posted on the web on April 13 2003

Country Data

Full Name: Republic of France Capital: Paris Population: 59,765,983 (2002 est.) Location: Europe Total area: 547,030 sq km Language: French Ethnic groups: French 93% Religions: Roman Catholic 85%, Protestant 2%, Muslim 5-10%, Jewish 1% Currency: Euro IGO memberships: G-8, EU, NATO, UN, UNSC, WHO, WTO Internet site: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Source: CIA World Factbook

On March 17, the leaders of the United States and Britain agreed that the time for diplomacy regarding Iraq was over. In the United Nations Security Council, US President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put themselves in direct confrontation with the leaders of France, Germany, and Russia over the nature of the inspections program as well as possible military intervention. US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw minced no words when they expressed that adamant French opposition to any second UN resolution forced the 'coalition of the willing' to resort to force. The recent polarization of these opposing camps has caused discomfort in the international arena, and many wonder how these differences will affect the aftermath of military operations in Iraq.

To those who pay attention to post-Cold War international issues, these tensions are not necessarily surprising because they are not new. Here, I will argue that international disagreements between traditional allies will continue to occur. Indeed, these disagreements will become more apparent as we progress through our post-Cold War world. While these differences will cause discord for some time to come, they are necessary 'growing pains' for the international community if the bipolar Cold War framework is to become a new bipolar US-EU world. After a period of time, there may be a renewed harmonization of opinion. I will discuss this post-Cold War evolution on two levels, simplifying the current international situation to issues between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On the first level, there is the obvious tension over Iraq. France consistently differed with the United States and the United Kingdom after the Gulf War on how to relate to President Saddam Hussein's government. On the second level, tensions exist over the nature of the European Union itself. The French and British governments differ over various policies of the European Union, and the differences often spill into European relationships with the United States regarding foreign policy and NATO. The current conflict over Iraq only highlights those differences.

Disagreement over Iraq

Country Data

Full Name: Republic of Iraq Capital: Baghdad Population: 24,001,816 (2002 est.) Location: Middle East Total area: 437,072 sq km Language: Arabic Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20% Religions: Muslim 97% Currency: Iraqi dinar IGO memberships: UN, WHO Internet site: Iraq.net Source: CIA World Factbook

Throughout the past several decades, Iraq has been seen as a matter of national interest, and the differences of opinion among members of the international community reflect the different histories these nations had with pre-Gulf War Iraq. The current US-UK alignment against France over Iraq is now over a decade old. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, all three nations had various economic interests in Iraq, but France's were the most significant. Then-Vice President Hussein ejected the British from the Iraqi Petroleum Company after its nationalization in 1972. France retained a quarter-share in the oil company (1) and increased its sales of arms to the Iraqi army through the first half of the decade. In 1976, Iraq and France signed a Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, and France built a nuclear reactor at Osirak. In the 1980s, the US, the UK, and France provided military aid to Iraq, which was used to fight Iran. All three nations were more concerned by Khomeini's Islamism than Hussein's internal repression of dissent. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, France was Iraq's greatest western creditor, with debt totaling over 24 billion Francs (2). Among Western nations, France had the most to lose from a sanctioned Iraq.

France, along with Russia, opposed the Iraqi sanctions following the Gulf War. France raised objections to the humanitarian conditions in Iraq and argued for a more 'pragmatic' approach towards President Hussein. The US and UK, continuing to define Iraq in terms of security, argued throughout the decade that sanctions were necessary for international peace and stability. In 1995, French President Jacques Chirac called for an ending of the oil embargo and a reopening of normalized trade. While not successful with this measure, French diplomats convinced Hussein in May of 1996 to accept the UN oil-for-food program as outlined in Resolution 986. France later opposed the bombing raids of Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998.

While working patiently through the auspices of the United Nations, the French government remained steadfast in its convictions against the UN policies toward Iraq. France's opposition to the sanctions chipped away at the credibility of the sanctions, in which the international reputations of the US and UK were vested. At the same time, France's credibility increased worldwide.

Fault Lines in the European Union

Basic Data

Full Name: European Union Headquarters: Brussels Population: about 371 million (2002 est.) Total area: 3,191,100 sq km Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Candidate Countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. Internet site: Europa Source: EU

The potential for unified internal and external policies in the European Union has led to major disagreements over the nature of economic and political issues; although this division is not always consistent, Britain often opposes France and Germany over various issues. For instance, Britain often clashes with France and Germany over European economic policies. In the late 1990s, the French and German governments supported a unified tax (3) while Britain did not. Both France and Germany used the Euro from its beginning in January of 2002, while the British government has yet to decide on its adoption of the Euro. Britain and France continue to clash over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Britain, less dependent on agriculture than France, believes an overhaul of the system to be necessary because the current system wastes money, encourages farmers to overproduce crops, damages the environment, and impoverishes developing countries unable to compete with subsidized European crops. France, as late as September 2002, denied these charges and continues to support the CAP (4). Although Germany traditionally does not support the CAP, Chancellor Gerard Schroeder and Chirac agreed in December, 2002 upon a future ceiling on agricultural spending.

The most fundamental debates currently center on how the European Union presents itself to the world. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, is currently leading a commission to create a stronger, more centralized EU. Britain, France, and Germany are moving together toward accepting some sort of model with a constitution, greater powers for European institutions, and a European president while preserving the importance of the individual European nations. France and Britain specifically may be converging on the structure of a strengthened European Union, but they diverge on military and foreign policy; this divergence is key to understanding current rifts over Iraq. Tony Blair vouches for close cooperation between the European Union and the United States through NATO. He believes that a transatlantic alliance is key to European stability. On the other hand, Jacques Chirac announced his support for an independent, European force at the summit at Nice in 2000. Even though the EU Rapid Reaction Force, effective this year, will work in alliance with NATO, independence from NATO may continue to be a goal of France and other European nations. Current policy splits may only hasten progress towards this goal.

Foreign policy differences, inside the EU as well as across the Atlantic, have led to the current crisis in the international community. Previously divergent opinions have become more drastically different. This is not the end of diplomacy as we know it. In fact, this could be the "laying down of the cards" that the United States and Europe need as they define themselves in the post-Cold War era.

A Post-Cold War Order

The European Union is growing to be a formidable counterweight for the power of the United States. This was not always the case; the US supported European integration during the Cold War as a supplement to American power directed towards the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, though, the US did not have a monopoly in Western foreign policy. For instance, the UK and France certainly did not follow Eisenhower's wishes during the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. Again, the US was more than irritated with Charles de Gaulle's extensions of French influence in China, the USSR, and Latin America throughout the 1960s. Nonetheless, the US had the most influence in the Western half of the Cold War world. But Europe's general feeling of alarm toward the USSR subsided as the 1970s progressed, and by the 1980s, the European Union was moving ahead in its evolution (5). The 1986 Single Europe Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union were major developments in the political and economic concentration of power in Europe. This power is more pronounced now that the Cold War is over. Yet, as the power of Europe grows, power in the United States will not necessarily shrink, as in a zero-sum game. This will continue the economic and political interdependence of both sides of the Atlantic indefinitely.

Interdependence does not negate the political differences in the current transatlantic rift. European governments and the United States take care to pursue their specific economic and political interests. European interests may complement or clash with those of the United States. Great Britain's pursuit of its interests currently works in the favor of the United States. Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair defined the UK's interest in Iraq in terms of security; Iraqi oil may be plentiful, but the risk from its weapons of mass destruction poses too much of a threat. Blair believes Iraq to be a source of threat to such an extent that he was willing to fight his electorate and party for what he interpreted to be in Britain's interest. This hawkish view may make more sense when one remembers that Hussein himself orchestrated the ejection of Britain from the Iraqi economy in the early 1970s. On the other hand, France's pursuit of its own interests recently worked against the United States. President Jacques Chirac attempted to reopen previous ties with Hussein. France, along with Germany and other nations, opposed any military action in Iraq. True to their previous foreign policy stances, the UK cooperated with the US while France opposed the plans of the US in the Security Council. In the end, this crisis did not end the way France and Germany would have wanted. These governments may have believed that the outcome would be against their wishes, but at least they could make a great impression on the international community.

The intensity of the disagreement is quite new. This is because the West is not in a postwar period but in a post-Cold War period. No longer do Western allies need to unify against a powerful state antithetical to democratic values. In these circumstances, the level of disagreement over Iraq is now permissible, if not foreseeable. Debates on agricultural subsidies and tariffs (as now seen in the faltering Doha trade round), as well as war and conflict may only become more heated across the Atlantic as time passes.

This is not necessarily a bad thing. International allies can have fundamental disagreements, yet the relationship could become stronger once they reconcile their differences. The American and French officials have a much better understanding of each other now. President Chirac believed that the US and UK's aspirations in Iraq could be stopped. Chirac learned that this is not possible because American and British leaders have an intense will to follow through with such a course of action. Likewise, the hawks in the Bush Administration assumed their allies would jump on the American bandwagon given enough time for persuasion. Now they know that they can no longer count on the support of allies when their opposition is so strong. Everyone's position is quite clear.

Cooperation is Possible

Country Data

Full Name: United States of America Capital: Washington D.C. Population: 280,562,489 (2002 est.) Location: North America Total area: 9,629,091 sq km Language: English, Spanish Ethnic groups: white 77.1%, black 12.9%, Asian 4.2%, Native 1.8% Religions: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2% Currency: US Dollar IGO memberships: G-8, NATO, UN, UNSC, WHO, WTO Internet site: Department of State Source: CIA World Factbook

Rifts can be permanent if the parties are too stubborn, and stubbornness is the greatest threat currently facing both sides of the Atlantic. Presidents Bush and Chirac exhibit certain behaviors that should be changed. President Chirac, with his antiwar stance defeated, has done little to improve a bad situation for Europe. This attitude was already clear weeks before diplomacy in the United Nations ended. In late February, Chirac threatened the membership of the EU-candidate countries after they signed two letters supporting the stance of the US on Iraq. He dismissed these candidates when he stated, "They missed a great opportunity to shut up." At a European summit immediately after the start of the war, Chirac referred to the US and UK as "belligerents" whom France would not allow to rule Iraq after the end of the war in place of the UN because "That would justify the war after the event". Finally, France, Germany, and Belgium announced that they will hold a meeting this month on how best to pool their security resources. As punishment for attacking Iraq, Britain will be excluded.

Unfortunately, the Bush Administration could easily be accused of similar behavior. Long before the conflict in Iraq, President Bush quickly rejected any consideration of US involvement in the Kyoto Accords and the International Criminal Court. Both measures are widely supported among European leaders. Many felt the president struck another blow at multilateralism when he neglected to appear at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development last September. Colin Powell, in Bush's place, received a most unenthusiastic response from its delegates. European calls for American diplomacy in the Israel-Palestine conflict have gone mostly unheeded. While the Bush Administration recently announced the possible unveiling of a roadmap in connection with the advent of a prime ministerial post in Palestine, many Europeans were skeptical. Finally, there is no real indication as of yet that the United States plans on welcoming the United Nations into Iraq with open arms once the war is over. Americans may feel betrayed by the lack of resolve over Iraq on the behalf of many European allies, but Europeans feel the same toward the United States over many other issues.

Presidents Chirac and Bush must not allow their attitudes to continue to be counterproductive as the Iraq crisis unfolds. President Chirac may have miscalculated the damage he caused Europe through his recent actions. If he desires a strong Europe eventually to form a counterweight to the United States, he must stop working to do the exact opposite. Chirac, as well as his counterparts in Germany and Belgium, must make sure that their meeting this month regarding security does not lead to the creation of an institutionally separate European military entity. Chirac must not wish to coerce other European governments (especially those in Eastern Europe) to do his bidding on any number of issues. Also, Chirac will never witness his aspirations to make the EU strong and unified if he attempts to make Britain peripheral in European policy: its economic and military power is too important for the continent's success. He must remember, Iraq aside, that Blair is among the most pro-Europe politicians in London and that it will do no good to alienate him permanently.

The Bush Administration will have a difficult time reviving its international image. Certainly, a successful campaign in Iraq would be a good start, but President Bush needs to reexamine his general strategies toward international relations in order to win back any measure of trust from skeptical nations. Previous disagreements with the international community have tainted his policy in Iraq, as European leaders believed the regime change doctrine to be just another unilateral action rather than a legitimate security policy. Bush must not continually reject measures deemed necessary by American allies without expecting to run into opposition on other policies he supports. His administration must become more open to the desires of others in order to garner the cooperation the US needs from its allies in future operations relating to Iraq as well as the war on terrorism. The best place to begin this change is in the Middle East. President Bush must not hesitate to allow the United Nations access to Iraq immediately after the war. The United States cannot rebuild Iraq successfully with the United Kingdom alone, nor would Blair or the American and British electorates support such a decision. Second, the United States must launch into negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict upon the end of the war. The week before fighting in Iraq commenced, Bush announced his promotion of the roadmap to peace for the Israelis and Palestinians. Bush must engage both the Israelis and Palestinians much like US President Bill Clinton in order to show that the recent reform inside the Palestinian government does indeed matter. The United States will have to work with the European Union in order to show both the Israelis and Palestinians that peace in the region is an issue that unifies the international community and thus gives both sides in the region more reason to work toward the goal.

Working Toward New Alliances

These broad changes are not magical. The internal divisions in the EU will not disappear overnight, and the tension across the Atlantic will require time to heal. Hopefully, closer cooperation among Europeans themselves as well as between the EU and US over the Middle East will convince old friends that they can renew their alliances. Through renewed relationships, it may become easier to work out whatever differences that may arise in the future.

Until then, diplomacy will be more difficult as we venture into a new bipolar, or even multi-polar, era. There is no reason to fear differing interests, but many interests must be harmonized in order to build a stronger international community. Not only will this serve the interests of the United States and the European Union, but it will also serve the developing world. Only a united front of the US and a unified EU, under the auspices of the United Nations, will be able to successfully rebuild Iraq, bring peace to Israel, and build a Palestinian state. Without sufficient unity, the European Union will find itself divided beyond repair, and the United States will have few allies. If the post-Cold War order finds itself in a permanent standstill, everyone will lose.

Alexander Lewko is a 2002 graduate from Harvard University, USA.

Bibliography

"Agreement on EU Defence." BBC News, 08 December 2000.
1. Sluglett, Marion Farouk and Peter. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: KPI Limited, 2001. pp 154.
2. Graham-Brown, Sarah. Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. London: I. B. Tauris, 1999. pp 4.
3. "Different shades of European blueprint." BBC News, 30 May 2001.
4. Farming ministers from France, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain signed a letter in support of the CAP to European newspapers. "Ministers defend EU farming policy." BBC News, 23 September 2002.
5. Spero, Joan and Hart, Jeffrey. The Politics of International Economic Relations, 5th edition. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. pp 5.