posted on the web on April 21 2003

Basic Data

Full Name: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters: Brussels Member Countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. Internet site: Europa Source: EU

At the end of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz, two of America's leading realist scholars, famously predicted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would soon wither away and ultimately cease to exist (1). Yet rather than disappear, the world's preeminent alliance has enlarged and transformed itself at a remarkable pace. Since 1990, NATO has admitted ten new members, dramatically expanded its mission, fought its first war in Kosovo, deployed tens of thousands of peacekeepers in the Balkans, and begun to strengthen its capacity to deal with threats stemming from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But since 9/11, debate has intensified about NATO's proper role, and in the months leading up to the war in Iraq, the alliance was sharply divided about what role, if any, it should play in the conflict. What has driven NATO to grow and evolve as it has over the past 13 years? And how should the United States and its allies seek to shape NATO to meet the security challenges of today?

NATO's expansion and transformation since the collapse of Communism in Europe have resulted from a complex mix of factors. Foremost among these motors of enlargement and change have been the allied goals of: 1) promoting security, democracy, and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe; 2) keeping the United States tightly tied to Europe; 3) stopping the violent conflicts that ravaged the Balkans during the 1990s; and, most recently, 4) strengthening NATO's capacity to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. This article explores these various factors, examines recent debates about NATO's mission, and offers recommendations for NATO policy in the years ahead.

NATO's purpose and evolution

Established in 1949 to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union, NATO commits its members to consider an armed attack against any of them to be an armed attack against them all. By thereby reducing uncertainty about members' commitment to each other's security, the alliance helps to prevent and deter conflict. NATO also benefits weaker members by helping to ensure that more powerful members remain committed to multilateralism. The alliance has historically had its appeal for the European allies by easing their fears of U.S. domination or abandonment (2). Additionally, by 1990 members viewed NATO as not just a collective defense organization, but also as the central institution of an interdependent Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security community (3).

NATO members continued to support the alliance after the Cold War because it provided advantages in many domains. Most importantly, NATO remained a useful security blanket in case of the emergence of a new threat from Russia or other actors. The alliance also preserved the U.S. commitment to European security and provided the security framework necessary for political stability and prosperity in Europe. It also prevented a renationalization of European military power and made it unlikely that Germany would attempt to dominate the continent. Additionally, NATO promoted military transparency among allies, improved multilateral military coordination, and offered smaller members an opportunity for increased influence through the alliance's ‘one nation-one vote’ principle. From the American perspective, NATO also allowed the U.S. to project power more effectively, locked European countries into a friendly foreign policy orientation, and made the exercise of U.S. power more legitimate (4).

As the Cold War ended, debate heated up in NATO capitals about the future role of the alliance. While few public officials believed NATO should go out of business, some questioned its relevance and proposed alternative frameworks for European security. France, in particular, wanted to lessen the influence of NATO and develop a stronger independent European security policy. But the U.S., Germany, Britain, and other leading allies supported keeping NATO at the center of the European security architecture while adapting it to suit the circumstances of the new era.

As a result, in 1990 and 1991 NATO made major changes to its military doctrine, posture, and deployment, and cut its overall forces substantially. Additionally, at the November 1991 NATO Rome summit, members approved a "New Strategic Concept" that articulated a broader approach to European security and called for the alliance to prepare for missions across the military spectrum, from major conflicts to crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. NATO also increased its outreach to former Warsaw Pact nations, establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to promote consultation with them (5).

Enlargement and New Relationships to the East

Basic Data

Full Name: European Union Headquarters: Brussels Population: about 371 million (2002 est.) Total area: 3,191,100 sq km Member Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Candidate Countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. Internet site: Europa Source: EU

Central and Eastern European leaders made clear, however, that they were not satisfied with a consultative relationship with NATO; they wanted full NATO membership. They viewed membership as protection against the possibility that Russia might reassert its influence, as a means to prevent security competition in the region, and to enhance their security ties with the U.S. Additionally, they viewed membership as an entrée into the broader Western political and economic community, leading toward increased foreign investment and membership in the European Union (EU). Some leaders in the region believed also that the prospect of NATO membership would help to solidify their fledgling market democracies (6).

NATO enlargement was more controversial in some member countries, though it was ultimately supported by all of them. The Clinton administration's policy on enlargement was based on the goals of expanding the European zone of peace and stability, and solidifying democracy and market reform in transition countries. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued in 1997 that NATO enlargement could "do for Europe's East what the old NATO did for Europe's West: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the Cold War began" (7). U.S. officials also asserted that the prospect of NATO membership would promote political, legal, and economic reform by serving as an incentive for prospective members to comply with NATO criteria in these areas. This claim was generally borne out by events, as many countries in Central and Eastern Europe made substantial progress in solidifying democracy, subordinating militaries to civilian control, and resolving border and ethnic disputes thanks in part to the discipline imposed by potential membership.

Another U.S. argument in support of enlargement was that it would strengthen America's international position by increasing the number of nations committed to the same foreign policy goals as the United States. Albright noted the importance of this political aim in congressional testimony in 1997, asserting that enlargement "binds our allies to us just as it binds us to our allies" (8). The recent strong support among new and prospective NATO members for the U.S.-led "war on terrorism" and military intervention in Iraq appears to vindicate this view.

European allies supported enlargement for similar reasons as the United States, although the motivations varied somewhat from country to country. Germany was one of the strongest advocates of expansion; it believed enlargement would take Germany off of NATO's front-line by pushing its perimeter Eastward and would help ensure that allies shared the burden of providing for Central European security. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also argued more generally that "keeping the U.S. in Europe was an irreplaceable basis for keeping Europe on a stable footing". He and his successor Gerhard Schroeder have backed continued enlargement (9).

France was markedly less enthusiastic about enlargement in the early-to-mid-1990s, maintaining that NATO needed to be ‘renovated’ before it grew. French officials asserted that NATO should first clarify its mission and restructure itself to give Europeans more senior command positions in the alliance. France also pressed for European countries to shift more of their security identity from NATO to the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Yet, France was unable to gain much support for its position because other allies wanted to maintain a strong U.S. security tie, and European countries generally lacked the political will to strengthen their own forces sufficiently to replace those of the United States. Ultimately, French President Jacques Chirac supported enlargement (10).

As the enlargement debate advanced, NATO made important moves to reach out to non-NATO former communist countries beyond Central Europe that were not likely candidates for membership in the near future. Foremost among these nations was Russia, which occupied the awkward position of a country that was still viewed as a potential threat by many of its former satellites, but was generally moving toward closer cooperation with the West. Realist theory suggests that enlargement closer to Russia's borders would threaten Russia and cause it to try to balance against the alliance. U.S. and European officials, well aware of this possibility, devoted a substantial amount of effort to develop strategies that would reassure Russia that enlargement was not contrary to its interests.

1) NATO expanded its institutional links to Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, its successor the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), established in 1994.

2) NATO developed special links with Russia intended to deepen the country's integration into the alliance, establishing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997 and the more ambitious NATO-Russia Council in 2002.

3) NATO leaders repeatedly emphasized that the alliance no longer considered Russia to be a threat and that enlargement was not directed against it.

Thanks in large part to NATO's efforts to reach out to Russia and to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision that his country's interests were better served by cooperation than by confrontation with the alliance, NATO-Russia ties are now stronger than ever and the possibility that enlargement could provoke a sharp backlash from Russia seems remote. The terrorist threats facing Russia and NATO members since 9/11 further strengthened the NATO-Russia relationship by highlighting the common dangers that the partners face (11).

Redefining the NATO Mission

As NATO deepened its relationships with countries to the East and moved toward enlargement during the 1990s, it also grappled with how to alter its mission in light of the changed international environment. During the Cold War, the alliance adhered to a de facto ban on out-of-area engagements, but some officials felt that the ban needed to be discarded in the new era in order for NATO to remain relevant. The 1992-95 war in Bosnia convinced many leaders that the alliance needed to shift much of its emphasis from collective defense to regional security management.

The failure of diplomatic efforts to end the Bosnian War placed increasing pressure on NATO to intervene militarily against the Bosnian Serbs, who were generally considered responsible for the conflict. After months of deliberations, NATO carried out an intensive bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb targets in August and September 1995. The air strikes helped sway the conflict's momentum against the Serbs and led to the Dayton peace accords, which ended the war in October. NATO-led peacekeeping forces, which included troops from non-NATO partners, were then deployed to Bosnia to implement the agreement. By this time, NATO had definitively abrogated its Cold War ban on out of area engagements and solidified its role as a collective security, as well as collective defense, organization.

Four years after the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the alliance initiated a much larger military campaign to force Yugoslavia to end its repressive crackdown on Kosovar Albanians. This war, conducted by NATO entirely by the air, lasted three months until it succeeded in forcing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw forces from Kosovo. Subsequently, another large NATO-led peacekeeping force was deployed to Kosovo, which, like the one in Bosnia, remains in place to this day.

9/11 and After

Country Data

Full Name: United States of America Capital: Washington D.C. Population: 280,562,489 (2002 est.) Location: North America Total area: 9,629,091 sq km Language: English, Spanish Ethnic groups: white 77.1%, black 12.9%, Asian 4.2%, Native 1.8% Religions: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2% Currency: US Dollar IGO memberships: G-8, NATO, UN, UNSC, WHO, WTO Internet site: Department of State Source: CIA World Factbook

Only two years after the Kosovo War seemed to have solidified NATO's new orientation toward regional security management, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 raised new questions about the alliance's purpose. One of the important effects of 9/11 was to bring basic security concerns back to the center of the NATO debate. Within 24 hours of the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history, declaring them an attack on all member nations. But the Bush administration did not seriously consider requesting a NATO-run military operation against Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Instead the administration believed, partly because of residual U.S. frustration with the complications of joint military planning during the Kosovo War, that it would be most effective pursuing the war in Afghanistan without a formal alliance umbrella but with bilateral assistance from NATO and non-NATO allies.

Many NATO members and prospective members contributed substantially to the war in Afghanistan and subsequent anti-terrorism activities. For instance, allies deployed aircraft and troops to Afghanistan, made bases and airspace available to U.S. forces, increased intelligence-sharing, and helped patrol U.S. airspace. The assistance provided by many PfP countries seemed to indicate that NATO's policy of enlargement and deepening relations with former Communist countries was paying important security dividends. Supreme Allied Commander Joseph Ralston testified before Congress in June 2002 that, "By improving access, interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our Partnership for Peace efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to the U.S. and NATO". Ralston also observed that all of the countries aspiring to NATO membership have acted as allies in the war on terrorism and many of them have provided forces for military missions (12).

Motivated in part by the search for more allies in the fight against terrorism, the U.S. pushed for a big second round of enlargement in 2002, and obtained agreement at the November Prague summit to admit seven new members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In their lobbying campaigns to join the alliance, these countries emphasized that they were eager to help NATO battle terrorism around the globe. The Bulgarian Ambassador to the U.S. noted in congressional testimony that the aspirant countries were prepared to contribute to NATO in many ways, from air surveillance provided by Baltic states to de-mining expertise supplied by Slovenia (13). Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden noted in a separate hearing that Romania and Bulgaria had strengthened their case for membership by their "exemplary support" for the anti-terrorism campaign (14).

The second round of enlargement was notable in part for the lack of controversy surrounding it. By the Prague summit the most contentious debate in NATO was not over membership but over the alliance's goals and capabilities. At the heart of this debate is the growing gap between the military capacities of the U.S. and those of its NATO allies. The Kosovo War and subsequent engagements in Afghanistan underscored to many U.S. and European officials that most NATO allies are not able to operate alongside U.S. forces in an effective manner because of their deficiencies in areas such as command and control, precision bombing, reconnaissance, surveillance, and strategic lift.

As a result of this gap, the Bush administration has concluded that NATO cannot currently be used for high-intensity military operations. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman told Congress that the growing capabilities gap between the U.S. and Europe "is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO," and that if it wasn't addressed NATO would "be increasingly less able to play its part in countering the threats that now face us" (15).

To make NATO more useful, the administration is pushing for the alliance to focus more on counterterrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and to develop more flexible and powerful forces capable of conducting a wide variety of contingency operations. It also is urging NATO to move toward greater specialization of tasks among members. Since the European countries are unlikely to increase their military budgets sufficiently to improve their overall military capacity dramatically, the U.S. is lobbying for each NATO ally to develop expertise in a certain area, such as chemical weapons decontamination, smart weapons, or transport capacity, that could be used by the alliance as a whole. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson has advanced this goal as well, recognizing that its achievement is essential in order for the U.S. to have greater confidence in the institution (16). Bush also called at the Prague summit for the formation of a NATO rapid response force that would be well-armed and ready for deployment on short notice wherever in the world it is needed. The alliance agreed to Bush's proposal to establish a force of 5,000-20,000 troops within four years.

The Bush administration's effort to redirect NATO's focus toward out-of-area security threats reflects its preoccupation with the war on terrorism and WMD proliferation. But some European allies believe that NATO should not come to be widely used for operations outside of Europe and worry that the Bush administration seeks to make NATO a tool of the United States. They do not see a great need for NATO to become deeply involved in the anti-terrorism campaign, maintaining that terrorism is best fought with financial, law enforcement, and intelligence tools, and that the UN and other institutions are better suited for many of these tasks. Some Europeans assert that if the U.S. keeps pressing NATO to make counterterrorism its focus, the transatlantic divide will only deepen (17).

European allies are also continuing their effort to develop a stronger independent European security and defense capacity. France remains the strongest supporter of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which it sees as a way to give Europe the ability to take military action without the U.S. Although the ESDP has progressed slower than many Europeans hoped, the EU aims to establish its own rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops, which is intended to perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in areas where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The Bush administration has voiced rhetorical support for the initiative, but some U.S. officials are skeptical that it will produce a military capacity of real significance and argue that Europe would be better off focusing on improving its interoperability with the United States. Supporters of an EU rapid reaction force counter that it will benefit America and Europe by providing the allies with an additional military tool and lifting some of the regional security burden from the United States (18).

NATO and the War in Iraq

Country Data

Full Name: Republic of Iraq Capital: Baghdad Population: 24,001,816 (2002 est.) Location: Middle East Total area: 437,072 sq km Language: Arabic Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20% Religions: Muslim 97% Currency: Iraqi dinar IGO memberships: UN, WHO Internet site: Iraq.net Source: CIA World Factbook

In the early months of 2003, the impending U.S.-led war against Iraq exposed deep fissures in NATO that created the alliance's most severe crisis in recent years. Given the split among allies over the war, NATO was never expected to play a direct role in the military campaign. But the United States and the United Kingdom supported a request by Turkey for NATO assistance, including air-defense missiles, surveillance aircraft, and chemical and biological weapons protection units, to help it defend its territory against a possible Iraqi attack in the event of war. Although 16 out of the 19 NATO members supported providing the defensive assistance, France, Germany, and Belgium opposed the aid, arguing that it would undermine their efforts at diplomacy by suggesting that war in Iraq was inevitable. Anger grew on both sides of the dispute, and some leaders began lamenting NATO's decline. Secretary of State Colin Powell used unusually blunt language in stating, "The alliance is breaking itself up because it will not meet its responsibilities." (19).

In the end, a deal was struck in February, as Germany and Belgium reached a compromise with the other NATO members, and the relevant decisions were made in NATO's defense planning committee, in which France does not participate. But the dispute left a bad taste in everyone's mouth and put into question the unity and purpose of the alliance. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson suggested that the public rift had done real damage to the organization (20).

The strains within NATO were also illustrated by the public positions taken by alliance members and prospective members on the Iraq war generally. While current members were nearly evenly split on support or opposition to the war, new and prospective members were uniformly behind the U.S. and British position. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and ten other new or aspiring NATO members signed public letters of support for the Anglo-American allies. Their open support upset France and other opponents of the war, and French President Chirac even suggested that bids for European Union membership could be harmed by pro-war stances.

This intra-European divide reflected the different security perspectives of Western and Eastern Europeans. While France and several other Western European countries seek to develop a more independent European foreign and security policy, most other European nations look primarily to the U.S. to protect their security. Poland's former Ambassador to Germany Janusz Reiter articulated this pro-American perspective, asserting that, "As long as the U.S. is a functioning reality and a united Europe is a dream, we will always choose the reality over the dream" (21). The difference in perspectives among NATO members presents a serious long-term challenge for the alliance.

Charting NATO's Future Course

Given NATO's recent history and tensions, what direction should it take in the years ahead? Looking at the two key issues of the alliance's membership and mission, there are four basic scenarios for charting its future:

1) NATO could stop its Eastward expansion and remain focused on security management in Europe.

2) NATO could continue expanding Eastward while remaining focused on security management in Europe.

3) NATO could stop its Eastward expansion but transform its capabilities to deal more effectively with new out of area threats.

4) NATO could continue expanding Eastward and transform its capabilities to deal more effectively with new out of area threats.

NATO's history of enlargement and adaptation since 1990 suggests that the fourth scenario is both the most likely and the most desirable. When faced with the loss of their longtime nemesis, the Warsaw Pact countries, NATO leaders recognized that the alliance needed to change its mission and expand Eastward to keep it relevant. That lesson seems as applicable today as it was a dozen years ago.

If NATO does not continue to adapt to changes in the international security environment, it risks losing its value to its members. Former German General and Chairman of NATO's Military Committee Klaus Naumann made this point by arguing that NATO must be used when a security crisis faces its members or its defense guarantee will become hollow. He concluded, therefore, that NATO "must become a global alliance, ready to defend its member countries' interests wherever they are at risk" (22). Above all, NATO must substantially improve its ability to deal with threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Such a transformation would entail an extensive modernization and adaptation of European defense capabilities, which may not be feasible in the near future. If Europe or the United States are struck by new large-scale terrorist attacks, however, support may quickly grow for a radical revitalization of the alliance.

Continued Eastward expansion is less urgent than a reshaping of NATO's mission, but in the long run it will also be necessary. For the next decade or so, it would probably be unwise for NATO to admit additional members because it will take some time for the alliance to adjust to its recent growth. Enlargement that is too rapid could seriously dilute NATO's effectiveness. Stopping at the second round of enlargement, however, would send a dangerous signal to other Partnership for Peace countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. At the Prague summit, President Bush said, "Every European democracy that seeks NATO membership and is ready to share in NATO's responsibilities should be welcome in our alliance". Other NATO leaders have made similar comments. If the alliance then closed the door on countries like Russia and the Ukraine, they might conclude that enlargement really was directed against them and a serious anti-NATO backlash could result, threatening the security, political, and economic progress of the region.

In a sense, the basic dilemma of enlargement is that once it begins it is difficult to stop. The best policy is to keep the door open to all Eurasian countries extending to Russia and Central Asia, while waiting for events to make the individual decisions clearer. When those decisions are made, NATO should adhere to a policy of only admitting members when the overall benefits of enlargement outweigh the total costs. In the meantime, the alliance should continue to pursue ways of tying non-NATO partners to it without offering them formal membership. After some initial difficulties and adjustments, this approach has ultimately worked well with Russia and other PfP countries.

Jordan Tama is a student at Princeton Univeristy, USA.

Bibliography

1. Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization, 50: 3 (Summer 1996), p. 469.
2. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 246-256.
3. The Atlantic Council of United States, Policy Paper, Permanent Alliance? NATO's Prague Summit and Beyond, Washington, DC, April 2001, p. 1.
4. Ikenberry, After Victory, pp. 233-239; Robert L. Hutchings, Interview, January 6, 2003.
5. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, pp. 271-300; Paul Cornish, "European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO," International Affairs, 72: 4 (October 1996), pp. 751-769.
6. Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds., Enlarging NATO: the National Debates, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
7. David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p. 92.
8. Ibid., p. 125.
9. Daniel J. Whiteneck, "Germany: Consensus Politics and Changing Security Paradigms," in Mattox and Rachwald, eds., Enlarging NATO, pp. 35-53.
10. Paul Gallis, "France: NATO's ‘Renovation’ and Enlargement," in Mattox and Rachwald, eds., Enlarging NATO, pp. 55-73.
11. Paul Fritch, "New Beginnings," NATO Review, Summer 2002, Brussels: NATO.
12. House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, Hearing, "NATO and Enlargement: A United States and NATO Perspective," June 19, 2002.
13. House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, Hearing, "NATO Enlargement: A View from the Candidate Countries," May 1, 2002.
14. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, "The Future of NATO," May 1, 2002.
15. House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, Hearing, "NATO Enlargement," May 1, 2002.
16. Steven Erlanger, "After NATO's Year of Identity Crisis, a Defining Meeting," New York Times, Nov. 2, 2002.
17. Debate between Daniel S. Hamilton and Timothy Garden, "Should NATO's New Function Be Counterterrorism?," NATO Review, Summer 2002, Brussels: NATO.
18. Rainer Schuwirth, "Hitting the Helsinki Headline Goal," NATO Review, Autumn 2002, Brussels: NATO.
19. Patrick Tyler, "As Cold War Link Itself Grows Cold, Europe Seems to Lose Value for Bush," New York Times, Feb. 12, 2003.
20. "United in Theory, Divided in Practice," The Economist, Feb. 22, 2003.
21. Craig S. Smith, "Poles Cherish U.S. As Friend, Fondly Recalling Its Support," New York Times, Feb. 22, 2003.
22. Klaus Naumann, "Crunch Time for the Alliance," NATO Review, Summer 2002, Brussels: NATO.