“Literal” Uses of Proper Names
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1. Predicativism

Predicativists about proper names are moved by examples of the following sort.

(1) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane. (Tyler Burge 1973, 429)

(2) Every Sarah I’ve met sometimes works as a babysitter.

(3) There is one Alfred in Princeton.

(4) Sarahs from Alaska are usually scary. (Fara no date)

In each case, we have a proper name occurring in a position reserved for count nouns like ‘hunter’ and ‘bear’. The proper names here occur as complements to quantificational or numeric determiners or as bare plurals. Let us call these predicate positions. We’ll call a name when it is in such a position a *predicative name* and when one is used in such a position, we’ll say that it is being *used predicatively*. And we’ll use these same expressions for names in similar determiner-name phrases, whether with or without a modifier (‘a weary Alfred’, ‘the Alfred I know’, ‘most Alfreds’, ‘which Alfred’, ‘that sultry Alfred’, *et cetera*).

From the perspective of compositional semantics, we want to treat the proper names here—proper names in predicate position—as having the same type of semantic value as that of other count nouns, namely, the semantic value of a predicate. I will assume for concreteness and simplicity that this is an *extension*, by which I mean the set of individuals of which the predicate is true.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of meaning analysis, we want to treat the proper names here as multiply applicable predicates that are true of just those things that are bearers of the name. For the truth of (1) it has to be that some individuals with the name ‘Alfred’ are crazy and that some individuals with the name ‘Alfred’ are sane.

For the sake of having a uniform compositional semantics for proper names, predicativists treat proper names as predicates even when they appear in an argument position—as in ‘Alfred is crazy’. We’ll call these “referential” proper names (or proper names used “referentially”). Here, predicativists persist in treating the name as a count noun with an extension as its semantic value.

For the sake of having a uniform meaning analysis, predicativists treat all proper names, even “referential” ones, as multiply applicable predicates that are true of just those things that are bearers of the name.
For the sake of both uniformities, predicativists treat “referential” proper names as occupying the common-noun complement of an unpronounced determiner.

Burge argued for one version of such a view (Burge 1973). He thought that “referential” proper names co-occurred with an unpronounced ‘that’. On Burge’s view, the sentence

\[(5) \text{Alfred is insane}\]

has the same logical form and indexical semantics as the sentence

\[(6) \text{That Alfred is insane},\]

but the demonstrative ‘that’ doesn’t get pronounced or written down when the sentence is spoken or written.

The covert complex demonstrative is to denote some particular individual with the name ‘Alfred’ who has been “demonstrated” in whatever way it is that produces denotations for complex demonstratives in general.¹

Other predicativists think that “referential” proper names co-occur with an unpronounced ‘the’ (Sloat 1969), (Larson & Segal 1995, 354–355), (Elbourne 2005), (Matushansky 2005, 2006, 2008), (Fara no date). (Gabriel Segal (2001) later re-considered but rejected the view.) On this view, the sentence ‘Alfred is insane’ has the logical form and semantics of the sentence ‘The Alfred is insane’, with the incomplete definite description ‘the Alfred’ denoting some particular individual named ‘Alfred’ who has been “picked out” in whatever way it is that produces denotations for incomplete definite descriptions.

Either way, “referential” proper names are treated as being multiply applicable count nouns that apply to just those individuals that bear that name.

Quine was a predicativist too. He didn’t explicitly consider Burge-type examples. He was moved to treat proper names as predicates by considerations about true negative existential claims (1939, 1948). The sentence ‘Pegasus does not exist’ does not mean that there is some object that is the referent of the name ‘Pegasus’ which doesn’t exist. Since the sentence is true, there is no such object around to be nonexistent. For Quine, the true claim that Pegasus does not exist should be regimented in first-order logic as \(\neg \exists x \text{Pegasus}(x)—\text{“Nothing is-Pegasus”}\)—where the ‘is’ here is the ‘is’ of predication and the name ‘Pegasus’ is a predicate. He treated the name as a general term, one that could occur in a meaningful sentence independently of which particular individuals existed. When proper names appeared in argument position, he regimented them as co-occurring with an existential quantifier. ‘Socrates is wise’ would be regimented as \(\exists x (\text{Socrates}(x) \land \text{wise}(x))\)—“Some Socrates is an x such that x is wise” (Quine 1960, §39). Quine thought that ‘some’ (as contrasted with ‘that’ or ‘the’) would suffice since he thought that in “referential” uses, the extension of the name ‘Socrates’ would already have been contextually narrowed so as to have at most

one thing in it.\textsuperscript{2} As I interpret Quine, he eschewed what he took to be the unnecessary logical complexity of having a further uniqueness-requiring determiner like ‘the’, given the antecedent contextual narrowing of the name ‘Socrates’\textsuperscript{3}.

To summarize (albeit anachronistically in the case of Quine), we can say that the aforementioned predicativists take “referential” proper names to be the common-noun complements of an unpronounced determiner: ‘that’; ‘the’; or ‘some’.

As I said above, for the sake of having a uniform compositional semantics for proper names, predicativists treat proper names in all of their occurrences as count nouns that have a predicate-type semantic value—\textit{viz.}, an extension.\textsuperscript{4} And for the sake of having a uniform meaning analysis, predicativists treat proper names in all of their occurrences as being multiply applicable predicates that are true of just those things that are bearers of the name. To be a bearer of the name ‘Socrates’ is to have ‘Socrates’ as a name. To have ‘Socrates’ as a name is to be called Socrates. So we may say schematically that a name ‘$N$’ applies to a thing just in case it is called $N$. I call this the \textit{being-called condition} (the BCC).\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{(BCC-Schema)} A proper name ‘$N$’ is true of a thing just in case it is called $N$.

Here I rebut an argument against the being-called condition which is intended to show that it is false by appealing to examples in which predicative names are allegedly used literally but without satisfying the being-called condition. There is supposed to be a further conclusion that without a uniform meaning analysis of predicative proper names there is no reason to treat names as predicates when they are used “referentially.” I will consider a variety of such examples, ultimately categorizing them under three headings while showing that no example under any of the headings gives a relevant counterexample to the being-called condition.

I will focus on an essay of Robin Jeshion’s (\textit{THIS VOLUME}) since she provides the most extended and cohesive version of this criticism. She also devises many new and important examples that are used to broaden and bolster the criticism.

\textsuperscript{2}See Quine (1940, 146).

\textsuperscript{3}For more on Quine’s treatment of names as predicates, see ‘Socratizing’ (Fara 2011a).

\textsuperscript{4}Remember, just for the sake of concreteness and ease of presentation, I am taking a predicate-type semantic value to be an extension. I do not mean to disallow its being some extensional equivalent or intensional variant of this—such as a function from individuals to truth values or a function from possible worlds to extensions.

\textsuperscript{5}This schematic statement of the predicativist’s applicability condition is not metalinguistic since the name itself is used rather than mentioned on the right-hand side of the condition. Here it occurs in the predicate position—or appellation position—of appellative ‘called’. Larson and Segal provide the same applicability condition for names—with a name occurring in the predicate position of appellative ‘called’. But they do not present the condition schematically. Instead, they indicate what the schematic version would look like by giving a number of instances of it (Larson & Segal 1995, 352). This nonmetalinguistic, schematic statement of the condition contrasts with the following two metalinguistic, universally quantified versions of the statement: (i) For all names $N$, $N$ applies to a thing just in case it is a bearer of $N$ (Katz 1994, 5) (Geurts 1997, 337), (Bach 2002, 75); or (ii) For all names $N$, $N$ applies to a thing just in case it is called $N$ (Burge 1973, 429), (Loar 1976, 370), (Bach 1981, 371). The first statement is grammatical and true but needlessly metalinguistic since it can be replaced by the nonmetalinguistic condition framed in terms of appellative ‘called’. The second statement is ungrammatical since appellative ‘called’ does not permit an individual-level variable in its appellation position, only a predicate, as in ‘Maude called me stupid’. See Matushansky (2005, 2006, 2008) and Fara (2011b).
2. The Anti-Unification Argument

Jeshion argues that proper names do not always satisfy the being-called condition. There are cases, she says, in which a predicative name has to be interpreted as applying to something that is not a bearer of the name. And in at least some of these cases, she says, the name is used literally. Therefore, she further argues, the predicativist cannot maintain a uniform meaning analysis of even just predicative proper names. Consequently, she says, the predicativist loses her justification for unifying predicative occurrences of proper names with their “referential” occurrences: if the predicative occurrences are not even themselves unified, the argument goes, then there can be no unified theory of names that includes their “referential” occurrences as well.6

First let me bracket off—as Burge did, and as Jeshion is willing to do—so-called metaphorical uses of proper names:

(7) George Wallace is a Napoleon;7

(8) Dick is a real Machiavelli;

(9) My mother thinks she’s some kind of Martha Stewart.8

Of course George Wallace was not among those who are called Napoleon; ‘Napoleon’ was not one of his names. Dick isn’t really someone whose name is ‘Machiavelli’. My mother doesn’t think that she’s any kind of person whose name is ‘Martha Stewart’. Each subject is, or thinks that she is, like the most salient person who has the name in question—in the most salient ways that are associated with that person. These appropriate metaphorical uses of predicative proper names do not—as all parties agree—undercut the being-called condition. (I say “appropriate” rather than “true” since I do not here want to take a controversial stand on side issues concerning the semantic analysis of metaphor.) The metaphorical uses of proper names do not undercut the being-called condition any more than metaphorical uses of other count nouns undercut any condition for literal application of them. It is appropriate to say that my daughter is a blossom. But that does not undercut the idea that in literal uses, the common count noun ‘blossom’ does not apply to any human. Let me call examples like those illustrated by (7–9) Machiavelli examples. (Of course it will emerge that it is not clear exactly which uses of a sentence qualify as Machiavelli examples.)

Burge wrote that “literal use contrasts with metaphorical use” (434). Jeshion accepts this and takes it to entail that all nonmetaphorical uses are literal uses. We will call this BURGE’S CLAIM. So, the argument runs, if there are any nonmetaphorical uses of proper names that do not satisfy the being-called condition then we have a refutation of the predicativist view that the being-called condition is the condition of application for all literal uses of proper names. This, then, is how Jeshion’s argument against predicativism goes:

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6See Jeshion, ‘Names Not Predicates’, THIS VOLUME.
7(Burge 1973, 429).
8(Fara no date).
**Premise 1:** Predicativists about proper names think that all literal uses of proper names satisfy the *being-called condition*;

**Premise 2:** Nonmetaphorical usage entails literal usage; (BURGE’S CLAIM)

**Premise 3:** There are nonmetaphorical uses of predicative proper names that do not satisfy the *being-called condition*;

**Conclusion 1:** Therefore, there are literal uses of predicative proper names that do not satisfy the *being-called condition*.

**Conclusion 2:** Therefore, predicativists are wrong. More specifically, there is no unified meaning analysis of literal uses of predicative proper names, since literal uses of predicative proper names do not always satisfy the being-called condition.

**Premise 4:** Predicativists have a justification for unifying their account of predicative proper names with “referential” ones only if they can give a unified meaning analysis of all literally used predicative proper names.

**Conclusion 3:** Therefore, predicativists lack justification for unifying their account of predicative proper names with “referential” ones. We will call this the *anti-unification argument*.

One of Jeshion’s main lines of attack against predicativism is to defend premise 3. She presents a number of interesting and challenging examples in which it looks like we have a nonmetaphorical use of a predicative proper name that does not satisfy the being-called condition. My plan in what follows is to discuss the specific sorts of allegedly literal uses of predicative proper names that Jeshion invokes to argue against the being-called condition. In each case I argue either (i) that even if the putatively nonmetaphorical uses of predicative proper names are literal uses, it is nevertheless unproblematic for the predicativist that they do not satisfy the being-called condition or (ii) that the putative literal uses of proper names are not in fact uses of proper names. In each case, though, I show that the phenomenon which is alleged to plague the being-called condition equally plagues uncontroversial meaning analyses of other count nouns. So none of the examples offered refutes predicativism.

### 3. Romanov Examples

The first problematic category of problems for the being-called condition, due to Steven Boër (1975), is illustrated by the following sentences.

(10) Joe Romanov (my barber) is not a Romanov.⁹

⁹This is Boër’s example number (1), Jeshion’s (23).
(11) Waldo Cox (my gardener) is a Romanov. (An exciting fact revealed by recent historical investigations.)

Here (10) is true because the barber does not descend from that long-ruling Russian family that was overthrown in 1917. Meanwhile, (11) is true because the gardener does descend from that family. Problem: Joe Romanov is called Romanov while Waldo Cox is not. I will call these examples, and others like them, Romanov examples. Romanov examples present the most complex of the phenomena to be presented below. I will postpone examination of them until the end.

4. Costume Examples

Another sort of example invoked by Jeshion is this:

(12) Two Osama bin Ladens came to the Halloween party.

Although this could be an appropriate thing to say, neither of the people dressed as the infamous Al-Qaeda has ‘Osama bin Laden’ as a name. Let us call such examples costume examples. (Of course it will emerge that it is not clear exactly which examples are costume examples.) Do costume examples refute the being-called condition? No.

Think about common count nouns. The word ‘ballerina’ is a multiply applicable count noun which in its normal uses is true just of those women or girls who are ballet dancers. The word ‘cat’ is a multiply applicable count noun which in its normal uses is true just of small domesticated felines. But if the costume claim that uses the proper name ‘Osama’ refutes the being-called condition, then costume claims using the common nouns ‘ballerina’ or ‘cat’ overturn the just-mentioned platitudes about their applicability conditions. If the costume sentence about Osama can be literally true in the envisaged situation, then so can these, based only on what costumes are being worn by guests:

(13) There were two ballerinas at the party;

(14) There was only one cat at the party.

But costume examples do not overturn the platitudes about the literal applicability conditions for the common nouns ‘ballerina’ and ‘cat’. So costume examples do not overturn the being-called condition either.

Given that, predicativists have no further obligation to provide an analysis of the costume-example phenomenon. We will, however, say more about the phenomenon in section 7. We will there propose that costume examples are instances of a more general phenomenon. But at this point we can make at least this disjunctive claim, assuming that costume examples are not instances of metaphor.

10This is Boërs example number (2), Jeshion’s (24).
11This example is Jeshion’s number (38).
Literal: If costume claims are literally true, then predicativists need to circumscribe their claim about the applicability of the being-called condition to all literal uses. In other words, predicativists would revise premise 1 of the anti-unification argument, in which case conclusion 2, which says that predicativism has been refuted, would not follow. The need for the revision is no problem for the predicativist, though, since if costume claims are literally true, then the applicability conditions for all count nouns must be circumscribed in exactly the same way. Consequently, any support for premise 4 would crumble. In that case, conclusion 3 would not follow. Conclusion 3 said that predicativists lack justification for unifying their account of predicative proper names with “referential” proper names.

Not literal: If costume claims are not literally true, then since they are not metaphoric either (as we were assuming), premise 2—BURGE’S CLAIM—would be false. There would be nonliteral uses of predicative proper names that were not metaphoric either. In that case, conclusions 1, 2, and 3 would not follow.

Let me say now that I do think that BURGE’S CLAIM is false. This was the claim that every nonmetaphoric use is a literal use. (After all, there is synecdoche, hyperbole, irony, et cetera. At least some uses of these figures of speech are neither literal nor metaphorical.) But rather than engage in debate in each case about whether the claims made in each sort of example are literal or not, I will not bring BURGE’S CLAIM into the equation anymore. However, I will not unreservedly accept that the putatively literal uses are indeed literal uses. Instead, I will say that they are “literal” with ‘literal’ in scare quotes.

5. Deferred Interpretation Examples

Compare these sentences, invoked by Jeshion:

(15) Stella is inside the museum;¹²

(16) Two Stellas are inside the museum.¹³

In (15), the proper name is used “referentially”: in subject position; in the singular; and with no explicit determiner. One who utters the sentence says something about some particular person called Stella (Frank Stella, say) and says that he is inside the museum. But in (16), the proper name occurs in predicative position: in the plural; with a numeric determiner. One who utters this sentence could be understood to mean that there are two people called Stella inside the museum (Frank Stella and Joseph Stella, say). She could also be understood to mean that there are two paintings called Stella inside the museum (Stella I and Stella II, say). But more likely she would be understood as saying that there are two paintings by Stella inside the museum (likely Frank Stella, 

¹²This is Jeshion’s example (4).
¹³This is Jeshion’s example (10).
him being the more widely exhibited and better-known of the two artists named Stella). This seems to Jeshion to conflict with the being-called condition since in this last case the proper name ‘Stella’ is not true of things called Stella. It is true of paintings by Stella. It is two paintings by Stella that are in the museum—no one or thing called Stella is inside the museum. Let’s call these artwork examples.

Again, I am happy to admit that artwork examples are not examples of metaphor. Rather, they are examples of what Geoffrey Nunberg has called “deferred interpretation.”

By deferred interpretation (or “deference”) I mean the phenomenon whereby expressions can be used to refer to [or be true of] something that isn’t explicitly included in the conventional denotation of that expression. (Nunberg 2004, 344)

Here is the canonical example of deferred interpretation for a predicate, from Nunberg:

(17) The ham sandwich is at table twenty.\(^{14}\)

The waiter in a restaurant can say this to mean that the person who ordered a ham sandwich is at table twenty. This is different from Quine’s “deferred ostension” (Quine 1968):

(18) She’s at table twenty.

In the case of (18), the waiter points at a ham sandwich in order to say something about the person who is going to be served that sandwich. We can tell that the waiter is referring to the customer when he points at the sandwich by his use of the female pronoun ‘she’ and the fact that the ham sandwich is obviously not yet at table twenty: that is where the sandwich needs to be brought.

The case of deferred interpretation is crucially different.\(^{15}\) In the waiter’s utterance of (17), he does not point at one thing in order to say something about another thing. Rather, he uses the common noun ‘ham sandwich’ as if it applied to people who ordered ham sandwiches rather than to ham sandwiches themselves. It is not like Quine’s case in which a referential expression gets its denotation indirectly. Nunberg’s point is that it is the predicate ‘ham sandwich’ itself which has a deferred interpretation. The use of the definite article in ‘the ham sandwich’ is appropriate when there is just one thing (or one salient thing) in the extension of the complex noun ‘ham sandwich’. But in the envisaged situation it might be that no actual ham sandwiches have been made yet, or it might be that many have been already made and are sitting on the counter. So if ‘the’ is appropriate only when there is one thing (or one most salient thing) in the extension of its nominal complement, then ‘ham sandwich’ in (17) must have only one thing in its extension. It applies, then, to orderers of ham sandwiches, not to ham sandwiches themselves. In the scenario, there is just one salient orderer but there may be many or no actual ham sandwiches.

Nunberg’s condition on deferred interpretation is that there be a “salient functional relation” between the things satisfying the deferred interpretation of the predicate and those satisfying its

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\(^{14}\)This is Nunberg’s example (16) (1979, 149).

\(^{15}\)In what follows I merely elaborate on Nunberg’s discussion (1993, §6), (1995, §4).
normal interpretation (1995, §3) (2004, §3). The deferentially interpreted predicate is true of some-thing just in case the salient function maps it to something in the normally interpreted predicate. In the ham sandwich case, the salient function maps a customer to her order. In artwork examples, the function maps an individual artwork to the artist that created it.\textsuperscript{16}

There are different things that we could say about the mechanics of deferred interpretation. It could be what we might call a \textit{pragmatic} phenomenon. In that case the predicates ‘ham sandwich’ and ‘Stella’ would not have the deferred interpretation. They would rather be used as if they did. The sentences (16) and (17) would not be true in the envisaged situations. Although false, they would be used to communicate something true.

Alternatively, we could say that deferred interpretation is a \textit{semantic} phenomenon. In that case the predicates ‘ham sandwich’ and ‘Stella’ would have the deferred interpretation. They would have a different interpretation from their normal one. This could actually be divided into three alternative theses. First: The predicates ‘Stella’ and ‘ham sandwich’ are \textit{elliptical} for the different predicates ‘painting by Stella’ and ‘person who ordered a ham sandwich’.\textsuperscript{17} Second: The original predicates themselves \textit{shift} their normal interpretation to the deferred interpretation.\textsuperscript{18} Nunberg distinguishes yet a third thesis: The original predicates are \textit{replaced} by different predicates—ones that look and sound the same as the original ones but have the deferred interpretation.\textsuperscript{19}

Rather than investigate the empirical or theoretical advantages of choosing one of these mechanics over the other, let us note this: The phenomenon of deferred interpretation occurs just as easily with common count nouns as it does with proper names. In particular, there are artwork examples with all manner of count nouns.

\begin{equation}
\text{(19) Put the gorillas in the east wing and the humans in the west wing.}
\end{equation}

We imagine this as being said by a curator of the Primate Art Museum to her assistant in order to tell the assistant where to put the \textit{paintings} by the gorillas or humans. We have the same “functional relation” in this case as we do in the ‘Stella’ case: a function from artworks to their creators. They are both cases of deferred interpretation.

Moreover, different deferred interpretations occur with both proper names and other count nouns when different “functional relations” are salient. Consider examples (20) and (21).

\begin{equation}
\text{\textsuperscript{16}This requires that in the Stella example the name ‘Stella’ have been already contextually narrowed down to one person called Stella. It would at best be a “grammatical joke” to say that there were two Stellas in the museum on the grounds that there was a painting by Frank Stella in the museum and also one by Joseph Stella.}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{\textsuperscript{17}his is the view of Karen De Clercq (2008), at least as applied to German. She argues that in German, ‘Stella’ as it occurs in (16) is elliptical for ‘Stella painting’. Her evidence is that the indefinite article in ‘I bought a Stella’ takes the gender of the noun ‘painting’ (neuter) rather than that of the person Stella (masculine). The facts generalize to deleted nouns of other genders: in ‘a Stella [machine]’ the article takes the gender of ‘machine’, which is feminine. This is interesting evidence. She reports, however, that the gender behavior of articles with deferentially interpreted predicates does not generalize to Belgian Dutch. It does seem to me that the gender behavior of articles in German favors a semantic analysis over a pragmatic analysis. But by itself it does not seem to me to favor any of the three semantic analyses over either of the others.}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{\textsuperscript{18}This is Monroe Beardsley’s (1962) view concerning metaphor.}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{\textsuperscript{19}This third version of the semantic thesis is the one that Nunberg goes in for.}
\end{equation}
(20) There are two Kollwitzes inside the museum.
   ⇒ Could be used to mean: There are two portraits of Kollwitz inside the museum.
   ⇒ Could be used to mean: There are two paintings called *Kollwitz* inside the museum.

(21) There are two dragonfruits inside the museum.
   ⇒ Could be used to mean: There are two still lifes of a dragonfruit inside the museum.
   ⇒ Could be used to mean: There are two paintings called *dragonfruit* inside the museum.

Deferred interpretation is thus a phenomenon that shows up not just with proper names but with
count nouns generally. Since in no case are we required to reject the normal applicability condi-
tions for ‘gorilla’, ‘human’, ‘dragonfruit’, and the like, the phenomenon of deferred interpretation
does not require the predicativist to reject her being-called condition as the normal applicability
condition for proper names.

But how more specifically does the phenomenon of deferred interpretation bear on the anti-
unification argument?

**Pragmatic:** To say that deferred interpretation is a *pragmatic* phenomenon is to say that expres-
sions with a “deferred interpretation” do have their standard interpretation but are used as if
they had a different interpretation in order to convey something other than what is literally
expressed when using them. So if deferred interpretation is merely a pragmatic phenomenon,
then the predicativist need not reject the being-called condition in face of proper names with
a deferred interpretation.

**Predicate ellipsis:** If deferred interpretation were a *predicate-ellipsis* phenomenon, then it would
provide no support for Jeshion’s essential premise 3. The supposedly elided predicate ‘paint-
ing by Stella’ is not one in which we have a predicative proper name that does not satisfy
the being-called condition. It is not one in which we have a predicative proper name at all:
‘Stella’ is not in predicate position in the elided expression.

**Semantic shift:** If deferred interpretation were a *semantic-shift* phenomenon, then the predicativist
would circumscribe her claim for the general applicability of the being-called condition. She
would say that it does not give the applicability condition for proper names when they have a
deferred interpretation. This circumscription would be innocent, however, since normal ap-
pliability conditions for *all* count nouns are suspended in cases of deferred interpretation—
and in just the same way. (Remember ‘gorilla’ and ‘dragonfruit’.)

**Predicate replacement:** Similarly, if deferred interpretation were a *predicate-replacement* phe-
nomenon, the predicativist would circumscribe her claim for the general applicability of
the being-called condition. She would say that it does not give the applicability condition
for replacements put in for proper names in cases of deferred interpretation. This circum-
scription is as innocent as the one in the case of semantic shift since again, normal ap-
plicability conditions for all count-noun replacements would be suspended in cases of de-
ferred interpretation—again, in just the same way. For example, the replacement for ‘gorilla’
(which looks and sounds just like ‘gorilla’) in the cases of deferred interpretation would not
be a predicate that applies only to apes.

6. Resemblance Examples

The third premise of the anti-unification argument was that there are nonmetaphoric uses of pred-
icative names that do not satisfy the being-called condition. The next sort of example, devised by
Jeshion in her defense of premise 3, is illustrated by what I’ll call “a resemblance example”:

(22) Two little Lenas just arrived.20

The scenario here is one in which my friend, named Lena, has just arrived with her three young
daughters. One of them does not look like Lena at all. But the other two are “little Lenas” because
they resemble my friend so much—they look like her, dress like her, sound like her, wear similar
expressions, et cetera. In this scenario, we may agree, (22) can be appropriately uttered. I take
it that Jeshion’s point in saying that one of the daughters does not look like Lena is to show that
in this example, being a “little Lena” is not just a matter of being one of Lena’s children. Is this
another Machiavelli example? It certainly has more in common with those examples than with the
two others we’ve recently looked at.

Unlike the costume and deferred interpretation examples, the respects in which the daughters
are being claimed to be like Lena is not limited to just one respect. In one of the costume examples,
for instance, the only respect in which a person had to be like Osama bin Laden in order to be “an
Osama bin Laden” at the party was to go to the party as bin Laden. To go to the party as bin Laden
one has to do little more than wear one item of clothing or fake beard or some such thing that is like
his, or in the case of a lame costume, even just wear a name tag saying ‘Osama bin Laden’ on it. In
other words, there needn’t be a multitude of ways in which the costume-wearer is like bin Laden or
even looks like bin Laden.

And if Nunberg’s condition on deferred interpretation is right—that there be a salient functional
relation between the objects in the deferred extension of the predicate and those in the normal
extension—then the “little Lena” example is not a case of deferred interpretation. It would be if
being a “little Lena” were just a matter of being one of Lena’s daughters. We would in that case
have a function that mapped children to their mothers. But Jeshion’s case is not like that. Only two
of the three daughters are “little Lenas,” because they, but not the third daughter, resemble big Lena
in a number of ways.

20This example is Jeshion’s number (28).
On the flip side, when we say that Dick is a Machiavelli, it needn’t be that he is like Machiavelli in some one given respect, much less in every respect. It is familiar enough that that requirement does not need to be met in order for a metaphorical claim to be appropriate. The appropriateness of the metaphorical claim requires rather that Dick be like Machiavelli in some of the respects that are relevant in the context. We say “relevant in the context” because different resemblances might matter in different situations. As with Dick and Machiavelli, Lena’s daughters need not be like her in some one given respect, much less in every respect, in order for it to be appropriate to say that they are “little Lenas.”

But set aside the question whether Machiavelli examples just are “resemblance” examples. Instead let me fall back on the question whether common count nouns exhibit the same “resemblance” behavior as the proper name ‘Lena’ in (22). For a noun to exhibit the same resemblance behavior, is for it to be appropriately used as if it applied to a thing that it does not normally apply to because the thing resembles (in some contextually relevant ways) the things that the noun does normally apply to. If common nouns exhibit resemblance behavior, then it is no counterexample to the being-called condition that proper names exhibit resemblance behavior. To convince ourselves that common nouns do exhibit resemblance behavior, let’s consider some sentences. Here the common nouns in question are ‘woman’, ‘ballerina’, ‘kitten’, and ‘man’.

(23)  a. Here comes Lena with her two little women.
    b. Here comes Lena with her two little ballerinas.
    c. Here comes Sugarfluff with her two little kittens.
    d. How’s my little man doing?

The sentence (23a) would be appropriately uttered if two of Lena’s young daughters looked or behaved like women—for example, by wearing business suits, make-up, and high heels. The sentence (23b) would be appropriately uttered if two of Lena’s daughters looked or behaved like ballerinas—for example, by wearing tutus, ballet shoes, and a tight, high bun. Sentence (23c) would be appropriately uttered in either of the following two situations: (i) although grown, Sugarfluff’s kittens still act kittenish; (ii) although they are not Sugarfluff’s own offspring, they behave as if they were hers—for example, they follow Sugarfluff everywhere and expect her to clean them. Grandma could appropriately (if annoyingly) say (23d) to her grandson just because in her mind, he has grown so much that he is already like a man.

So each of the common nouns in (23) provide for resemblance examples. Furthermore, the second context described for sentence (23c) demonstrates that it is not only common count nouns that provide for resemblance examples, but also possessive pronouns. Even though the little kittens are not Sugarfluff’s own offspring, it can be appropriate to call them hers.

In the wake of these common-noun resemblance examples, consider the following sentence. It can be used to provide examples of each of the kinds that we’ve properly looked at so far:
There are two Hamlets at the party.

This sentence could be appropriately used in any of the following situations:

(a) It is a costume party and two people are dressed as Hamlet; (Costume)
(b) There are two portraits of Hamlet at the party; (Deferred Interpretation)
(c) There are two vengeful and tragically insane men at the party. (Resemblance)

One thing these show—completely unsurprisingly—is that it is not sentences that are costume examples, or deferred interpretation examples, or resemblance examples. It is rather the context in which they are used that makes an utterance of such a sentence into one or the other of these types of example. In context (a), the utterance of (24) yields a costume example; in context (b), an example of deferred interpretation; and in context (c), a resemblance example.

But what about context (d) below—which yields what we’ll call a role-playing example? Is this yet a new kind of example of a “literal” use of a proper name that does not satisfy the being-called condition?

(d) There are two actors at the party who are playing Hamlet in a performance of Shakespeare’s play. (Role-Playing)

The role-playing context does not overtly yield an example of any of the types already discussed. It does, however, yield an example very like the costume examples: there is one specific relation that the actors have to bear to the character Hamlet—they have to be playing him in a performance. Like the costume examples, there is a salient functional relation between the things to which ‘Hamlet’ applies here and the thing it normally applies to, namely, the character Hamlet himself. The function is the one that maps an actor to his character role. Costume examples and role-playing examples thus both meet the conditions on deferred interpretation that we saw in the ham sandwich and artist examples. All three of (24a), (24b), and (24d) straightforwardly provide examples of deferred interpretation. And there are still more besides. The first one below involves a common noun. The second involves proper nouns that are not (occurring as) proper names.

(e) I want the first flute to wear all white and the other flutes to wear all black.

(f) I’m a Les Paul but I’m married to a Flying V, and we’re even friends with a lot of Strats.

7. Two Sorts of “Literal” Uses of Proper Names

I propose, therefore, that the problematic sorts of “literal” uses that we have properly discussed so far can be divided into two main categories. The first category groups together examples of deferred interpretation. The second category groups together examples of resemblance.
The main difference between deferred interpretation examples and resemblance examples is that a deferred interpretation example requires there to be some one specific “salient functional relation” between the deferred usage of the expression (predicative count nouns in our case) and its normal usage. The following, then, illustrate contexts in which a predicative count noun falls under the heading of Nunberg’s “deferred interpretation.”

(25) Costume examples involve a function that maps an individual to that which he is dressed as;

(26) Artwork examples involve a function that maps an artwork to the individual that created that work.

(27) Role-playing examples involve a function that maps an individual to the role that he is playing in a (contextually salient) theatrical performance;

(28) Instrument-playing examples involve a function that maps an individual to the instrument that she plays.

Resemblance examples, meanwhile, do not require that the subject bear any one specific relation to the things that fall under the predicatively used noun. Rather, they must bear some of the resemblances that are relevant in the situation in which they are uttered. Moreover, different resemblances can be more or less relevant and more or less salient in different situations. Let me illustrate.

(29) ‘A little Lena’ could be used to describe a child who looks like her mother Lena or one who acts like her, et cetera.

(30) ‘An Ophelia’ could be used to describe a woman who is driven to madness by love; or it could be used to describe a woman who, floating on her back in the water, has the haunting but beautiful and serene appearance of the Ophelia in Mallais’s famous painting, et cetera.

It seems to me that the following examples are of just the same kind.

(31) ‘A little Jeff Koons’ could be used to describe a child who takes household items and transforms them to look like bizarre design objects; or it could be used to describe a child who makes large, cheeky sculptures; or it could be used to describe a child who manages to sell his artwork for exorbitant amounts of money; et cetera.

(32) ‘A Kant’ could be used to describe a prolific philosopher who writes about morals, aesthetics, and politics; or it could be used to describe a philosopher who is punctual, prim, and frugal to a fault; or it could be used to describe a philosopher who makes ample use of Kant-like antinomies; or it could be used to describe a philosopher who writes in excessively obscure prose with unduly complex constructions; et cetera.
One thing that makes the latter pair of examples be of the same kind as the preceding pair set of resemblance examples is that there is no particular group of resemblances that are required in order for the sentence to be “appropriate.”

Now what of the supposedly metaphoric Machiavelli examples (7–9)?

(7) George Wallace is a Napoleon.

(8) Dick is a real Machiavelli.

(9) My mother thinks she’s some kind of Martha Stewart.

We tacitly envisaged these Machiavelli sentences as not being uttered in either a costume context or a role-playing context, though of course they could be used in those ways. We tacitly took them to be uttered in more of a resemblance-like context. The main difference between Machiavelli examples and some of the other resemblance examples we considered had only to do with the particular individuals that bore the name in question together with the kind of respects of similarity to them that were contextually relevant. There’s not much else to distinguish Machiavelli examples from the more mundane resemblance examples discussed. Indeed, the Machiavelli examples simply are resemblance examples.

In the Machiavelli examples, the bearers of the names in question were well-known and famous for particular deeds or properties, and it was those particular deeds or properties that were relevant in the contexts we tacitly envisaged. But they needn’t be like that. The appropriateness of saying that someone is a Napoleon could, in the right contexts, just have to do with the person’s stature or with whether they have a typically Corsican manner. My mother might think that she’s some kind of Martha Stewart not because she’s an organized homemaker who produces fabulous meals and decorations appropriate to every occasion. Rather, she might think that she’s some kind of Martha Stewart because she has a flippy but sensible blond hairdo and a patrician American accent.

Anyway, the Machiavelli sentences we looked at do not exhibit the characteristic “inherent tension” (Beardsley 1962, 294) or “categorial falsity” (Grice 1975, 34) exhibited by clear cases of metaphor. Consider these clear cases of metaphor which do exhibit what Beardsley called the “inherent tension” or what Grice called the “categorical falsity” of metaphor:

(33) They left their laughter upon the ceiling;

(34) The moistness of the damp night falls silent through the lamplight.

Whether the Machiavelli examples be metaphors or not, the most important point for us here is that in each of the cases that have so far been discussed—where a use of a proper name was

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21Ted Cohen, though, gives convincing examples which show, at the very least, that Beardsley’s and Grice’s statements need to be sharpened. One of his examples is this: ‘The sun is warming today’ (Cohen 1976, 252). This is a metaphor when spoken to make a claim about Juliet, that she is warming today. But pace Beardsley there is no inherent tension within the sentence itself. And pace Grice, the sentence is not categorically false.

22Both of these metaphors are Chris Difford’s.
argued to scotch the being-called condition—we can find an analogous example with a common count noun that doesn’t scotch the application conditions for the common noun in its normal uses.

**Costume Examples:**

(35) Proper name: There were two Osama bin Ladens at the Halloween party;

(36) Common noun: There were two green witches at the Halloween party.

**Deferred Interpretation Examples:**

(37) Proper name: There were five Stellas and two Kollwitzes at the modern art museum 
    (= paintings by Stella or Kollwitz);

(38) Common noun: There were five gorillas and two orangutans at the primate art museum 
    (= paintings by a gorilla or an orangutan).

**Resemblance Examples:**

(39) Proper name: My friend arrived with her two little Lenas in tow 
    (Two of Lena’s children bear a striking physical resemblance to her);

(40) Common noun: My friend arrived with her two little kittens in tow 
    (Two of Lena’s children bear a striking behavioral resemblance to kittens).

**Machiavelli Examples:**

(41) Proper name: Dick is a real Machiavelli;

(42) Common noun: Your father is a veritable dictator;

(43) Common noun: Miguel is truly a messiah.

8. **Romanov Examples Revisited**

Romanov examples do not fall into either of the two broad categories of “literal” uses of proper names that we have circumscribed so far—*deferred interpretation* uses or *resemblance* uses. In fact I do think that Romanov examples involve literal uses of proper nouns. I say “proper nouns” because I think that the proper nouns in question are not in fact being used as proper names. A proper noun need not be a proper name. Recall ‘Strat’ and ‘Flying V’ in (24f). And a proper noun that sometimes occurs as a proper name need not always occur as a proper name. Recall ‘Les Paul’ in (24f).

A “Romanov example” is one in which a family or dynasty name—in predicative position—applies or doesn’t apply to a person regardless of whether that person has the family or dynasty name as one of his names. These were the Boër examples that Jeshion appealed to.
(10) Joe Romanov (my barber) is not a Romanov.

(11) Waldo Cox (my gardener) is a Romanov. (An exciting fact revealed by recent historical investigations.)

Not all Romanov examples require the indefinite article. Here is one of Jeshion’s examples and some further ones that expand on hers.

(44) Many Kennedys died tragically.\(^{23}\)

(45) At least two Kennedys were married to politicians; only one of them is a blood descendant of Joseph Kennedy senior.\(^{24}\)

(46) You can tell that Maria Shriver is one of the Kennedys from the contour of her jaw.

Maria Owings Shriver, niece of the tragically killed American president John F. Kennedy, does not have ‘Kennedy’ as one of her names. \textit{Maybe} she has been called ‘Maria Kennedy Shriver’ enough times by now for her to qualify as having ‘Kennedy’ as a name. Either way, whether ‘Kennedy’ is now among her names or not, she is still a Kennedy. Her properties and actions must be included when assessing what the \textit{Kennedys’} properties and actions have been. The truth of (44–46) turns in part on what Maria Shriver is like, on what she has done, and on what has happened to her.

And the phenomenon does not show up just with the names of famous families:

(47) Fred Smith is not a Smith after all—he’s a Jones.\(^{25}\)

The envisaged circumstance here is one in which it has been discovered that Fred Smith was fathered by Tom Jones rather than by John Smith, as had previously been thought. What matters for the question of whether Fred is a Jones rather than a Smith may have to do with his lineage rather than the name on his birth certificate or driver’s license (in the right context).

So if ‘Romanov’, ‘Kennedy’, and ‘Smith’, which are used predicatively here, are being used literally as well—as they surely are—then if they are occurring as proper names we have a counterexample to the being-called condition, even given the unproblematic revisions to it that we have made so far.

While I agree, though, that these are proper \textit{nouns} in the sentences at issue, I deny that they are always occurring as proper \textit{names}. All proper names are proper nouns, but not all proper nouns are proper names. It is proper \textit{names} that are subject to the being-called condition. Other proper nouns need not be.

Proper nouns are, roughly, those nouns that require capitalization. I, for one, sometimes have to consult style guides in order to find out whether a certain noun should be capitalized, hence whether

\(^{23}\)This is Jeshion’s example number (25).

\(^{24}\)By the way, this is not true.

\(^{25}\)This is Boër’s example (5).
it is a proper noun. For example, I had thought that the cat-breed name ‘korat’ was a proper noun but it turns out that it is not. I thought that we should write this:

(48) I have three Korats and I would never have any other breed of cat.

But it turns out that we should write this:

(49) I have three korats and I would never have any other breed of cat.

Similarly—I had to look this up—when we use trade names as common nouns, they should not be capitalized. These are officially wrong, but many people write like this anyway:

(50) The Xerox machine is out of order;
(51) I like using Saran Wrap better than tin foil;
(52) We need a new Hoover;
(53) Can you please hand me a Kleenex?

We all know that capitalization conventions vary across languages. Such rules have nothing to do with grammar. A capitalized noun need not be a proper name any more than a capitalized adjective need be. The adjective ‘Kafkaesque’ is not a proper name and it would not be one if we were to start using it as a noun to mean a Kafkaesque thing. Clarence Sloat distinguished the “orthographically definable” class of proper nouns from the “syntactically definable” one (Sloat 1969, 26). I won’t go into the criteria he used for marking off the syntactically definable class, but his is exactly the distinction that we are making here.

With that in mind, let me turn to the Romanov examples. I claim that family names like ‘Romanov’ do not always occur as proper names. I propose a test for whether ‘Romanov’ occurs as a proper name: if it doesn’t satisfy the being-called condition in some occurrence, then it is not a proper name in that occurrence. When ‘Romanov’ does not satisfy the being-called condition it is a proper noun that is not a proper name. (The test is only to apply in cases other than those of resemblance or deferred interpretation.) This might seem a question-begging test for the distinction between a proper noun’s occurring as a proper name or not. But it is not a question-begging test. Adoption of the test, as I will argue in the final section, is good methodology.

The foundation of my argument consists of two claims, an obvious one and a less obvious one.

The obvious claim: Whether or not a thing belongs to a certain family is independent of what its name is.

The less obvious claim: A proper count noun that is true of members of certain families may be orthographically and phonetically identical to some proper name without itself being a proper name.

Here is an example that uncontroversially verifies the obvious claim.
My little Hominid is not a hominid. (He’s a kitten to whom I’ve given the name ‘Hominid’.)

Obviously, I can give my cat the name ‘Hominid’ without thereby rendering him a hominid. Whether or not something is a member of a certain biological taxonomic family has nothing to do with what its name is. There are hominids who have no name at all. (My daughter is an example: she did not have a name for the first four days of her life.)

This by itself does not obviously have a direct bearing on predicativism. (Nor does it obviously have a bearing on the less obvious claim.) That is for two reasons. First, the term of biological nomenclature ‘hominid’ is not a proper noun. (Although I did have to look that up to find out.) It is therefore not a proper name. Second, since ‘hominid’ is not a proper name, there is no question whether it satisfies the being-called condition. Example (54) shows us that it does not satisfy the being-called condition. Rather, it is a common noun that applies to any member of the biological family of Hominidae. So this example simply, and uncontroversially, illustrates just how obvious the obvious claim is.

But why think that this does not have a bearing on predicativism? As it turns out (I discovered) the name of a taxonomic family is capitalized, e.g., ‘Hominidae’. But the common noun that applies to members of that family, namely ‘hominid’, is not capitalized. But suppose that it were capitalized (as I thought it might well be). Then (54) would rather have to be written as

My little Hominid is not a Hominid. (He’s a kitten to whom I’ve given the name ‘Hominid’.)

Would this then be a Romanov example? Could it reasonably be presented as a counterexample to the being-called condition? Certainly it shouldn’t be. Whether or not a sentence plausibly serves as a counterexample to the being-called condition must not turn on arbitrary conventions governing capitalization.

We might have mentioned at an earlier point that proper names do not have to be capitalized. The writer and feminist bell hooks has a name that is not capitalized, but that name, ‘bell hooks’, is a proper name nonetheless. It is a proper name because she called herself bell hooks. Anyone has the authority to give himself any name he likes. Once she calls herself bell hooks, she then becomes called bell hooks. That is sufficient to make ‘bell hooks’ be among her proper names. Assuming that ‘bell hooks’ is not the same name as ‘Bell Hooks’, bell hooks is probably the only bell hooks. So not all proper names have to be capitalized. But it should be uncontroversial to say this much: any noun that is not a proper name is a proper noun in English just in case it is capitalized in English. Being a proper noun is, then, a trivial, purely orthographical, feature of nouns.

Jeshion and Boër might try to reinstate the import of the Romanov examples by saying that (54’) would never have been presented as a counterexample to the being-called condition because whether or not something is a Hominid (i.e., a hominid) would never have been thought by anyone to have anything to do with what things’ names are. Despite its (feigned) capitalization, no-one
would have thought that the second occurrence of ‘Hominid’ in (54') is a predicative proper name. So the fact that it does not conform to the being-called condition need not worry predicativists. In Romanov examples, in contrast, they would say, ‘Romanov’ does occur as a predicative proper name that does not conform to the being-called condition, so that is a fact should worry predicativists.

On the side of predicativism, we should put pressure on the claim that Romanov examples are not just like our Hominid example. What is the justification for saying that ‘Hominid’ in its second occurrence in (54') is not a proper name? After all, whether or not something is a Hominid, in the biological sense, does have to do with what things’ names are. It has to do with the fact that to be a hominid is to be a member of the family with the name ‘Hominidae’. A predicativist provides justification by saying that ‘Hominid’ in its second occurrence in (54') is not a predicative proper name precisely because it does not pass the semantic test of satisfying the being-called condition. The antipredicativist demurs. She says that ‘Romanov’ in Boër’s example, but not ‘Hominid’ in the taxonomy example (54’), is a proper name. But what’s the difference?

To say that the second occurrence of ‘Hominid’ in (54') provides a counterexample to the being-called condition would be to say that although ‘Hominid’ can be used a proper name that does satisfy the being-called condition, it can nevertheless occur as a predicative proper name that does not satisfy the being-called condition. But neither party to the debate says that. Neither party says that ‘Hominid’, in its second occurrence in (54’), is a proper name. We predicativists say that the Romanov examples are like the ‘Hominid’ example. Antipredicativists say otherwise. Are we at a stalemate? I say no.

Of course we can use the word ‘Hominid’ as a proper name for anything we like (as we can with any sign or sound whatsoever). But when we do, it does satisfy the being-called condition:

(55) I gave my cat the name ‘Hominid’ and you gave your dog the same name; between us we have two Hominids.

The final plural occurrence of ‘Hominid’ is being used as a proper name precisely when the sentence is uttered to express a truth.

For comparison, now reconsider some of our Romanov examples. Here we allegedly had a predicative proper name that did not satisfy the being-called condition. We all agree that the second ‘Romanov’ in (10) is a proper noun that does not satisfy the being-called condition. In particular, ‘a Romanov’ in (10) has the same meaning as ‘a descendant of the Romanovs’ in (56).

(10) Joe Romanov (my barber) is not a Romanov.

(56) Joe Romanov (my barber) is not a descendant of the Romanovs.

But we can also use it as a predicative name that does satisfy the being-called condition.

(10)’ Joe Romanov (my barber) is a Romanov but he’s not one of the Romanovs.
In other words, the second occurrence of the proper noun ‘Romanov’, as used in (10), fails the semantic test for being a proper name: it does not there conform to the being-called condition. But as used in (10’) it does pass the semantic test for being a proper name: it does there conform to the being-called condition.

Return to an example that we looked at already, in our discussion of deferred interpretation:

(24) (f) I’m a Les Paul but I’m married to a Flying V, and we’re even friends with a lot of Strats.

This example has a number of interesting features. The proper noun ‘Les Paul’ sometimes occurs as a proper name:

(57) Les Paul was one of the great American guitarists.

It sometimes occurs as a proper noun that’s not a proper name, but as a count-noun predicate that’s true of the members of a certain family of Gibson guitars:

(58) I own two Les Pauls because Jimmy Page used them but not because Eric Clapton did.

Just as with some of our Romanov sentences, we can have ‘Les Paul’ occurring once as a proper name and once not, in the very same sentence:

(59) Les Paul, of course, only ever played Les Pauls.

What’s perhaps most interesting about sentence (24f) is that ‘Les Paul’ has a deferred interpretation in it: it’s true of people who play the Les Paul guitar. So we there have a case in which there’s a proper noun that often does occur as a proper name, but in which the proper noun is not occurring as a proper name; moreover, in this case it receives a deferred interpretation!

We can even have a combination of all three types of occurrences in a single text:

(60) I would be shocked if it turned out that Les Paul usually played an ES instead of a Les Paul. I’m a Les Paul because I thought he was one.

Unlike the taxonomic term ‘hominid’, we do not have to feign capitalization with the noun ‘Les Paul’ in order to make our point. It always occurs as a proper noun. And although it sometimes occurs as a proper name, it does not always. We can test when an occurrence of it is a proper name by seeing whether it satisfies the being-called condition. When it does, it is. When it doesn’t, it’s not.

So the upshot of all this is that Romanov examples do not serve as counterexamples to the being-called condition any more than our examples with ‘Hominid’ or ‘Les Paul’ do. In Romanov examples, the count noun ‘Romanov’ is a proper noun that may apply to something even if it is not called Romanov. But it is not in those examples a literally used predicative proper name that does not satisfy the being-called condition. Rather it there occurs as a literally used proper-count-noun that is not a proper name.
9. Some Concluding Remarks about Methodology

As Jeshion emphasizes, predicativists about proper names are motivated by the goal of uniformity to extend their account of predicative proper names to “referential” proper names. Predicativists know that it is better, all things considered, to have a semantic account of proper names that extends to all uses of them than it is to have two separate semantic analyses of proper names, one for their “referential” uses and another one for their predicative uses.

Jeshion argues that this goal is misplaced. She takes the predicativist to be appealing to an unjustified principle:

**Uber Uniformity Principle:** Other things equal, a theory that explains like phenomena uniformly is superior to one that does not.

Jeshion is right to oppose this as a guiding principle for semantic theorizing, or for scientific theorizing in general. For its implementation requires an antecedent view about which phenomena are like which other ones. If the antecedent view is unprincipled, then the Uber Uniformity Principle cannot be applied in a principled way. The underlying point of Jeshion’s criticisms of the being-called condition is to show that predicativists are wrong in thinking that even just predicative uses of proper names are all semantically like each other. For not even all predicative proper names are like each other, she argues.

I have argued otherwise here. I have argued that none of the examples put forward should lead us to give up the being-called condition once it is appropriately circumscribed—circumscribed in a principled way that’s generalizable to other count nouns.

In light of that, I should say a bit more about what uniformity principle predicativists really are guided by. I do not think it is Jeshion’s. Rather it is something a bit more like Occam’s Razor. If we were to rephrase the principle in the same terms as Jeshion’s Uber Uniformity Principle, we would get this one:

**Maximize Uniformity Principle:** Other things equal, the more phenomena that a theory explains as like, the better.

In the present context it is appropriate to bring up Grice’s “Modified Occam’s Razor” as a more specific version of this Maximize Uniformity Principle:

**Modified Occam’s Razor:** Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.

Given the broad applicability of the being-called condition, and given that we want to avoid multiplying senses beyond necessity, we should resist rejection of the being-called condition just in the face of any difficulty raised against it. Rather, we should welcome the opportunity to test the limits of its applicability. In particular its otherwise broad applicability licenses us to use it among the criteria for deciding between competing proposals about how to account for disputed cases.
Let me illustrate with our Romanov examples. My explanation of the Romanov examples was perhaps the only resistable one in this paper. There was a point in my argument at which predicativists and antipredicativists seemed at a stalemate about whether Romanov examples could stand up to the being-called condition. It was one of our ‘Hominid’ sentences that led to the stalemate.

(54′) My little Hominid is not a Hominid.26 (He’s a kitten to whom I’ve given the name ‘Hominid’.)

In its first occurrence, the count noun ‘Hominid’ is used as a predicative proper name: I have given my kitten the name ‘Hominid’. In its second occurrence, ‘Hominid’ is used as a proper count-noun that is not a proper name. Rather, it is a proper count-noun that applies to members of the taxonomic family of Hominidae.

No-one would have thought, unreflectively, that this example creates difficulty for the predicativist. But why shouldn’t it? Here the ‘second’ occurrence of ‘Hominid’ does not satisfy the being-called condition. My kitten is called Hominid, but in the sense of ‘Hominid’ in which (54′) is true she is nonetheless not a Hominid. She is not a Hominid because she is not a member of a certain family. Just as Joe Romanov the barber is not a member of the Romanov family, Hominid my kitten is not a member of the Hominid family. But why is that not supposed to be a problem for the predicativist?

Presumably it is not supposed to be a problem because there is no controversy over whether ‘Hominid’ in its non-proper-name occurrence in (54′) should satisfy the being-called condition. It uncontroversially should be expected not to satisfy the being-called condition. There is no controversy here because, obviously, whether something is a member of a certain family is not dependent on what its name is. The predicativist says exactly this about the Romanov examples. The antipredicativist says, “but clearly they’re different.” Are we at a stalemate?

I said that we were not at a stalemate because I have a semantic test for deciding whether a predicative occurrence of a proper noun is a predicative occurrence of a proper name.

(10) Joe Romanov (my barber) is not a Romanov.

(10′) Joe Romanov (my barber) is a Romanov but he’s not one of the Romanovs.

In the sense in which (10) is true, the second occurrence of ‘Romanov’ in it is not an occurrence of a proper name any more than the second occurrence of ‘Hominid’ in (54′) is. But in the sense in which (10′) is true, the second occurrence of ‘Romanov’ in it is an occurrence of a proper name just as the second occurrence of ‘Hominid’ in (55) is. Although the taxonomy example (54′), with ‘Hominid’, doesn’t feel like a Romanov example, it is sufficiently like one that the otherwise broad

26For the sake of accuracy, let my repeat that the noun ‘hominid’ is officially not capitalized. My point was that it may as well have been. Which expressions of taxonomy are capitalized is purely a matter of convention among taxonomists and writers of dictionaries and style manuals.
applicability of the being-called condition decides the case. The taxonomy examples really are just Romanov examples. We say this because instead of going with our gut we go with good theoretical methodology.

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