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PLACEMENT INFORMATION

Placement Director

Professor Mark Aguiar
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REFERENCES

Professor Faruk Gul (Co-adviser)
Department of Economics
Princeton University
(609)258-4009
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Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Co-adviser)
Department of Economics
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Professor Stephen Morris
Department of Economics
Princeton University
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EDUCATION

PhD, Economics, Princeton University	<i>2017 (Expected)</i>
MSc, Mathematics, University of British Columbia	<i>2011</i>
MA, Economics, University of Calgary	<i>2009</i>
BSc, Computer Science, University of Calgary	<i>2007</i>
BA, Economics, University of Calgary	<i>2007</i>

FIELDS

Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics
Secondary: Game Theory, Political Economy

RESEARCH

Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information, 2016. (Job Market Paper)

This paper develops a revealed-preference model of information disclosure. An initial decision maker, DM1, ranks information sources (Blackwell experiments) knowing that a second decision maker, DM2, uses the information to select an act from a menu. Both decision makers are subjective expected utility maximizers but may differ in their preferences and/or beliefs. I assume the analyst observes, for each menu of acts, (i) a preference ordering over all Blackwell experiments (DM1's preference for information), and (ii) for each signal, DM2's choice from the menu. The main result is a representation theorem characterizing DM1's *value of information*: the ex-ante expected utility associated with an experiment. The primitives of the model are sufficient to uniquely identify the tastes and beliefs of both DM1 and DM2, to establish that DM2 uses Bayes' rule to update his beliefs, and to show that DM1 correctly anticipates the behavior of DM2. I also present simple conditions to test whether DM1 and DM2 share a common prior, common preferences, or both. Hence, examination of a decision maker's informational choice provides a useful new method of revealed-preference analysis.

Implementation via Complex Contracts, 2015.

Standard models of rational behavior assume *logical omniscience*: if a fact is known to an agent, so are all logical implications of the fact. In this paper, I develop a model of belief formation without logical omniscience and apply it in a principal-agent setting. A sophisticated principal seeks to implement a function by writing a contract consisting of one or more sentences. The agent has a limited ability to combine sentences and determine their consequences; specifically, there is an integer $K \geq 1$ such that, whenever there are more than K sentences in the contract, he might not fully resolve the mapping from actions to outcomes. Consequently, the agent believes the contract is ambiguous, and I assume he is averse to this perceived ambiguity. I characterize the set of implementable functions and show that, without loss of generality, the principal selects a robust contract that implements a given function for as wide a range of abilities K as possible. Finally, I show that the principal can make this range arbitrarily large by introducing additional, superfluous language to the contracting environment.

A Finite Bayesian Representation (In progress).

Coarse Bayesianism (In progress).

TEACHING ASSISTANCE

Princeton University

ECO301 (Microeconomic Theory)

Fall 2013

ECO310 (Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach)

Spring 2014, Fall 2014/2015

University of British Columbia

MATH221 (Matrix Algebra)

Spring 2010/2011

MATH200 (Calculus III)

Fall 2010

MATH104 (Calculus I)

Fall 2009

University of Calgary

ECON301 (Intermediate Microeconomics I)	<i>Spring 2009/2008</i>
ECON373 (Game Theory)	<i>Spring 2009, Fall 2008/2007, Summer 2008</i>
ECON339 (Canadian Economic Development)	<i>Winter 2009</i>
ECON201/203 (Introductory Micro/Macroeconomics)	<i>Winter 2008</i>

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Princeton University

Dietrich Economic Theory Center Summer Grant	<i>2012–2016</i>
Stephen Goldfeld Memorial Summer Fellowship	<i>2015</i>
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship	<i>2011–2015</i>

University of British Columbia

Faculty of Science Graduate Award	<i>2010</i>
Graduate Entrance Scholarship	<i>2009</i>

University of Calgary

Queen Elizabeth II Graduate Economics Scholarship	<i>2009</i>
Alberta Graduate Scholarship	<i>2009</i>
Frank Mink Graduate Economics Scholarship	<i>2008</i>
University of Calgary Graduate Research Scholarship	<i>2008</i>
Jason Lang Scholarship	<i>2005–2007</i>

CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

Econometric Society Summer School (Seoul, South Korea)	<i>2014</i>
—Presented a preliminary version of <i>Implementation via Complex Contracts</i>	

Last update: February 2017