posted on the web on April 21 2003

Basic Data

Full Name: European Union Headquarters: Brussels Population: about 371 million (2002 est.) Total area: 3,191,100 sq km Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Candidate Countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. Internet site: Europa Source: EU

On February 15th, 2003, millions of Europeans took to the streets throughout the continent in a massive expression of opposition to the policies of the Bush administration on Iraq and the risk of a new Gulf war they entailed. Such large scale mobilization, which has continued after the outbreak of hostilities and up to the present time, has taken many in America by surprise. In conjuncture with the diplomatic stance of certain European governments, the anti-war movement has contributed to a general souring of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, a political drifting apart that, to a certain extent, has begun to call into question time-honored institutions and loyalties. It is, by now, a commonly accepted assessment that the U.S.-Europe partnership is facing its most severe crisis since the Second World War.

In what sense are the latest developments relative to the Middle East conflict to be associated with a broader wave of anti-American sentiment? The events of February 15th offer us a good entry point into the main issues. The size of European rallies, corroborated by subsequent opinion polls, points to the fact that, contrary to the characterizations of the popular press and of some official rhetoric, opposition to the current Gulf war is not the whim of a few misguided political leaders, but a truly mass phenomenon. In all major EU countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, as well as Turkey), at least 70 % of the population is contrary to the conflict. Thus, from the standpoint of democratic accountability, the anomaly to be explained is, rather, the support of the Blair and Aznar (and, in a more nuanced fashion, Berlusconi) governments to the U.S. administration’s policies. Such explanation (if we opt to remain agnostic about the true moral convictions of pro-US leaders on the need to liberate the Middle East from dictatorships) is readily available in the form of advantages in bilateral relationships as a reward for defection from a European consensus position, itself made easier by insufficient E.U. solidarity and the latent hegemonism of the French-led stance.

The European street protests were only one part of a truly global public opinion movement on February 15th, stretching from Melbourne to Manhattan. The continental variety, however, was distinct both from its American counterpart and the rallies in Arab and other developing nations: it could not be wholly reduced to domestic partisan politics, given the size and cross-cutting nature of the anti-war consensus, while at the same time, clearly, there was no question of choosing sides in the war, or supporting Iraq against “Western imperialism”. If direct political interests were not at stake, what can explain the magnitude of the pacifist movement? If we are to understand the situation in its complexity, we must shift our focus from the short-term crisis to the longer-term structural determinants of European public opinions’ unease with American policies: its historical roots, its current political and organizational vehicles, and the issues on which there is most friction.

European anti-Americanism is not, of course, new to the 21st century. Its proximate origins lie in Cold War cleavages and the militarization of the Western and Communist blocs in the early ‘50s. Most recently, popular opposition to American defense policies in Europe has manifested itself in the Euro-missiles controversy of the early ‘80s. After the fall of the Berlin wall, many of these conflicts lost their urgency; at the same time, however, certain sectors of public opinion began to re-evaluate their position with regard to the United States. In general, we can trace the following regularities in the distribution of political stances vis-à-vis US power in Europe in the several domestic public arenas.

First of all, governments by in large tend to be more pro-American than their constituents and public opinion, especially as represented by voluntary associations, unions, ONGs, etc. A parallel may be drawn with elite commitment throughout most of the continent to European integration: electorates in the main European countries are effectively offered no viable political force embodying a neutralist or anti-NATO stance. Even the much-reviled French political establishment is much more of a staunch “Atlanticist”, if of a critical type, than relevant sectors of the population would wish. The strategic-level choice of partnership with America can indeed be said to be a ‘locked-in’ policy for European political elites.

Second, within this general framework, left-wing and socialist administrations and parties tend on the whole to be more anti-American than conservative ones. While this trend has not changed since the end of the Cold War, the most important development in recent years has been the growing rift between America and European religious hierarchies. The most visible expression of this shift has been the Vatican’s position on a number of issues, from Cuba to cloning, but the trajectory of the Anglican Church, for example, has been quite similar. While the cold war saw religious organizations and movements forming the societal backbone of most conservative and Christian-democrat parties throughout the continent, in the past decade the potential anti-humanism implicit in the Anglo-Saxon version of mature global capitalism has appeared to religious hierarchies to present the larger threat. Such a perception is heightened when American leaders adopt religious language and arguments to support their political choices and buttress their legitimacy, thus appearing to religious authorities to be “invading” their field of prerogative. This is potentially the most important long-term development in European public attitudes towards the transatlantic relationship.

Third, and last, traditional conservative and neo-reactionary parties and movements in Europe find themselves in a curious political bind vis-à-vis the United States. Both groups are typically nationalist, but at the same time they require a vigorous anti-communist rhetoric as one of their most potent forces of ideological cohesion. They have thus been mostly pro-NATO during the Cold War, but now, ironically, risk being outflanked by any nationalistic evolution of anti-American feeling in public opinion. Their middle-eastern policy is subject to even more glaring paradoxes. Many groups have vestiges of anti-Semitism in their political DNA; more recently, however, their populist opposition to immigration and consequent anti-Arab xenophobia has merged with admiration of the state of Israel’s strong-arm tactics in the Territories and regional power politics, to make them into some of the most enthusiastic (and embarrassing) foreign supporters of the Sharon administration. It is hard to miss the historical irony of Gianfranco Fini, leader of Italy’s ruling post-fascist National Alliance Party, being the most outspoken domestic apologist of Israel’s right to defend herself from Palestinian terrorism.

Country Data

Full Name: United States of America Capital: Washington D.C. Population: 280,562,489 (2002 est.) Location: North America Total area: 9,629,091 sq km Language: English, Spanish Ethnic groups: white 77.1%, black 12.9%, Asian 4.2%, Native 1.8% Religions: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2% Currency: US Dollar IGO memberships: G-8, NATO, UN, UNSC, WHO, WTO Internet site: Department of State Source: CIA World Factbook

We have, so far, taken a narrow view of European anti-American sentiments, as if they were centered exclusively on military policy. In fact, the political distance between the two shores of the Atlantic is broader and less episodic. We can briefly sketch the main areas of friction.

On the economic level, the main dispute has centered around the social effects of globalization. While successive U.S. administrations have appeared to embrace the neo-liberal view of economic governance wholeheartedly, most continental countries have been engaged in an attempt to shield their social model from the pressures of the global marketplace. The occasional rows over protectionism, mergers, intellectual property rights, and the government of international economic organizations have taken place in the context of differing perceptions of the desirability of state intervention in society. Disputes such as the one over Genetically Modified Organisms are indicative of sharply diverging levels of public trust in the capacity for self-regulation of large Multi-National Corporations.

On the military level, most problems derive from the objective imbalance in power projection capabilities between NATO allies, which has increased dimensionally following the IT-propelled Revolution in Military Affairs that the US armed forces have launched in the 1990s. Such an increase in U.S. military might has diminished the viability and usefulness of the Atlantic Alliance as an effective fighting force, consequently making the Americans less dependent on active European support. Capabilities and foreign policies have followed parallel trajectories: asymmetric military decoupling has coincided with a growing rift in the perception of threats to common security. The pronounced unilateralism of the current U.S. administration has even engendered some doubts regarding the compatibility of (at least) short-term national interests: the effects can be seen most clearly in the resurgence of the periodic debate on the series of treaties granting the U.S. access to military facilities in various European countries, and shielding her armed forces from the jurisdiction of local courts. The most militant expressions of European anti-Americanism proceed to draw the connection between the economic and military aspects of transatlantic political differences, interpreting them both (with an often quite significant conspiracy-theory component) as parts of one and the same fundamentally malign hegemonic design.

It is, however, the last area of transatlantic friction that is the least discussed but potentially most troubling source of division: on the level of political culture, there seems to be a great and growing distance between the American and the several European polities. European political systems, of course, are traditionally more polarized and ideologized, with a stronger left-wing and social-democratic component, and more powerful unions. However, the recent rise to power of militant neo-conservative forces within American political life constitutes a fundamental change in the transatlantic political equation. Despite the influence wielded by traditional religious hierarchies in Europe, continental politics and societies are considerably more secularized than the social base from which the American neo-conservatives draw their values and electoral strength. The consequence is that the new U.S. elite fundamentally does not share the Europeans’ universe of discourse; the significance and appeal of their political concepts and metaphors, from compassionate conservatism to faith-based welfare, from the axis of evil to the crusade on terror, are thus, in a broad sense, incomprehensible. Their use in justifying policy leads inevitably to misunderstandings, skepticism, and eventual hostility.

Given these dimensions of European anti-Americanism, what does the future hold?

The current bout of acute anti-American feelings is largely contingent: the grassroots movement owes its cohesion, in spite of its heterogeneous nature, to the broad cross-cutting appeal of pacifism. Anti-American resentment, where it belongs not to radical fringes but to the mainstream, appears, above and beyond folkloristic negative displays, in but a timid positive guise, as a desire for dissociation from what are perceived as the most blatantly instrumental policies of the Bush Administration. Naturally, a space now potentially exists in Europe for political entrepreneurs desirous of guiding and institutionalizing the vague yearnings for larger autonomy and non-domination in continental public opinion. Such politicians, however, face the formidable hurdle represented by the force of inertia of ‘locked-in’ policies enshrining Atlantic solidarity. Even in the unlikely event of a long-term change of outlook by important European political actors, the continent at present possesses only fairly weak and decentralized diplomatic and logistic assets to bring to bear in attempting to coax the United States toward different policies. It is difficult to imagine, given today’s political realities, an ability on the part of supranational entities such as the E.U. to develop a unitary political will backed by material capabilities sufficient to render it a global counterweight to America. Current institutional development is simply too beset by veto-points, opt-outs, and temptations for defection.

This is not necessarily good news for American unilateralists, though: if the institutional and military equation seems stable, the loss of international legitimacy brought about by the pacifist movement is unprecedented. American hegemony in the past century rested largely on the ability on the part of the U.S. to exert “soft power”, which in turn depended on shared values, understandings, and norms in the international community. A hegemon that cannot share responsibility for the upholding of international order, and that is obliged to fight its own battles militarily, and nearly alone, already suffers from a diminished leadership. This same situation dictates a course of action for those who, on the contrary, wish for Atlantic rapprochement: a concerted effort must be made on both sides to distinguish between administrations and peoples, between policies and long term interests, between states and civil societies. Only thus can the more distasteful and dangerous forms of xenophobia and intolerance be kept at bay.

Matteo Giglioli is a student at Princeton University, USA.