Research |
Helen Milner: Research
Note: To download the papers, please use Internet Explorer browser.
WORKING PAPERS:
Globalization and Domestic Politics: Party Politics and Preferences for CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica
Co-Authored with Raymond Hicks and Dustin H. Tingley
Abstract:
Developing countries have increasingly opened their economies to trade; under what circumstances is this likely? Preferences about trade policy among citizens in developed countries have been researched, but we know less about preferences in developing countries. How important are economic factors for public preferences? Can political leaders and parties affect domestic preferences for openness? We analyze public opinion data and the public referendum on the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in Costa Rica. We consider the influence of both economic and political factors. We find little support for Heckscher-Ohlin models of economic preferences. Controlling for economic factors, we isolate the effects of political parties on the referendum vote. We find that at least one party appeared to influence voters independent of their economic interests. Politics, in the form of parties using their organizational strength to cue and frame messages for voters, made a substantial difference to the outcome of the CAFTA-DR referendum.
The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives
Co-Authored with Stephen Chaudoin and Dustin H. Tingley
Abstract:
Recent research including a prominent article in this journal has argued that America’s longstanding foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. We question the theoretical logic and empirical evidence driving this argument and suggest that liberal internationalism is alive and well. We reanalyze extant evidence on congressional roll call voting and public opinion surveys, which is often used to support the theory that liberal internationalism has declined. We also analyze new evidence about partisan divisions in Congress using policy gridlock and cosponsorship data from other studies of American politics to extend this debate. We do not observe the decline in bipartisanship in foreign policy that conventional wisdom maintains. We also find no evidence of a Vietnam War or a post Cold War effect on domestic partisan divisions on foreign policy. Unlike much of the recent literature, we argue that liberal internationalism persists as a grand strategy for the US in part because of globalization pressures.
Democracy and the Skill-Bias in Trade Policy in Developing Countries
Co-Authored with Bumba Mukherjee
Abstract:
A growing body of research suggests that democracy promotes trade liberalization in developing countries. We argue that democracy in developing countries generates a “skill bias” in trade policy where democratic incumbents have incentives to increase tariffs on high skilled goods but reduce trade barriers on low skilled goods. Our model analyzes how electoral competition and interest group politics in the Heckscher-Ohlin economy of a democratic developing country affects trade protection on low and high skilled goods. It predicts that electoral competition induces the government to reduce trade barriers for low skilled goods to maximize the utility of the abundant factor, namely the low skilled median voter, who optimally prefers a reduction in tariffs for low skilled goods. At the same time, electoral politics also engenders lobbying pressure and campaign contributions from the scarce factor in the polity –the owners of skill-intensive industries (the interest group)—who prefers more trade protection for high skilled goods. The government rationally responds to contributions and electoral dividends generated by protecting skill-intensive industries from import competition by increasing tariffs on high skilled goods. Empirical tests conducted on a novel disaggregated industry-level dataset of trade protection for 92 developing countries from 1978-2004 provides robust statistical support for our theoretical predictions.
Abstract:
What factors have promoted and retarded the spread of the internet globally? Much as other technologies, the internet has diffused unevenly across countries. The main proposition is that its spread is neither purely economic nor entirely domestic. International diffusion pressures exert a powerful influence. The adoption of new technology depends on domestic policy, and this in turn depends on the choices that political leaders make about rules governing new technologies. I examine the impact of international diffusion pressures on political leaders, testing the role of five types of such pressures. The distribution of capabilities globally may shape the spread of the internet, as dominant power(s) may directly or indirectly coerce others into adopting. Patterns of adoption may also be shaped by competitive pressures from the world market. Technological change especially may depend on network externalities, involving the number of adopters already in existence. Learning from other countries or from participating in international organizations may stimulate adoption. Finally, countries may simply copy the policies and hence the adoption patterns of other countries with whom they share sociological similarities. Data from about 190 countries since 1990 shows that diffusion pressures matter, even when controlling for domestic factors. Economic competition and sociological emulation play consistently important roles in affecting the spread of the internet.
FORTHCOMING & PUBLISHED PAPERS:
Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy
Co-Authored with Dustin H. Tingley
International Organization. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
Can IR theory help us understand who supports global engagement through foreign aid and trade? Using votes in the US House of Representatives from 1979-2004, we explore different theoretical predictions about foreign economic policy. Unlike other studies, we assess the impact of a wide variety of factors: political economy, foreign policy pressures, and ideology. We find three surprising results. Aid preferences are as affected by the same domestic political economy factors as trade ones. Trade preferences, but not economic aid ones, are shaped by the president’s foreign policy concerns; for economic aid, domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones. Aid is shaped more by ideological factors than is trade, but ideology plays a different substantive role in each, with groups holding more left-wing ideas favoring aid and opposing trade, and vice versa for conservative ones. No single axis of conflict over internationalism exists in the US. Foreign policy substitutability between aid and trade is constrained by these different domestic political coalitions, and presidents and their foreign policy concerns matter more in trade than previously known.
The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid
Co-Authored with Dustin H. Tingley
Economics & Politics. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
Are there systematic political economy factors that shape preferences for foreign aid, a key component of American foreign policy? We analyze votes in the House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003 that would increase or decrease foreign aid by considering the political, economic, and ideological characteristics of legislators and their districts. To understand who supports and opposes foreign aid, we utilize theories of foreign economic policy preferences. By examining different types of aid policy, we show that domestic politics and especially the distributional consequences of economic aid can matter. The economic characteristics of a district and its left-right ideological predispositions influence support for aid in a systematic fashion over the nearly twenty-five year period. Stolper-Samuelson models along with political ideology can help explain legislators’ preferences toward aid.
Democratization and Economic Globalization
Co-Authored with Bumba Mukherjee
Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 12. June 2009: 163-181.
Abstract:
We address two questions that are central to the literature on the emergence of democracy and economic globalization. First, does democratization foster higher levels of trade and capital account openness? Second, do trade and capital account openness increase the likelihood of democratization? We review the literature in international political economy and comparative politics that has theoretically and empirically addressed these questions. We then conduct some empirical tests in a sample of developing countries to briefly evaluate the empirical relationship between democracy and economic globalization. Our analysis reveals that evidence for the claim that democracy fosters trade and capital account liberalization is robust but that empirical support for the predicted positive effect of economic openness on democracy among developing countries is weak. More theoretical work is needed to clarify the link between democracy and economic liberalization, and to this end we provide possible topics for future research.
Co-Authored with Tim Büthe
American Journal of Political Science. Volume 52, Number 4. October 2008: 741-762.
Abstract:
The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements— GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)— provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and increasing investment. These international commitments are more credible than domestic policy choices, because reneging on them is more costly. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries since the early 1970s support this argument. Developing countries that belong to the WTO and participate in more PTAs experience greater FDI inflows than otherwise, controlling for many factors including domestic policy preferences and taking into account possible endogeneity. Joining international trade agreements allows developing countries to attract more FDI and thus increase economic growth.
Democracy, Veto Players, and the Depth of Regional Integration
Co-Authored with Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse
The World Economy. Volume 31, number 1. January 2008: 67-96
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the domestic political factors that might account for the choice of regional integration arrangement (RIA) that states enter. States can pursue at least five types of RIAs, in order of their depth of policy integration: preferential trade agreements, free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, and economic unions. What accounts for the type of arrangement that they choose? We argue that domestic politics influence this choice, particularly a country’s regime type and the number of institutional “veto players.” Democracies are more likely to form an RIA than other states, a tendency that becomes more pronounced as the proposed level of integration in an arrangement rises. However, all democracies are not the same. As the number of veto players rises, democratic governments are increasingly less likely to enter an RIA. Furthermore, RIAs that aim to achieve greater integration are likely to generate more pronounced distributional consequences than those that aim to achieve more modest amounts of integration. As the number of veto players increases in a democracy, so does the likelihood that at least one such player will have a constituency that is adversely affected by the RIA and therefore will block it. Consequently, veto players are expected to have a larger effect on the odds of a democracy forming an RIA, the greater is the extent of integration that the arrangement aims to achieve. A series of statistical tests, based on analysis of all pairs of countries from 1950 to 2000, support our arguments. Democracy and veto players strongly affect whether states enter an RIA, as well as the type of arrangement that they choose.
International Trade and Environmental Policy in the Post-Communist World
Co-Authored with Liliana Botcheva-Andonova and Edward D. Mansfield
Comparative Political Studies. Volume 40. Number 7. July 2007: 782-807.
Abstract:
This paper examines whether trade liberalization and increasing commercial openness has affected environmental policy in the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. During the Cold War, these countries had closed economies and autarkic trade policies combined with little environmental regulation and poor environmental quality. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union began a process of marked change. Many post-Communist countries have engaged in extensive trade liberalization. Some, however, have been slower to open their markets and others have maintained highly protectionist trade policies. Have countries that opened up to global markets improved their environmental policies or has increasing exposure to the international trading system undermined efforts to improve environmental policy? Controlling for a many economic and political factors, our results indicate that heightened trade openness has weakened one important element of environmental policy in the post-Communist world.
Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements.
Co-Authored with Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse
British Journal of Political Science. Volume 36, Number 4. December 2006: 403-432.
Abstract:
Since World War II, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them, especially the domestic influences on PTA formation. We investigate the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We focus on the number of veto players within a country and hypothesize that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. Our data, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this hypothesis. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country reduces the probability of signing a PTA by a sizable amount.
The Digital Divide: The Role of Political Institutions in Technology Diffusion.
Comparative Political Studies. Volumn 39, No 2, March 2006, pp 176-199.
Abstract:
What factors have promoted and retarded the spread of the internet globally? The internet is one example of the diffusion and adoption of technology generally. Much as other technologies, the internet has diffused unevenly across countries. This uneven spread has raised concerns over an increasing “digital divide”. The main proposition here is that its spread has been driven by neither technological nor purely economic factors alone. Rather political factors, especially the type of domestic institutions, exert a powerful influence. Groups that believe they will lose from the internet try to use political institutions to enact policies that block the spread of the internet. Some political institutions make this easier to do than others. Data from roughly 190 countries over the past decade (1991-2001) show that a country’s regime type matters greatly, even when controlling for other economic, technological, political and sociological factors. Democratic governments facilitate the spread of the internet relative to autocratic ones. Thus the spread of democracy may help reduce the digital divide.
Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems
In Darren Hawkins et al., eds. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 107-139.
Abstract:
Why do countries delegate the distribution of foreign aid to international institutions? Why would governments relinquish control over their aid if they are a useful instrument of statecraft? Governments delegate aid delivery to international institutions when their publics lack information about the consequences of aid and fear that their governments will deviate from their preferences concerning its use. By using the international organization to send aid, the government issues a credible signal to domestic groups about the use of foreign aid. This signal leaves all actors better off by helping to solve a principal-agent problem in domestic politics. When publics are more skeptical about the benefits of aid, governments are more likely to turn aid over to multilateral organizations in order to reassure taxpayers that their money is being well spent. Using data on about 20 donor countries of the OECD from 1960-2000, I investigate the sources of multilateral giving, showing that public opinion has the expected negative relationship to multilateral aid-giving.
Perspectives on Politics, Volume 3, Issue 04, December 2005, pp 833-854.
Abstract:
1. Introduction. 2. A Brief Review of the Books. 3. The Role of the International Economic Institutions. 4. The Experience of the Developing Countries. 5. Theories about the Functions and Benefits of International Institutions. 1) Constraining the Great Powers. 2) Providing Information and Reducing Transaction Costs. 3) Facilitating Reciprocity. 4) Facilitating Reform in Domestic Politics. 6. Four Sources of the Problems with International Institutions. 1) No Impact. 2) Capture by the Powerful Developed Countries. 3) Capture by Private Producers and Investors. 4) Internal Dysfunctions and Failure of Accountability. 7. International Justice and Institutions: Normative Perspectives. 1) Distributive Justice is Global. 2) Current Counterfactual Assessments are Insufficient. 3) The “Nationalist” Research Agenda Must Change. 8. Conclusions: What is to be Done?
Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries
International Organization, Volume 59, Issue 1, Winter 2005, pp 157-193
Abstract:
Rising international trade flows are a primary component of globalization. The liberalization of trade policy in many developing countries has helped foster the growth of these flows. Preceding and concurrent with this move to free trade, there has been a global movement toward democracy. We argue that these two trends are related: democratization of the political system reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support. Political leaders in labor rich countries may prefer lower trade barriers as democracy increases. Empirical evidence supports our claim about the developing countries from 1970-1999. Regime change toward democracy is associated with trade liberalization, controlling for many factors. Conventional explanations of economic reform, such as economic crises and external pressures, seem less salient. Democratization may have fostered globalization in this period.
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right Divide on Trade Policy?
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 48, pp. 95-119
Abstract:
Are there noticeable differences among political parties in a country over their trade policy positions? Do left parties advocate different trade policies than right parties? In the advanced industrial countries where labor tends to be scarce, are left parties more protectionist than right ones, which represent capital owners? Political institutions within these democratic countries may affect the role of partisanship. We also investigate whether increasing globalization has led to more or less partisan polarization over trade policy. We examine 25 developed countries from 1945 to 1998 to see how their parties have competed over trade policy. Controlling for various factors, partisanship matters. Right parties consistently take more free trade stances than do left ones. Globalization and other international forces have also shaped both the nature and the extent of the domestic debate over exposure to international trade.