Helen Yetter Chappell |
I'm a graduate student in philosophy at Princeton University (since 2007). My dissertation explores the nature of phenomenal concepts and the work they can (and can't) do in solving the mind-body problem. Among other things, I defend a version of the constitutional theory of phenomenal concepts, argue against the phenomenal concept strategy, develop an attractive new way to be an a priori (or type-A) physicalist that appeals to phenomenal concepts (though I don't myself endorse this view!), and offer a defense of epiphenomenalism. My research interests lie mainly in the philosophy of mind, including the nature of consciousness, mental imagery, intentionality, the unity of consciousness, and personal identity. I have less developed interests in moral concepts and primitive concepts more generally, connections between the mind-body debate and the naturalism/nonnaturalism debate in metaethics, and character/virtue. I seem to be attracted to unpopular positions: epiphenomenalism, a radically internalistic worldview, nonnaturalism, phenomenology as essential for intentionality -- is that still unpopular? Before coming to Princeton, I graduated summa cum laude from Mount Holyoke College, where I wrote a thesis defending narrow mental content. Prior to college I grew up in Manhattan, Kansas.
(My husband, Richard Yetter Chappell, works in ethics and blogs about philosophy.)
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