Vita

June 30, 2009

Honors: Fellow of the Cognitive Science Society 2002; Jean Nicod Prize 2005; Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2005; James S. McDonnell Distinguished Professor of Philosophy 2009.

Editorial Boards: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, Cognition, Cognitive Science Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy Compass, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Social Philosophy and Policy.

Professional Associations: American Philosophical Association, Cognitive Science Society, Philosophy of Science Association. Association for Psychological Science. Linguistic Society of America. Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Recent Publications: Books

Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. x, 108.

Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).

Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. viii, 291.

Harman, G. and Thomson, J. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

Harman, G., Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, Massachusetts; M.I.T. Press/Bradford Books: 1986).

Selected Recent Articles not in Explaining Value or Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind

“Skepticism about Character Traits,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009). Published online: 27 May 2009.

Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., “Precis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory” and “Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens, and Hanson,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 5-9, 47-56.

“More on Explaning a Gap,” The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8.1 (Fall 2008): 4-6.

“What Is Cognitively Accessed?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007): 505.

“Mechanical Mind,” a review of Margaret Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, in American Scientist 96 (2008): 76-78.

“Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality,” in Moral Psychology, Volume 1, The Evolution of Morality, 2008), pp. 345-351.

“Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Direct Speaker Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), pp. 173-179.

“Explaining an Explanatory Gap,” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 6.2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 2-3.

Harman, G., and Kulkarni, S., “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 559-575.

Greenberg, M., and Harman, G., “Conceptual Role Semantics,” Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 295-322.

“Self-reflexive thoughts.” Philosophical Issues, 16 (2006): 334-45.

“Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006): 269-75.

Review of Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason, in The Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 243-6.

“Moral particularism and transduction,” Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005): 44-55.

Harman, G., and Sherman, B., “Knowledge, assumptions, lotteries,” Philosophical Issues, 14 (2004): 492-500

“Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy,” Value Inquiry 37.3 (2003) [published January 2004]: 415-25.

“Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Al Mele and Piers Rawling, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 45-56.

“Category Mistakes in M&E,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17, Language and Philosophical Linguistics (2003): 165-180.

“Reflection on Knowledge and Its Limits,” The Philosophical Review, 111 (2002) [published November 2003]: 417-28.

“The Future of the A Priori,” in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosophical Research (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 23-34.

Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., “Inductive simplicity and the Matrix,” Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2003, edited by Richard Alterman and David Kirsh (Boston, MA: Cognitive Science Society: 2003).

“Skepticism and foundations,” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 1-11.

“No character or personality,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003), pp. 87-94.

“Internal critique of logic and practical reasoning,” in Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning Volume 1, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Hans Jurgen Ohlbach (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2002), pp. 171-86.

“The logic of ordinary language.” In Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality, edited by Renee Elio (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 93-103.

“General foundations versus rational insight,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001), pp. 657-63.

“Virtue ethics without character traits.” In Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgewood, editors, Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 117-27.