This page will follow the development of a book that might be called Logical Philosophy of Science, or perhaps The Logic of Theories. As new chapter drafts become available, they will be posted below. The book is a highly collaborative enterprise, organized by Hans Halvorson. Contributors include Thomas Barrett, Dimitris Tsementzis, and Evan Washington. Thanks also to Neil Dewar, Laurenz Hudetz, and Sebastian Lutz for freely sharing their ideas. If you have corrections, suggestions, or would otherwise like to be involved, please email hhalvors at princeton dot edu.
Introduction to metalogic  
The category of sets Includes a basic introduction to category theory 

The category of propositional theories Includes basic introductions to Boolean algebra, topology, and the Stone duality theorem 

Firstorder logic in syntatic approach  
Firstorder logic in semantic approach Basic introduction to model theory. Completeness and compactness theorems. LowenheimSkolem theorem 

Definitions and definitional equivalence Includes an introduction to manysorted logic, Morita equivalence, Beth's theorem, and Quine's elimination of sorts 

Translations and translational equivalence 

Scientific reduction Syntactic (Nagelian) and semantic (newwave) accounts of reduction. Supervenience versus reduction. 

Implicit definition and analytic truth In 1940, Goodman and Quine "proved" that synthetic postulates can be eliminated — thereby setting up Quine's famous argument against the analyticsynthetic distinction. Here we explain their proof, and why it doesn't quite underwrite the philosophical claims that they attempt to base upon it. 

Theoretical terms and Ramsification 

Symmetry 

Putnam's model theoretic argument against realism 

What is realism? The realismantirealism distinction is not as clear cut as you might think. Formulations such as "belief in a mindindependent reality" are not very helpful. I propose that we think about realism and antirealism as views about theoretical equivalence: realists have tight standards for equivalence, antirealists have more relaxed standards. Using this classification, it becomes obvious that extreme realist and antirealist views lead to absurdity. 