AFTER THE PARTY: LEGACIES AND LEFT-RIGHT DISTINCTIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

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1. Introduction[*]

The left-right political spectrum sits at the heart of political analysis.[1] Large comparative surveys such as the World Values Study always contain a question asking respondents to locate themselves on a left-right dimension. Expert surveys on party positions (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007) also always include party placements on this left-right dimension. Most formal models of elections and voting are built on the left-right dimension (Osborne 1995). Indeed, one could credibly argue that it is impossible to discuss electoral or party politics anywhere – and especially in competitive multiparty systems – without making use of the left-right spectrum as part of this discussion.

Yet questions remain as to the appropriateness of the left-right spectrum for the *comparative* analysis of party systems: does the left-right spectrum mean the same thing in different political contexts? Huber (1989) answered affirmatively in regard to eight West European countries, arguing that since left-right self placement is fundamentally a function of issue attitudes as opposed to partisanship (ie., determined on a country by country basis), it was legitimate to compare these scales cross-nationally. Thorrisdottir *et al.* (2007), however, cast doubt on whether this comparability of left-right scales extends to central and eastern Europe, finding a number of characteristics of left-right self-placement that seem to differ between the established democracies of Western Europe and their post-communist counterparts (although it should be noted that their study contained only four post-communist countries).[2] This research seemed to confirm earlier speculation that post-communist citizens would have a weak understanding of the left-right spectrum (Evans and Whitefield 1993, see works cited on p.530) or that they might be more likely to think of politics as structured around parties' relationship to the transition away from communism than around traditional left-right divides (Tismaneanu 1998, Tucker 2006).

In this paper, we advance our understanding of this topic in three important directions. First, we revisit the question of the appropriateness of comparing left-right self-placement in post-communist countries with left-right self-placement in other countries in a much more thorough empirical framework, namely a pooled dataset of the second, third, fourth, and fifth

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[1] For a survey of the literature in both the political and psychological traditions, see Jost *et al.* (2009).

[2] See as well Todosijevic and Enyedi (2008), who while not employing a comparative analysis, do find a different relationship between authoritarian personality traits and ideological orientation in Hungary than expected based on research from established democracies.

waves of the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS). This allows us to compare 57 surveys from 24 post-communist countries with 100 surveys from 42 non-post-communist countries from 1990-2009. We are thus able to bring much more data to bear on this question than previous work. With these data, we demonstrate that while post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale than other citizens, they are more likely to rely primarily on economic attitudes in making these placements than citizens elsewhere, who bring a combination of economic and social attitudes to bear on their left-right self placement.

Second, in a more novel vein, we explore the socio-demographic and attitudinal profile of the post-communist left and the right in comparative perspective, and make three important observations. First, while elsewhere older citizens tend to have a right-wing bias, in post-communist countries older citizens posses a left-wing bias. Conversely, while in the rest of the world more educated and more democratically inclined citizens on average have a left-wing bias, in post-communist countries both of these types of respondents have a right-wing bias. Moreover, these results are robust using a re-conceptualized left-right scale, which estimates left-right placements as if post-communist and non-communist citizens had placed the same weight on economic and social attitudes in their left-right assessments.

Finally, and most importantly from a theoretical standpoint, we do not merely identify these distinctions, but rather seek to explain them in a systematic fashion. More specifically, we apply a theoretical framework we have previously developed (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010) for analyzing the effects of communist era *legacies* on political values, attitudes, and behavior in post-communist countries. The framework lays out four theoretical propositions for how the past could impact political behavior in the present. Two of these propositions flow from the idea that post-communist citizens approach politics in a fundamentally *different* manner than citizens elsewhere due to the communist past. The other two these propositions begin from the concept that citizens in post-communist countries approach politics in a manner that is essentially *similar* to the way citizens do so elsewhere, but that the aggregate level outcome is still different due to the legacy of communism. This framework is designed to provide specific testable and falsifiable hypotheses concerning the effects of communist era legacies through an exhaustive set of possible mechanism by which these legacies can act on values and behavior in the present. We lay out this framework in Section 2 of the paper, and use it to develop a set of hypotheses about the drivers of distinctive patterns of left-right self-placement in post-communist countries. In Section 3 we briefly discuss the data sources and statistical methods, which we will then use in Section 4 to test

both how post-communist citizens understand left-right dimensions and how they place themselves on the left-right ideological continuum. Section 5 discusses the implications of these results for our understanding of left-right placement in post-communist countries, and more broadly for how historical legacies shape subsequent individual political attitudes.

2. Theory and hypotheses

2.1 Communist legacies and post-communist political attitudes: A theoretical framework[3]

Our theoretical framework for exploring the effects of the past upon political attitudes in the present consists of four separate – although not necessarily mutually exclusive – sets of causal pathways. The first two of these assume that post-communist citizens take a fundamentally different approach to politics than citizens elsewhere because of the manner in which they were *socialized* under communism. In one version of this causal story, citizens pick up many of their political values and attitudes at a relatively young age as they are entering adulthood. (Cambell et al.1960; Greenstein 1965; Langton and Jennings 1968; Jennings and Markus 1984). The reason why post-communist citizens might hold different beliefs about politics, therefore, is because they were *socialized* under communism. Crucially, the socialization approach would lead us to believe that once these attitudes are fixed, they tend to stay that way over the course of one's life. So if we can properly identify the types of attitudes that were likely to have developed under communism, we can then go look to see if these attitudes permeate into citizens' attitudes and behavior in the post-communist era. A nice feature of this theory is that it also points to important differences *between* post-communist citizens, based on the nature of communism in the country in which they were living at the time they were undergoing this socialization process, including some current post-communist citizens that were not socialized under communism at all.

A second, contrasting, theory of individual attitude formation suggests that although individuals enter the political world with a set of attitudes and behaviors that tend to reflect early-life socialization, these positions are far from solidified and are actually quite malleable over an individual's lifetime, updating constantly in response to new information and experiences. While in the partisanship literature this has acquired the moniker of the "rational revisionist school" or the "running tally", we will refer to it by its more general theoretical label as a *Bayesian Theory* (Achen 1989; Fiorina 1981). The version of this *Bayesian Theory* we will put forward will therefore suggest that post-communist citizens start

[3] For much, much more detail on these theoretical arguments, see Pop-Eleches and Tucker, nd.

with views about politics and political behavior that are shaped by communism, but that these views are updated throughout citizens' lives, including the period of time during the collapse of communism and through what we now call the post-communist era. In particular, we will be interested in the quality of economic and political experiences under communism (and particularly under late communism), and how they compare to economic and political experiences in the post-communist era.

An alternative causal framework suggests that citizens in post-communist countries react to politics similarly to individuals elsewhere, but that the aggregate level patterns of political behavior, opinions, and attitudes in post-communist countries still differ from other countries because of other communist legacies. Again, we posit two different causal mechanisms for this type of approach. The first is that the grand developmental project of Communism arguably left behind individuals with a very distinctive set of demographic characteristics. For now, let us a highlight three such possible socio-economic legacies, although there may be more. First, communism left behind societies that were significantly poorer than their West European neighbors and in some cases further behind than during the pre-communist period (Janos 2000). Second, communism produced highly literate societies with lower levels of income inequality, and very distinctive patterns of social mobility.[4] Finally, communism resulted in a rapid but distorted industrialization, which created pockets of industrial concentration. So it may be the case that low income earners who are highly educated the world over tend to be leftists, but that there turn out to be disproportionately more poor highly educated people in post-communist countries. In this case, individuals would behave similarly, but we will still end up with societal wide patterns that look very different in post-communist countries than elsewhere (in this example, a leftist bias). We refer to this theoretical proposition as the *Demographic Legacy Theory*.

Alternatively, it may be the case that citizens in post-communist countries react to politics in the same manner as citizens elsewhere, but that the post-communist experience has brought about a set of different stimuli that have resulted in different aggregate level patterns of political attitudes and behavior. To put it perhaps more intuitively, the argument here would be that citizens in Great Britain would likely have reacted the same way to politics in the 1990s (e.g., evaluated institutions similarly, chosen whether or not to participate in politics, etc.) had they faced the same set of circumstances in the 1990s as citizens in

[4] Although it should be noted that high literacy was accompanied by generally low levels of higher education and, to the extent that citizens received higher education, it was more along line of technical training than liberal arts education (CITATION).

Moldova. So the key point here is not that individuals are changed from having experienced in communism, but rather that the *post-communist experience* has led citizens in post-communist countries to hold different attitudes and behave differently. While there are a variety of stimuli on which one could focus, we are particularly interested in the performance of the economy and the performance of political institutions.

Of course, it is legitimate to ask whether or not we can think of such a *Differential Stimuli Theory* as positing a "legacy effect" of communism. On one hand, the stimuli themselves to which people are reacting may in many cases be legacies of communism. So one can reasonably argue that the economic crisis faced by post-communist countries in the early 1990s was a direct result of communist-era distortions (Sachs 1993; Hellman 1998). On the other hand, one could argue that empirical confirmation of this theory would essentially be a *rejection* of a legacy-based approach at the individual level: if we find that citizens in post-communist countries approach politics no differently than anywhere else, then what does that actually have to say about the long term effects of communism on political attitudes and behavior? In some ways, this is largely a question of semantics, and should not interfere with our empirical inquiries. One alternative is to consider the Differential Stimuli Theory as one type of *Null Hypothesis*: support for this theory would in a sense down-grade the role of the past in conditioning political attitudes and behavior in the post-communist present, although it would do so in a very specific manner. Another way of interpreting this, though, would be to say that to the extent we find support only for the Differential Stimuli Theory, it should lead us to conclude that individuals were not affected by communism in a lasting psychological manner but nevertheless explain why we observe different political attitudes and behavior in post-communist countries.

2.2 Communism and left-right positioning: Historical background

Before turning to the formulation of specific hypotheses for each of our four legacy theoretical propositions outlined above, we need to discuss at least briefly a few of the defining aspects of the region's pre-1989 political history and their likely impact on how post-communist citizens would understand left-right positions and how they would place themselves on a left-right ideological scale.

The obvious starting point of such a discussion is the widespread conception of communist regimes as embodiments of leftist ideologies. While this conception was not universal, it was nevertheless one of the few points on which the communist regimes agreed

with their most vocal political critics, many of whom hailed from the right of the ideological spectrum. Therefore, the communist experience may have been less disorienting with respect to left-right positioning than for other political issues such as conceptions of democracy, where the communist regimes offered competing democratic definitions and claims to those advanced by Western liberal democracies. Thus, among both communist critics and apologists, there was broad agreement that the communist parties, which ran Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics for several decades of the twentieth century, were located on the left of the ideological spectrum. While one can of course argue – as some on the left have done – that by the 1980s the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had preserved very little of the initial leftist ideological appeals that characterized late 19th century Marxist movements, the identification of leftist ideology with communism was sufficiently strong in post-communist Eastern Europe to preclude the rise of successful and genuinely leftist political parties without ties to the communist regime.[5]

Of course, such general agreement about the leftist nature of communism does not necessarily imply that citizens of the ex-communist world would understand communism in the same way as their non-communist counterparts. While in Western democracies left-right distinctions can occur along both economic and social dimensions, there are several historical reasons to expect that the former dimension will play a stronger role among post-communist citizens. First, the communist regimes were much more consistently leftist in their economic policies, where despite some significant geographic and temporal variations they broadly pursued redistributive policies and strongly favored public/collective over private property. By comparison, at least after the early days of the Russian Revolution, the social policy track record of the communist regimes was less obviously leftist despite their rejection of the religious values that generally underlie conservative social policies elsewhere in the world. Thus, while communist regimes promoted fairly permissive divorce and – with the notable exception of post-1968 Romania – abortion laws, they were at least as draconian about gay rights as their non-communist counterparts. And while communist policies went a long way towards providing more equal education and employment opportunities for women, traditional gender roles were reproduced not only at the family level but also in most state institutions, where men occupied the vast majority of top leadership positions.

Second, ideological struggles along the economic dimension were much more salient under most communist regimes than social policy disagreements. While, especially in Poland,

[5] The one notable exception is the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which was, however, quite centrist in its ideological positions.

the communists repeatedly clashed with a fairly resilient and assertive Catholic Church, the struggles over social issues like divorce and abortion laws were much less violent and prolonged than over the policies at the core of the communist economic redistribution efforts, especially the nationalization and collectivization campaigns. Moreover, when espousing the achievements of communism and its advantages over capitalism, the communist leaders were much more likely to invoke the greater social equity of the socialist countries rather than the more liberal social policies. This greater ideological salience of economic over social issues was arguably reinforced by the nature of the post-communist transition, where most of the public debates focused on the politics of the transition to capitalism, while social policy debates played a more marginal role (with the partial exception of Poland and maybe Hungary).

Third, even though communist regimes were not successful in completely routing out organized religion in the societies over which they ruled, their concerted and at times violent campaigns against the role of churches in East European societies arguably resulted in a greatly diminished influence of religion at both the individual and the societal level (although see Wittenberg 2006). Therefore, we might expect social issues, whose salience in the West is closely tied to individual religious beliefs and the institutional influence of religious organizations, to play a more marginal role in ex-communist countries. By contrast, the Marxist emphasis on class struggles was a constant element of communist-era rhetoric and, even though the intensity of class struggle had declined significantly by the 1980s in most countries of the Soviet bloc, it may have nevertheless have primed East Europeans to prioritize economic redistribution over other potential ideological concerns.

The discussion so far suggests that the powerful identification of leftist ideology with the historical experience of communism should lead to ideological self-placement patterns – that are closely tied to how individuals evaluate the communist regime and its aftermath.[6] However, what is less clear is what historical associations East Europeans would have with the right. In this respect, countries are likely to differ along two potentially important dimensions of their political history. The first aspect is the extent of pre-communist

[6] In this respect communist regimes probably resemble other ideologically extreme regimes, such as Fascism or right-wing military dictatorships like Pinochet's Chile, where those dissatisfied with the regime can only plausibly go into one possible ideological direction. By contrast, citizens who are dissatisfied with most democracies as well as with more centrist or non-ideological authoritarian regimes, can theoretically "defect" to either the left or the right of the ideological spectrum in search of better alternatives; think here of opposition to Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes as a useful contrast. While the more specific predictions arising from this association between ideology and the communist past will be discussed in greater detail below, overall it should lead to peculiarly post-communist ideological patterns among groups of citizens whose ideal or material interests made them either embrace or reject communism to a greater extent than their co-nationals.

democracy: to the extent that a country had a reasonably positive democratic track record before World War II, such an experience would arguably provide usable historical models for a democratic ideological right and could promote the embrace of rightist ideology in the post-communist era. The second aspect, which figured very prominently in communist ideological discourse, was the experience of Fascism in the 1930s and 1940s. While much of the region eventually experienced Fascism in one form or another, we should expect to see different historical memories, and hence different ideological repercussions, between countries where Fascism was imposed by foreign military force (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia) and countries that experienced "home-grown" fascist regimes (e.g. Hungary, Romania).

2.3 Specific hypotheses

Building on the historical discussion above and in line with the theoretical framework developed in section 2.1, in this section we will formulate hypotheses about the nature of post-communist exceptionalism in left-right conceptions and self-placements, and about how we can establish which – if any – of the historical legacy explanations provides a more persuasive account of the peculiarly post-communist ideological patterns.

2.3.1 Post-communist exceptionalism

Given our earlier discussion about the association between communism and leftist ideology, we would expect this association to compensate for the lower familiarity of post-communist citizens with party politics along a traditional left-right spectrum. Therefore, *we do not expect post-communist citizens to be significantly less likely to understand and place themselves on a left-right ideological scale than their non-communist counterparts*. However, given the greater communist and post-communist emphasis on the economic rather than social policy dimensions of ideological conflict, we expect that the post-communist understanding of left-right ideological differences will reflect these differences. Therefore, *we expect citizens of post-communist countries to place greater emphasis on economic rather than social issues in their conceptions of left-right ideological differences.*

With respect to how citizens place themselves on a left-right ideological dimension, probably the most straightforward communist legacy prediction would be that *post-communist citizens should exhibit a leftist bias compared to their counterparts from non-communist countries*. While we will explore the mechanisms underlying this prediction in greater detail below, this hypothesis is based on the expected impact of decades of communist indoctrination, combined with the socio-demographic and institutional legacies of

communism, which left behind fairly equal societies and extensive welfare states. However, it is likely that for some parts of the population, the economic, political, and moral failure of communism would produce the opposite effect – a rightist bias driven by the wholesale rejection of ideological positions associated with the communist past – and therefore the magnitude and even the direction of the post-communist ideological bias will vary as a function of the relative weight of social groups who had been co-opted by the communist regimes vs. those that rejected them. The relative weight of communist supporters and opponents, and implicitly of leftist and rightist ideological positions, is likely to reflect the relative pre-communist, communist and post-communist experience of individuals (and by extension of entire social groups and even countries), and will be discussed in greater detail in the Bayesian updating hypothesis section.

In addition to how the average citizen places herself on a left-right scale, we may be interested to find out whether citizens of ex-communist countries differ in the demographic and political patterns of their ideological preferences. While the list of potential differences is quite long, due to space limitations we will here only focus on a few more obvious candidates. There are three main sources for why such differences may arise: the first is a direct extension of the discussion above about communist supporters and opponents, and essentially implies that any socio-demographic characteristic, which is associated with support for the communist regime, should correlate differently with left-right ideology in post-communist countries than elsewhere. For example, given that more educated individuals generally suffered more under the communist regimes, we would predict that *education would be associated with an anti-communist and hence rightist ideological bias in post-communist compared to non-communist countries*. The second possibility is that certain individual characteristics are associated with greater exposure to communist ideological indoctrination, and therefore the ideological effect of such characteristics would differ between communist and non-communist countries. The most obvious example in this respect is age, which at any given point of the post-communist transition is associated with a longer personal experience of communism.[7] Therefore, to the extent that we assume that communist regimes were successful in inculcating a leftist bias in their citizens, we should *expect age to be associated with a leftist bias in ex-communist countries compared to elsewhere*. A third set of potential differences is likely to arise from the mental associations between the different

[7] The one qualification to this statement is that for the oldest citizens of Eastern Europe the relationship is no longer monotonous, since the overall communist exposure was capped at about 45 years (i.e. the duration of the communist regime).

facets of communism for many ex-communist citizens. Thus, to the extent that communism is associated with both a leftist ideology and a rejection of Western democratic principles, then we should *expect strong democratic convictions to produce a relative rightist bias among post-communist citizens compared to their non-communist counterparts*.

2.3.2 Socio-demographic landscapes hypotheses

As discussed in Section 2.2, from the *socio-demographic landscapes* perspective post-communist political attitudes may differ from those found elsewhere in the world simply because of the peculiar social and demographic legacies left behind by several decades of communist developmental strategies. Two socio-demographic legacies of communism could be promising candidates for explaining at least part of any leftist bias exhibited by citizens of ex-communist countries. Perhaps most importantly, the *lower religiosity* of East Europeans after decades of communist efforts to weaken organized religion should undermine their willingness to embrace many of the social values in which rightist ideologies are anchored. Moreover, given that higher education is generally associated with more leftist ideological beliefs, the *highly educated societies* left behind by communism may have been provided more natural constituencies for leftist ideologies. Meanwhile, the ideological implications of the *low economic inequality* left behind by communism are harder to gauge: on the one hand the absence of high inequality should have reduced the appeal of leftist redistribution promises but on the other hand it may also inculcate an egalitarian ethos, which is more compatible with leftist ideological positions. Overall, however, to the extent that the "different socio-demographic landscapes" theory is correct we should expect that *on aggregate the post-communist exceptionalism in left-right ideological positions will be reduced or even eliminated once we account for differences in socio-demographic conditions between ex-communist and non-communist countries.*

2.3.3 Different stimuli hypotheses

The post-communist transition abounded in both economic and political stimuli, which could at least in theory account for the different ideological preferences of its citizens. In economic terms, East European countries experienced one of the most traumatic economic crises in recent memory, with deep and prolonged recessions that were often accompanied by high and persistent inflation, and significant rises in unemployment. However, it is not entirely clear what the net ideological effects of such economic upheavals would be: thus, whereas weak growth and high unemployment may trigger greater support for leftist policy

solutions involving government intervention to stimulate the economy and alleviate social costs, right-wing governments are usually seen as having a comparative advantage in dealing with high inflation (Powell and Whitten 1993). Moreover, the effects of crises are likely to hinge on the ideological spin, which political elites and especially incumbent governments put on the nature and the implications of the crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009). Similarly, one would expect the shorter democratic histories and the more fragile and more corrupt state institutions of post-communist Eastern Europe to fuel popular dissatisfaction with the political status quo, but it is less clear whether such discontent is likely to fuel left-wing or right-wing defections or whether it would simply result in political apathy without a noticeable ideological impact. Nonetheless, to the extent that the *different stimuli theory* is correct, we expect that *controlling for economic and political performance differences should greatly reduce the extent post-communist ideological bias.*

2.3.4 Socialization hypotheses

As discussed in section 2.1, there are two versions of the socialization theory. Based on the cumulative socialization theory, which treats political attitudes as the cumulative result of life experiences, we should expect *citizens who lived for longer periods under communism to exhibit stronger leftist bias in their ideological positions* than those who experienced shorter communist spells. Meanwhile, longer periods of either pre-communist or post-communist life experience should have the opposite effect.

To the extent that the second version – early socialization theory – is correct and ideology is shaped by early formative political experiences, then we should *expect individuals who spent more of these crucial early years under communism to have a stronger leftist bias in their ideological positions* than their co-nationals who grew up during either pre- or post-communism. As a corollary, assuming that under some subtypes of communist regimes the “dose” of ideological indoctrination was higher than in others, we would expect *individuals whose early socialization took place under particularly rigid communist regimes (esp. Stalinist and neo-Stalinist) to have a stronger leftist bias than those who grew up in more reformist communist periods.* To assist us in testing this hypothesis, we have broken down the communist era in each country into five categories: the transition to communism, Stalinist, post-Stalinist hardline; post-totalitarian (in the Linz and Stepan (1996) sense); and reformist (note that not all countries experienced all five periods). We lay out the coding scheme below in Table 0.

Table 0. Communist Experience by Year and Country[8]

Country	Transition to Communism	Stalinist	Post-Stalinist Hardline	Post-Totalitarian	Reformist
Albania	1944	1945-90			
Bulgaria	1945	1946-53	1954-89		1990
Czechoslovakia	1945-47	1948-53	1953-67, 1969-89		1968
East Germany	1945-48	1949-62	1971-89		1963-1970
Hungary	1945-47	1948-53	1957-60	1961-89	1954-1956
Poland	1945	1946-56	1980-83	1963-80, 83-87	1956-62, 1988-89
Romania	1945-47	1948-64	1971-89		1965-70
USSR	1918-20	1921-53	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1956-64; 1985-91
Yugoslavia	1945	1946-48			1949-90

2.3.5 Bayesian updating hypotheses

As discussed in section 3.2, the Bayesian updating theory also acknowledges the importance of prior political experiences but unlike socialization theory it argues that these priors can be updated – at times rather quickly – as a result of new information. For the purpose of the present analysis, we will focus on how the nature of economic and political performance during three main periods – pre-communism, communism and post-communism – should be expected to shape post-communist ideological positions.

First, the previously discussed differences in pre-communist political trajectories among countries in the region may affect citizens' ideological orientations. Even though the pre-communist experience was more than four decades old by 1989, we would argue that a longer and better interwar democratic spell could provide important "guidance" not only for citizens old enough to consciously remember the pre-communist period but also – through inter-generational transmission within families or other non-communist formal and informal institutions[9] – for their younger compatriots. Therefore, we should *expect to see smaller leftist biases in countries with stronger pre-communist democratic traditions.* The implications of having a homegrown fascist regime in the pre-communist period are somewhat more ambiguous: on the one hand, we may expect that populations where Fascism

[8] Table 0 is obviously not a great number for a Table, but we realized we should include this table very late in the game and did not have the time renumber all of our tables – and, more importantly, all the references we have made to all of our tables – before APSA. Suffice it to say this will be renumbered in our next round of revisions. But for those of you who have made it this far into this footnote, we would really like your feedback on Table 0. Do you agree with the coding? If you have any suggestions for improving the coding – either in terms of the categorization or the specific coding decisions by year – please do let us know.

[9] See for example, Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) and Wittenberg (2006).

had native roots would have fonder (or at least less negative) memories of the period than countries where it was imposed by German (or Italian) troops, and therefore promote rightist ideological tendencies. On the other hand, in countries where Fascism could not be blamed exclusively on outsiders, communist claims equating anti-communism with Fascism were likely to be more credible, therefore pushing citizens towards the left. On balance, *the predicted ideological impact of homegrown Fascist regimes is indeterminate but it could be associated with either leftist or rightist biases*.

Second, individual ideological positions should also be shaped by the nature of communist rule in a given country. More concretely, we would expect *a greater leftist bias in countries where communism enjoyed greater legitimacy at the time of its collapse*. Among the multiple possible sources of communist regime legitimacy, we will here focus on two potentially important time periods. The first goes back to the early days of communism, and to the legitimacy differences between homegrown communist regimes and those imposed by Soviet military force. While communist regimes could of course gain or lose legitimacy in subsequent decades for a variety of reasons, we would expect these different origins to survive in both individual and collective memories and affect the ease with which communist ideas could be discarded after its collapse. However, it is also important to focus on the economic and political performance of late communism, which supplied East Europeans with the freshest communist memories. Therefore, we would expect that communist regimes, which delivered decent economic performance and/or genuine political liberalization efforts in the 1980s, would leave behind citizens more likely to preserve communist ideals and more likely to exhibit a leftist ideological bias.

Finally, we expect that the most important updating about the relative worth of different ideologies should happen during the post-communist transition. Therefore, we should *expect lower leftist biases in countries/periods with better post-communist economic and political performance*. In assessing political performance, we will focus not only on basic democratic rights but also on the quality of democratic governance. With respect to economic performance, we will test the repercussions of both short-term economic performance and longer-term comparisons to the pre-transition period.[10]

Of course, the post-communist political and economic experience differed not only across countries and time periods but also across individuals at a given point in space and

[10] This choice is justified by the fact that whereas studies on economic voting generally find that individuals care most about short-term economic conditions, post-communist surveys suggest that economic comparisons to 1989 continue to be highly salient for East Europeans (Owen and Tucker 2010; Pop-Eleches 2008).

time. Since such "pocketbook" considerations are likely to affect not only voting decisions but also ideological preferences, we would *expect economic losers to have a stronger leftist bias than economic winners.* However, this effect will only continue for as long as the implicit comparison is between a "leftist" communist period and a "rightist" post-communist period. As the transition progresses, the salience of this particular comparison may be gradually overtaken by shorter-term considerations, such as the relative ideological orientation of the incumbent government: thus, *if a leftist government is in power, then relative economic winners may show greater leftist sympathies, while under a rightist government economic winners would show greater rightist ideological tendencies.*

While so far we have discussed how different types of pre-communist, communist and post-communist performance should be expected to shape post-communist ideological positions, it is important to remember that empirical support for the Bayesian updating hypothesis requires more than evidence that performance in any one of the three historical periods matters. By definition, for updating to take place, we need to establish the existence of a (historical) prior and some additional information at a later point in time, which leads to a reassessment of prior beliefs. Thus, if we found that post-communist performance matters but pre-communist and communist are irrelevant, then we could not really talk about updating (or at least not of the type of updating we are interested in here.)[11] Meanwhile, if only the nature of pre-communist or communist performance were to matter, then we could once again not really talk about Bayesian updating, since subsequent information would be irrelevant, but instead we would be much closer to a socialization scenario, whereby individuals are stuck in the past.

So far we have focused on the nature of the political environment during certain historical periods, and the likely conclusions post-communist citizens are likely to draw from comparing these historical episodes. However, this process is likely to be shaped not only by the nature of these historical memories but also by their intensity. For example, two individuals may be equally aware that their countries had a vibrant pre-communist democracy or a bad late communist economic crisis, but the ideological implications of these memories could be very different if for one of them these memories are very vivid and politically salient, while for the other they are simply part of a number of abstract facts learned in a history class. For space reasons in this paper we cannot address the question of what

[11] In theory, citizens could still engage in shorter-term updating, e.g. in how the political developments since the most recent post-communist election affects their views of democracy. However, while such updating would still be interesting in its own right, it would be less relevant for our present focus on communist legacies.

psychological processes explain the varying degrees of salience of certain historical memories for individuals living in very similar environments.[12] Instead, we will focus on the extent to which the post-communist political landscape refreshes people's memory of the communist past, and therefore increases the salience of the communist past in current political attitudes. Arguably the most visible institutional reminder of the communist era is the survival of more or less reformed ex-communist parties. Such parties are likely to reinforce communist-era memories among both supporters and opponents of the old regime and should therefore prolong the half-life of distinctively post-communist patterns of left-right alignments. Thus, *as long as the left of the ideological spectrum is dominated by a political party with clear continuity to the communist past, committed democrats will be less likely to embrace leftist ideologies* even if they may share the left's concerns with inequality and redistribution.[13] However, *the aggregate effect of a strong communist successor party on left-right positions in a given country is uncertain*, since such parties serve simultaneously as institutional vehicles for articulating and reinforcing leftist tendencies among transition losers and as catalysts for coordination among anti-communist political forces, which may reinforce rightist tendencies among their supporters.[14]

3 Data, indicators and methods

3.1 Data sources

To test the hypotheses developed in the preceding section, we use data from the four most recent waves (1989-93, 1995-7, 1999-2002 and 2004-2009) of the *World Values Survey*, which yielded 206 surveys from 87 countries (see Table A3 for more details.) In addition to the individual-level survey data, we collected data on a range of economic and political performance indicators for each of the over 200 country-years for which we had survey data. We then merged these indicators, which are discussed in greater detail below, with the individual-level survey data to construct a multi-level data set, which allows us to test the interaction between individual and country-level factors in driving post-communist attitudes towards democracy.

[12] One promising venue, which we may pursue in future versions of this paper, is to focus on the extent to which a respondent and/or her immediate family suffered traumatic losses in any of these historical periods. Such traumas are likely to inform political attitudes for a long time after the event has become "history" for other people.

[13] Anecdotal evidence from authors' interviews in multiple post-communist countries has repeatedly suggested the importance of consideration.

[14] For an interesting discussion of this mechanism, see Grzymala-Busse's (2007) analysis of the role of communist successor parties in driving robust party competition in Eastern Europe.

3.2 Indicators

3.2.1 Dependent variables

Our main dependent variable is based on a WVS survey question, which asked the respondents to place themselves on a 10-point left-right scale, where 1=extreme left and 10=extreme right. To assess whether respondents were able to place themselves on the left-right scale, we created a simple dummy variable, coded 1 if the responded either did not answer the question at all or if he/she stated that they did not know their position.[15]

To test whether post-communist citizens have the same left-right understanding as their non-communist counterparts, we regressed left-right self-placement indicator on five socially oriented questions and three questions about economic preferences. The socially oriented questions load nicely onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha = .81), so we combine them into a single *social liberalism index*.[16] The economic preference questions do not load well onto a single dimension (Cronbach's alpha < .4), so we include them individually in our analyses; these questions address the extent to which the respondent believes individuals or the government should be responsible for making sure everyone is provided for (*government responsibility)*, whether private or government ownership of business and industry should be increased (*government ownership)*, and whether incomes should be made more or less equal (*incomes equal)*.

As we will demonstrate below in Section 4.2, we find that post-communist citizens place less emphasis on their social policy positions in formulating their own left-right self placement than citizens in the rest of the world. In response to this finding, we have created a second version of our left-right self-placement variable, which essentially imputes how post-communist citizens would have placed themselves on the left-right scale had they *attached the same degree of importance to social considerations* as people in the rest of the world. More specifically, we run a pooled regression with respondents from both ex-communist and non-communist countries, in which we regress left-right self-placement on the economic and social preferences discussed above.[17] On the basis of this regression, we calculate the

[15] Ideally, it would have been useful to differentiate between respondents who refused to answer and those who explicitly said they did not know their position, but unfortunately the "don't know" option was not asked consistently in all surveys, which would have created comparability problems.

[16] Questions address the extent that the respondent is accepting of the following: homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce and euthanasia.

[17] In order to avoid problems associated with missing data here, we use mean replacement for missing data and then include variable-specific dummy variable identifying each of the respondents who do not answer this question. In this way, we do not have to resort to listwise deletion, but at the same time the estimates for the economic and social variables are made based only on the basis of respondents who actually answered those questions.

predicted left-right self-placement (ie., $\hat{y}$) for all individuals in the data set. This variable can then be interpreted as a globally consistent measure of left- right self placement if everyone in the world weighted economic and social considerations equally.[18] We can then test whether the ideological choices and their covariates are different in ex-communist countries even once we use this "normalized left-right position." For space reasons we will only present the full set of statistical tests using this alternative measure in the appendix, whereas in the main discussion we will only discuss those regressions where we find significant and theoretically interesting differences for the two types of dependent variable.

3.2.2 Independent variables

To establish the extent of post-communist exceptionalism, the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 include an indicator denoting whether the respondent lived in an ex-communist country of Eastern Europe[19] or the former Soviet Union.[20]

To test the importance of socio-demographic differences, our regressions include several relevant individual-level characteristics, including dummies for tertiary and secondary education, age, sex, religious denomination, religiosity/church attendance and size of locality. Since personal income questions present problems for cross-national analysis,[21] we decided to focus instead on country-level GDP/capita to capture cross-country income differences. Moreover, to test the impact of the egalitarian legacy of communism, we included a GINI coefficient of income inequality from the most recently available pre-survey year.[22]

As potential indicators of different economic stimuli facing post-communist citizens, we collected data on inflation, GDP change and unemployment in the year (or two years) preceding the survey. To capture current political performance we included Freedom House democracy score (reversed, so that higher scores indicate greater civil liberties and political rights) and a corruption control index, which used data from three different sources (see appendix) to deal with uneven geographic and temporal coverage problems. Finally, to

[18] We thank John Londregan for his feedback on the construction of this measure.
[19] Respondents from the former East Germany (DDR) were also coded as ex-communist citizens.
[20] Since we are interested in establishing the difference between these countries and non-communist countries, in our analysis we excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.
[21] The WVS asked respondents to place themselves into one of ten income bands but since these categories were country-specific, they cannot be used for cross-country comparisons (even though they do provide an indicator of within-country household income differences.)
[22] Unless otherwise stated, all of the country-level economic and political variables are lagged one year to reduce possible reverse causation concerns.

measure a country's democratic track record we created an indicator of the logged number of years for which the country had been continuously democratic.[23]

To test the socialization hypotheses, we used a person's age and the year of the survey to determine their birth year, and then combined this information with the communist periodization data from Table 0 to calculate the *number of years a given respondent had lived under pre-communism, communism and post-communism*. In the statistical tests we used logged versions of these duration measures because doing so produced consistently stronger model fits than linear duration. Moreover, for each respondent we calculated the *number of years spent under pre-communism, post-communism and during each type of communist regime subtype* for two periods of their formative years: *ages 8-13 and 14-19*. These periods were chosen to broadly capture primary and secondary school ages, and since we are not aware of recent studies establishing the age at which children in communist regimes develop political consciousness, we tested the effects for both time periods and presented the ones which produced stronger results.[24]

In order to get at least partial proxies of the historical economic and political performance of different countries, which we expect to inform the Bayesian updating process, we used several different indicators. For pre-communist democratic experience, we used the *average Polity Regime score for the 1920-39 period* in Eastern Europe and for the two decades preceding the 1917 Revolution in the interwar Soviet republics. While we also tested a number of alternative measures, including the highest pre-communist Polity regime score and a dummy variable capturing the existence of competitive elections in the interwar period, the results were quite similar and are not presented here for space reasons.

To capture the initial legitimacy of the communist regimes, we constructed a "homegrown communism" dummy variable based on our discussion in section 2.2. As measures of late communist economic performance, we used *average GDP change from 1981-88* (compiled from several sources, including Kornai 1992 and Maddison 2009). For late communist political performance, we used *Polity regime scores in 1989* but we also used alternative measures, including 1989 FH democracy scores and a dummy indicator identifying late (neo)Stalinist regimes, and found similar results.

[23] The logged version is justified on both theoretical grounds (since the difference between 50 and 60 years of democracy is arguably less than between 1 and 11 years), and empirically, since the logged version consistently produced better fits than non-logged and quadratic specifications.
[24] Easton and Dennis (1969) found that among white US children political consciousness developed in primary school but it is unclear to what extent this finding applies to children in communist regimes. We thank Markus Prior for bringing this study to our attention.

In addition to these regime performance indicators, our regressions included two institutional variables – dummy indicators for the presence of a PR electoral system and a presidential system. Since we are not making an institutional legacy argument for these two variables, they are best interpreted as control variables meant to ensure that our findings are robust to controlling for institutional variation.

3.3 Statistical methods

For the statistical tests presented in this chapter we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the models where the DV is either self-reported or corrected left-right placement,[25] and logistic regressions for models where the DV is the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent can place herself on the left-right scale. For all regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. This approach adjusts standard errors in order to account for the multi-level nature of our data, i.e. that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and governance differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey.[26] Moreover, all the regressions for both data sources use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

4. Statistical results

4.1 Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

In this section, we demonstrate the following three characteristics of left-right self-placement in post-communist countries. First, post-communist citizens are no less likely to place themselves on a left-right scale than respondents from other countries. Second, while citizens from non-post-communist countries use both social and economic policy concerns to place themselves on left-right scales, citizens in post-communist countries rely more heavily on economic policy issues. Finally, ex-communist citizens tend to exhibit a leftist bias in their ideological self-placement, and while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and

[25] Given that left-right self-placement is a categorical variable (with ten categories) and its kurtosis is higher than for a normal distribution, we also re-ran all the models using ordered probit (available from the authors). However, since the results were very similar and since interaction effects are much more difficult to interpret for ordered probit models, we report OLS results here.

[26] In a future version of this paper we plan to re-run these tests using hierarchical linear models in HLM 6.0 to model the multi-level nature of the data more explicitly. However, in an earlier paper where we ran similar tests using WVS data (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010a) we found no difference between HLM models and the clustered standard errors approach used here, which is most likely due to our large number of Level 2 observations (i.e., the number of individuals in each country-year survey). We thank Nathaniel Beck for his advice in this regard.

more democratic citizens exhibit a leftist bias on average, in post-communist countries it is just the opposite.

4.1.1 Familiarity with the left-right ideological dimension

Our first task is to examine whether post-communist citizens have more trouble placing themselves on the left-right spectrum. Model 1 of Table 1 shows that when we simply look at the ability of stating one's own ideological position, post-communist citizens do exhibit a disadvantage compared to their non-communist counterparts, but the effect is fairly small and falls just short of achieving statistical significance. Moreover, once we include demographic controls and indicators of economic and political performance in model 2, the size of the effect for the post-communist dummy variable drops below its standard error. Moreover, model 3 suggests that when we restrict the analysis to East and West Germans we actually find an (albeit statistically insignificant) post-communist surplus in left-right familiarity.

Table 1 here

4.1.2 Components of left-right ideological orientation

Given that post-communist citizens have no more difficulty placing themselves on a left-right scale than people living elsewhere, our next step is to determine whether they do so based on the same set of issue concerns as people living in other countries. Traditionally, political scientists have tended to think of left-right self placement as being a function of two different sets of policy concerns: economic and social (Benoit and Laver 2007, Kitschelt 1991, Huber 1989).[27]

In models 4-6 in Table 1 we examine the effect of the social liberalism index and three economic preference variables on left-right self placement in post-communist countries (model 4), non-communist new democracies (model 5) and established democracies (model 6). Since for both social and economic indicators more left wing views are coded as being positive – we expect the coefficient on all of these variables to be negative, as the left right scale runs from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

The findings are rather clear: as expected, more statist and pro-equality views correspond with, on average, more leftist self-placement throughout the world. Moreover, while the

[27] This stands somewhat in contrast to psychologists, who tend to focus on an economic dimension (acceptance of inequality/hierarchy) and "traditionalism", or resistance to change (Thorisdottir *et al.* 2007; Jost *et al.* 2007). Psychologists also focus on the extent to which right wing ideology is function of an "authoritarian personality" (Adorno *et al.* 1950; Todosijevic and Enyedi 2008).

relative impact of economic indicators was slightly lower in ex-communist countries (model 4) than in advanced democracies (model 6), the effects were comparable in size (with the partial exception of a weaker impact of attitudes towards inequality). Moreover, a comparison of models 4 and 5 indicates that ex-communist citizens were actually more attuned to economic considerations than their counterparts in other new democracies, especially on the question of government vs. private ownership.

However, we find a different pattern when we turn to the social liberalism index. On the one hand, the coefficient of the variable is negative and statistically significant in all three models. On the other hand, it is equally apparent that social liberalism is much less closely aligned with left-right self-placement in post-communist countries than it is in other parts of the world. While the difference is smaller when we focus on the patterns in West vs. East Germany (models 7 & 8) the trend is nevertheless sufficiently clear to suggest that communist conceptions of left-right ideology differ systematically from those found in non-communist countries.

While this finding raises an interesting puzzle, which could also be analyzed using the legacy framework proposed in this paper, for the purpose of our current discussion its importance lies in the fact that it questions the appropriateness of cross-national comparisons of left-right self placement in samples that include post-communist and non-communist cases. Therefore, we created an alternative "corrected" left-right orientation indicator (as described in the data section) and re-ran our main models for both versions of the left-right scale. However, since our main interest is still in explaining the patterns of individual ideological conceptions, our discussion will focus primarily on the declared left-right self-placement of the respondents and will only refer to the "corrected" scale when the results for the two measures diverge to a significant extent.

4.1.3 Post-communist exceptionalism in left-right placement

The regressions in Table 2 establish the extent to which the patterns of left-right self-placement differ between ex-communist and non-communist countries. In doing so, we are interested not only in whether post-communist citizens exhibit a certain ideological bias compared to their non-communist counterparts but also in whether the ideological effects of certain covariates are distinctive in the post-communist context.

The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the post-communist dummy variable in model 1 of Table 2 confirms that post-communist citizens are more likely to be left-wing than citizens in the rest of the world. The effect is even larger in substantive terms

when we restrict the analysis to respondents from East and West Germany in model 2, which suggests that our finding is not simply due to unobserved omitted variable bias.[28]

Beyond the existence of an aggregate-level leftist bias, the results in Table 2 suggest that this bias is unevenly distributed along a number of demographic and political dimensions. Thus, the substantively large and statistically significant interaction between post-communism and age in models 3 and 4 indicates that whereas in non-communist countries older people tend to lean towards the right, in ex-communist countries higher age actually pushes people in the opposite ideological direction (and the effects are even stronger if we restrict the analysis to East and West Germans). Moreover, looking at the predicted ideological bias for different age groups, we find that among young respondents we can no longer talk about a post-communist leftist bias. Indeed, among the youngest respondents the effect is flipped – i.e. ex-communist citizens have a slight right bias – though the effect falls short of achieving statistical significance.[29]

Model 5 confirms that education had a different ideological impact in post-communist countries than elsewhere. Thus, whereas in non-communist countries secondary and especially post-secondary education were associated with statistically significant leftist biases, the positive interaction effects between education and the post-communism dummy variable completely erased this effect. These findings are in line with our theoretical predictions about the potential rightist bias inherent in the fact that more educated citizens were more likely to suffer from political repression under communism. However, the results of the Germany-only tests in model 6 add an important qualification to this finding: while for this within-country analysis the interaction between secondary education and post-communism was still positive (but smaller and no longer statistically significant), the interaction effect for post-secondary education was actually negative and significant in both substantive and statistical terms.[30] In other words, post-secondary education had an even greater leftist influence in East Germany than in West Germany. While a more detailed analysis of the drivers of this interesting contrast is beyond the scope of the present paper, this greater leftist conviction among the East German educational elite is probably tied to the

[28] Interestingly, however, the results in Table A2 suggest that when using the corrected left-right scale, East Germans no longer have a leftist bias.

[29] The statistically significant positive effect of the post-communism dummy in models 3 and 4 is deceiving, since it captures the out-of-sample effect on someone who was newly born at the time of the interview due to the inclusion of the post-communist X Age interactive variable (Brambor et al. 2006). Among the youngest actual respondents (18 year olds) the statistical significance is at best marginal (.17 two-tailed).

[30] However, model 6 in Table A2 indicates that when using the alternative "corrected" left-right scale, the interaction is actually positive (though it is small and statistically insignificant).

particular details of East German education policies, which included quota-based affirmative action policies for children of workers and peasants for a much longer period than in most other countries of the former Soviet bloc. More importantly, the finding highlights the importance of local political context in mediating the ideological legacies of communism.

Finally, the last two models in Table 2 investigate whether and how the relationship between ideological orientation and democratic values differs between ex-communist and non-communist countries. Model 7 provides strong support for the hypothesis that the recent experience of a left-wing authoritarian regime led to a lasting association between leftist ideology and non-democratic values in ex-communist countries: thus, whereas elsewhere in the world democrats tended to have a leftist bias, the large and statistically significant positive interaction effect between post-communism and the democratic values index meant that in post-communist countries the effect was actually reversed, with democrats exhibiting a significant rightist bias. However, it should be noted that once again the within-country comparison of East and West Germans produces different results, with the East German democrats actually exhibiting (and albeit insignificant) *leftist* bias compared to their West German compatriots.[31] While we will explore some potential explanations of this contrast in a later section of the paper, for now it highlights the somewhat unusual political dynamics of East German ideological patterns, which suggest that the external validity of findings based on an East vs. West Germany comparison may be more limited than is usually assumed.

While all of these interactive effects – age, education, and democratic attitudes – would be interesting to consider from a legacy based perspective, for reasons of space considerations we will only present results in the following section from testing the effects of our legacy based explanation on the interaction between democratic attitudes and left-right self placement in post-communist countries; this is of course in addition to testing our legacy effects on the overall left-wing post-communist bias.

4.2 Left-right ideological placement and communist legacy mechanisms

In Table 3 we test whether the differences in left-right placement patterns revealed in Table 2 can be accounted for by the four legacy-based mechanisms presented in Section 2. As a first step, in model 1 we added a series of demographic and developmental indicators to test whether the post-communist exceptionalism could be driven by the peculiar developmental blueprint of communism. However, when we compare the size of the post-

[31] Once again, model 8 in Table A2 indicates that when using the alternative "corrected" left-right scale, the interaction is actually positive (though it is fairly small and statistically insignificant).

communism coefficient to the baseline in model 1 of Table 2, we find that once we account for developmental differences, the leftist bias of ex-communist countries is even greater (largely because citizens of poorer countries generally tend to be less leftist.) However, the inclusion of religiosity indicators (frequency of religious service attendance and atheism) in model 2 results in a 50% reduction in the magnitude of the post-communist leftist bias, which is no longer statistically significant. In other words, it appears that much of the leftist legacy of communism is due to the much lower religiosity of post-communist citizens, which makes them less likely to embrace the conservative values that are often associated with greater religiosity. We get similar results when restricting the sample to East and West Germans in model 3 but in that case the leftist bias was still significant even when we control for religiosity, even though its magnitude was also reduced by almost half compared to the baseline in model 2 of Table 2. On the other hand, controlling for demographics, development and even religiosity does very little to explain the rightist bias of post-communist democrats, given that the size of the interaction effect in model 4 of Table 3 is virtually identical to the baseline in model 7 of Table 2.

In the last two models of Table 3, we test the predictions of the differential stimuli theory, whereby post-communist differences may simply reflect differences in economic and political performance. While both greater democracy and a longer democratic experience are associated with more rightist ideological orientations among that country's citizens, these effects have a modest impact on the size of the post-communist leftist bias (which in model 5 is reduced by less than 10% compared to model 1). Similarly, the size of the interaction between the post-communism indicator and the democratic values index is only minimally affected by the inclusion of economic and political performance controls in model 6.

Overall, the findings in Table 3 reveal modest support for the differential stimuli theory and for most demographic and developmental differences. The one notable exception – differences in religiosity – is particularly striking given that religiosity should have a greater impact on precisely those aspects of left-right ideology which are less salient in the post-communist context (i.e. social policy questions.) However, this finding does not by itself solve the puzzle of post-communist ideological exceptionalism, since the lower religiosity is arguably itself a function of the types of socialization and Bayesian updating dynamics, which we discuss in greater detail below.

Table 4 here

In Table 4 we turn to the question of how communist-era socialization affects both the overall ideological self-placement of East Europeans and the rightist bias of East European democrats. As discussed above, the sample for these tests is limited to respondents from ex-communist countries, which means that we will identify within-region differences between individuals with varying cumulative and early socialization experiences. In model 1 we test the impact of cumulative socialization on left-right self-placement and find strong confirmation that individuals who spent more time living under communism exhibited a significantly larger leftist bias than their co-nationals with shorter communist exposures. The effect is also substantively large: thus, the predicted ideological self-placement of an East European citizen with a short exposure to communism (14 years, i.e. the 10th percentile) is roughly .29 to the right of the predicted ideological position of the median post-communist citizen, who had lived 35 years under communism. This difference is slightly larger than magnitude of the post-communist leftist bias in model 5 of Table 3, which suggests that the leftist bias is indeed closely tied to a person's life experience under communism. By comparison, model 1 suggests that longer pre- and post-communist life experience had a slight rightward ideological impact, but the effects were substantively small and statistically insignificant.[32]

In model 2 we turn to the predictions of the early socialization theory; note that the omitted category is people socialized (e.g., who were 8-13) under pre-communism. In line with expectations, we found that individuals whose early socialization took place under Stalinism exhibited a significantly larger leftist bias than their co-nationals who were spared that experience. Moreover, the effect is fairly large in substantive terms: the predicted leftist bias of an individual whose entire socialization between the ages of 8 and 13 took place under Stalinism was .21 larger than for someone who had no Stalinist early socialization, a difference which is fairly close in magnitude to the post-communist leftist bias in model 5 of Table 3. A similar but slightly smaller leftist bias also applies for post-totalitarian socialization, whereas in line with our expectations the effects were weaker and statistically insignificant for individuals whose early socialization occurred during the more permissive reformist communist periods. However, two other results in model 2 deviate from the straightforward "ideological indoctrination" predictions. Thus, neo-Stalinist early socialization did not produce a leftist bias, and in fact even pointed in the wrong direction,

[32] Years spent under post-communist essentially picks up when the survey was conducted and therefore is closely correlated with survey wave, but it provides a more fine grained measure by taking into account the actual year of the survey, as well as small differences (i.e., 1989 vs 1990 vs 1991) in the years in which a country transitioned away from communism.

which suggests that the ideological effectiveness of such regimes was quite limited and that their heavier reliance on repression (compared to post-totalitarian regimes) may have actually been counter-productive. (Think as well of this as the generation whose parents and teachers could openly discussed the horrors of Stalinism with them as children from a first hand perspective, without fearing retribution for doing so.) Perhaps even more surprisingly, post-communist early socialization is associated with a substantively large leftist bias. While the effect falls short of achieving statistical significance (.2 two-tailed), it nevertheless suggests that post-communist societies were not very effective in raising a new generation of convinced neoliberals. Another potentially interesting way of interpreting this finding is that it lends credence to the idea that the rigors of transition life may have given way to "nostalgic" feelings about the communist past (and especially the Brezhnevian post-totalitarian past, the low point of repression and the high point of Soviet consume society), thus resulting in the observed leftist bias. So here we may be picking up the effects of students who are witnessing an economic collapse while at the same time hearing their parents wax poetically about life in the good old Brezhnev days. Note as well that the omitted category in this analysis is pre-Stalinist socialization, so what we are also picking up – due to the fact that all of the coefficients are negative except neo-Stalinist socialization – is that the few East Europeans (the number of citizens of pre-WWII Soviet Republics who were 8-13 before 1917 and we still answering surveys in the 1990s and 2000s is bound to be very low) who were educated before and during WWII were generally more rightist the most of their fellow citizens who were socialized under communism, a finding that is quite consistent with the early socialization hypothesis.

Models 3 and 4 analyze the impact of socialization on the rightist bias of East European democrats. Since these tests are also limited to post-communist respondents, the main variables in these models are the interactions between the democratic values index on the one hand and the cumulative and early socialization indicators on the other. Judging by the results in model 3, cumulative socialization was somewhat less effective in explaining the peculiar democracy-ideology associations of ex-communist citizens than their overall ideological self-placement. Thus, even though both interaction terms in model 3 point in the correct direction, suggesting that the rightist bias among democrats is stronger for individuals with longer communist and shorter post-communist life experiences, the effects were fairly modest in terms of statistical and substantive significance.

By comparison, the predictions of early socialization fare somewhat better in explaining the rightist bias of post-communist democrats. Thus, as expected, the rightist bias of

democrats is stronger among individuals whose early socialization took place under Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, and the effect is statistically significant for the latter and barely misses statistical significance for the former. By contrast, the perceived tension between leftist ideology and democratic values was weaker among individuals socialized under reformist communist regimes, for whom the overall impact of the democratic values index was about 35% lower and no longer statistically significant. The remaining two categories – post-totalitarian communism and post-communism – were also associated with weaker links between ideology and democratic values, but the effects were statistically more modest.

Table 5 here

In Table 5 we test several different versions of our fourth and final legacy mechanism: the Bayesian updating theory. As a first step, in model 1 we test the impact of a country's political history on its citizens' left-right ideological self-placement. The results confirm the strong staying power of historical experiences: thus, in countries with better interwar democratic experiences, citizens were significantly more likely to subscribe to rightist ideological positions, whereas in countries with homegrown Fascist regimes they were more reluctant to embrace right ideological views. This contrast confirms the importance of having an additional anchor besides the experience of communism: where this non-communist alternative was largely positive (i.e. democratic rather than Fascist) citizens were more likely to embrace the right instead of the communism-tainted left. However, where the right bore the stigma of Fascism, the pull of communism was stronger and resulted in a larger leftist bias. Meanwhile, greater leftist bias in countries with greater late-communist liberalization and the rightist bias in more democratic post-communist regimes confirm that the relative appeal of left vs. right ideologies is informed by the relative performance of communism and post-communism, but the effects were fairly modest in statistical terms and need to be interpreted cautiously. Finally, the weak effect of native communism suggests that the initial legitimacy of homegrown communist regimes was less important than either pre-communist or late/post-communist experiences.

Somewhat surprisingly, model 2 indicates that a country's relative economic performance during and after communism was less important for ideological self-placement than broad regime trajectories. Thus, even though, in line with Bayesian updating predictions, better late communist growth was associated with a stronger leftist bias, while higher post-

communist unemployment also drove citizens towards the left, these effects fell short of achieving statistical significance.[33]

However, the results in model 3 suggest that the weak ideological effects of country-level economic performance are not due to the irrelevance of economic considerations but due to the more short-term nature of economic memories. Even though in model 2 we found that inflation had a negligible impact on left-right positions, the strong interaction between inflation and government orientation in model 3 suggests that post-communist citizens use the information inherent in economic conditions to update about the relative worth of the incumbent government rather than that of the entire post-communist economic and political system. Thus, higher inflation resulted in a rightist ideological effect only when an ex-communist party was in power but when that was not the case, the effect was actually reversed. Conversely, at low inflation levels having an ex-communist governing party resulted in a leftist impact on individual ideological preferences (significant at .005), whereas at high inflation levels the effect was significant in the opposite direction. We found similar but somewhat weaker results when interacting incumbent ideology with short-term growth, which further reinforces the short-term nature of the ideological impact of economic conditions.

In model 4 we shift the focus to the individual-level economic experiences of post-communist citizens. We find that while greater financial satisfaction is associated with a more rightist ideology for all three time periods under consideration, the effect is considerably weaker for the early transition period (1989-93). This finding is consistent with the Bayesian updating prediction whereby individuals shift towards the ideological position of the system, which "works well" for them. From this perspective, the weaker ideological impact of personal economic satisfaction in the early 1990s is arguably due to the fact that at this early point in the transition at least part of the economic satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) could be ascribed to the communist regime, whereas starting in the mid 1990s economic satisfaction was much more clearly reflective of a given individual's experience during the post-communist transition. Thus once again we see the importance of being an economic "winner" on political attitudes in post-communist countries.

In models 5 and 6 we turn to analyzing the impact of different party system configurations on the ideological preferences of post-communist citizens. Thus, in model 5 we find that the presence of a large reformed or unreformed ex-communist party (with at

[33] Their one-tailed statistical significance hovered in the .15-.2 range, perhaps in part due to the relatively small number of level-1 observations (we used 66 post-communist surveys for this part of the analysis).

least 20% of votes in the election preceding the survey) was associated with a moderately significant left-ward shift in the ideological self-placement of East European citizens. However, these results are reversed when we run the same model specification but instead use the "corrected" left-right scale as a dependent variable: thus, according to model 5 in Table A3 in the appendix, the presence of large unreformed or reformed ex-communist parties is actually associated with a rightward shift in policy-based ideological preferences. In other words, it appears as though ex-communist parties may reinforce rhetorical commitments to leftist ideology, while at the same time moving citizens towards the ideological right as far as actual policies are concerned. While this contrast may be puzzling at a first glance, it arguably reflects the fact that beneath their leftist rhetoric, most ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe have actually implemented fairly orthodox neoliberal reforms, especially in times of crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009).

The rather weak correspondence between party platforms and actual policies is probably also the main reason why, according to model 6, the weighted ideological center of a given country's party system is a very poor predictor of individual ideological positions. Given that for the non-communist countries covered in the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey the party system ideological center was a statistically significant predictor of individual ideological positions (results omitted), this finding suggests that this ideological disconnect between voters and parties is primarily a post-communist phenomenon.[34]

In the final two models of Table 5 we turn to the question of whether Bayesian updating mechanisms can account for the peculiar post-communist link between democratic values and ideology. Model 7 includes interaction terms between the democratic values index on the one hand and three indicators of a country's political history. The strong negative interaction between the democratic values index and the country's Polity regime score in 1989 confirms that the perceived tension between leftist ideology and democracy was highly sensitive to the political dynamics of late communism: thus, for countries like Poland and Hungary, which experienced significant political liberalization, the correlation between democracy and ideology is weak and statistically insignificant, whereas in countries like Romania and Czechoslovakia, where the Communists avoided reforms until the bitter end, the correlation was very high. In other words the perceived compatibility of democracy and leftist ideology

[34] While our analysis only uses temporally lagged party system data to predict subsequent citizen survey responses, we cannot conclusively establish whether the correlation between party and voter ideology in non-communist countries reflects the greater responsiveness of voters to parties or vice versa. However, for the purpose of our discussion this question is less important than the lack of correlation in post-communist countries.

was driven to a large extent by whether late communist events allowed gave greater credence to arguments about the feasibility of democratic socialism or to charges about whether the system could be reformed at all.

Model 7 provides additional support about the importance of interwar democracy: thus, the positive and marginally significant interaction between interwar Polity scores and the democratic values index suggests that the rightist bias of democrats was reinforced in countries where a positive non-communist democratic experience could be used as a contrast to the authoritarian communist experience. Finally, model 7 also provides some evidence that in countries with homegrown Fascist regimes the association between democratic values and rightist ideology was somewhat weaker but the effect was statistically quite modest and needs to be interpreted cautiously.

Finally, in model 8 the strong positive interaction between democratic values and the large unreformed ex-communist party indicator (as well as to a less extent the large reformed ex-communist party indicator) suggests that communist successor parties can act as a vivid institutional reminder of the communist past. Whereas earlier we saw that their presence is associated with a greater leftist bias at the individual level, the results in model 8 suggest that communist successor parties also reinforce the negative association between leftist ideology and democratic values. Indeed, it appears that having a large unreformed communist successor parties leads to an almost three times larger correlation between democratic values and ideology than in countries without a significant successor party. This finding may explain at least in part why East Germans bucked the regional trend by having a leftist bias among democrats: unlike in other countries, where the return to power of the ex-communists was a real possibility (and in many cases a reality), in the East German PDS was largely marginalized in the party system of unified Germany, and therefore arguably played a weaker role in refreshing communist-era political associations.

Conclusion: Ideology and Legacies

This paper was motivated by two primary goals. First, we aimed to provide a systematic, large-scale comparative analysis of the extent to which left-right self placement in the post-communist world deviated from patterns found elsewhere. Second, we wanted to understand to what extent to which these distinctions could be cast as *legacies* from the communist era, and, if so, which pathways the effects of these legacies followed.

Regarding the first goal, we demonstrated three distinctly post-communist patterns of left-right positioning. First, there is overall a left-wing bias in post-communist countries compared to the rest of the world. Second, left-right self-placement is less a function of social issues in post-communist countries than it is the rest of the world, although it appears to be just as influenced by economic preferences as it is elsewhere. Third, there are important covariates of less right-self placement that have the opposite effect in post-communist countries: while in the rest of the world younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined voters trend to the left, in post-communist countries they do not (and may even lean towards the right).

Our second goal was to see if any of our theoretical frameworks of legacy effects – or how the communist past may affect citizen politics in post-communist countries – could explain patterns of left-right self placement in post-communist countries. Our first theoretical approach – that post-communist exceptionalism is a function of the demographic legacies of communism – received fairly lukewarm empirical support with one glaring exception: a significant portion of the leftist bias in post-communist countries is related to the fact that post-communist citizens are less religious than citizens in the rest of the world; once we account for religious attendance and atheism, the size of the post-communist leftist bias drops by almost one third. By contrast, controlling for macro-economic conditions as well as levels of democratization and corruption had a negligible impact on left-right self placement. As both of these theoretical approaches start from the first principle that post-communist citizens approached politics in largely the same way as citizens elsewhere, the fact that we are still left with sizable left-wing biases after controlling for demographics and political and economic stimuli holds open the real possibility that the legacy of living through communism and its aftermath might be in part responsible for the left-wing bias.

With this in mind, we considered two other theoretical approaches that could account for the fact that the communist experience had indeed changed the way people viewed politics. The first of these builds on classical theories of political socialization by suggesting that the left-wing bias would be a function of how long one had lived under communism. And indeed, this is exactly what we found. Moreover, we also found evidence that people who spent their formative years (8-13) during high Stalinism – the most "extreme" form of communist experience – also exhibited a particularly strong leftist bias, especially as compared to those who spent their formative years in the pre-communist era or during periods of reform communism.

However, the story does not stop there. We also found quite a bit of evidence in line with a *Bayesian updating* theoretical perspective, which we argued suggested that post-communist citizens would not just blindly follow socialization patterns acquired under communism, but rather would update their thinking about left-right self placement based on what they could compare communism to (e.g., prior democratic or fascist experiences in their country), as well as their particular experiences with late communism and the post-communist era. So in perhaps the most striking finding, post-communist citizens who were economic "winners" in the post-communist era exhibited a markedly more right-wing orientation than economic "losers", a result we should not have found if only socialization under communism mattered for left-right self placement. Similarly, living in the post-communist era with successful ex-communist parties also increased citizens' likelihood of placing themselves farther to the left in the political spectrum. Additionally, post-communist citizens who lived in a more democratic country in the interwar period (1920-1939) were more likely to place themselves further to the right in the post-communist era, while citizens with home grown fascist regimes were much less likely to do so. So apparently, living through communism may have conditioned the way in which citizens thought about their left-right ideological orientation, but it did not permanently fix these attitudes, and nor did it do so independent of prior, pre-communist, developments.

We also tested these approaches on the link between pro-democratic attitudes and right wing biases in post-communist countries, which is the opposite effect of what is found elsewhere (i.e., in the rest of the world, pro-democratic attitudes were associated with left-wing biases). Similarly to left-right self-placement, we found almost no mitigating effect for demographics or political and economic stimuli on the strong relationship between pro-democratic attitudes and right wing biases in post-communist countries. Also similarly to left-right self placement, we did find important socialization effects. First, living longer under communism did cut into the right-wing bias among pro-democratic post-communist citizens, although we want to be clear that the statistical significance of this interactive effect was quite weak. More importantly, we found that the right-wing bias of pro-democrats was accentuated by being socialized under Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes, and mitigated by being educated under reformist and post-communist regimes, thus suggesting that the connection between the left and anti-democratic values was at least a part a function of early childhood socialization. In support of the Bayesian updating approach, we found that the link between pro-democracy values and more right-wing self placement was strengthened by the presence of a viable communist successor party – and especially an unreformed one – thus

suggesting again that post-communist political realities could inform how citizens continued to update their beliefs acquired under communism.

Taken together, then, it seems clear that the left-wing bias in post-communist countries – as well as the connection between right wing views and pro-democratic sentiments – was not merely a function of different socio-demographic patterns in the post-communist world or the especially severe economic crises experienced by these countries. Instead, the communist experience itself seems to have affected the ideological orientation of people who lived through it, pushing them more to the left than elsewhere in the world – in part by producing lower levels of religiosity – but at the same time fostering a link between authoritarianism and the left that is not as present elsewhere and which has proven harder to break for some post-communist citizens (e.g., those living in countries with strong unreformed post-communist parties or with more democratic inter-war regimes) than others. But we also feel confident concluding that these orientations are not irrevocably fixed in individuals. For example, doing well in the post-communist era economically cleared pulled people to the right. Thus, these left (or right) biases matter but they are likely to be updated based on how current developments are compared to reference points from the past, such as the climate under that latter years of the communist regime.

What does this tell us about the future of ideology in the post-communist world? Perhaps the most likely scenario is continuing convergence to patterns found elsewhere in the world. To the extent that the leftist bias among communist citizens is a function of the number of years one spent living under communism and having come of age under Stalinist regimes, both of these numbers are obviously going to continue to drop in the future as generational replacement substitutes in citizens born in the post-communist era for those who lived most of their lives under communism and especially for those socialized in Stalinist regimes. Similarly, the fact that left-right ideological self-placement is increasingly a function of personal economic success (see Table 5, model 4) also suggests convergence with the rest of world. However, to the extent that comparisons to specific elements of the past continue to shape ideology, the potential for communist – and especially late-communist – nostalgia to draw citizens to the left will undoubtedly still continue to exist for the foreseeable future. One interesting question to watch is the viability of a rise of a non-democratic right in post-communist countries, and what that will eventually do to pro-democrats. Unlike the rest of the world, post-communist authoritarians and quasi-authoritarians have tended to try to come from the center (Putin, Yanukovych, maybe GERB in Bulgaria) or even center-left (Lukashenko, Milosevic, Mečiar). We have yet to see particularly successful right-wing

quasi-authoritarians (with the possible exception of Tudjman), but as the legacy of communism continues to recede, perhaps this pattern will come to an end as well.

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Table 1: Left-right familiarity and conceptions

VARIABLES	(1) LR familiarity	(2) LR familiarity	(3) LR familiarity	(4) LR self placemt	(5) LR self placemt	(6) LR self placemt	(7) LR self placemt	(8) LR self placemt
Post-communist	-.197	-.149	.237					
	(.127)	(.231)	(.246)					
Government Responsibility				-.056**	-.057**	-.062**	-.051**	-.027*
				(.008)	(.013)	(.010)	(.019)	(.004)
Government Ownership				-.082**	-.022	-.091**	-.126**	-.105#
				(.012)	(.016)	(.020)	(.005)	(.029)
Incomes Equal				-.083**	-.056**	-.139**	-.104	-.082#
				(.011)	(.013)	(.013)	(.042)	(.026)
Social Liberalism Index				-.054**	-.162**	-.162**	-.173*	-.132**
				(.018)	(.032)	(.016)	(.028)	(.007)
Survey year	-.022*	-.013	-.011	.031*	.010	.019*	.016	.013
	(.011)	(.014)	(.008)	(.014)	(.014)	(.009)	(.012)	(.006)
Demog controls	No	**Yes**	No	No	No	No	No	No
Econ & pol/inst controls	No	**Yes**	No	No	No	No	No	No
Sample	All	All	West & East Germ	Ex-comm	Other new democs	Old democs	West Germ	East Germ
Observations	294422	294422	9563	53634	63062	62681	3274	2947
Pseudo R-sq	.003	.059	.002					
R-squared				.037	.034	.093	.133	.089

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 2: Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-communist	-.195**	-.460**	.398**	.750#	-.299**	-.387*	-.200*	-.586**
	(.073)	(.125)	(.140)	(.347)	(.089)	(.121)	(.082)	(.136)
Post-comm* Age			-.014**	-.027**				
			(.002)	(.007)				
Age			.007**	.020**				
			(.001)	(.002)				
Post-comm* Post-sec educ					.202*	-.423*		
					(.115)	(.167)		
Post-comm* Second. educ					.126#	.067		
					(.077)	(.061)		
Post-Secondary education					-.203**	-.588**		
					(.066)	(.068)		
Secondary education					-.102*	-.297**		
					(.050)	(.046)		
Post-comm* Dem. values							.583**	-.118
							(.098)	(.144)
Dem values index							-.320**	-.499*
							(.056)	(.126)
Survey year	.006	-.019**	.006	-.020*	.005	-.018**	.001	-.012
	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.006)	(.007)	(.005)	(.011)	(.018)
Countries	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany
Observations	224463	8411	224463	8411	224463	8411	172845	5341
R-squared	.002	.021	.004	.049	.003	.042	.009	.046

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 3: Demographic and differential stimuli hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-communist	-.271*	-.144	-.272*	-.274*	-.253*	-.244*
	(.129)	(.127)	(.095)	(.143)	(.130)	(.127)
Post-comm* Dem.				.566**		.546**
Values				(.093)		(.095)
Dem values index				-.256**		-.206**
				(.053)		(.054)
Post-Secondary	-.060	-.043	-.570*	-.021	-.103*	-.085
education	(.050)	(.049)	(.174)	(.059)	(.045)	(.052)
Secondary education	.011	.014	-.066	.017	-.023	-.025
	(.038)	(.037)	(.077)	(.044)	(.036)	(.042)
GDP/capita (log)	-.169**	-.074		-.093	-.196**	-.239**
	(.054)	(.053)		(.059)	(.072)	(.074)
Income inequality	.004	.001		-.003	-.005	-.011#
	(.245)	(.233)		(.281)	(.006)	(.006)
Age	.005**	.003**	.008	.003*	.005**	.004**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Relig svc attend (often)		.278**	.346*	.261**		
		(.044)	(.116)	(.048)		
Relig svc attend (never)		-.386**	-.266*	-.335**		
		(.031)	(.077)	(.033)		
Atheist		-.618**	-.527**	-.616**		
		(.067)	(.086)	(.076)		
Corruption ctrl index					.007	-.010
					(.024)	(.026)
FH democracy					.125**	.194**
					(.046)	(.052)
Age of democracy (log)					.144*	.144*
					(.065)	(.071)
PR system					.244*	.283**
					(.099)	(.091)
Presidential system					.004	.007
					(.008)	(.009)
GDP chg					-.012	-.009
					(.008)	(.008)
Unemployment					-.025	-.064
					(.037)	(.055)
Inflation (log)					-.027	-.068
					(.037)	(.055)
Add'l demog vars	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Germany	All	All	All
Observations	224463	224463	8411	172845	224463	172845
R-squared	.009	.026	.079	.030	.016	.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 4: Socialization hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Yrs comm. (log)	-.336**	-.385**	-.276**	-.283**
	(.048)	(.079)	(.047)	(.078)
Yrs pre-comm (log)	.024	.040	-.011	.002
	(.026)	(.029)	(.030)	(.032)
Yrs post-comm (log)	.021	.036	.035	.044
	(.098)	(.096)	(.158)	(.166)
Stalinist soc (8-13)		-.037*		-.021
		(.014)		(.014)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)		.006		.016
		(.019)		(.024)
Post-tot soc (8-13)		-.030*		-.014
		(.014)		(.016)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)		-.015		-.010
		(.021)		(.020)
Post-comm soc (8-13)		-.049		-.023
		(.037)		(.035)
Yrs comm.*			.066	-.097
Dem values index			(.073)	(.102)
Yrs post-comm*			-.124	-.145
Dem values index			(.187)	(.174)
Stalinist soc (8-13)*				.032
Dem values index				(.025)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)*				.040*
Dem values index				(.022)
Post-tot soc (8-13)*				-.016
Dem values index				(.030)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)*				-.064**
Dem values index				(.024)
Post-comm soc (8-13)*				-.045
Dem values index				(.044)
Dem values index			.384	1.043#
			(.562)	(.567)
FH democracy	.019	.014	.055#	.042
	(.032)	(.035)	(.030)	(.035)
PR system	.090	.065	.263**	.241*
	(.105)	(.105)	(.095)	(.096)
Presidential system	-.537*	-.516*	-.087	-.132
	(.255)	(.242)	(.157)	(.157)
GDP chg	.003	.002	-.004	-.003
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)
Inflation (log)	.014	.014	-.045	-.035
	(.059)	(.057)	(.063)	(.061)
Unemployment	-.027**	-.025**	-.016*	-.017*
	(.009)	(.009)	(.007)	(.007)
GDP/capita (log)	-.326*	-.328*	-.470**	-.449**
	(.133)	(.142)	(.132)	(.150)
Income inequality	.030*	.032*	.032**	.036**
	(.014)	(.014)	(.010)	(.011)
Add'l demog variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	58806	58806	46726	46726
R-squared	.018	.019	.028	.033

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 5: Bayesian updating hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Polity Regime 1989	-.010						-.009	
	(.012)						(.014)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39	.052**						.020	
	(.015)						(.014)	
Native Fascism	-.260**						-.253*	
	(.091)						(.117)	
Native Communism	-.036						-.141	
	(.147)						(.131)	
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88		-.071						
		(.068)						
Comm. Gov't			-.812*					
			(.342)					
Inflation* Comm Gov't			.228*					
			(.087)					
Pers. fin satisf (1989-93)				.045**				
				(.016)				
Pers. fin satisf (1994-2000)				.092**				
				(.021)				
Pers. fin satisf (2001-2009)				.108**				
				(.027)				
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)					-.197#			-.142
					(.122)			(.115)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)					-.393*			-.003
					(.219)			(.161)
Party system left-right average						.013		
						(.066)		
Dem values index							.255**	.220*
							(.090)	(.087)
Polity Regime 1989*							-.041*	
Dem values index							(.016)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39*							.021#	
Dem values index							(.014)	
Native Fascism*							-.063	
Dem values index							(.147)	
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)								.137
Dem values index								(.155)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)								.393*
Dem values index								(.178)
FH democracy	.022	.061#	.068*	.069#	.035	.015	.076#	.102**
	(.034)	(.033)	(.031)	(.038)	(.032)	(.109)	(.039)	(.033)
GDP chg	.008	-.000	-.002	.001	-.002	.202*	.002	-.006
	(.011)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.066)	(.012)	(.008)
Inflation (log)	.097	.029	-.043	.081	.028	.236	-.045	-.059
	(.079)	(.070)	(.070)	(.066)	(.069)	(.163)	(.078)	(.072)
Unemployment	-.010	-.008	-.004	-.002	-.012		-.007	.001
	(.009)	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)	(.009)		(.009)	(.009)
GDP/capita (log)	-.314**	-.265#	-.344**	-.282	-.323*	.236	-.475**	-.469**
	(.095)	(.133)	(.116)	(.172)	(.129)	(.385)	(.120)	(.128)
Income inequality	.026	.016	.011	.016	.016	.025	.005	.008
	(.017)	(.015)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)	(.024)	(.014)	(.012)
Additional demographic ctrls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	61078	61078	61078	47731	61078	11266	48975	48975
R-squared	.020	.012	.012	.022	.012	.022	.029	.027

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 (one-tailed where appropriate)

APPENDIX

Table A1: Overview of survey countries and years for World Values Survey (WVS) data

Country	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4	Survey 5
Albania	1998	2002			
Algeria	2002				
Argentina	1991	1995	1999	2006	
Armenia	1997				
Australia	1995	2005			
Austria	1990	1999			
Azerbaijan	1997				
Bangladesh	1996	2002			
Belarus	1990	1996			
Belgium	1990	1999	2000		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998	2001			
Brazil	1991	1997	2006		
Bulgaria	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Burkina Faso	2007				
Canada	1990	2000	2006		
Chile	1990	1996	2000	2006	
Colombia	1998	2005			
Croatia	1996	1999			
Cyprus	2006				
Czech Republic	1990	1991	1998	1999	
Denmark	1990	1999			
Egypt	2008				
El Salvador	1999				
Estonia	1996	1999			
Ethiopia	2007				
Finland	1990	1996	2000	2005	
France	1990	1999	2006		
Georgia	1996	2009			
Germany (East)	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Germany (West)	1990	1997	1999	2006	
Ghana	2007				
Great Britain	1990	1999	2005		
Greece	1999				
Guatemala	2004				
Hungary	1991	1998	1999		
Iceland	1990	1999			
India	1990	1995	2001	2006	
Indonesia	2001	2006			
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2000				
Iraq	2006				
Ireland	1990	1999			
Israel	2001				
Italy	1990	1999	2005		
Japan	1990	1995	2000	2005	
Jordan	2001	2007			
Korea, Rep.	1990	1996	2001	2005	
Kyrgyz Republic	2003				
Latvia	1996	1999			
Lithuania	1997	1999			
Luxembourg	1999				

Macedonia	1998	2001			
Malaysia	2006				
Mali	2007				
Malta	1991	1999			
Mexico	1990	1996	2000	2005	
Moldova	1996	2002	2006		
Morocco	2001	2007			
Netherlands	1990	1999	2006		
New Zealand	1998	2004			
Nigeria	1990	1995	2000		
Norway	1990	1996	2007		
Pakistan	2001				
Peru	1996	2001	2006		
Philippines	1996	2001			
Poland	1989	1990	1997	1999	2005
Portugal	1990	1999			
Romania	1993	1998	1999	2005	
Russian Federation	1990	1995	1999		
Rwanda	2007				
Saudi Arabia	2003				
Serbia	2006				
Serbia and Montenegro	1996	2001			
Singapore	2002				
Slovak Republic	1990	1991	1998	1999	
Slovenia	1992	1995	1999	2005	
South Africa	1990	1996	2001	2006	
Spain	1990	1995	1999	2000	2007
South Africa	2006				
Sweden	1990	1996	1999	2006	
Switzerland	1989	1996	2007		
Taiwan	2006				
Tanzania	2001				
Thailand	2007				
Trinidad Tobago	2006				
Turkey	1990	1996	2001	2007	
Uganda	2001				
Ukraine	1996	1999	2006		
Uganda	2001				
United States	1990	1995	1999	2006	
Uruguay	1996	2006			
Venezuela, RB	1996	2000			
Zambia	2007				
Zimbabwe	2001				

Note: These are the surveys in which the questions about support for democracy were asked in the second, third, fourth and fifth wave of the WVS. We excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) non-communist.

Table A2: Establishing post-communist exceptionalism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-communist	-.051*	-.009	.037	.303	-.105**	-.018	-.061#	-.173**
	(.027)	(.145)	(.036)	(.186)	(.032)	(.136)	(.031)	(.005)
Post-comm* Age			-.002**	-.007**				
			(.001)	(.002)				
Age			.001**	.008**				
			(.000)	(.001)				
Post-comm* Post-sec educ					.122**	.017		
					(.034)	(.078)		
Post-comm* Second. educ					.046*	.022		
					(.020)	(.076)		
Post-Secondary education					-.030	-.142*		
					(.019)	(.040)		
Secondary education					.004	-.087		
					(.014)	(.050)		
Post-comm* Dem. values							.106**	.023
							(.027)	(.023)
Dem values index							-.056**	-.060*
							(.017)	(.011)
Survey year	-.008**	-.034*	-.008**	-.034**	-.008**	-.033*	-.000	-.003
	(.002)	(.009)	(.002)	(.008)	(.002)	(.008)	(.004)	(.001)
Countries	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany	All	Germany
Observations	185167	6186	185167	6186	185167	6186	139374	3413
R-squared	.010	.174	.012	.220	.012	.183	.009	.035

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A3: Demographic and differential stimuli hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-communist	-.169**	-.126**	.039	-.132**	-.108*	-.111*
	(.042)	(.037)	(.131)	(.040)	(.042)	(.043)
Post-comm* Dem.				.102**		.083**
Values				(.019)		(.021)
Dem values index				-.025*		-.017
				(.011)		(.012)
Post-Secondary	.053**	.059**	-.061#	.057**	.052**	.052**
education	(.013)	(.013)	(.029)	(.013)	(.012)	(.013)
Secondary education	.056**	.060**	.014	.049**	.055**	.046**
	(.010)	(.009)	(.031)	(.009)	(.009)	(.010)
GDP/capita (log)	-.100**	-.069**		-.064**	-.072**	-.075**
	(.016)	(.014)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)
Income inequality	.001	.000		.003#	-.001	-.000
	(.002)	(.002)		(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Age	.003**	.002**	.005*	.002**	.003**	.002**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Relig svc attend (often)		.135**	.184**	.122**		
		(.012)	(.036)	(.013)		
Relig svc attend (never)		-.082**	-.118**	-.084**		
		(.008)	(.015)	(.008)		
Atheist		-.111**	-.098#	-.106**		
		(.019)	(.041)	(.021)		
Corruption ctrl index					-.052*	-.075**
					(.021)	(.024)
FH democracy					-.013#	-.012
					(.007)	(.008)
Age of democracy (log)					.031*	.034#
					(.015)	(.018)
PR system					-.023	-.016
					(.025)	(.025)
Presidential system					.029	.036
					(.027)	(.028)
GDP chg					.001	.001
					(.002)	(.002)
Unemployment					-.003#	-.002
					(.002)	(.002)
Inflation (log)					-.011	-.028#
					(.014)	(.016)
Add'l demog vars	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Germany	All	All	All
Observations	185167	185167	6186	139374	185167	139374
R-squared	.068	.099	.265	.116	.075	.088

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A4: Socialization hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Yrs comm. (log)	-.032**	-.061*	-.005	-.039
	(.009)	(.027)	(.008)	(.024)
Yrs pre-comm (log)	.006	-.003	.001	-.007
	(.004)	(.007)	(.005)	(.008)
Yrs post-comm (log)	-.140**	-.143**	.094	.100#
	(.035)	(.034)	(.059)	(.056)
Stalinist soc (8-13)		.001		.004
		(.006)		(.007)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)		-.010		-.012
		(.006)		(.008)
Post-tot soc (8-13)		-.009		-.002
		(.006)		(.007)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)		-.013		-.011
		(.009)		(.007)
Post-comm soc (8-13)		-.012		-.018#
		(.011)		(.010)
Yrs comm.*			.044**	.079**
Dem values index			(.010)	(.026)
Yrs post-comm*			.017	.010
Dem values index			(.041)	(.037)
Stalinist soc (8-13)*				.013#
Dem values index				(.008)
Neo-stalinist soc (8-13)*				.019**
Dem values index				(.007)
Post-tot soc (8-13)*				.013#
Dem values index				(.008)
Ref-comm soc (8-13)*				.005
Dem values index				(.007)
Post-comm soc (8-13)*				.025*
Dem values index				(.012)
Dem values index			-.104	-.262
			(.105)	(.156)
FH democracy	.011	.008	.014	.010
	(.013)	(.013)	(.016)	(.015)
PR system	-.038	-.028	-.014	-.002
	(.059)	(.058)	(.058)	(.056)
Presidential system	-.057	-.055	-.047	-.054
	(.069)	(.067)	(.088)	(.085)
GDP chg	.003	.003	.001	.002
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Inflation (log)	.008	.007	.030	.033
	(.018)	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)
Unemployment	-.002	-.002	.000	.001
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
GDP/capita (log)	-.148**	-.135**	-.185**	-.168**
	(.042)	(.041)	(.055)	(.052)
Income inequality	.006	.007	.013#	.014*
	(.004)	(.004)	(.007)	(.006)
Add'l demog variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	51317	51317	39954	39954
R-squared	.066	.069	.082	.088

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table A5: Bayesian updating hypotheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Polity Regime 1989	.003						.001	
	(.008)						(.008)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39	.002						-.004	
	(.005)						(.005)	
Native Fascism	-.148*						-.112*	
	(.063)						(.050)	
Native Communism	-.079						-.021	
	(.051)						(.039)	
Avg. GDP chg 1981-88		-.050#						
		(.031)						
Comm. Gov't			.033					
			(.090)					
Inflation* Comm Gov't			.028					
			(.029)					
Pers. fin satisf (1989-93)				.019**				
				(.003)				
Pers. fin satisf (1994-2000)				.026**				
				(.004)				
Pers. fin satisf (2001-2009)				.021**				
				(.004)				
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)					.082			.053
					(.067)			(.060)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)					.066			-.002
					(.059)			(.063)
Party system left-right average						-.004		
						(.020)		
Dem values index							.040	.093**
							(.027)	(.018)
Polity Regime 1989*							-.016**	
Dem values index							(.004)	
Avg. Polity Regime 1920-39*							.002	
Dem values index							(.003)	
Native Fascism*							-.050*	
Dem values index							(.024)	
Reformed ex-Communist (>20%)								-.035
Dem values index								(.038)
Unreformed Communist(>20%)								.005
Dem values index								(.031)
FH democracy	-.015	.003	.005	.017	.001	-.061*	.018	.024
	(.015)	(.016)	(.014)	(.011)	(.015)	(.022)	(.012)	(.015)
GDP chg	.003	.003	.003	.003	.005	.068**	.002	.002
	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)	(.002)	(.005)	(.018)	(.003)	(.005)
Inflation (log)	.008	.015	.012	.037**	.022	-.020	.008	.012
	(.019)	(.020)	(.019)	(.011)	(.021)	(.042)	(.017)	(.018)
Unemployment	-.006*	-.005*	-.004#	.004*	-.005#		.001	.002
	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)		(.002)	(.003)
GDP/capita (log)	-.088#	-.111*	-.083	-.145**	-.065	.090	-.167**	-.171**
	(.052)	(.054)	(.055)	(.038)	(.054)	(.067)	(.048)	(.048)
Income inequality	-.004	-.000	-.001	.007*	-.001	.000	.005	.007
	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.009)	(.004)	(.005)
Additional demographic ctrls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	53500	53500	53500	45578	53500	10628	42121	42121
R-squared	.055	.041	.051	.119	.043	.094	.085	.073

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 (one-tailed where appropriate)

Table A6: Survey questions used in the construction of dependent variables

Indicator	Survey question wording
WVS democratic values index	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having a democratic political system** (4 point scale)
	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (4 point scale)
	Having the army rule (4 point scale)
	I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? **In democracy, the economic system runs badly** (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling (4 point agree-disagree scale)
	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government (4 point agree-disagree scale)