survey data and interview testimonies. These supplement and give flavor to the system-level data on which most studies are based. The final chapters are of special interest. Reform schemes, such as the voucher program practiced in Seattle (on the ballot in 2016 in Washington State and South Dakota), are too new to be studied here, but current dissatisfaction with the arrangements of plutocratic funding in both the Democratic (see Sanders) and Republican (see Donald Trump) parties ensures that the principles of public funding and the assessment of their results will stay with us for the foreseeable future.

Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. By Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 352p. $35.00 cloth, $27.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592716004850

In their book, Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley examine the effect of domestic politics on the capacity of American presidents to conduct diplomatic and military affairs. They develop a theory of distributive politics to explain domestic mobilization around executive policies and provide extensive empirical analysis of key influences, which include interest group lobbying, congressional appropriations and roll calls, bureaucratic structure, and public opinion. They demonstrate that political activity and public attitudes vary in predictable ways across diverse policy instruments in response to the economic and ideological interests arising under each approach. The authors succeed admirably in overturning conventional wisdom that the president enjoys a relatively free hand in foreign affairs, a feat that earned Sailing the Water’s Edge the American Political Science Association’s 2016 Gladys M. Kammerer Award. Milner and Tingley fall short, however, in proving their contention that domestic constraints lead to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

The study of domestic politics is not new to international relations. Theorists have focused on audience costs as restraints on conflict initiation and have identified institutions as fostering cooperation among democracies. Researchers also have looked at the arrangements of plutocratic funding in both the Democratic and Republican (see Donald Trump) parties ensures that the principles of public funding and the assessment of their results will stay with us for the foreseeable future.

--- Linda Fowler, Dartmouth College

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deployments instead of “softer,” potentially more appropriate, instruments. They offer a case study of sub-Saharan Africa during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations to probe for such substitution effects. They contend that both presidents preferred policies of economic aid and trade, but deemphasized these tools in favor of military options after repeated political conflicts: Clinton with the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) and Bush with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Sub-Saharan Africa probably is not the best venue for examining policy substitution. The stakes for the United States in the region have been comparatively low; moreover, Milner and Tingley’s narrative provides grounds for a different interpretation. Both presidents, but particularly Bush, enjoyed success with nonmilitary instruments, and neither initiated the use of troops in the region. Indeed, Clinton succumbed to congressional and public pressure to rescind his orders to expand the peacekeeping effort in Somalia launched by his predecessor, George H. W. Bush; he endeavored to ignore Rwanda; and he adopted a restrained response to the bombings in Kenya. Bush, who continued to promote a modest trade agenda throughout his presidency, avoided the use of force on the continent and embraced the idea of a unified command at the urging of key senators. It is not clear that the conflict experienced by these presidents over aid and trade were any more severe than difficulties they encountered with their domestic agendas. In addition, their respective decisions to beef up the command structure in the region arguably resulted from concerns about the growing threat of terrorism, rather than frustration with political conflict over economic instruments.

The theory of policy substitution remains vitally important to views of executive power in foreign affairs, even if Milner and Tingley cannot confirm it. The authors fear that presidents will choose military options, not because they are most effective but because they inspire less domestic political conflict. From the vantage point of hindsight, this perspective seems problematic on two counts. First, Barack Obama opted for diplomacy over force in places like Iran and adopted a mix of instruments with respect to Iraq, Libya, Syria, or China. He undoubtedly would be surprised to learn that his decisions regarding the projection of American military power around the globe were unconstrained by domestic politics. Second, the authors appear to regard domestic influence on U.S. foreign policy as dangerous in undermining the capacity of presidents to pursue liberal internationalism. In the view of many scholars, however, unfettered presidential power has been the greatest danger to American security both at home and abroad. The skeptics, including me, would like to see more domestic conflict about the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy, not less. The fact that Milner and Tingley find so much domestic political activity about matters beyond the water’s edge provides a ray of hope, therefore, for those who worry about an imperial presidency.


—Gregory A. Huber, Yale University

How do bureaucrats decide how to implement the law? This central topic in public administration and bureaucratic politics is the focus of Zachary Oberfield’s new book that examines street-level policy implementation by police and welfare case workers. While the book is about employees in public bureaucracies, the question it addresses about how members of an organization come to understand and undertake their jobs is much larger. (For example, as a professor, how do I understand what I am to do when asked to write a book review?) Oberfield frames the study as helping to explain the relative importance of the organizational experience, such as training, oversight, the nature of assigned work, acculturation, peer influence, and learning—and the bureaucrat’s own proclivities (dispositions) in shaping policy. Bluntly, does bureaucracy make the bureaucrat, or is the bureaucracy made by those individuals who are recruited and retained in it? In the end, the author makes a compelling case for the role of bureaucrats’ own individual orientations in understanding how the law is carried out.

Teasing out the relative importance of public employees’ prior beliefs from their organizational experience demands a different sort of data from that most often brought to bear in studies of bureaucratic politics, because it requires understanding who bureaucrats are when they arrive and how they change over time. And herein is the key strength of Oberfield’s analysis. Oberfield observes two cohorts of emerging bureaucrats—one is welfare case workers and the second is police officers—from the earliest stages of their recruitment into government over more than two years of government service (or, in exceptional cases, until their exit from government). These data take the form of extensive interviews, supplemented by quantitative survey data analysis and the author’s own ethnographic account of his experience as a newly hired welfare case worker.

The raw interview material, skillfully supplemented by Oberfield’s analysis and his description of his own experience, provides the contextual understanding that helps to evaluate who these bureaucrats really are. In that way, the book is like Herbert Kaufman’s *The Forest Ranger* (RFF Press, 2006) and other classics of public administration that skillfully bridge the gap between abstract accounts and the real individuals who implement the law. A common trajectory in Oberfield’s account of the two sets of new bureaucrats is that individuals enter into