James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy
Honors: Fellow of the Cognitive Science Society 2002; Jean Nicod Prize 2005; Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2005; Behrman Award 2009; Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science 2011.
Editorial Boards: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, Cognition, Cognitive Science Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy Compass, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Social Philosophy and Policy.
Professional Associations: American Philosophical Association, Cognitive Science Society, Philosophy of Science Association. Association for Psychological Science. Linguistic Society of America. Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
Kulkarni, S. and Harman, G. An Elementary Introduction to Statistical Learning Theory. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011, pp. xiv, 209.
Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. x, 108.
Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. viii, 291.
Harman, G. and Thomson, J. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
Harman, G., Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, Massachusetts; M.I.T. Press/Bradford Books: 1986).
Harman, G., The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York, Oxford University Press: 1977).
Harman, G., Thought, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press (1973).
Selected Recent Articles
“Rationality,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette, John Deigh, and Sarah Stroud (Blackwell, 2013), pp. 4338-4347. Also online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.
“Davidson’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic and Language,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Davidson’s Philosophy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 41-48.
“Naturalism in Moral Philosophy,” Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, edited by Susana I. Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 8-23.
Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory and Induction,” Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning, Norbert M. Seel, ed., Springer (2012) pp. 3186-3188.
“Notes on Practical Reasoning,” Cogency 3.4 (Winter 2011), pp. 127-145.
Sanjeev Kulkarni and Gilbert Harman, “Statistical Learning: A Tutorial,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics, 3 (2011) pp. 543-556.
Brett Sherman and Gilbert Harman, “Knowledge and Assumptions,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 131-140.
Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction,” in Prasanta Bandyopadhyay And Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Amsterdam: Elservier (2011): 833-848.
“Quine’s Semantic Relativity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (2011) pp. 287-289.
“Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity,” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 435-441.
Gilbert Harman, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kelby Mason, “Moral Reasoning,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 205-244.
Maria Merritt, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 354-400.
Erica Roeder and Gilbert Harman, “Linguistics and Moral Theory,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 272-295.
“Epistemology as Methodology,” in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, editors, A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 152-156.
“Guilt-Free Morality,”Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4 (2009): 203-214.
“Skepticism about Character Traits,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009).
Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., “Precis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory” and “Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens, and Hanson,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 5-9, 47-56.
“Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality,” in Moral Psychology, Volume 1, The Evolution of Morality, 2008), pp. 345-351.
“Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Direct Speaker Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), pp. 173-179.
Harman, G., and Kulkarni, S., “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 559-575.
Greenberg, M., and Harman, G., “Conceptual Role Semantics,” Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 295-322.
“Self-reflexive thoughts.” Philosophical Issues, 16 (2006): 334-45.
“Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006): 269-75.
“Moral particularism and transduction,” Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005): 44-55.