posted on the web on April 21 2003

Basic Data

Full Name: European Union Headquarters: Brussels Population: about 371 million (2002 est.) Total area: 3,191,100 sq km Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Candidate Countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. Internet site: Europa Source: EU

The appeal of mutual military defense within the European Union is understandable. The ability to enforce and project the mandates of European nations into both lawless areas of Europe and distant corners of the globe would appeal to leaders as ideologically opposed as Silvio Berlusconi and Lionel Jospin. However, after pushing aside the political posturing, it becomes readily apparent that the RRF (or RRC, for Rapid Reaction Capability) is, at this point, little more than a set of general principles initially expressed in the Maastricht Treaty, and a far cry from the enforcer of the new Europe that so many politicians are touting. In fact, what one begins to realize is that the RRF is simply political posturing-ideological lip service to European independence from US-based influence that will simply reinforce egotism and not enforce policy.

As created by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Rapid Reaction Force is generally unformed and unstructured. Section J4 of the section on the Common Foreign and Security Policy talks of a general defense policy towards issues of European defense. Nonetheless, the goals are general enough to be applicable to the macro context. The EU is charged with safeguarding “common values, fundamental interests, and the union’s independence.” (Article J.1) Sections J.2 and J.3 discuss joint action, but make no mention of a permanent force, nor do they explain specific issues of structure or command. These issues were initially discussed at later meetings, but many of them are still unresolved. A basic command structure has been determined (with a commander named), but no provisions have been enacted thus far for joint training. Additionally, fundamental issues-such as intelligence gathering and the provision of heavy weaponry-are as of yet unresolved.

The problems with the RRF as it is currently defined exist on many different fronts. First is the basic problem of national identity, which has been overlooked by the force’s proponents. Inherent in the concept of mutual defense force is that troops will be placing their lives at risk for the interests of other countries. Often, troops will be required to give their lives for historical enemies, on issues in which their home countries have little interest. The odds that French troops will readily die to protect a German interest that does not promote French interests does not appear great, especially given the history of conflict between the two countries (1).

While some people point to recent economic cooperation as evidence of a new political community in Europe, having a unified currency is qualitatively different from to being asked to give one’s life for the interests of a historical enemy. These nationalistic constraints, which are descended from centuries of intra-European conflict, have been overlooked by those seeking RRC capability for Europe, but represent a justifiable threat to the success of a European Rapid Reaction Force.

In addition, the geographic disparities within Europe itself will lead to implementation problems with the RRF. How will Eastern European nations respond to a request to send troops to support French influence in Northern Africa, for example? The significant geographical distances found within Europe will augment nationalistic differences found between EU member nations in hindering a successful RRF.

Moreover, if making service in the RRF non-compulsory would seriously undermine any potential for its success. As states under the Maastricht Treaty, only those countries that desire to take part in joint actions can be compelled to do so. Countries can therefore select in which conflicts they will involve themselves. First, this seriously compromises the RRF’s ability to maintain a unified force. The constant movement of troops and machinery in and out of the force would complicate fighting due to the lack of cohesion within the RRF. At this point, one begins to wonder whether or not having a force at all is beneficial, as it shows few advantages to simple coalition building in times of crisis. If the motivation of having a unified Europe is to centralize problems and difficulties and address them on a continental level, a non-compulsory RRF would not contribute to this goal. Instead, it shows European countries getting involved exclusively where it suits them, most often due to pressing domestic concerns. This allows them to claim to support unity, but actually encouraging the retention of national boundaries instead.

Additionally, there are massive numbers of unanswered questions, which, in their current state, preclude effective implementation of the RRF. On the military side, while over 60,000 troops have been committed by many different nations, the question of military hardware arises. No nation has pledged large quantities of military hardware to support the force. Military hardware is necessary to allow the RRF to project European common policy safely. The structure of the force itself has yet to be determined, and furthermore, military exercises for the force itself have not yet been planned. Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is no plan for the reliable sharing of active intelligence between countries. This leads, once again, to reconsideration of Europe’s dedication to ultimately creating the RRF.

More important, are the unanswered questions concerning the RRF’s mission and deployment limitations. The Maastricht Treaty claims that it should be limited to, “conflict prevention, humanitarian missions, and conflict management”. These general and broad definitions do little in terms of effectively sculpting a role for the force, and thereby does not encourage participation. Where will the force operate-will it be confined to Europe, or will it enforce European interests across the globe? Are there realistic and specific limitations on the types of situations in which the force can get involved? Furthermore, if it is successful in the future, can it become a victim of its own successes, i.e. are there checks to make sure that it is only used where appropriate and not where conflict resolution is better undertaken by other bodies. If the member nations that will be contributing to the RRF were truly serious about its creation, these questions and others would have been answered long ago.

Thereby, if the Rapid Reaction Force is more a figment of policy makers’ imaginations than a military power, its actual usefulness is called into question. At the macro level, the RRF was a part of a larger treaty that contained several measures declaring European unity, creating the Euro. Rapid Reaction Capability serves to augment that goal, but moreover, it allows for a feeling of independence from US power. Which country has supported a RRF separate from NATO the most? France, where vociferous proclamations of European independence from the US stretch back to the days of De Gaulle. The RRF gives President Chirac the opportunity to tell his constituents that he is working towards autonomy from US influence, regardless of regardless of whether this will actually come to be. Furthermore, the constant discussion of the RRF gives to the Europeans perceived political bargaining material in discussions with the United States, although the US remains passive towards the RRC, so long as it does not replace NATO, which it definitely will not do. There are many different reasons why NATO’s strength will not be questioned in the years to come. These include (but are not limited to), the strength inherent in the NATO charter, the defensive nature of the alliance, and its historic strength and prestige. Furthermore, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson publicly stated that NATO will not support it if it will undermine NATO power. Due to the disparity in the amount of power held by NATO and the military wing of the EU, the dearth of support from NATO could alone spell disaster for the RRF.

The more serious short-term danger in this scenario stems from members of European governments using the RRF in their speeches and public appearances to the extent that they believe that they can rely on it. Vociferous leaders can make grandiose claims of European military capability, and the invalidation of these claims will make leaders, and by extension their countries, permanently indebted to US support for military intervention. In both its present state and the immediate future, the RRF cannot be relied upon due to its lack of organization, structure, and capability. Reliance on the RRF will not only embarrass the newly integrated Europe, but also reaffirm its military reliance on the United States. The road to military independence diverges and the RRF is a mirage that the smarter nations will choose not to chase.

Matthew Gold is a student at Princeton University, USA.

Endnotes

1. While many correctly point out that France and Germany comprise the heart of the European Union and the former European Community, those who downplay divisions between the two nations do not give sufficient credence to the many and varied forces at work in this situation. The history of political animosity and military engagements between the two countries cannot be ignored, especially for the current generation in power, and even for the generation to come.