

## Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy

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### 1. Introduction

There have been three good trends in moral and political philosophy over the last fifty years or so. First, there has been a trend toward rejecting special foundations, a trend that is exemplified by the widespread adoption of the method John Rawls adopts, in which particular judgments and principles are adjusted to each other in an attempt to reach “reflective equilibrium.”<sup>1</sup> Second, there have been attempts to use intuitions about particular cases in order to arrive at new and often arcane moral principles like that of double effect, as in discussions of so-called trolley problems.<sup>2</sup> Third, and perhaps most important, there has been increased interaction between scientific and philosophical studies of morality, as for example in philosophical reactions to psychological accounts of moral development and evolutionary explanations of aspects of morality.<sup>3</sup>

### 2. Rejecting Special Foundations

Advocates of the old special foundationalism saw an important difference between foundational beliefs and other, non-foundational, beliefs. Justification was to begin from a limited number of special foundational beliefs and proceed from there to non-foundational

beliefs. Foundational beliefs were supposed to be either self-evident or directly justified by experience. Non-foundational beliefs were supposed to be justified only if there was an argument for them from other things a person was justified in believing. Special foundationalists also saw an important difference between special foundational methods of reasoning that were thought to be directly or self-evidently justified and non-foundational methods that could only be indirectly justified.

Special foundationalists supposed that non-foundational beliefs and methods were justified only if they could be derived from special foundational premises using only foundational methods. The foundational beliefs and methods were foundational in the sense that we must start with them and justify everything else in terms of them. They were special in that most of our beliefs and methods are not foundational. In this view, beliefs and methods that had no foundational justification were supposed to be abandoned as unjustified.

An alternative view, general foundationalism, would have us treat all of a person's current beliefs and methods as foundational, not because they are all stuck deeply into the ground but because they are the beliefs and methods from which the person must start the process of justification. In deciding what to believe, we are to start where we are with all our beliefs and inferential methods, adjusting them to each other in case of conflict, trying to make them cohere better. Key principles within general foundationalism are conservatism, coherence, and simplicity. In some respects general foundationalism resembles a coherence theory of justification. In other respects, these two views are opposed. The coherence theory implies that there are no foundational beliefs and methods; it requires that all beliefs and methods be justified in terms of coherence with other beliefs and methods a person accepts.

General foundationalism would have us treat all beliefs and methods as foundational; it takes them to require justification only when there are conflicts among them.

Rawls, referring to an earlier discussion by Nelson Goodman, describes a “process of mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgments” whose aim is to achieve what Rawls calls “reflective equilibrium.”<sup>4</sup> We correct our considered intuitions about particular cases by making them more coherent with our considered general principles and we correct our general principles by making them more coherent with our judgments about particular cases. We make progress by adjusting our views to each other, pursuing the ideal of reaching a set of particular opinions and general views that are in complete accord with each other. The method is conservative in that we start with our present views and try to make the least change that will best promote the coherence of our whole view. Some of our opinions may be firmer than others; we may have more confidence in some than in others. But definitions are no more privileged than other general views and there are no *a priori* fixed points.

Rawls defends various principles of justice and various meta-principles about choice in an original position and about the relation between principles of justice and choices that would be made in an original position. He does not argue that any of the principles or meta-principles are definitional truths or self-evident axioms or known *a priori*. He takes them to be part of an overall account arrived at through adjustment of opinions in the search for reflective equilibrium. This rejection of special foundationalism in favor of general foundationalism also plays a significant role in Rawls’s later discussion about how people in a pluralistic society might move from a “modus vivendi” to an “overlapping consensus” concerning principles of justice.<sup>5</sup>

Principles of liberty of conscience and religious toleration, for example, initially were accepted only because the alternative was religious war. But once they were accepted, their acceptance had an impact on other things people believed through the mutual adjustment of beliefs with each other aiming at reflective equilibrium. As people came to accept moral and religious principles that fit in with liberty of conscience and toleration, their religious and moral views were reinterpreted. Eventually, they came to have more coherent systems of thought in which principles of toleration and liberty of conscience figured as important values and not just as something agreed to as part of a *modus vivendi*. Many people with a variety of religious views now agree on principles of toleration and liberty of thought even though the principles fit in different ways into their various religious views and are seen as having different religious justifications. Rawls argues that the other principles of justice he defends can in the same way become part of an overlapping consensus in a pluralistic society.

Rawls's views about justice illustrate a tendency to reject special foundationalism. Ronald Dworkin's views provide another illustration.<sup>6</sup> He defends moral and political principles as providing interpretations of our political and legal practices. For example, he argues that certain ways of understanding integrity or the sanctity of human life both fit with our current practices and make the practices out to be good practices in accordance with our current understandings. Like Rawls, Dworkin starts with our current views and practices rather than from definitions or other self-evident foundational principles.

John McDowell argues in a similar way. In defending a kind of naturalistic virtue ethics, he appeals to what he calls "Neurathian" reflection, holding that even in ethics we are in "Neurath's boat."<sup>7</sup> According to Otto Neurath, "No *tabula rasa* exists. We are like sailors

who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials.”<sup>8</sup>

Other defenders of virtue ethics agree with McDowell’s method. For example, Rosalind Hursthouse refers approvingly to McDowell’s invocation of a “Neurathian procedure.”<sup>9</sup> Similarly, philosophical discussions of trolley problems have tended to be very much in the reflective equilibrium, Neurathian procedure, camp. Sometimes the issue has been whether such problems refute utilitarianism, and, at least to that extent, the debate is conducted at the level of reflective equilibrium. In these and many other instances philosophers often simply adopt the reflective equilibrium approach without any explicit methodological discussion.<sup>10</sup>

Not everyone has abandoned special foundationalism in ethics. Some Kantians seem to have tried to provide a foundational justification for ethics.<sup>11</sup> But theorists in ethics increasingly reject special foundationalism. While this may be obvious, Neurathian procedures and reflective equilibrium are often ignored in contemporary epistemology, which is still focused on special foundationalism.

### 3. Finding New Principles

The second trend in moral and political philosophy consists in an attempt to uncover new moral principles through a consideration of ordinary intuitions or judgments about cases. Here philosophers begin with initial judgments or intuitions about cases and reason using a Neurathian procedure in the search for reflective equilibrium. They note, for example, that it seems morally right or permissible to turn a trolley to a side track in order to reduce the

number of people killed from five to one, but it does not seem in the same way right or permissible to cut up a hospital visitor and distribute his organs to patients who need them to live, even if this will reduce the number of people who die from five to one.<sup>12</sup> It seems wrong to push a fat man off a bridge so that a runaway trolley will hit him and stop before running over the five people trapped ahead; it seems permissible to divert a missile heading for New York City so that it explodes instead over Worcester, Massachusetts, where fewer people will be killed.<sup>13</sup> It seems worse to refuse to give food to a beggar on the grounds that bodies are needed for medical research than to refuse to give food to the beggar simply out of inertia because we cannot be bothered.<sup>14</sup> It seems right for someone to give benefits to his or her children in preference to other children. It seems wrong for a brother and sister to engage in sexual intercourse even if they use contraception. Philosophers then try to think of principles that might account for ordinary considered judgments about these and other cases, sometimes abandoning the judgments about cases because of not wanting to accept the principles on which they are apparently based.

Often the principles in question are unfamiliar to ordinary moral thought: the principle of double effect, according to which it is worse to aim at harm to someone else than to act in a way that produces the same harm as a mere side effect; the principle that positive duties to help others are less strict than negative duties not to harm others; a deflection principle that takes it to be worse to initiate harm to some in order to prevent harm to others than it is to deflect harm from some to others. Some philosophers see an analogy between moral philosophy and linguistics.<sup>15</sup> They speculate that our ordinary intuitions or judgments depend on internalized principles of which we are ordinarily unaware, just as we are unaware of the linguistic principles that are reflected in our intuitive linguistic judgments. The

strangeness or counter-intuitiveness of a principle like the principle of double effect might or might not be taken to be a reason to reject that principle and perhaps also to reject the intuitive judgments the principle would account for.

Consider Richard Posner's principle of wealth maximization.<sup>16</sup> Posner assumes that the value of something to a person can be measured by the highest price for which he would buy it, if he does not have it, or the lowest price for which he would sell it, if he does have it. A person's wealth is the sum of the values of everything the person has. If one person buys something from another, the transaction typically increases total wealth, because the seller would normally have been willing to take less and the buyer would only be willing to sell the item back at a higher price. Each person has gained in wealth. Where utilitarians say that we should arrange institutions so as to maximize happiness, Posner says that we should arrange institutions in order to maximize total wealth. He argues persuasively that his principle accounts better for our actual moral judgments than utilitarianism does, for example, because Robert Nozick's utility monster problem does not arise for wealth maximization.<sup>17</sup>

Dworkin rejects Posner's wealth maximization principle on the grounds that the principle itself is counter-intuitive and does not seem to have any justification from more intuitive principles.<sup>18</sup> Someone might raise a similar objection to some of the principles that have been put forward to account for trolley cases, including the principle of double effect or Judith Jarvis Thomson's deflection principle. Alternatively, we might try to explain and justify the unintuitive seeming principles in question. Warren Quinn tries to find deep justifications of the principle of double effect and the distinction between doing and allowing.<sup>19</sup> In recent linguistics the Minimalist Program tries to account for seemingly arcane

principles and parameters by supposing that in some sense the language faculty is the perfect solution to a certain engineering problem.<sup>20</sup>

There are a couple of interesting suggestions in Dworkin's *Life's Dominion*. Dworkin argues that people ordinarily assign a certain sort of variable value to human life in a way that correlates with how tragic they take the loss of human life to be. Almost everyone thinks that an early miscarriage is less tragic than a late miscarriage, that a late miscarriage is less tragic than the death of a two year old, and that the death of a twenty year old is more tragic than that of a two year old or seventy year old. Our normal understanding of this value might be represented as a curve that has a positive value at conception or somewhat after, gradually rising to a high point in the teen age years, then leveling off, and eventually declining in middle and old age. Dworkin argues that this value curve is relevant to the fact that most people do not think that early abortions are as wrong as late abortions, because early abortions are either not tragic or are less tragic than late abortions. He notes also that few people think that a woman who has an abortion should be prosecuted for murder in the way that a parent who kills an older child should be prosecuted. Dworkin concludes that most people who are against abortion do not really believe that abortion violates rights; their view is really about the value of life in something like the sense he tries to describe.

Dworkin goes on to argue that the sort of value at issue attaches only to the continued existence of what already exists and does not by itself imply anything about the value of bringing more beings of value into existence. A human life that exists has value and it is more or less tragic if that life should go out of existence; but this does not mean it would be a good thing for people to have more children, or that it would be tragic to have fewer children than we can. There are two principles here, one having to do with the curve of value of

human life, measuring how tragic loss of life would be at various points in that life, the other having to do with the way this value attaches to things that already exist. Both principles do seem to capture ordinary views.

Dworkin offers the following explanation of the curve of value or tragedy in terms of a notion of investment toward a fulfilling life. As a fetus develops, the parents and perhaps also nature have invested a certain amount in the fetus, an investment that increases over time. After birth, there is more investment by the parents and by the child also. Increasingly also there is a return on the investment, as the child matures, becomes an adult, and lives his or her life. The degree of tragedy involved in the loss of the life is a function of the investment so far and the payback so far. When there has been considerable investment and payback lies mainly in the future, loss of life is especially tragic. When the investment has been largely recovered in old age, loss of life is less tragic.

That is Dworkin's position. In a way, it makes sense of our intuitions about the tragedy of loss of life, but it may very well seem to do so in a metaphorical manner that does not really justify our feelings. It is possible to find a different sort of explanation of our reactions within evolutionary psychology, an explanation that seems to have very little justificatory force at all. But even if we decide that neither the investment explanation nor the evolutionary psychology explanation justifies our ideas about the tragedy of loss of human life, it would not be appropriate simply to reject the curve of value in the way Dworkin rejects Posner's wealth maximization principle.

Dworkin's other principle, about how value attaches to what already exists with no implication that it would be good to have more, does seem to capture an important aspect of ordinary thinking. But we need not consider it here.<sup>21</sup> In any event, a number of more or less

novel principles have been proposed to account for people's intuitions about particular cases, including the principle of double effect, Thomson's deflection principle, Posner's wealth maximization principle, and Dworkin's curve representing the value of life, or disvalue of death, at various stages in life.

#### 4. Moral Science

In "Modern Moral Philosophy" G. E. M. Anscombe argued that moral philosophy is impossible in the absence of an adequate moral psychology.<sup>22</sup> Many defenders of the new analytic virtue ethics might agree with this. But what did Anscombe mean by moral psychology? We might suppose that moral psychology is a branch of scientific psychology, including the study of moral development in children, but that is probably not what Anscombe meant. Nevertheless, moral philosophers have been increasingly interested in the work of moral psychologists as well as other scientists, including anthropologists, evolutionary psychologists, economists, and historians.

It is true that, at least for a relatively brief period, some analytic philosophers thought philosophy, including moral philosophy, was concerned only with truths of language or other sorts of *a priori* truths. This pernicious idea seems to have lost much of its force, in part perhaps because of justified skepticism about analytic and *a priori* truth but especially because certain developments in science are so clearly relevant to moral philosophy.

Someone may ask, "What is the difference, then, between moral philosophy and moral psychology?" The answer may be that there is no interesting difference and that the issue is of interest only to university administrators. It may seem that there is a difference in

degree of theoreticity. Psychologists tend to have to do experiments to back up their theorizing, whereas philosophers tend mainly to theorize. But psychologists also theorize and increasingly philosophers join with psychologists in doing experiments and considering how that evidence from experiments may be relevant to philosophical theories.

Social psychologists have discovered that people are very quick to attribute any sort of unusual action to specific character traits of the agent even when there is considerable evidence that the situation may be of a sort that might lead almost anyone to act in the same way.<sup>23</sup> This tendency has been called “the fundamental attribution error.”<sup>24</sup> This widespread error raises the question whether the notion of a character trait is of any real value either in social and personality psychology, in moral philosophy, or in ordinary moral thinking. This is significant because ordinary thinking about character traits can have terribly bad consequences and because of the number of philosophers currently working in virtue ethics. Bad consequences of thinking about character traits include failures in political reasoning, as when people say, “It all comes down to character.” Mistakes are made about moral education when it is conceived as character development. Misjudgments of others occur when people assume that they could only have acted as they did because of bad character of this or that sort. In extreme cases, this leads to ethnic warfare, as in Bosnia and Somalia. If philosophy is concerned to improve moral and political thinking, it is highly relevant if the whole notion of character is misconceived.

Virtue ethics may well give a good account of aspects of ordinary moral thinking, just as medieval impetus theory gives a good account of aspects of ordinary untutored physical intuition. However, as an account about right and wrong and not just about what people believe about right and wrong, a certain sort of virtue ethics presupposes the viability of the

notion of a character trait. If character is an illusion, that sort of virtue ethics is based on a false presupposition.

Some defenders of character-based virtue ethics say that it does not matter whether anyone has character traits. In their view, it is enough that there be an ideal of a virtuous person. Even if no one could actually be a virtuous person, the ideal can still function as a guide to action: we can still try to act as a virtuous person would act in our situation. However, this idea does not apply if a virtuous person would never be in our situation and, anyway, if the whole notion of character is a mistake and there cannot be a virtuous person in the relevant sense, then it is a vacuous illusion to suppose that we could figure out what to do by asking what a virtuous person would do in a given situation. The best we can do is to figure out what the right thing to do is in the situation and then conclude that that is what a virtuous person would do in the situation, and that this is what we should do. But this reduces to saying we ought to do what we ought to do and does not represent an interesting theoretical position. This objection does not apply to the version of virtue ethics that is concerned with honest, courageous, and other virtuous acts only, with no commitment to character traits.<sup>25</sup>

Moral psychology also includes the study of moral development, a subject that has been of great interest to moral philosophers at least since Adam Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*. More recently, philosophers have been impressed with the tradition from Jean Piaget to Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. In *A Theory of Justice* Rawls refers to Piaget, Kohlberg, and other psychologists in developing his own psychological theory of how a sense of justice may arise in children, given a background of just institutions.<sup>26</sup> We have seen that Rawls' important discussion of how a *modus vivendi* might become an overlapping

consensus appeals to similar psychological assumptions. Rawls is not the only philosopher to notice current developments in psychology. Many philosophers have been influenced by Gilligan's research into a distinction between male and female morality, a morality of rights versus a morality of care.<sup>27</sup> However, subsequent psychological research suggests that men and women are sensitive to both sorts of considerations and the differences Gilligan claimed to find between men and women have proved elusive.<sup>28</sup>

One especially interesting question concerns the extent to which moral development in children is like linguistic development.<sup>29</sup> All normal children learn language and, although there are differences between the languages learned by children brought up in different locations, there are interesting universal features to all languages that children learn or invent. The universals do not hold of the artificial languages of logic and mathematics and do not hold of so-called pidgin languages that arise for business purposes in international ports where people speak different languages. Children who are brought up among speakers of such a pidgin develop what linguists call a creole, which resembles the pidgin of adults but does satisfy linguistic universals. Creoles but not pidgins are learnable languages. Similarly, deaf children have sometimes spontaneously invented their own sign languages, and their languages have satisfied the linguistic universals.<sup>30</sup>

If moral development is like linguistic development, we would expect all normal children to develop a moral sense and, despite differences in moralities depending on local customs, we might expect there to be certain moral universals that hold of all learnable moralities. If our moral judgments turn out to be sensitive to the principle of double effect and if we cannot imagine how a child learns to make his or her judgments sensitive to the principle, it might make sense to hypothesize that some such principle is built into our moral

judgment faculty, in which case all learnable moralities must accept a principle of double effect. It would follow that certain constructed moralities that philosophers take seriously, such as utilitarianism, are not learnable by children in the normal natural way in which children learn morality. We might predict that the children of utilitarians will acquire a morality that is like utilitarianism but containing principles like double effect. They might still later acquire utilitarianism as a morality but only in a self-conscious way, just as people have to learn formal logical languages or contemporary physical theories in a self-conscious way.<sup>31</sup>

There are many other ways in which scientific studies can be relevant to moral philosophy. For example, there are studies of the importance of moral disgust to certain moral judgments. Jonathan Haidt reports that the strong negative reaction people have to the thought of incest does not depend on their being able to give good reasons for avoiding incest. If asked, people will give reasons, but when those reasons are defeated, most do not change their minds about incest.<sup>32</sup>

There has been considerable speculation about evolutionary explanations of aspects of morality. For example, consider Hume's sensitive explanation of the difference between our attitudes toward lack of chastity in women and lack of chastity in men.<sup>33</sup> Hume's explanation begins by noting that parents are more disposed to care for their own natural children and less disposed to take care of other children. Furthermore, when a baby is born, the mother can be determined directly but the father can only be determined indirectly. If the husband of the mother has reasons to doubt that he is the father of the baby, he will be less inclined to take care of the baby. Therefore, a lack of chastity in the mother may lead to difficulties for her children. Hume appeals to a tendency to take better care of our natural

children than other children. He does not try to explain that fact. But evolutionary psychologists might well argue that natural selection might favor parents that are discriminating in this way.<sup>34</sup> Or consider parents under evolutionary conditions of hardship who must choose among their offspring lest none survive. From the perspective of keeping a parent's genes going down the generations, it seems important to protect older children and protect children who are raising the parent's grandchildren. If the evolutionary importance of children is measured by this criterion, something like Dworkin's curve measuring how tragic is predicted. His investment notion can be kept, with payout being in prospects the genes of the parents being passed down the generations.<sup>35</sup> There are also recent attempts to explain the moral intuitions philosophers rely on using general principles that figure in psychological accounts of irrationality and framing.<sup>36</sup> Finally, there is group at Princeton including the philosopher Joshua Greene has been studying the role of emotion in people's reactions to trolley problems by using functional MRI to see where in the brain activity occurs when subjects think about different trolley problems.<sup>37</sup>

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1. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 18.
  2. See Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," in *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
  3. See Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York.: Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, *Essays on Moral Development, vol. I. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1965); Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); M. Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue* (New York: Viking Penguin: 1997).
  4. Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-68; Rawls, op. cit., pp. 18, 40-45.
  5. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 158-168.
  6. See Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom*. (New York: Knopf, 1993).
  7. John McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn, eds., *Virtues and Reasons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
  8. Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism*, A. J. Ayer, ed., (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 201.

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9. *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 165.
  10. Shelly Kagan, *The Limits of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
  11. Alan Gewirth, *Reason and Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978);  
Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970);  
and Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge, England:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  12. See Foot, op. cit.
  13. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," in *Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory*, ed. by W. Parent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
  14. Foot, op. cit.
  15. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, op. cit., p. 41
  16. See Richard Posner, *The Economics of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
  17. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974), p. 41.
  18. Ronald Dworkin, "A Reply by Ronald Dworkin: Posner," in *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence*, M. Cohen, ed., (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983): 295-298.
  19. Warren Quinn, *Morality and Action* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), essays 7-8.
  20. See Noam Chomsky, *The Minimalist Program* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); Howard Lasnik, *Minimalist Analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).

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21. Gilbert Harman, "Intrinsic Value," in *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
  22. G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
  23. See Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, *The Person and the Situation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
  24. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99 (1998-99) and "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100 (1999-2000); also see John Doris, *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
  25. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Evaluatives and directives," in G. Harman and J. J. Thomson, *Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), ch. 7 see also "The Right and the Good," *Journal of Philosophy* 94 (1997) and *Goodness and Advice* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
  26. See Rawls. *A Theory of Justice*, ch. 7.
  27. See Eva F. Kittay, and D. T. Meyers, eds., *Women and Moral Theory* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
  28. See J. M. Darley and T. Schultz, "Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition," *Annual Review of Psychology* 41 (1990).
  29. See Susan Dwyer, "Moral Competence," in *Philosophy and Linguistics*, K. Murasugi and R. Stainton, eds., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).
  30. See Steven Pinker, "Language Acquisition," in *Language*, Vol. 1 of *Invitation to*

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- Cognitive Science*, 2nd ed., L. Gleitman and M. Liberman, eds., (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
31. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy and Linguistics," in *Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol.I: Ethics*, K. Brinkmann, ed., (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999).
32. See Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review*, 108 (2001).
33. David Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., L. A Selby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), bk. 3, pt. 2, sect. 12.
34. See M. Ridley, op. cit.
35. See R. Wright, *The Moral Animal* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).
36. T. Horowitz, "Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory," *Ethics* 108 (1998); also see Francis M. Kamm, "Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction," *Ethics*, 108 (1998).
37. See J. D. Greene, R. B. Sommerville, L. E. Nystrom, J. M. Darley, and J. D. Cohen, "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment," *Science*, 293 (2001).