posted on the web on April 21 2003

Country Data

Full Name: People's Republic of China Capital: Beijing Population: 1,284,303,705 (2002 est.) Location: Asia Total area: 9,596,960 sq km Language: Standard Chinese - Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect (official) Ethnic groups: Han Chinese 91.9% Religions: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 1%-2%, Christian 3%-4% Currency: Yuan IGO memberships: UN, WHO, WTO Internet site: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Source: CIA World Factbook

Of late, China’s political and economic future has enamored Washington’s politicians and media pundits alike, as they analyze and debate the meaning of China’s accession into the WTO, just as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji prepare to step aside in favor of (presumably hand-picked) new blood. China-watchers have tended to be optimistic about China’s future economic prospects as they point to a plethora of impressive statistics to support their cause; they duly point to China’s large potential consumer market, her explosive growth in GDP, and her high level of foreign investment as celebratory indicators. On the whole, the average CNN-watching Joe American believes China to be a land of opportunity, whose open-market reforms and subsequent prosperity are slowly eroding her Communist façade.

Of course, when Deng Xiaoping and the CCP began these open-market reforms in 1979, they had no intention of toppling the Communist Party. In fact, still reeling from the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and its consequent loss of prestige for the Party, Deng began his market-oriented reforms in hopes of further legitimizing Communist Party rule. With a rise in the standard of living coming on the heels of quick economic growth, Deng largely succeeded in circumventing discontent among the masses and perpetuating the Communist hegemony. During his tenure, Deng coined a bizarre new “-ism”, the so-called ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Although this new branch of socialism, in which state-owned enterprise exists side-by-side with private enterprise, may have staved off the collapse of the post-Cultural Revolution Party, it nonetheless brought with it a new set of problems and contradictions that might, ironically enough, discredit the Party still yet. Once such socio-political problems are investigated--instead of the glamour of economic growth indicators--it becomes evident that the CCP cannot much longer sustain its strategy of stability through market reform.

Through the economic boom of the 1990’s and the political hush-hush of post-Tiananmen China, economic reforms were the vogue while political reform was dangerous. Special Economic Zones sprang up without any real thought to their political needs and consequences; a tiny, new elite-class of rich bourgeoisie began to wield enormous power through their checkbooks; local officials became the primary beneficiaries of the economic boom. Even as the average urban family began buying Deng’s sacred washing machines and microwaves, officials were buying big screen TV’s and BMW’s. Corruption and graft were the problems of the day in a country ruled, not by Law, but by Man.

Of course, corruption itself was not new to the glitzy 1990’s; individual accounts from the Great Leap Forward down through the Cultural Revolution are filled with personal encounters with government corruption. As early as the 1950’s, Hu Shi (arguably modern China’s most famous intellectual) remarked upon the almost ‘magical power of words’--the People’s Congress, the Supreme Court of the People, the People’s Republic of China--to conceal the graft and privilege of the elite. Such words, however, could not (and still cannot) magically conceal the material disparity between official and commoner brought on by economic reforms lacking their necessary political counterparts. The Communist Party must recognize the consequent desire for social and political autonomy that follows economic liberalization. Government corruption will only feed those desires, not quench them.

Hu Shi’s comments also reveal the fervor and faith of the masses in the Communist Party and its ideology apparent in the 1950‘s. Indeed, its ability to mobilize both its party cadre and its larger populace was the birthmark of the early Communist regime. The CCP of the 21st century visibly lacks its once defining characteristic. The people are no longer fooled by magical words. Its inability to mobilize the masses (see, for instance, the persistence of Falun Gong despite extreme government repression) reflects a greater loss of prestige suffered by the Party and Communism at large, caused by rampant corruption with Party ranks and the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, respectively (to put it simply). The consequences of a pervasive cynicism and corruption within Party ranks (some figures claim that up to 50% of the Party is corrupt in some form or another) is hard to determine, yet must be deleterious to the future of the Party. Its own dwindling numbers, particularly among the rising (both in terms of power and numbers) entrepreneurial class, heralds a grim future for the Party and Communism itself. Perhaps in recognition of its precarious position, in recent weeks the CCP loudly proclaimed the addition of several wealthy businessmen to the ranks of the Party--the New York Times even publishing a very prominent article. Yet all of this seems too little, too late, as these few new members belie a Party bleeding from within.

The very nature of economic reform is quite dangerous for the Party as well. Economic liberalization has brought with it a lop-sided growth: cities have prospered at the expense of rural areas; private enterprise has benefited at the expense of state-owned enterprise (now exacerbated by China’s entrance into the WTO); the gap between rich and poor grows wider every year. China’s economic growth has been a zero-sum game of winners and losers. Though historically China has always had a disparity between rural and urban--indeed, simply attaining an urban hukou or residence permit was, and still remains, the long-standing dream of many--economic reform has only aggravated the situation. Likewise, keen observers of China can now read of rising urban discontent among the unemployed, presumably from state-owned enterprises now gone bust, reported quietly in the papers. For the strikes and riots that are reported, one wonders how many of these are downplayed, and still how many go unreported. Economic growth at the expense of large segments of the population (whether viewed regionally or socio-economically), combined with inevitable outrage at government corruption becomes a powerful incentive to strike, protest and even fight back.

Lop-sided economic growth and government corruption are not the only reasons for protest. On a more concrete level, though much lip-service has been paid to its efforts at the improvement of educational and health care systems, economic boom has not brought improvement in these areas. Indeed, the rural areas that have hitherto been ignored by China’s primarily urban economic growth--and incidentally where corruption appears most rampant--have seen little improvement in its educational systems. The vast majority of peasants go uneducated. Likewise, their available health care--of which we have seen glimpses in reports about the HIV/AIDS epidemic in China--seems minimal at best. Such looming social problems in the countryside will only further tarnish the image and reputation of the Communist Party in spite of--even because of--economic boom. It does not help that the Party continues to advertise itself as the ‘party of the proletariat’. Fear of retribution, that is government repression, has so far quelled most tides of discontent. One wonders for how much longer.

Repression, and not the mobilization, of the masses has become the new hallmark of a regime that has lost much respect in the eyes of its people and party members. Such repression has been successful in creating a tangible unwillingness on the part of some to engage in political protest--indeed, political activity altogether--in favor of a life devoted to economic gain and social betterment. Such political apathy seems understandable for generations that came of age during the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square, respectively. Yet the coming generation is not so quiescent in its concerns and is marked by a fervent loyalty to China--which does not, it is important to note, necessarily spell loyalty to the Communist Party. For the moment, economic growth remains the primary objective of both the Party as well as this new nationalistic generation. On this point, too, however, one wonders for how long. During the now infamous Hainan spy plane incident, students were willing to criticize the government for what it perceived to be a lack of fortitude in dealing with the US. Such nationalism should not be strictly interpreted as beneficial to the regime--indeed, the spy plane incident only demonstrated its many shades, at times beneficial, at times harmful, to the Communist regime. Will this generation be satisfied with economic reform alone, without an outlet to voice their inevitable social and political agendas? It would be erroneous to assume that their demands will end with economic liberalization.

As it uses market-oriented reforms to perpetuate its own rule, the Communist Party should keep in mind lessons from history. In the tradition of May Fourth--indeed, one may argue long before it--students and intellectuals have been the symbolic voice of discontent and a catalyst for protest. Likewise, the countryside has historically been a dangerous and explosive seat of discontent. Current economic reforms are slowly alienating the peasant population, while the younger, educated generation is more willing to voice their concerns in the greater name of China. Structural, political changes are necessary to address the problems of the peasants, and provide them with a valve to vent their frustrations in the face of corruption, unfair taxes and an obvious disparity of wealth. Neither can the regime insist upon strict ideological discipline from its students and intellectuals, as it has in the past.

In the final analysis, however, the CCP’s current governmental problems seem neither grave nor critical enough to incite sociopolitical revolution. Certainly, serious problems do exist, and historically, the combination of these problems has proven destructive--destructive enough, in fact, to warrant Gordan Chang to prophesy “the coming collapse of China“ and author a book of the same name. However, the stability of the Communist regime is still in the interest of too many--from politicians to businessmen to nationalistic student-intellectuals--because of its commitment to market-oriented reform and economic growth. For the time being at least, the CCP’s market reforms keep it in power. However, such strategy is not sustainable in the long run because the reforms themselves are inimical to a large peasant majority, and because the CCP is unwilling to address the unavoidable question of greater political reforms. Likewise, a sinister cynicism fueled by pervasive corruption and ideological hypocrisy resides both within and without the Party. Without significant efforts at governmental reform, cynicism will only grow as economic growth fuels greater corruption and more hypocrisy. Ineffective governance can not only lead to social upheaval, but also eventually affect economic performance as well. Already, corruption is thought to account for a significant drain on existing growth. Likewise, development and investment become riskier and less profitable in an unstable social environment. Thus, in the long term, the continuation of one-party rule is not guaranteed by the status quo of market-oriented reform as it stands now.

John T. Kaaiohelo is a student at Princeton University, USA.