WORKING PAPERS:
Which Devil in Development? A Randomized Study of Citizen Actions Supporting Foreign Aid in Uganda
Co-Authored with Daniel L. Nielson and Michael G. Findley
Abstract:
Debates over foreign aid effectiveness have neglected the views of recipients, especially as they compare aid to domestic government programs. We argue that citizens may see foreign aid as an escape from clientelism because aid is less politicized than government programs and citizens trust donors more. They may also favor multilateral over bilateral aid for similar reasons. We test the argument with a randomized experiment on a representative subject pool of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens. We randomly assigned the project funders for actual forthcoming projects and invited citizens to show support behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to support foreign aid projects compared to government programs. A companion survey to the experiment reveals evidence that citizens perceive aid as less prone to politicization. Some evidence indicates that Ugandans also see multilateral donors as superior to bilaterals.
The Interaction of International and Domestic Institutions: Preferential Trade Agreements, Democracy, and Foreign Direct Investment
Co-Authored with Tim Büthe
Abstract:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has come to be seen as a promising avenue for boosting economic development. As a consequence, most developing countries now seek to attract FDI, often by making ex ante promises to foreign investors not to pass laws or regulations—or refrain from other actions—that would diminish the value of the investment ex post. But how credible are such promises? A number of recent studies have examined the effect of domestic institutions (veto players, democracy, etc.) on the credibility of commitments by developing country governments toward foreign private economic actors, such as foreign investors. In addition, a few studies have examined the effect of international institutions on the credibility of such commitments. We examine the interaction of domestic and international institutions in promoting FDI. We show theoretically and empirically that democratic domestic institutions help attract more FDI into developing countries only in the context of economically liberal international institutions.
Sailing the Water's Edge: Where Domestic Politics Meets Foreign Policy
Co-Authored with Dustin H. Tingley
Abstract:
How important is the President for US foreign policy? Studies in American politics—the Two Presidencies literature—assert that the president is much less constrained by Congress and other domestic forces in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Studies in international relations also often assume that the president is the most important actor in foreign policy and is relatively unconstrained by domestic politics. Additionally, studies in international relations often assume that each issue area in foreign policy can be studied in separation. We challenge each of these views. Using new data on roll call votes in Congress and on Presidential-Congressional budget interactions, we argue that 1. Foreign policy instruments should be analyzed jointly and comparatively because they are substitutable, 2. Some foreign policy instruments are more constrained by Congress and domestic forces and look more like domestic issue areas, 3. Other foreign policy instruments, because they can be linked more directly to national security, allow the President more discretion and influence over their use. Our research has two larger implications. Presidential bargaining with Congress over foreign policy matters since the Presidents tends to be more favorable on average to international engagement; rising congressional influence may circumscribe America's role in the international system. Finally, given the ability of the President to bargain more successfully for the use of instruments that are more linked to national security issues, these instruments are more likely to be employed by the executive. This may help account for the growing militarization of American foreign policy since World War II.
The Economic and Political Influences on Different Dimensions of United States Immigration Policy
Co-Authored with Dustin H. Tingley
Abstract:
Recent research on political attitudes towards immigration often pits arguments emphasizing economic self-interest against ideological or cultural explanations. Many of these studies conceptualize immigration policy along a single dimension instead of disaggregating it into its distinct policy dimensions. Conditional on the type of immigration policy, different explanations should have more or less explanatory power. We disaggregate immigration policy into six different dimensions and provide theoretical scope conditions for when ideological and economic factors should matter. We test these predictions on votes on immigration policy in the US House of Representatives from 1979-2006. We advance the debate on the determinants of immigration policy by showing that both economic self-interest and ideological explanations can be powerful, depending upon the type of immigration policy under consideration.
Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971-2007
Co-Authored with Tim Büthe
Abstract:
International trade agreements can help developing countries attract foreign direct investment. We ask whether differences in the specific provisions included in trade agreements have differential effects on FDI. Can trade agreements with more credible commitments to protect investment induce more FDI than other agreements? We explore four institutional differences among preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We first examine whether those that have entered into force lead to greater FDI than PTAs that have merely been negotiated and signed. Second, do trade agreements that have investment clauses lead to greater FDI? Third, we examine the impact of dispute settlement mechanisms in PTAs. Turning to multilateral agreements, we differentiate the GATT from the WTO, since the latter allows member states to commit more credibly to more comprehensive obligations. Analyses of FDI flows into 125 developing countries from 1971 to 2007 show that more FDI is induced by trade agreements that include stronger mechanisms for credible commitment. Institutional diversity in international agreements matters.
Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries: Particularism and Domestic Politics with a Case Study of India
Co-Authored with Bumba Mukherjee
Abstract:
What explains the variation in trade policy among democracies in developing countries? Why have some liberalized trade more than others? We analyze the impact of political particularism – defined as the degree of party discipline and the incentives for politicians to cultivate a personal vote – on trade protection. We present theoretical results from a model of particularism and its effects on tariffs; we present quantitative evidence to test the model; and then we develop a case study of India to illuminate it. Our model analyzes how an increase in particularism (that is, a shift from a party-centered to a more candidate-centered system) interacts with the degree of inter-industry occupational mobility of labor and the asset-specificity of industries to influence trade policies in developing democracies. Our model suggests that an increase in particularism induces leaders from the ruling and opposition parties to shift trade policy in equilibrium to the median voter's optimal preference, who in a developing society is a worker; and this means a reduction in trade barriers when labor mobility is high. Our data strongly support this conclusion. Our case study of India shows how the dynamics of a party-centered system operate to maintain higher trade barriers.
Democracy and the Skill-Bias in Trade Policy in Developing Countries
Co-Authored with Bumba Mukherjee
Abstract:
A growing body of research suggests that democracy promotes trade liberalization in developing countries. We argue that democracy in developing countries generates a "skill bias" in trade policy where democratic incumbents have incentives to increase tariffs on high skilled goods but reduce trade barriers on low skilled goods. Our model analyzes how electoral competition and interest group politics in the Heckscher-Ohlin economy of a democratic developing country affects trade protection on low and high skilled goods. It predicts that electoral competition induces the government to reduce trade barriers for low skilled goods to maximize the utility of the abundant factor, namely the low skilled median voter, who optimally prefers a reduction in tariffs for low skilled goods. At the same time, electoral politics also engenders lobbying pressure and campaign contributions from the scarce factor in the polity -the owners of skill-intensive industries (the interest group)-who prefers more trade protection for high skilled goods. The government rationally responds to contributions and electoral dividends generated by protecting skill-intensive industries from import competition by increasing tariffs on high skilled goods. Empirical tests conducted on a novel disaggregated industry-level dataset of trade protection for 92 developing countries from 1978-2004 provides robust statistical support for our theoretical predictions.
The Global Spread of the Internet: The Role of International Diffusion Pressures in Technology Adoption
Abstract:
What factors have promoted and retarded the spread of the internet globally? Much as other technologies, the internet has diffused unevenly across countries. The main proposition is that its spread is neither purely economic nor entirely domestic. International diffusion pressures exert a powerful influence. The adoption of new technology depends on domestic policy, and this in turn depends on the choices that political leaders make about rules governing new technologies. I examine the impact of international diffusion pressures on political leaders, testing the role of five types of such pressures. The distribution of capabilities globally may shape the spread of the internet, as dominant power(s) may directly or indirectly coerce others into adopting. Patterns of adoption may also be shaped by competitive pressures from the world market. Technological change especially may depend on network externalities, involving the number of adopters already in existence. Learning from other countries or from participating in international organizations may stimulate adoption. Finally, countries may simply copy the policies and hence the adoption patterns of other countries with whom they share sociological similarities. Data from about 190 countries since 1990 shows that diffusion pressures matter, even when controlling for domestic factors. Economic competition and sociological emulation play consistently important roles in affecting the spread of the internet.