Publications

Gilbert Harman

February 21, 2014

Contents

1 BOOKS
 1.1 Authored
 1.2 Edited
2 ARTICLES
3 REVIEWS

1 BOOKS

1.1 Authored

  1. Kulkarni, S. and Harman, G. An Elementary Introduction to Statistical Learning Theory. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011, pp. xiv, 209.
  2. Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. x, 108.
  3. Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. xiv, 238.
  4. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. viii, 291. [Essays.]
  5. Harman, G. and Thomson, J., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. x, 225.
  6. Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge (New York, Garland: 1990), pp. xvi, 166. [This is my Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard, 1964, with a new preface.]
  7. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, Massachusetts; M.I.T. Press/Bradford Books: 1986) pp. xiv, 147. Print on demand edition 2013.
  8. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York, Oxford University Press: 1977) pp. xiii, 165.
  9. Thought, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press (1973), pp. viii, 199; paperback edition 1974. Excerpts reprinted in

1.2 Edited

  1. Editor with Ernie Lepore, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Blackwell (2014), pp.  xiii, 581.
  2. Editor, Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller (Hillside, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1993) pp. xiii, 277. “Preface” pp. vii-ix.
  3. Editor with Donald Davidson, The Logic of Grammar (Encino, California; Dickenson: 1975) pp. x, 307. “Preface” pp. ix-x; “Introduction” pp. 1-14.
  4. Editor, On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (Garden City, New York; Anchor: 1974), pp. xii, 348; “Introduction” pp. vii-xii.
  5. Editor with Donald Davidson, Semantics of Natural Language in Synthese 21 (1970) pp. 249-487 and 22 (1970- 1971) pp. 1-289.

2 ARTICLES

  1. “Introduction: Life and Work,” in Gilbert Harman and Ernie Lepore, editors, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Blackwell (2014), pp. 1-13.
  2. “Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism,” in Gilbert Harman and Ernie Lepore, editors, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Blackwell (2014), pp. 219-235.
  3. “Rationality,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette, John Deigh, and Sarah Stroud (Blackwell, 2013), pp. 4338-4347. Also online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.
  4. “The Philosophy-Linguistics Connection 1967-76,” Donald Davidson, edited by Maria Baghramian (Routledge, 2012), pp. 42-45.
  5. “Davidson’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic and Language,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Davidson’s Philosophy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 41-48.
  6. “Naturalism in Moral Philosophy,” Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, edited by Susana I. Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 8-23.
  7. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory and Induction,” Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning, Norbert M. Seel, ed., Springer (2012) pp. 3186-3188.
  8. “Notes on Practical Reasoning,” Cogency 3.4 (Winter 2011), pp. 127-145.
  9. Sanjeev Kulkarni and Gilbert Harman, “Statistical Learning: A Tutorial,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics, 3 (2011) pp. 543-556.
  10. Brett Sherman and Gilbert Harman, “Knowledge and Assumptions,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 131-140.
  11. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction,” in Prasanta Bandyopadhyay And Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Amsterdam: Elservier (2011): 833-848.
  12. “Quine’s Semantic Relativity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (2011) pp. 287-289.
  13. “Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity,” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 435-441.
  14. Gilbert Harman, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kelby Mason, “Moral Reasoning,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 205-244.
  15. Maria Merritt, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 354-400.
  16. Erica Roeder and Gilbert Harman, “Linguistics and Moral Theory,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 272-295.
  17. “Words and Pictures in Reports of fMRI Research,” in Hanson, S. J. and Bunzl, M., eds., Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 113-114.
  18. “Epistemology as Methodology,” in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, editors, A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 152-156.
  19. “Field on the Normative Role of Logic,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume CIX, Part 3 (2009), 333-335.
  20. “Guilt-Free Morality,”Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4 (2009): 203-214.
  21. “Skepticism about Character Traits,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009): 235-242.
  22. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens, and Hanson,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 47-56.
  23. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Precis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 5-9.
  24. “More on Explaining a Gap,” The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8.1 (Fall 2008): 4-6.
  25. “What Is Cognitively Accessed?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007) [published 2008]: 505.
  26. “Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality,” Moral Psychology, Volume 1, The Evolution of Morality, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008): 345-351.
  27. “Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Direct Speaker Meaning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), pp. 173-179.
  28. “Explaining an Explanatory Gap,” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 6.2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 2-3.
  29. Harman, G., and Kulkarni, S., “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006) [published April 2007]: 559-575.
  30. Greenberg, M., and Harman, G., “Conceptual Role Semantics,” Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 295-322.
  31. “Self-reflexive thoughts.” Philosophical Issues, 16 (2006): 334-45.
  32. “Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006): 269-75.
  33. “Moral particularism and transduction,” Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005): 44-55.
  34. Harman, G., and Sherman, B., “Knowledge, assumptions, lotteries,” Philosophical Issues, 14 (2004): 492-500.
  35. “Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Al Mele and Piers Rawling, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 45-56.
  36. “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37.3 (2003): 415-25.
  37. “Category Mistakes in M&E,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17, Language and Philosophical Linguistics (2003): 165-180.
  38. “Reflection on Knowledge and Its Limits,” The Philosophical Review, 111 (2002) [published November 2003]: 417-28.
  39. “The Future of the A Priori,” in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosophical Research (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 23-34.
  40. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Inductive simplicity and the Matrix,” Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2003, edited by Richard Alterman and David Kirsh (Boston, MA: Cognitive Science Society: 2003), published on disk.
  41. “Skepticism and foundations,” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 1-11.
  42. “No character or personality,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003), pp. 87-94.
  43. “Internal Critique: A Logic is not a Theory of Reasoning and a Theory of Reasoning is not a Logic,” in D.M. Gabbay, R.H. Johnson, H.J. Ohlbach, and J. Woods, eds., Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical, Volume 1 in Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2002, pp. 171-86.
  44. “The logic of ordinary language.” In Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality, edited by Renee Elio (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 93-103.
  45. “General foundations versus rational insight,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001), pp. 657-63.
  46. “Virtue ethics without character traits.” In Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgewood, editors, Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 117-27.
  47. “Intrinsic Value,” in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 137-148.
  48. “Can evolutionary theory provide evidence against psychological hedonism?” Consciousness Studies, 7 (2000), pp. 219-221.
  49. “The nonexistence of character traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1999-2000, 100, pp. 223-226.
  50. “Moral philosophy and linguistics,” Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy: Volume I: Ethics, edited by Klaus Brinkmann (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999), pp. 107-115.
  51. “Moral philosophy meets social psychology: virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1998-99, 99, pp. 315-331.
  52. “Intentionality.” In William Bechtel and George Graham, editors, A Companion to Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 602-610. Second edition (2010), pp. 438-444.
  53. “The toxin puzzle.” In Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, editors, Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 84-89.
  54. “Précis of ‘Moral Relativism’: Part One of Harman & Thomson’s Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity” and “Reply to Critics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), pp. 161-169; 207-213.
  55. “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief.” In Kulp, C. B., editor, Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. pp. 123-147.
  56. “Analyticity Regained?” Nous 30 (1996), pp. 392-400.
  57. “Moral relativism.” In Borchert, D. M., editor, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement. New York: Macmillan, 1996. pp. 383-4.
  58. “Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions.” In Villanueva, E., ed., Perception: Philosophical Issues 7, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company (1996), pp. 1-17.
  59. “Qualia and color concepts.” In Villanueva, E., ed., Perception: Philosophical Issues 7, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company (1996), pp. 75-79.
  60. “Rationality.” In Smith, E. E., and Osherson, D. N., eds., Thinking: Invitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (1995), pp. 175-211.
  61. “Phenomenal fallacies and conflations,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (1995), pp. 256-7.
  62. “Doubts about conceptual analysis.” In Michael,M. and O’Leary-Hawthorne, J., eds., Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Dordrecht, Kluwer (1994), pp. 43-48.
  63. “Epistemology and the Diet Revolution.” In Michael, M. and O’Leary-Hawthorne, J., eds., Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Dordrecht, Kluwer (1994), pp. 203-214.
  64. “Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously.” In Grue!: The New Riddle of Induction, edited by Douglas Stalker, (Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 1994) pp. 153-171.
  65. “La valeur intrinseque,” translated by Laurie Calhoun, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 99 (1994) pp. 245- 255.
  66. “Explaining Value,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994), pp. 229-248.
  67. “Meaning holism defended,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1993) pp. 163-171
  68. “Can Science Understand the Mind?” in Conceptions of the Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, edited by Gilbert Harman, (Hillside, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1993), pp. 111-121.
  69. “Desired desires,” in Value, Welfare, and Morality, edited by Ray Frey and Chris Morris (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press: 1993), pp. 138-157.
  70. “Stringency of Rights and Ought.” Comments on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Realm of Rights. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993) pp. 181-185.
  71. “Induction: enumerative and hypothetical,” In Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 200-206.
  72. “Moral diversity as an argument for moral relativism,” in Douglas Odegard and Carole Stewart, Perspectives on Moral Relativism (Milliken, Ontario; Agathon: 1991) pp. 13-31.
  73. “Intentionality: some distinctions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1990) pp. 607-8.
  74. “Relativism,” The London Correspondent, March 4, 1990, p. 22.
  75. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990) pp. 31-52.
  76. “Benefits to Moral Philosophy of the Computational Theory of Mind.” In L. Sieg (editor) Acting and Reflecting (Dordrecht, Kluwer: 1990) pp. 40-43.
  77. “Immanent and transcendent approaches to the theory of meaning.” In Roger Gibson and Robert B. Barrett, eds., Perspectives on Quine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 144-157 (paperback edition, in the “Philosophers and Their Critics” series, edited by Ernie LePore, published by Blackwell, 1993).
  78. “Some Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science: Qualia, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem.” In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Massachusetts; MIT Press: 1989).
  79. “Competition for evidential support,” Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Hillsdale, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1989), pp. 220-226.
  80. “The simplest hypothesis,” Critica 20 (1989), pp. 23-42.
  81. “What is the intentional stance?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1988) p. 515.
  82. “Wide Functionalism,” in Stephen Schiffer and Susan Steele, Cognition and Representation (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press: 1988) pp. 11-20.
  83. “Rationality in Agreement,” Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1988) pp. 1-16.
  84. “Cognitive science?” In William Hirst, ed., The making of cognitive science: Essays in honor of George A. Miller. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1988), pp. 258-268.
  85. Gilbert Harman, Michael Ranney, Ken Salem, Frank Doring, Jonathan Epstein, and Agnieszka Jaworska, “A theory of simplicity,” Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, N.J., Erlbaum (1988). pp. 111-117.
  86. “Philosophical issues in cognitive science,” Cognitive Science Laboratory Report 14, Princeton University (1988) 28.
  87. Gilbert Harman, Marie A. Bienkowski, Ken Salem, and Ian Pratt, “Measuring change and coherence in evaluating potential change in view,” Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ. Erlbaum (1987) 203-209.
  88. “(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics,” New Directions in Semantics, edited by Ernest LePore, London, Academic Press (1987) 55-81.
  89. Bas C. Van Fraassen, R.I.G. Hughes, and Gilbert Harman, “A problem for relative information minimizers, continued” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986): 453-463.
  90. “Quine’s grammar,” The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp, LaSalle, Illionois; Open Court (1986, second exanded edition 1998), pp. 165-180.
  91. “Default defeaters in explanation-based reasoning” (with Richard Cullingford, Marie Bienkowski, Ken Salem, and Ian Pratt), The Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society Amherst, Massachusetts, Lawrence Erlbaum (1986), pp. 283-291.
  92. “Moral agent and impartial spectator,” The Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas (1986), Lawrence Kansas, 15 pages.
  93. “Moral explanations of natural facts can moral claims be tested against moral reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, Supplement (1986), pp. 57-68.
  94. “Troubles with flourishing: comments on David Norton,” Reason Papers 11 (1986), pp. 69-71.
  95. “The meanings of logical constants,” Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest Le Pore (Oxford, Blackwell: 1986), pp. 125-134.
  96. “Willing and intending,” Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, edited by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1986), pp. 363-380.
  97. Cullingford, R.E., Harman, G.H., Bienkowski, M.A., & Salem, K., “Without logic or justification: realistic belief revision,” Proceedings of the Workshop on AI and Distributed Problem Solving (Washington, D.C.; National Academy Press: 1985), pp. 139-153.
  98. “Is pain overt behavior?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985) p. 61.
  99. “Is there a single true morality?” in Morality, Reason and Truth, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowman and Allanheld: 1985) pp. 27-48.
  100. “Problems with probabilistic semantics,” in Alex Orenstein et. al., Developments in Semantics (New York: Haven, 1985).
  101. “Logic and Reasoning,” Synthese 60 (1984) pp. 107-127.
  102. “Positive versus negative undermining in belief revision,” Nous 18 (1984): 39-49.
  103. “Internally represented grammars,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 408.
  104. “Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 365.
  105. “Justice and moral bargaining,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983): 114-131.
  106. “Rational action and the extent of intention,” Social Theory and Practice 9 (1983) pp. 123-141.
  107. “Beliefs and concepts: comments on Brian Loar,” in PSA 1982, Volume 2, edited by P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles (East-Lansing, Michigan; Philosophy of Science Association: 1983) pp. 654-661.
  108. “Human flourishing, ethics, and liberty,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983) pp. 307-322.
  109. “Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 251.
  110. “Knowledge and the relativity of information,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 72.
  111. “Libertarianism and morality,” in The Libertarian Reader edited by Tibor Machan (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowman and Littlefield: 1982) pp. 226-234.
  112. “Metaphysical realism and moral relativism: reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth, and History,Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) pp. 568-575.
  113. “Conceptual role semantics,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982) pp. 242-256.
  114. “Logic, reasoning, and logical form,” in Language, Mind, and Brain edited by Thomas W. Simon, (Hillsdale, New Jersey; Erlbaum: 1982) pp. 13-19.
  115. “The essential grammar of action (and other) sentences,” Philosophia 10 (1981) pp. 209-216.
  116. “Reasoning,” Encyclopedia Americana, (Danbury, Connecticut; Grolier 1981), vol. 23, p. 295.
  117. “Moral relativism as a foundation for natural rights,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 4 (1980) pp. 367-371.
  118. “Comments on Fullinwider’s review,” Metaphilosophy 11 (1980) pp. 278-280.
  119. “What is methodological solipsism?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980) p. 81.
  120. “Two quibbles about analyticity and psychological reality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980) pp. 21-22.
  121. “Reasoning and evidence one does not possess,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980) pp. 165-182.
  122. “Reasoning and explanatory coherence,” American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980) pp. 151-157.
  123. “If and modus ponens: a study of the relations between grammar and logical form,” Theory and Decision 11 (1979) pp. 41-53.
  124. “Eco-location,” in Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen (eds.), Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, second edition (New York, Oxford University Press: 1979) pp. 234-236.
  125. “Studying the chimpanzee’s theory of mind,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1978) pp. 576-577.
  126. “Meaning and theory,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1978) pp. 9-19
  127. “What is experience made of?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1978) pp. 356-357.
  128. “Is there mental representation?” in C. Wade Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 9 (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minnesota Press: 1978) pp. 57-64.
  129. “What is moral relativism?” in A. I. Goldman and J. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1978) pp. 143-161.
  130. “Using intuitions about knowledge to study reasoning: a reply to Williams,” Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978) pp. 433-438.
  131. “Relativistic ethics: morality as politics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978) pp. 109-121.
  132. “How to use propositions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977) pp. 173-176.
  133. “Semiotics and the cinema: Metz and Wollen,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies 2 (1977) pp. 15-24.
  134. “Katz’ credo,” Synthese 32 (1976) pp. 387-394.
  135. “Practical reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976) pp. 431-463.
  136. “Logic and grammar,” in Clea Rameh (ed.), Semantics: Theory and Application. Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (Washington, D. C.; Georgetown University Press: 1976) pp. 173-180.
  137. “Inferential justification,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) pp. 570-571.
  138. “Discussion of Philosophia Problem 3,” Philosophia (1976) pp. 149-150.
  139. “Reply to Lisagor,” Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) p. 477.
  140. “Logic and language,” broadcast over Radio Three, BBC (England), April 29, 1976. Text published in Listener 95/2456 (May 6, 1976) pp. 581-582.
  141. “Anaphoric pronouns as bound variables: syntax or semantics?” Language 52 (1976) pp. 78-81.
  142. “Reasons,” Critica 7 (1975) pp. 3-13.
  143. “Una teoria naturalista de las razones,” translated by Hugo Margain, Dianoia (1975) pp. 174-181.
  144. “Reply to Carrier,” Journal of Critical Analysis 5 (1975) pp. 151-152.
  145. “Noun phrases as variable-binding operators and Grandy’s theory of pronominalization,” in B. Freed, A. Marras, and P. Maynard (eds.), Forms of Representation (Amsterdam, North Holland: 1975) pp. 23-40.
  146. “Language, thought, and communication,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume VII (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minnesota Press: 1975) pp. 279-298
  147. “Wilfrid Sellars’ theory of induction,” in Hector-Neri Caste neda (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill: 1975) pp. 265-275.
  148. “Moral relativism defended,” Philosophical Review 84 (1975) pp. 3-22. Reprinted in

    Translated in Finnish by Veikko Launis as “Moraalirelativismin puolustus,” in Etiikan lukemisto, Markku Oksanen, Veikko Launis & Seppo Sajama, editors. (Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press, 2010).

  149. “Meaning and semantics,” in Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York, New York University Press: 1974) pp. 1-16.
  150. Remarks in discussion, Synthese 27 (1974) pp. 478, 479, 486-490, 494-496, 501, 505, 509, 511, 513.
  151. “Comment on Michael Dummett,” Synthese 27 (1974) pp. 401-404.
  152. “Identifying numbers,” Analysis 35 (1974) p. 12.
  153. “Epistemology,” in Edward C. Carterette and Morton P. Friedman (eds.), Handbook of Perception, Volume 1: Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception (New York, Academic Press: 1974) pp. 41-56.
  154. “Logical form,” Foundations of Language 9 (1972) pp. 38-65.
  155. “Is modal logic logic?” Philosophia 2 (1972) pp. 75-84.
  156. “Substitutional quantification and quotation,” Nous 5 (1971) pp. 23-214.
  157. “Knowledge, reasons and causes,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) pp. 841-855.
  158. “Deep structure as logical form,” Synthese 21 (1970) pp. 225-297.
  159. “Sellars semantics,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970) pp. 404-419.
  160. “Language learning,” Nous 4 (1970) pp. 33-43.
  161. “Induction: a discussion of the relevance of the theory of knowledge to the theory of induction (with a digression to the effect that neither deductive logic nor the probability calculus has anything to do with inference,” in Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1970).
  162. “A nonessential property,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) pp. 183-185.
  163. “…is true,” Analysis!? 30 (1970) pp. 98-99.
  164. “Reply to Arbini,” Synthese 19 (1968-1969) pp. 425-432.
  165. “An introduction to translation and meaning: chapter two of Word and Object,Synthese 19 (1968-1969) pp. 14- 26.
  166. “Knowledge, inference, and explanation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968) pp. 164-173.
  167. “Three levels of meaning,” Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968) pp. 590-602.
  168. “R. M. Hare on moral reasoning,” Mind 77 (1968) pp. 427-428.
  169. “Detachment, probability, and maximum likelihood,” Nous 1 (1967) pp. 401-411.
  170. “Toward a theory of intrinsic value,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 792-804.
  171. “Quine on meaning and existence, II: existential commitment,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) pp. 343-367.
  172. “Quine on meaning and existence, I: the death of meaning,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) pp. 124-151.
  173. “Scriven on the unknowability of psychological laws,” Philosophical Studies 18 (1967) pp. 61-63.
  174. “Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 529-33.
  175. “Unger on knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 390-395.
  176. “Psychological Aspects of the theory of syntax,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 75-87.
  177. “About what an adequate grammar could do,” Foundations of Language 2 (1966) pp. 134-141.
  178. “Lehrer on knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) pp. 241-247.
  179. “New implications of ‘someone’,” Analysis 26 (1966) p. 206
  180. “The adequacy of context-free phrase structure grammars,” Word 22 (1966) pp. 276-293.
  181. “The inference to the best explanation,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965) pp. 88-95.
  182. “How belief is based on inference,” Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 353-360.
  183. “Generative grammars without transformation rules: a defense of phrase structure,” Language 39 (1963) pp. 597- 616.

3 REVIEWS

  1. With Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Models in the Mind,” a review of The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions, in The American Journal of Psychology 127 (Spring 2014): 129-131.
  2. Review of Kathrin Glüer, Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction, in The Review of Metaphysics, (September 2013): 162-164.
  3. Review of Adam Morton, Bounded Thinking: Intellectual Virtues for Limited Agents, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40972/(2013.
  4. “Review of Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson’s Truth-Theoretic Semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2011): 788-792.
  5. Review of Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Volume 1: The Formal Turn; Volume 2: The Philosophical Turn, in the online Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, February 2011 http://ndpr.nd.edu
  6. “Mechanical Mind,” a review of Margaret Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, in American Scientist 96 (2008): 76-78.
  7. Review of Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason, in The Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 243-6.
  8. Review of Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason, The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 457-9.
  9. “Aspects of Reason II,” a review of H. P. Grice, Aspects of Reason, The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003) pp. 280-4.
  10. Review of Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, in The Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 265-9.
  11. “Love isn’t all you need,” a review of On Virtue Ethics, by Rosalind Hursthouse, in the Times Literary Supplement no. 5104 (January 26, 2001), p. 26.
  12. Review of The Logical Foundations of Cognition, by John Macnamara and Gonzalo E. Reyes, eds., in The Philosophical Quarterly (1997), pp. 385-6.
  13. Review of Inference to the Best Explanation, by Peter Lipton, in Mind 101 (1992) pp. 578-580.
  14. “Justification, Truth, Goals, and Pragmatism: Comments on Stich’s Fragmentation of Reason,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991) 195-9.
  15. Review of Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, in Ethics 100 (1989), p. 200.
  16. “A new paradigm,” a review of Alexander George, editor, Reflections on Noam Chomsky, review appearing in The Times Literary Supplement, no. 4,507 (August 18-24, 1989).
  17. “Semantics of mental representations,” a review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos, editors, Meaning and Cognitive Structure in Contemporary Psychology 33 (1988) pp. 259-260.
  18. Review of Paul Ziff’s Epistemic Analysis in The Philosophical Review. 97 (1988) pp. 122-123.
  19. Review of Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use by Noam Chomsky, in American Scientist 75 (1987) p. 73.
  20. Review of Logical Form in Natural Language by William G. Lycan, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986) pp. 340-343.
  21. “Philosophy: beliefs, attitudes, and justification,” a review of The Nature of Philosophy by John Kekes, in Reason Papers no. 8 (1982) pp. 59-70.
  22. “Critical review: Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right,” in Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) pp. 119-139.
  23. “The Fregean framework,” a review of The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy and the second edition of Frege: Philosophy of Language, by Michael Dummett, in The Times Literary Supplement No. 4124 (April 16, 1982) pp. 433-434.
  24. Review of The Formal Mechanics of Mind by Stephen Thomas, in Ethics 92 (1982) p. 350.
  25. “Against moral relativism,” a review of Essays on Moral Development, Volume 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice by Lawrence Kohlberg, reviewed in The Nation February 3, 1982, pp. 34-37.
  26. “Liberalism without foundations?” a review of Social Justice in the Liberal State by Bruce Ackerman, in The Yale Law Review 91 (1981) pp. 397-403.
  27. Review of Michael E. Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem in Ethics 92 (1981) pp. 174-176.
  28. “Modes of mediation,” a review of On Thinking by Gilbert Ryle in The Times Literary Supplement, June 20, 1980, p. 704.
  29. Review of Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics in Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (1980) pp. 372-373.
  30. Review of D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms, in Philosophical Review (1980) pp. 115-117.
  31. “Specialist and citizen,” a review of Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility, in Nation Volume 288, number 12 (March 31,1979) pp. 345-347.
  32. Review of Stephen Bradley Smith, Meaning and Negation, in Linguistics 205 (March 1978) pp. 89-91.
  33. Review of Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language, in Partisan Review 45 (1978) pp. 463-466.
  34. Review of Gareth Evans and John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning, in Times Literary Supplement number 3955 (January 13,1978) p. 41.
  35. Review of Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour, in Language 53 (1977) pp. 417-424.
  36. Review of J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), Logic and Philosophy for Linguists: A Book of Readings, in Linguistics 185 (1977) pp. 84-85.
  37. Review of P. F. Strawson, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, in Language 52 (1976) pp. 695-698.
  38. Review of Peter T. Geach, Logic Matters, in Foundations of Language 13 (1975) pp. 127-132.
  39. Review of W. V. Quine, The Roots of Reference, in Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975) pp. 388-396.
  40. Review of Stephen Schiffer, Meaning, in Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974) pp. 224-229.
  41. Review of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Aspects of Language, in Synthese 26 (1973) pp. 150-152.
  42. Review of Bernard Harrison, Meaning and Structure, in Contemporary Psychology 18 (1973) pp. 337-338.
  43. Review of Roger Wertheimer, The Significance of Sense, in Philosophical Review 82 (1973) pp. 235-239
  44. Review of Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, Revised Edition, in Language 49 (1973) pp. 453-464.
  45. Review of Michael A. Slote, Reason and Scepticism, in Philosophical Review 81 (1972) pp. 253-254.
  46. Review of W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, in Metaphilosophy 2 (1971) pp. 184-190.
  47. Review of W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, in Metaphilosophy 2 (1971) pp. 79-81.
  48. Reviews of William P. Alston, “The quest for meanings” and “Meaning and use” and B. L. Blase, “Synonyms,” in Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970) pp. 456-458.
  49. Review of J. F. Staal, “Some semantic relations between sentoids,” in Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970) pp. 132-133.
  50. Review of Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives, in Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969) pp. 133-144.
  51. Review of The Concept of Morality (University of Colorado Studies; Series in Philosophy No. 3), in Australasian Journal in Philosophy 46 (1968) pp. 294-297.
  52. Review of Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy, in Philosophical Review 76 (1968) pp. 383-386.
  53. Review of Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, in Philosophical Review 76 (1968) pp. 229-235.
  54. Review of David G. Hays, Computational Linguistics, in American Scientist (1967) p. 527a.
  55. Review of M. Dufrenne, Language and Philosophy, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (1967) pp. 113-114.
  56. Review of George P. Klubertanz, Habits and Virtues, in Philosophical Review 76 (1967) pp. 237-238.
  57. Review of D. W. Gotshalk, Human Aims in Modern Perspectives in Science 153 (1966) pp. 732-733.
  58. Review of Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, in Harvard Educational Review 36 (1966) pp. 558-563.