posted on the web on May 19 2003

Country Data

Full Name: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Capital: Pyongyang Population: 22,224,195 (2002 est.) Location: Asia Pacific Total area: 120,540 sq km Language: Korean Ethnic groups: Korean Religions: traditionally Buddhist, Confucianist Currency: North Korean won IGO memberships: UN, WHO, WTO Internet site: Government of DPR Korea Source: CIA World Factbook

Introduction

North Korea, a small nation of about 23 million people, has been quite a source of headaches to US policy makers since its creation in 1945. At certain times in its history, the isolated country has been more than simply a bad migraine, with tensions between the US and North Korea often rising to crisis levels. What are the root causes of these less-than-friendly relations between the two nations? Why has Pyongyang gone nuclear? And why does it flaunt its nuclear weapons and break international non-proliferation treaties? This paper will address these questions in addition to examining policies under the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and how they might have contributed to the current nuclear standoff.

Roots and History of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis

Korea's involvement with nuclear weapons finds its earliest roots in the dawn of the nuclear age. During World War II, while Japan was intensely pursuing nuclear weapons in an arms race with the Soviet Union, Germany, and the US, it moved its weapons program to the northern part of their Korean colony. This was an attempt to protect their nuclear program as US bombing of their country increased, and in order to take advantage of Korea's wealth of minerals and quality electricity-generating capacity.1

With the start of the Cold War, Korea's nuclear stash would play a different role, however. In 1945, Korea was divided in two by the US and the USSR along the 38th parallel. A Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed on September 9, 1948. This coincided with the start of North Korea's nuclear program in the late 1950s when North Korea and the USSR agreed to establish a joint nuclear research institute. North Koreans were sent to the Soviet Union to study nuclear science and in 1964, the Research Institute of Atomic Energy was established. In the 1970s, nuclear science departments were founded at Kimilsung University and Kimchaek Engineering College in North Korea.2 At the same time, the Soviets mined materials in North Korea for its own nuclear weapons program.3

In the late 1950s, a 1000-kilowatt reactor was constructed at Yongbyon.

In the mid-1960s, a larger, 2 to 4 megawatt reactor was constructed, and in the mid-1980s, a 50 to 200 megawatt reactor, along with a spent fuel reprocessing plant, was also built at Yongbyon. The first signs that the North Koreans had a home-grown nuclear program came in March 1984 when US satellite intelligence revealed a nuclear-reactor vessel under construction at Yongbyon. In 1985, Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but refused to agree to the Safeguards Accord, which allowed for the inspection of nuclear facilities, until seven years later. It is normally required that it be signed within 18 months of agreeing to the NPT. After finally signing the Accord, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was allowed into North Korea between May 1992 and March 1993 to conduct six inspections of its nuclear facilities.4

Suspicions that the North Koreans were being dishonest about their nuclear capabilities arose when the results of these inspections proved to be inconsistent with North Korean claims. For example, characteristics of certain plutonium samples were different from the North Korean descriptions of what they had. Such discrepancies led the IAEA to request an inspection of the nuclear-waste areas. The North Koreans refused, saying that such sites were military installments. In March 1993, Pyongyang proclaimed that it would be withdrawing from the NPT in June, and only with negotiations with the US, did it finally agree not to do so.5 I will continue with discussions of Clinton and Bush's policies further in this paper, as well as the current condition, but will first address the domestic situation in North Korea, which plays a significant part in the cause of the current nuclear standoff.

General Culture and Political Atmosphere of North Korea and Kim Jong Il

One of the root causes of the current nuclear situation has much to do with domestic circumstances in North Korea, making the situation especially complex. North Korea is basically like a real life version of George Orwell's 1984. North Koreans live in the most closed society on earth because the Kim regime refuses to discard an unworkable totalitarian ideology and adapt to the international environment. As a result, it has destroyed the North Korean economy and the lives of millions of North Koreans.6 The military also remains an overwhelming power and presence in North Korea. The Korean People's Army (KPA), which consists of naval, air force, and special forces, is estimated to number about 1.2 million, compared with South Korea's 700,000. Reserve forces are said to total at least 5 million. Foreign estimates have put the military budget at 25% of the country's GDP and virtually the only factories still operating near capacity are military factories. This is a sign that the military budget is swallowing up a large portion of the civilian budget, making the lives of North Koreans even more impoverished.7

Country Data

Full Name: Republic of Korea Capital: Seoul Population: 48,324,000 (2002 est.) Location: Asia Pacific Total area: 98,480 sq km Language: Korean Ethnic groups: Korean Religions: Christian 49%, Buddhist 47%, Confucianist 3% Currency: South Korean won IGO memberships: UN, WHO, WTO Internet site: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Source: CIA World Factbook

1984 characteristics of North Korea are ample. For example, North Koreans are expected to inform on one another if they suspect someone of being disloyal to the regime in any manner. Even children are expected to turn in their own parents. The system works because if one does not report a crime and it is discovered, he too is implicated. Thus there is a prisoner's dilemma, and organizing any kind of resistance against the Kim regime is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thought control is also rampant, with bugged houses and one allowed radio station. Like in 1984, North Korean apartments, houses, and public buildings all have a public address speaker wired to local transmitters. As a result, North Koreans have no idea what is going on in the real world and the government can manipulate the people as they please.8 This use of totalitarian techniques is a means for Kim to keep in control of a regime which would, without all the mind control, fall to pieces. It prevents the North Korean people from rebelling, demanding reform, and overthrowing the government. It also makes communication and diplomacy with the US and other states difficult because its ideas differ so vastly from most other states of the modern age. First, North Korean leaders still believe that communism is a working option for government. Second, they believe that a nation's domestic affairs can be free of dependence on and interference from the rest of the world.9 These are, of course, illusions which they are unwilling to see through.

Another issue which makes negotiation difficult is the North Korean idea of juche or "self reliance." This idea, first used by former North Korean ruler Kim Il Sung, gave him a rationale for his dictatorship and helped build a personality cult around himself.10 Juche as a national motto also means that the regime is extremely persistent and stubborn. There is a sense of national pride and unwillingness to give in to reality. The current North Korean ruler, Kim Jong Il does not strive to join the international community, but wants the world to revolve around North Korea. He, like his father, Kim Il Sung, uses a crisis-oriented negotiation style, which makes diplomacy often tense. However, according to some authors, North Korea is not crazy or even unpredictable. Scott Snyder of the United States Institute of Peace states that "their behavior has an internal logic and repetitiveness to it."11 According to such experts, the good news is that it is possible to negotiate with North Korea. The bad news is that such negotiations will often be accompanied by moments of real or apparent crisis and brinkmanship.12

What this has to do with Nuclear Weapons and the US

Country Data

Full Name: United States of America Capital: Washington D.C. Population: 280,562,489 (2002 est.) Location: North America Total area: 9,629,091 sq km Language: English, Spanish Ethnic groups: white 77.1%, black 12.9%, Asian 4.2%, Native 1.8% Religions: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2% Currency: US Dollar IGO memberships: G-8, NATO, UN, UNSC, WHO, WTO Internet site: Department of State Source: CIA World Factbook

As mentioned above, all of this persistence and need for control in the regime has to do with Kim's efforts to survive when failure of his regime would be inevitable otherwise. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost the economic and political support that had been so necessary to maintaining its faltering system. North Korea's economic crisis is currently so severe that the economy cannot be sustained without outside help. Hard times for North Korea necessitated a foreign policy plan designed to gain aid and recognition from the US. To achieve this from the US, it wanted to deal directly with the US and chose an unconventional incentive to rivet American attention-the threat of nuclear weapons. In other words, the weapons were used as a means of blackmailing the US into giving economic assistance and treating North Korea as a "real" state. The more the outside world feared it, the more its nuclear program was a valuable asset to North Korea-a bargaining chip. North Korea was able to use the threat of nuclear weapons production to cleverly gain aid, recognition by the US, and international standing.13

The only other alternative to nuclear blackmail for the North Koreans is fundamental reform instigated by the people or the regime. Reform by the regime would mean Kim's demise so he would obviously not be in favor of such an idea. Reform by the people is nearly impossible given the 1984 type society is which they live. Thus, the only choice left for sustaining the regime is the threat of nuclear weapons. The North Koreans are not producing their nuclear weapons for offensive reasons. Kim is not suicidal and would not likely use the weapons against anyone, especially the US, as this would mean the end of his regime. The purpose of the weapons is thus blackmail. The only real threats from the weapons themselves are that Pyongyang might sell them to terrorists who would then have no qualms against using them against the US.14 In addition, if North Korea remains nuclear, it is unlikely that Japan will be content to remain nuclear-free. China, of course, would then be likely to reexamine its own nuclear arsenal. An arms race in Northeast Asia might then be possible.

Policies under Clinton

During the first six months of his presidency, Clinton was preoccupied with issues such as Somalia and Haiti and did not engage in any sort of policy-level discussions with North Korea.15 Attention only switched to North Korea when it was discovered in 1992 through satellite evidence that North Korea was cheating on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by reprocessing plutonium. International apprehension increased when North Korea rebuffed requests for IAEA inspection of the suspected Yongbyon facilities.16 Clinton employed economic sanctions as a way of preventing North Korea from continuing to proliferate. Beginning in the summer of 1993, Clinton began plans for a graduated campaign of coercive diplomacy, through the use of sanctions and military deployments to pressure North Korea.17

On October 21, 1994, Washington and Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework, which allowed the exchange of aid from the US, Japan, and South Korea, for an agreement from the North Koreans that they would abandon their nuclear weapons. Clinton gave not only aid such as food and fuel but also agreed to give Pyongyang two "safe" nuclear reactors to replace North Korean aging reactors by 2005. As revealed through recent events, North Korea breached the Agreed Framework. Does this mean that Clinton's policies failed? Not necessarily. Clinton did succeed in freezing nuclear weapons production at Yongbyon for 9 years. Had he not, North Korea would today have enough plutonium to produce at least 30 nuclear weapons instead of the one or two bombs' worth which they currently have.18 Although far from perfect, the Agreed Framework represented the best deal available at a far from ideal time. Alternatives could have been a catastrophic war. In addition, it provided both parties with critical breathing room.19

North Korea and the US also engaged in bilateral talks from 1996 onwards. The so-called "Perry Process," under the guidance of former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, was an effort to better coordinate and strengthen the engagement policy towards North Korea. The first visible success of this process was the September 1999 missile test moratorium signed in Berlin between the two states which called for an exchange of the partial lifting of economic sanctions by the Americans for bilateral inspections at a nuclear site in Kumchang-ri.20

Towards the end of Clinton's second term, North Korea was suddenly seen reaching out to the US and other countries in a dramatic fashion. After meeting with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Kim Jong Il, responded to Albright's suggestion that Kim "pick up the phone anytime" to reach her, by saying, "Please give me your email address." In addition, Kim hosted visits from the presidents of South Korea, Russia, and even visited Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. This outreach was most likely an attempt to balance superpowers and to attain benefits from the US such as removal of North Korea from the US list of terrorist states and assistance with the launching of a satellite before the more hard-line Bush administration came into office.2122

Policies under Bush

From the start, Bush's policies towards North Korea were more hard-line than Clinton's. His attitude towards the Agreed Framework was wary, and he initially thought of it as a form of blackmail, although after examining it carefully, realized that he could not justify abandoning it without replacing it with something better.23 In 1999, a Republican study group headed by Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage criticized the Perry process as "insufficient" and called for alliance consultations and an integrated package deal such as conventional arms control and the unification of North and South Korea instead of a focus on preventing North Korea's collapse. Only if such a strategy should fail, should the US act preemptively. The Armitage report basically agreed with Clinton's policy of engagement, while criticizing it. This was in contrast to the North Korea Advisory Group, which took a harsher stance.24

The Bush Team broke off all talks with North Korea after it confessed to a nuclear enrichment program in October of 2002 even though North Korea reportedly offered to stop the program in exchange for a written agreement that the US would not launch a pre-emptive strike on it. Bush refused, suspended fuel shipments, and hardened his stance. North Korea subsequently responded by declaring that it would reopen its Yongbyon facilities, and began to move it's spent fuel rods out of storage. It also announced its plans to reopen the critical reprocessing plant beginning in February 2003 and stated on January 9, 2002 that it would be withdrawing from the NPT.25 After 9/11, Bush included North Korea in his January 29, 2002 "Axis of Evil" speech. This was perceived as a part of a more hostile American attitude towards North Korea and gave the North Koreans the impression that the US was set on attacking North Korea after it was through with Iraq. In addition, North Korea made the list of nations that would be subject to a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the administration's nuclear posture review.26

Did Bush's policies lead to the current nuclear crisis? Although his "Axis-of-Evil" speech and harsher stance towards North Korea may have exacerbated the already tense situation, it did not cause it. Again, the nuclear problem had been going on long before Bush took office.27

Where are We Now?

Currently, talks between the US and North Korea are taking place in Beijing. China is crucial to success of these talks because of its leverage over North Korea. China is North Korea's largest trading partner and its largest source of food and economic aid, and thus a country the North Koreans may be more likely to listen to. Beijing's cooperation is seen as essential if the US and its allies seek to increase North Korea's isolation by reducing its energy supplies or restricting exports.28 Having the Chinese take part in the talks also makes the talks multilateral in both form and fact. The arrogant behavior of the North Koreans towards the Chinese in talks in Beijing last week may have alienated the Chinese somewhat towards the North Korean cause and "strengthened America's hand globally in the dispute."29

At the point at which I stopped my research, White House officials were in the process of ordering the CIA to conduct a review of whether or not North Korea is capable of producing bomb-grade plutonium, as it has reported, without being detected by the US. This was in response to North Korea's declaration last week that it was "already a nuclear power" and had already completed reprocessing its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods which could provide enough plutonium for another six weapons. Senior US officials believe that Pyongyang is bluffing, however, and feel a need to verify their statements. The results of this new intelligence review could determine whether or not the Bush administration will continue talks with the North Koreans, or move in the next couple of weeks or months towards a "kind of economic embargo not seen since the Cuban missile crisis."30 North Korea has retorted that any embargo of this sort would be viewed by them as an act of war. South Korea and China both believe that an embargo would be a bad idea given that North Korea is currently willing to talk.31

Alice Wang is a student at Princeton University, USA.

Bibliography

1. Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, p. 251.
2. Oh, Kongdan, and Ralph C. Hassiq. "North Korea's Nuclear Program." Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War. Young Whan Kihl, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 234.
3. Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, p. 252.
4. Wendt, James C. The North Korean Nuclear Program: What is to be Done? Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994, p. 1.
5. Wendt, James C. The North Korean Nuclear Program: What is to be Done? Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994, p. 1.
6. Oh, Kongdan, and Ralph C. Hassiq. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000, p. 91.
7. Ibid, p. 105.
8. Ibid, pp. 139-140.
9. Ibid, p. 192.
10. Reese, David. The Prospects for North Korea's Survival. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 16.
11. Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiation Behavior. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. ix.
12. Ibid, p. 153.
13. Henriksen, Thomas H. Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea. Stanford University: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1996, p. 29.
14. Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. "The Korea Crisis." Foreign Policy. May/June 2003, p. 20-30, p. 22.
15. Manning, Robert A. "The Enigma of the North." Wilson Quarterly. Summer 99, Issue 3, p. 73.
16. Henriksen, Thomas H. Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea. Stanford University: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1996, p. 30.
17. Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 75.
18. Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. "The Korea Crisis." Foreign Policy. May/June 2003, p. 24.
19. Laney, James T., and Jason T. Shaplen. "How to Deal with North Korea." Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2003 Vol.82 Issue 2, p. 16.
20. Harnisch, Sebastian. "US-North Korean Relations under the Bush Administration: From 'Slow Go' to 'No Go'." Asian Survey. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press Journals Division, 2002. p. 862
21.
22. Clifford, Mark L., and Sheridan Prasso. "Why North Korea is Rushing to Cozy up to Clinton." Business Week. 11/06/2000. Issue 3706, p. 68.
23. Laney, James T., and Jason T. Shaplen. "How to Deal with North Korea." Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2003 Vol.82 Issue 2.
24. Harnisch, Sebastian. "US-North Korean Relations under the Bush Administration: From 'Slow Go' to 'No Go'." Asian Survey. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press Journals Division, 2002, p. 864.
25. Laney, James T., and Jason T. Shaplen. "How to Deal with North Korea." Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2003 Vol.82 Issue 2.
26. "Axis of Incoherence." Nation. 01/27/03. Vol. 276, Issue 3, p. 3.
27. Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. "The Korea Crisis." Foreign Policy. May/June 2003, p. 26.
28. Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, p. 411.
29. Scowcroft, Brent, and Arnold Kanter. "A Surprising Success on North Korea." The New York Times. 1 May 2003, late ed.: A35.
30. Sanger, David E., with Howard W. French. "North Korea Prompts U.S. To Investigate Nuclear Boast." The New York Times. 1 May 2003, late ed.: A20.
31. Ibid.