Most troubling in this regard is the failure to come to terms with one of the central themes of the book: democracy. After a useful chapter by Giles Smith on the stakes of American democracy promotion in the twenty-first century, little more is done with democracy as a concept. None of the chapters define what it means by democracy; rather, it is taken for granted that democracy is the inverse of the Franco dictatorship, that the health of the latter is an obstacle to the former. This is a shame, since the practice of public diplomacy offers much nuanced analytical territory to study democracy development in a local context. How did American culture offer political or cultural alternatives to the status quo? How did American efforts promote social networks or empower civic groups, the sines of modern democratic practice? How did American efforts challenge prevailing juridical norms? Crucially, none of the authors extend Smith’s observation of an important question in public diplomacy scholarship: did the United States operate as an agent of democracy in Spain, or was it merely an exemplar?

The most developed theme addresses the rise of Spanish technocracy during the high tide of American modernization efforts in the 1960s. Here American doctrine began to dovetail with the (apparently) indigenous currents of Spanish technocratic modernization. Clearly American ideas played a role. Yet while several of the chapters mention this development, none exploit fully the analytical possibilities on offer. What, to take one example, is the apparent conflict between the traditional anti-Americanism of Spanish elites, who were closely associated with the regime and invested both in Franco and in the broader tradition of conservative European disdain for American culture, and the eagerness of those elites to embrace American modernity in its productive and technocratic modeling and to import American techniques into modernizing Spain? Much more might have been done with this apparent paradox, since—despite the firewall within Spanish political culture—American public diplomacy appears to have been catalyzing support for the regime at the same time it was helping to undermine it. These processes are hinted at in several of the articles, but a rigorous and detailed treatment of this tantalizing story remains to be undertaken.

Some chapters focus on discrete public diplomacy efforts, such as the American library in Madrid (the Casa Americana), American Studies in Spain, various iterations of political and intellectual exchange (the Leader Program, the Fulbright Program), and there is some attention to radio. But otherwise the volume offers little analysis of American film, cultural diplomacy (especially art and music), or exhibitions. Technical assistance and productivity missions are underemphasized, given the importance of those initiatives to U.S. policy and, apparently, to the Spanish case. Only the American Studies initiative gets its own chapter, and here important questions about the qualitative nature of American Studies in Spain have been shelved in favor of quantitative data about numbers of grantees and budgets. The near-complete absence of the infamous 1966 Palomares nuclear accident seems a serious omission in this regard. While David Stiles has offered a fine account of the information strategy associated with the accident elsewhere, the current volume seems to cry out for a consideration of how the accident impacted long-term bilateral relations.1

One essay hints at this richer analytical possibility for public diplomacy studies: Neal Rosendorf’s account of what is essentially Francoist propaganda in and toward the United States. The chapter is a reminder of the constant feedback loops of international culture and international political messaging that proliferated in an era of mounting technological diversity and richness. And yet the success of Rosendorf’s article shows the absence elsewhere of what is supposedly the central focus of this book: a deep analysis of the American role in promoting, extending, or catalyzing Spanish democratic practice.

Public diplomacy scholarship often reaches a negative conclusion—i.e., it judges a given U.S. policy initiative to have been a failure—and I have published such conclusions several times. An exhibition, presentation, lecture, or recital often provokes an immediate critical response, and most of the contributors to this volume, like many scholars in other contexts, conclude that U.S. public diplomacy did not enhance the image of the United States in Spain or contribute much to indigenous democratization efforts. But in this case, given that the United States generally stood behind the regime when it was strategically advantageous to do so, the anti-American position happened to be the pro-democratic position. Ambassador Mark Asquino’s concluding recollections offer a counterpart to the pessimism of much of the rest of the volume. For Asquino, the contacts and networks associated with American public diplomacy mattered over the long run. Whether those contacts helped to foster democratic practice in Spain or merely coincided with it remains the subject of future research.

Note:


Michael Breines

Sailing the Water’s Edge is a book written for political scientists, but diplomatic historians will find it useful if they want to study the domestic politics of foreign policy. Its thesis will sound familiar. Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley argue that domestic politics matter significantly in understanding American foreign policy since 1945, since “politics does not always stop at the water’s edge” (154). But the ways in which Milner and Tingley go about proving this thesis make the book relevant and its conclusions fresh. Analyses of domestic politics can sometimes be vague and misleading, but the authors bring new empirical and quantitative data to bear in order to prove, in very specific terms, how domestic politics can arrange and alter foreign policy outcomes. They are programmatic and deliberative in their efforts at assessing just how domestic politics can reshape American foreign policy—and when they cannot. In avoiding the broad scope of the domestic and exploring its particulars, Milner and Tingley demonstrate the limits and boundaries faced by policymakers in pursuing a foreign policy of liberal internationalism.
The authors are primarily focused on how the presidency and the executive branch are constrained by the interplay of domestic politics in the United States. But their book is not a study of the presidency. Their analysis accounts for how domestic pressures—and the ways they are manifested in defense appropriations and the budgetary process—give Congress and various lobbying and interest groups significant power to affect the executive’s desired course of action. Foreign aid, trade policy, immigration, defense budgets, and public opinion, they argue, play a prominent role in affecting how members of Congress respond to foreign policy dilemmas and determining whether the president can be coerced into a policy substitution. Milner and Tingley target these factors for their ability to be “highly distributive” (50) —i.e., to deliver many material benefits to domestic constituents. It is here that the book excels. As the authors acknowledge, the discussion of how the political economy of U.S. foreign relations shapes policymakers’ changing outlook toward the strategy and substance of international affairs represents their overarching contribution to the field (14).

Within this theoretical framework, Milner and Tingley suggest that the militarization of American foreign policy is a corollary of domestic politics. As a policy instrument, militarization can overcome the varying bureaucratic and institutional constraints imposed upon the president. It is therefore not a policy failure, they argue. Nor is it an artifact of American culture. It is a recurring product of the institutions of American foreign policy, integral to the scaffolding of American democracy and to the way the legislative branch wields power. With this argument, Milner and Tingley are making another significant contribution to the literature on domestic politics and American foreign policy—and a provocative one: they suggest that an overreliance on the military option over diplomatic and economic alternatives is an outgrowth of processes and structures designed to restrain that option.

The authors’ conclusions rest predominantly upon a single historical case study: American foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa from the presidency of Bill Clinton to that of George W. Bush. The reasons Milner and Tingley focus on post-Cold War U.S.-Africa relations are well taken, but their decision ultimately rests on how the domestic interests they have selected influenced policy changes over a period of more than twenty-five years. During the Cold War, the United States considered Africa to be a pawn in its struggle with the Soviet Union, but the continent was largely untouched by military interventions. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, that situation began to change. Clinton sought to increase America’s role in the region through trade agreements and economic arrangements that fostered development and modernization. His effort to engage Africa through trade policy drew Congress into the process, which not only increased lobbying from interest groups that sought to propound their ideological positions and promote their economic interests. With the president constrained by Congress, “American policy in Sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly militarized over the 1990s” (233). A similar phenomenon was repeated in the George W. Bush administration after September 11, 2001, when Bush “began to pursue a markedly more militarized policy on the continent” (249).

Milner and Tingley are to be applauded not only for their insights on the militarization of American foreign policy, but also for the richness of their quantitative data and for the conclusions they draw from it. Indeed, the book’s tables and graphs showing when interest groups lobbied Congress and tracing congressional involvement in the United States Agency of International Development are fascinating and are employed in ways that historians should try to emulate. Sailing the Water’s Edge also adds to the scholarship on Congress and American foreign policy. Historians and political scientists still know little of how Congress contributes to American foreign policy—although historians are probably less knowledgeable on the subject—and Milner and Tingley offer a welcome addition to the literature. Chapter 4 offers an interesting overview of congressional budget-making and roll call votes on foreign policy instruments and shows where the president can shape both. From this evidence, the authors conclude that the parochial concerns of members of Congress and their dedication to satisfying their constituents’ expectations prevent the president from dealing effectively with foreign policy issues attached to the fate of America’s political economy.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, the book is problematic for historians. I can’t help but feel that Milner and Tingley could have relied more on history to prove their claims. While the case study of U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa legitimizes Milner and Tingley’s operative theory effectively, there is no historical nuance, and the narrative feels incomplete. Again, as a historian, I bristled to see how the authors reference and use historical developments to prove an argument instead of deriving the argument from the history. They draw theoretical correlations from history, but without demonstrating causation.

These objections don’t detract from the book’s arguments, but they do attest to the methodological and epistemological differences between historians and political scientists, and thus to the inherent challenges the book presents for historians. It is also overlaid with academic jargon and with terms used almost exclusively by political scientists. Milner and Tingley should not be faulted for having a conversation with their peers and building upon the existing literature within their field, but the language and structure of the book may deter historians from reading it.

That would be a pity, since Sailing the Water’s Edge can provide historians with nuanced insight into how American foreign policy is conducted in both a historical and contemporary context. Despite its intended audience, the book offers much-needed clarity on America’s democratic way of war. It can also help scholars in their efforts to better theorize the interrelationship between domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy.

Note:

Review of Nicholas J. Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War Against East Germany (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015)

Laura A. Belmonte

Nicholas Schlosser’s new book on Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) is a first-rate addition to a growing body of work on propaganda in the post-World War II era. Drawn from research in German and U.S. archives, Cold War on the Airwaves is exceptionally well documented on both sides of the ideological battle, a rarity in much of the literature because of gaps in recordskeeping and barriers to archival access.

Created by the U.S. government in the final months of World War II as a means of communicating with the population of the American sector of occupied Berlin, RIAS initially adhered to objective, nonpartisan standards of journalism. But as Soviet-American relations