimes than in the non-communist world (democratic and authoritarian alike). Therefore, we should expect that the legacy of the once dominant communist party and ideology to affect both the institutional landscape of post-communist politics and the individual values and attitudes of individuals in ex-communist countries.

² A few countries, like East Germany and Poland nominally allowed the existence of multiple parties but such parties were expected – and very consistently fulfilled the expectations – to toe the official party line.

³ Probably the most prominent exception is the KMT in Taiwan – a highly institutionalized political party, which allowed very little political competition until the 1980s.

⁴ This is true even of many of the pseudo-Marxist regimes sponsored by the Soviet Union in parts of the developing world (e.g. Angola, Tanzania, Yemen) as part of the Cold War ideological and military rivalry with the US.

A second feature, driven to a great extent by the combination of high institutionalization and ideological aspirations discussed above, was the much *greater penetration of all levels of society* by communist regimes compared to other authoritarian regimes. Even beyond the infamous mass “reeducation” campaigns and purges of Stalinism, the deep penetration of society by extensive networks of secret police agents and informers led to an unprecedented degree of state control over the daily lives (and thoughts) of individuals.⁵ The effects of these surveillance and indoctrination efforts were exacerbated by the simultaneous repression and cooptation of most civil society organizations by the communist regimes. Thus, churches were either subordinated to the political agenda of the regimes – and often infiltrated by secret police informers up to the highest levels – or severely limited in their activities and in some instances completely outlawed. Meanwhile other intermediary organizations – such as labor unions, youth organizations, sports clubs and cultural groups – were allowed to operate and often received generous state support but were subjected to tight ideological controls by the state and therefore did not provide opportunities for independent civic interactions. By contrast, most other authoritarian regimes were usually content to ward off political challenges, and while such concerns sometimes resulted in violent campaigns against certain parts of civil society – as in the case of unions in many Latin American military regimes – they nevertheless left more space in other parts of public life. We should expect the totalitarian legacy of Communism to drive not only the civic participation deficit noted by earlier studies (Howard 2003, Bernhard and Karakoc 2007) but more broadly how citizens interact with each other and with the political sphere.

⁵ Of course the aggressiveness and effectiveness of such efforts varied widely across time, space and sector (Jowitt 1992) – arguably peaking during the Great Terror of the 1930s in the Soviet Union and in the first post-war decade in Eastern Europe – and while we will analyze the implications of such intra-regional variation throughout the book, for the purpose of the present discussion what matters is that (with the partial exception of the late Gorbachev years) communist regimes never abandoned this basic model of societal control.

A third important feature that sets Communist countries apart from the non-communist world is *the central role of the state in the economy*. While extensive state intervention in the economy (including in some cases prominent roles for state-owned enterprises in many key sectors) also featured prominently in some West European democracies and in the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) models prevalent in many developing countries until the early 1980s, Communist countries nevertheless stood out in their systematic suppression of private enterprise and in their heavy reliance on central planning, which produced a very different economic logic and a series of typically communist pathologies (Kornai 1992). Again, important variations in the scope and nature of the state's economic control existed within the Soviet bloc,⁶ and in the 1980s there were significant differences in the extent to which communist governments embraced Gorbachev's limited economic reform efforts, and we will explore the impact of such differences on post-communist attitudes and behavior. But despite such differences, as late as 1989 the share of the private sector in overall economic output varied surprisingly little in most of communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia, largely ranging from about 5% in most Soviet Republics, Czechoslovakia and Albania to 15% in most of the Yugoslav Republics.⁷ (EBRD 2008)

Fourth, driven by both ideological biases towards promoting the industrial proletariat and by the demands of military competition with the West, the communist economies also differed from both advanced industrialized countries and even other late developers in *the nature of their economic development and modernization strategies*. In particular, communist countries stood out in their emphasis on industry, and especially energy-intensive heavy industry (at the expense

⁶ The most prominent outliers was Yugoslavia's "socialist self-management," where enterprises were technically owned and controlled by workers' councils (albeit with a great degree of interference from the Party).

⁷ The only partial outlier was Poland, where the private sector in 1989 accounted for 30% of the economy, largely because of the partial failure of large-scale collectivization of agriculture.

of both agriculture and services) and in their relative neglect of consumer goods, whose variety and quality lagged far behind the sometimes impressive achievements in producer goods and military technology. Politically, these imbalances, combined with the widespread shortages of even basic goods, inevitably invited invidious comparisons to Western Europe and helped undermine the legitimacy of communist regimes. (Janos 2000)

But beyond its immediate impact on living standards and regime legitimacy, the particular nature of communist economic development led to modernization strategies, which produced peculiarly communist demographic patterns. On the one hand, the rush to promote industrialization pushed communist regimes to promote a rapid expansion of primary and secondary and technical post-secondary education, as well as – less successfully – urbanization. (Pop-Eleches 2009). On the other hand the ideological bent and the often narrowly technical nature of communist education, combined with the strict restrictions imposed on individual entrepreneurship, arguably put many East Europeans in a difficult position in the post-communist period, where in the emerging market economies of the 1990s there was much less demand for their particular education and job skills. Similarly, many of the “one-factory” industrial towns promoted by communist central planners were highly vulnerable once the communist system of price controls and subsidies was dismantled and indeed many of these towns suffered devastating drops in employment after the fall of communism, often leaving residents few options but to try to migrate, either internally – often to the country-side in a remarkable trend of de-urbanization – or abroad. Thus, communism left behind a demographic landscape characterized by very specific opportunities and vulnerabilities, which differed from the social footprint of alternative development models, and can be expected to shape the longer-term attitudes and behavior of its subjects in the post-communist period.

Fifth, true to its ideological aspirations of promoting social and political equality among its citizens, communist regimes left behind more equal societies and more expansive welfare states than their non-communist counterparts. Thus, judging by a series of statistical measures, ranging from GINI coefficients of income inequality to access to education and healthcare, communist countries outperformed non-communist countries with similar levels of economic development. Rather than engaging in the debates over the extent to which these achievements justify the high human costs at which they were achieved, our focus here is on how they are likely to affect post-communist attitudes and behavior. A few points are worth noting here: first, given that the transition to capitalism brought significant – though highly variable – increases in inequality to the former Soviet bloc countries, one would expect that in countries and time periods with rapidly increasing inequality, citizens – and particularly transition losers – would become much more receptive to the egalitarian rhetoric of communist parties (and some of their post-communist successors). Along similar lines, the legacy of generous communist-era welfare benefits created strong popular expectations about the state's responsibilities for caring for its citizens. The combination of economic liberalization and deep recessions in the early transition years resulted in a significant reduction of welfare benefits in many countries, and created very difficult choices for politicians caught between demands for fiscal restraint (in the context of inflationary pressures) and the difficulty of scaling back pre-existing social entitlement programs (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008). This tension, which was to a great extent an institutional legacy of communism, may have played an important role in driving the chronic discontent of East European citizens with the post-communist political leaders. Finally, many welfare benefits under communism – including childcare and public housing – were channeled through state-owned enterprises. This peculiarity of the communist welfare state arguably made it more

difficult to disentangle welfare state reform from other aspects of economic reforms, and may therefore translate into peculiarly post-communist attitudes towards markets, states, and their proper relationship to each other.

1.2.2. Historical developmental differences

The countries of the former Soviet bloc entered their communist periods with significant variations in socio-economic development, political history, cultural and religious backgrounds. Thus, whereas some of the communist countries – especially Czechoslovakia and East Germany – had reached pre-communist income, education and industrialization levels, which were on par with much of Western Europe and superior to Southern Europe and most of the rest of the world, in other areas – especially in Central Asia and parts of the Balkans – most citizens were illiterate and relied on subsistence agriculture at the time when the communists took over. Moreover, while a few East European countries – especially Czechoslovakia and to a lesser extent Poland and the Baltic republics – had experienced reasonably democratic elections and governance in the interwar period, most of the former Soviet republics and Albania had practically no usable democratic past prior to entering communism. Finally, the former Soviet bloc included a broad mix of ethnicities, religions and cultural traditions, ranging from the predominantly Muslim and partially nomadic populations of Central Asia to the countries of East-Central Europe with their long Western Christian traditions.

While some of these differences were subsequently modified by communist developmental and redistributive efforts, by 1989 the countries of the Soviet bloc still differed along a significant range of socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions, and these differences were strongly correlated with post-communist political trajectories (c.f. Bunce 1999,

Janos 2000, Horowitz 2003, Kitschelt 2003, Pop-Eleches 2007). Thus, it was arguably no coincidence that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, some of the countries with the region's highest levels of pre-communist socio-economic development, not only experienced some of the largest anti-communist protest movements before 1989 and subsequently emerged as the region's liberal democratic frontrunners in the 1990s. Moreover, even in areas where communist development effectively erased pre-communist differences – especially in terms of education - post-communist political behavior seems to be shaped to a significant extent by pre-communist developmental patterns (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006).

While the particular reverberations of these pre-communist differences will be discussed in greater detail in the second chapter and in the subsequent empirical chapters, what matters for the present discussion is that such diversity presents two distinctive analytical advantages for our efforts to assess the attitudinal and behavioral legacies of communism. First, this heterogeneity should make it easier to distinguish the legacy of communism from other competing explanations of political attitudes and behavior, such as accounts based on socio-economic development, prior institutional legacies, or cultural factors. Second, the large “within-bloc” variation along many key drivers of citizen politics means that our empirical setup represents a hard test of the systemic legacy of communism. To the extent that despite their important differences ex-communist countries exhibit significant commonalities in attitudinal and behavioral patterns and significant differences compared to non-communist countries, then we can be much more confident that communism played an important causal role in explaining these

distinctive patterns than if such patterns were observed among countries which shared more similar developmental and political histories.⁸

1.2.3. Exogeneity in the rise and the fall of communism

A serious – and potentially intractable – challenge for studying the impact of political and economic regimes on subsequent attitudes and behavior is the possibility of reverse causation due to the endogeneity of political regimes. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the emergence of certain types of economic and political regimes may be the consequence of prior economic and political attitudes among a country's citizens. For example, if citizens strongly value crucial aspects of democratic regimes, and if they are sufficiently organized and mobilized to act on these beliefs, then we would expect their countries more likely to democratize and/or less likely to revert to authoritarianism. To the extent that such values and behavioral proclivities are relatively stable over time, then any correspondence between current attitudes and recent regime characteristics may simply be the product of spurious correlation rather than evidence of regime legacies.

From this perspective, studying the effects of communism also has significant advantages, because for many of the countries of the former Soviet bloc, both the rise and the fall of communism was much more exogenous than for other many authoritarian regimes elsewhere

⁸ Consider for example the legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. While these regimes shared important political features (Collier 1979), which would allow for a comparative analysis of their impact on political attitudes and behavior, such an analysis would be significantly complicated by the fact that bureaucratic authoritarianism emerged primarily among the more developed countries in the region, which featured many important similarities, including prior development levels, industrialization patterns, colonial legacies, Catholicism, while differing from most other developing countries, including other Latin American countries. Therefore, any analysis of the impact of bureaucratic authoritarianism would face much greater obstacles in disentangling the regime effect from other potential explanations.

around the world. Among the former Soviet Republics, Russia was arguably the only one where Communism arose endogenously, whereas in the other republics of the former Russian Empire it was imposed as a result of the Red victory in the Russian civil war of 1917-21.⁹ For the three Baltic states and Moldova, the incorporation into the Soviet Union and the imposition of communism were initially the direct result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and later of the ability of Soviet troops to re-conquer these territories following the German invasion of 1941. For the East European satellite states, the rise of communism was indelibly tied to the presence of Soviet troops in most countries in the region in the aftermath of World War II, and this de facto power balance on the ground was sanctioned by the agreements of the Yalta Conference in early 1945, in which Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's demands for control over Eastern Europe. Therefore, except for Albania and Yugoslavia,¹⁰ and to some extent Czechoslovakia,¹¹ the rise to power of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was also largely exogenous, in the sense that it was driven by great power politics and the presence of Soviet troops rather than the economic and political preferences of the majority of citizens from the region.

The surprising collapse of East European and Eurasian communism in 1989-91 was also more exogenous than the collapse of most other authoritarian regimes, and once again for reasons closely tied to the actual or threatened use of force by the Soviet army to uphold

⁹ Even in Russia, much of the evidence suggests that the rise of communism was in many ways the product of a series of historical accidents rather than the inevitable conclusion of the type of historical forces, which Marx had expected would lead to the victory of Communism.

¹⁰ In both cases the communists took over as a result of anti-fascist military campaigns with genuine popular backing and minimal Soviet military involvement in 1944-45. As a result, the Soviet Union also had less of an influence on the subsequent development of Communism (in Yugoslavia after 1948 and in Albania after 1956).

¹¹ In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party won the largest vote share in the reasonably free and fair 1946 elections riding a wave of anti-Fascist sentiment, but their vote share was only around 38% and their subsequent rise to absolute power was less the result of popular support and than of the presence of Soviet troops, which allowed the Communists to marginalize their non-communist coalition partners and to suppress the resulting dissent.

communist rule throughout the region. Here again, we need to distinguish between the events in the Soviet Union and those in its East European satellite states. The timing of the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was arguably to a large extent the result of Gorbachev's abandonment in 1988 of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which signaled that the Soviet Union would no longer use force or the threat of force (as in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981) to reverse political reforms in its East European satellites. Following this crucial external signal the communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact countries collapsed with remarkable speed over the course of a single year, starting with the Polish Roundtable in the early spring of 1989 and ending with the formal renunciation of power by the Bulgarian Communist Party in February 1989. While the collapse of these regimes obviously had important domestic roots, including an erosion of political legitimacy and a range of economic difficulties in the 1980s, the timing of these events cannot be explained by domestic factors. Many of these problems had existed many years before 1989 without producing regime change. Furthermore, change happened almost simultaneously in countries whose recent communist experience had been as diverse as Hungary's relatively benign and prosperous "goulash communism" and the nightmare of Romania's neo-Stalinist Ceausescu dictatorship. While it is true that Poland and Hungary were at the forefront of these changes, and that their earlier timing was hardly accidental,¹² what matters most for the purposes of our analysis is that over the course of about a year most East European countries transitioned from communism to post-communism irrespective of their differences in pre-communist and communist trajectories.¹³

¹² We thank Milada Vachudova for this point and for her many other useful comments on the first draft of this chapter.

¹³ The fall of communism in the two non-Warsaw pact communist countries of Eastern Europe was slightly different: in Albania, where communism had survived under conditions of almost complete international isolation for most of the 1980s, the transition to multipartism did not start until December 1990. Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia the timing of the transition to multi-party competition quite similar to the rest of Eastern Europe but was driven

In the Soviet republics, the fall of communism was intertwined with the complicated and chaotic dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus, technically, the transition to multipartism was driven by Gorbachev's change in March 1990 of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which effectively ended the political power monopoly of the Communist Party and paved the way for competitive elections later that year. The outcomes of these elections differed quite dramatically – with anti-communist popular fronts doing much better in the Baltics, Georgia and Moldova than in the Central Asian republics – and arguably reflected different popular evaluations of the legitimacy of the communist regime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's refusal to recognize the independence declarations of the Baltic republics, and the repeated violent interventions of Soviet troops against independence movements in the Soviet republics (e.g. Azerbaijan in January 1990, Lithuania March 1990 and January 1991 etc.) suggest that the ultimate fate of communism in the region was once again decided by events in Moscow to a greater extent than by the preferences of Soviet citizens. While it is unclear for how long the Soviet Union could have been held together by force after the fall of East European communism and the rapid rise of nationalist popular mobilization (Beissinger 2002), it seems very likely that the political trajectories of most former Soviet republics would have looked very differently in the 1990s had the August 1991 hardline coup been successful or had the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev been won by the latter. As things turned out, the failure of the coup and Yeltsin's assertion of Russian independence effectively sealed the fate of Soviet communism and led to the emergence of fifteen newly independent countries in the fall of 1991. While the subsequent trajectories of these countries diverged quite dramatically over the following years, what matters

primarily by ethnic rifts between Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian factions within the *League of Communists of Yugoslavia* at the 14th Congress in January 1990.

for the current discussion is that all of them abandoned communism at roughly the same time¹⁴ and – with the partial exception of Russia – for reasons that were largely independent of the political attitudes and behavior of their citizens.

1.2.4. Regime longevity

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe and Eurasia also stand out – at least in comparison to most 20th century authoritarian regimes – in their remarkable longevity, ranging from roughly 45 years in Eastern Europe to over 70 years for the pre-WWII Soviet republics. Combined with their previously discussed ambitious efforts to revolutionize the societies and individuals over which they ruled, this longevity arguably gave communist regimes a unique scope for affecting the political attitudes and behavior of East European citizens. Therefore, the communists had greater opportunities to root out or at least marginalize prior formal and informal institutions. While these efforts were only partially successful, they nevertheless had more profound consequences than similar efforts by other authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Thus, even though the Nazi and Fascist regimes arguably had similarly radical – though differently conceived – societal transformation ambitions, their execution was cut short by the defeat of the Axis countries in World War II, which capped the length of the Fascist experiment at just over two decades in the case of Italy, and at less than 15 years for all the other comparable regimes.

¹⁴ The high continuity of communist personnel and political repression in many of the former Soviet Republics (especially in Central Asia) raises important questions about the extent to which 1991 really represented genuine regime change. Nonetheless, the marginalization of the role of communist parties and communist ideology in the new regimes, combined with the albeit gradual and uneven abandonment of central planning, suggest that even the most notoriously authoritarian of the former Soviet republics (especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) represent new breeds of authoritarian regimes rather than continuations of Soviet communism.

Regime duration matters not only for the extent of institutional transformation but also for the processes through individual citizens are politically socialized. For shorter-lived authoritarian regimes, such as interwar Fascist regimes or post-war Latin American military dictatorships, large proportions of the adult population of the country still had distinctive personal political memories of the preceding regimes by the time the authoritarian regimes collapsed. By contrast, even assuming that a ten-year old could form political memories that would survive over 70 years of turmoil and repression, in the interwar Soviet republics such memories would have been limited to persons in their eighties and older, while in the East European satellite states the corresponding age cutoff would have been around 55-60 years. Even if we allow for inter-generational transmission of political memories (cf. Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) the much greater longevity of communist regimes effectively meant that the average resident of an interwar Soviet republic was two generations further removed from the pre-communist past than a German citizen would have been to the pre-fascist past in 1945.

In addition to allowing us to test the individual level effects of a much greater “dose” of authoritarian/totalitarian rule, the communist social experiment provides us with two additional analytical advantages. First, it provides dramatic within-country individual-level variation in the extent to which citizens were exposed to communism, ranging from people who had been born and lived for 70 years under a communist regime, to others who were born just as communism collapsed and thus had no direct personal experience with the system. Second, the coexistence among the post-communist transition countries – and sometimes even in the same country (see below) – of regions which had experienced 45 vs. 70 years of communism, means that we can systematically test the effects of authoritarian/totalitarian regime duration on a scale which would not be possible elsewhere in the world. Both of these features should be very useful in

promoting a better understanding of political socialization in authoritarian regimes (and of political socialization more broadly). Thus, to the extent that what matters most for subsequent attitudes and behavior is early political socialization, then we should detect significant differences among elderly citizens of Eastern Europe vs. the interwar Soviet Union: while the former were socialized and educated in the pre-communist period (in regimes ranging from liberal democracies to fascist dictatorships), the latter never experienced anything besides communism. If, on the other hand, attitudes are formed through a *Running tally* process, then any differences between elderly post-communist citizens should be driven by their own and their country's experience during late communism and the post-communist transition rather than the type of regime in which they grew up half a century earlier.

1.2.5. Post-communist divergence

To the extent that citizen politics are shaped by a combination of any individual's personal experience of the political sphere, then with the partial exception of the few months immediately following the collapse of communism, we should expect that any survey-based evidence of post-communist exceptionalism would reflect not only the influence of communism but also that of the post-communist transition. To the extent that the nature of this transition was both highly uniform across ex-communist countries and very different from the experience of non-communist countries during the same period, this fact would raise important doubts about our ability to draw inferences about the direct individual-level effects of communism as opposed to indirect effects via economic and institutional legacies. These concerns are particularly salient given the shared – and significant – challenges facing ex-communist countries in their transition away from one-party states and command economies. Moreover, these challenges resulted in

high political uncertainty, and significant economic and social costs, which were on average much more severe than those inflicted by the economic and political reform efforts undertaken during the same time period in other parts of the developing world.

While in our statistical tests we will try to address this issue in a number of ways – including through the use of survey data from the very early transition period and by controlling for indicators of well established differences in economic and political performance – the task is made considerably more manageable by the fact that following the collapse of communism the former communist countries experienced very different economic and political trajectories at both the domestic and the international level. While even a brief inventory of these differences is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is worth noting that after 1990 some countries (such as Poland) underwent rapid economic and political reforms in an effort to emulate Western markets and democratic institutions, others (such as Romania and Slovakia) underwent similar transformations but over a longer period and via lengthy detours of economic and political populism, while others still (such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) went into an entirely different economic and political direction altogether. At the same time, the socio-economic and political outputs of the last two decades have varied widely across almost all politically salient performance indicators, ranging from economic output, monetary stability, unemployment, inequality and life expectancy to criminality, governance and state capacity. Finally, the international context of these domestic transformations has also varied dramatically, with some countries benefitting from the powerful incentives of European integration (Vachudova 2005), while others were affected by regional conflicts such as the Afghan war or the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

While an exhaustive overview of these post-communist trajectory differences is beyond the scope of this section, what matters for the purpose of the present discussion is the fact that such diversity should make it easier to disentangle the effects of communism from the impact of the post-communist transition. To the extent that substantial ex-communist attitudinal commonalities persist beyond the early transition years despite the significant post-communist divergence, then such a finding would significantly strengthen our confidence in the causal impact of the communist experience on citizen politics. Moreover, this diversity will provide us with greater analytical leverage for understanding how the relatively uniform experience of communism interacts with the sharply contrasting post-communist developments to produce particular attitudinal configurations.

1.2.6. Within-country variation

The dramatic reconfiguration of East European borders in the aftermath of World War II border provides us with an additional analytical tool for studying the impact of communism on subsequent economic and political behavior: the existence of significant within-country variations in the length of communist exposure for several of the post-communist countries. Such sub-national variation has become an increasingly popular alternative in comparative politics for dealing with the potential shortfalls of cross-country comparisons, which may be more prone to omitted variable bias.

In the post-communist context, the most visible instance of such a “natural experiment” – though there was very little that was natural about it – was the partition and subsequent reunification of Germany, which meant that by the 1990s East Germans differed from their West German compatriots through their experience of 45 years of communist rule but shared not only

a common language, culture, and history, but also – increasingly – similar economic and institutions. Therefore, a number of studies have used comparative survey data from East and West Germany to study the impact of communism while minimizing the risk of omitted variable bias (c.f. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, Dalton 2009). Other instances of such analytically valuable border changes also occurred in several former Soviet republics, which include territories that belonged to the Soviet Union in the interwar period along with more recent territorial acquisitions during and after World War II. The most prominent such division is between Eastern and Western Ukraine, which has been shown to matter with respect to voting behavior in both initial and subsequent post-communist elections (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) but similar differences exist between Eastern and Western Belarus, between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova, and between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia.

While such sub-national comparisons are important complements to cross-national survey analyses, and will be used in several of our empirical chapters, we do not claim that the former are necessarily methodologically preferable to the latter. Even though, as mentioned, sub-national comparisons help reduce the omitted variable concerns that usually plague even many well specified cross-country statistical comparisons, they do not eliminate them entirely. To take the German example, East Germans do not differ from West Germans just in their experience of communism and in potentially observable variables such as income, but prior to the unification of Germany in 1871, most of what eventually became East Germany was part of Prussia, a state with a very different political history and culture than the states which eventually became part of West Germany, such as Bavaria or Saarland. Moreover, comparisons focused on sub-national variation in a single country run into potentially serious external validity limitations: even if it turns out that East Germans prefer larger welfare states or hold different democratic values than

their Western counterparts, it is unclear whether one would be justified in concluding that communism had similar effects elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, East Germans had a reputation for being much more ideologically committed to communism in the late 1980s than their East European neighbors, which suggests that they may have experienced and processed communism differently than their other communist comrades.¹⁵

1.3 Theoretical Arguments

In Chapter 2, we will lay out four competing theoretical frameworks for how we might expect the (communist era) past to affect political attitudes and behavior in the present; here, we briefly highlight their most salient features. As the study of political attitudes and behavior is ultimately a study of individuals, all of these theoretical arguments are rooted at the level of the individual. The first two, however, are based on the idea that individuals in post-communist countries might somehow approach politics *differently* than individuals in non-post-communist countries because of the communist experience. The second two theories will posit that citizens in post-communist countries essentially approach politics *similarly* to citizens in other countries, but that peculiar features of the post-communist landscape cause the aggregated views of these individuals to differ from their counterparts elsewhere. We use the remainder of this section to briefly elaborate on these four theoretical approaches. These different theoretical arguments are *not* necessarily mutually exclusive, but they do highlight distinctly different causal pathways for the communist past to influence political attitudes and behavior in the post-communist present.

¹⁵ Other examples include the trauma of living in a divided city (Berlin), the greater salience of the Western consumption model through the proximity of West Germany, the particular patterns of communist-era economic transfers (marked by significant outflows in the 1950s but balanced by significant Soviet subsidies later on) etc.

1.3.1 Post-communist citizens as “different” political actors than citizens elsewhere

We turn to the voluminous literature on partisanship as inspiration in identifying two ways in which we might expect individuals to carry forward experiences from the past into the present. The first is *socialization theory* (Cambell et al.1960; Greenstein 1965; Langton and Jennings 1968; Jennings and Markus 1984). In this world, citizens pick up many of their political values and attitudes at a relatively young age as they are entering adulthood. The reason why post-communist citizens might hold different beliefs about politics, therefore, is because they were *socialized* under communism. Crucially, the socialization approach would lead us to believe that once these attitudes are fixed, they tend to stay that way over the course of one’s life. So if we can properly identify the types of attitudes that were likely to have developed under communism, we can then go look to see if these attitudes permeate into citizens’ attitudes and behavior in the post-communist era. A nice feature of this theory is that it also points to important differences *between* post-communist citizens, based on the nature of communism in the country in which they were living at the time they were undergoing this socialization process, including some current post-communist citizens that were not socialized under communism at all.

A second, contrasting, theory of individual attitude formation suggests that although individuals enter the political world with a set of attitudes and behaviors that tend to reflect early-life socialization, these positions are far from solidified and are actually quite malleable over an individual’s lifetime, updating constantly in response to new information and experiences. While in the partisanship literature this has acquired the moniker of the “rational revisionist school”, we will refer to it by the more intuitively descriptive label popularized by Fiorina as the as a *running tally* (Achen 1989; Fiorina 1981). The version of this *running tally*

theory we will put forward will therefore suggest that post-communist citizens start with views about politics and political behavior that are shaped by communism, but that these views are updated throughout citizens' lives, including the period of time during the collapse of communism and through what we now call the post-communist era. But the *Running Tally* theoretical approach opens up the door to considering the impact of institutions – many of which themselves will be legacies from the communist era – on the manner in which individuals update their political attitudes and behaviors, in a way that the *Socialization Theory* does not really allow for. Moreover, the *Running Tally Theory* also holds open the possibility that there will be *fewer* generational differences among post-communist citizens, as the importance of the time in which one was socialized recedes into the background in comparison with contemporary political developments. As we will discuss in much greater detail in the following chapter, the challenge in operationalizing hypotheses from this type of theory will be in drawing a line between what is truly a legacy of communism and what is simply a reaction to contemporary politics; we most certainly do not want by definition to label all political behavior that occurs in post-communist countries as a legacy of communism; although there is obviously some truth to this comment – could any political actor in any of these countries credibly claim they would be doing the same thing at any given time had the Bolsheviks not seized power in Russia? – it is of little analytical value since a theory that explains everything of course explains nothing.

1.3.2 Post-communist citizens as “similar” political actors to citizens elsewhere

Of course, it is equally possible that individual citizens in Poland approach politics in the same manner as individual citizens in Great Britain in 1993 (ie., the neither the Socialization nor the Bayesian Theories accurately predict political attitudes or behavior in post-communist

countries), but we could still find differential aggregate level patterns of attitudes and behavior along the lines with which we began this chapter. We consider two such theoretical mechanisms.

The first is that the grand developmental project of Communism arguably left behind individuals with a very distinctive set of demographic characteristics. For now, let us highlight three such possible socio-economic legacies, although there may be more. First, communism left behind societies that were significantly poorer than their West European neighbors and in some cases further behind than during the pre-communist period (Janos 2000). Second, communism produced highly literate societies with lower levels of income inequality, and very distinctive patterns of social mobility.¹⁶ Finally, communism resulted in a rapid but distorted industrialization, which created pockets of industrial concentration. So it may be the case that low income earners who are highly educated the world over tend to distrust market-based economic institutions, but that there turn out to be disproportionately more poor highly educated people in post-communist countries. In this case, individuals would behave similarly, but we will still end up with societal wide patterns that look very different in post-communist countries than elsewhere. To the extent that the demographic composition of post-communist societies looks different than in other parts of the world precisely because of communist era policies – and the three examples presented above clearly fall into that category – then aggregate level attitudes in post-communist countries that result from these demographic characteristics of society should also be considered communist legacies. It is crucial, however, to note that this sort of legacy is not because individuals socialized under communism hold different views about politics, but

¹⁶ Although it should be noted that high literacy was accompanied by generally low levels of higher education and, to the extent that citizens received higher education, it was more along line of technical training than liberal arts education (CITATION).

because communism left behind societies with particular demographic compositions. For the remainder of the manuscript, we refer to this as the *Demographic Legacy Theory*.

Our final theoretical approach also builds on the idea that citizens in post-communist countries react to politics in the same manner as citizens elsewhere, but that the post-communist experience has brought about a set of different stimuli that have resulted in different aggregate level patterns of political attitudes and behavior. To put perhaps more intuitively, the argument here would be that citizens in Great Britain would likely have reacted the same way to politics in the 1990s (e.g., evaluated institutions similarly, chosen whether or not to participate in politics, etc.) had they faced the same set of circumstances in the 1990s as citizens in Moldova. So the key point here is not that individuals are changed from having experienced in communism, but rather that the *post-communist experience* has led citizens in post-communist countries to hold different attitudes and behave differently.

So what are the “stimuli” on which we will focus? We elaborate on this in much greater detail in the following chapters, but essentially we will be interested in the performance of the economy, and, to the extent possible, the performance of political institutions. So one example would be to argue that worldwide, people tend to evaluate incumbent governments in a negative manner when the economy performs poorly (Wilkin et al. 1997; Whitten and Palmer 1999). If we find that post-communist incumbent governments are indeed on average held in worse esteem by their citizens than governments in other parts of the world, then we will want to test whether that is simply because economic conditions have been worse in post-communist countries than in other parts of the world. Similarly, we could think about something like trust in political parties as not being a function of a deep-seated distrust of political parties stemming from having lived under the single party rule of the communist era, but rather a perfectly rational

response to disappointing performances by post-communist political parties. We will refer to this set of theoretical arguments as the *Differential Stimuli Theory*.

Of course, it is legitimate to ask whether or not we can think of the *Differential Stimuli Theory* as positing a “legacy effect” of communism. On one hand, the stimuli themselves to which people are reacting may in many cases be legacies of communism. To return to the example in the previous paragraph, one can reasonably argue that the economic crisis faced by post-communist countries in the early 1990s was a direct result of communist-era distortions (Sachs 1993; Hellman 1998). On the other hand, one could argue that empirical confirmation of this theory would essentially be a *rejection* of a legacy-based approach at the individual level: if we find that citizens in post-communist countries approach politics no differently than anywhere else, then what does that actually have to say about the long term effects of communism on political attitudes and behavior? In some ways, this is largely a question of semantics, and should not interfere with our empirical inquiries. We will return to this question in greater detail throughout the manuscript, and especially in the next chapter and the final chapter. For now, one alternative is to consider the Differential Stimuli Theory as one type of *Null Hypothesis*: support for this theory would in a sense down-grade the role of the past in conditioning political attitudes and behavior in the post-communist present, although it would do so in a very specific manner. Another way of interpreting this, though, would be to say that to the extent we find support for the Differential Stimuli Theory, it should lead us to conclude that individuals were not affected by communism in a lasting psychological manner but nevertheless explain why we observe different political attitudes and behavior in post-communist countries.

This point segues nicely to the more general topic of *falsifiability*. Again, we will have a much more substantial discuss in the following chapter, but for now we want to explicitly note

that in all of our empirical work, we will be specifying clear *Null Hypotheses*, identifying what set of results will illustrate that political attitudes and behavior in the present were not affected by the communist past. Although such an exercise may seem pedantic at times, it will ensure that we not fall into the trap of claiming that all evidence supports one of the four theoretical approaches. Although we begin skeptical of the argument that the past does not in any way affect political attitudes and behavior in post-communist countries, we want to ensure that our research design allows us to falsify our legacy hypotheses.

1.4. Our dependent variable: how ordinary citizens interact with the political world

With these competing theoretical frameworks in hand, we move on to the final piece of our puzzle, which is specifying our dependent variables. As noted earlier, this is to be a book about how citizens interact with politics in the post-communist world. As a discipline, we lack a good overarching term for this field of study. In American politics, it is generally called “political behavior,” but to a lot of people – especially sociologists! – the term “behavior” implies action, and therefore not simply the holding of an attitude or position. In homage to Russell Dalton’s impressive run of textbooks (Dalton 2002, 2006, etc.), we propose a framework of what we will call *citizen politics*: the realm of political science that is reserved for studying how individual citizens interact with the political sphere. Thus, we are excluding from this definition the behavior of elites (e.g., legislative politics, how a budget is crafted, why political parties are formed, etc.) and the formation and evolution of political institutions (e.g., why a country employs a proportional representation electoral system instead of single member districts, what leads a post-communist party to pursue a reformist path, etc.) These topics are of course interesting, and indeed are also fruitful avenues to look for the effects of communist era

past (see inter alia Kitschelt et al 1999, Grzymala-Busse 2002; Pop-Eleches 2007). Nevertheless, to tackle all of these topics would take us well beyond the scope of a single book, and – as the remainder of this manuscript demonstrates – there are more than enough unanswered questions in the realm of *citizen politics* to keep us busy.

More specifically, we define the realm of *citizen politics* using the following interrelated three-fold classification scheme. First, we expect that citizens with an interest in politics will bring a set of broad based preferences for policy outputs on the part of the state; in much of the extant literature, these preferences are often referred to as *political attitudes*. There are numerous ways to think about organizing political preferences. For example, most studies of left-right political ideology assume what is essentially a preference over two dimensions of policy: *economic* preferences regarding the degree of state intervention in the economy, social welfare provision, and income redistribution, and *social* preferences, largely regarding the tension between state prescribed norms of behavior and individual freedoms (Benoit and Laver 2007, Kitschelt 1991, Huber 1989). When we move beyond established democracies, however, we often start with an even prior set of fundamental questions concerning preference over the polity (democratic vs. non-democratic) and economy (market vs. non-market) (Hancock and Logue 2000; Encarnacion 1996; Offe 1991). As this is a book focused on post-communist countries, we therefore begin with the more fundamental questions, looking first at preferences for *democratic forms of government* (Chapter 3), and general *economic preferences* (Chapter 4), before moving on to the question of *social policy preferences* (Chapter 5). Of course, as political scientists, we often try to capture an overall summary of these preferences along a single

dimension by relying on *left-right ideological self-placement*, so this will be the final general preference-related topic which we examine (Chapter 6).¹⁷

With these *general preferences* for outcomes from the political process in hand, we then expect citizens to use these preferences to *evaluate the performance of political institutions*. The simplest format this will take is the evaluation of *incumbent governments and politicians* (Chapter 6). However, citizens will also form opinions of more permanent political fixtures, such as evaluations of *political parties* (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a); *parliaments* (Citations); *executives* (citations), and *courts and the judiciary* (citations) (Chapter 7). Ultimately, we expect that the cumulative effect of all these evaluations will come together in a level of *overall satisfaction with democracy* (Chapter 8).¹⁸


Finally, on the basis of these preferences and evaluations, we expect citizens to make decision about whether and how to *participate* in politics. The simplest and most common form of participation in politics will be *voting* (Chapter 9). However, a smaller number of citizens will get more actively involved in political life, either by participating in civil society, participating directly in politics (e.g., lobbying political parties; participating in campaigns), or taking part in political protests (Chapter 10). Figure 1.1 displays this framework graphically; readers should

¹⁷ One could argue that after having considered preferences for democratic governance and economic and social policy outcomes that looking at left-right self-placement will inevitably be repetitive. While there is obviously something to this argument, we believe the topic still warrants its own attention for two reasons. First, given the ubiquity of measurements of left-right self-placement in survey research – as well as its near universal employment in describing both political parties and party systems – it seems important to have an understanding of how left-right self-placement plays out in the post-communist context. Second, as illustrated by the observations at the beginning of this chapter, there are some very interesting patterns of post-communist exceptionalism in left-right self-placement that warrant explanation.

¹⁸ As democracy becomes more consolidated and reaches the elusive status of “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan (1996), we might expect these types of general systemic-wide evaluation to take a different format that satisfaction with democracy, perhaps something like “satisfaction with the direction the country is heading”. Nevertheless, for a large portion of the world, and especially the post-communist world, satisfaction with democracy is likely to remain a valuable summary evaluation of political outputs for years to come.

note that we explicitly that we allow for the possibility that participation will be a function both of preferences and evaluation.

Figure 1.1: Citizen Politics



Taken together then, we have a unified framework of the manner in which citizens interact with politics: they begin with preferences for government outputs, use these preferences to evaluate the performance of political institutions, and ultimately, on the basis of both preferences and evaluation, make decisions about participating in politics. There are certainly opportunities for other feedback mechanisms – participating in politics, for example, could change one’s expectations about what the state should be doing – but the general framework provides us with a nice set of guidelines for how to investigate the manner in which ordinary citizens interact with the realm of politics.

In the following chapters, we will demonstrate that post-communist citizens do indeed look different from citizens in other parts of this world in terms of their preferences, evaluations, and decisions regarding participation. The goal of our book is to understand to what extent these deviations are due to the communist past, and, if so, whether any of the four theories presented in the previous section can indeed explain how the past impacts citizen politics in the present. One way to think about the type of questions we want to answer is illustrated in Figure 1.1. With this task in hand, we next need to consider *how* we will actually go about testing hypotheses drawn from our four theories to explain variation in post-communist political preferences, evaluations, and behavior. It is to this topic that we turn in the following section.

1.5 Methodological approaches to the study of legacy effects

In the following chapters, we will propose hypotheses about ways in which the communist past can effect political attitudes and behavior in the post-communist present. This raises a methodological challenge: how will we either support or falsify such hypotheses? More specifically, we need methods for (1) identifying distinctive patterns in post-communist political attitudes and behavior and (2) testing to see whether any of our four theoretical approaches can indeed explain these distinctions. While the specifics of our statistical analyses will of course be fleshed out in greater detail in the empirical portions of the manuscript, here we lay out the basics of our methodological approach.

1.5.1 Inter-regional comparisons

Our first task of identifying distinctive patterns of post-communist political attitudes and behavior requires comparative data from both the post-communist world and, crucially, countries

from outside of the post-communist world. Only by looking at the attitude or behavior in question both outside of and inside of the set of post-communist countries can we in fact determine whether there is a post-communist “difference” to be explained. The simplest and most direct way of doing so is to measure a quantity of interest in post-communist countries, measure the same quantity of interest in other countries, and then establish whether there is a statistically and substantively significant difference across the two.¹⁹ So for example, if one wants to claim that there are lower levels of political trust in post-communist countries, then a first step would be to find a comparative survey project that measures levels of party trust cross-nationally – such as the *World Values Survey* – calculate the mean level of party trust in post-communist countries, calculate the same values outside of the post-communist countries, and then compare the two. Of course, we will rarely expect communist legacies to be the sole determinant of levels of any political attitude or behavior, so instead of simply comparing differences in means, we will generally want to embed our comparison in a more fully specified multivariate model that includes other relevant control variables at both the individual and country level.²⁰ Within such a multivariate framework, the key variable will be a *post-communist dummy variable*, uniquely identifying respondents in the survey who are from post-communist countries. If such a variable is substantively and statistically significant, then we can conclude there is in fact a distinction in the post-communist attitude or behavior, even after controlling for the relevant other factors. And indeed, this is how we generally begin each empirical chapter: with a large cross-national dataset identifying the presence of a distinctive post-communist

¹⁹ For the moment, we set aside the question of the appropriate reference group of “other countries”; depending on the question, it could include all other countries in the world, advanced industrialized democracies, other European countries, other new democracies, non-democracies, etc.

²⁰ Any discussion of individual and country level control variables will of course raise the issue of multi-level models (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Gelman and Hill 2007), which will indeed be employed in our analyses.

attitude or behavior, which we then attempt to see if we can explain with either of our theoretical approaches.

However, there is also another important phenomenon that we can observe with cross-regional data in addition to whether or not an outcome variable – such as trust in political parties – differs in the post-communist world. Thus, it may also be the case that the *effect* of a particular variable is different in the post-communist world than it is elsewhere. For example, to return to the observation with which we opened this chapter, we find that more educated citizens in post-communist countries have a right-wing bias as compared to their less educated counterparts in post-communist countries, whereas in the rest of the world more educated citizens tend to be more left-wing than their less educated counterparts. In this case, we are not necessarily interested in comparing levels of the outcome variable itself – here, self-placements on a left-right dimension – but in the relationship between a particular covariate and that outcome variable: here, the relationship between education and left-right self-placement. The opportunity to examine differences between particular covariates and political attitudes and behavior of interest is valuable because it greatly expands the range of our analyses, giving us more opportunities to test hypotheses generated by our four theoretical approaches. To test such hypotheses we will use *interactive variables* between our covariate of interest and the post-communist dummy variable. If an interactive variable is substantively and statistically significant, then we will be able to conclude that the effect of the covariate in question is indeed different in the post-communist world than it is elsewhere, as, for example, is the case with the effect of education on left-right self placement.

1.5.2 Intra-regional comparisons

However, there is also a second, less obvious, way to think about testing for the presence of legacies effects in post-communist countries, which is to leverage variation *within* post-communist countries. Doing so requires that there is variation in the effect being tested across different citizens within post-communist countries. There are actually a lot of different ways that we can think about individual experiences differing across different citizens from post-communist countries. First and foremost, we can think about differences induced by how long a person has been alive. As was noted earlier, a central feature of the hypotheses generated from the Socialization Theory will involve the political climate in the years in which individuals were educated and entered adulthood. Such an experience will of course vary greatly between people who came of age during periods of high Stalinism and those who came of age during *perestroika*. Similarly, we will be interested in differences in how an individual interacted with the communist regime. Here we can also find useful variation, as post-communist societies will include both those who (and whose families) did well under communism and those for whom communism was a much more difficult experience.

Another approach is to think about variation across different post-communist countries. So for example, one hypothesis associated with the Bayesian Theory and left-right self-placement is that as long as the presence of a large unreformed communist successor party serves as a vivid reminder of the communist past, more democratically minded citizens will continue to find it difficult to self-identify as left-wing (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010b). To test such a hypothesis, our best approach is clearly to look at the variation in the relationship between pro-democratic sentiment and left-right self-placement between citizens living in post-communist countries featuring a strong unreformed post-communist party and those that live in countries without a strong unreformed post-communist party. Similarly, for other hypotheses we will want

to take account of the differences between countries that were ruled by communist parties for longer (e.g., the former Soviet Union) or shorter (e.g., East-Central Europe) periods of time, or to distinguish between different types of communist rule (e.g. the difference between countries that embraced perestroika in the late 1980s and those that rejected Gorbachev's reforms). Indeed, there will be many such hypotheses which it will only make sense to test using data from post-communist countries and then analyzing variation across individuals or across countries within the post-communist cases.²¹

1.5.3 Intra-country comparisons

All of the previously described analyses will involve the pooling of survey data across multiple countries. So far we have discussed communist legacy effects on political attitudes and behavior in a cross-national comparative framework. While such a research design is justified by the fact that we need to compare the attitudes and behavior of ex-communist citizens to their counterparts in non-communist countries (as well as comparing attitudes and behavior across post-communist countries), such analyses will nevertheless raise concerns about the comparability of survey questions given cross-national cultural and linguistic differences in the absence of anchoring vignettes (King et al 2003).

However, history has provided us with an interesting opportunity in this regard. The reunification of Germany in 1990 offers a methodological solution to this problem, because it allows us to compare the patterns of attitudes and behavior among East and West Germans, who

²¹ Furthermore, in many instances we will want to think about both individual-level and country-level differences within post-communist countries. For example, to test a hypothesis from the Socialization Theory that predicts a particular type of attitudes ought to be held by someone educated under high Stalinism, we will ultimately need to know both how old the person is and what country they lived in, as periods of high Stalinism differed across different countries.

share a common language and culture but of course differ in their exposure to Communism. Since the two countries have had very similar – and in many cases identical – political institutions, such a comparison has the additional advantage of reducing the potential for omitted variable bias that may affect cross-country regressions, as we do not have perfect indicators of institutional performance in different countries. While demographic and developmental differences of course persist between West and East Germany, these are arguably captured by individual characteristics, for which we can often control in our analyses. Thus the existence of a reunified Germany offers another opportunity to explore our hypotheses, only this time in a context that does not require cross-country analysis.²²

1.6 A few quick words on terminology

Before proceeding to the following chapters, we want to briefly pause to address our use of terminology. Most importantly, we want to move forward with a clear understanding how we will describe our dependent variables in this study. In Section 1.3, we introduced the phrase “citizen politics” as an alternative way of specifying the fields of study that generally fall under the rubric of “political behavior” in US politics: the various ways in which ordinary citizens interact with the political sphere. We further defined this concept as having three principal components: preferences for political outcomes; evaluations of political actors and institutions; and political behavior, where behavior is defined as actually doing something, such as voting or participating in a protest. We will at times in the book refer to these components individually, but

²² In certain limited instances, we may also be able to get similar within country leverage from analyses of Ukraine and Belarus, both of which include Western regions which were only incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II and thus their inhabitants had shorter exposures to communism than their compatriots from the East.

as a shorthand for all of them collectively we will largely use the term “political attitudes and behavior” and, occasionally, “citizen politics”.²³

Another phrase that always comes into question in these types of studies is what exactly we mean by “post-communist countries”. We have no interest at all in getting involved in arguments as to whether terms like “post-communist” or “transition” imply some unalterable path towards one political outcome or another (Gans-Morse 2004; Roberts 2004). Instead, we merely use the term descriptively, as a short-hand for identifying the successor states to the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the East-Central European countries that at one time or another made up the old Communist Bloc.²⁴ In contrast, we will use the terms “communist successor parties” or “post-communist parties” to refer to parties that are either the legal successor party of former ruling communist parties, splinter-movements from these parties that retain an ideological attachment to communism, or “reorganized” version of former ruling communist parties (Tucker 2006).

1.7 Outline for remainder of the book

In this chapter, we have (1) explained why we are writing this book, (2) presented a set of arguments for why the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union represent an analytically distinct and useful set of countries, (3) briefly introduced a set of theoretical arguments as to how we might expect the communist past to impact political attitudes and behavior in the post-communist era, and (4) introduced a set of distinct political attitudes and

²³ One might legitimately question why, if we plan to use the phrase “political attitudes and behavior” we have employed the phrase “citizen politics” at all. We do so for two reasons. First, we do feel that the field is lacking in a good term for the study of all the different ways in which citizens – as opposed to elites – interact with the political world. “Citizen politics” strikes us as a nice way to loosely describe this field of study. As a direct description of what it is that we are analyze in this book, though, “political attitudes and behavior” seems more analytically precise, as well as grammatically appropriate.

²⁴ Essentially, the former members of the Warsaw Pact plus Albania.

behaviors all grouped under the rubric of “citizen politics” that we will analyze using our theoretical approach.

The remainder of the book will proceed in the following manner. In the next chapter, we will expand considerably on the themes presented in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this chapter. First, we will turn to our theoretical arguments, presenting much more detail on the logic underlying the four potentially different theoretical explanations for why and how political attitudes and behavior might differ in post-communist countries from attitudes and behavior in the rest of the world. In the second half of Chapter 2, we will expand upon our areas of inquiry in our analysis, namely the three realms of citizens politics introduced earlier in Section 1.4: preference for economic, political, and social policy outcomes; evaluation of political actors and institutions; and actual political activity on the parts of individual citizens.

The next eight chapters of the book will then tackle each of the different substantive topics laid out in Section 1.4 of this chapter and expanded upon in Chapter 2 (see Section 1.4 for the specific topics and orderings of the chapters). The chapters will follow a similar logic. In the first section of each chapter, we will lay out the empirical evidence suggesting that a peculiar pattern of political attitudes or behavior can indeed be found in the post-communist world. As described earlier in this chapter, doing so will involve large datasets of cross-national surveys that will allow us to compare the attitude or behavior in question in post-communist countries to the attitude or behavior elsewhere. What exactly is the appropriate “elsewhere” will vary by context. In many cases, we will simply want to examine differences between citizens in post-communist countries and those anywhere else in the world. In other cases, however, we will be interested in more specific comparison, e.g., with advanced industrialized democracies, with other newer democracies, or with other lower and middle income countries. Either way, with the

initial post-communist distinction established, we will then specify what exactly the four different theoretical approaches would predict could account for this distinction, how we would go about testing to these if this was the case, and, crucially, how we would know what results would falsify our hypotheses. The remainder of each substantive chapter will then report on the results of these empirical analyses. As noted previously, these analyses will often continue to feature cross-country survey datasets including both post-communist and non-communist countries. However, as individual topics warrant, we will also turn to comparative analyses within the set of post-communist countries – such analyses will prove particularly useful when we have predictions about variation in specific post-communist (and communist era holdover) institutions – and even within individual post-communist countries. By the end of each chapter, we hope to be able to conclude whether (1) the attitude or behavior in question can credibly be said to be a function of the communist era past and (2) if so, which of our four theoretical arguments for how the past may have mattered is best supported by our analysis of that particular attitude or behavior.

Our hope, therefore, is that each individual chapter will prove interesting on its own, providing crucial new information about the political attitudes and behavior of post-communist citizens differs from those found elsewhere, why this is the case, and to what extent the communist past is responsible for this difference. At the same time, we expect the cumulative exercise of systematically examining these questions across different sets of preferences, evaluations, and behaviors will allow us to draw much more general conclusion about the way the past influences the present in post-communist countries. Moreover, through the breadth of the topics that we will examine in this manuscript, we also hope to provide a synthetic picture of the overall nature of citizen politics in post-communist societies, how that is affected by the

communist past, and, ultimately, what kind of prognoses this holds for the future. We will revisit these broad themes in the final chapter of the manuscript.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Frameworks: Citizen Politics and Legacy Effects

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, we lay out a theory of *citizen politics*, the subject matter of our study. This theory comes in three parts, and aims to comprehensively address the manner in which ordinary citizens interact with the political sphere. First, citizens have *preferences* for what politics should produce. Second, on the basis of these preferences, citizens *evaluate* the performance of political actors and institutions. Finally, as a result of their preferences and evaluations, citizens make choices about whether or not to *participate* in politics, and, if so, how.

Having established such a framework, we then move on to the motivation for the current manuscript by considering from a theoretical perspective how a nation's past might distinguish the political attitudes and behavior (i.e., citizen politics) of its citizens from those in other countries. As noted in the previous chapter, we are motivated in doing so by a desire to understand post-communist politics specifically, but we aim for our theoretical arguments about how the past may affect political attitudes and behavior in the present to be as general as possible. Therefore, our analysis will focus on how the communist past affects the post-communist present. But we intend that our theoretical arguments can just as easily be adapted to explain, for example, how the legacy of the Apartheid era in South Africa affects current political attitudes and behavior in that country, or, alternatively, how the experience of military dictatorships affects political attitudes and behavior in numerous Latin American countries today.

Our theoretical framework for exploring the effects of the past upon political attitudes and behavior in the present consists of four separate – although not necessarily mutually exclusive – sets of causal pathways. The first two of these assume that post-communist citizens take a fundamentally different approach to politics than citizens elsewhere because of the manner in which they were *socialized* under communism. In one version of this causal story, the socialization process leaves citizens with fixed attitudes about politics that are unlikely to vary greatly over the course of their lives. In a second version, we consider communist era socialization as a starting point, but one which can be updated over the course of one's life through the collapse of communism and into the post-communist era.

Our alternative causal framework suggests that citizens in post-communist countries react to politics similarly to individuals elsewhere, but that the aggregate level patterns of *citizen politics* in post-communist countries still differ because of other communist legacies. Again, we posit two different causal mechanisms for this type of outcome. First, it may be the case – for reasons discussed in the previous chapter – that communism left behind societies with peculiar socio-demographic make ups. So at the individual level, post-communist citizens might hold similar attitudes about politics to others with similar socio-economic status, but taken together, it might lead to very different overall patterns of citizen politics. Second, it may be the case that post-communist citizens react similarly to important political stimuli as citizens elsewhere, but the nature of the collapse of communism and the post-communist transition has led to systematically different variants of these stimuli being felt in post-communist countries than elsewhere.

In the second half of this chapter, we will draw out in considerable detail the theoretical arguments underlying all four of these causal pathways, and elaborate on the types of empirical

evidence that will distinguish between them. But first, we turn to what exactly it is we hope to explain in this book: the nature of citizen politics.

2.2 A Theory of Citizen Politics

2.2.1 Defining the Realm of Citizen of Politics

The subject matter of any given discipline in the social science is constantly shifting, and political science is no exception (Goodin 2009; Katznelson and Milner 2002). At its core, though, we can think of political scientists as largely interested in the behavior of either elites or masses (Marger 1987). Elites are those who actually “make” most of politics; another way to think of elites is as people whose careers revolve around politics (Parry 1969). These are the politicians, leaders of political parties and movements, career civil servants and diplomats, etc. Much of the study of politics is indeed the study of elites: how are governments formed? Why are some bills passed, while others are not? When do party leaders defect from one political party to another?

But of course all the activities of politics are always conducted against the backdrop of the masses, the ordinary citizens whose lives are affected by the outputs of politics and the actions of politicians, and whose tacit approval is always at least somewhat needed for politics to proceed. In democracies, this approval is given explicitly through periodic elections; in non-democracies, what we might call quasi-approval (or at least insufficient disapproval) is often provided more implicitly through the decision not to revolt. Even if they do not revolt openly, they may engage in passive resistance, which can result in high costs to political elites. But in both democracies and non-democracies, the masses play a role beyond simply providing this approval or not. Especially in the modern era, politicians and leaders often seek to gauge the sentiments of citizens through opinion polling. Citizens can also attempt to influence the

outcome of politics themselves, through actions such as donating money to lobbying organizations, contacting politicians and bureaucrats, and participating in protests and demonstrations.

The study of this “mass” component of politics has been given the label of “political behavior” (Dalton and Klingemann 2007), especially in American politics (Feldman 1982; Lau 1985). However, it is clear that much of what falls under the rubric of what is commonly called political behavior involves more than just actions (or no concrete actions at all). Indeed, much of what we study under the rubric of political behavior involves attitudes towards, preferences regarding, and assessments of politics and policy as much as it involves actual “behavior”. For this reason, we have adopted Russell Dalton’s label of “citizen politics” to refer to the realm of political activity that involves not elites, but the masses. More specifically, we subdivide this realm into three general areas of citizen politics, each of which build on those that precede it: preferences over political outcomes; evaluations of political performance; and, finally, political behavior. In this manuscript, we will examine the effect of communist-era legacies on all three of these areas in the manner described previously in Chapter 1; in the remainder of this section, we expand upon exactly what it is we mean by each of these categorizations and how they relate to one another.

2.2.2. Citizens Politics: Preferences over Political Outcomes

As is common in many models, we begin our exploration of citizen politics at the level of preferences. We start here because before we can expect citizens to evaluate the output of politics and/or to decide how to personally interact with the political world, we have to know what it is that individual citizens actually want from politics. While there are a myriad of

directions in which one can take the topic of preferences, we begin with perhaps the most fundamental question regarding the nature of politics in a country: do citizens desire a democratic form of governance, or, put slightly differently, why do some citizens prefer democracy to other forms of government while others do not (Almond and Verba 1965; Bratton et al. 2008; Dalton 2009; Evans and Whitefield 2009; Kitschelt 1992; Przeworski 1991; Rose et al. 1998)? This preference is not so much over particular types of outcomes, but rather a basic framework for the political process. Indeed, when we study the politics of a given country, we often start with the very question of regime type: are regimes democratic or non-democratic? In a similar sense, this seems the logical place to begin with citizen preferences for politics and political outcomes.²⁵

Since one of the fundamental roles of politics is to set the rules of the game for economic life, the next logical step is to consider economic preferences. Most generally – and somewhat analogous to questions regarding preferences for democracy as opposed to non-democratic forms of government – we can consider the question of whether citizens prefer a market based economy (“capitalism”) or not (Duch 1993; Earle and Gehlbach 2003; Fidrmuc 2000; Hayo 2004; Kitschelt 1992; Przeworski 1991). The idea of whether a citizen prefers a market-based economy provides a kind of underlying baseline about the type of economic output that the citizen would like to see result from the political process, as well as, at least to a certain extent, very basic summary of general economic preferences. However, we can of course go beyond this very coarse measure of economic preferences to think about some more specific aspects of economic policy preferences. Most commonly, we tend to think about three of these: the degree of state ownership of economic assets; the degree of state regulation of the economy, and the

²⁵ For more on preferences for democracy, see as well Almond and Verba (1989); Evans and Whitefield (1993); Gibson et al. (1992); Graham and Sukhtankar (2004); Lagos (2001), and Sil and Chen (2004).

degree of state sponsored redistribution of wealth across different segments of society (McCarty et al. 2006; Kitschelt 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996).

Turning back to political preferences, we can similarly advance beyond the simple dichotomy of preference for democracy, to questions about the types of liberal or social-democratic elements one wants to add to the minimal procedural definition of democracy as consisting of basic political rights and free and fair elections. Again, there are a variety of directions in which we can take this point, but all to a certain extent revolve around how much the rights of individuals ought to be shielded from the power of the state. On the more political side, we can think about preferences for free speech or the right to protest to be guaranteed even when, for example, it leads to political unrest or potentially offensive political action. In the social realm, we can think about the extent to which the state should or should not be allowed to prescribe codes of individual behavior; good examples here include abortion rights or gay rights. And then perhaps somewhere in between these two lies the question of tolerance of minority rights, an important issue in a number of post-communist countries. Taken together, we can think of all these issues making up a sort of second dimension of political preferences to complement the traditional set of economic preferences.

There is of course nothing novel about thinking of two dimensions of political preferences, one focusing on economic questions and one on more general questions of social liberalism (Benoit and Laver 2007, Huber 1989, Meguid 2008 and, in our case, especially Kitschelt 1992). Indeed, this is precisely the point of our citizen politics framework: to try to capture the major avenues of citizen interaction with the political realm. However, just as it is common to speak of two dimensions of political preferences, it is equally common to try to collapse these two dimensions of preferences into a single “left-right” political dimension that

attempts to summarize an individual's overall sense of political priorities (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Markowski 1997).²⁶ Thus, the final component of our first stage of the citizen politics model - preferences for politics – consists of left-right self-placement. We do so cognizant of the fact that in a sense this is simply repeating the questions of economic and political preferences addressed previously, but also realizing that the idea of politics as a uni-dimensional political space is an important concept both for scholars and for citizens attempting to make sense of the political world. Just as we will want to understand whether post-communist citizens possess different preferences over economic policy than citizens in other parts of the world, so too will we want to know whether or not those preferences translate into different left-right self-placement (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010b).

In sum, then, the first stage of our citizen politics model consists of what we consider to be the most important political preferences held by citizens: (1) do they prefer a democratic regime to a non-democratic regime? (2) what role ought the state to play in managing the economy? (3) what role ought the state to play in regulating the political and social rights of individuals? and finally (4) where ought political outcomes to fall on a single left-right dimension? While we certainly do not claim that every political preference is encompassed by such an approach, modeling is always an exercise that involves trade-offs between parsimony and scope. In our case, we believe this four-fold approach to preferences captures the major elements of political preferences held by citizens, while at the same time maintaining a manageable degree of focus and a desirable level of parsimony.

²⁶ For a review of the formal literature on single-dimensional spatial models of politics, see Osborne 1995.

2.2.3. Citizen Politics: Evaluation

Armed with these preferences, citizens next have to turn to the question of evaluating whether or not the current political actors and institutions are performing satisfactorily. However, as a large literature on principal-agent models has shown, such evaluations are rarely completely straight-forward, since outcomes are usually not only the result of the agent's effort but may also be affected by external factors which are outside of the agent's control. Since it is possible to get bad outcomes with good agents and good outcomes with bad agents, the principals cannot simply tell the agent's type on the basis of observed performance, and while close monitoring of the agent's behavior would reduce the uncertainty, principals often do not have the resources or the incentives to do so. If we apply this logic to the relationship between citizens and politicians, it becomes clear that evaluations of individual politicians or of entire institutions will not simply reflect the extent to which policy outcomes match citizen policy preferences but also about the prior beliefs that individuals hold about that politician or institution. Such prior beliefs may refer to a range of potentially important qualities, such as competence and honesty, and they may be formed either through direct personal interactions with certain types of institutions or government officials, or – more frequently – by information from other sources, such as the mass media. Regardless of the relationship between evaluation and preferences, though, evaluation remains a crucial sphere of interaction between citizens and the political worlds they inhabit.

What evaluations have traditionally most concerned political scientists? First and foremost, we tend to be interested in evaluations of current governments. Indeed, the vast majority of the literature on economic voting – one of political science's most studied topics – is at its heart based on an attempt to answer the question of how citizens evaluate the performance

of the current incumbent government (Anderson 2007; Erickson 1989; Fiorina 1981; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; MacKuen et al. 1992; Tufte 1975; Tucker 2006). In addition to economics, political scientists have explored the role of a wider variety of other topics on the evaluation of current government performance, including but not limited to corruption scandals, foreign policy successes or failures, success in enacting legislation, adherence to campaign promises, and the individual traits and characteristics of particular government officials, most notably presidents and prime ministers. To the extent that citizens do take an interest in politics, then, evaluating the performance of the current government is definitely an essential component of any framework of citizen politics.

But current governments are not the only objects of political evaluation. Citizens observing the political world are also confronted with numerous other political institutions on which they may be want to pass judgment. While again the list of potential institutions to consider is large, in this manuscript we elect to focus on what we consider to be the most important institutions of democratic policies. Beyond the government (the executive branch of the state), we therefore also consider evaluations of legislatures (a somewhat understudied topic, although see Mishler and Rose 1997) and evaluations of the judiciary (Caldera and Gibson 1992; Gibson et al. 1998). Between these three topics – evaluations of incumbent governments, evaluations of legislatures, and evaluations of the judiciary – we therefore can include in our framework of citizen politics the manner in which individual citizens evaluate the three primary branches of democratic states. This is not to say one might not want to expand this list to include, for example, evaluations of other aspects of the state, such as particular parts of the bureaucracy or the armed forces, but again it does give a broad overview of how citizens see the

performance of the state while at the same time providing a degree of parsimony and some needed limits to the substantive topics we will investigate.

To this list, however, we must also add one particular extra-governmental form of political organization: political parties. It has long been said that without political parties, you can not have democracy (Aldrich 1995). Political parties play a myriad of roles in democratic societies, including articulating public preferences, consolidating these preferences into discrete policy options, forming governments, providing opposition to governments, educating the public on policy issues, and recruiting current and future political elites. Thus to get a complete sense of how the political system is being evaluated by citizens, we need as well to understand what citizens think of job being done in their country by political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a, Shlapentokh 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001).

Taken together, the second stage of our citizen politics model involves citizens' evaluations of the government, the legislature, the judiciary, and the political parties that compete to staff these various branches of the state. Although these are ostensibly some broad categorizations, they encompass much of what we expect in politics to concern ordinary citizens: has the government implemented citizens' preferred policies? How has the government managed the economy? Is it competent at running the executive? How corrupt are members of the government, legislature, and judiciary perceived to be? Are political parties seen as acting in the interests of ordinary people as opposed to furthering the interests of their own elites? Indeed, it is difficult to come up with too many pressing public opinion questions that cannot in some way be seen as at least feeding into evaluations of the government, the legislature, the judiciary, or political parties.

2.2.4. *Citizen Politics: Political Behavior*

Our first two components of the citizen politics model largely proceed within the minds of individual citizens: they form preferences about what it is they hope politics will produce and/or how politics will be organized in their country, and they evaluate the performance of current political elites and institutions based at least in part on these preferences. If the world of citizen politics stopped here, then question of how the masses view politics would still likely remain one of interest for scholars and social scientists, but would have little real world consequences, thus allowing those interested in understanding the outputs of the political sphere to justifiably content themselves with studying the actions and behaviors of elites. But of course the masses do – at least from time to time – take actions that affect the political sphere, and thus it is this action – or “political behavior”, in its literal sense – that forms the third component of our citizen politics model.

In democracies, of course, the masses are required by definition to play an important political role at regular intervals by selecting the government – either directly or indirectly – the legislature, and sometimes even the members of the judiciary in free and fair elections. In most democracies, a majority of adult citizens will participate in any given national election; an even greater proportion will participate in an election at some point in their lifetime.²⁷ So first and foremost, our citizen politics model identifies voting in an elections as a key element of political behavior.

There are two ways that we can think about voting from the perspective of mass politics. The first is to analyze the question of who votes and why, or, to put this more concisely, the topic of turnout (Aldrich 1993; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2006; Kostadinova 2003; Pacek et

²⁷ For comparative turnout data, see <http://www.idea.int/vt/>.

al. 2009). Alternatively, we can consider the much broader topic of why people vote the way they do.²⁸ Either way, though, the question of whether turnout specifically or voting more generally follows peculiar patterns in the post-communist world is ripe for study (Fidrmuc 2000; Jackson et al. 2003, 2005; Kostadinova 2003; Pacek 1994; Pacek et al. 2009; Tucker 2006).

Voting, however, is not the only role played by citizens that affects political developments within countries. Citizens have a wide variety of options for alternative forms of political participation, especially in open democracies. Generally, political scientists tend to place these opportunities for participation into one of the following three categories. First, citizens can attempt to become directly involved in the political process, either through donating money to campaigns, joining political parties, volunteering for political activity (especially election campaigning) and the like (citations). Second, citizens can join organizations that while not directly contesting political campaigns (i.e., political parties) still are seen to influence political outcomes, either directly – through lobbying efforts – or indirectly, through providing citizens with the skills to organize and therefore make demands of government; such organizations are often referred to as “civil society” (Berman 1997; Edwards and Foley 1998; Howard 2003; Putnam 1993).²⁹ Third, citizens can choose to engage in various forms of protest against the government and its policies (Chong 1991; Ekiert and Kubiek 1998, 1999; Kitschelt 2009; Kuran 1991; Tucker 2007; Weingast 1997).

²⁸ The political science literature on voting is so extensive that it seems almost trivial to include citations here. So we will simply say see Campbell et al. 1960, who arguably started the modern variant of the study of voting behavior, as well Anderson (2007); Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000); Osborne (1995); and Tucker (2002) for examples of review articles on the subject of elections and voting. Tucker (2002) is particularly germane from the perspective of this manuscript – and not just because one of us wrote it – as it is the only survey of which we are aware of the elections and voting literature to focus exclusively on the literature on this topic that has emerged from the study of post-communist countries.

²⁹ See as well <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/cid/CID%20in%20D&S.pdf>.

Taken together, therefore, our final stage of the citizen politics model encompasses the opportunity for citizens to actually take action to effect change in the political world. In all regimes – from totalitarian to democratic – the opportunity to protest is always one that citizens can embrace. However, especially in democracies, there are other, less risky, ways of attempting to influence the political process. Some are routinized and low cost, such as voting, while others involve much higher costs in terms of time or money. Nevertheless, all present opportunities for citizens to impact political outcomes, and, because of their existence, force political elites – to varying degrees – to take account of both the preferences of their citizens and to be concerned about how those citizens will evaluate the actions and outputs of political elites.

2.2.5: Citizen Politics: The Direction of the Causal Arrows

Figure 2.1




Figure 2.1 therefore concisely summarizes our model of citizen politics (and is a slightly more detailed version of Figure 1.1 from the previous chapter). The direction of the causal arrows flows rather intuitively from the preceding discussion: citizens form preferences; preferences help inform evaluations; and finally evaluations and preferences combine to spur decisions regarding actual political behavior such as voting or taking part in a protest. We proceed in this manner in the remaining chapters of the book, exploring first preferences, then evaluations, and finally political behavior.

A richer model would of course allow for other channels of feedback between the various categories of citizen politics. For example, we might expect that enough poor evaluations of government performance in a new democracy might eventually reverberate into one's preference for a democratic regime. Similarly, one could imagine that an individual who has a negative experience interacting with the government might eventually change her preference for how large a role the government ought to play in managing the economy. While we do believe the theoretical framework we have laid out above is flexible enough to incorporate these types of feedback mechanisms, the purpose of this particular manuscript is *not* to test a model of citizen politics; were this the case, we would certainly explore the nuances of the relationship between the three broad sub-categories – as well as the different components of the sub-categories highlighted in Figure 2.1 – in much greater detail, and indeed we hope that others will find this a useful model for exploring such questions in the future. In our case, however, we have set up this model primarily to assist us in knowing what exactly communist era legacies could be expected to help explain. Put another way, the model provides us with a set of dependent variables for the remainder of the manuscript, but does so in a way which – we hope – others will

find to be theoretically coherent and substantively comprehensive. With these dependent variables in hand, we can now turn to the primary theoretical endeavor of this manuscript: laying out a set of competing theoretical frameworks for how a country's past can affect the its citizen politics – or the preferences, evaluations, and behavior of its citizens – in the present.

2.3. Theories of Legacy Effects

2.3.1. Theories of Legacy Effects: Introduction

The purpose of this section is to lay out for theoretical arguments for how the communist past (and in some cases the pre-communist past as well) could affect citizen politics – i.e., political preferences, evaluations, and behavior – in the post-communist era. These different pathways by which the past can affect the present are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they do point to different causal explanations. To be perfectly clear, our goal in this chapter is to lay out the underlying logic behind these four theoretical arguments. It is *not* to derive specific hypotheses based on these theories to explain all of the different aspects of citizen politics laid out in the previous section. This task – generating specific hypotheses peculiar to the different dependent variables we will examine in each chapter – will be left to the chapters themselves.

To reiterate, we divide our four theoretical approaches into two general categories. The first two theoretical approaches are based on the idea that citizens in post-communist countries actually approach politics *differently* than their counterparts in the rest of the world because of their communist era experiences. So here we expect that even if they were facing similar circumstances post-communist citizens would have different preferences from their counterparts elsewhere, which would then play into different evaluations of political actors and institutions, which in turn might lead to different types of action. So for example, perhaps it could be that as

a result of communism's reputed guarantee of employment to all, a much higher proportion of post-communist citizens expect the government to deliver full employment. Given the inability of capitalism to ever deliver full employment (Marx 1872) and given the additional challenges facing transition countries (Diamond and Plattner 1995; Haggard and Kaufmann 1995; Przeworski 1991; Sachs 1993; Stokes 1996), this type of preference might result in perpetual dissatisfaction with the performance of governments, legislatures, and political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a). This in turn could therefore result in a marked propensity for citizens to vote incumbent parties out of office (Roberts 2008) and a constant churn of new parties and electoral volatility (Pop-Eleches 2010; Markowski and Tucker 2010; Powell and Tucker 2009; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2008).

The second two theoretical approaches build off of the idea that citizens in post-communist countries instead approach politics *similarly* to their counterparts elsewhere but, due to other legacies of communism, citizen politics still differ at the aggregate level in post-communist countries compared to the rest of the world. Thus, it may be the case, for example, that highly educated people with low incomes everywhere tend to gravitate towards far-left political and economic preferences. Highly educated poor people in post-communist countries might be no more or less likely to do so than highly educated poor people elsewhere, but if there are disproportionately more highly educated poor people in post-communist countries due to a combination of communist-era educational practices and lack of economic opportunities, then we might find more left leaning societies in post-communist countries. This would be a clear legacy effect of communism, but it would be built on a very different assumption – that citizens approach politics *similarly* in post-communist countries as they do elsewhere – than the theoretical approaches highlighted in the previous paragraph.

In the remainder of this section, therefore, we present two theoretical arguments based on the “post-communist citizens as different” assumption, and two theoretical arguments based on the “post-communist citizens as similar but facing different circumstances” assumption. We begin with the former.

2.3.2 Legacy Effect Theories: Post-Communist Citizens as Different

If we think post-communist citizens approach citizen politics in a fundamentally different manner than citizens elsewhere, then our citizen politics model suggests that we need to start by considering why it is that post-communist citizens might hold different preferences for political outcomes than citizens in the rest of the world. To answer this question, we take our lead from the voluminous theoretical work on the partisanship, which is also essentially a study of the origins of baseline political preferences. The “Michigan School” of partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Greenstein 1965; Langton and Jennings 1968; Jennings and Markus 1984) points us to the concept of *socialization*. Socialization theories of partisanship suggest individuals pick up a preference for a political party from those around them during their adolescent and early adult years, which manifests itself as an almost psychological attachment to that political party and is usually maintained throughout one’s life, barring rather dramatic events either in the life of the individual or in the nation’s political development. Conversely, the “running tally” or “rationalist revisionist” school of partisanship suggests that individuals are constantly updating their partisanship in a Bayesian manner throughout the course of their life as they become exposed to new information about political parties, including both their performance and policies (Achen 1989; Fiorina 1981). We build off of each of these approaches in formulating our first two theories of legacy effects on citizen politics in post-communist countries.

2.3.2.1 Legacy Effect Theories: Socialization

The concept of socialization into a particular world view and corresponding set of political preferences points us in two particularly interesting directions in the post-communist context. First, it may be the case that being educated under communist rule leads – on average – to individuals developing a different set of political preferences from people who are not educated under communist rule. If we then subscribe to the idea that political preferences – and especially big picture political preferences, such as the state’s role in running the economy, or preferences for income redistribution – take hold during one’s adolescent or early adult years and then rarely waver from that starting point, then we might expect to see a very different set of citizen politics from citizens who came of age (i.e., were educated) under communist rule than those who did not. We call this conceptualization of socialization effect the “early socialization theory.”

Of course, as was discussed in the previous chapter, “communism” was not a monolithic experience across countries and over time. To put this most starkly, we might expect that someone who came of political age in Moscow under Stalinism in the early 1950s to have been socialized into somewhat different political preferences than someone who came of age under Gorbachev’s *perestroika*. With this in mind, Table 2.1 breaks down the communist experience into five subcategories that represent different “types” of communist experiences that we might expect – if the socialization model holds – to people being socialized into different types of preferences. (We wish to remind readers at this point that we will link these types of theoretical arguments more specifically to particular hypotheses in the empirical chapters that follow. It is

important to note that for some aspects of citizens politics – e.g., Stalinism and preference for democracy; reform communism and support for market economies – particular subcategories of these communist era experiences may be more important than others.). As with any attempt at classification, we face a trade-off between level of detail, comparability, and parsimony. Thus we do not mean to claim that Stalinism in Albania in the 1980s was exactly the same thing as Stalinism in Romania in the early 1950s, but at the same time we hope that the classification scheme represents a useful first step in identifying different types of communist-era experiences.

Table 2.1. Communist Experience by Year and Country

Country	Transition to Communism	Stalinist	Post-Stalinist Hardline	Post-Totalitarian (Linz and Stepan)	Reformist
Albania	1944	1945-90			
Bulgaria	1945	1946-53	1954-89		1990
Czechoslovakia	1945-47	1948-53	1953-67, 1969-89		1968
East Germany	1945-48	1949-62	1971-89		1963-1970
Hungary	1945-47	1948-53	1957-60	1961-1989	1954-1956
Poland	1945	1946-1956	1980-83	1963-1980, 83-87	1956-62, 1988-89
Romania	1945-47	1948-1964	1971-89		1965-70
USSR	1918-20	1928-1953	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1921-27; 1956-64; 1985-1991
Yugoslavia	1945	1946-1948			1949-90

Our five-fold classification scheme works as follows.³⁰ First, we consider the initial years in which countries were in the process of installing communist systems of government.

³⁰ We thank Andrew Janos for comments and suggestions regarding this classification scheme.

The next category is the Stalinist period, essentially the high-water mark of communist orthodoxy and repression. With the exception of Albania, the communist countries then all moved beyond Stalinism, and we break down these “post-Stalinist experiences” into three categories. “Post-Stalinist Hardline” refers to regimes that moved beyond Stalinism, but essentially still pursued hardline policies (e.g., low dissent tolerance, an active repressive state apparatus but without widespread terror, active security services, etc.). “Post-Totalitarianism” is taken from Linz and Stepan (1996), and refers communist regimes where the communist monopoly on power was still in place, but true believers in the ideology were few and far between, with most party members now associating with the party for careerist as opposed to ideological reasons. Post-Totalitarian regimes are also known for the tacit trade-off of political power for economic security; limited pluralism was tolerated so long as the state was not directly targeted. Finally, Reformist communism refers to periods like the Prague Spring, Gorbachev’s *perestroika*, Poland’s various flirtations with greater political openness and independent trade unions like Solidarity, etc.

An early socialization approach would therefore suggest that we identify the year(s) in which different citizens came of age, and then see the extent to which being socialized in these different periods led to different types of political preferences, much as posited above. However, there is a second way to think about socialization building on Converse’s (1969) seminal comparative study of partisanship by age bracket across five countries. Converse suggested that socialization was more of a cumulative process, increasing over time as long as one continued to have the opportunity to be attached to the same political party. Transplanted to our framework, this would suggest that socialization effects would depend not so much on exactly what type of communism one was exposed to in early adolescence and adulthood, but rather the amount of

time spent living under (different forms of) communist rule. We call this second type of argument about socialization processes, the “cumulative socialization theory.” One of the nice things about Table 2.1, therefore, is that because these different periods of communism took hold in different countries at different times, we should in many cases be able to disentangle the effects of initial socialization from cumulative socialization, and both in turn from simply being of a certain age.³¹

Overall, though, both versions of the socialization theory are consistent with the idea that citizens who lived through communism will approach politics in a different way from those who did not. This will either be due to the period of time in which citizens came of age politically – and the nature of the communist regime in their country at that point in time – or to the cumulative amount of time that citizens spent living under a communist regime. But either way, we can begin to test hypotheses based on the socialization theory by getting variation across individuals on these key dimensions. And in both cases, the assumption is that the “communist effect” – be it through early life or cumulative socialization – ought to remain constant over the course of an individual’s life as he or she progresses through the post-communist era. Note, however, that this constant effect prediction does not necessarily mean that we expect individual opinions to be completely fixed throughout the post-communist period: instead, it requires that the differences between differently socialized individuals should remain relatively unchanged over the course of the transition.³²

³¹ In contrast, a single country study at a single point in time would be unable to do so. Consider a 2005 study in the Russia that found 65-70 year olds expressing less support for democracy than younger Russians. This could be because the 65-70 year olds in the Russia were educated under Stalinism, because they lived for 40 years under communism, or because it simply had to do with being old in Russia in 2005.

³² For example, if we predict communist socialization to undermine democratic support, then a scenario where democratic support increases for both communist-socialized and non-communist-socialized individuals but the relative democratic deficit of the former compared to the latter remains unchanged, would still be compatible with the socialization theory.

2.3.2.2. *Legacy Effect Theories: Running Tally*

Of course, it may not be the case that communist era socialization has a static effect on how one engages with citizen politics. Again taking our cue from the partisanship literature, it may be the case instead that citizens are continually updating their political preferences throughout their lifetime, and that this updating continues throughout the post-communist period. Such a *Running tally* theory would therefore posit – similarly to the socialization theory – that post-communist citizens exited communism with different political preferences from those who did not live through communism – but there would an additional wrinkle: those preferences would continue to be affected by both one’s exit from communism and one’s post-communist experiences. So unlike the socialization theory in which the communism era effects are permanent and limited to effects from the communist period (i.e., once we know what happened under communism we know all there is to know), the *Running tally* theory would allow for continued evolution of these distinctively post-communist approaches to citizen politics.

At this point we have to be very careful to distinguish between updating preferences in a manner that is a distinctive function of having lived through communism and its aftermath and simply saying that the *Running tally* theory takes into account current conditions. The latter is clearly *not* a theoretical argument proceeding from the assumption that post-communist citizens approach politics differently than citizens from other parts of the world, and for the most part it is not even an argument about legacies.³³ Therefore, we have to be very clear to identify exactly how *A running tally evolution* of communist-era expectations is occurring.

³³ In the following section, we present the particular conditions under which this kind of argument could be considered a legacy effect.

While this will vary a bit depending on the particular aspect of citizen politics being analyzed, one common framework we will employ is the following. While citizens may have spent much of their lives living under communism, the last years of communism are likely to be most salient in their memories. Some people will have had a positive “late communism” experience (e.g., in terms of economics, those living in Hungary), while others will have had a very negative “late communist” experience (e.g., in terms of repression, those living in Romania). Similarly, we often speak of the “transitional winners” and “transitional losers” – those who have done well and poorly economically, respectively, during the transition period (Tucker et al. 2002). Combining these two experiences, we can crudely break post-communist citizens into the following four categories:

Table 2.2 Post-Communist Bayesian Updaters

	Good Transition	Bad Transition
Good Late Communism	Indifferent Winners	Nostalgic Regretters
Bad Late Communism	Transitional Enthusiasts	Indifferent Losers

If the socialization theory is correct, then where one falls in this four-fold classification scheme should have no systematic effect on one’s approach to citizen politics in the post-communist era; only when one was socialized and how long one spent living under communism should matter. However, if post-communist citizens are Bayesian updaters, then somebody with a good late-communist experience and a bad transition experience should have very different attitudes towards democracy or markets than a person with a good late-communist experience and a bad transition experience. To be clear, this is not the only way in which one could generate a *Running tally* hypothesis – we could also, for instance, examine whether or not one was persecuted during the communist era – but it is an example of the type of hypotheses we can, and

indeed will in many chapters, draw from this sort of theoretically approach. Crucially, one should note how this sort of hypothesis – looking at specific experiences under communism and in its aftermath – differs from simply positing that citizens are reacting to contemporary political developments. If the latter were the case, then we should see no difference between “Indifferent Winners” and “Transitional Enthusiasts” or between “Nostalgic Regretters” and “Indifferent Losers.”

2.3.2 Legacy Effect Theories: Post-Communist Citizens as Similar

Both the socialization and *Running tally* theories begin from the premise that post-communist citizens are likely to approach citizen politics differently than citizens elsewhere. It may be, however, that this is assumption is incorrect. Perhaps individual citizens in post-communist countries approach citizen politics – and hold preferences about politics – that are no different from similar citizens elsewhere. Could this be the case, even if we find aggregate level differences across our measures of citizen politics between post-communist countries and countries in other parts of the world (e.g., that post-communist citizens trust parties less, are more leftist on average, have less support for democracy, etc.)? In the remainder of this section we propose two different theoretical mechanisms that could account for just this type of pattern.

2.3.2.1 Legacy Effect Theories: Socio-Demographic Landscapes

Perhaps the simplest way in which individual post-communist citizens could approach citizen politics in the exact same manner as citizen elsewhere but still leave behind a different aggregate level pattern of citizen politics would be if people’s preferences, evaluations, and political behavior were all a function of their socio-demographic characteristics *and* if post-

communist countries had different socio-demographic make-ups than other countries. To the extent that this different socio-demographic make-up was a direct result of communist era policies, then this would clearly be an example of a communist legacy effect on citizen politics.

Consider the following highly stylized example. Imagine a world with three income categories (high, medium, and low) and three education categories (post-secondary, secondary, and less than secondary). If all political preferences were a direct function of income and education, then we would expect societies with similar distributions of education and income to have similar distributions of political preferences. Now imagine that preference for extreme forms of redistribution were largely concentrated among those with high levels of education and low incomes. If in Country A there are very few highly educated poor people (either because there are few poor people, or few highly educated people or because income is very highly correlated with education), then that country would have a very small proportion of the population supporting extreme forms of income redistribution. In contrast, if in Country B income was unrelated to education or if both poverty and higher education were very prevalent, then we might find a much larger proportion of the population supporting extreme forms of income redistribution. This would hold despite the fact that in both countries, *individual preferences were generated in exactly the same manner*: as a function of income and education. Thus, despite identical processes of individual preference formation the aggregate nature of preferences across the whole society would be different. As noted in the previous chapter, one of the effects of communism was to create societies with very different socio-demographic characteristics, so certainly this type of theoretical approach is one that can be tested in the post-communist context. Methodologically, it is also probably the easiest of our analyses; we simply need to control for individual level social-demographic characteristics and see if once we have

done that, any post-communist exceptionalism disappears. However, if this is indeed the case, we are still left with the question of whether this is a legacy effect. To answer this question we would have to establish how much of the variation in the relevant socio-demographic factors driving different citizen politics patterns is actually due to communist legacies rather than to pre-communist developmental differences.

2.3.2.2 Legacy Effect Theories: Different Stimuli

There is a second way in which citizens in post-communist countries could approach politics in the same manner as citizens of other countries and yet still have aggregate level differences between citizen politics in post-communist countries and in other countries. In the previous section, we imagined a world in which preferences were simply a function of social-demographic characteristics. Instead, let us now consider a world in which evaluations are simply a function of economic conditions. In this hypothetical world, as long as one's real disposable income has gone up in the past 12 months, one evaluates the government positively and then votes for the government to be re-elected; conversely, if real disposable income has declined in the past 12 months, one evaluates the government negatively and votes for an opposition party.

Now let us assume that in the rest of the world, at any given time 50% of citizens have incomes that are going up, and 50% of citizens have incomes that are going down. However, let us assume – not completely unrealistically- that in post-communist countries in the 1990s, due to the economic nature of the transition from central planning to market based economies (Przeworski 1991), only 20% of the population enjoyed rising incomes and 80% saw their incomes falling in any given year. Were we then to observe evaluations of incumbent

governments and voting patterns, we would conclude that citizens in post-communist countries were much more likely to have negative evaluations of their government and much more likely to vote incumbent governments out of office (Roberts 2008). However, this pattern would *not* be present because the communist experience had somehow fundamentally changed citizens in post-communist countries to make them much more demanding of their governments (or much more inclined to switch parties across elections). Quite to the contrary, in this world post-communist citizens are no different than citizens anywhere else in terms of how they react to political and economic stimuli; it is instead the stimuli themselves that differ.

This is the crux of our final theoretical argument: perhaps citizens in post-communist countries do not react to political stimuli any differently than citizens elsewhere, but they systematically receive different stimuli. The nature of these “stimuli” will of course differ by the different aspects of citizen politics that we will be exploring, but two of the most important will be economic conditions and the political performance of state institutions (especially allegations of government corruption.) We will also in selected instances consider the nature of the media in post-communist countries that deliver these stimuli.

Considering the effects of different stimuli on citizen politics raises a question that must be addressed. Certainly these differential stimuli effects can explain the pattern in which we are potentially interested: the existence of different aggregate level patterns of citizen politics despite the fact that the way individual citizens approach politics *does not vary* between citizens of post-communist countries and citizens of other countries in the world. Once again, however, we are left with the question of whether this is a legacy effect.

Our answer to this question is fairly clear. If the differential stimuli in question are conclusively tied to the existence (and therefore demise) of communism, then we are definitely

justified in calling this a legacy effect. So perhaps the clearest example is the state of the economy in the 1990s. It is undeniable that the economic conditions that emerged in post-communist countries in the first decade following the collapse of communism were inextricably linked to the existence and collapse of communism.³⁴ Other topics, however, will be less clear. The emergence of corruption, for example could be tied to legacies of communist rule, but on the other hand one could also argue that corruption emerged for reasons that are exogenous to communist and have everything to do with weak transitional states. Certain configurations of political institutions may be even less clearly linked to communism. For example, if strong presidents in the states of the former Soviet Union were due to a copy-cat effect of the Gorbachev presidency in the final days of the Soviet Union (Olcott 1993), the structure of old regime elites at the end of the communist era (Easter 1997), the comparative weakness of the (especially liberal) opposition as the Soviet empire collapsed (Kitschelt et al. 1999, esp. p.36-9), or the lack of inter-war parliamentary systems of government (Schöpflin 1993), then one could describe the strong post-soviet presidencies as an institutional legacy of communism. Alternatively, one could interpret this institutional choice as rooted in the short-term strategic calculations of post-communist leaders (Frye 1997), in which case we would not want to consider it a legacy effect.

Ultimately, this is not a question that can be answered at this level of generality; it will require more specific consideration of the particular stimuli at hand that are linked to particular features of citizen politics. Perhaps the clearest guidelines we can give for now is simply that if the stimuli can be clearly linked to communism and its demise, then this can legitimately be

³⁴ Of course, we are still left with potentially very hard to answer questions about the extent to which additional factors, such as the nature of economic conditionality from international financial institutions, exacerbated these problems.

considered a legacy effect. If not, then it is probably better to think of differential stimuli hypotheses as a type of null hypothesis for our overall inquiry into the question of how the past effect the present. Either way, though, it represents a promising avenue for empirical inquiry.

2.4. Conclusions

Forthcoming

Chapter 3 – Democratic conceptions and attitudes

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we apply the theoretical framework developed in the preceding chapters to understand how communist legacies shaped citizens' democratic attitudes and conceptions of politics. Along with the attitudes towards markets, which will be analyzed in the next chapter, the extent to which East Europeans understand and support democracy has been one of the most important “citizen politics” questions of the post-communist transition. Moreover, without getting into the debate about the primacy of economics vs. politics, the transition towards democracy – or at least away from communist one-party rule – was for most East Europeans the most visible aspect of the early post-communist period. Within a few months of the dramatic collapse of their communist regimes, the citizens of most East European countries had the chance to experience their first genuinely contested multi-party elections in over four decades. But beneath the widespread excitement generated by this historical event, many domestic and international observers worried about the extent to which post-communist elites and citizens would be able to discard decades of communist rule and turn – almost overnight – into Western liberal democrats.

The analysis in this chapter focuses on how communist legacies affected two specific aspects of how East European citizens related to the process of post-communist political change: their conception of what democracy means, and their support for democracy. Most of the previous survey-based analyses of democratic attitudes in transition countries and beyond have tended to focus on support for democracy (cf. Dalton 1994, Evans and Whitefield 1994, 2009, Rose et al 1998, Bratton et al 2008). While this focus is understandable, given the justified concerns about the link between popular democratic support and the survival and consolidation

of post-communist democracy, we will also focus on the less visible but theoretically prior question about whether and how East Europeans understand democracy. This question is important not only because it offers us a unique insight into how communism shaped citizen political views but also because the nature of conceptions of democracy should be expected to shape the extent to which citizens are willing to endorse democracy and the criteria by which they evaluate the nascent democratic regime and its institutions.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this chapter does not exhaust our discussion of how communist legacies shape post-communist individual attitudes towards democracy. Thus, given that the economic and political transitions away from communism were intertwined in distinctive ways compared to similar transitions elsewhere, democratic attitudes will figure prominently in our discussions of both attitudes towards markets (chapter 4) and left-right ideological orientations (chapter 6). Moreover, the current chapter defers the questions about how citizens evaluate the performance of particular democratic institutions and of democracy overall to a later section of the book (chapters 7 and 8, respectively). While a number of previous studies seem to conflate support for democratic values and satisfaction with democracy or systemic evaluations, we would argue that the two are both theoretically and empirically distinctive. From a theoretical standpoint, it is possible – and in many East European countries perfectly reasonable – to subscribe to democratic values as a political ideal while at the same time being dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in practice in a particular country.³⁵

While it is, of course, possible that over time dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of

³⁵ Conversely, it is conceivable that an individual with mixed democratic commitments could be fairly satisfied with the imperfect ways in which democracy functions in his/her country. For example, individuals opposed to extensive minority rights could have been fairly happy with Slovak or Romanian democracy in 1994-6 but such satisfaction clearly does not make them more democratic than their co-nationals who condemn the functioning of their country's democracy for similar reasons! For evidence about the disjunction between democratic satisfaction and democratic values in the Latin American context, see Lagos (2003) and Graham and Sukhtankar (2004).

democracy may undermine popular support for democratic principles, this is a hypothesis that needs to be tested empirically, instead of simply equating democratic satisfaction and democratic values. Empirically, our survey data indicate that democratic satisfaction is more weakly correlated with different indicators of democratic values than these indicators are correlated to each other, which suggests that there is no compelling statistical reason for lumping the two types of indicators together.³⁶

There is a long-standing debate in political science about the drivers of popular *support for democracy*, and more specifically about the relative importance of economic considerations, political performance and cultural factors. Thus, whereas several authors have traced patterns democratic support to individual and societal variations in economic conditions (Przeworski 1991, Kitschelt 1992, Dalton 1994), others have instead emphasized the importance of political performance and especially citizens' evaluation of the functioning of basic democratic institutions (Evans and Whitefield 1995, Rose et al 1998, Chu et al 2009). Finally, a third strand of the literature focuses on the role of political culture in shaping democratic regime support (Almond and Verba 1965, Inglehart 1990.)

Our analysis in this chapter speaks directly to these debates, in the sense that we will test the explanatory power of hypotheses derived from all three of these scholarly tradition. However, we intend to do so from the very specific perspective of our broader concern for the specific mechanisms through which communist legacies affect post-communist citizen politics. Thus, both the *different stimuli* and the *running tally* theories include a range of economic and political performance indicators as potential explanations for patterns of democratic support.

³⁶ Thus, democratic satisfaction is correlated at .10-.15 with four of the five democratic values indicators discussed below, while the correlation between the democratic values indicators range between .14-.38. Moreover, factor analysis confirms that democratic satisfaction has much higher uniqueness and a lower factor loading on the main factor than the other indicators.

Moreover, the very notion of focusing on communist attitudinal legacies, and particularly our *socialization* theory, means that we take the role of political culture very seriously.

Somewhat surprisingly, even though much of the literature cited above is based on analyses of surveys from the former communist countries, there has been very little explicit discussion about the extent to which communist legacies can help explain the patterns of democratic support in the region. In part, this may be due to the fact that most of the contributions to this debate only used surveys from a single country or region, and that one of the few explicitly cross-regional analyses (Chu et al 2009) does not include data from the ex-communist countries. One exception in this respect is previous work by one of us (Pop-Eleches 2008), which identifies a significant post-communist deficit in democratic values but explains it largely in terms of the peculiar version of communist modernization efforts.

The most important contributions to our understanding of the impact of communism on individual *conceptions of democracy* is Rohrschneider's work comparing East and West Germany after reunification. While his earlier work had focused on differences in elite-level democratic conceptions between East and West Germans (Rohrschneider 1994) a subsequent study (Rohrschneider 1999) complemented this elite focus with public opinion surveys from the early to mid 1990s. Rohrschneider argues that even though both East and West German publics regarded liberal democratic rights as key components of democracy, the former showed considerably higher concern for social egalitarianism and were more willing to trade off individual political rights for social equality than their Western counterparts. This emphasis on social egalitarian conceptions of democracy as a communist legacy, and the importance of analyzing the relative concern for political rights and socio-economic concerns are important starting points for our present analysis. However, Rohrschneider arguably overstated the degree

of uniformity in Eastern and Western support for political rights³⁷ and since his primary concern was with elite attitudes, he did not analyze the impact of communist legacies on mass publics in sufficient detail to differentiate between different legacy mechanisms. Moreover, Rohrschneider does not focus on another potentially important category of voters, who are likely to abound especially in the early, chaotic days of the transition: individuals who have no clearly defined understanding of democracy or those who patently confuse democracy for something else (such as prosperity).

3.2. Theory and hypotheses

Rather than rehashing the theoretical discussion from chapter 2, in this section we will discuss how the nature of communist regimes and the post-communist efforts to transition to democracy through the adoption of the Western liberal model are likely to affect democratic conceptions and attitudes of ex-communist citizens. This discussion will allow us to move from the general theoretical framework laid out in the previous chapters to a set of concrete and specific hypotheses about how different legacy should affect democratic conceptions and attitudes.

3.2.1 Communism and democracy in historical perspective

But before turning to the formulation of specific hypotheses for each of our four legacy theories (see Section 2.3), we need to discuss at least briefly a few of the defining aspects of the

³⁷ For example, judging by the survey data presented in Rohrschneider (1999:82) in 1991 85% of West Germans regarded a choice of multiple parties as essential to democracy whereas only 70% of East Germans did so. Similarly, an emphasis on regular, free and secret elections was shared by 82% of West Germans but only 66% of East Germans. While there was a fair amount of temporal fluctuation, these statistics nevertheless suggest that for key components of liberal democratic rights there were almost twice as many dissenters in East Germany as in the West.

region's pre-1989 political history and their likely impact on how post-communist citizens would understand democracy and the extent to which they would be willing to support it. While this brief discussion cannot begin to do justice to the region's diverse and often convoluted political history (c.f. Janos 2000), we hope that these stylized facts can help us combine our general theoretical framework with the region's specific historical context to derive our hypotheses as systematically and transparently as possible.

First, as briefly discussed in the introductory chapter, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia differed greatly in their pre-communist exposure to democracy. During the interwar period, several countries in the region, including Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and the Baltic states experienced spells of genuine democracy in the 1920s before falling prey to domestic coups or foreign troops at various points in the 1930s. The citizens of a few other countries in the region, including Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania, also had the opportunity to experience reasonably free (though often unfair) multi-party elections at various points in the interwar period though their regimes included important authoritarian elements and eventually degenerated into full-blown dictatorships. Finally, the citizens of the interwar Soviet republics and Albania experienced almost only full-blown authoritarianism throughout their pre-communist history. While the communists tried and largely (but not fully) succeeded in destroying the institutional vestiges of pre-communist democracies, what matters more for our current analysis is that the nature of pre-communist regimes greatly affected the extent to which East European citizens and elites had prior democratic memories (or myths) to fall back on both during communist rule and in its immediate aftermath.

Secondly, while communism was introduced and survived in much of the region through the actual or threatened use of Russian/Soviet military force, the communist regimes in the

region nevertheless differed quite significantly in the extent to which they could credibly claim authentic domestic roots. Thus, in Russia, Albania, and Yugoslavia the communist takeover occurred with either no or minimal external support, while in Czechoslovakia the Communist Party did very well in the first democratic post-war elections (though their rise to absolute power in 1948 was definitely buttressed by the presence of Soviet troops). By contrast, in countries like Romania, Poland and most of the non-Russian Soviet republics, local communist parties were minimal political presences before they were swept into power by Russian troops. While some of these regimes tried – and in some cases succeeded – to gain popular legitimacy from other sources (e.g. by appealing to national sentiment in Romania), these “birth defects” arguably undermined the long-term legitimacy of communism and should therefore be expected to affect democratic conceptions and support.

Third, despite their previously discussed high ideological and institutional uniformity, communist regimes nevertheless differed in a number of significant ways, including the relative rigidity with which they stuck to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in both the economic and political realm, and in the concrete repercussions of their policies on the lives of the average citizen. For the purpose of the current analysis our main focus will be on the divergent paths during the late communist period of the 1980s, which is likely to have been the most important historical reference point for the retrospective evaluations of the communist system by post-communist citizens. We will here focus on two distinctions: arguably the most important for our current focus was the difference between countries that embraced at least limited political liberalization prior to the collapse of communism (e.g. Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union) and those whose regimes stuck to their old (neo-)Stalinist ways (e.g. Albania, Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany). In the former countries the claim that communism could have been reformed

from the inside was arguably much more plausible than in the latter group, which should have implications for the extent to which citizens are willing to embrace the most obvious regime alternative: liberal democracy. More indirectly – but perhaps no less importantly – the divergence between countries that weathered the economic crisis of the 1980s relatively well (e.g. East Germany and the Soviet Union) vs. those that suffered crippling recessions (e.g. Poland, Yugoslavia and especially Romania) is likely to shape how individuals remember communism and by extension the extent to which they retain or reject its values.

Last, but not least, communism differed from most other authoritarian regimes in that it actually claimed to be democratic. These pretensions went beyond the use of “democracy” in a variety of official names (including the “German Democratic Republic”), to include regular elections, which in some countries (e.g. Poland and East Germany) even gave voters a choice between multiple parties, even if the outcome of the elections was never really in question. Perhaps more importantly for the present discussion, was the fact that communist regimes referred to themselves as “people’s democracies,” whose democratic nature supposedly derived from the fact that their leaders governed in accordance with the interests of the majority of the people. While by the 1980s most of these democratic claims sounded increasingly hollow,³⁸ they nevertheless meant that unlike other authoritarian regimes, communism offered its own vision of democracy. This vision was characterized by an emphasis on outcomes (e.g. equality) over democratic procedures, on socio-economic entitlements over political rights and civil liberties, and on broad national unity over the conflict inherent in competitive electoral politics. While

³⁸ While some of the early communist redistributive efforts and developmental achievements had given a certain validation that communist regimes represented rule for the people (if not necessarily by the people), by the 1980s the increasingly visible life style differences between communist elites and average citizens had largely delegitimized these claims.

post-communist elite efforts to salvage key components of this vision ultimately failed,³⁹ they are nevertheless likely to affect how post-communist citizens understand democracy and the extent to which different facets of political and economic performance affect their support for democracy.

3.2.2 *Concepts and definitions*

In order to formulate hypotheses we first need clear definitions of our key concepts. While we defer a more detailed discussion of the specific indicators to the next section, we will now briefly define what we mean by democratic conceptions and democratic support for the purposes of this chapter.

To keep the discussion (and the analysis) manageable, we will not attempt to address the impact on communism on all the possible dimensions along which democracies and democratic conceptions can vary (such as direct vs. indirect democracy, the importance of participation and deliberation etc.). While our framework could be applied to such questions in future research, we will here focus on what we consider to be the central issues facing the transition from communism to some form of Western democracy.

Therefore, in light of our earlier discussion of communist “people’s democracy” we will distinguish between three main *democratic conceptions*, which we will call *minimalist/procedural*, *social-democratic*, and *communist*, and a fourth (non)conception, which for lack of a better term we call *confused*. The first three conceptions can be very clearly defined by how much emphasis they place on basic procedures ensuring free and fair political competition for public office versus the achievement of certain ideals (such as social equality)

³⁹ See, for example, the “original democracy” proposals by Romania’s president Ion Iliescu in 1990.

which are assumed to be in the interest of the majority of citizens. As discussed above, a *communist* conception of democracy clearly prioritizes the achievement of such ideologically derived outcomes over the respect for democratic procedures. At the other extreme, following in the Schumpeterian tradition, proponents of a *minimalist/procedural* definition of democracy emphasize the importance of basic rules allowing for free political competition but show little concern for whether the outcomes of this process conform with popular preferences. This procedural emphasis arguably comes closest to the vision of democracy promoted by the West in the aftermath of the collapse of communism,⁴⁰ and as such it represents not only a conceptual counter-pole but also the clearest political alternative to communism. In between, as suggested by its name, a *social-democratic* vision of democracy attempts to combine the social aspirations of the communist conception with respect for the democratic procedures emphasized by the minimalist/procedural definition. Finally, if one's understanding of democracy emphasizes neither political competition nor social ideals but instead substitutes unrelated elements (such as prosperity), then we would classify such a conception as *confused*.

By *democratic support*, we mean the extent to which an individual expresses general support for democracy as a form of government. This definition includes support for the basic institutions of representative democracy (such as elections, parliaments and political parties) and for the individual political rights and civil liberties necessary to satisfy the requirements of a minimalist definition of democracy. However, this definition does not include support for additional elements of a broader liberal understanding of democracy, such as minority rights or

⁴⁰ To be fair, Western democratic prescriptions also emphasized liberal elements (such as minority rights and somewhat later also rule of law), which are missing from the strict minimalist version discussed here. However, for practical reasons we have decided against adding an additional *liberal* conception of democracy to our typology for two reasons: first, the legacy of communism vv. key components of the liberal model (esp. minority rights) is much more ambiguous than with respect to the other two dimensions; and second, we found no good survey questions capturing the importance of minority protections as a democratic component, which would have made it difficult to test it empirically with our data. However, such an extension could be pursued by future research.

respect for the rule of law. Moreover, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, our understanding of democratic support is explicitly distinct from the questions of trust in and satisfaction with various “real-life” democratic institutions. In other words, in this chapter we are interested in knowing whether an individual supports elections featuring multiple political parties as a way of selecting the country’s leadership, not whether that same individual is satisfied with the choice of political parties or with the political leaders in their own country at a certain point in time, which are topics we will take up in later chapters.

3.2.3 *Specific hypotheses*

In line with the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2, this section will formulate hypotheses about both the nature of post-communist exceptionalism in conceptions of and support for democracy, and about how we can establish which – if any – of the historical legacy explanations provides a more persuasive account of the peculiarly post-communist attitudinal patterns.

3.2.3.1 *Post-communist exceptionalism*

At the most basic level, we expect democratic conceptions and support to differ between citizens of ex-communist and non-communist countries. Thus, given their country’s communist legacy of “popular democracy,” we should expect *post-communist citizens to be more likely to embrace a communist conception of democracy and less likely to embrace a minimalist/procedural view* than their counterparts in non-communist countries. While we have no definite predictions about the absolute impact of communism on the embrace of social-democratic views of democracy, there are several reasons to *expect confused conceptions to be*

more prevalent among post-communist citizens. First, a certain degree of conceptual confusion is arguably inevitable during any rapid regime transition, especially after long authoritarian spells like those experienced by the communist countries. Second, due to the ideological degeneration of late communism, the legitimacy of communist regimes came to depend increasingly on their ability to ensure the economic welfare of their citizens. While both early and late communism shared a lack of concern for democratic procedures, the growing focus on economic outcomes under late communism should be expected to continue into the post-communist period, thereby reinforcing the conceptual confusion inherent in any regime change. Third, both domestic and international promoters of post-communist democracy had an understandable – but potentially dangerous – tendency of “selling” Western democracy as part of a broader package, which either implicitly or explicitly appealed to the frustrated hopes of East Europeans of being able to emulate Western living standards. As a result, much of the political discourse of the post-communist transition has tended to conflate democracy and prosperity, and thereby unwittingly reinforced the communist legacy of conceptual confusion.

There are two types of reasons why we predict that *democratic support will be lower in post-communist countries* than elsewhere. Most directly, there are several elements inherent in a democratic transition process, which are likely to undermine (at least in the short to medium term) democratic support among at least some sections of the population. First, individuals who benefited either politically or economically under the authoritarian regime are unlikely to embrace democratic values, especially if they know or fear that they will do worse under democracy. Second, the fall of authoritarianism is rarely followed immediately by the rise of coherent and fully functional democratic institutions, and the potential for instability and conflict that often accompanies such upheavals is likely to reduce democratic support.

More indirectly, there are reasons to expect that post-communist support for democracy would be affected by the previously discussed differences in democratic conceptions among the citizens of ex-communist countries. Thus, to the extent that post-communist citizens are more likely to see democracy as being primarily about social justice or economic prosperity, then they may be less willing to endorse the procedural version of democracy, which was eventually adopted in most of Eastern Europe after 1989. This problem was arguably exacerbated by the fact that most transition countries experienced severe economic crises and significant increases in economic inequality during the early and mid 1990s. While these trends were obviously not the result of the simultaneous process of democratization,⁴¹ it is not surprising that their temporal correlation would undermine democratic support, especially for citizens for whom democracy is not primarily about multi-party elections.

Of course, we need to consider at least the possibility that the collapse of thoroughly discredited authoritarian regimes – as many East European communist regimes were in 1989 – would actually result in a surplus of democratic fervor, as citizens rush to embrace the most obvious political alternative to their authoritarian past. While there is certainly a certain appeal to this logic, we expect these democratic surges to be limited in at least two ways. First, the democratic honeymoon, which occurred during and immediately after the fall of communism, was arguably fairly brief in most countries as the messy reality of (semi)democratic politics clashed with the lofty ideals that had dominated during the early days of regime change. Therefore, in order to capture such democratic enthusiasm statistically, we would need to use surveys from the relatively short weeks (or perhaps a few months) surrounding the fall of communism. Second, even if we were able to focus on these short honeymoon periods, we may

⁴¹ In fact, as Hellman (1998) shows, post-communist democracies experienced lower output falls and inequality increases than their authoritarian counterparts.

well find that beneath the intensive affective embrace of democracy many post-communist citizens and elites harbored political attitudes that were at odds with key tenets of democratic politics. By this we refer not only to the strong ethno-nationalist currents that permeated many of the early democratic movements, but also to the fact that popular enthusiasm for the vague overall notion of democracy often co-existed with considerable reservations about many institutions – such as political parties – without which democratic politics cannot properly function.⁴²

2.3.2 *Socio-demographic landscapes hypotheses*

As discussed in Chapter 2, the basic idea underlying the *socio-demographic landscapes* theory is that it is conceivable that to the extent that post-communist political attitudes indeed differ from those found elsewhere in the world, these differences could simply be the product of the peculiar social and demographic legacies left behind by several decades of communism's unique developmental approach. While we cannot hope to capture all the social and demographic aspects along which communist societies differed from their non-communist counterparts, we will here focus on three crucial aspects. First, citizens of communist countries tended to be comparatively over-educated, and since we expect education to be associated with both clearer conceptions of liberal democracy and greater support for democracy, we predict that *controlling for education will not reduce (and may even exacerbate) post-communist deficits in democratic conceptions and support.*

Second, communist countries tended to be poorer than most other democracies. Since greater socio-economic development generally means that economic concerns are less urgent for

⁴² Tellingly, such reservations existed even among leading democratic elites, including Vaclav Havel and other prominent members of the Czech Civic Forum (Kopecky 2000).

the majority of citizens, we should expect it to lead to a lower tendency to equate democracy with economic performance.⁴³ Moreover, citizens of richer countries should face lower temptations to sacrifice democracy in the pursuit of authoritarian alternatives promising faster economic development, which may account for the well documented negative relationship between economic development levels and transitions away from democracy (cf. Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Boix and Stokes 2003). Therefore, we predict that *controlling for economic development will reduce the post-communist surplus in confused democratic conceptions and will reduce the post-communist deficit in democratic support.*

Thirdly, communist societies were considerably more equal than their non-communist counterparts, and some of this advantage was preserved despite the fairly rapid increase in inequality during the 1990s. Given that in many non-communist developing countries high inequality is an important factor undermining democratic legitimacy, we should expect that *controlling for inequality will exacerbate the post-communist democratic support deficit.* However, it is less clear how lower inequality levels would affect democratic conceptions and support. On the one hand, it is possible that being used to lower inequality, citizens would incorporate a concern for social equality into their definition of democracy. On the other hand, it is possible that many East Europeans regarded the inequality levels left behind by communism as a symptom of a lack of individual opportunities, in which case they could have been more eager to exclude social equality from their democratic conception. Therefore, we have no clear prediction of whether and how the legacy of low economic inequality affects post-communist democratic conceptions.

⁴³ It is less clear a priori whether the inclusion of redistributive elements into the definition of democracy would be more or less frequent in rich countries, since instances of liberal and redistributive democracies exist at both extremes of the developmental spectrum.

Finally, there are a few other socio-demographic legacies, such as the peculiar urbanization patterns promoted by communist developmental strategies and the significant decline in religiosity and church attendance in communist countries, which may affect democratic conceptions and support but we do not have clear theoretical predictions about how controlling for such differences would affect the nature and the magnitude of post-communist exceptionalism. Overall, this brief discussion of the likely impact of accounting for communist-era socio-demographic differences suggests that different facets of the communist developmental blueprint should be expected to have opposite (and at times indeterminate) effects. Nevertheless, to the extent that the “different socio-demographic landscapes” theory is correct we should expect that *on aggregate the post-communist exceptionalism in democratic conceptions and support should be reduced or even eliminated once we account for differences in socio-demographic conditions between ex-communist and non-communist countries.*

3.2.3.3 Different stimuli hypotheses

The post-communist transition abounded in both economic and political stimuli, which could at least in theory account for the different democratic attitudes of its citizens. In economic terms, East European countries experienced one of the most traumatic economic crises in recent memory, with recessions that dwarfed both the Great Depression of the 1930s and the lost decade of the 1980s in Latin America, often accompanied by high and persistent inflation, and significant rises in unemployment. Since such economic traumas are widely believed to be detrimental to the health and survival of democracy, we should expect that *controlling for economic performance differences should greatly reduce the post-communist democratic support deficit.* However, there are also reasons not to overstate this “Weimar scenario,” not only

because we know in hindsight that at least in Eastern Europe democracy survived these crises, but also because there is pretty clear evidence that East Europeans were remarkably patient during this crisis periods (Greskovits 1998), perhaps because many of them blamed these hardships at least in part on the defunct communist regimes (Pop-Eleches 2009).

In terms of democratic conceptions, the impact of the post-communist economic crisis is more ambiguous: on the one hand, the widespread hardship, growing inequality and greater exposure to market risk, which accompanied economic liberalization, could be expected to contribute to greater emphasis on social and economic criteria in post-communist democratic conceptions. On the other hand, given that these phenomena occurred in parallel to the transition to democracy, it is conceivable that they taught East Europeans a painful lesson in democratic theory by making it very clear that democracy does not necessarily mean greater social equality and economic prosperity. Therefore, we have *no clear prediction about how controlling for different economic stimuli would affect democratic conception differences between ex-communist and non-communist countries.*

Among the myriad of political stimuli differences confronting post-communist citizens, we will focus on the likely impact of three aspects, which are most likely to account for differences in democratic attitudes. Perhaps most obviously, on average post-communist countries have significantly shorter democratic histories than even most developing countries, which should contribute to conceptual confusion about democracy and potentially to lower democratic support (as discussed above). Second, as one of us has shown elsewhere (Pop-Eleches 2009) has shown, transition countries suffered from a significant deficit in political liberties and civil liberties even after more than a decade since the fall of communism. This deficit, which was not limited to the former Soviet Union, suggests that post-communist citizens

experienced regimes, which were more likely to fall short of satisfying even the minimal requirements for procedural democracy. Given that for most East Europeans, the flawed post-communist (semi)democracies were their only experience with anything other than full-blown communist authoritarianism, we should expect their democratic conceptions and their support for democratic ideals to reflect the flaws of the only real-life “democracies” they had the opportunity to experience. Third, post-communist countries experienced more than their share of corruption and governance problems, which means that even to the extent that their citizens enjoyed basic civil and political liberties, the quality of post-communist democracy was lower than elsewhere. This deficit should also be expected to undermine democratic support, though it is somewhat less clear how it would affect democratic conceptions.⁴⁴ Overall, however, this discussion suggests that *controlling for the shorter and weaker political track record of East European democracy should reduce the magnitude of post-communist differences in democratic conceptions and support.*

3.2.3.4 Socialization hypotheses

As discussed in greater detail in chapter 2, there are two versions of the socialization theory. Based on the cumulative socialization theory, which treats political attitudes as the cumulative result of life experiences, we should expect *citizens who lived for longer periods under communism should have more distorted views of democracy and lower levels of democratic support* than those who experienced shorter communist spells. Meanwhile, longer

⁴⁴ Presumably, high corruption and weak rule of law would emphasize the importance of adding liberal elements to the basic procedural definition of democracy, but it does not produce equally strong predictions about the salience of social and economic considerations, which are the focus of our present discussion.

periods of either pre-communist or post-communist life experience should have the opposite effect.

The second version – early socialization theory – focuses instead on the importance of early socialization in adolescence or early adulthood. To the extent that these early formative political experiences have a decisive impact on later political attitudes, then we should *expect individuals who spent more of these crucial early years under communism to have more distorted democratic conceptions and weaker democratic support* than their co-nationals who grew up during either pre- or post-communism. As a corollary, going back to our earlier discussion of different subtypes of communist regimes, and assuming that under some subtypes the “dose” of ideological indoctrination was higher than in others, we would expect *individuals whose early socialization took place under particularly rigid communist regimes (esp. Stalinist and neo-Stalinist) to have more distorted democratic conceptions and weaker democratic support than those who grew up in more reformist communist periods.*

3.2.3.5 Running tally hypotheses

While socialization theory assumes that individuals form their attitudes early and/or change them only over relatively long periods of time, in a world of Running tally, such earlier experiences serve to inform individual priors on certain issues but these priors can be updated – at times rather quickly – as a result of compelling new information. For the purpose of the present analysis, we will focus on how the nature of economic and political performance during three main periods – pre-communism, communism and post-communism – should be expected to shape post-communist democratic conceptions and attitudes.

First, the previously discussed differences in pre-communist democratic trajectories among countries in the region may inform both citizens' views about the meaning of democracy and the extent of their support for democratic values. Even though the pre-communist experience was more than four decades old by 1989, we would argue that a longer and better interwar democratic spell could provide important "guidance" not only for citizens old enough to consciously remember pre-communist democracy but also – through inter-generational transmission within families or other non-communist formal and informal institutions⁴⁵ – for their younger compatriots. Therefore, we should *expect to see smaller deficits in democratic support and weaker differences in democratic conceptions in countries with stronger pre-communist democratic traditions.*

Second, a Bayesian perspective would also predict that individual attitudes towards democracy would be shaped by the nature of communist rule in a given country. More concretely, we would expect *greater allegiance to communist conceptions of democracy and lower support for non-communist democracy in countries where communism enjoyed greater legitimacy at the time of its collapse.* While there are of course multiple possible sources of regime legitimacy, based on our earlier historical overview of East European communist trajectories, we will here focus on two potentially important time periods. The first goes back to the early days of communism, and to the legitimacy differences between homegrown communist regimes and those imposed by Soviet military force. While communist regimes could of course gain or lose legitimacy in subsequent decades for a variety of reasons, we would expect these different origins to survive in both individual and collective memories and affect the ease with which communist ideas could be discarded after its collapse. However, it is also important to

⁴⁵ See for example, Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) and Wittenberg (2006).

focus on the economic and political performance of the late communist period, whose temporal proximity to the transition period means that it supplied East Europeans with the freshest communist memories. Therefore we would expect that in communist regimes, which redeemed themselves at least partially in the 1980s through decent economic performance and/or genuine political liberalization efforts, would leave behind citizens more likely to preserve communist ideals and, therefore, less eager to embrace Western democratic conceptions and values.

Finally, for obvious reasons, the most important updating about the relative worth of democracy should be expected to happen over the actual course of the post-communist transition. Therefore, we should *expect faster convergence to Western democratic conceptions and greater support for democracy in countries/periods with better post-communist economic and political performance*. In line with our earlier discussion, in assessing political performance, we will focus not only on basic democratic rights but also on the quality of democratic governance. With respect to economic performance, we will test the democratic attitude repercussions of both short-term economic performance and longer-term comparisons to the pre-transition period.⁴⁶

Of course, the post-communist political and economic experience differed not only across countries and time periods but also across individuals at a given point in space and time. Since such “pocketbook” considerations are likely to affect not only voting decisions but also more fundamental political attitudes, such as democratic support, we would *expect that democratic support will be higher among transition winners than among transition losers*.

While our discussion so far has identified the nature of the effect on democratic conceptions and support we would expect to see for different types of pre-communist,

⁴⁶ This choice is justified by the fact that whereas studies on economic voting generally find that individuals care most about short-term economic conditions, post-communist surveys suggest that economic comparisons to 1989 continue to be highly salient for East Europeans (Owen and Tucker 2010; Pop-Eleches 2008).

communist and post-communist performance, we want to reiterate that empirical support for the Running tally hypothesis requires more than support for the importance of performance in any one of the three historical periods. By definition, for updating to take place, we need to establish the existence of a (historical) prior and some additional information at a later point in time, which leads to a reassessment of prior beliefs. Thus, if we found that post-communist performance matters but pre-communist and communist are irrelevant, then we could not really talk about updating (or at least not of the type of updating we are interested in here.)⁴⁷ Meanwhile, if only the nature of pre-communist or communist performance were to matter, then we could once again not really talk about a running tally, since subsequent information would be irrelevant, but instead we would be much closer to a socialization scenario, whereby individuals are stuck in the past. However, if pre-communist and post-communist performance matters but post-communist performance does not, then we could still consider this to be evidence of A running tally, albeit one on a much longer historical scale.

3.3 Data, indicators and methods

3.3.1 Data sources

To test the hypotheses developed in the preceding section, we will rely on data from two sets of cross-national public opinion surveys: the *Post-Communist Publics* (PCP) Study and the *World Values Survey* (WVS). The PCP study consists of two waves of surveys (1990-2 and 1998-2001) and was administered in twelve ex-communist countries for the first wave and in fourteen ex-communist countries plus West Germany for the second wave (see Table A2 for full

⁴⁷ In theory, citizens could still engage in shorter-term updating, e.g. in how the political developments since the most recent post-communist election affects their views of democracy. However, while such updating would still be interesting in its own right, it would be less relevant for our present focus on communist legacies.

coverage details). While the World Values Survey dates back to 1980 and has recently completed its fifth wave, for the purposes of the analysis in this chapter we were only able to use data from the three most recent waves (1995-7, 1999-2002 and 2004-2009) but this still yielded 172 surveys from 90 countries (see Table A3 for more details.)

While managing, analyzing and presenting data from multiple sources raises a number of difficulties, and may at times complicate the reader's task of keeping tab of the various types of data, even a brief comparison of the two sets of surveys used in this chapter helps illustrate several of the advantages inherent in our reliance on multiple sources of survey data throughout the manuscript. Perhaps most obviously, different surveys tend to cover different topics with varying degrees of detail, which means that given the broad range of citizen politics our book tackles it is highly unlikely that one set of surveys will consistently have the best set of survey questions. For example, despite its wide variety of survey questions, WVS does not include (to the best of our knowledge) questions about democratic conceptions, which made it essential to rely on PCP data for that part of our analysis.

Moreover, even to the extent that different sets of surveys cover the same topic - as in the case of democratic support for the analysis in this chapter - different sources will still differ in terms of question wording and coverage. Therefore, comparing statistical results across different sources is helpful for testing the robustness of key findings. In situations where different data sources yield different results, such discrepancies can help us establish scope conditions for certain types of findings.

Finally, cross-national sets of public opinion surveys tend to vary widely in the extent and the nature of their geographic and temporal coverage, which means that different data sources will offer the best universe of cases for particular questions. Thus, for establishing the

extent of post-communist exceptionalism and the impact of demographic legacies and different stimuli on the comparative patterns of democratic conceptions and support, WVS has the advantage of nearly unrivaled geographic coverage, since it not only covers 90 countries from all five continents over a period of almost two decades but it also includes 23 of the 28 former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. By comparison, the PCP study only includes a single survey from a non-communist country (West Germany in 2000), which obviously provides a much narrower reference category against which to measure the post-communist countries.⁴⁸ On the other hand, for analyzing the socialization and Running tally hypotheses, which are best tested through intra-regional comparisons of ex-communist countries, the PCP surveys are the better choice both because unlike WVS they include democratic support questions from the crucial 1990-92 period and because their sample composition is much more balanced across waves than the WVS,⁴⁹ which facilitates cross-temporal analyses.

In addition to the individual-level survey data from the two sources discussed above, we collected data on a range of economic and political performance indicators for each of the almost 200 country-years for which we had survey data from either of the sources. We then merged these indicators, which are discussed in greater detail below, with the individual-level survey data to construct a multi-level data set, which allows us to test the interaction between individual and country-level factors in driving post-communist attitudes towards democracy.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Fortunately, West Germany is a fairly useful reference point, for a number of reasons. First, it is a good example of the Western democratic model, which most East European countries tried to emulate after the fall of communism. Second, judging by the nature of its party politics and its welfare state, West Germany should be expected to display a more balanced mix of procedural/minimalist and social-democratic conceptions of democracy than the United States at one extreme and Sweden at the other. Third, the inclusion of Germany allows for intra-country comparisons of East and West Germans, which has several methodological advantages (as discussed earlier).

⁴⁹ As Table A2 in the appendix shows, 12 of the 14 post-communist countries were surveyed in both waves of the PCP study, whereas in WVS the mix of post-communist countries varies widely by wave.

⁵⁰ NOTE: We expect that much of the discussion of different data sources in this section will eventually be moved into either a separate chapter or into a new section in Chapter 2.

3.3.2 Indicators

3.3.2.1 Dependent variables

To construct statistical indicators of conceptions of democracy along the lines of our conceptual discussion in section 3.2, we proceeded as follows. First, we identified two questions for each of the three different types of democratic components, which respondents could consider to be important elements of democracy: (1) political rights and procedures (2) social equality and state economic regulation and (3) good economic performance (see appendix for full wording). Next we constructed averages for each of the categories (M_{proc} , M_{soc} , M_{econ}), ranging from 1-4 in line with the 4-point original survey questions. Finally, respondents were classified as having a *procedural* conception if procedural concerns clearly outweighed both social and economic concerns; a *social-democratic* conception if procedural and social concerns were of comparable importance and outweighed economic concerns; a *communist* conception if social concerns clearly outweighed both procedural and economic concerns; and *no/confused* conception if economic concerns clearly outweighed both procedural and social concerns or if there was no response to both questions for either the procedural or the social categories.⁵¹ For a breakdown of democratic conceptions by country and year, see Table 3.1.

To assess democratic support, we created two standardized democracy index based on seven WVS survey questions, and on five PCP survey questions.⁵² While the two indexes have

⁵¹ More precisely we assigned a procedural conception if $M_{proc} \geq M_{soc} + 1$ & $M_{proc} \geq M_{econ}$; a *social-democratic* conception if $M_{proc} > M_{soc} - 1$ & $M_{proc} < M_{soc} + 1$ & $M_{proc} \geq M_{econ}$ | $M_{soc} \geq M_{econ}$, a *communist* conception $M_{soc} \geq M_{proc} + 1$ & $M_{soc} \geq M_{econ}$, and *no/confused* conception if $(M_{econ} > M_{soc} \text{ \& \& } M_{econ} > M_{proc})$ | $M_{proc} = \text{miss.}$ | $M_{socdem} = \text{miss.}$ [Note that M_{proc} , M_{soc} , and M_{econ} are all measured on a 4-point scale, which means that a 1-point difference is actually fairly substantial.]

⁵² Cronbach's alpha for the index was .72 for the WVS index and .60 for the PCP index, which is quite reasonable for this type of survey questions. Moreover, in both cases, factor analysis confirmed that all the questions loaded on

very similar means and standard deviations, the regression results based using the two different indicators should not be interpreted as directly comparable, as the measures are based on rather different survey questions and there is no single question that was asked identically in both sets of surveys. Thus, the WVS questions asked respondents to evaluate different statements about democracy and alternative ways of ruling the country, whereas the PCP questions mostly asked respondents about whether their country needed a number of basic democratic institutions (such as parties and a parliament) and about the importance of multi-party elections (see appendix for question wording).

3.3.2.1 Independent variables

To establish the extent of post-communist exceptionalism, the regressions in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 include an indicator denoting whether the respondent lived in an ex-communist country of Eastern Europe⁵³ or the former Soviet Union. Since we are interested in establishing the difference between these countries and non-communist countries, in our analysis we excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.

To test the importance of socio-demographic differences, our regressions include several relevant individual-level characteristics, including dummies for tertiary and secondary education, age, sex, religious denomination, religiosity/church attendance and size of locality.⁵⁴ Since

a single main factor, and in no case were we able to improve the alpha statistic by either dropping or adding any variables from the index.

⁵³ Respondents from the former East Germany (DDR) were also coded as ex-communist citizens.

⁵⁴ We did our best to ensure that the demographic categories were comparable across surveys, though in some cases this was not fully possible (e.g. because locality size categories differed slightly between WVS and PCP).

personal income questions were not asked consistently across the two surveys,⁵⁵ we decided to focus instead on country-level GDP/capita to capture cross-country and cross-regional income differences. Moreover, to test the impact of the egalitarian legacy of communism, we included a GINI coefficient of income inequality from the most recently available pre-survey year.⁵⁶

As potential indicators of different economic stimuli facing post-communist citizens, we collected data on inflation, GDP change and unemployment in the year (or two years) preceding the survey. However, since unemployment statistics are more difficult to compare cross-nationally and since the fairly high correlation between unemployment and GDP growth (.41 in the PCP survey sample) created some multi-collinearity problems, our final model specifications only included inflation and GDP change to capture economic performance. To capture current political performance we included Freedom House democracy score (reversed, so that higher scores indicate greater civil liberties and political rights) and a corruption control index, which used data from three different sources (see appendix) to deal with uneven geographic and temporal coverage problems. Finally, to measure a country's democratic track record we created an indicator of the logged number of years for which the country had been continuously democratic.⁵⁷

To test the socialization hypotheses, we used a person's age and the year of the survey to determine their birth year, and then combined this information with the communist periodization

⁵⁵ Thus, PCP only asked respondents how they thought their incomes compared to their co-nationals but did not collect data on actual household income. WVS asked respondents to place themselves into one of ten income bands but since these categories were country-specific, they cannot be used for cross-country comparisons (even though they do provide an indicator of within-country household income differences.)

⁵⁶ Unless otherwise stated, all of the country-level economic and political variables are lagged one year to reduce possible reverse causation concerns (e.g. if the weak democratic support reflected in a survey early in the calendar year would lead to a decline in democracy later that year, then the lower democracy score received by the country for that year should obviously not be used to explain democratic support.)

⁵⁷ The logged version is justified on both theoretical grounds (since the difference between 50 and 60 years of democracy is arguably less than between 1 and 11 years), and empirically, since the logged version consistently produced better fits than non-logged and quadratic specifications.

data from Table 2.1 to calculate the *number of years a given respondent had lived under pre-communism, communism and post-communism*. In the statistical tests we used logged versions of these duration measures because doing so produced consistently stronger model fits than linear duration. Moreover, for each respondent we calculated the *number of years spent under pre-communism, post-communism and during each type of communist regime subtype* for two periods of their formative years: *ages 8-13 and 14-19*. These periods were chosen to broadly capture primary and secondary school ages, and since we are not aware of recent studies establishing the age at which children in communist regimes develop political consciousness, we tested the effects for both time periods and presented the ones which produced stronger results.⁵⁸

In order to get at least partial proxies of the historical economic and political performance of different countries, which we expect to inform the Running tally process, we used several different indicators. For pre-communist democratic experience, we used the *average Polity Regime score for the 1920-39 period* in Eastern Europe and for the two decades preceding the 1917 Revolution in the interwar Soviet republics. While we also tested a number of alternative measures, including the highest pre-communist Polity regime score and a dummy variable capturing the existence of competitive elections in the interwar period, the results were quite similar and are not presented here for space reasons.

To capture the initial legitimacy of the communist regimes, we constructed a “homegrown communism” dummy variable based on our discussion in section 1.2.1 of the introductory chapter. As measures of late communist economic performance, we used *average GDP change from 1981-88* (compiled from several sources, including Kornai 1992 and

⁵⁸ Easton and Dennis (1969) found that among white US children political consciousness developed in primary school but it is unclear to what extent this finding applies to children in communist regimes. We thank Markus Prior for bringing this study to our attention.

Maddison 2009). For late communist political performance, we used *Polity regime scores in 1989* but we also used alternative measures, including 1989 FH democracy scores and a dummy indicator identifying late (neo)Stalinist regimes, and found similar results. For the post-communist period, in addition to the short-term economic and political performance indicators discussed above, we included current GDP as a % of 1989 levels to capture the cumulative post-communist economic performance of a given country at the time of the survey.

In addition to these regime performance indicators, our regressions included two institutional variables – dummy indicators for the presence of a PR electoral system and a presidential system. Since we are not making an institutional legacy argument for these two variables, they are best interpreted as control variables meant to ensure that our findings are robust to controlling for institutional variation.

3.3.3 Statistical methods

For the statistical tests presented in this chapter we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the two democratic support indexes (which were normally distributed) and multinomial logistic regressions in the case of democratic conception types. In interpreting multinomial logit tests, it is important to keep in mind that the coefficients for any given category of the dependent variables are reported in reference to the omitted category, which means that both the size and the significance of the effect need to be interpreted accordingly. However, it is very easy to calculate the relative effect of an IV on any two categories by simply calculating the difference in coefficients and the conditional standard errors.

For both types of regressions we present robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. This approach adjusts standard errors in order to account for the multi-level nature of

our data, i.e. that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and governance differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey.⁵⁹ Moreover, all the regressions for both data sources use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

3.4. Statistical results

3.4.1 Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

The summary statistics in Table 3.1 about the proportions of citizens holding different democratic conceptions allow us to draw a few preliminary conclusions. Most importantly for our purposes, Table 3.1 suggests that democratic conceptions in ex-communist countries did indeed differ in theoretically predictable ways from those in West Germany, with East Europeans being less likely to embrace a procedural conception of democracy and more likely to display either a communist understanding or no coherent understanding of democracy than their non-communist counterparts. Nonetheless, these differences should not be overstated: thus, in all ex-communist countries absolute majorities of citizens embraced procedural and social-democratic definitions of democracy, while support for the communist conception averaged only 5% even in 1990. Moreover, the post-communist deficit was much smaller in the case of East Germany and the Czech Republic (and to a certain extent Slovakia and Poland), which suggests that not all of the East-West gap should be ascribed to the legacy of communism.

Table 3.1 here

⁵⁹ In a future version of this chapter we plan to re-run these tests using hierarchical linear models in HLM 6.0 to model the multi-level nature of the data more explicitly. However, in earlier paper where we ran similar tests using WVS data (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a) we found no difference between HLM models and the clustered standard errors approach used here. We thank Nathaniel Beck for his advice in this regard.

Second, the temporal patterns at the regional level and for most individual countries point towards a clear but fairly slow post-communist convergence towards Western conceptions of democracy: thus, the proportion of “proceduralists” generally increased by an average of 3-4% at the expense of “social democrats”, “communists” and “ignorants,” but remained quite different from Western standards even by 2000. The main exceptions to this gradualist trend were Romania, which experienced a 16% increase in proceduralists (mostly at the expense of a large drop in ignorants) and Bulgaria, whose citizens appear to have become significantly more confused (though not less proceduralist) in their democratic conceptions during the first transition decade.⁶⁰

Finally, there is a fair amount of within-country temporal continuity in the proportions of citizens subscribing to different conceptions of democracy. While in the absence of panel data we cannot infer individual-level continuity from these figures, their stability nevertheless suggests that at the societal level there have not been massive upheavals in how post-communist citizens view democracy. Moreover, this stability, combined with the fairly intuitive cross-country differences discussed above, suggests that our democratic conceptions indicators have decent reliability and validity.

By comparison, the cross-regional and cross-temporal patterns of democratic support are much less encouraging and much less supportive of a gradual decline of the importance of communist legacies. Thus, citizens of the former communist countries were not only less supportive of democratic principles than their West German counterparts, but their enthusiasm for democracy actually declined quite dramatically over the course of the first post-communist

⁶⁰ Russia also experienced an unusual trend – with liberals declining sharply at the expense of communists and ignorants – but sample differences across the two surveys make direct comparisons more difficult.

decade.⁶¹ While the magnitude of this decline has varied significantly across countries, the only country to experience an (albeit modest) increase in democratic support was East Germany, which suggests that the experience of living in the significantly more functional German democracy may have facilitated at least some value convergence. However, the changes in democratic support among the other transition countries defy easy explanation, and a closer inquiry into their drivers will have to be left to the regression analysis in the following section.⁶²

As a next step in establishing the nature and extent of post-communist exceptionalism, in Table 3.2 we present “bare-bones” regression results, which mostly just include a post-communism dummy variable and a year indicator. In line with our methodological discussion about the importance of combining cross-national and within-country analyses, for both types of dependent variables (democratic conceptions and support) we will present both regressions based on the full sample of ex-communist and non-communist countries and regressions based solely on respondents from East and West Germany.

To test the extent to which the differences in democratic conceptions discussed above were indeed statistically significant, in models 1&2 of Table 3.1 we ran multinomial logistic regressions on the four-category indicator of the type of democratic conception embraced by a given respondent based on data from the two waves (1990-92 and 1998-2001) of the Post-Communist Publics (PCP) Study. Model 1 confirms that post-communist citizens were significantly more likely to hold either communist conception of democracy (where social equality was deemed much more important than political liberties), or to be confused about the

⁶¹ While Table 1 only presents the averages for the 5-item democratic support index, democratic support actually declined significantly for all five questions that make up the index (results available upon request), which suggests that these findings are not driven by massive changes in one narrow area of democratic values.

⁶² Thus, while the dramatic drop in democratic support in Ukraine and (perhaps) Bulgaria can be explained by their poor post-communist economic performance and governance, the Czech Republic also experienced a significant drop despite its significantly better post-communist performance.

meaning of democracy (by either equating democracy with good economic outcomes or by having no clearly defined views about what democracy means.) Given that the excluded category is a social democratic definition of democracy, the negative and statistically significant but substantively smaller effect of post-communism on procedural democracy conceptions suggests that among the more mainstream visions of democracy, East Europeans were relatively more likely to embrace the one that was closest to the type of democracy which the communist regimes had tried to promote before 1989. These trends are also confirmed when we limit our analysis to inter-German differences in Model 2, but in this case the magnitude of the post-communist knowledge and proceduralism gap is somewhat smaller.

Overall, the findings in Tables 3.1 & 3.2 confirm that – at least compared to West Germans – post-communist citizens did indeed differ in their democratic conceptions in ways that are very much in line with what one would have expected given the nature of the communist political experience and their lack of recent democratic exposure. On the other hand, the magnitude of these differences was not sufficiently large to lead us to conclude that the democratic conceptions of East Europeans are fundamentally different from those of their Western counterparts. This conclusion is also supported by the very weak explanatory power of models 1 and 2, which suggests that post-communism alone does not account for a significant proportion of individual differences in democratic conceptions. Moreover, it should be noted that since the reference group for these tests was West Germany, we are essentially setting a fairly high standard of a clear and mainstream understanding of democracy: had the reference group included other more poorer or more recent democracies, the differences may well have been smaller. Nonetheless, the greater share of communist and confused conceptions of democracy among East Europeans suggests that in our subsequent analyses we need to be cognizant of these

differences to ensure that any differences in democratic support or satisfaction are not driven by these differences in understanding about what democracy is really about.

To test whether citizens of ex-communist countries differ in their level of support for democracy from citizens of non-communist countries, in models 3-7 we use data from both the PCP and the WVS surveys. As discussed earlier, the samples and the survey questions used to construct the indexes differed across the two data sources. While this means that the regression coefficients cannot be directly compared across the two sources, this approach has the advantage of providing greater confidence in the robustness of our findings if we find similar findings across sources.

Judging by the results in models 3 and 6, citizens in ex-communist countries were indeed significantly less pro-democracy than their non-communist counterparts, and these patterns apply not only to the PCP data presented in Table 3.1 but also to the WVS-based test in model 6, which included a different time period (1995-2008) and a larger sample (especially for non-communist countries.) These trends are also confirmed by the within-country analysis of German voters: according to models 5 and 7, East Germans were significantly less enthusiastic about democracy than their West German co-nationals, which reinforces the idea that something about the legacy of communism seems to be at odds with fully embracing democratic values. However, it should be noted that whereas for the PCP data (in line with the summary statistics in Table 3.1) the post-communist deficit was substantively much smaller for the within-Germany comparison in model 5, for the WVS data the intra-German differences in model 7 were actually greater than the ones for the full sample.⁶³

⁶³ While a more detailed analysis of this difference is beyond the scope of the present discussion, the difference between the two sources does not appear to be driven simply by sample and timing differences: we obtained similar trends for the WVS data when restricting the non-communist countries to West Germany or limited the time frame

Finally, in line with our earlier discussion, we tested whether the differences in democratic support are affected by the previously discussed differences in democratic conceptions between citizens of ex-communist and non-communist countries. To do so, in model 4 we added controls for whether an individual displayed a procedural, communist, or confused understanding of democracy to the basic specification in model 3. As expected, compared to the baseline (a social-democratic understanding of democracy), individuals holding a procedural conception of democracy were also more supportive of democratic values, while those with either a communist or a confused conception were significantly less supportive. However, for the purposes of our analysis, the more important finding in model 4 is the fact that the inclusion of democratic conception controls does not greatly affect our finding about the post-communist democratic support deficit, which was still highly statistically significant and only about 10% smaller in substantive terms than in model 3.⁶⁴

Overall, the results in Tables 3.1&3.2 reveal a statistically significant and substantively large post-communist deficit in democratic support among its citizens. Given that this deficit holds across analyses with different survey questions, samples and time periods, our next analytical task is to test which particular communism legacy mechanisms provide a more convincing account of these differences in democratic support, as well as in the previously discussed differences in democratic conceptions.

3.4.2 Democratic conceptions and communist legacy mechanisms

to pre-2002 data. Therefore, the differences are probably driven by the different questions included in the democracy index – a finding whose implications for our understanding of democratic values could be explored by future research.

⁶⁴ We obtained very similar results in a model (available upon request) where instead of controlling for democratic conception type we limited the analysis to individuals with mainstream democratic conceptions (i.e. liberal and social-democratic.)

In Table 3.3 we test whether the differences in democratic conceptions revealed in the first two tables can be accounted for by the four legacy-based mechanisms, which we discussed in chapter 2 and on which we based the hypotheses developed in the second section of this chapter. As a first step, in model 1 we added a series of demographic indicators to test whether the post-communist exceptionalism could be driven by the peculiar developmental blueprint of communism. However, the results in model 1 do not support this expectation, given that two of communism's developmental achievements – higher education and lower inequality – turned out to be statistically significant predictors of more procedural and less communist and confused democratic conceptions, while their lower economic development had a much weaker impact (and actually pointed in the wrong direction with respect to procedural conceptions). Therefore, once we control for demographics, the post-communist exceptionalism actually increases with respect to procedural conceptions, is virtually unchanged for confused conceptions and is only marginally lower with respect to communist views of democracy. Model 2 confirms that the same basic patterns are hold when we focus on within-country variation in Germany, in the sense that adding demographics does not make a significant dent in the magnitude of post-communist exceptionalism.⁶⁵

Table 3.3 here

Support for the differential stimuli hypothesis in models 3&4 was even weaker. Thus, according the model 3, the effects of economic conditions were statistically modest, and the only marginally significant effect actually pointed in the wrong direction, given that higher unemployment appears to promote a procedural conception of democracy and to reduce the

⁶⁵ The only exception is a fairly large drop in the coefficient for communist conceptions but this is at least partially counter-balanced by a significant increase in the coefficient for the (more numerous) no/confused democracy conceptions.

prevalence of democratic confusion, even though we hypothesized that worse economic conditions should determine East Europeans to embrace either economic or communist views of democracy. As a result the magnitude of the post-communist exceptionalism actually increased marginally for all three categories compared to model 2. The political performance indicators, which we included in the specification for model 4, also produced fairly modest results. The only exception was a statistically significant reduction in no/confused democratic conceptions among citizens of countries with lower corruption levels. However, this effect was only significant compared to the base category (social democratic) but not to the other two categories, and it reduced the substantive effect of the post-communism indicator only marginally for the “confused” category. Meanwhile, higher levels of FH democracy had no noticeably impact on democratic conceptions. Finally, the two institutional controls, which are less readily attributable to communist legacies – having a PR electoral system or a presidential system – were statistically more powerful but not necessarily in the expected direction, and jointly they did not help explain away the post-communist democratic conception patterns. Indeed, the post-communism deficit in procedural democracy conceptions was noticeably higher than in model 3, while the surplus in communist views was unchanged.

Table 3.4 here

In Table 3.4 we turn to testing the two remaining legacy mechanisms: socialization and Running tally. Judging by the results in model 1, the predictions of cumulative socialization receive strong statistical support with respect to democratic conceptions. Thus, individuals who lived longer under the communist system were significantly less likely to subscribe to a procedural conception of democracy and more likely to understand democracy along the lines promoted by the communist regimes. While longer personal exposure to communism does not

appear to have contributed to greater democratic confusion (at least compared to the baseline category,)⁶⁶ the negative and significant effect of post-communist experience in panel 1C indicates that confusion about the meaning of democracy did gradually decline over the course of the transition, even though this did not necessarily translate into a more procedural understanding (as the weakly positive post-communism effects in panels 1A and 1B suggest). Finally, pre-communist life experience did not seem to counteract the post-communist distortions: while having lived prior to the arrival of communism was associated with a lower propensity to subscribe to the communist conception of democracy, this effect was statistically inconclusive, and was countered by a marginally significant negative effect on procedural democracy conceptions and a marginally significant increase in confusion.⁶⁷

In model 2 we analyze the effects of early socialization on the later democratic conceptions of individuals. In general, the results in model 2 reveal a fairly modest impact of the type of regime in which individuals received their primary education (8-13 years).⁶⁸ However, two statistically significant effects are worth mentioning: thus, individuals who were socialized in the repressive and strictly ideological context of Stalinism, were significantly less likely to display a procedural understanding of democracy especially when compared to a communist conception (on which Stalinist socialization had a positive impact). The fact that these early socialization effects can be detected after four or more decades since the end of Stalinism and

⁶⁶ However, it should be noted that the difference between the coefficients in panel 1A and 1C was significant at .05, which means that individuals with longer communist exposures were more likely to be confused than to have a liberal conception.

⁶⁷ The negative effect on liberalism may not be particularly surprising given the weak liberal tradition in interwar Eastern Europe (Janos 2000, Kopstein and Wittenberg).

⁶⁸ We also tested the impact of slightly later socialization (ages 14-19) but the results were very similar and slightly weaker, and are omitted here for space reasons.

that the results in model 2 are net of overall communist exposure,⁶⁹ suggests that as far as democratic conceptions go the experience of Stalinist socialization had a very powerful impact on post-communist citizens. The other significant communist-era early socialization effect is the much lower frequency of communist democratic conceptions among individuals whose initial political experiences occurred during relatively reformist communist periods. This finding suggests that the relative political openness and ideological flexibility of these reformist episodes had longer-term repercussions on the political views of East European citizens who happened to come to political consciousness in those environments. Finally, while neither post-totalitarian nor neo-Stalinist regimes had significant long-term early socialization effects on democratic conceptions, their impact on the relative mix of procedural and communist democratic conceptions was fairly similar, and differed significantly from both Stalinist and reformist periods. This pattern suggests that despite their greater ideological rigidity and their more repressive tendencies, neo-Stalinist regimes could not rival their Stalinist role models in terms of their long term impact on the psyche of East European citizens.

In model 3 we test the extent to which post-communist democratic conceptions seem to be informed by both the recent and the more distant past along the lines of a Running tally model. The first set of indicators, which captures the nature of a country's political regime at three crucial reference points (the interwar period, 1989 and the year prior to the survey), is strongly supportive of the importance of prior beliefs and historical experience on the nature of democratic conceptions. Thus, citizens in countries with better democratic experiences in the

⁶⁹ For obvious reasons, an individual aged 8-13 during the heyday of Stalinism (generally pre-1953) had a longer overall communist exposure than somebody who came of age in the post-Stalinist period. This means that the anti-liberal and pro-communist bias in democratic conceptions is even higher for such a person than for somebody socialized during the Gorbachev period in the late 1980s. (Not surprisingly, the effects of the early socialization indicators are stronger if we exclude cumulative socialization measures from the model specification, but such models would be more difficult to interpret as capturing only early socialization effects).

interwar period were significantly more likely to embrace a procedural conception of democracy than either a social-democratic or a communist one. Furthermore, a pre-communist democratic history was also associated with significantly lower levels of post-communist confusion about the meaning of democracy, which confirms the importance of historical precedents as anchors for individual political views (even many decades later).

By contrast, citizens of countries that experienced at least partial political liberalizations in the year(s) prior to the collapse of communism, did not experience a similar procedural boost but instead were more likely to endorse a social-democratic and to an even greater extent a communist conception of democracy than their counterparts in regimes that had resisted political liberalization in the late 1980s. This interesting “reversal of fortunes” is important for two reasons. From a theoretical standpoint it provides strong evidence for the Running tally hypothesis, given that communist-era political liberalization arguably led East Europeans to form more positive opinions of the possibility of “communist democracy,” in which limited political rights could co-exist with the traditional ideological emphasis on social equality and state paternalism. Meanwhile, the experience of watching communist hardliners resist liberalization until the bitter end probably lowered the appeal of communist democratic conceptions in countries like Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Methodologically, this reversal of late communist fortunes helps counter potential concerns about reverse causation and spurious correlation, which would have been much more troubling if procedural conceptions of democracy had been consistently associated with greater historical political liberalism. Thus, one might argue that procedural democratic conceptions lead citizens to push for greater political rights and thereby be the reason rather than the result of more liberal political regimes. Alternatively, one might think that certain omitted country

characteristics (e.g. more distant institutional or developmental differences) drive both regime type and democratic conceptions. However, unlike our Running tally approach, neither of these perspectives could account for the fact that greater political liberties in the late 1980s would be associated with a less procedural conception of democracy in the 1990s.

Model 3 also suggests that higher levels of democracy in the period immediately preceding the survey tend to be associated with more procedural conceptions of democracy, particularly at the expense of communist conceptions.⁷⁰ This finding indicates that the experience of living in a more liberal democratic environment (which the FH democracy scores capture) can help post-communist citizens overcome the mental legacies of communism at least as far as democratic conceptions are concerned. In other words, by seeing the (admittedly imperfect) post-communist efforts at emulating Western democratic institutions, East European seem to be slowly updating their views about meaning of democracy.

Perhaps not surprisingly given their more indirect connection to democracy, the three indicators of economic performance had a somewhat weaker impact on democratic conceptions. Nonetheless, the fact that higher late-communist economic growth was associated with less frequent procedural and more frequent communist conceptions of democracy in the post-communist era, suggests that positive economic evaluations of late communism also left behind more positive priors about communism, and therefore ensured a longer half-life of its ideological legacies.

Overall, the result in Tables 3.3&3.4 suggest that as far as democratic conceptions are concerned, there is considerably stronger support for the socialization hypothesis (especially in

⁷⁰ Thus, when focusing on the difference in regression coefficients between panels 3A and 3B, it is easy to see that the liberal conception surplus in democratic countries is substantively larger and statistically more significant (at .01) when compared to communist conceptions than to the social-democratic baseline.

its cumulative version) and for the importance of Running tally about the relative merits of communism based on the political and economic performance of late communism compared to both the pre-communist and the post-communist period. By comparison, the evidence was much weaker and more ambiguous for the demographic legacies explanation as well as for the economic and political performance versions of the differential stimuli hypothesis.

3.4.3 Democratic support and communist legacy mechanisms

Our analysis of the communist legacy impact on democratic support patterns in ex-communist countries closely mirrors our previous discussion of democratic conceptions. The main difference is that in testing the demographic and differential stimuli hypotheses for democratic support we will use data from two different sources (Post-Communist Publics *PCP* and World Values Survey *WVS*) and that instead of multinomial logistic regression we are using OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors. Since the models for the two sources have virtually identical specifications, we will discuss the results for both sources jointly, but point out any noteworthy differences between the two sets of findings.

Table 3.5 here

Judging by the results in models 1 and 5 of Table 3.5, the impact of demographic differences was somewhat greater with respect to democratic support than our earlier results about democratic conceptions. Thus, both the communist developmental advantages (more widespread education, lower inequality) and its disadvantages (lower GDP/capita) mattered in the predicted direction and were mostly statistically significant. More importantly, the net effect of adding demographic controls was that it resulted in a modest but nevertheless noticeable

reduction in the size of the post-communist deficit in democratic support compared to the base models in Table 3.2 (ranging from 4.3% for the WVS data to 18% for the PCP data).

We found similar patterns when we restricted our analysis to a within-country comparison of citizens from the former East and West Germany after reunification. Thus, according to models 2 and 6, adding demographic control variables significantly improved the explanatory power of the regression models compared to the baseline models from Table 3.2. Once again, controlling for demographic differences resulted in a reduction of the post-communist democratic support deficit but this time the magnitude of the reduction differed even more across sources (6.5% for the WVS data vs. 52% for the PCP data). On the one hand, these differences reinforce our earlier point that the results of cross-country and even within-country survey data comparisons can be quite sensitive to differences in sample and question wording, and further emphasize the importance of using data from multiple sources to test the robustness of statistical findings. On the other hand, however, despite these differences, the results of all four models broadly support the overall conclusion that while demographic differences account for a part of the post-communist democratic value deficit, they do not “explain it away.”

Therefore, as a next step we tested the impact of differential economic performance in models 3 and 7. In both cases, better economic performance was associated with greater support for democracy, with better growth being significant at .05 in model 3 and both growth and inflation being marginally significant in model 7. Moreover, for both data sources the inclusion of economic performance controls slightly reduced the size of the post-communist deficit but once again the size of the reduction was fairly modest (2.4% for PCP and 15% for WVS) and did not eliminate the deficit altogether.

Finally, in models 4 and 8 we further added two political performance controls (FH democracy and a corruption control index) and two institutional indicators (capturing the presence of a PR electoral system and a presidential system) which may explain cross-regional democratic support differences. The impact of different political performance and institutional arrangements was mixed: on the one hand better corruption performance had at least a marginally significant positive impact on democratic support in both models, while presidential systems appeared to be consistently worse in instilling democratic values in their citizens, but higher levels of democracy had a surprising negative effect on individual attitudes towards democracy, which means that the weaker country-level democratic performance of ex-communist countries (Pop-Eleches 2009) cannot help account for the post-communist democratic support deficit. More importantly for our purposes, when we compare the post-communism coefficients in models 4 and 8 with those in the preceding two models, the inclusion of political and institutional controls led to a moderate decrease in the post-communist deficit for the PCP data but did not make a difference at all when using the WVS data.

Overall, while differential demographic legacies and differential post-communist economic and political stimuli mattered slightly more for the democratic support in Table 3.5 than for the democratic conceptions analyzed in Table 3.3, they jointly account only for a relatively small proportion of the post-communist deficit.⁷¹ Therefore, we now turn to testing the remaining two legacy mechanisms: socialization and Running tally.

Table 3.6 here

⁷¹ Comparing model 4 in Table 3.5 to the barebones specification in model 3 of Table 3.2, the post-coefficient for the post-communism variable was reduced by slightly less than one third when using PCP data, while for WVS data the corresponding comparison yields a more modest 17% reduction.

Model 1 in Table 3.6 offers strong support for the cumulative socialization hypothesis: thus, individuals who lived longer time periods under a communist regime exhibited lower support for democracy, and the effect was both statistically significant and substantively large. By contrast, longer pre-communist experience seems to make people significantly more supportive of democracy, though the magnitude of the effect was considerably smaller (perhaps because the pre-communist political trajectories of most East European countries were hardly as uniformly democratic as their communist experience was non-democratic.) Finally, the negative effect of post-communist life experience confirms the broad temporal trends in Table 3.1, whereby support for democracy had declined in Eastern Europe after 1990. While this effect falls short of achieving statistical significance, it is substantively large and raises interesting questions about what aspects of the post-communist experience are to blame for this waning democratic enthusiasm.

By comparison, the indicators of early socialization in model 2 produced modest results and fell short of reaching statistical significance (both individually and jointly). The weak support for the early socialization hypothesis is further emphasized by the relative direction of the different regime types: thus, the two more repressive and rigid regime types (Stalinist and neo-Stalinist) appear to have had a more democratic educational effect on individuals who experienced them in their early youth than the two comparatively more permissive regimes (post-totalitarian and reformist.) We obtained similarly weak results when using a slightly later age range (14-19) to capture early socialization. Overall, the weakness of early communist socialization combined with the powerful impact of cumulative communist socialization suggests that while pro-democratic attitudes are not hard-wired at an early age, they are significantly

shaped by later life experience and could therefore be subject to the types of Running tally processes we test in the next three models.

In model 3 we included several indicators that are meant to capture the nature of pre-communist, communist and post-communist political experience in different countries in order to test how individuals incorporate such comparative performance patterns into their attitudes towards democracy. While not particularly significant in statistical terms, the results in model 3 nevertheless broadly confirm the predictions of the Running tally hypothesis: thus, greater pre-communist democracy had a positive (though fairly weak) impact on post-communist democratic support, while citizens of countries with native communist regimes displayed significantly lower support for democracy, which suggests that some of the greater initial legitimacy of communism in these countries continues to shape political regime preferences several decades later.

With respect to the more recent markers of regime performance model 3 also provides mixed evidence. As in the case of democratic conceptions, more liberal late-communist regimes seem to have bred more lasting communist allegiances among their citizens as reflected in the lower democratic support among citizens of such regimes.⁷² The results for the two indicators of post-communist political performance reveal an interesting contrast: thus, whereas lower corruption was associated with much greater popular democratic support, greater political rights and civil liberties actually had the opposite effect (and both effects were significant at .01 or better).⁷³ Given that this pattern holds even if we restrict our analysis to individuals holding procedural conceptions of democracy (results omitted), the results in model 3 help explain the

⁷² While in model 3 the coefficient for the 1989 Polity Regime score fell short of statistical significance, a dichotomous indicator of late neo-Stalinist regimes was at least marginally significant (results available from the authors).

⁷³ While FH democracy and our corruption control index were moderately correlated with each other, the results in model 3 are not an artifact of multicollinearity and

decline in democratic support over the first decade of the post-communist transition: even though during this time period most East Europeans (with some prominent exceptions) experienced improved civil and political rights, improvements in governance were much slower to materialize and thereby undermined popular support for democracy.

Table 3.7 here

But as discussed in the hypothesis section, what matters for the purpose of testing the Running tally hypothesis is not only whether we find statistically and substantively significant evidence that the effects of regime performance/legitimacy on democratic support is in the predicted direction for one of the historical periods under consideration. Instead we need significant evidence from at least two periods. While the results for the pre-communist and late-communist indicators were statistically too weak to meet this standard, the statistically significant and correctly signed effects of “homegrown (early) communism” and post-communist corruption control are sufficiently strong to warrant further consideration. Therefore, in Table 3.7 we present the predicted values of our democratic support index for four categories of respondents with different combinations of communist and post-communist experiences along the lines discussed in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Table 2.2.⁷⁴ In line with the theoretical predictions of The running tally mechanism, “nostalgic regretters” who experienced comparatively “good” (i.e. homegrown) communism and a bad (i.e. corrupt) post-communist transition expressed considerably weaker democratic support than “transitional enthusiasts” whose “bad” communist experience was juxtaposed to a “good” (i.e. non-corrupt) post-communist transition. The difference between these two extremes was not only statistically

⁷⁴ To ensure that we were not predicting out of sample, the low/high corruption control values were constrained to the actual range for homegrown and foreign communist regimes in our sample. All other variables in the model were set to their weighted sample means.

significant but also substantively quite large (roughly equivalent to two-thirds of a standard deviation in the democratic support index). Meanwhile, the two groups that experienced either good communist regimes and good transitions (“indifferent winners”) or bad communist regimes and bad transitions (“indifferent losers”), predictably exhibited intermediate (and very similar) levels of democratic support, which suggests that respondents weighed the nature of the communist and the post-communist experience – at least as captured by these two indicators – very evenly.

In model 4 we explore an additional dimension along which East Europeans could compare the old and the new regimes and therefore update their views on the relative desirability of democracy: economic performance. The results are strongly supportive of the running tally mechanism along economic lines: thus, better late communist economic growth (measured as average GDP change from 1981-88) was associated with significantly lower democratic support in the post-communist period. Meanwhile, stronger post-communist growth – especially short-term growth performance in the year preceding the survey – gave an important boost to democratic support among post-communist citizens. Even though this economic version of the running tally mechanism was somewhat stronger for citizens holding confused conceptions of democracy, the same patterns held even for individuals subscribing to a procedural definition of democracy (results omitted), which further confirms how difficult it is for citizens to separate the post-communist political transformations from the simultaneous and closely connected economic changes of the 1990s.

In model 5 we shift from the “sociotropic” focus on aggregate economic performance to a more pocketbook perspective concerned with the individual economic experience during the transition. To do so, model 5 includes an interaction effect between FH democracy levels and the

respondent's self-assessment on a 10-point relative income scale. The positive and statistically significant interaction effect confirms that better-off individuals were less likely to become less pro-democratic as their countries' civil and political liberties improved. Indeed, judging by the conditional effects, transition losers (towards the low end of the income scale) experienced sharp and statistically significant declines in democratic fervor in the region's more democratic countries, whereas for transition winners the effect was substantively negligible and statistically insignificant. This finding confirms the importance of economic updating for democratic support patterns also holds at the individual and not just at the aggregate level.

3.5 Discussion and conclusions

In this chapter we have applied our theoretical framework to analyze how communist legacies have shaped post-communist democratic conceptions and support for democracy. At the most basic level, the statistical evidence presented in this chapter confirms that citizens of ex-communist differ significantly from their non-communist counterparts both in terms of how they understand democracy and in the extent to which they endorse democracy. Moreover, these differences hold across different data sources and survey questions, and across a variety of cross-regional, cross-national and within-country samples, which suggests that these differences are quite robust.

More importantly, by analyzing the individual and country-level drivers of democratic support, we are able to gauge the relative explanatory power of the four legacy-based theories we developed in chapter 2. While our tests produced some statistical support in favor of all four theories, it appears that at least for this particular political preference, the two theories that posit individual-level differences in post-communist political attitudes fare better than the two theories

that ascribe the differences to demographic legacies or different post-communist stimuli. Thus, we found strong support for the importance of cumulative socialization, in the sense that longer personal exposures to communism were associated with weaker democratic allegiances, while a longer pre-communist life experience seemed to alleviate this effect. Given that the results for the early socialization indicators were rather weak, these findings suggest that democratic attitudes build up gradually over the course of an individual's lifetime rather than being set in stone at an early age.

This relative malleability of democratic attitudes is further confirmed by the fairly strong statistical support for several of our Running tally hypotheses: as predicted, better recent political and economic performance – as captured by lower corruption and higher economic growth, though interestingly not by higher democracy scores – were associated with significant increases in democratic support levels among post-communist citizens. Moreover, our findings also suggest that East European democratic values are not simply myopic reflections of short term performance fluctuations: thus, we also found that citizens of countries with externally imposed communist regimes and weak late-communist economic performance were more likely to be pro-democratic, which suggests that they used information about the worth of the communist regime to place post-communist developments in proper perspective. Finally, the finding that democratic values in post-communist democracies declined much faster among economic losers suggests that East European citizens used not only country-level sociotropic performance criteria but also personal “pocketbook” considerations when updating their democratic attitudes.

Our analysis also confirms that some of the post-communist exceptionalism can be explained by socio-demographic differences (especially lower economic development levels) and by different political and economic stimuli connected to the post-communist economic crisis

of the 1990 and the region's widespread corruption problems. However, the joint effect of controlling for socio-demographics and post-communist stimuli cannot account for more than a fraction of the post-communist differences in democratic attitudes, which further confirms the importance of individual differences in the psychological processes through which post-communist citizens interact with the political sphere.

Our analysis in this chapter has also addressed the theoretically prior (but somewhat less central) question about whether and how communist legacies affect how post-communist citizens understand democracy. In this respect, too, post-communist citizens were systematically different from their non-communist counterparts in the sense that they were more likely to be either confused about the meaning of democracy or to endorse a definition along the lines of the "popular democracy" claims advanced by the communist regimes. Nonetheless, the magnitude of these differences was not very large and showed signs of diminishing over the course of the transition, which suggests that increasingly large majorities of post-communist citizens have reasonably informed mainstream conceptions of democracy. More importantly, our tests suggest that our findings about the patterns of democratic support are not affected by controlling for these differences in democratic conceptions, which gives us greater confidence in the validity of cross-regional comparisons of democratic attitudes.

In probing the drivers of post-communist democratic conceptions, we also found much stronger support for individual-level differences in psychological processes than for the theories based on demographic and stimuli differences. Thus, cumulative socialization once again was a powerful predictor of democratic conceptions, with longer communist exposure leading to greater support for communist definitions of democracy and weaker support for procedural definitions of democracy. While early socialization effects were somewhat weaker, they

nevertheless fared better than for democratic support, given that individuals exposed to Stalinist early socialization were significantly less likely to express procedural conceptions of democracy even several decades after the fact. There was also evidence in support of The running tally hypotheses with respect to democratic conceptions, though the patterns differed from those occurring for democratic support attitudes: thus, short-term economic performance was relatively unimportant and current democratic rights mattered in the expected direction (i.e. they promoted procedural conceptions of democracy at the expense of communist views.) More importantly, both late communist and even pre-communist performance indicators had statistically significant effects along the lines predicted by The running tally mechanism: better economic and political performance during late communism was associated with greater support for the communist vision of democracy, while stronger pre-communist democracy seemed to promote a more procedural view of democracy even more than half a century later! By contrast, socio-demographic factors and different post-communist economic and political stimuli had virtually no impact on the magnitude of the post-communist exceptionalism in democratic conceptions, and especially economic crisis indicators had a surprisingly weak impact on democratic conceptions.

Overall, our analysis of democratic conceptions and support suggests that the peculiar patterns of post-communist political attitudes are driven to a significant extent by individual-level psychological differences in how citizens process information from the political realm. The cumulative effects of communist socialization are still clearly visible both in how East Europeans understand democracy and in the degree to which they support it, and while they used information from the post-communist period to update their views, comparisons to the

communist (and at times even the pre-communist) past still informed their attitudes in significant ways.

The greater weight of the more distant past in the case of democratic conceptions, combined with the greater sensitivity of democratic support to short-term economic and political performance raises some interesting questions about the different legacy mechanisms underlying cognitive vs. affective processes. These differences are further emphasized by the fact that whereas for democratic conceptions the post-communist experience seems to have triggered an (albeit slow) process of convergence to the Western standard, in terms of democratic support it had the opposite effect, leading to a widening post-communist deficit.

To the extent that these patterns are confirmed by subsequent chapters, the substantive conclusion that emerges from this analyses is somewhat disconcerting: while the process of living through the transition seems to have given East Europeans a better understanding of the meaning and functioning of democracy, it also made them less supportive of democracy. Given that even in the early years of the transition, ex-communist citizens did not exactly stand out for their democratic enthusiasm, this further decline needs to be taken seriously. On the other hand, to the extent that this decline simply marks the inevitable adjustment of unrealistic democratic expectations in the early transition years, and provided that the quality of democratic governance in the region continues to improve at least incrementally, then perhaps we can hope for a gradual recovery of post-communist support for democratic values.

Table 3.1: Overview of country-level trends in democratic conceptions and support

Country	Year	Democratic conception (%)				Democrati c support index
		Procedura l	Social- democrati c	Communi st	None/confus ed	
Belarus	1998	27.5	39.9	4.9	27.7	-.01
Bulgaria	1990	26.2	48	3.5	22.3	.32
Bulgaria	1999	28.7	32.7	5.4	33.3	-.16
Czech Rep	1990	54.6	32.5	2.8	10	.01
Czech Rep	2001	56.4	29.2	3.2	11.3	-.25
Estonia	1991	35.1	39.2	4.9	20.8	.16
Estonia	2001	38	35.7	4.9	21.4	.09
Hungary	1990	32.3	44	4.2	19.5	.11
Hungary	1999	34.4	45	4.3	16.2	.11
Latvia	1998	44.6	36.9	2.9	15.6	-.08
Lithuania	1991	24.6	37.9	5	32.5	.05
Lithuania	2001	30.6	35.4	4.4	29.6	-.31
Poland	1991	33	42.8	4.9	19.4	-.05
Poland	2000	37.6	40.2	2.6	19.6	-.07
Romania	1990	23.3	33.7	7.8	35.2	.17
Romania	1998	39.3	33.4	4.1	23.1	-.04
Russia ^a	1991	30.6	36	6.5	26.9	-.23
Russia ^a	1998	21.1	37.4	10.2	31.3	-.44
Slovakia	1990	45.4	34.3	7.7	12.7	-.18
Slovakia	2001	47	35	3.5	14.5	-.21
Slovenia	1991	34.5	34.4	2.3	28.7	-.01
Slovenia	1999	35.4	36.7	2.6	25.4	-.04
Ukraine	1991	25.2	39.2	7.3	28.3	-.14
Ukraine	1998	27	39.4	7.4	26.2	-.47
PC w/o EGer ^b	1990-2	33.4	38.6	5	22.9	.05
PC w/o EGer ^b	1998- 2001	37.4	36.3	4.3	22.1	-.13
E Germany	1992	33.7	49.1	2.9	14.3	.17
E Germany	2000	41.4	44.6	2.6	11.3	.18
W Germany	2000	49.4	41.5	1.7	7.4	.28

- a. Figures for Russia are not strictly comparable, since the 1991 survey was only from one region (Krasnoyarsk), while the 1998 survey was nationally representative
- b. To improve cross-temporal comparability, these averages exclude the figures for Russia (see above) and for Belarus and Latvia, which did not have surveys in the first round (1990-2)

Table 3.2: Post-communist differences in democratic conceptions and support

VARIABLES	(1) Procedural democ concept	(1) Comm demo c conce pt	None/ confuse d democ concept	(2) Proced ural democ concept	(2) Comm. democ concept	None/ confuse d democ concept	(3) Dem support index (PCP)	(4) Dem suppor t index (PCP)	(5) Dem support index (PCP)	(6) Dem support index (WVS)	(7) Dem support index (WVS)
Post-communist	-.175*	1.042*	1.171**	-	.371**	.420**	-	-	-	-	-
	(.087)	(.124)	(.106)	.397**	(.005)	(.057)	.408**	.357**	.108**	.161**	.215**
Year	.020	-.013	-.001				-	-	.000	-	.008**
	(.016)	(.019)	(.017)				.016**	.017**	(.003)	.003**	(.002)
Procedural democ conception								.081**			
								(.009)			
Comm. democ conception								-			
								.396**			
								(.020)			
No/confused democ conception								-			
								.251**			
								(.011)			
Sample		Full			GE-only		Full	Full	GE- only	Full	GE - only
Observations		28926			3122		28250	28250	3109	235059	6054
Pseudo R-sq		.004			.008						
R-sq							.018	.060	.010	.012	.032

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 3.3 Explaining post-communist democratic conceptions: socio-demographic and different stimuli hypotheses

VARIABLE	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat	None/confused democrat	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat	None/confused democrat	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat	None/confused democrat	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat	None/confused democrat
Post-Communist	-.375*	.868**	1.181*	-.340**	.979**	.246**	-.488*	1.00**	1.248*	-.619**	1.010*	1.054*
	(.070)	(.121)	(.096)	(.013)	(.351)	(.055)	(.097)	(.177)	(.139)	(.091)	(.175)	(.186)
Post-Secondary Education	.546*	-.542**	-.732**	.356	1.22**	.913**	.550*	-.562**	.736**	.522**	-.552**	-.773**
Secondary Education	.136*	-.176*	.397**	.294**	1.03**	.516**	.145*	-.193*	.407**	.124*	-.173#	-.426**
	(.053)	(.080)	(.059)	(.097)	(.209)	(.137)	(.054)	(.086)	(.050)	(.052)	(.090)	(.050)
GDP/capita (log)	-.193*	-.087	.047				-.210*	-.059	.067	-.183**	-.040	.091*

	*			*					
	(.028)	(.078)	(.062)	(.034)	(.080)	(.055)	(.044)	(.094)	(.045)
Income inequality	-	.044*	.059**	-	.043#	.063**	-.040**	.027	.046**
	.029*			.034*					
	*			*					
GDP chg (2yr)	(.010)	(.020)	(.014)	(.011)	(.022)	(.014)	(.010)	(.021)	(.012)
Inflation (log)				.002	.007	.002	.005	.002	.000
Unemployment				(.006)	(.008)	(.006)	(.005)	(.009)	(.007)
FH democracy				.004	-.043	.014	-.043	-.066	-.077#
Corruption ctrl index				(.039)	(.040)	(.049)	(.031)	(.059)	(.044)
PR system				.022#	-.012	-.021#	.003	-.001	-.031*
Presidential system				(.011)	(.020)	(.012)	(.014)	(.021)	(.013)
Add'l demog controls ^a							.028	-.007	.033
Sample							(.024)	(.049)	(.029)
Observations							-.090	-.043	-.152*
Pseudo R-sq							(.074)	(.112)	(.077)
							.292**	-.097	.336*
							(.085)	(.188)	(.155)
							-.093	.266	.225*
							(.117)	(.194)	(.105)
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Full	GER-only	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
	28850	3120	28850	28850	28850	28850	28850	28850	28850
	.0389	.0347	.0399	.0399	.0399	.0399	.0399	.0399	.0399

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

a. Also included in regressions but not presented here were controls for age, sex, size of locality, religious denomination and religiosity and for models 1,3 and 4 survey year.

Table 3.4 Explaining post-communist democratic conceptions(2): Socialization and Running tally hypotheses

VARIABLE	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat concept	No/confused concept	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat concept	No/confused concept	Procedural democratic concept	Comm. democrat concept	No/confused concept
Yrs comm.	-	.294**	-.051	-.164*	.093	.143			
	.247**								
	(.069)	(.096)	(.076)	(.082)	(.157)	(.089)			
Yrs pre-comm	-.037#	-.050	.054#	-.034	-.053	.048			
	(.021)	(.056)	(.028)	(.023)	(.061)	(.031)			
Yrs post-comm	.059	.049	-.211*	.082	.052	-.200*			
	(.110)	(.155)	(.089)	(.109)	(.148)	(.080)			
Stalinist soc (8-13)				-.031**	.019	.001			
				(.012)	(.024)	(.013)			
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)				.011	-.013	-.008			
				(.014)	(.030)	(.017)			
Post-tot soc (8-13)				.018	.001	.025			
				(.015)	(.034)	(.019)			
Ref-comm soc (8-13)				.016	-.093**	.025			
				(.017)	(.036)	(.021)			
Post-comm soc (8-13)				-.029	-.035	.135**			
				(.041)	(.098)	(.039)			
FH democracy	.030	-.032	.015	.028	-.030	.012	.022#	-.055	-.016
	(.024)	(.042)	(.028)	(.024)	(.038)	(.026)	(.013)	(.034)	(.020)
Polity Regime 1989							-.022**	.022	-.022#
							(.006)	(.017)	(.012)
Avg. Polity Reg. 1920-39							.036**	.008	-
							(.008)	(.021)	.045**
GDP chg (t-1)	.013#	-.019	-.008	.012#	-.020	-.008	.007	-.021	.002
	(.007)	(.015)	(.012)	(.006)	(.015)	(.011)	(.006)	(.016)	(.013)
GDP as % of 1989							-.036	-.020	.667*
							(.183)	(.465)	(.281)
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88							-.128*	.121	.027
							(.055)	(.107)	(.089)
GDP/capita (log)	-	-.054	.055	-.150**	-.026	.043	-.132**	-.046	.003
	.149**								
	(.053)	(.095)	(.045)	(.054)	(.090)	(.047)	(.029)	(.091)	(.045)
Income inequality	-	.037	.053**	-.049**	.040#	.051**	-.007	.039#	.035*
	.047**								
	(.013)	(.024)	(.014)	(.012)	(.022)	(.014)	(.008)	(.022)	(.017)
Inflation	-.071*	-.055	-.039	-.078*	-.045	-.030			

(log)	(.034)	(.061)	(.051)	(.032)	(.054)	(.047)	
Unemployment	-.005	-.005	-.021	-.005	-.011	-.020	
Corruption	-.162#	.021	-.053	-.157	.008	-.045	
ctrl index	(.096)	(.140)	(.088)	(.096)	(.130)	(.085)	
PR system	.286**	-.093	.334*	.293**	-.040	.304#	
Presidential	(.084)	(.154)	(.158)	(.076)	(.146)	(.157)	
system	-.124	.263	.214#	-.108	.219	.184#	
Add'l	(.122)	(.196)	(.120)	(.121)	(.173)	(.105)	
demog		Yes			Yes		Yes
controls ^a							
Observations		27841			27829		27841
Pseudo R-sq		.0395			.0410		.0395

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

a. Also included in regressions but not presented here were controls for education, sex, size of locality, religious denomination and religiosity.

Table 3.5 Explaining post-communist democratic support: Socio-demographic and different stimuli hypotheses

VARIABLES	(1) Dem support index (PCP)	(2) Dem support index (PCP)	(3) Dem support index (PCP)	(4) Dem support index (PCP)	(5) Dem support index (WVS)	(6) Dem support index (WV S)	(7) Dem support index (WVS)	(8) Dem support index (WVS)
Post-Communist	-.334**	-.052	-.326**	-.279**	-.154*	-.201*	-.131*	-.134*
	(.051)	(.021)	(.060)	(.064)	(.055)	(.037)	(.055)	(.058)
Post-Secondary Education	.272**	.144**	.269**	.271**	.258*	.305*	.269**	.258*
	(.029)	(.010)	(.027)	(.023)	(.022)	(.043)	(.021)	(.019)
Secondary Education	.131**	.053	.125**	.121**	.100*	.167*	.106**	.103*
	(.019)	(.022)	(.017)	(.016)	(.016)	(.028)	(.016)	(.015)
GDP/capita (log)	.059*		.075**	.061*	.081*		.070**	.055#
	(.023)		(.021)	(.025)	(.022)		(.024)	(.033)
Income inequality	-.013		-.018*	-.003	-.011*		-.011**	-.008*

GDP chg								
	(.008)							
Inflation (log)								
FH democracy								
Corruption ctrl index								
PR system								
Presidential system								
Add'l demog controls ^a	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full	GER- only	Full	Full	Full	GER- only	Full	Full
Observations	28180	3108	28180	28180	23505	6054	23505	23505
					9		9	9
R-squared	.057	.046	.062	.075	.092	.093	.096	.103

Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

a. Also included in regressions but not presented here were controls for age, sex, size of locality, religious denomination, religiosity and survey year.

Table 3.6 Explaining post-communist democratic support(2): Socialization and Running tally

VARIABLES	(1) Dem support index (PCP)	(2) Dem support index (PCP)	(3) Dem support index (PCP)	(4) Dem support index (PCP)	(5) Dem support index (PCP)
Yrs comm.	-.078** (.020)	-.089* (.037)			
Yrs pre-comm	.033** (.011)	.035* (.013)			
Yrs post-comm	-.064 (.045)	-.071 (.044)			
Stalinist soc (8-13)		.001 (.004)			
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)		.005 (.007)			
Post-tot soc (8-13)		-.010 (.007)			
Ref-comm soc (8-13)		-.004 (.008)			
Post-comm soc (8-13)		.002 (.014)			
Polity Regime 1989			-.006 (.006)		
Avg. Polity Regime 1920- 39			.003 (.008)		
Native Communism			-.119* (.062)		
FH democracy	-.024* (.011)	-.023* (.011)	-.029** (.010)	-.039** (.012)	-.024* (.009)
Pers income eval* FH democracy				.003* (.001)	
Pers income eval				.010 (.011)	
Corruption ctrl index	.120** (.028)	.119** (.028)	.095** (.030)	.098** (.033)	.086** (.031)
GDP as % of 1989					.236# (.149)
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88					-.076* (.038)
GDP chg (t-1)	.009* (.004)	.009* (.004)	.005 (.003)	.008* (.003)	.008** (.003)
PR system	.087	.087			

	(.057)	(.054)			
Presidential system	-.211**	-.196**	-.130#	-.211**	-.187*
	(.072)	(.063)	(.067)	(.065)	(.068)
Inflation (log)	.025	.025			
	(.021)	(.021)			
GDP/capita (log)	.055*	.057*	.050	.070**	.060**
	(.026)	(.027)	(.035)	(.021)	(.021)
Income inequality	-.001	.000			
	(.008)	(.008)			
Add'l dem ctrls ^a	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27172	27162	27172	24712	27172
R-squared	.073	.074	.068	.069	.072

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-year ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

a. Also included in regressions but not presented here were controls for education, sex, size of locality, religious denomination and religiosity

Table 3.7: Running tally: predicted democratic support for different scenarios

	Good post-communist corruption control	Bad post-communist corruption control
Homegrown “Good” Communism	-0.06	-0.29
Foreign “Bad” Communism	0.16	-0.13

ELECTRONIC APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3

Table A1: Overview of survey countries and years for Post-Communist Publics (PCP) data

Country	Wave 1	Wave 2
Belarus		1998
Bulgaria	1990	1999
Czech Rep	1990	2001
East Germany	1992	2000
Estonia	1991	2001
Hungary	1990	1999
Latvia		1998
Lithuania	1991	2001
Poland	1991	2000
Romania	1990	1998
Russia	1991	1998
Slovakia	1990	2001
Slovenia	1991	1999
Ukraine	1991	1998
West Germany	1992	2000

Table A2: Overview of survey countries and years for World Values Survey (WVS) data

Country	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Albania	1998	2002		
Algeria	2002			
Argentina	1995	1999	2006	
Armenia	1997			
Australia	1995	2005		
Austria	1999			
Azerbaijan	1997			
Bangladesh	1996	2002		
Belarus	1996	2000		
Belgium	1999			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998	2001		
Brazil	1997	2006		
Bulgaria	1997	1999	2006	
Burkina Faso	2007			
Canada	2000	2006		
Chile	1996	2000	2006	
Colombia	1997	1998	2005	
Croatia	1996	1999		
Cyprus	2006			
Czech Republic	1998	1999		
Denmark	1999			
Egypt	2000	2008		
El Salvador	1999			
Estonia	1996	1999		
Ethiopia	2007			
Finland	1996	2000	2005	
France	1999	2006		
Georgia	1996	2009		
Germany (East)	1997	1999	2006	
Germany (West)	1997	1999	2006	
Ghana	2007			
Great Britain	1998	1999	2005	
Greece	1999			
Guatemala	2004			
Hungary	1998	1999		
Iceland	1999			
India	1995	2001	2006	
Indonesia	2001	2006		
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2000	2007		
Iraq	2004	2006		
Ireland	1999			

Italy	1999	2005		
Japan	1995	2000	2005	
Jordan	2001	2007		
Korea, Rep.	1996	2001	2005	
Kyrgyz Republic	2003			
Latvia	1996	1999		
Lithuania	1997	1999		
Luxembourg	1999			
Macedonia	1998	2001		
Malaysia	2006			
Mali	2007			
Malta	1999			
Mexico	1996	2000		
Moldova	1996	2002	2006	
Morocco	2001	2007		
Netherlands	1999	2006		
New Zealand	1998	2004		
Nigeria	1995	2000		
Norway	1996	2007		
Pakistan	1997	2001		
Peru	1996	2001	2006	
Philippines	1996	2001		
Poland	1997	1999	2005	
Portugal	1999			
Romania	1998	1999	2005	
Russian Federation	1995	1999	2006	
Saudi Arabia	2003			
Serbia	2006			
Serbia and Montenegro	1996	2001		
Singapore	2002			
Slovak Republic	1998	1999		
Slovenia	1995	1999	2005	
South Africa	1996	2001	2006	
Spain	1995	1999	2000	2007
South Africa	2006			
Sweden	1996	1999	2006	
Switzerland	1996	2007		
Taiwan	2006			
Tanzania	2001			
Thailand	2007			
Trinidad Tobago	2006			
Turkey	1996	2001	2007	
Uganda	2001			
Ukraine	1996	1999	2006	
United States	1995	1999	2006	
Uruguay	1996	2006		

Venezuela, RB	1996	2000		
Zambia	2007			
Zimbabwe	2001			

Note: These are the surveys in which the questions about support for democracy were asked in the second, third, fourth and fifth wave of the WVS. We excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.

Table A3: Survey questions used in the construction of dependent variables

Indicator	Survey question wording
WVS democratic support index	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system (4 point scale)
	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (4 point scale)
	Having the army rule (4 point scale)
	I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? In democracy, the economic system runs badly (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government (4 point agree-disagree scale)
PCP democratic support index	Do you think that elections are the best way to choose a government and the authorities of the country or do you not think so? (Yes/No)
	Looking at things from the point of view of utility, do you think that in order for things to go well we need a parliament? Or are you among those who think we can do without it?
	Do you think that in democracy the problem in our country (1) will be solved (2) will remain the same (3) will get more serious?
	Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements: We need political parties if we want democratic development.
	Which do you think would be better for our country: (1) One-party system (2) Multi-party system?
Procedural requirements of democracy	People associate democracy with many diverse meanings such as those on this card. For each of them, please tell me whether, for you, it has a lot, something, not much, or nothing to do with democracy. Multi-party democracy.
	Political freedoms e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of association.
Social requirements of democracy	Greater social equality.
	That the government controls banks and large private enterprises.
Economic requirements of democracy	More jobs, less unemployment.
	That economic conditions improve.

Chapter 6 - Left-Right Ideological Orientations

[Note to readers: Chapter 4 and 5 will have examined preferences over economic policies (Chapter 4) and social policies (Chapter 5).]

6.1. Introduction *

Having now considered determinants of both economic and social policy preferences, we now turn in our final chapter on political preferences to the aspect of citizen politics that attempts to bring these preferences together in a single unified dimension of political competition: the left-right spectrum. It is probably not too much of a stretch to claim that the left-right political spectrum sits at the heart of the study of political preferences.⁷⁵ Large comparative surveys such as the World Values Study always contain a question asking respondents to locate themselves on a left-right dimension. Expert surveys on party positions (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007) also always include party placements on this left-right dimension. Most formal models of elections and voting are built on the left-right dimension (Osborne 1995). Indeed, one could credibly argue that it is impossible to discuss electoral or party politics anywhere – and especially in multiparty systems – without making use of the left-right spectrum as part of this discussion.

Yet questions remain as to the appropriateness of the left-right spectrum for the *comparative* analysis of party systems: does the left-right spectrum mean the same thing in different political

*We are grateful for the many helpful comments we received on this chapter following presentations at the American Political Science Association Meeting in September 2010 and the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Fundación Juan March, Madrid, Spain and at Princeton University in April, 2010. We also wish to thank Chris Bellaire, Dominik Duell, Rebecca Greenberg, and Gabriel Kreindler for excellent research assistance. For the APSA meetings, we need this chapter to function as a stand alone paper. In the limited time since APSA, we have revised the chapter to take away those elements necessary for it to function as a stand alone paper, but it is possible that some may still be lingering in the text; please accept our apologies if this is the case and rest assured they will be corrected in the next round of revisions!

⁷⁵ For a survey of the literature in both the political and psychological traditions, see Jost *et al.* (2009).

contexts? Huber (1989) answered affirmatively in regard to eight West European countries, arguing that since left-right self placement is fundamentally a function of issue attitudes as opposed to partisanship (ie., determined on a country by country basis), it was legitimate to compare these scales cross-nationally. Thorrisdottir *et al.* (2007), however, cast doubt on whether this comparability of left-right scales extends to central and eastern Europe, finding a number of characteristics of left-right self-placement that seem to differ between the established democracies of Western Europe and their post-communist counterparts (although it should be noted that their study contained only four post-communist countries).⁷⁶ This research seemed to confirm earlier speculation that post-communist citizens would have a weak understanding of the left-right spectrum (Evans and Whitefield 1993, see works cited on p.530) or that they might be more likely to think of politics as structured around parties' relationship to the transition away from communism than around traditional left-right divides (Tismaneanu 1998, Tucker 2006).

From our perspective, asking the question of whether post-communist citizens place themselves differently on the left-right political spectrum than citizens elsewhere is both the next logical step to take in our analysis of the effects of legacies on post-communist political preferences as well as the appropriate culmination of our discussion to post-communist preferences. As in Chapter 3 (on attitudes towards democracy), we begin by addressing the question of whether left-right self-placement means the same thing in post-communist countries as it does elsewhere before moving on to the primary task of addressing differences in where post-communist citizens self-place themselves on the left-right dimension. We demonstrate that while post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale

⁷⁶ See as well Todosijevic and Enyedi (2008), who while not employing a comparative analysis, do find a different relationship between authoritarian personality traits and ideological orientation in Hungary than expected based on research from established democracies.

than other citizens, they are more likely to rely primarily on economic attitudes in making these placements than citizens elsewhere, who bring a combination of economic and social attitudes to bear on their left-right self placement. With this in mind, we then find that there is indeed a left-wing bias in left-right self-placement in post-communist as compared to citizens in the rest of the world. In addition, we find that while in the rest of the world more democratically inclined citizens on average have a left-wing bias, in post-communist countries both they have a right-wing bias. It is to these two distinctions that we then apply our four legacy based approaches to test the extent to which they can account for our observed post-communist exceptionalism. As in Chapter 3, we again find stronger empirical support for the *socialization* and *running tally* hypotheses than we do for the *socio-demographic* or *differential stimuli* hypotheses.

6.2. Theory and hypotheses

In this section we will discuss how the nature of communist and the post-communist economic and political experience affected the left-right positions of ex-communist citizens. We will first briefly discuss a few of the salient features of the communist (and pre-communist) past, which should be expected to shape the patterns of ideological alignments during the post-communist period. Next, we will draw on this historical background to develop a set of concrete and specific hypotheses about how our four different legacy mechanisms should affect left-right ideological positions.

6.1 Communism and left-right positioning: Historical background

Before turning to the formulation of specific hypotheses for each of our four legacy theoretical propositions outlined above, we need to discuss at least briefly a few of the defining

aspects of the region's pre-1989 political history and their likely impact on how post-communist citizens would understand left-right positions and how they would place themselves on a left-right ideological scale.

The obvious starting point of such a discussion is the widespread conception of communist regimes as embodiments of leftist ideologies. While this conception was not universal, it was nevertheless one of the few points on which the communist regimes agreed with their most vocal political critics, many of whom hailed from the right of the ideological spectrum. Therefore, the communist experience may have been less disorienting with respect to left-right positioning than for other political issues such as conceptions of democracy, where the communist regimes offered competing democratic definitions and claims to those advanced by Western liberal democracies. Thus, among both communist critics and apologists, there was broad agreement that the communist parties, which ran Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics for several decades of the twentieth century, were located on the left of the ideological spectrum. While one can of course argue – as some on the left have done – that by the 1980s the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had preserved very little of the initial leftist ideological appeals that characterized late 19th century Marxist movements, the identification of leftist ideology with communism was sufficiently strong in post-communist Eastern Europe to preclude the rise of successful and genuinely leftist political parties without ties to the communist regime.⁷⁷

Of course, such general agreement about the leftist nature of communism does not necessarily imply that citizens of the ex-communist world would understand communism in the same way as their non-communist counterparts. While in Western democracies left-right distinctions can occur along both economic and social dimensions, there are several historical

⁷⁷ The one notable exception is the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which was, however, quite centrist in its ideological positions.

reasons to expect that the former dimension will play a stronger role among post-communist citizens. First, the communist regimes were much more consistently leftist in their economic policies, where despite some significant geographic and temporal variations they broadly pursued redistributive policies and strongly favored public/collective over private property. By comparison, at least after the early days of the Russian Revolution, the social policy track record of the communist regimes was less obviously leftist despite their rejection of the religious values that generally underlie conservative social policies elsewhere in the world. Thus, while communist regimes promoted fairly permissive divorce and – with the notable exception of post-1968 Romania – abortion laws, they were at least as draconian about gay rights as their non-communist counterparts. And while communist policies went a long way towards providing more equal education and employment opportunities for women, traditional gender roles were reproduced not only at the family level but also in most state institutions, where men occupied the vast majority of top leadership positions.

Second, ideological struggles along the economic dimension were much more salient under most communist regimes than social policy disagreements. While, especially in Poland, the communists repeatedly clashed with a fairly resilient and assertive Catholic Church, the struggles over social issues like divorce and abortion laws were much less violent and prolonged than over the policies at the core of the communist economic redistribution efforts, especially the nationalization and collectivization campaigns. Moreover, when espousing the achievements of communism and its advantages over capitalism, the communist leaders were much more likely to invoke the greater social equity of the socialist countries rather than the more liberal social policies. This greater ideological salience of economic over social issues was arguably reinforced by the nature of the post-communist transition, where most of the public debates focused on the

politics of the transition to capitalism, while social policy debates played a more marginal role (with the partial exception of Poland and maybe Hungary).

Third, even though communist regimes were not successful in completely routing out organized religion in the societies over which they ruled, their concerted and at times violent campaigns against the role of churches in East European societies arguably resulted in a greatly diminished influence of religion at both the individual and the societal level (although see Wittenberg 2006). Therefore, we might expect social issues, whose salience in the West is closely tied to individual religious beliefs and the institutional influence of religious organizations, to play a more marginal role in ex-communist countries. By contrast, the Marxist emphasis on class struggles was a constant element of communist-era rhetoric and, even though the intensity of class struggle had declined significantly by the 1980s in most countries of the Soviet bloc, it may have nevertheless have primed East Europeans to prioritize economic redistribution over other potential ideological concerns.

The discussion so far suggests that the powerful identification of leftist ideology with the historical experience of communism should lead to ideological self-placement patterns –that are closely tied to how individuals evaluate the communist regime and its aftermath.⁷⁸ However, what is less clear is what historical associations East Europeans would have with the right. In this respect, countries are likely to differ along two potentially important dimensions of their political history. The first aspect is the extent of pre-communist democracy: to the extent that a country

⁷⁸ In this respect communist regimes probably resemble other ideologically extreme regimes, such as Fascism or right-wing military dictatorships like Pinochet's Chile, where those dissatisfied with the regime can only plausibly go into one possible ideological direction. By contrast, citizens who are dissatisfied with most democracies as well as with more centrist or non-ideological authoritarian regimes, can theoretically "defect" to either the left or the right of the ideological spectrum in search of better alternatives; think here of opposition to Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes as a useful contrast. While the more specific predictions arising from this association between ideology and the communist past will be discussed in greater detail below, overall it should lead to peculiarly post-communist ideological patterns among groups of citizens whose ideal or material interests made them either embrace or reject communism to a greater extent than their co-nationals.

had a reasonably positive democratic track record before World War II, such an experience would arguably provide usable historical models for a democratic ideological right and could promote the embrace of rightist ideology in the post-communist era. The second aspect, which figured very prominently in communist ideological discourse, was the experience of Fascism in the 1930s and 1940s. While much of the region eventually experienced Fascism in one form or another, we should expect to see different historical memories, and hence different ideological repercussions, between countries where Fascism was imposed by foreign military force (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia) and countries that experienced “home-grown” fascist regimes (e.g. Hungary, Romania).

6.2 Specific hypotheses

Building on the historical discussion above and in line with the theoretical framework developed in section 2.1, in this section we will formulate hypotheses about the nature of post-communist exceptionalism in left-right conceptions and self-placements, and about how we can establish which – if any – of the historical legacy explanations provides a more persuasive account of the peculiarly post-communist ideological patterns.

6.2.1 Post-communist exceptionalism

Given our earlier discussion about the association between communism and leftist ideology, we would expect this association to compensate for the lower familiarity of post-communist citizens with party politics along a traditional left-right spectrum. Therefore, *we do not expect post-communist citizens to be significantly less likely to understand and place themselves on a left-right ideological scale than their non-communist counterparts*. However,

given the greater communist and post-communist emphasis on the economic rather than social policy dimensions of ideological conflict, we expect that the post-communist understanding of left-right ideological differences will reflect these differences. Therefore, *we expect citizens of post-communist countries to place greater emphasis on economic rather than social issues in their conceptions of left-right ideological differences.*

With respect to how citizens place themselves on a left-right ideological dimension, probably the most straightforward communist legacy prediction would be that *post-communist citizens should exhibit a leftist bias compared to their counterparts from non-communist countries.* While we will explore the mechanisms underlying this prediction in greater detail below, this hypothesis is based on the expected impact of decades of communist indoctrination, combined with the socio-demographic and institutional legacies of communism, which left behind fairly equal societies and extensive welfare states. However, it is likely that for some parts of the population, the economic, political, and moral failure of communism would produce the opposite effect – a rightist bias driven by the wholesale rejection of ideological positions associated with the communist past – and therefore the magnitude and even the direction of the post-communist ideological bias will vary as a function of the relative weight of social groups who had been co-opted by the communist regimes vs. those that rejected them. The relative weight of communist supporters and opponents, and implicitly of leftist and rightist ideological positions, is likely to reflect the relative pre-communist, communist and post-communist experience of individuals (and by extension of entire social groups and even countries), and will be discussed in greater detail in the running tally hypothesis section.

In addition to how the average citizen places herself on a left-right scale, we may be interested to find out whether citizens of ex-communist countries differ in the demographic and

political patterns of their ideological preferences. While the list of potential differences is quite long, due to space limitations we will here only focus on a few more obvious candidates. There are three main sources for why such differences may arise: the first is a direct extension of the discussion above about communist supporters and opponents, and essentially implies that any socio-demographic characteristic, which is associated with support for the communist regime, should correlate differently with left-right ideology in post-communist countries than elsewhere. For example, given that more educated individuals generally suffered more under the communist regimes, we would predict that *education would be associated with an anti-communist and hence rightist ideological bias in post-communist compared to non-communist countries*. The second possibility is that certain individual characteristics are associated with greater exposure to communist ideological indoctrination, and therefore the ideological effect of such characteristics would differ between communist and non-communist countries. The most obvious example in this respect is age, which at any given point of the post-communist transition is associated with a longer personal experience of communism.⁷⁹ Therefore, to the extent that we assume that communist regimes were successful in inculcating a leftist bias in their citizens, we should *expect age to be associated with a leftist bias in ex-communist countries compared to elsewhere*. A third set of potential differences is likely to arise from the mental associations between the different facets of communism for many ex-communist citizens. Thus, to the extent that communism is associated with both a leftist ideology and a rejection of Western democratic principles, then we should *expect strong democratic convictions to produce a relative rightist bias among post-communist citizens compared to their non-communist counterparts*.

⁷⁹ The one qualification to this statement is that for the oldest citizens of Eastern Europe the relationship is no longer monotonous, since the overall communist exposure was capped at about 45 years (i.e. the duration of the communist regime).

6.2.2 *Socio-demographic landscapes hypotheses*

As discussed in Section 2.2, from the *socio-demographic landscapes* perspective post-communist political attitudes may differ from those found elsewhere in the world simply because of the peculiar social and demographic legacies left behind by several decades of communist developmental strategies. Two socio-demographic legacies of communism could be promising candidates for explaining at least part of any leftist bias exhibited by citizens of ex-communist countries. Perhaps most importantly, the *lower religiosity* of East Europeans after decades of communist efforts to weaken organized religion should undermine their willingness to embrace many of the social values in which rightist ideologies are anchored. Moreover, given that higher education is generally associated with more leftist ideological beliefs, the *highly educated societies* left behind by communism may have been provided more natural constituencies for leftist ideologies. Meanwhile, the ideological implications of the *low economic inequality* left behind by communism are harder to gauge: on the one hand the absence of high inequality should have reduced the appeal of leftist redistribution promises but on the other hand it may also inculcate an egalitarian ethos, which is more compatible with leftist ideological positions. Overall, however, to the extent that the “different socio-demographic landscapes” theory is correct we should expect that *on aggregate the post-communist exceptionalism in left-right ideological positions will be reduced or even eliminated once we account for differences in socio-demographic conditions between ex-communist and non-communist countries.*

6.2.3 *Different stimuli hypotheses*

The post-communist transition abounded in both economic and political stimuli, which could at least in theory account for the different ideological preferences of its citizens. In economic terms, East European countries experienced one of the most traumatic economic crises in recent memory, with deep and prolonged recessions that were often accompanied by high and persistent inflation, and significant rises in unemployment. However, it is not entirely clear what the net ideological effects of such economic upheavals would be: thus, whereas weak growth and high unemployment may trigger greater support for leftist policy solutions involving government intervention to stimulate the economy and alleviate social costs, right-wing governments are usually seen as having a comparative advantage in dealing with high inflation (Powell and Whitten 1993). Moreover, the effects of crises are likely to hinge on the ideological spin, which political elites and especially incumbent governments put on the nature and the implications of the crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009). Similarly, one would expect the shorter democratic histories and the more fragile and more corrupt state institutions of post-communist Eastern Europe to fuel popular dissatisfaction with the political status quo, but it is less clear whether such discontent is likely to fuel left-wing or right-wing defections or whether it would simply result in political apathy without a noticeable ideological impact. Nonetheless, to the extent that the *different stimuli theory* is correct, we expect that *controlling for economic and political performance differences should greatly reduce the extent post-communist ideological bias.*

6.2.4 Socialization hypotheses

As discussed in section 2.1, there are two versions of the socialization theory. Based on the cumulative socialization theory, which treats political attitudes as the cumulative result of life experiences, we should expect *citizens who lived for longer periods under communism to exhibit*

stronger leftist bias in their ideological positions than those who experienced shorter communist spells. Meanwhile, longer periods of either pre-communist or post-communist life experience should have the opposite effect.

To the extent that the second version – early socialization theory – is correct and ideology is shaped by early formative political experiences, then we should *expect individuals who spent more of these crucial early years under communism to have a stronger leftist bias in their ideological positions* than their co-nationals who grew up during either pre- or post-communism. As a corollary, assuming that under some subtypes of communist regimes the “dose” of ideological indoctrination was higher than in others, we would expect *individuals whose early socialization took place under particularly rigid communist regimes (esp. Stalinist and neo-Stalinist) to have a stronger leftist bias than those who grew up in more reformist communist periods*. To test this hypothesis, we are using the same five sub-types of communist regimes, which are shown in Table 2.1: the transition to communism, Stalinist, post-Stalinist hardline; post-totalitarian; and reformist.

6.2.3.5 *Running tally hypotheses*

As discussed in section 6.2, the running tally theory also acknowledges the importance of prior political experiences but unlike socialization theory it argues that these priors can be updated – at times rather quickly – as a result of new information. For the purpose of the present analysis, we will focus on how the nature of economic and political performance during three main periods – pre-communism, communism and post-communism – should be expected to shape post-communist ideological positions.

First, the previously discussed differences in pre-communist political trajectories among countries in the region may affect citizens' ideological orientations. Even though the pre-communist experience was more than four decades old by 1989, we would argue that a longer and better interwar democratic spell could provide important "guidance" not only for citizens old enough to consciously remember the pre-communist period but also – through inter-generational transmission within families or other non-communist formal and informal institutions⁸⁰ – for their younger compatriots. Therefore, we should *expect to see smaller leftist biases in countries with stronger pre-communist democratic traditions*. The implications of having a homegrown fascist regime in the pre-communist period are somewhat more ambiguous: on the one hand, we may expect that populations where Fascism had native roots would have fonder (or at least less negative) memories of the period than countries where it was imposed by German (or Italian) troops, and therefore promote rightist ideological tendencies. On the other hand, in countries where Fascism could not be blamed exclusively on outsiders, communist claims equating anti-communism with Fascism were likely to be more credible, therefore pushing citizens towards the left. On balance, *the predicted ideological impact of homegrown Fascist regimes is indeterminate but it could be associated with either leftist or rightist biases*.

Second, individual ideological positions should also be shaped by the nature of communist rule in a given country. More concretely, we would expect *a greater leftist bias in countries where communism enjoyed greater legitimacy at the time of its collapse*. Among the multiple possible sources of communist regime legitimacy, we will here focus on two potentially important time periods. The first goes back to the early days of communism, and to the legitimacy differences between homegrown communist regimes and those imposed by Soviet

⁸⁰ See for example, Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) and Wittenberg (2006).

military force. While communist regimes could of course gain or lose legitimacy in subsequent decades for a variety of reasons, we would expect these different origins to survive in both individual and collective memories and affect the ease with which communist ideas could be discarded after its collapse. However, it is also important to focus on the economic and political performance of late communism, which supplied East Europeans with the freshest communist memories. Therefore, we would expect that communist regimes, which delivered decent economic performance and/or genuine political liberalization efforts in the 1980s, would leave behind citizens more likely to preserve communist ideals and more likely to exhibit a leftist ideological bias.

Finally, we expect that the most important updating about the relative worth of different ideologies should happen during the post-communist transition. Therefore, we should *expect lower leftist biases in countries/periods with better post-communist economic and political performance*. In assessing political performance, we will focus not only on basic democratic rights but also on the quality of democratic governance. With respect to economic performance, we will test the repercussions of both short-term economic performance and longer-term comparisons to the pre-transition period.⁸¹

Of course, the post-communist political and economic experience differed not only across countries and time periods but also across individuals at a given point in space and time. Since such “pocketbook” considerations are likely to affect not only voting decisions but also ideological preferences, we would *expect economic losers to have a stronger leftist bias than economic winners*. However, this effect will only continue for as long as the implicit comparison

⁸¹ This choice is justified by the fact that whereas studies on economic voting generally find that individuals care most about short-term economic conditions, post-communist surveys suggest that economic comparisons to 1989 continue to be highly salient for East Europeans (Owen and Tucker 2010; Pop-Eleches 2008).

is between a “leftist” communist period and a “rightist” post-communist period. As the transition progresses, the salience of this particular comparison may be gradually overtaken by shorter-term considerations, such as the relative ideological orientation of the incumbent government: *thus, if a leftist government is in power, then relative economic winners may show greater leftist sympathies, while under a rightist government economic winners would show greater rightist ideological tendencies.*

While so far we have discussed how different types of pre-communist, communist and post-communist performance should be expected to shape post-communist ideological positions, it is important to remember that empirical support for the running tally hypothesis requires more than evidence that performance in any one of the three historical periods matters. By definition, for updating to take place, we need to establish the existence of a (historical) prior and some additional information at a later point in time, which leads to a reassessment of prior beliefs. Thus, if we found that post-communist performance matters but pre-communist and communist are irrelevant, then we could not really talk about updating (or at least not of the type of updating we are interested in here.)⁸² Meanwhile, if only the nature of pre-communist or communist performance were to matter, then we could once again not really talk about a running tally, since subsequent information would be irrelevant, but instead we would be much closer to a socialization scenario, whereby individuals are stuck in the past.

So far we have focused on the nature of the political environment during certain historical periods, and the likely conclusions post-communist citizens are likely to draw from comparing these historical episodes. However, this process is likely to be shaped not only by the nature of

⁸² In theory, citizens could still engage in shorter-term updating, e.g. in how the political developments since the most recent post-communist election affects their views of democracy. However, while such updating would still be interesting in its own right, it would be less relevant for our present focus on communist legacies.

these historical memories but also by their intensity. For example, two individuals may be equally aware that their countries had a vibrant pre-communist democracy or a bad late communist economic crisis, but the ideological implications of these memories could be very different if for one of them these memories are very vivid and politically salient, while for the other they are simply part of a number of abstract facts learned in a history class. For space reasons in this chapter we cannot address the question of what psychological processes explain the varying degrees of salience of certain historical memories for individuals living in very similar environments.⁸³ Instead, we will focus on the extent to which the post-communist political landscape refreshes people's memory of the communist past, and therefore increases the salience of the communist past in current political attitudes. Arguably the most visible institutional reminder of the communist era is the survival of more or less reformed ex-communist parties. Such parties are likely to reinforce communist-era memories among both supporters and opponents of the old regime and should therefore prolong the half-life of distinctively post-communist patterns of left-right alignments. Thus, *as long as the left of the ideological spectrum is dominated by a political party with clear continuity to the communist past, committed democrats will be less likely to embrace leftist ideologies* even if they may share the left's concerns with inequality and redistribution.⁸⁴ However, *the aggregate effect of a strong communist successor party on left-right positions in a given country is uncertain*, since such parties serve simultaneously as institutional vehicles for articulating and reinforcing leftist

⁸³ One promising venue, which we may pursue in future versions of this paper, is to focus on the extent to which a respondent and/or her immediate family suffered traumatic losses in any of these historical periods. Such traumas are likely to inform political attitudes for a long time after the event has become "history" for other people.

⁸⁴ Anecdotal evidence from authors' interviews in multiple post-communist countries has repeatedly suggested the importance of consideration.

tendencies among transition losers and as catalysts for coordination among anti-communist political forces, which may reinforce rightist tendencies among their supporters.⁸⁵

6.3 Data, indicators and methods

6.3.1 Data sources

To test the hypotheses developed in the preceding section, we use data from the four most recent waves (1989-93, 1995-7, 1999-2002 and 2004-2009) of the *World Values Survey*, which yielded 206 surveys from 87 countries (see Table A3 for more details.) In addition to the individual-level survey data, we collected data on a range of economic and political performance indicators for each of the over 200 country-years for which we had survey data. We then merged these indicators, which are discussed in greater detail below, with the individual-level survey data to construct a multi-level data set, which allows us to test the interaction between individual and country-level factors in driving post-communist attitudes towards democracy.

6.3.2 Indicators

6.3.2.1 Dependent variables

Our main dependent variable is based on a WVS survey question, which asked the respondents to place themselves on a 10-point left-right scale, where 1=extreme left and 10=extreme right. To assess whether respondents were able to place themselves on the left-right scale, we created a simple dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent either did not answer the question at all or if he/she stated that they did not know their position.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ For an interesting discussion of this mechanism, see Grzymala-Busse's (2007) analysis of the role of communist successor parties in driving robust party competition in Eastern Europe.

⁸⁶ Ideally, it would have been useful to differentiate between respondents who refused to answer and those who explicitly said they did not know their position, but unfortunately the "don't know" option was not asked consistently in all surveys, which would have created comparability problems.

To test whether post-communist citizens have the same left-right understanding as their non-communist counterparts, we regressed left-right self-placement indicator on five socially oriented questions and three questions about economic preferences. The socially oriented questions load nicely onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha = .81), so we combine them into a single *social liberalism index*.⁸⁷ The economic preference questions do not load well onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha < .4), so we include them individually in our analyses; these questions address the extent to which the respondent believes individuals or the government should be responsible for making sure everyone is provided for (*government responsibility*), whether private or government ownership of business and industry should be increased (*government ownership*), and whether incomes should be made more or less equal (*incomes equal*).

As we will demonstrate below in Section 4.2, we find that post-communist citizens place less emphasis on their social policy positions in formulating their own left-right self placement than citizens in the rest of the world. In response to this finding, we have created a second version of our left-right self-placement variable, which essentially imputes how post-communist citizens would have placed themselves on the left-right scale had they *attached the same degree of importance to social considerations* as people in the rest of the world. More specifically, we run a pooled regression with respondents from both ex-communist and non-communist countries, in which we regress left-right self-placement on the economic and social preferences discussed above.⁸⁸ On the basis of this regression, we calculate the predicted left-right self-placement (ie.,

⁸⁷ Questions address the extent that the respondent is accepting of the following: homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce and euthanasia.

⁸⁸ In order to avoid problems associated with missing data here, we use mean replacement for missing data and then include variable-specific dummy variable identifying each of the respondents who do not answer this question. In this way, we do not have to resort to listwise deletion, but at the same time the estimates for the economic and social variables are made based only on the basis of respondents who actually answered those questions.

7) for all individuals in the data set. This variable can then be interpreted as a globally consistent measure of left- right self placement if everyone in the world weighted economic and social considerations equally.⁸⁹ We can then test whether the ideological choices and their covariates are different in ex-communist countries even once we use this “normalized left-right position.” For space reasons we will only present the full set of statistical tests using this alternative measure in the appendix, whereas in the main discussion we will only discuss those regressions where we find significant and theoretically interesting differences for the two types of dependent variable.

6.3.2.2 *Independent variables*

To establish the extent of post-communist exceptionalism, the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 include an indicator denoting whether the respondent lived in an ex-communist country of Eastern Europe⁹⁰ or the former Soviet Union.⁹¹

To test the importance of socio-demographic differences, our regressions include several relevant individual-level characteristics, including dummies for tertiary and secondary education, age, sex, religious denomination, religiosity/church attendance and size of locality. Since personal income questions present problems for cross-national analysis,⁹² we decided to focus instead on country-level GDP/capita to capture cross-country income differences. Moreover, to

⁸⁹ We thank John Londregan for his feedback on the construction of this measure.

⁹⁰ Respondents from the former East Germany (DDR) were also coded as ex-communist citizens.

⁹¹ Since we are interested in establishing the difference between these countries and non-communist countries, in our analysis we excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.

⁹² The WVS asked respondents to place themselves into one of ten income bands but since these categories were country-specific, they cannot be used for cross-country comparisons (even though they do provide an indicator of within-country household income differences.)

test the impact of the egalitarian legacy of communism, we included a GINI coefficient of income inequality from the most recently available pre-survey year.⁹³

As potential indicators of different economic stimuli facing post-communist citizens, we collected data on inflation, GDP change and unemployment in the year (or two years) preceding the survey. To capture current political performance we included Freedom House democracy score (reversed, so that higher scores indicate greater civil liberties and political rights) and a corruption control index, which used data from three different sources (see appendix) to deal with uneven geographic and temporal coverage problems. Finally, to measure a country's democratic track record we created an indicator of the logged number of years for which the country had been continuously democratic.⁹⁴

To test the socialization hypotheses, we used a person's age and the year of the survey to determine their birth year, and then combined this information with the communist periodization data from Table 2.1 to calculate the *number of years a given respondent had lived under pre-communism, communism and post-communism*. In the statistical tests we used logged versions of these duration measures because doing so produced consistently stronger model fits than linear duration. Moreover, for each respondent we calculated the *number of years spent under pre-communism, post-communism and during each type of communist regime subtype* for two periods of their formative years: *ages 8-13 and 14-19*. These periods were chosen to broadly capture primary and secondary school ages, and since we are not aware of recent studies

⁹³ Unless otherwise stated, all of the country-level economic and political variables are lagged one year to reduce possible reverse causation concerns.

⁹⁴ The logged version is justified on both theoretical grounds (since the difference between 50 and 60 years of democracy is arguably less than between 1 and 11 years), and empirically, since the logged version consistently produced better fits than non-logged and quadratic specifications.

establishing the age at which children in communist regimes develop political consciousness, we tested the effects for both time periods and presented the ones which produced stronger results.⁹⁵

In order to get at least partial proxies of the historical economic and political performance of different countries, which we expect to inform the a running tally process, we used several different indicators. For pre-communist democratic experience, we used the *average Polity Regime score for the 1920-39 period* in Eastern Europe and for the two decades preceding the 1917 Revolution in the interwar Soviet republics. While we also tested a number of alternative measures, including the highest pre-communist Polity regime score and a dummy variable capturing the existence of competitive elections in the interwar period, the results were quite similar and are not presented here for space reasons.

To capture the initial legitimacy of the communist regimes, we constructed a “homegrown communism” dummy variable based on our discussion in section 2.2. As measures of late communist economic performance, we used *average GDP change from 1981-88* (compiled from several sources, including Kornai 1992 and Maddison 2009). For late communist political performance, we used *Polity regime scores in 1989* but we also used alternative measures, including 1989 FH democracy scores and a dummy indicator identifying late (neo)Stalinist regimes, and found similar results.

In addition to these regime performance indicators, our regressions included two institutional variables – dummy indicators for the presence of a PR electoral system and a presidential system. Since we are not making an institutional legacy argument for these two

⁹⁵ Easton and Dennis (1969) found that among white US children political consciousness developed in primary school but it is unclear to what extent this finding applies to children in communist regimes. We thank Markus Prior for bringing this study to our attention.

variables, they are best interpreted as control variables meant to ensure that our findings are robust to controlling for institutional variation.

6.3.3 Statistical methods

For the statistical tests presented in this chapter we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the models where the DV is either self-reported or corrected left-right placement,⁹⁶ and logistic regressions for models where the DV is the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent can place herself on the left-right scale. For all regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. This approach adjusts standard errors in order to account for the multi-level nature of our data, i.e. that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and governance differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey.⁹⁷ Moreover, all the regressions for both data sources use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

6.4. Statistical results

6.4.1 Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

In this section, we demonstrate the following three characteristics of left-right self-placement in post-communist countries. First, post-communist citizens are no less likely to place themselves

⁹⁶ Given that left-right self-placement is a categorical variable (with ten categories) and its kurtosis is higher than for a normal distribution, we also re-ran all the models using ordered probit (available from the authors). However, since the results were very similar and since interaction effects are much more difficult to interpret for ordered probit models, we report OLS results here.

⁹⁷ In a future version of this paper we plan to re-run these tests using hierarchical linear models in HLM 6.0 to model the multi-level nature of the data more explicitly. However, in an earlier paper where we ran similar tests using WVS data (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a) we found no difference between HLM models and the clustered standard errors approach used here, which is most likely due to our large number of Level 2 observations (i.e., the number of individuals in each country-year survey). We thank Nathaniel Beck for his advice in this regard.

on a left-right scale than respondents from other countries. Second, while citizens from non-post-communist countries use both social and economic policy concerns to place themselves on left-right scales, citizens in post-communist countries rely more heavily on economic policy issues. Finally, ex-communist citizens tend to exhibit a leftist bias in their ideological self-placement, and while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and more democratic citizens exhibit a leftist bias on average, in post-communist countries it is just the opposite.

6.4.1.1 Familiarity with the left-right ideological dimension

Our first task is to examine whether post-communist citizens have more trouble placing themselves on the left-right spectrum. Model 1 of Table 6.1 shows that when we simply look at the ability of stating one's own ideological position, post-communist citizens do exhibit a disadvantage compared to their non-communist counterparts, but the effect is fairly small and falls just short of achieving statistical significance. Moreover, once we include demographic controls and indicators of economic and political performance in model 2, the size of the effect for the post-communist dummy variable drops below its standard error. Moreover, model 3 suggests that when we restrict the analysis to East and West Germans we actually find an (albeit statistically insignificant) post-communist surplus in left-right familiarity.

Table 6.1 here

6.4.1.2 Components of left-right ideological orientation

Given that post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale than people living elsewhere, our next step is to determine whether they do so based on the same set of issue concerns as people living in other countries. Traditionally, political scientists

have tended to think of left-right self placement as being a function of two different sets of policy concerns: economic and social (Benoit and Laver 2007, Kitschelt 1991, Huber 1989).⁹⁸

In models 4-6 in Table 6.1 we examine the effect of the social liberalism index and three economic preference variables on left-right self placement in post-communist countries (model 4), non-communist new democracies (model 5) and established democracies (model 6). Since for both social and economic indicators more left wing views are coded as being positive – we expect the coefficient on all of these variables to be negative, as the left right scale runs from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

The findings are rather clear: as expected, more statist and pro-equality views correspond with, on average, more leftist self-placement throughout the world. Moreover, while the relative impact of economic indicators was slightly lower in ex-communist countries (model 4) than in advanced democracies (model 6), the effects were comparable in size (with the partial exception of a weaker impact of attitudes towards inequality). Moreover, a comparison of models 4 and 5 indicates that ex-communist citizens were actually more attuned to economic considerations than their counterparts in other new democracies, especially on the question of government vs. private ownership.

However, we find a different pattern when we turn to the social liberalism index. On the one hand, the coefficient of the variable is negative and statistically significant in all three models. On the other hand, it is equally apparent that social liberalism is much less closely aligned with left-right self-placement in post-communist countries than it is in other parts of the world. While the difference is smaller when we focus on the patterns in West vs. East Germany (models 7 &

⁹⁸ This stands somewhat in contrast to psychologists, who tend to focus on an economic dimension (acceptance of inequality/hierarchy) and “traditionalism”, or resistance to change (Thorisdottir *et al.* 2007; Jost *et al.* 2007). Psychologists also focus on the extent to which right wing ideology is function of an “authoritarian personality” (Adorno *et al.* 1950; Todosijevic and Enyedi 2008).

8) the trend is nevertheless sufficiently clear to suggest that communist conceptions of left-right ideology differ systematically from those found in non-communist countries.

While this finding raises an interesting puzzle, which could also be analyzed using the legacy framework proposed in this book, for the purpose of our current discussion its importance lies in the fact that it questions the appropriateness of cross-national comparisons of left-right self placement in samples that include post-communist and non-communist cases. Therefore, we created an alternative “corrected” left-right orientation indicator (as described in the data section) and re-ran our main models for both versions of the left-right scale. However, since our main interest is still in explaining the patterns of individual ideological conceptions, our discussion will focus primarily on the declared left-right self-placement of the respondents and will only refer to the “corrected” scale when the results for the two measures diverge to a significant extent.

6.4.1.3 Post-communist exceptionalism in left-right placement

The regressions in Table 6.2 establish the extent to which the patterns of left-right self-placement differ between ex-communist and non-communist countries. In doing so, we are interested not only in whether post-communist citizens exhibit a certain ideological bias compared to their non-communist counterparts but also in whether the ideological effects of certain covariates are distinctive in the post-communist context.

The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the post-communist dummy variable in model 1 of Table 6.2 confirms that post-communist citizens are more likely to be left-wing than citizens in the rest of the world. The effect is even larger in substantive terms when we restrict

the analysis to respondents from East and West Germany in model 2, which suggests that our finding is not simply due to unobserved omitted variable bias.⁹⁹

Beyond the existence of an aggregate-level leftist bias, the results in Table 6.2 suggest that this bias is unevenly distributed along a number of demographic and political dimensions. Thus, the substantively large and statistically significant interaction between post-communism and age in models 3 and 4 indicates that whereas in non-communist countries older people tend to lean towards the right, in ex-communist countries higher age actually pushes people in the opposite ideological direction (and the effects are even stronger if we restrict the analysis to East and West Germans). Moreover, looking at the predicted ideological bias for different age groups, we find that among young respondents we can no longer talk about a post-communist leftist bias. Indeed, among the youngest respondents the effect is flipped – i.e. ex-communist citizens have a slight right bias – though the effect falls short of achieving statistical significance.¹⁰⁰

Model 5 confirms that education had a different ideological impact in post-communist countries than elsewhere. Thus, whereas in non-communist countries secondary and especially post-secondary education were associated with statistically significant leftist biases, the positive interaction effects between education and the post-communism dummy variable completely erased this effect. These findings are in line with our theoretical predictions about the potential rightist bias inherent in the fact that more educated citizens were more likely to suffer from political repression under communism. However, the results of the Germany-only tests in model 6 add an important qualification to this finding: while for this within-country analysis the

⁹⁹ Interestingly, however, the results in Table A2 suggest that when using the corrected left-right scale, East Germans no longer have a leftist bias.

¹⁰⁰ The statistically significant positive effect of the post-communism dummy in models 3 and 4 is deceiving, since it captures the out-of-sample effect on someone who was newly born at the time of the interview due to the inclusion of the post-communist X Age interactive variable (Brambor et al. 2006). Among the youngest actual respondents (18 year olds) the statistical significance is at best marginal (.17 two-tailed).

interaction between secondary education and post-communism was still positive (but smaller and no longer statistically significant), the interaction effect for post-secondary education was actually negative and significant in both substantive and statistical terms.¹⁰¹ In other words, post-secondary education had an even greater leftist influence in East Germany than in West Germany. While a more detailed analysis of the drivers of this interesting contrast is beyond the scope of the present chapter, this greater leftist conviction among the East German educational elite is probably tied to the particular details of East German education policies, which included quota-based affirmative action policies for children of workers and peasants for a much longer period than in most other countries of the former Soviet bloc. More importantly, the finding highlights the importance of local political context in mediating the ideological legacies of communism.

Finally, the last two models in Table 6.2 investigate whether and how the relationship between ideological orientation and democratic values differs between ex-communist and non-communist countries. Model 7 provides strong support for the hypothesis that the recent experience of a left-wing authoritarian regime led to a lasting association between leftist ideology and non-democratic values in ex-communist countries: thus, whereas elsewhere in the world democrats tended to have a leftist bias, the large and statistically significant positive interaction effect between post-communism and the democratic values index meant that in post-communist countries the effect was actually reversed, with democrats exhibiting a significant rightist bias. However, it should be noted that once again the within-country comparison of East and West Germans produces different results, with the East German democrats actually

¹⁰¹ However, model 6 in Table A2 indicates that when using the alternative “corrected” left-right scale, the interaction is actually positive (though it is small and statistically insignificant).

exhibiting (and albeit insignificant) *leftist* bias compared to their West German compatriots.¹⁰²

While we will explore some potential explanations of this contrast in a later section of the chapter, for now it highlights the somewhat unusual political dynamics of East German ideological patterns, which suggest that the external validity of findings based on an East vs. West Germany comparison may be more limited than is usually assumed.

While all of these interactive effects – age, education, and democratic attitudes – would be interesting to consider from a legacy based perspective, for space reasons we will only present results in the following section from testing the effects of our legacy based explanation on the interaction between democratic attitudes and left-right self placement in post-communist countries; this is of course in addition to testing our legacy effects on the overall left-wing post-communist bias.

6.4.2 Left-right ideological placement and communist legacy mechanisms

In Table 6.3 we test whether the differences in left-right placement patterns revealed in Table 6.2 can be accounted for by the four legacy-based mechanisms presented in Section 2. As a first step, in model 1 we added a series of demographic and developmental indicators to test whether the post-communist exceptionalism could be driven by the peculiar developmental blueprint of communism. However, when we compare the size of the post-communism coefficient to the baseline in model 1 of Table 6.2, we find that once we account for developmental differences, the leftist bias of ex-communist countries is even greater (largely because citizens of poorer countries generally tend to be less leftist.) However, the inclusion of religiosity indicators (frequency of religious service attendance and atheism) in model 2 results

¹⁰² Once again, model 8 in Table A2 indicates that when using the alternative “corrected” left-right scale, the interaction is actually positive (though it is fairly small and statistically insignificant).

in a 50% reduction in the magnitude of the post-communist leftist bias, which is no longer statistically significant. In other words, it appears that much of the leftist legacy of communism is due to the much lower religiosity of post-communist citizens, which makes them less likely to embrace the conservative values that are often associated with greater religiosity. We get similar results when restricting the sample to East and West Germans in model 3 but in that case the leftist bias was still significant even when we control for religiosity, even though its magnitude was also reduced by almost half compared to the baseline in model 2 of Table 6.2. On the other hand, controlling for demographics, development and even religiosity does very little to explain the rightist bias of post-communist democrats, given that the size of the interaction effect in model 4 of Table 6.3 is virtually identical to the baseline in model 7 of Table 6.2.

In the last two models of Table 6.3, we test the predictions of the differential stimuli theory, whereby post-communist differences may simply reflect differences in economic and political performance. While both greater democracy and a longer democratic experience are associated with more rightist ideological orientations among that country's citizens, these effects have a modest impact on the size of the post-communist leftist bias (which in model 5 is reduced by less than 10% compared to model 1). Similarly, the size of the interaction between the post-communism indicator and the democratic values index is only minimally affected by the inclusion of economic and political performance controls in model 6.

Overall, the findings in Table 6.3 reveal modest support for the differential stimuli theory and for most demographic and developmental differences. The one notable exception – differences in religiosity – is particularly striking given that religiosity should have a greater impact on precisely those aspects of left-right ideology which are less salient in the post-communist context (i.e. social policy questions.) However, this finding does not by itself solve

the puzzle of post-communist ideological exceptionalism, since the lower religiosity is arguably itself a function of the types of socialization and a running tally dynamics, which we discuss in greater detail below.

Table 6.4 here

In Table 6.4 we turn to the question of how communist-era socialization affects both the overall ideological self-placement of East Europeans and the rightist bias of East European democrats. As discussed above, the sample for these tests is limited to respondents from ex-communist countries, which means that we will identify within-region differences between individuals with varying cumulative and early socialization experiences. In model 1 we test the impact of cumulative socialization on left-right self-placement and find strong confirmation that individuals who spent more time living under communism exhibited a significantly larger leftist bias than their co-nationals with shorter communist exposures. The effect is also substantively large: thus, the predicted ideological self-placement of an East European citizen with a short exposure to communism (14 years, i.e. the 10th percentile) is roughly .29 to the right of the predicted ideological position of the median post-communist citizen, who had lived 35 years under communism. This difference is slightly larger than magnitude of the post-communist leftist bias in model 5 of Table 6.3, which suggests that the leftist bias is indeed closely tied to a person's life experience under communism. By comparison, model 1 suggests that longer pre- and post-communist life experience had a slight rightward ideological impact, but the effects were substantively small and statistically insignificant.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Years spent under post-communist essentially picks up when the survey was conducted and therefore is closely correlated with survey wave, but it provides a more fine grained measure by taking into account the actual year of

In model 2 we turn to the predictions of the early socialization theory; note that the omitted category is people socialized (e.g., who were 8-13) under pre-communism. In line with expectations, we found that individuals whose early socialization took place under Stalinism exhibited a significantly larger leftist bias than their co-nationals who were spared that experience. Moreover, the effect is fairly large in substantive terms: the predicted leftist bias of an individual whose entire socialization between the ages of 8 and 13 took place under Stalinism was .21 larger than for someone who had no Stalinist early socialization, a difference which is fairly close in magnitude to the post-communist leftist bias in model 5 of Table 6.3. A similar but slightly smaller leftist bias also applies for post-totalitarian socialization, whereas in line with our expectations the effects were weaker and statistically insignificant for individuals whose early socialization occurred during the more permissive reformist communist periods. However, two other results in model 2 deviate from the straightforward “ideological indoctrination” predictions. Thus, neo-Stalinist early socialization did not produce a leftist bias, and in fact even pointed in the wrong direction, which suggests that the ideological effectiveness of such regimes was quite limited and that their heavier reliance on repression (compared to post-totalitarian regimes) may have actually been counter-productive. (Think as well of this as the generation whose parents and teachers could openly discuss the horrors of Stalinism with them as children from a first hand perspective, without fearing retribution for doing so.) Perhaps even more surprisingly, post-communist early socialization is associated with a substantively large leftist bias. While the effect falls short of achieving statistical significance (.2 two-tailed), it nevertheless suggests that post-communist societies were not very effective in raising a new generation of convinced neoliberals. Another potentially interesting way of interpreting this

the survey, as well as small differences (i.e., 1989 vs 1990 vs 1991) in the years in which a country transitioned away from communism.

finding is that it lends credence to the idea that the rigors of transition life may have given way to “nostalgic” feelings about the communist past (and especially the Brezhnevian post-totalitarian past, the low point of repression and the high point of Soviet consume society), thus resulting in the observed leftist bias. So here we may be picking up the effects of students who are witnessing an economic collapse while at the same time hearing their parents wax poetically about life in the good old Brezhnev days. Note as well that the omitted category in this analysis is pre-Stalinist socialization, so what we are also picking up – due to the fact that all of the coefficients are negative except neo-Stalinist socialization – is that the few East Europeans (the number of citizens of pre-WWII Soviet Republics who were 8-13 before 1917 and we still answering surveys in the 1990s and 2000s is bound to be very low) who were educated before and during WWII were generally more rightist the most of their fellow citizens who were socialized under communism, a finding that is quite consistent with the early socialization hypothesis.

Models 3 and 4 analyze the impact of socialization on the rightist bias of East European democrats. Since these tests are also limited to post-communist respondents, the main variables in these models are the interactions between the democratic values index on the one hand and the cumulative and early socialization indicators on the other. Judging by the results in model 3, cumulative socialization was somewhat less effective in explaining the peculiar democracy-ideology associations of ex-communist citizens than their overall ideological self-placement. Thus, even though both interaction terms in model 3 point in the correct direction, suggesting that the rightist bias among democrats is stronger for individuals with longer communist and shorter post-communist life experiences, the effects were fairly modest in terms of statistical and substantive significance.

By comparison, the predictions of early socialization fare somewhat better in explaining the rightist bias of post-communist democrats. Thus, as expected, the rightist bias of democrats is stronger among individuals whose early socialization took place under Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, and the effect is statistically significant for the latter and barely misses statistical significance for the former. By contrast, the perceived tension between leftist ideology and democratic values was weaker among individuals socialized under reformist communist regimes, for whom the overall impact of the democratic values index was about 35% lower and no longer statistically significant. The remaining two categories – post-totalitarian communism and post-communism – were also associated with weaker links between ideology and democratic values, but the effects were statistically more modest.

Table 6.5 here

In Table 6.5 we test several different versions of our fourth and final legacy mechanism: the a running tally theory. As a first step, in model 1 we test the impact of a country's political history on its citizens' left-right ideological self-placement. The results confirm the strong staying power of historical experiences: thus, in countries with better interwar democratic experiences, citizens were significantly more likely to subscribe to rightist ideological positions, whereas in countries with homegrown Fascist regimes they were more reluctant to embrace right ideological views. This contrast confirms the importance of having an additional anchor besides the experience of communism: where this non-communist alternative was largely positive (i.e. democratic rather than Fascist) citizens were more likely to embrace the right instead of the communism-tainted left. However, where the right bore the stigma of Fascism, the pull of communism was stronger and resulted in a larger leftist bias. Meanwhile, greater leftist bias in countries with greater late-communist liberalization and the rightist bias in more democratic

post-communist regimes confirm that the relative appeal of left vs. right ideologies is informed by the relative performance of communism and post-communism, but the effects were fairly modest in statistical terms and need to be interpreted cautiously. Finally, the weak effect of native communism suggests that the initial legitimacy of homegrown communist regimes was less important than either pre-communist or late/post-communist experiences.

Somewhat surprisingly, model 2 indicates that a country's relative economic performance during and after communism was less important for ideological self-placement than broad regime trajectories. Thus, even though, in line with a running tally predictions, better late communist growth was associated with a stronger leftist bias, while higher post-communist unemployment also drove citizens towards the left, these effects fell short of achieving statistical significance.¹⁰⁴

However, the results in model 3 suggest that the weak ideological effects of country-level economic performance are not due to the irrelevance of economic considerations but due to the more short-term nature of economic memories. Even though in model 2 we found that inflation had a negligible impact on left-right positions, the strong interaction between inflation and government orientation in model 3 suggests that post-communist citizens use the information inherent in economic conditions to update about the relative worth of the incumbent government rather than that of the entire post-communist economic and political system. Thus, higher inflation resulted in a rightist ideological effect only when an ex-communist party was in power but when that was not the case, the effect was actually reversed. Conversely, at low inflation levels having an ex-communist governing party resulted in a leftist impact on individual ideological preferences (significant at .005), whereas at high inflation levels the effect was

¹⁰⁴ Their one-tailed statistical significance hovered in the .15-.2 range, perhaps in part due to the relatively small number of level-1 observations (we used 66 post-communist surveys for this part of the analysis).

significant in the opposite direction. We found similar but somewhat weaker results when interacting incumbent ideology with short-term growth, which further reinforces the short-term nature of the ideological impact of economic conditions.

In model 4 we shift the focus to the individual-level economic experiences of post-communist citizens. We find that while greater financial satisfaction is associated with a more rightist ideology for all three time periods under consideration, the effect is considerably weaker for the early transition period (1989-93). This finding is consistent with the a running tally prediction whereby individuals shift towards the ideological position of the system, which “works well” for them. From this perspective, the weaker ideological impact of personal economic satisfaction in the early 1990s is arguably due to the fact that at this early point in the transition at least part of the economic satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) could be ascribed to the communist regime, whereas starting in the mid 1990s economic satisfaction was much more clearly reflective of a given individual’s experience during the post-communist transition. Thus once again we see the importance of being an economic “winner” on political attitudes in post-communist countries.

In models 5 and 6 we turn to analyzing the impact of different party system configurations on the ideological preferences of post-communist citizens. Thus, in model 5 we find that the presence of a large reformed or unreformed ex-communist party (with at least 20% of votes in the election preceding the survey) was associated with a moderately significant left-ward shift in the ideological self-placement of East European citizens. However, these results are reversed when we run the same model specification but instead use the “corrected” left-right scale as a dependent variable: thus, according to model 5 in Table A3 in the appendix, the presence of large unreformed or reformed ex-communist parties is actually associated with a rightward shift in

policy-based ideological preferences. In other words, it appears as though ex-communist parties may reinforce rhetorical commitments to leftist ideology, while at the same time moving citizens towards the ideological right as far as actual policies are concerned. While this contrast may be puzzling at a first glance, it arguably reflects the fact that beneath their leftist rhetoric, most ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe have actually implemented fairly orthodox neoliberal reforms, especially in times of crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009).

The rather weak correspondence between party platforms and actual policies is probably also the main reason why, according to model 6, the weighted ideological center of a given country's party system is a very poor predictor of individual ideological positions. Given that for the non-communist countries covered in the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey the party system ideological center was a statistically significant predictor of individual ideological positions (results omitted), this finding suggests that this ideological disconnect between voters and parties is primarily a post-communist phenomenon.¹⁰⁵

In the final two models of Table 6.5 we turn to the question of whether a running tally mechanisms can account for the peculiar post-communist link between democratic values and ideology. Model 7 includes interaction terms between the democratic values index on the one hand and three indicators of a country's political history. The strong negative interaction between the democratic values index and the country's Polity regime score in 1989 confirms that the perceived tension between leftist ideology and democracy was highly sensitive to the political dynamics of late communism: thus, for countries like Poland and Hungary, which experienced significant political liberalization, the correlation between democracy and ideology is weak and

¹⁰⁵ While our analysis only uses temporally lagged party system data to predict subsequent citizen survey responses, we cannot conclusively establish whether the correlation between party and voter ideology in non-communist countries reflects the greater responsiveness of voters to parties or vice versa. However, for the purpose of our discussion this question is less important than the lack of correlation in post-communist countries.

statistically insignificant, whereas in countries like Romania and Czechoslovakia, where the Communists avoided reforms until the bitter end, the correlation was very high. In other words the perceived compatibility of democracy and leftist ideology was driven to a large extent by whether late communist events allowed gave greater credence to arguments about the feasibility of democratic socialism or to charges about whether the system could be reformed at all.

Model 7 provides additional support about the importance of interwar democracy: thus, the positive and marginally significant interaction between interwar Polity scores and the democratic values index suggests that the rightist bias of democrats was reinforced in countries where a positive non-communist democratic experience could be used as a contrast to the authoritarian communist experience. Finally, model 7 also provides some evidence that in countries with homegrown Fascist regimes the association between democratic values and rightist ideology was somewhat weaker but the effect was statistically quite modest and needs to be interpreted cautiously.

Finally, in model 8 the strong positive interaction between democratic values and the large unreformed ex-communist party indicator (as well as to a less extent the large reformed ex-communist party indicator) suggests that communist successor parties can act as a vivid institutional reminder of the communist past. Whereas earlier we saw that their presence is associated with a greater leftist bias at the individual level, the results in model 8 suggest that communist successor parties also reinforce the negative association between leftist ideology and democratic values. Indeed, it appears that having a large unreformed communist successor parties leads to an almost three times larger correlation between democratic values and ideology than in countries without a significant successor party. This finding may explain at least in part why East Germans bucked the regional trend by having a leftist bias among democrats: unlike in

other countries, where the return to power of the ex-communists was a real possibility (and in many cases a reality), in the East German PDS was largely marginalized in the party system of unified Germany, and therefore arguably played a weaker role in refreshing communist-era political associations.

6.5 Conclusion: Ideology and Legacies

In this chapter, we have demonstrated three distinctly post-communist patterns of left-right positioning. First, there is overall a left-wing bias in post-communist countries compared to the rest of the world. Second, left-right self-placement is less a function of social issues in post-communist countries than it is the rest of the world, although it appears to be just as influenced by economic preferences as it is elsewhere. Third, there are important covariates of less right-self placement that have the opposite effect in post-communist countries: while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined voters trend to the left, in post-communist countries they do not (and may even lean towards the right).

With these patterns established, we then tested the ability of our four legacy theories to account for the post-communist exceptionalism in this regard. Our first theoretical approach – that post-communist exceptionalism is a function of the demographic legacies of communism – received fairly lukewarm empirical support with one glaring exception: a significant portion of the leftist bias in post-communist countries is related to the fact that post-communist citizens are less religious than citizens in the rest of the world; once we account for religious attendance and atheism, the size of the post-communist leftist bias drops by almost one third. By contrast, controlling for macro-economic conditions as well as levels of democratization and corruption had a negligible impact on left-right self placement. As both of these theoretical approaches start

from the first principle that post-communist citizens approached politics in largely the same way as citizens elsewhere, the fact that we are still left with sizable left-wing biases after controlling for demographics and political and economic stimuli holds open the real possibility that the legacy of living through communism and its aftermath might be in part responsible for the left-wing bias.

Turning first to our *socialization approach*, we found that the left-wing bias was indeed in part a function of how long one had lived under communism. Moreover, we also found evidence that people who spent their formative years (8-13) during high Stalinism – the most “extreme” form of communist experience – also exhibited a particularly strong leftist bias, especially as compared to those who spent their formative years in the pre-communist era or during periods of reform communism.

However, the story did not stop there. We also found quite a bit of evidence in line with the *running tally* theoretical perspective, which we argued suggested that post-communist citizens would not just blindly follow socialization patterns acquired under communism, but rather would update their thinking about left-right self placement based on what they could compare communism to (e.g., prior democratic or fascist experiences in their country), as well as their particular experiences with late communism and the post-communist era. So in perhaps the most striking finding, post-communist citizens who were economic “winners” in the post-communist era exhibited a markedly more right-wing orientation than economic “losers”, a result we should not have found if only socialization under communism mattered for left-right self placement. Similarly, living in the post-communist era with successful ex-communist parties also increased citizens’ likelihood of placing themselves farther to the left in the political spectrum. Additionally, post-communist citizens who lived in a more democratic country in the interwar

period (1920-1939) were more likely to place themselves further to the right in the post-communist era, while citizens with home grown fascist regimes were much less likely to do so. So apparently, living through communism may have conditioned the way in which citizens thought about their left-right ideological orientation, but it did not permanently fix these attitudes, and nor did it do so independent of prior, pre-communist, developments.

We also tested these approaches on the link between pro-democratic attitudes and right wing biases in post-communist countries, which is the opposite effect of what is found elsewhere (i.e., in the rest of the world, pro-democratic attitudes were associated with left-wing biases). Similarly to left-right self-placement, we found almost no mitigating effect for demographics or political and economic stimuli on the strong relationship between pro-democratic attitudes and right wing biases in post-communist countries. Also similarly to left-right self placement, we did find important *socialization* effects. First, living longer under communism did cut into the right-wing bias among pro-democratic post-communist citizens, although we want to be clear that the statistical significance of this interactive effect was quite weak. More importantly, we found that the right-wing bias of pro-democrats was accentuated by being socialized under Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes, and mitigated by being educated under reformist and post-communist regimes, thus suggesting that the connection between the left and anti-democratic values was at least a part a function of early childhood socialization. In support of the *running tally* approach, we found that the link between pro-democracy values and more right-wing self placement was strengthened by the presence of a viable communist successor party – and especially an unreformed one – thus suggesting again that post-communist political realities could inform how citizens continued to update their beliefs acquired under communism.

Taken together, then, it seems clear that the left-wing bias in post-communist countries – as well as the connection between right wing views and pro-democratic sentiments – was not merely a function of different socio-demographic patterns in the post-communist world or the especially severe economic crises experienced by these countries. Instead, the communist experience itself seems to have affected the ideological orientation of people who lived through it, pushing them more to the left than elsewhere in the world – in part by producing lower levels of religiosity – but at the same time by fostering a link between authoritarianism and the left that is not as present elsewhere and which has proven harder to break for some post-communist citizens (e.g., those living in countries with strong unreformed post-communist parties or with more democratic inter-war regimes) than others. But we also feel confident concluding that these orientations are not irrevocably fixed in individuals. For example, doing well in the post-communist era economically cleared pulled people to the right. Thus, these left (or right) biases matter but they are likely to be updated based on how current developments are compared to reference points from the past, such as the climate under that latter years of the communist regime.

Beyond providing further evidence to test our four legacy approaches, it is also worth pausing for just a moment to consider what these results might tell us about the future of ideology in the post-communist world. Perhaps the most likely scenario is continuing convergence to patterns found elsewhere in the world. To the extent that the leftist bias among communist citizens is a function of the number of years one spent living under communism and having come of age under Stalinist regimes, both of these numbers are obviously going to continue to drop in the future as generational replacement substitutes in citizens born in the post-communist era for those who lived most of their lives under communism and especially for those socialized in

Stalinist regimes. Similarly, the fact that left-right ideological self-placement is increasingly a function of personal economic success (see Table 6.5, model 4) also suggests convergence with the rest of world. However, to the extent that comparisons to specific elements of the past continue to shape ideology, the potential for communist – and especially late-communist – nostalgia to draw citizens to the left will undoubtedly still continue to exist for the foreseeable future. One interesting question to watch is the viability of a rise of a non-democratic right in post-communist countries, and what that will eventually do to pro-democrats. Unlike the rest of the world, post-communist authoritarians and quasi-authoritarians have tended to try to come from the center (Putin, Yanukovych, maybe GERB in Bulgaria) or even center-left (Lukashenko, Milosevic, Mečiar). We have yet to see particularly successful right-wing quasi-authoritarians (with the possible exception of Tudjman), but as the legacy of communism continues to recede, perhaps this pattern will come to an end as well.

Having considered attitudes towards democracy, markets, social policy, and now the synthetic question of left-right self-placement, our focus on the *preferences* of post-communist citizens draws to a close. However, as laid out in Chapter 2, preferences are only one of our three components in citizen politics. Thus we now turn to the question of political *evaluation* in post-communist countries, looking first how citizens evaluate incumbent politicians and governments (Ch. 7), then courts and legislators (Ch.8) and finally the performance of democratic government as a whole (Ch. 9). We take up this task beginning with the following chapter.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Although the book chapter has not yet been written, readers interested in the evaluation of political parties by post-communist citizens are invited to see our previous work on this topic (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010b)

Table 6.1: Left-right familiarity and conceptions

VARIABLES	(1) LR familiarity	(2) LR familiarity	(3) LR familiarity	(4) LR self placemt	(5) LR self placemt	(6) LR self placemt	(7) LR self placemt	(8) LR self placemt
Post-communist	-.197 (.127)	-.149 (.231)	.237 (.246)					
Government Responsibility				-.056** (.008)	-.057** (.013)	-.062** (.010)	-.051** (.019)	-.027* (.004)
Government Ownership				-.082** (.012)	-.022 (.016)	-.091** (.020)	-.126** (.005)	-.105# (.029)
Incomes Equal				-.083** (.011)	-.056** (.013)	-.139** (.013)	-.104 (.042)	-.082# (.026)
Social Liberalism Index				-.054** (.018)	-.162** (.032)	-.162** (.016)	-.173* (.028)	-.132** (.007)
Survey year	-.022* (.011)	-.013 (.014)	-.011 (.008)	.031* (.014)	.010 (.014)	.019* (.009)	.016 (.012)	.013 (.006)
Demog controls	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Econ & pol/inst controls	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Sample	All	All	West & East Germ	Ex- comm	Other new democs	Old democs	West Germ	East Germ
Observations	294422	294422	9563	53634	63062	62681	3274	2947
Pseudo R-sq	.003	.059	.002					
R-squared				.037	.034	.093	.133	.089

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 6.2: Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-communist	-.195** (.073)	-.460** (.125)	.398** (.140)	.750# (.347)	-.299** (.089)	-.387* (.121)	-.200* (.082)	-.586** (.136)
Post-comm* Age			-.014** (.002)	-.027** (.007)				
Age			.007** (.001)	.020** (.002)				
Post-comm* Post-sec educ					.202* (.115)	-.423* (.167)		
Post-comm* Second. educ					.126# (.077)	.067 (.061)		
Post-Secondary education					-.203** (.066)	-.588** (.068)		
Secondary education					-.102* (.050)	-.297** (.046)		
Post-comm* Dem. values							.583** (.098)	-.118 (.144)
Dem values index							-.320** (.056)	-.499* (.126)
Survey year	.006 (.007)	-.019** (.005)	.006 (.007)	-.020* (.006)	.005 (.007)	-.018** (.005)	.001 (.011)	-.012 (.018)
Countries	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany
Observations	224463	8411	224463	8411	224463	8411	172845	5341
R-squared	.002	.021	.004	.049	.003	.042	.009	.046

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 6.3: Demographic and differential stimuli hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-communist	-.271*	-.144	-.272*	-.274*	-.253*	-.244*
	(.129)	(.127)	(.095)	(.143)	(.130)	(.127)
Post-comm* Dem.				.566**		.546**
Values				(.093)		(.095)
Dem values index				-.256**		-.206**
				(.053)		(.054)
Post-Secondary	-.060	-.043	-.570*	-.021	-.103*	-.085
education	(.050)	(.049)	(.174)	(.059)	(.045)	(.052)
Secondary education	.011	.014	-.066	.017	-.023	-.025
	(.038)	(.037)	(.077)	(.044)	(.036)	(.042)
GDP/capita (log)	-.169**	-.074		-.093	-.196**	-.239**
	(.054)	(.053)		(.059)	(.072)	(.074)
Income inequality	.004	.001		-.003	-.005	-.011#
	(.245)	(.233)		(.281)	(.006)	(.006)
Age	.005**	.003**	.008	.003*	.005**	.004**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Relig svc attend (often)		.278**	.346*	.261**		
		(.044)	(.116)	(.048)		
Relig svc attend (never)		-.386**	-.266*	-.335**		
		(.031)	(.077)	(.033)		
Atheist		-.618**	-.527**	-.616**		
		(.067)	(.086)	(.076)		
Corruption ctrl index					.007	-.010
					(.024)	(.026)
FH democracy					.125**	.194**
					(.046)	(.052)
Age of democracy (log)					.144*	.144*
					(.065)	(.071)
PR system					.244*	.283**
					(.099)	(.091)
Presidential system					.004	.007
					(.008)	(.009)
GDP chg					-.012	-.009
					(.008)	(.008)
Unemployment					-.025	-.064
					(.037)	(.055)
Inflation (log)					-.027	-.068
					(.037)	(.055)
Add'l demog vars	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Germany	All	All	All
Observations	224463	224463	8411	172845	224463	172845
R-squared	.009	.026	.079	.030	.016	.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 6.4: Socialization hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Yrs comm. (log)	-.336** (.048)	-.385** (.079)	-.276** (.047)	-.283** (.078)
Yrs pre-comm (log)	.024 (.026)	.040 (.029)	-.011 (.030)	.002 (.032)
Yrs post-comm (log)	.021 (.098)	.036 (.096)	.035 (.158)	.044 (.166)
Stalinist soc (8-13)		-.037* (.014)		-.021 (.014)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)		.006 (.019)		.016 (.024)
Post-tot soc (8-13)		-.030* (.014)		-.014 (.016)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)		-.015 (.021)		-.010 (.020)
Post-comm soc (8-13)		-.049 (.037)		-.023 (.035)
Yrs comm.*			.066 (.073)	-.097 (.102)
Dem values index				-.145 (.174)
Yrs post-comm*			-.124 (.187)	.032 (.025)
Dem values index				.040* (.022)
Stalinist soc (8-13)*				-.016 (.030)
Dem values index				-.064** (.024)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)*				-.045 (.044)
Dem values index				.384 (.562)
Dem values index				1.043# (.567)
FH democracy	.019 (.032)	.014 (.035)	.055# (.030)	.042 (.035)
PR system	.090 (.105)	.065 (.105)	.263** (.095)	.241* (.096)
Presidential system	-.537* (.255)	-.516* (.242)	-.087 (.157)	-.132 (.157)
GDP chg	.003 (.008)	.002 (.008)	-.004 (.008)	-.003 (.007)
Inflation (log)	.014 (.059)	.014 (.057)	-.045 (.063)	-.035 (.061)
Unemployment	-.027** (.009)	-.025** (.009)	-.016* (.007)	-.017* (.007)
GDP/capita (log)	-.326* (.133)	-.328* (.142)	-.470** (.132)	-.449** (.150)
Income inequality	.030* (.014)	.032* (.014)	.032** (.010)	.036** (.011)
Add'l demog variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	58806	58806	46726	46726
R-squared	.018	.019	.028	.033

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 6.5: Running tally hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Polity Regime 1989	-.010 (.012)						-.009 (.014)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39	.052** (.015)						.020 (.014)	
Native Fascism	-.260** (.091)						-.253* (.117)	
Native Communism	-.036 (.147)						-.141 (.131)	
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88		-.071 (.068)						
Comm. Gov't			-.812* (.342)					
Inflation* Comm Gov't			.228* (.087)					
Pers. fin satisf (1989-93)				.045** (.016)				
Pers. fin satisf (1994-2000)				.092** (.021)				
Pers. fin satisf (2001-2009)				.108** (.027)				
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)					-.197# (.122)			-.142 (.115)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)					-.393* (.219)			-.003 (.161)
Party system left-right average						.013 (.066)		
Dem values index							.255** (.090)	.220* (.087)
Polity Regime 1989*							-.041* (.016)	
Dem values index							.021# (.014)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39*							-.063 (.147)	
Dem values index								.137 (.155)
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)								.393* (.178)
Dem values index								
Unreformed Communist(>20%)								
Dem values index								
FH democracy	.022 (.034)	.061# (.033)	.068* (.031)	.069# (.038)	.035 (.032)	.015 (.109)	.076# (.039)	.102** (.033)
GDP chg	.008 (.011)	-.000 (.009)	-.002 (.009)	.001 (.009)	-.002 (.009)	.202* (.066)	.002 (.012)	-.006 (.008)
Inflation (log)	.097 (.079)	.029 (.070)	-.043 (.070)	.081 (.066)	.028 (.069)	.236 (.163)	-.045 (.078)	-.059 (.072)
Unemployment	-.010 (.009)	-.008 (.008)	-.004 (.009)	-.002 (.008)	-.012 (.009)		-.007 (.009)	.001 (.009)
GDP/capita (log)	-.314** (.095)	-.265# (.133)	-.344** (.116)	-.282 (.172)	-.323* (.129)	.236 (.385)	-.475** (.120)	-.469** (.128)
Income inequality	.026 (.017)	.016 (.015)	.011 (.013)	.016 (.014)	.016 (.014)	.025 (.024)	.005 (.014)	.008 (.012)
Additional demographic ctrls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	61078	61078	61078	47731	61078	11266	48975	48975
R-squared	.020	.012	.012	.022	.012	.022	.029	.027

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 (one-tailed where appropriate)

ELECTRONIC APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 6

Table A1: Overview of survey countries and years for World Values Survey (WVS) data

Country	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4	Survey 5
Albania	1998	2002			
Algeria	2002				
Argentina	1991	1995	1999	2006	
Armenia	1997				
Australia	1995	2005			
Austria	1990	1999			
Azerbaijan	1997				
Bangladesh	1996	2002			
Belarus	1990	1996			
Belgium	1990	1999	2000		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998	2001			
Brazil	1991	1997	2006		
Bulgaria	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Burkina Faso	2007				
Canada	1990	2000	2006		
Chile	1990	1996	2000	2006	
Colombia	1998	2005			
Croatia	1996	1999			
Cyprus	2006				
Czech Republic	1990	1991	1998	1999	
Denmark	1990	1999			
Egypt	2008				
El Salvador	1999				
Estonia	1996	1999			
Ethiopia	2007				
Finland	1990	1996	2000	2005	
France	1990	1999	2006		
Georgia	1996	2009			
Germany (East)	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Germany (West)	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Ghana	2007				
Great Britain	1990	1999	2005		
Greece	1999				
Guatemala	2004				
Hungary	1991	1998	1999		
Iceland	1990	1999			
India	1990	1995	2001	2006	
Indonesia	2001	2006			
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2000				
Iraq	2006				
Ireland	1990	1999			
Israel	2001				
Italy	1990	1999	2005		
Japan	1990	1995	2000	2005	
Jordan	2001	2007			
Korea, Rep.	1990	1996	2001	2005	
Kyrgyz Republic	2003				

Latvia	1996	1999			
Lithuania	1997	1999			
Luxembourg	1999				
Macedonia	1998	2001			
Malaysia	2006				
Mali	2007				
Malta	1991	1999			
Mexico	1990	1996	2000	2005	
Moldova	1996	2002	2006		
Morocco	2001	2007			
Netherlands	1990	1999	2006		
New Zealand	1998	2004			
Nigeria	1990	1995	2000		
Norway	1990	1996	2007		
Pakistan	2001				
Peru	1996	2001	2006		
Philippines	1996	2001			
Poland	1989	1990	1997	1999	2005
Portugal	1990	1999			
Romania	1993	1998	1999	2005	
Russian Federation	1990	1995	1999		
Rwanda	2007				
Saudi Arabia	2003				
Serbia	2006				
Serbia and Montenegro	1996	2001			
Singapore	2002				
Slovak Republic	1990	1991	1998	1999	
Slovenia	1992	1995	1999	2005	
South Africa	1990	1996	2001	2006	
Spain	1990	1995	1999	2000	2007
South Africa	2006				
Sweden	1990	1996	1999	2006	
Switzerland	1989	1996	2007		
Taiwan	2006				
Tanzania	2001				
Thailand	2007				
Trinidad Tobago	2006				
Turkey	1990	1996	2001	2007	
Uganda	2001				
Ukraine	1996	1999	2006		
Uganda	2001				
United States	1990	1995	1999	2006	
Uruguay	1996	2006			
Venezuela, RB	1996	2000			
Zambia	2007				
Zimbabwe	2001				

Note: These are the surveys in which the questions about support for democracy were asked in the second, third, fourth and fifth wave of the WVS. We excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.

Table A2: Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-communist	-.051*	-.009	.037	.303	-.105**	-.018	-.061#	-.173**
	(.027)	(.145)	(.036)	(.186)	(.032)	(.136)	(.031)	(.005)
Post-comm* Age			-.002**	-.007**				
			(.001)	(.002)				
Age			.001**	.008**				
			(.000)	(.001)				
Post-comm* Post-sec educ					.122**	.017		
					(.034)	(.078)		
Post-comm* Second. educ					.046*	.022		
					(.020)	(.076)		
Post-Secondary education					-.030	-.142*		
					(.019)	(.040)		
Secondary education					.004	-.087		
					(.014)	(.050)		
Post-comm* Dem. values							.106**	.023
							(.027)	(.023)
Dem values index							-.056**	-.060*
							(.017)	(.011)
Survey year	-.008**	-.034*	-.008**	-.034**	-.008**	-.033*	-.000	-.003
	(.002)	(.009)	(.002)	(.008)	(.002)	(.008)	(.004)	(.001)
Countries	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany
Observations	185167	6186	185167	6186	185167	6186	139374	3413
R-squared	.010	.174	.012	.220	.012	.183	.009	.035

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A3: Demographic and differential stimuli hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-communist	-.169** (.042)	-.126** (.037)	.039 (.131)	-.132** (.040)	-.108* (.042)	-.111* (.043)
Post-comm* Dem. Values				.102** (.019)		.083** (.021)
Dem values index				-.025* (.011)		-.017 (.012)
Post-Secondary education	.053** (.013)	.059** (.013)	-.061# (.029)	.057** (.013)	.052** (.012)	.052** (.013)
Secondary education	.056** (.010)	.060** (.009)	.014 (.031)	.049** (.009)	.055** (.009)	.046** (.010)
GDP/capita (log)	-.100** (.016)	-.069** (.014)		-.064** (.016)	-.072** (.020)	-.075** (.022)
Income inequality	.001 (.002)	.000 (.002)		.003# (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.000 (.002)
Age	.003** (.000)	.002** (.000)	.005* (.001)	.002** (.000)	.003** (.000)	.002** (.000)
Relig svc attend (often)		.135** (.012)	.184** (.036)	.122** (.013)		
Relig svc attend (never)		-.082** (.008)	-.118** (.015)	-.084** (.008)		
Atheist		-.111** (.019)	-.098# (.041)	-.106** (.021)		
Corruption ctrl index					-.052* (.021)	-.075** (.024)
FH democracy					-.013# (.007)	-.012 (.008)
Age of democracy (log)					.031* (.015)	.034# (.018)
PR system					-.023 (.025)	-.016 (.025)
Presidential system					.029 (.027)	.036 (.028)
GDP chg					.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Unemployment					-.003# (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Inflation (log)					-.011 (.014)	-.028# (.016)
Add'l demog vars	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Germany	All	All	All
Observations	185167	185167	6186	139374	185167	139374
R-squared	.068	.099	.265	.116	.075	.088

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A4: Socialization hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Yrs comm. (log)	-.032** (.009)	-.061* (.027)	-.005 (.008)	-.039 (.024)
Yrs pre-comm (log)	.006 (.004)	-.003 (.007)	.001 (.005)	-.007 (.008)
Yrs post-comm (log)	-.140** (.035)	-.143** (.034)	.094 (.059)	.100# (.056)
Stalinist soc (8-13)		.001 (.006)		.004 (.007)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)		-.010 (.006)		-.012 (.008)
Post-tot soc (8-13)		-.009 (.006)		-.002 (.007)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)		-.013 (.009)		-.011 (.007)
Post-comm soc (8-13)		-.012 (.011)		-.018# (.010)
Yrs comm.*			.044** (.010)	.079** (.026)
Dem values index			.017 (.041)	.010 (.037)
Yrs post-comm*				.013# (.008)
Dem values index				.019** (.007)
Stalinist soc (8-13)*				.013# (.008)
Dem values index				.019** (.007)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)*				.013# (.008)
Dem values index				.005 (.007)
Post-tot soc (8-13)*				.005 (.007)
Dem values index				.025* (.012)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)*				.025* (.012)
Dem values index				-.104 (.105)
Dem values index				-.262 (.156)
FH democracy	.011 (.013)	.008 (.013)	.014 (.016)	.010 (.015)
PR system	-.038 (.059)	-.028 (.058)	-.014 (.058)	-.002 (.056)
Presidential system	-.057 (.069)	-.055 (.067)	-.047 (.088)	-.054 (.085)
GDP chg	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.001 (.003)	.002 (.003)
Inflation (log)	.008 (.018)	.007 (.017)	.030 (.024)	.033 (.024)
Unemployment	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.000 (.003)	.001 (.003)
GDP/capita (log)	-.148** (.042)	-.135** (.041)	-.185** (.055)	-.168** (.052)
Income inequality	.006 (.004)	.007 (.004)	.013# (.007)	.014* (.006)
Add'l demog variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	51317	51317	39954	39954
R-squared	.066	.069	.082	.088

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A5: Running tally hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Polity Regime 1989	.003 (.008)						.001 (.008)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39	.002 (.005)						-.004 (.005)	
Native Fascism	-.148* (.063)						-.112* (.050)	
Native Communism	-.079 (.051)						-.021 (.039)	
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88		-.050# (.031)						
Comm. Gov't			.033 (.090)					
Inflation* Comm Gov't			.028 (.029)					
Pers. fin satisf (1989-93)				.019** (.003)				
Pers. fin satisf (1994-2000)				.026** (.004)				
Pers. fin satisf (2001-2009)				.021** (.004)				
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)					.082 (.067)			.053 (.060)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)					.066 (.059)			-.002 (.063)
Party system left-right average						-.004 (.020)		
Dem values index							.040 (.027)	.093** (.018)
Polity Regime 1989*							-.016** (.004)	
Dem values index							.002 (.003)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39*							-.050* (.024)	
Dem values index								-.035 (.038)
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)								.005 (.031)
Dem values index								
Unreformed Communist(>20%)								
Dem values index								
FH democracy	-.015 (.015)	.003 (.016)	.005 (.014)	.017 (.011)	.001 (.015)	-.061* (.022)	.018 (.012)	.024 (.015)
GDP chg	.003 (.003)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.002)	.005 (.005)	.068** (.018)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.005)
Inflation (log)	.008 (.019)	.015 (.020)	.012 (.019)	.037** (.011)	.022 (.021)	-.020 (.042)	.008 (.017)	.012 (.018)
Unemployment	-.006* (.003)	-.005* (.002)	-.004# (.002)	.004* (.002)	-.005# (.003)		.001 (.002)	.002 (.003)
GDP/capita (log)	-.088# (.052)	-.111* (.054)	-.083 (.055)	-.145** (.038)	-.065 (.054)	.090 (.067)	-.167** (.048)	-.171** (.048)
Income inequality	-.004 (.004)	-.000 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	.007* (.003)	-.001 (.003)	.000 (.009)	.005 (.004)	.007 (.005)
Additional demographic ctrls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	53500	53500	53500	45578	53500	10628	42121	42121
R-squared	.055	.041	.051	.119	.043	.094	.085	.073

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 (one-tailed where appropriate)

Partial Bibliography

- Abbott, Pamela and Roger Sapsford. 2006. "Trust, Confidence And Social Environment in Post-Communist Societies." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(1): 59-71.
- Achen, Christopher H. 2002. "Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24 (2): 151-70.
- Adorno, Theodor W. 1950. *The Authoritarian personality*. 1st ed. New York: Harper.
- Aldrich, John. 1993. "Rational Choice And Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1): 246-278.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1965. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations*. London: Sage Publications.
- Anderson, Christopher and Kathleen O'Conner. 2000. "System Change, Learning And Public Opinion About The Economy." *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(01): 147-172.
- Babones, Salvatore J., and María José Alvarez-Rivadulla. 2007. "Standardized Income Inequality Data for Use in Cross-National Research," *Sociological Inquiry* 77 (1): 3–22.
- Badescu, Gabriel, and Paul Sum. 2005. "Historical Legacies, Social Capital and Civil Society: Comparing Romania on a Regional Level." *Europe-Asia Studies*. 57 (1): 117-133.
- Bahry, Donna, Cynthia Boaz, and Stacy Burnett Gordon. 1997. "Tolerance, transition, and support for civil liberties in Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (4): 484–510.
- Baird, Vanessa, Gregory Caldeira, and James Gibson. 1998. "On The Legitimacy Of National High Courts." *American Political Science Review*, 92(2): 343-358.
- Beissinger, Mark. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2007. *Party policy in modern democracies*. New York: Routledge.

- Berinsky, Adam J. 2004. *Silent voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Berinsky, Adam, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2006. "'Don't Knows' and Public Opinion Towards Economic Reform: Evidence from Russia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (1): 1-27.
- Bernhard, Michael and Ekrem Karakoç. 2007. "Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship", *World Politics* 59(4):539-567.
- Blais, Andre. 2006. "What Affects Voter Turnout?" *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Blais, Andre and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. 1998. "Turnout In Electoral Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(2): 239-262.
- Brady, Henry. 1993. "Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What Do They Say?." *American Political Science Review*, 87(2): 303-318.
- Bratton, Michael. 1999. "Political Participation In A New Democracy: Institutional Considerations From Zambia." *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(5): 549.
- Bratton, Michael. 2008. "Public Opinion And Democratic Legitimacy." *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2): 74.
- Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. 2001. "Support For Democracy In Africa: Intrinsic Or Instrumental?" *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3): 447-474.
- Chu, Yun-han, Michael Bratton, Marta Lagos, Sandeep Shastri, and Mark Tessler. "Public Opinion and Democratic Legitimacy." *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2):74, 2008.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1995. "Should Transitologists Be Grounded? *Slavic Review* 54(1):111- 127.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1998. "Regional differences in democratization: the East versus the South," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14(3):187.
- Bunce, Valerie. 2005. "The National Idea: Imperial Legacies and Postcommunist Pathways in Eastern Europe." *East European Politics and Society*, 19(3): 406-442.
- Caldeira, Gregory and James Gibson. 1992. "The Etiology Of Public Support For The Supreme Court." *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(3): 635-664.

- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Chanley, Virginia, Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn. 2000. "The Origins And Consequences Of Public Trust In Government: A Time Series Analysis." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 64(3): 239.
- Chen, Cheng and Rudra Sil. 2004. "State-Legitimacy And The (In)-Significance Of Democracy In Post-Communist Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(3): 347-368.
- Chong, Dennis. 1991. *Collective action and the civil rights movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Converse, Philip E. 1969. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (2):139-71.
- Cox, James and Denise Powers. 1997. "Echoes From The Past: The Relationship Between Satisfaction With Economic Reforms And Voting Behavior In Poland." *American Political Science Review*, 91(3): 617-633.
- Crawford, Beverly, and Arend Lijphart, eds. 1997. *Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies.
- Dalton, Russel. 1994. "Communists And Democrats: Democratic Attitudes In The Two Germanies." *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(04): 469-493.
- Darden, Keith, and Anna Grzymala-Busse. 2006. "The Great Divide: Precommunist Schooling and Postcommunist Trajectories." *World Politics*. 59 (1).
- Duch, Raymond. 1993. "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support For Transition To A Free Market In The Former Soviet Union." *American Political Science Review*, 87(3): 590-608.
- Earle, John and Scott Gehlbach. 2003. "A Spoonful Of Sugar: Privatization And Popular Support For Reform In The Czech Republic." *Economics and Politics*
- Easter, Gerald. 1997. "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS." *World Politics* 49 (1):184-211.

- Eisenstadt SN. 1995. *Power, Trust and Meaning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz 1996. *The state against society: Political crises and their aftermath in East Central Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Stephen Hanson. 2003. "Time, Space, and Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe." In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 15–48.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. 1998. "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93", *World Politics* 50(4): 547-72.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. 1999. *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest And Democratic Consolidation In Poland, 1989-1993*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies." *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (4):485.
- Evans, Geoffrey. 2006. "The Social Bases Of Political Divisions In Post-Communist Eastern Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology*.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1993. "Identifying The Bases Of Party Competition In Eastern Europe." *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4): 521-48.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics And Economics Of Democratic Commitment: Support For Democracy In Transition Societies." *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(04): 485-514.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "Social And Ideological Cleavage Formation In Post-Communist Hungary." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47(7): 1177-1204.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1998. "The Evolution Of Left And Right In Post-Soviet Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50(6): 1023-1042.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1998. "The Structuring Of Political Cleavages In Post-Communist Societies: The Case Of The Czech Republic And Slovakia." *Political Studies*, 46(1): 115-139.

- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1999. "Political Culture Versus Rational Choice: Explaining Responses To Transition In The Czech Republic And Slovakia." *British Journal of Political Science*, 29(01): 129-154.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 2000. "Elections In Central And Eastern Europe: The First Wave." In *Explaining The Formation Of Electoral Cleavages In Post-Communist Democracies*. eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Ekkehard Mochmann. Berlin: Edition Sigma .
- Fidrmuc, Jan. 2000. "Political Support For Reforms: Economics Of Voting In Transition Countries." *European Economic Review*, 44(8).
- Finkel, Steven. 1985. "Reciprocal Effects Of Participation And Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*, 891-913.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Fish, Steven. 1997. "The Determinants Of Economic Reform In The Post-Communist World." *East European Politics and Societies*, 12(1): 31.
- Fletcher, Joseph T., and Boris Sergeyev. 2002. "Islam and Intolerance in Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan " *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (2):251-75.
- Franklin, Charles H., and John E. Jackson. 1983. "The Dynamics of Party Identification." *American Political Science Review* 77: 957-73.
- Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. "The Left-Right Scheme: Theoretical Framework." In *Continuities In Political Action: A Longitudinal Study Of Political Orientations In Three Western Democracies*. eds. Kent Jennings and Jan van Deth. Amsterdam: De Gruyter.
- Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. *Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, James, Raymond Duch, and Kent Tedin. 1992. "Democratic Values And The Transformation Of The Soviet Union." *The Journal of Politics*, 54(02): 329-371.

- Gibson, James L. 1995. 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1995), pp. 53–111.
- Gibson, James L. 1996. "Political and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine." *Journal of Politics* 58:954-84.
- Gibson, James L. 1998a. "Putting Up With Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy" *Political Research Quarterly*, 51(1): 37-68.
- Gibson, James L. 1998b. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate " *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (3):819-50.
- Gibson, James. 2002. "Becoming Tolerant? Short-Term Changes in Russian Political Culture" *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2):309-33.
- Gibson, James L., and Raymond N. Duch. 1993. "Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion." *Comparative Political Studies* 26: 286-329.
- Gijsberts, Merove and Paul Nieuwbeerta. 2000. "Class Cleavages In Party Preferences In The New Democracies In Eastern Europe. A Comparison With Western Democracies." *European Societies*, 2(4): 397-430.
- Graham, Carol and Sandip Sukhtankar. 2004. "Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support For Markets And Democracy In Latin America? Some Evidence From Surveys Of Public Opinion And Well Being." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 36(02): 349-377.
- Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan hearts and minds: political parties and the social identities of voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna 2007. *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Guerin, Daniel, Francois Petry, and Jean Crete. 2004. "Tolerance, protest and democratic transition: Survey evidence from 13 post-communist countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 43:371-95.
- Hadenius, Axel. 1992. *Democracy And Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 2008. *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hayo, Bernd. 2004. "Public Support For Creating A Market Economy In Eastern Europe." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 32(4): 720-744.
- Hellman, Joel. 1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." *World Politics* 50 (2):203-34.
- Herzog, Alexander, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2010. "The Dynamics of Dissent: The Winners-Losers Gap in Attitudes Towards EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries." *European Political Science Review*. Forthcoming.
- Hodson, Randy, Dusko Sekulic, and Garth Massey. 1994. "National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia." *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (6):1534-58.
- Howard, Marc. 2002. "The Weakness Of Post-Communist Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1): 157-169.
- Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. *The weakness of civil society in post-Communist Europe*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift In Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1976. "Party Identification, Ideological Preferences And The Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics." In *Party Identification And Beyond: Representations Of Voting And Party Competition*. eds. Dennis Farlie, Ivor Crewe, and Ian Budge. New York: Wiley.
- Ishiyama-Smithey, Shannon and John Ishiyama. 2002. "Judicial Activism In Post-Communist Politics." *Law and Society Review*, 36: 719.

- Innes, Abby. 2002. Party competition in postcommunist Europe - The great electoral lottery. *Comparative Politics* 35(1):85-104.
- Janos, Andrew C. 2000. *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Jowitt, Ken. 1992. *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 307-37.
- Karpov, Vyacheslav. 1999a. "Political Tolerance in Poland and the United States " *Social Forces* 77 (4):1525-49.
- Karpov, Vyacheslav. 1999b. "Religiosity and Political Tolerance in Poland." *Sociology of Religion* 60 (4):387-402.
- Katnik, Amy. 2002. "Religion, Social Class, and Political Tolerance." *International Journal of Sociology* 32 (1):14-38.
- King, Gary, Christopher J. L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon, and Ajay Tandon. 2003. "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research," *American Political Science Review*, 97:4: 191-207.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures And Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements In Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(1):57-85.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "The Formation Of Party Systems In East Central Europe." *Politics and Society*, 20: 7-50.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1999. *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, And Party Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Manfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka. 1999. *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- Kitschelt, Herbert and Lenka Bustokova 2009. "The radical right in post-communist Europe. Comparative perspectives on legacies and party competition." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42(4): 459-83.
- Kopecký, Petr. 2001. *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics : Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.
- Kopstein, Jeffrey. 2003. "Postcommunist Democracy: Legacies and Outcomes." *Comparative Politics*. 35 (2):231-50.
- Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2003. "Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." *European Journal of Political Research*. 42: 741-759.
- Kurtz, Marcus J., and Andrew Barnes. 2002. The political foundations of post-communist regimes - Marketization, agrarian legacies, or international influences. *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (5):524-553.
- Lagos, Marta. 2001. "Between Stability And Crisis In Latin America." *Journal of Democracy*, 12(1): 137-145.
- Lagos, Marta. 2003. " Latin America's Lost Illusions: A Road With No Return?" *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2): 163-173.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1996 *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Letki, Natalia. 2004. "Socialization For Participation? Trust, Membership, And Democratization In East-Central Europe." *Political Research Quarterly*, 57(4): 665.
- Linz, Juan and A. Stepan. 1996. *Problems Of Democratic Transition And Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America And Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Maddison, Angus (2009) *Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD* available at: www.ggdc.net/maddison/
- Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. "Political Parties And Ideological Spaces In East Central Europe." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 30(3): 221-54.
- Mason, David. 1995. "Attitudes Toward The Market And Political Participation In The Post Communist States." *Slavic Review*, 54(2): 385-406.

- Mason, David S. 2003/04. "Fairness Matters: Equity and the Transition to Democracy." *World Policy Journal*. 20(4): 48-56.
- McIntosh, Mary E., Marth Abele MacIver, Daniel G. Abele, and David B. Nolle. 1995. "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria " *Social Forces* 73 (3):939-67.
- Millard, F. 2010. *Democratic elections in Poland, 1991-2007*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Miller, Arthur H., Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger. 1994. "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR." *American Political Science Review* 88: 399-411.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 1994. "Support For Parliaments And Regimes In The Transition Toward Democracy In Eastern Europe." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 5-32.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001. "Political Support For Incomplete Democracies: Realist Vs. Idealist Theories And Measures." *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique*, 22(4): 303-320.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose 1997. "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies." *Journal of Politics* 59:419-51.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. 2001. "What Are The Origins Of Political Trust?: Testing Institutional And Cultural Theories In Post-Communist Societies." *Comparative political studies*, 34(1): 30.
- Olcott, Martha B. 1993. "Central Asia on its own" *Journal of Democracy* 4(1): 92-103.
- Osborne, Martin. 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 28 (2): 261-301.
- Pacek, Alexander C., Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2009. "Disenchanted or Discerning? Turnout in Post-Communist Elections, 1990-2004." *The Journal of Politics*. 71 (2):473-91.

- Peffley, Mark, and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-Level Model of Democratic Learning." *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (3):243-57.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 1999. "Separated at Birth or Separated by Birth? The Communist Successor Parties in Romania and Hungary." *East European Politics and Societies* 13 (1): 117–47.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2007. "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change." – *The Journal of Politics* 69(4):908-926
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. "The Post-Communist Democratic Deficit: Roots and Mechanisms" Princeton University Working Paper.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2010. "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Anti-Establishment Parties after Communism" *World Politics* 62(2): 221-260.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Joshua A. Tucker. 2010a. "After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries", *Center for Advanced Study in the Social Science*, Fundacion Juan March, Madrid, Spain, Working Paper Series, Estudio/Working Paper 2010/250.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2010b "Communist Legacies and Political Values and Behavior: A Theoretical Framework with an Application to Political Party Trust." *Comparative Politics*, forthcoming.
- Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science*. 37 (2):391-414.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. *Making democracy work : civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy And The Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rohrschneider, Robert. 1994. "Report from the laboratory: The influence of institutions on political elites' values in Germany" *American Political Science Review*, 88(4)927-941.
- Rohrschneider, Robert. 1999. *Learning democracy : democratic and economic values in unified Germany*. Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press.

- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. *Democracy And Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rose, Richard. 1994. "Post-Communism And The Problem Of Trust." *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3): 18-30.
- Rose, Richard. 2009. *Understanding post-communist transformations: A bottom up approach*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Schmitter, Philippe. 1994. *Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*. In *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, edited by Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans- Jurgen Puhle. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl 1994. "The conceptual travels of transitologists and consolidologists." *Slavic Review*, 53(1):173-185.
- Schöpflin, George. 1993. *Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Shabad, Goldie, and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski. 1999. "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis". *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(6): 690-723.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 1989. *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 2006. "Trust In Public Institutions In Russia: The Lowest In The World." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(2): 153-174.
- Snijders, T. A. B., and R. J. Bosker. 1999. *Multilevel analysis : an introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Stokes, Susan. 1996. "Public Opinion And Market Reforms: The Limits Of Economic Voting." *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(5): 499.
- Stokes, Susan Carol. 2001. *Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Tismaneanu, Vladimir (1998) *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Todosijevic, Bojan, and Szolt Enyedi. 2008. "Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary." *Political Psychology* 29 (5): 767-87.
- Thorisdottir, Hulda, John T. Jost, Ido Liviatan, and Patrick E. Shrout. 2007. "Psychological Needs and Values Underlying Left-Right Political Orientation: Cross-National Evidence from Eastern and Western Europe." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71: 175-203.
- Tucker, Joshua A., Alexander Pacek, and Adam Berinsky. 2002. "Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 557-71.
- Tucker, Joshua A. 2002. "The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:271-304.
- Tucker, Joshua A. 2006. *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-99*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tucker, Joshua A., Alexander Pacek, and Adam Berinsky. 2002. "Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3):557-71.
- United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research. 2007. *World Income Inequality Database: User Guide and Data Sources*. Vol. 2.0b. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER.
- Vachudova, Milada Anna. 2005. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vachudova, Milada. 2008. "Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6), 861-879.
- Weatherford MS. 1984. "Economic stagflation and public support for the political system." *British Journal of Political Science* 14:187-205.

Wittenberg, Jason. 2006. *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.