

Politics 552
International Relations Theory

Princeton University
Spring Semester, 2009
Mondays 9:00-11:55am

127 Corwin

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Office Hours: Thursdays 1:30-3, sign up sheet outside door

PS 552 is the second of a two-course graduate-level sequence in international relations theory. The primary audience is political science graduate students intending to take the qualifying exam and/or write a 591 paper in IR. Graduate students from other departments and advanced undergraduates with adequate preparation may be admitted to the course with permission from the instructor.

The sequence has three main objectives:

1. To further students' familiarity with the large academic literature on international politics to help them prepare for the synthesis and analysis they will be required to carry out on the IR field exam.
2. To introduce students to a variety of frontier research problems that animate current work in the field, so they can see and evaluate examples of how research is actually conducted rather than just commenting on "the classics" or reading pure theory.
3. To initiate one or more of their own empirical research projects, to gain practical experience in elaborating a theoretical argument, drawing out testable implications, assembling and analyzing relevant evidence, and presenting the work in stages before colleagues. For some students this may entail producing a first draft of a 591 paper.

The research-related goals 2 and 3 necessarily constrain the instructors' ability to provide a really thorough survey of IR literature. I expect that students taking the IR field exam will have read extensively in the literatures of IR theory, security studies, and international political economy *beyond* the specific materials assigned for 551 and 552.

Because the course is organized around problems in international relations, not around theoretical approaches (e.g. neo-liberal institutionalism or constructivism) students will be exposed to key debates and theoretical issues throughout the course.

Course Requirements:

1. Class participation.
2. Syllabus input. We will modify the syllabus throughout the semester as a team. Each week two students will make suggestion about changes or additions to the readings for the following week.
3. Issue papers. Each week two students will prepare brief papers that offer a guide to the key issues in that week's readings. These students will lead discussion for the first half of each class. Issue papers will be distributed 36 hours prior to class.
4. Two 5-7 pages research proposals, each consisting of:
 - a. A description of the "puzzle" that you are trying to solve.
 - b. A clear and succinct statement of a theoretical argument on an important question that you extract from the literature or develop yourself.
 - c. A characterization of the population of cases to which the theoretical argument/hypotheses apply, and the description of a sample (or way of sampling) from this population.
 - d. A preliminary assessment or "plausibility probe" based on brief examination of one or more cases from a sample, or a "quick" coding of variables for a simple descriptive analysis.
5. A practice field exam, 4 hours, closed book.

I will not allow incompletes in this course, so plan accordingly. Grades will be based on participation and issue papers (30%), research proposals (25% each), and the practice exam (20%).

Readings:

Books can be purchase online or checked out from the library. Articles can be downloaded or copied by the class.

As an IR scholar with a sense of the history of your discipline you should have the following in your library:

- Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- Brady, Henry E. and David Collier, eds. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).
- Kenneth A. Schulz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Barbara Farnham (ed.) *Avoiding Losses, Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979).
- John J. Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)
- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
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Some other useful things to be familiar with for your comp are:

- Conlist (1996) “Why Bounded Rationality”.
- Simon (1979) “Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations”
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Schedule and Assignments:

Most weeks we will focus on substantive questions, e.g.’ why do wars happen?’ We will spend one week on methods and we will have an open week at the end of the course which you can decide how to fill.

Week 1 (2/2): Methods in IR. Students will coordinate to assign response papers and syllabi input by email or wiki after class. Readings for the week are required.

1. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chps. 1-4, 6 required.
2. John Lewis Gaddis. *The Landscape of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chps 4-5. [[HAVE CINDY SCAN AND POST TO COURSE WEBSITE.]]
3. Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). Chps. 1, 7, 12, and appendix.
4. Robert Adcock and David Collier, “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001).
5. Fearon (1991), “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”
6. Steven M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” *International Security* 23 (Spring 1999): 5-48.
7. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions,” *International Security* 24 (Fall 1999): 56-73.
8. A case study:
 1. Robert Pape, *Dying to Win*, or Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror.”
 2. ACMR, “Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”
 3. Pape, “Methods and Findings in the Study of Suicide Terrorism”

4. ACMR, "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder"
9. Imbens and Woolridge, "Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation"

I. Crises and War

Week 2 (2/9): Why Do They Happen?

1. Game Theoretic Accounts
 - a. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for war," *International Organization* 49, n3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
 - b. Fearon, James. 1998. "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict." In The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Lake and David Rothschild. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ch. 5. (107-126).
 - c. Powell, Robert. 1999. Bargaining in the Shadow of Power. In The Shadow of Power (Chapter 3). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 - d. Jackson & Morelli (2007) "Political Bias and War".
 - e. Mark Fey and Kris Ramsay (2007) "Mutual Optimism and War" *American Journal of Political Science*. 51:4,73-754.
2. Traditional Rationalist Accounts
 - a. Andrew Kydd, "Game theory and the spiral model," *World Politics* 49, n3 (April 1997): 371-400.
 - b. Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as self-help," *International Security* 19, n3 (Winter 1994): 50-91 .
 - c. Stephen Van Evera, "The cult of the offensive and the origins of the first world war," *International Security* 9, n1 (Summer 1984): 58-107.
 - d. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory."
 - e. Jack Snyder and Keir A. Lieber, "Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I," *International Security*, 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 174-194.

Recommended Reading:

- John Steinbruner. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
- Dale Copeland. *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
- Reiter (2004) "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War"

Week 3 (2/16): Do Formal Agreements or Informal Norms Matter?

1. Formal Agreements

- a. Bearce, David. H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros. 2006. Internal Information, Alliances, and Military Conflict among Member-States. *International Organization*, 60, 3: 595-625
 - b. Fortna, Virginia. 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization*. 57, 2: 337-72.
 - c. Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. *International Organization*. 57:801-27.
 - d. Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco. 2006. Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War. *World Politics* 58, 3: 339-77.
2. Norms and institutions
 - a. Alexander Wendt. Constructing international politics. *International Security*, 20(1):71– 81, Summer 1995.
 - b. John J. Mearsheimer. A realist reply. *International Security*, 20(1):82–93, Summer 1995.
 - c. Xinyuan Dai. Information systems in treaty regimes. *World Politics*, 54(4):405–436, July 2002.
 - d. Ward Thomas, “Norms and security,” *International Security* 25, n1 (Summer 2000): 105-133.
 - e. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216-268.

Week 4 (2/23): Does Trade or Psychology?

1. Psychological Accounts
 - a. Chris Gelpi, “Crime and Punishment: The role of norms in crisis bargaining,” *American Political Science Review* 91, n2 (June 1997): 339-60.
 - b. Barbara Farnham (ed.) *Avoiding Losses, Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
 - c. Richard Ned Lebow. *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 101-147.
 - d. Robert Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapters 3, 8-9; p.58-113; 319-355.
2. Trade
 - a. Dorussen, Han. 2006. Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict: What You Trade Matters. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50, 1(February): 87-107.
 - b. Mansfield, Edward D. and Brian M. Pollins. 2001. “Interdependence and Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45,6:834-59.
 - c. Powell, Robert. 1999. Guns, Butter, and Internal Balancing in the Shadow of Power. In *The Shadow of Power* (Chapter 2). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 - d. Gartzke, 2007, “The Capitalist Peace”

Week 5 (3/2): Does Democracy?

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2006. Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace. [American Political Science Review](#), 4, 637-642

Farber, H. and J. Gowa. 1997. Common Interests or Common Politics? [The Journal of Politics](#): 393-417.

Gowa, Joanne. 2008. [The Democratic Peace: After the Cold War](#). Manuscript.

Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-86. [American Political Science Review](#) 624-38.

Weeks (2008) "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve"

Treier and Jackman, "Democracy as a Latent Variable"

Schultz and Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition," *International Organization* (Winter, 2003) 57: 3-42.

David Stasavage. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785." *International Organization* 61 (Summer): 489-525.

Week 6 (3/9): How and Why Do They End?

1. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle
2. Ramsay, "Settling it on the Field"
3. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44 No.5 (October) 2000: 555-579.
4. Goemans and Chiozza, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders, Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science*. Volume 48 No. 3 (July) 2004: 604-619.
5. Schultz (2005) "The Politics of Risking Peace"
6. Powell, "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting" [Maybe]
7. Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations"
8. Fearon (2007) "Fighting Rather Than Bargaining"
9. Paul R. Pillar (1983), *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as Bargaining Process*

II. International Institutions

Week 7 (3/23): Do States Need Them?

Keohane, Robert. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. [International Organization](#) (Spring): 325-55.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. [Economics and Politics](#) 2: 1-23.

Robert Powell. 1994. "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring): 313–44.

James D. Fearon. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring): 269–305.

Moravcsik, Andrew, Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. The Concept of Legalization. International Organization v, no. pps.

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation through Agent-Specific Punishments." *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn): 809–24.

Weingast, Barry R. 2002. Rational-Choice Institutionalism. In Political Science: The State of the Discipline. NY: W.W. Norton. 669-75.

Week 8 (3/30): Do They Work in Trade and Finance?

Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, "Commitment, Coordination, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guilds". **Journal of Political Economy** (1994) 102: 745-76.

Christina Davis. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98:1 (February): 153– 69.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? American Economic Review 94,1:94-118.

Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94." *World Politics* 57, no. 4 (July): 453–78.

Tomz, Goldstein, Rivers. 2007. "Membership Has It's Privileges: The Impact of GATT on international trade." *American Economic Review*.

Rose, Andrew. 2007. The GATT: Its Everywhere You Want it to Be. <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/TomzR.pdf>.

Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61 (Winter): 37–67.

Beth Simmons. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4):819–36, December 2000.

Tim Buthe and Helen Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no.4 (October): 741–62.

Lane, Philip R. 2006. The Real Effects of European Monetary Union. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20,4: 47-66.

Week 9 (4/6): How About Elsewhere?

Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime. *International Organization* 60, 4:93-69.

Tomz, 2007, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations"

Simmons, Beth. 2002. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94,4: 819-35.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99,4: 611-22.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political change," *International Organization* 52, n4 (Autumn,1998): 887-917.

Beth A. Simmons and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November).

James Raymond Vreeland. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (January): 65–101.

Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America." *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (August): 633–59.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59, no.3 (Summer): 593–629.

Judith Kelley. 2007. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (August): 573–89.

Michael Tomz. 2008. "Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs." Working Paper, Stanford University.

Recommended:

Sartori (2005) *Deterrence by Diplomacy*

III. Domestic Politics and International Outcomes

Week 10 (4/13): Security, Foreign Policy, and Conflict.

1. Leaders

- a. Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." International Security 25 (March): 107- 46.
- b. Howell, William G. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2005. Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force. International Organization 59, 1: 209-32
- c. Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Benjamin I. Page. 2005 Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy? American Political Science Review 99, 1 (February): 107-123.
- d. Jones, Benjamin F, and Benjamin Olken. 2008. "Hit or Miss?: The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War," NBER Working Paper No. W13102.

2. Political Considerations

- a. Schultz, "Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes" (with Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan), *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (August 2008), pp. 479-506.
- b. Hess & Orphanides (2001) "War and Democracy"
- c. Smith, 1998, "International Crises and Domestic Politics"
- d. Aldrich, et. al., (2006) "Foreign Policy And The Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 9: 477-502
- e. Kaufman & Pape (1999) "Explaining Costly Moral Action"

3. Bureaucracy

- a. Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63:3 (1969), 689-718.
- b. Bendor, Jonathan and Thomas Hammond. "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review* 86:2 (1992), 301-322.

4. Civilization

- a. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72,n3 (Summer 1993): 22-50.
- b. Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaeline Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism déjà vu? Some evidence," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, n5 (2000): 583-612.
- c. Samuel Huntington, "Try again: A response to Russett, Oneal and Cox," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, n5 (2000): 609-610.
- d. Bruce M. Russett, and John R. Oneal, "A response to Huntington" *Journal of Peace Research* 37, n5 (2000): 611-612

Week 11 (4/20): Trade and economics

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84, no. 4 (September): 833–50.

Miguel, Satyanath, Sergenti, 2004, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," JPE

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy. *World Politics*. 49,3:309-38.

Hiscox, Michael. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53,4:669-98.

Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin. Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: A cautionary note. *International Organization*, 54(3), Summer 2000.

Mayda, A. M., and D. Rodrik. 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?" *European Economic Review* 49 (6):1393-1430.

Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade," *International Organization* 60 (Spring): 469–98.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer): 477–513.

Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz. 2008. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety" Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.

Yotam Margalit, "Commerce & Oppositions: The Political Responses of Globalization's Losers," Working Paper, Stanford University.

Week 12 (4/27): To Be Decided By Students.