The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, πάθη) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ἐρωτικόσ), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature itself demands and indeed justifies—under certain circumstances at any rate—emotional attachments to or aversions from, and reactions to, some persons, things, and happenings, they introduced a theory of what came to be called ἐπάθειαι, good and acceptable ways of feeling or being affected. For short I will render these in English by “good feelings.” They divided these into three generic kinds, which they dubbed “joy” (χαρά), “wish” (βουλήσις) and “caution” (εὐλάβεια). They ranged these alongside, and set them in sharp contrast to, three of the four highest genera into which they divided the normal human emotions: “pleasure” (ίδωνι), i.e., being pleased about something, “appetitive desire” (ἐπιθυμία), and “fear” (φόβος), respectively. The Stoics maintained that, though ordinary, familiar human emotions such as these last-named ones were always bad, the three sorts of “good feeling,” and their more specific variations (since these three are only the basic genera into which lots of other good ways of feeling will fall), were not merely free from the grounds of criticism on which ordinary emotions were rejected, and so were perfectly acceptable. The fully perfected human being (the “wise person”) would indeed regularly be subject to them.

Their theory of the perfect human life did not, then, they could claim, require any outrageously unnatural demand, presumably unrealizable in any case, for a life completely without all feelings of involvement in the sweep and flow of life. It would not be a life of total detachment from people, things, and events, with no feelings about things in prospect, or events, or oneself
or other people. Only \( \pi\alpha\eta \)—the symptoms of moral and mental disease—were to be eliminated. Feelings such as being pleased about something you’ve accomplished, or grieving over someone’s death, and the rest of the \( \pi\alpha\eta \), are bad because in experiencing them one is wrongly thinking of their objects or causes as good or bad things to have happened (or in prospect). Since, for the Stoics, no such things can be good or bad (only a person’s state of mind can be a good or bad thing), any such feeling is predicated on a false belief that attributes too much (and the wrong kind of) value to these things. So any such feeling is strictly excessive and totally unjustified. Good sorts of feelings, \( \varepsilon\upi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\iota \), would, however, survive and flourish in the best, the perfect life. Thus, the wise would have a rich emotional life, quite different from the one grounded in “emotions” in the narrow sense of \( \pi\alpha\eta \) that we are familiar with, but one that nonetheless would bring the wise into connection with human life and its varying circumstances through their feelings, that is, through the ways they are psychologically affected by them.

More fundamentally, the Stoics could insist that their call for a life “without passions” (\( \dot{\alpha}\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha \)) does not rest upon or imply the simple rejection of what their opponents reasonably thought of as a natural and even wholesome aspect of human nature: our capacity to respond emotionally to things of value to us, to recognize their value in our feelings about them, and not merely with cool reasoned judgments. They can say, and seriously mean—I am not suggesting that this was self-defensive sophistry on their part—that their own view about human nature and human psychology does not deny the appropriateness and the naturalness of emotions. It does not call for simple and total suppression of the emotional side of human life. What they call for is not that at all, but, in this case as in others, the proper development and use of what is given to us by our nature. That proper development does indeed require that we eliminate all of the ordinary, familiar emotions of anger, fear, appetitive desire, and so on, which, in our misguided societies with their bad ideas and traditional outlooks, we grow up finding sometimes natural and appropriate. But this means only that we need to rework and redirect our capacity to recognize value through our responsive feelings so that they conform, finally, to what is truly
appropriate and natural for a rational being. If we do that, we will experience instead the good feelings of joy, wish and caution, and only them (and their subvarieties).

Given the defensive context in which, as it appears, this element of Stoic theory was worked out, it is not surprising that we have little detail about, and no full illustrations of, precisely how these good feelings would function in a perfected human life. The Stoics apparently did not develop very far the theory as a positive account in its own right of what they should have regarded, and clearly did regard, as important phenomena of the moral life. This paper is devoted to pursuing some of the questions that arise when one begins to examine the theory in this light. One point I want to make is that if the Stoics had thought these matters through more thoroughly as part of a positive account of the emotional life of the wise, they could in fact have given satisfactory answers to many of these questions—on the basis of an independently interesting and not implausible overall theory of human psychology.

II

Cicero, in one of the three expositions that have come down to us, in Tusculan Disputations 4.12 and 13, says flatly about two of the “good feelings,” wish and caution, that they are experienced solely by wise persons; he omits this when he comes to joy, but that is plainly what he must think about that one too. And we have explicit testimony from Plutarch that Chrysippus limited caution to wise people. Further, Cicero reports that, as I said just now, the “good feelings” took the place, in the life of the wise, of ordinary emotions that are experienced by the nonwise, and he offers a certain amount of comparative information about how the two sorts of feelings relate to each other. What Cicero says conforms completely with what we learn from our other sources. Thus it is safe to say that on the Stoic theory as it was understood by Cicero and later authors (1) the “good feelings” were limited to wise persons, and (2) they corresponded to and in some way replaced, in the wise person’s psychology, the passionately emotional states of appetite, fear, and pleasure that typically motivate the actions of the nonwise, and that constitute one large part of their typical reactions to events and outcomes affecting them—the ones that they are not in some way pained by or totally indifferent to.
I will postpone discussion of the Stoics’ grounds for not only describing the “good feelings” as ones that are specially characteristic of the wise person’s way of living, but going so far as to declare that only a fully perfected person ever could experience any of them. I want to focus instead, for most of the paper, on the underlying contrast between these feelings and the three ordinary emotions that they replace. In fact, it appears, there are two distinguishable aspects to this contrast, and what we learn from Cicero (and our other sources) about the second of these aspects is confused and confusing. My first order of business will be to straighten out this confusion.

As Cicero reports them, not only do the Stoics insist upon the different phenomenological character of the wise person’s feelings from those of the nonwise, but they apparently also hold that their feelings are directed at what are in fact entirely different objects. This is where the confusion comes in: in fact, as I will explain, the Stoic view involves certain complications, with the result that it is true only with important qualification that the feelings of the wise are directed at entirely different objects. The phenomenological differences, however, are straightforward: whereas the emotions of the nonwise are agitated and effusive, the good feelings of the wise are calm, steady, equable, smooth, and so on. And Cicero clearly implies (T.D. 4. 13) that the good feelings are always governed by the wise person’s correct conception of which things are, and which ones are not, good and bad respectively. Thus, the objects of the three “good feelings” would in each case be true goods or true bads, while the objects of the emotions of the nonwise would instead be things wrongly (according to Stoic theory) taken by them to be either good or bad. And, of course, the true “goods” that evoke the quiet and consistent movement of the wise person’s mind are virtue (a certain state of mind) and virtuous acts (the immediate practical expression of that state of mind). The non-goods that the unwise wrongly take to be good, and that can arouse what Cicero calls their groundlessly exuberant exultation by their presence, or anxious and agitated desire for them when in the offing, are various bodily states and conditions, and various external events or things, of which they are made aware or that otherwise come to their minds.
Thus, a nonwise person will have a passionate, “appetitive,” desire for some bodily pleasure or some supposed external good (some money, some elevated position, some power, maybe an agitated desire simply to maintain their health and good physical condition). But the wise, since they know that those things are in fact not good, nor bad either, will certainly not want them in that inflated, heated, excessive way. We will need to ask shortly in what way they do go for such things (whenever they do in fact go for them). But what corresponds in their psychology, anyhow in the first instance, is their desire for true goods: the continued maintenance of their own and others’ virtue, future virtuous acts of their own or other people, all the essential accompaniments of virtue when possessed by someone—and those are desired calmly, equably, with firmness, and without agitation. They feel drawn to them, that is they are moved with a feeling of attachment and liking for them, but this is not an empassioned and agitated feeling, such as the nonwise person feels in experiencing appetite. Likewise, whereas the non-wise will fear all kinds of threats of physical harm or loss, to themselves or others they are close to, wise people will never experience fear of such things; what they will experience instead is a calm feeling of dislike and avoidance, “caution,” but (again: in the first instance) in relation to the true bad—vice and vicious actions, and their essential accompaniments. And while nonwise people will be delighted and exult when they get something they previously had a passionate desire to have, or when, simply, they get something, or something happens to them, that they think a good thing, whether they wanted and pursued it in advance or not, wise people experience a positive and welcoming reaction, a calm, steady feeling of “joy,” that is limited to their own or others’ virtuous state, virtuous actions, and what is involved in those. Accordingly, as Cicero points out (4.14), there is no good feeling at all, corresponding to the fourth of the four classes of πάθη, the heated and fluctuating “pain” or “distress” (λυπη) of the nonwise, felt when something happens to them that they regard as bad—the loss of something they regard as good, the failure to attain something they wanted, the onset of some illness, physical or emotional pain. Cicero says that the wise never are never affected emotionally by anything that they regard as, and that in truth is, bad. They may experience things that ordinary people
count as bad, but they do not count them so, and feel no adverse reaction to them; nor do they ever do any bad actions, which you might expect would then merit an adverse feeling of regret or the like. It is true that they often witness thoroughly unreasonable and bad decisions and actions (of the nonwise), but, apparently, these are not things they suppose merit their having any negative feeling about—or so, anyhow, Stoic theory maintains.\(^7\) (I return to this below, sects. IV-V.)

Plainly, under many circumstances where the nonwise experiences an “appetitive” desire, or an emotion of fearful avoidance, the wise person would be left simply unmoved. Many unwise people want pleasurable sensory experiences or various objects, or are moved to avoid pains, and so forth, of a type that, or under conditions when, the wise person would hold it contrary to reason to try to get or avoid them at all. However, there certainly will be occasions and circumstances when the wise person will resemble the nonwise to this extent, that what the nonwise pursues or avoids the wise will pursue or avoid also. That is because in the judgment of the wise it is natural and appropriate for human beings, in their own current condition and circumstances, to pursue and, if possible, obtain or enjoy something, or, in the other case, to avoid it. What, then, are we to say about that desire, the desire that the wise person has and endorses, for the pursued object, in such cases? It will surely be a ἀλογος (“well-reasoned”) feeling of motivation toward what is in fact the same object as that which the nonwise felt a badly reasoned, indeed irrational, motivation toward. However, and this is the crucial point, the object will be conceived of differently. It will be conceived of, and pursued, not as something good to have and enjoy, but rather as something in itself indifferent, so far as goodness or badness is concerned—but something naturally preferable (as the Stoics say), worth trying to achieve, something possessed of a certain positive value. But would that not then be a “well-reasoned desire”—in fact, a “wish,” since “wish” is defined by the Stoics as “well-reasoned desire”—for the object in question?\(^8\) Likewise, when wise people decide (correctly, of course) that something is to be avoided or warded off, if possible, because it would cause them bodily pain or harm, or pain or harm to someone they are close to—pain or harm being naturally dispreferable
things—they will not fear it. But they certainly are going to be motivated to avoid it or ward it off; they will have some sort of impulse of rejection, to use Stoic terminology, toward it. And, again, it will certainly be a “well-reasoned” such impulse. But if so, would not that amount to their experiencing, in relation to those avoided objects, a “well-reasoned avoidance” or “rejection” of them—precisely what the ancient sources tell us the Stoics offered as the definition of the “good feeling” that they called “caution”?

Thus, it appears, the Stoics should hold that the good feelings of caution and wish have as their objects not only vice and virtue respectively, but also somehow the external or bodily conditions or things that the wise person avoids or pursues on the ground that they are naturally dispreferable or preferable. Now in fact, Cicero begins his exposition of the Stoic theory of “good feelings” in a way that fairly strongly suggests just that view. He says the following (T.D. 4.12):

By nature, all people pursue those things which they take to be good and avoid their opposites. Therefore, as soon as a person receives an impression of some thing which he takes to be good, nature itself pushes him to get it. When this is done with consistency and wisely, it is the sort of impulse which the Stoics call a βουλήθησις, and we could call a “wish.” This they define thus: a wish is that which desires some object in accordance with reason; and they say that it is found only in the wise person. But the sort of impulse that is aroused too vigorously and in a manner opposed to reason is an “appetite” or “unbridled longing,” and this is to be found in all who are foolish.9

Since Cicero gives no warning here about different conceptions of what is good, this certainly seems to say that, when anyone gets an impression of something as worth going for (and assents to that impression), in such a way that they go for it wisely and consistently, what motivates them is a “wish”; whereas if they are aroused for pursuit of it too vigorously and in a way that goes against reason by attributing too much and the wrong sort of value to it, then such a motivating desire is an “appetite.” So similarly for motivations leading a person to prevent or keep away from something harmful: this would be fear in the nonwise, but caution in the wise.
In fact, in the passage where Plutarch reports Chrysippus’s definition of εὐλάβεια as εὐλογος ἐκκλισις (n. 5 above) he clearly conceives, as one possible set of objects avoided or rejected through “caution,” all the things ordinarily prohibited by law: drunkenness, taking other people’s property, killing another person, leaving the army camp without permission, etc. These may not be things that, by contrast, ordinary people fear, but they certainly are not themselves acts of vice: as Plutarch emphasizes, for his polemical purposes, they are, in Stoic terms, only acts that it is inappropriate to do; they fall into the realm of καθῆκοντα (appropriate acts, things there is good reason to do) and their opposites, not κατορθώματα (such acts done from a fully virtuous condition) and the opposites of those.

What we find in Cicero, then, and our other sources, is confusing. On the one hand, we appear to be told that joy, wish and caution are directly solely at goods and bads, true ones: virtuous and vicious states of mind and actions. On the other hand, we get suggestions that they are also, or even instead, directed at external events and objects. In fact, I believe, these unclarities, and the confusions they cause interpreters, can be convincingly cleared up. When correctly elaborated the Stoic theory holds that the two good feelings that I have just mentioned, “wish” and “caution,” turn out, in a certain way, to aim at, and have for their objects, often at the same time, both the true goods and bads, respectively, of virtue and vice, and the various neither good nor bad objects that a nonwise person in the wise person’s conditions and circumstances would have an “appetite” for or a “fear” about. (Severe difficulties remain for the third good feeling, “joy,” as I will explain.) But before turning to this elaboration, we should notice the consequences for the Stoics if on their view the sole objects of “wish” and “caution” were the continuance of the virtuous state, and the future virtuous actions, or else, respectively, the avoidance of some imagined or possible vicious state and actions, of the agent himself, or of others he came into contact with. In such a case, the Stoics would not be able to claim that the wise person’s life would not be some cold, inhuman life, exempt from what do surely seem natural, and justified, human felt attachments and concerns. It would in fact be completely without all feelings of involvement in the sweep and flow of daily life. It would be a
life of complete emotional detachment from other people and from ordinary human concerns—from all the ordinary, harmless pleasures of life, all the ordinary things that people legitimately hope for (decent incomes, comfortable places to live, good-tasting and ample food and drink, companionship) and, equally, from feelings of dislike and opposition to physical pain, illness, poverty, hunger, social isolation, being treated unjustly, and so forth. If “wish” and “caution” do not in any way have for their objects anything except virtue and virtuous actions, then no perfected person has any feeling at all, pro or con, when it comes to any of these objects of ordinary human concern—despite the fact that, of course, such people will indeed actively pursue the one set and actively avoid the other. All such pursuits and avoidances will be the simple result of decisions, on the basis of reason, that it is appropriate and correct for human beings under normal conditions to go for the one and keep away, if possible, from the other. No feeling of attachment and dislike will be experienced at all toward any of these objectives of their action. Any attempt on the part of the Stoics to protest that in fact the wise will have feelings (feelings for their own virtue and virtuous actions, for example) would be perfectly hollow and indeed, in this context, quite laughable. It would be, quite simply, beside the point. Can it be that Chrysippus contented himself with such an obviously inadequate, purely formal, response to his opponents’ objections?

III

Fortunately, as I have indicated, this result is avoidable. In fact, on basic Stoic principles, it turns out that the “wishes” and “cautions” of the wise are, ordinarily, simultaneously directed both to the prospect of a virtuous action (or avoidance of a vicious one) and to the achievement or avoidance of whatever particular objective the action is itself aimed at attaining or preventing. To see this, we should note, to begin with, that on Stoic theory, all human action requires a mental “impulse,” which constitutes the psychic movement that in turn moves the limbs in the intended way. These impulses are constituted or caused by an “assent” to a special sort of mental impression, an “impulsive” one—one that (in the case of an impulse for action, a “practical” impulse) represents something to the agent as worth going for or avoiding, if possi-
ble. One crucial difference between a wise person and any nonwise one concerns the character of the impulsive impressions that they receive and assent to, when they generate the impulses that in turn move their bodily parts when they engage in action. The nonwise have the inveterate habit of thinking of all the ordinary things of concern in daily life as being good for them to get and enjoy (or bad to suffer), and so they get impulsive impressions of various of these things, when they are in the offing or might be made to be, which represent them to them as good or bad for them. They think of them, and see them in their imaginations and deliberations, as affecting their well-being, their happiness; that thought, on Stoic theory, is what causes their desires, and feelings of aversion, to be so damagingly passionate in character. It justifies, in their subconscious minds, the strong feelings of need for the things they pursue in action, or of need to avoid the ones moved away from, with which they pursue or avoid them.\(^\text{12}\)

Perfected, fully wise human beings have quite different ideas about things, and so they also get quite different impulsive impressions.\(^\text{13}\) They have learned, or trained themselves, so that they get instead impressions of things that represent them as neither bad nor good, but only, depending on the circumstances, things to be preferred or dispreferred, and so, things that are worth going for or avoiding, if possible, other things being equal. But that is not all. Since they are fully wise, their impulsive impressions also represent things as only worth going for or avoiding in a certain way and spirit. This spirit includes having the full understanding that whether or not one succeeds in achieving any of them, when one does act with the purpose of achieving them, is not within one’s own control but is rather in the hands of nature’s general processes, including within those, in this context, the actions of other human agents.\(^\text{14}\) In fact, in their impulsive impressions things present themselves to the wise as worth going for or trying to avoid only insofar as it is virtuous to go for or avoid them, and only in ways that fully reflect that fact. Thus, every impulsive impression that wise people assent to, and so every impulse they generate for action, represents something in particular as worth going for or trying to avoid. At the same time, it represents it as worth going for or avoiding in a very special way, namely a virtuous one. In fact, any “wish”—impulse to act—that a wise person might have in
relation to any specific circumstance must, precisely insofar as it is a wish to do a virtuous action, be a wish to do some particular virtuous action; it is an impulse generated in just the way I have explained. Admittedly, one can think of the wise as being possessed by a very generalized state of feeling, a “wish” for future virtuous action, just in general, and without any detailed specifications, whether of their own or (equally) of any other person. But such a “wish” could not be (by itself) what constitutes the impulse that leads them to do any of their virtuous actions. Any impulse that issues in action must be one that directs some particular bodily movements, with some particular conception of what is to be done, and some particular objectives. And without an impulse of that sort no one, not even a wise person, could ever do anything at all.

This analysis makes it clear that a fully fleshed-out Stoic theory of “wish” as what motivates wise people’s actions must treat the feeling of wishing as directed simultaneously, in the same conception and act, at virtuous behavior and at whatever particular objective was taken up in the act of assent itself that constituted that particular impulse. Suppose, for example, the action decided on is to repay a loan that is justly due. (It could instead be something morally quite trivial—as we moderns would think—for example simply to eat a tasty lunch: on Stoic theory every action of the perfected person will be a virtuous one, deriving from and expressing, in the particular circumstances, their virtuous state of mind.) In acting to repay the loan, the wish is both to do what it takes to repay it but also to actually get it repaid. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the agent as he or she forms the intention to perform an action, and does perform it, that which is “wished for” (the virtuous action, as such, as the good that it is) includes the particular objective—the one judged, correctly, to be worth attending to and making efforts to achieve—as an objective internal to itself. Hence, in aiming at the action as good, they are also aiming at the particular objective (even if, of course, that is not being aimed at as good, but only as appropriate, as a preferred indifferent, in the given circumstances). In that way, the “wish” for the action is inevitably also a “wish” for the particular objective that gives direction, and some of its shape, to the particular action that is undertaken.
It would, then, be quite appropriate to speak both of the virtuous action itself, qua virtuous and good, and of its defining objective as objects of wish when the agent plans, decides on, and executes the action. Hence, it is quite natural, and should not cause surprise, if, as we have seen, Cicero implies that virtuous agents, in activating a “wish,” are aiming, in the mode of wishing, at the particular objective of the action—the pleasure of the meal, the achievement of a fair distribution among disputed material resources, the defense of one’s country, or whatever the particular virtuous action might be. In “wishing for” those outcomes, they do not think those are good, but nonetheless they do wish for them, precisely in wishing for what they do regard as good, in the circumstances—namely, aiming at those objectives (in the right way). You cannot “wish” for any action unless, in doing so, you also “wish” for the particular objective of the action in question.\(^1\)

Something closely similar can be said also about “caution,” but certain differences need to be taken note of. To begin with, as previously noted, it does seem that wise persons will often feel motivated to avoid many of the objects that ordinary people also avoid, because they regard them as greatly dispreferred—a bodily injury, severe pain, their own death or that of someone close to them, say. The objects to be avoided by the wise person will thus in fact prominently include things that a nonwise person would typically feel afraid of. And when nonwise people threatened with injury, pain, harm, or death feel fear, which motivates them to avoid or prevent these feared outcomes, wise ones, not being afraid at all, will nonetheless recognize that this is a situation where fear frequently or regularly arises in human beings. Their being wise partly consists in that recognition. And, since they, after all, are human too, they will see this as posing a threat for themselves—a different threat from the one the nonwise person will feel. They will see a threat that one might not act well and rightly, but instead, by adopting a false view of the goods and bads in the situation (i.e. by accepting a false impression about them that arises for human beings only too easily), get carried away into fear of the impending event. That, of course, would be a vicious thing to permit or to do, and so wise persons in this situation will feel “caution” against it. They steel themselves against being tempted, or worse,
to regard the thing legitimately avoided as itself bad. They caution themselves not to go down that path in their own feelings. Here, then, wise people have a feeling of caution that, in being about the wrong way of regarding the avoided pending events or conditions that the nonwise person would or might typically feel fear in relation to, is also about, directed at, those same things. They are cautious about the injury, pain, harm, or death that they are legitimately trying to avert, lest in legitimately making those things objects of avoidance they fall victim to the natural human tendency to fear them. The wise regard these with caution just because they are so naturally found by human beings to be worth fearing. This caution about those harms, or whatever, will of course rest on different grounds from the fear felt by ordinary people. It is nonetheless a feeling of “rejection” or “avoidance” directed at precisely the same things as the ordinary person fears. It is, thus, a genuine counterpart to ordinary fear.

We can conclude, then, that, when properly understood, Stoic moral psychology includes the thought that wise persons, in experiencing both the “wishes” and the “feelings of caution” that motivate their actions of pursuit and avoidance of ordinary objects, will direct these (always, in the case of wish; often, in that of caution) not merely at their own future virtuous states and actions, and avoidance of vicious ones, but also at the relevant ordinary objects themselves. Thus we can now see that the somewhat obscure tendency in Cicero’s account, confirmed by other sources, to relate wishes and feelings of caution to both true goods and bads—virtue and vice—and to some of the objects and events that ordinary people have heated, excessive appetitive feelings of desire, or fear, for, does in fact correctly represent the Stoic view. Furthermore, that view is philosophically and psychologically both coherent and well grounded (in these respects). Thus, so far as concerns these two of the three “good feelings,” the Stoics are on fairly solid ground in claiming that the perfected, fully wise person will indeed not be completely without all feelings of involvement in the sweep and flow of life. Despite being free of all normal emotions, the wise will lead a life of felt attachment to other people and to normal human concerns, through their wishes and cautions in relation to them. They will have lots of felt likings and dislikings in relation to other people, things, and events.
IV

However, there remains the third “good feeling,” “joy.” Unlike wishes and cautious feelings, “joy” does not motivate actions of pursuit or avoidance. It is, rather, a reactive feeling. As our sources explain it, it is a feeling of “uplift” at being in the presence of (true) goods—i.e., virtue itself, virtuous actions, and their essential accompaniments. Since wise people, on Stoic principles, are constantly aware of their own virtuous condition, and this never wavers, or fails to express itself in virtuous action, the wise will feel a constant and steady joy at their condition and its expression in their actions. On the other hand, inasmuch as the actions themselves vary from moment to moment, the joy felt will vary from occasion to occasion to this extent, that its objects (the specific actions that give one joy) will differ. Hence, as with wish and caution, you might think that, on Stoic principles, when feeling joy at some action of their own or someone else that succeeds in achieving its particular objective (say, an act of courageous resistance to some threat, which in fact averts it), wise people will feel joy not merely at the virtue exhibited in carrying the action out, but also at the success in averting whatever it was that was thought, and felt, to be worth avoiding.

However, on Stoic principles, wise persons will feel joy at their own accomplishment in having pursued correctly whatever the immediate objective of any action of theirs might have been, and at having successfully brought off the relevant action, whether or not the object pursued was actually achieved. Hence, there can be no, as it were, special joy in having succeeded in one’s objectives on any occasion (or in something’s befalling one that, if one had known to expect it, one might have tried to help bring about). Indeed, whatever does eventuate is due to a thought of Zeus’s in deciding that it shall happen, and each and every such thought of Zeus’s is correctly welcomed with joy by all Zeus’s cosmic fellow-citizens and collaborators, viz., the wise and virtuous among human beings. Here we should bear in mind, also, that, as I mentioned, Cicero explains (T.D. 4. 14) that for the Stoics there is no fourth type of good feeling, corresponding to the banned emotion of distress (and all its many variations), because the wise and good never do find themselves confronted in their own lives with anything bad, or at least are
not affected by it in their feelings. (One could certainly raise questions about this. The wise surely would encounter all kinds of bad things, and one might think they would react to them with some measured and smooth negative feeling, a counterpart to the excessive and impassioned distress of ordinary disappointed people: all the bad people and all their bad actions that the wise become aware of in their daily lives. But for the moment I let that pass.) The consequence is that, on the Stoic theory, as it is reported to us, there can be nothing in the virtuous life that at all resembles regret or disappointment—a negative reaction, for example, to something’s not happening that one correctly tried to bring about, or when something befalls one that, if one had considered the matter in advance, one would have wished would not happen, and would have tried to prevent, if possible.

Thus, even if one could say, in defense of their theory, that the perfected human life will contain lots of episodes of joy at successful outcomes of one’s own efforts, or at preferred things that happen to one, this defense misfires. Any joy experienced in such cases is incidental to the event’s constituting a success, or being preferred: it is not a differential reaction to the success or to the desirability (when viewed in advance), as one sees things, of what has eventuated. The wise will be just as joyful about whatever happens, since that always evidences Zeus’s marvellously well-ordered rationality. But, of course, in normal human life it is a crucial fact that people do welcome, in a special way, their successes in achieving hoped for goals, and even desirable lucky outcomes. Hence, although, as I have argued, the Stoics can legitimately claim that wise people do experience feelings of attachment to and aversion from many of the same sorts of things in life that the nonwise have passionately emotional attachments to, this is limited to the prospective feelings of motivation for or against objects to come (or not) in the future, for which one then exerts oneself. So far as the present or past goes, there is in the wise person no feeling that corresponds to the way the nonwise feel, of pleasure at accomplishments (or in general, of preferred indifferents arising in one’s life)—just as there is no regret or disappointment at dispreferred ones.

To that extent, on Stoic theory as the Stoics seem actually to have developed it, one
cannot claim for the wise person as extensive a felt engagement as the nonwise have with the objects of normal human concern. The wise have no felt attachment, corresponding to that of the nonwise, for or against how things currently stand in these respects in their lives, or those of the people they feel affection for, or how things have gone in the past. Even, of course, with this limited set of feelings—wish and caution directed at both virtue and virtuous actions and their preferred or dispreferred objectives, plus joy at all virtuous actions without regard for or special attention to their success or failure in achieving those objectives—the Stoics can defend their fundamental claim. In promoting a life free from passions (ἐπάθεια) they are by no means denying or neglecting the importance in human psychology, and for a good human life, of our human capacity to register and appreciate value correctly not only in our cool rational judgments but also in our affective responses. However, they cannot say, as one might have expected when one sees how wish and caution work on their theory, that the wise are just as much bound through their good feelings, as the nonwise are through their bad and empassioned ones, to all the same classes of things (all the preferred and dispreferred indifferents) whose presence or absence, prospect or unlikelihood constitute the ebb and flow of daily life. The wise are in fact significantly more disconnected emotionally from the events of daily life. Whether or not, ultimately, that can reasonably be made the basis for an objection to Stoic psychological and ethical theory is a further question. But one must at least grant that, to the extent that the Stoic theory of ἐπάθεια was intended as a preemptive response to critics who objected to it on this score, it is only a severely limited success.

V

However, it seems to me that Chrysippus and the others who established Stoic moral and psychological theory missed a valuable opportunity here—one that, as I will suggest, they surely might have taken if they had developed their theory of the good feelings more thoroughly in a positive spirit and not merely defensively. So far as I can see, they might, consistently with their most basic principles, have recognized a fourth class of good feeling corresponding, broadly speaking, to the passionate emotion of “distress”—and, thereby, they might
have made room in their theory also for precisely the sort of differential “joy” that, in fact, they closed off from the wise. If they had exploited this opportunity, they would have won for the perfect human being the additional sorts of feelings of involvement in the sweep and flow of life that their theory, as actually developed by them, barred. In this section I want to explore these possibilities for enriching the actual Stoic theory of $\text{EUTÀΦΕΙΩΛ.}$

One can indeed insist, with the Stoics, that when Zeus has brought something about, a person who fully appreciates their partnership with Zeus as a rational agent capable of bringing things about in the material world, and thinks (and feels) correctly about things, will also realize that there were perfectly adequate reasons why this thought of Zeus’s was required, as one of his thoughts in relation to that time and place. It was fully justified, as part of the next stage in the development of the total history of thought in the world, and as such it was a good thing, indeed the best thing that could conceivably have been thought just then and there. However, only Zeus himself knows, to anything approaching a full degree, just how this is so, i.e. just how it is, in the unfolding of the total thought-history lying behind the material world and its development, that this was the best thought—with the result that just this event took place in the material world. Human rationality does not come anywhere near to permitting any human person, no matter how wise they might be, to understand, even in retrospect, the complete actual justifications for anything that happens. This applies with special effect to things that happen contrary to our before-the-event wishes. We may have some glimmerings, after the event, of reasons why it was best for that to have happened, notwithstanding our legitimate beforehand wishes that it not happen. And, of course, we can know—but only on adequate general grounds of philosophical theory—that a full justification, by reference to the overall good, is known to Zeus. However, it is known to Zeus.

Under these conditions, it seems to me, even wise people would take a different attitude to those natural events caused by Zeus’s own, as it were private, thoughts, or else by those in combination with some other human agent’s, which bring about conditions and circumstances that (in advance) they strongly dispreferred, as against events bringing about preferred ones.
This would require, of course, quite a complex train of thought, and it would result in a rather complicated set of contrasting feelings in the wise, but surely their very wisdom might enable them to sustain such complexities. If, for example, they wanted, for clear and strong good reasons, to save some children from death when their house catches fire, but after they go back in and bring them out of the blaze the children die in their arms, they can and should be of two minds about this event and have a complicated set of feelings about it. On the one hand, they accept it as for the best and have feelings of appropriate joy at Zeus’s marvelously excellent thought-process that caused it, and necessitated it. They certainly will not fall into recriminations, or make objections; nor will they feel disturbed about it, by for example feeling sore regret or gnawing disappointment, or grief, or any sort of wrenching sorrow. All such impassioned emotional reactions they will reject as inappropriate, indeed irrational, and vicious. Still, they surely did hopefully expect that the overall history of the world’s thought might include the thinking necessary to permit the safe rescue and continued life of the children, whom they loved as good parents do or (if they were someone else’s children) felt appropriate feelings of protection and tenderness for. After all, that hopeful expectation was part of the motivation they had when they saw the need to go back in and try to save the children, since (in the case I am envisaging) it was so very clear that this was the action the situation demanded. If reason does clearly and strongly and unambiguously indicate that the salvation of the children is the objective to aim, with all one’s strength, to achieve, then one has good reason to hope that this is what, in a rational universe such as the Stoic one is, will result. Of course, wise people will be constantly aware of the limitations inherent in human rationality on grasping the full range of reasons there may actually be in favor of it, or con; but that does not remove this reasonable expectation, in these clear cases, though it does introduce an element of tentativeness. Accordingly, I suggest, it would be entirely suitable for this wise agent to feel at least a sort of (what for want of a better term I will call) wistful regret (after the event) that it did not prove possible for them to save the children (as they, legitimately, hopefully expected to do). As with the other good feelings I have discussed, this would be equable, smooth, measured, easy, and in
no way impassioned; it would be an affection of the mind, and so what one could call in a gen-
eral sense an emotion, as with caution, wish and joy; but it would not be a πάθος.26

To this, one could add the following. If the Stoics do, as we have seen, hold that wise
people will have feelings of caution partly directed at such outcomes, which they then act upon
in working to prevent them, some negative feeling when things go contrary to their efforts
seems not only natural but even necessary. Such a feeling is simply the continuation of that
cautions into the new circumstance, and its counterpart there. If there were no negative feeling
of any kind, that would cast strong doubt upon the genuineness of any before-the-event wish
that things not turn out the way they in fact have. (Remember, I am here speaking only of
cases where the agent is in no doubt at all about what is the outcome to work hard to achieve,
or avoid.)

It seems to me entirely suitable, then, that this wise agent should have contrary feelings
about the children’s being burnt to death. On the one hand, when he or she considers it from
the point of view that it resulted from Zeus’s marvelously well-ordered overall thought-process,
they rejoice in it. On the other hand, they should also regard it from the point of view that they
themselves had every reason not only to want that not to happen, but also to expect that it
would not if they exerted themselves, as in fact they did, to prevent it. From that point of
view, this is by no means something to be rejoiced about; on the contrary, it brings to light the
limitations on all human knowledge that I referred to above and merits a negative feeling of
(wistful) regret. Having rationally preferred the successful rescue in advance of acting, they
can and will now think that they would have preferred that the needs of the world had included
the successful rescue. A human being, even the wisest, as I have said, has no significant, even
so much as a, clue as to how it happens that the needs of the world did not include the rescue.
Nothing has changed in that respect, merely because we now see what Zeus had in mind to
bring about. However wise we are, we still do not come anywhere close to understanding his
reasons. After all, to feel that way does no more than to carry forward, in all honesty, into their
after-the-event feelings, the agent’s before-the-event wishes. Why should those now be for-
gotten or denied? Having these feelings of wistful regret seems to me to reflect a perfectly suitable recognition of our own human limitations: even the wisest of us never do understand, even after the event, why things do not turn out as we had very good reason, in advance, to try to make them do, and to expect that they would.  

Likewise, in the other case—where the rescue does succeed—it seems to me entirely appropriate, and psychologically possible, for a wise person to feel a special sort of joy, over and above the general one that all of Zeus’s actions merit. Here, something has resulted that, before the event, the agent knew he or she had very strong reason to try to bring about, and to expect would come about if they did make every effort. They hopefully expected that, in this rational world, events would confirm their judgment and efforts. When this happens, they naturally respond with a special feeling of elation. The rescue of the children, seen from the point of view that it evidenced the marvelously well-ordered cosmic thought-process, is the object, as always, of one feeling of joy; but there is another feeling of joy, too, directed at the same event, seen now from the point of view that it was what one wanted and worked to achieve, with clear and strong reasons for doing so and for expecting success—a wish and effort that are now confirmed by events.

These additional, differential feelings, depending upon whether a wished for objective of one’s action has come about, or one that was the object of caution and avoidance (or might have been, if anticipated), would not in any way undermine the full, wholehearted, even-handed acceptance, and indeed endorsement, after the event, of what has actually happened, whatever it may be. The negative feeling involves no thought that the thing ought not to have happened, that it was any sort of harm or loss to oneself, or to anyone else, that it did. In the rescue case, it is not a feeling that the rescue ought to have succeeded, despite the need from the point of view of the overall history of the world’s thought that it not succeed. Nor (in the positive case) is it a feeling that it was in fact a better thing that it did happen than not. The thought-content of the feeling, in the negative case, is simply the sense that one wishes the desired outcome had been possible. Given that it wasn’t, as one now sees, one passes on with one’s life, without
any sort of recrimination or lamentation, but with nonetheless this moderate feeling of wistful regret. Or, in the other case, there is a moderate feeling of special uplift, that what one had good reason to try hard to bring about (and so, what one’s own thought-process led one to think was best to try for) has been confirmed as also what the overall thought-process of the world itself thought best.

Special joy and wistful regret do not, of course, involve any feeling that anything good or bad has happened: they are respectively a “reasonable” (and so, quite moderate) psychic uplift or psychic “contraction,” to use Stoic terminology I have not much used so far, but ones directed at something conceived whole-heartedly, and with complete understanding of the reasons why it is such, as something merely preferred or dispreferred. They could nonetheless be classified as “good feelings,” on Stoic principles, simply because they do deserve, on the analysis provided just now, to be counted as “reasonable” or “well-reasoned” uplift or contraction—which, after all, is how in our ancient sources the three recognized “good feelings” are formally defined. The modification, and extension, of Stoic theory I am envisaging consists simply in recognizing that, in these two cases, something that satisfies the condition of being well-reasoned does not also require as its object, or among its objects, something conceived as being good or bad, respectively.

VI

Something similar can be said for the issue I postponed discussing above (beginning of sect. II)—the fact that the Stoics did not present the good ways of feeling merely as specially characteristic of the wise person’s way of life but reserved them exclusively to the wise. We need to take into account, in this connection, the question whether the Stoic theory, as Chrysippus and others actually developed it, also maintained that every pro or con desire motivating a nonwise person’s actions, and every pro or con reaction that a nonwise person has to events that affect them in one way or another, are “emotional” ones, in the narrow sense of παθη. One might have thought that, while often enough the nonwise fall into emotional states, say of heated, impassioned pursuit of things thought good when in fact they are not, they might none-
theless at other times pursue objects of interest to them in a relaxed and unagitated way, even though they think them good to have. But though our sources are not straightforward enough to allow us to say firmly that that is what they thought, the evidence does seem to suggest that they thought all nonwise desires and felt reactions are passionate in character. If so, we would find a certain symmetry in their analysis: every motivation for action, and pro reaction to events felt by a wise person (there would be no con ones, as we have seen, on Stoic theory as they actually developed it), would be a good way of feeling, and every motivation and pro or con reaction of a nonwise person would be an ordinary (bad) emotion. If that is their view, not only do nonwise people never experience any good feeling, but they never experience any motivations or reactions that are not impassioned, and so thoroughly vicious, ways of feeling about things.

It is true that Cicero once explains the Stoic theory of ordinary emotions in a way that suggests that they did not count all nonwise wantings either for things of for their avoidance, and all nonwise pro or con reactions to things, as πάθος, but only the strongest, most intense, and most committed among them. In T.D. 3. 24-25 (in the course of a discussion specifically of “distress”) Cicero sets out the basic Stoic theory of all four of the genera of πάθος in terms which specify in each case that the opinion that gives rise to the emotion is that of a great or serious (magnum) good or bad, either in prospect or actually present. And he seems to connect the seriousness or magnitude of the good or bad believed to be present, or in the offing, with the further opinion that the good or bad in question is of such a sort that a passionately emotional attitude is appropriate under the circumstances: he seems to think that the imagined magnitude is what justifies in the person’s eyes (at least implicitly) the emotional response. Thus about “distress” (aegritudo, λύπη) he says: “distress is an opinion that a serious evil is present, specifically a fresh opinion of an evil of such a sort that it seems right to be pained by it.” The implication would be that not all the things that nonwise people might think were present or forthcoming goods or bads would be such that they would respond to them with impassioned feelings, of pursuit or avoidance, or liking or dislike: among such things only the ones
believed to be big, i.e. worth getting agitated about, would be responded to in an impassioned way, the rest not.

Now, in fact, if one were concerned with mere plausibility or responsiveness to ordinary conceptions and ways of speaking, one might welcome such a nuanced understanding of the states of mind of nonwise people, i.e. of all of us as we actually are. For, if that were one’s concern, it would seem reasonable to want to reserve the notion of an (ordinary) emotion for application not to all ways of feeling motivated for things, or reacting in one’s feelings to them, but only the ones where one felt especially strongly about them (and those would correspond to the ones that Cicero seems to have in mind here as “great” or “serious”). A mild, not overly committed, not absolutely insistent, feeling of desire or of liking or dislike would not, in light of ordinary usage and thought, seem to deserve description in terms of “emotions.” “Emotions” are, it would seem from the point of view of ordinary conceptions, only notably strong such feelings. With one quite telling exception, however, it is only here, in T.D. 3. 24-25 (with echoes also in the sequel, 3. 28, 3. 61), that Cicero adds the qualifier of “greatness” or “seriousness” to the opined good or bad. Everywhere else where he expounds and discusses the Stoic theory, he speaks simply of an opinion of something good or bad present or in prospect, with the implication that any such opinion will lead to an impassioned response, of pursuit, avoidance, or liking or disliking, depending on the particular circumstances. And all our other sources do the same. The exception for Cicero occurs in a side-remark in his discussion of Epicurean ethics in De Finibus 2. 13, where he says in passing that the Stoics actually define “pleasure” (in the sense not of a bodily feeling, but of a mental response to something that occurs) as “an elation of a mind that without reason holds the opinion that it is enjoying a great good.” We have tens of citations in our Greek (and Latin) sources of Stoic “definitions” of the emotions, and in absolutely none of them do we ever find the adjective “great” added as qualifier for the good or bad of which the agent has an opinion.\(^\text{31}\)

It seems fairly clear that Cicero, here and also in T.D. 3, has simply invented this limitation—apparently in a wish to help the Stoics out, by suggesting that their view was more in line
with ordinary ways of thinking and speaking, where talk of emotions comes up, than in fact it was. In fact, according to the Stoics, reason tells us, if we think clearly and correctly, that all the things wanted or avoided in ordinary life, or welcomed or disliked when they occur, are in fact neither good nor bad. Therefore, any response to their being present or in the offing that does take them to be either good or bad overestimates their value (indeed, does so quite grossly). Any such response in the ways one feels departs decisively from, and exceeds, reason’s own measures for how one should feel. Pretty much everyone in ordinary life, pretty much all the time, acts and reacts on the basis of impulses that do precisely this. Hence any such impulse will go beyond the measures of reason. All of them are too strong. Hence, there is no reason at all to follow ordinary language and thought, and to count as “emotions” (i.e. strong feelings of attachment or disaffection) only the more or most strong among them, felt in response to great or serious (perceived) goods or bads. If, by ordinary standards, an “emotion” is a strong impulse of some sort, then all the ordinary impulses of ordinary people should be so counted, even the phenomenologically very mildest among them, and even the ones directed toward minor (perceived) goods and bads. Any differences among them as to degree (and felt character) of that strength are, from the point of view of correct philosophical analysis, entirely insignificant. Any impulses that do not feel very elevated or agitated are, in basic principle, to be counted precisely as such: there is elevation and agitation, whether one feels their presence or not, essentially contained in their very constitution. They are all strong—much too strong—whether or not we ordinarily would report them as feeling strong.

It does seem, then, that for the Stoics, not only do nonwise people never experience any good feeling, but they never experience any feelings that are not (anyhow in principle) impassioned, and so thoroughly vicious. But why might some nonwise person not, sometimes, manage to get beyond the habitual sorts of impassioned attachments and reactions to things of concern to us all in ordinary life? One might have thought that sometimes, some of us nonwise people might come to grasp that, really, the things we are concerned over (our health, our money, our ordinary pleasures, our achievements of one sort or another, our children, our
spouses, our friends and relatives) are correctly to be taken as objects of appropriate and legitimate concern, to be sure, but are nonetheless neither good nor bad—because only our own human states of mind and our thoughts, and Zeus’s own, of course, deserve to be so counted. In such a case, would it not be correct to count any impulse or felt reaction we experienced, which reflected or was caused by such a thought, and was directed at particular objects on particular occasions, not as an impulse or reaction of the ordinary emotional sort classified by the Stoics as a πάθος, but rather as very much the sort of thing that a perfect, fully wise, person would experience in our conditions and circumstances—i.e., one or another of the “good feelings”? Yet, through their denial that any nonwise person can experience a “good feeling,” the Stoics deny that this can ever happen. Why?

In fact, it is really not hard to understand this denial. The denial does fit well together with, though it is not a direct consequence of, their (notorious, but deeply principled) exhaustive division of adult human beings into those who are wise, and all the rest, who therefore count as fools. Not to be wise means that one lacks all firm grasp even on the true things one has come to believe, and even (for the moment) to grasp and understand. This applies, of course, to any true belief or even understanding one may have achieved of the principles that establish the correct—Stoic—account of goods and bads, and in general things of value, for a human being or from a human’s point of view. Hence any impulse of either action or reaction, reflecting such a correct understanding of the values of various things, that could be achieved by even the best and most nearly perfected of the nonwise among us, would necessarily have to fall short of the specific way of feeling that the Stoics had in mind when they contrasted the impassioned feelings of the (typical) nonwise person with the feelings of the wise themselves. There is certainly no doubt that the flawed understanding, because not yet firmly and unalterably implanted in one’s mind, that even the best nonwise person can present, must be reflected in each and every feeling of theirs. After all, suppose one does feel an impulse that reflects one’s nonwise understanding that virtue and vice are respectively the sole things either good or bad for any one, and that objects of ordinary human concern are exclusively characterizable as
at best preferred indifferents—worth working to obtain and make proper use of, but ones one should be ready to renounce at any time when it becomes clear that the overall history of the world’s thoughts goes against one’s getting or enjoying them. That understanding is not yet firmly implanted in one’s mind. Hence, one must at the same moment be harboring, if not quite the actual thought, then at least the tendency to fall back into thinking, that things of ordinary concern are, after all, good or bad, that they do matter to one’s happiness, to how one’s life in fact is going, for better or worse.35 This tendency is not yet eradicated in the only way it can be, by completing the process of fully implanting the correct view in one’s mind, with all the reasons that support it. You remain, in fact, of two minds about what you are moved impulsively about: you say, and even (predominantly) think, that it is not good or bad, only preferable or dispreferable, but at the same time you don’t fully believe that, you half- or partly believe it is good or bad, as the case may be. And that means that your feelings, too, which on Stoic theory have their sole basis in your thoughts, must be ambivalent, at any rate at the deepest level.

Since no nonwise person could ever experience an impulse that was in all respects the equivalent of the ones that characterize the whole emotional life of the wise, it is important not to speak as if they could. Given basic Stoic principles, one must insist, at least when speaking strictly, that the same terms not be used for the feelings of the nonwise—even the best and purest feelings that any nonwise person is capable of experiencing—as for the feelings of the wise. Hence, it seems to me easily understandable, and defensible, that the Stoics insisted on reserving a special terminology, distinct from any to be employed for the nonwise, to refer to the special set of feelings felt by the wise. And one can appreciate why they say that really, even such commendable feelings of the nonwise are fundamentally impassioned in character and therefore bad: these feelings still harbor the thought that externals are good or bad. They may not be cases of what we think ordinarily of as emotions (appetite, pleasure, fear) but they are not, morally speaking, worth distinguishing from them.

However, as my analysis so far suffices to bring out, the differences among the practical attitudes and impulses among the nonwise are far too complex to be well accommodated within
this simple bifurcation between ordinary emotions and “good feelings.” With that bifurcation, the Stoics left themselves no room in which to place satisfactorily the improved impulses of persons who have struggled successfully, precisely under the guidance and influence of Stoic philosophical theory, and who, at least often, are motivated by types of impulse that are more or less correctly conceived (even if not firmly based) ones, rather than by the ordinary, overtly and grossly mistaken impulses that derive from full endorsement of the false theory of values standardly adhered to in human populations. In fact, I think there was no reason at all, deriving from their fundamental principles, why they should not have done better; a second revision or extension of their actual theory is fully justified on the basis of the fundamental principles of their ethics and moral psychology.

In order to reflect better these important differences, the Stoics could have explicitly allowed the use of their words for the good ways of feeling (“wish,” “caution,” and “joy”—as well as the special joy and wistful regret that I have argued they could and should have extended their theory of the good feelings to encompass) also for describing these pretty good, very special emotions of these morally well-meaning, morally pretty well informed, and morally hard-working people, under the conditions I have indicated. This would be comparable to the misuse of terms for emotions such as “rage” or “fear” or “erôs” or “hunger” (or again, virtue- and vice-names such as “courage” or “cunning”) in reference to non-rational animals. Thus, we could speak of certain in-principle “impassioned” impulses under the names “wish,” “caution,” and “joy,” with further terms to characterize the other well-reasoned impulses of these nonwise people, drawn from the list of the sub-varieties ranged under the three generic “good feelings.” They could have explained that this is a special and stretched use of these terms, but one that the complexity of the phenomena themselves amply justifies. In this way, one could speak of even certain nonwise persons, on some occasions, as being moved not by an appetitive desire for food, for example, by rather a “wish” for it, when they are motivated more by a concern to act correctly in relation to the need for food (and so also, of course, but secondarily, out of a properly qualified desire for the food) than by any attachment to food and the enjoyment of it
as an object of pursuit on its own. In such a case, one could not, of course, speak of the agent as desiring their own action thinking of it as a good (and desiring the food only insofar as it is the objective of this particular good action). Ex hypothesi, as one who knows he or she is not fully virtuous, they do not regard their action as in fact good. So this would not be a true wish, an εὐτάθεια. Yet, their motivation would—correctly, from the point of view of Stoic theory—put a higher value, and a value of what it regards as a higher rank, on the action’s correctness, as an action of pursuit of the food and of the nourishment it provides, than on its objective, the enjoyment of the food and the replenishment of the body. Such well-reasoned feelings of pursuit would justifiably be conceived, in that way, as being in some way intermediate between the gross appetitive desires ordinary, unreconstructed persons experience and the full wishes of the wise. Similarly, there would be “intermediate” cautions—and also, if my earlier proposed expansion of the Stoic theory of impulses is accepted, intermediate special feelings of joy when something wanted as a preferred indifferent actually comes about, or wistful regret in the opposite case. The resulting moral psychology seems to me much better. More to the present point, it would have shown that the Stoic outlook is not trapped in the position either of championing a way of life that is cold and unfeeling, or of condemning all ordinary people (in fact, virtually everyone who has ever lived) to a life of nothing but grossly overblown and completely misinformed ways of feeling about things. Sometimes, some of us do feel quite well-informed, praiseworthy feelings of attachment and aversion, and feel reactions positive and negative to what happens. We need not always be subject to the thoroughly bad, completely misinformed emotional feelings that are admittedly characteristic of life in human communities.

VII

One quite important advantage of recognizing such “intermediate” types of impulses—neither ordinary impassioned ones, nor yet full εὐτάθειαι—would be to enable a much more complete and apposite account of the process by which people manage, through hard practice, to “chop their way forward” (which is the literal meaning of the verb προκόπτειν, standardly used to refer to those who are “making progress”) toward living a moral, Stoic life. To
speak as if ordinary humans, all of us, inevitably and constantly feel only impulses of appetite, fear, distress and pleasure, based on false views about what is good and bad in life, leaves it seeming quite mysterious how it can happen, even in principle, that someone might shift decisively out of a state of mind or soul in which those were the only sorts of impulses one felt, and into one where one felt only the “good feelings” of the wise—because one had in fact become wise. It is certainly true that opponents of the Stoics in antiquity, and many modern readers as well, have failed to grasp that on Stoic principles there is no obstacle at all to holding, as they did in fact, that the transition from fool to wise person can be ever so gradual and cumulative. The Stoics said, notoriously, that “just as in the sea the person an arm’s length from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are those who are approaching virtue any the less in vice than those far away from it.” But that allows, indeed explicitly asserts, that there are stages in the approach, and degrees of progress, toward virtue. The Stoic doctrine that there are no degrees, so to speak, within either virtue or vice (each virtuous person being equally virtuous as any other, and so for each vicious one) only means that no good person is a better good person than another, not that no one can be better than another in the sense of being more nearly good.

Still, one might wonder about the psychological process by which such progress is driven and sustained. Even if one accepts the Stoic view that progress consists essentially only in increases in one’s rational understanding, and indeed accepts their general view that emotions and other practical feelings and attitudes derive ultimately, and solely, from one’s thoughts (one’s beliefs, one’s judgments about things), one might think that, somehow, certain emotions or other sorts of felt attachments, that may develop in earlier stages of moral improvement, play a crucial, even necessary, role in spurring one on toward increased understanding—and, ultimately, toward the goal of a fully and firmly implanted, complete understanding of the true, Stoic, system of values. It is here that more careful attention to the variety of impulses that a nonwise person might attain becomes important—and the failure of Chrysippus and the other early Stoics to pay such attention the more regrettable. As I have noted, questions about the
variety of motivations among the nonwise arise especially in connection with people who are making progress toward a virtuous and wise way of life. Hence one might have hoped to find some attention paid to these issues in the work of later Stoics such as Panaetius and Posidonius, who do figure in the history of Stoicism as ones who (in what used to be called the “Middle Stoa”) addressed especially the situation of more ordinary, decent people, who can at best aspire to virtue, and laid less emphasis in their writings on the status of the wise themselves. But we do, however, find something of the sort in many of the protreptic addresses of Epictetus to his pupils. Since Epictetus’s Discourses are not works of Stoic moral theory, but consist instead (in the passages concerned) of informal moralizing, aimed at spurring students of Stoic theory to improve themselves by putting that theory into actual practice in their lives, we must not claim that this reflects advances in Stoic philosophical theories of moral psychology. We cannot even claim that Epictetus’s own instruction, when conducting his formal classes, included any rethinking, at the level of moral-psychological theory, of these matters.

Epictetus’s psychological insights, displayed in his practical moralizing, would only find their way into his presentation of Stoic moral theory if he made them a subject for independent philosophical reflection. Given our nearly total ignorance about any special views or theories of Epictetus’s as a teacher of moral theory, we have no reason at all to think that he did that. (Or that he did not.) Still, it will be of interest, in considering the philosophical strengths and weaknesses, and possible coherent refinements, of Stoic theory, to conclude with a brief discussion of this aspect of Epictetus’s work.

Both Arrian’s Discourses of Epictetus and the Manual begin by setting out what for Epictetus was the core of Stoicism as a moral theory and philosophy of life: the distinction between what (the Stoics say) is up to us, what we have authority and control over, and what is not, but is controlled with authority by other powers. What is up to us is what we do with our minds: what we think about anything, all our impulses toward or away from anything, what we
desire and what we avoid. These are our doings (Manual 1.1), exercises of our power of choice (our προάρεσις): not even Zeus can overrule that (Discourses 1.1.23; similarly 1.6.40, 1.17.27, 3.3.10). Not under our control are our body, property, reputation, public offices: these are not our doings (Manual 1.1). However, precisely because we do have absolute control over our minds and their doings, we can bind ourselves fast, through our attachments to and concern for them, to things we do not control—body, property, friends—and as a result get weighed down and dragged altogether under by them (Disc. 1.14-15). This we all too commonly do. Thus, instead of maintaining the naturally free, unhindered, and unimpeded condition of the only thing we do control, we find ourselves actually unfree, frequently hindered and impeded (“dragged down”), since, having once formed those attachments, we now must await events, and then react according to how they turn out, either positively or negatively. Now our mind and its doings are not completely free, but enslaved.

Neither here nor anywhere in his works does Epictetus argue for or explain these doctrines in detail; his young men have learned about them in their regular classes. What he does do is try to bring his addressees actually to make concern for this one thing, which we do all, by our nature, have absolutely under our control, their dominant motive: a concern for its preservation in its free condition. Other concerns one may have, in relation to things not in our own control, not our own doings, we must fit into our life only on terms that do not violate this natural freedom. Epictetus’s chief strategy appears to be to emphasize, from several points of view, our privileged situation in the world of nature as possessing this essential freedom, this control over our own lives. And he evokes, repeatedly, a variety of moral sentiments that he plainly believes anyone who accepts this basic Stoic view should feel in relation to our privileged status. On the positive side, we find appeals to our pride, our sense of our own dignity, our natural elation in knowing we have been thus favored by Zeus or nature in our constitution, as forces to draw on in encouraging the young men to honor their free status by taking care to preserve and sustain it in the only way possible—by constantly regarding only their own inner state as either good or bad for them, and so by not yielding to any temptation to regard any-
thing at all that they do not control as either good or bad. And, on the negative side, we find repeated appeals to our sense of shame at any thought of selling our freedom out by binding ourselves fast to any mundane objectives, and to our trust in ourselves, as free minds, to govern our lives without such perversion. Thus, on both the positive and the negative sides, we find appeals to his students’ feelings about themselves, evoked, he hopes and expects, by thinking of themselves—their essential natures—as Stoic theory invites them to do. In both cases, these feelings defy classification as ordinary passionate emotions (πάθη); they are properly informed moral feelings, and as such need to be categorized somehow (if made the subject of philosophically theoretical reflection at all) as preliminary adumbrations of the full ἐπάθεια by which wise people themselves are moved. This is most clearly true, however, in connection with the sense of shame, αἰδωσ, which Epictetus evokes again and again in his Discourses in this connection, since, as it happens, that is a term used within the standard Stoic theory of ἐπάθεια to denote one subvariety of “caution”: caution about correct censure.42

Before turning to consider in some detail Epictetus’s appeals to our sense of shame, let me flesh out somewhat the general account I have just provided, and offer some textual references to back it up. Already in Discourses 1.1.12, Epictetus strikingly has Zeus speak directly to him, saying that he has given Epictetus a portion of himself (μέρος τι ἡμέτερον), the capacity to generate (as he himself does) one’s own impulses, to decide for oneself what to make of any impressions one receives—in short, a free mind or power of reason. A little later, Epictetus says,

If one could only subscribe heart and soul, as one ought, to this doctrine, that we are all offspring of god of the first rank, and that god is father both of humans and of gods, I think that one will have no ignoble or mean idea about oneself. If Caesar adopts you, no one will be able to endure your conceit; if you know you are a son of Zeus, won’t you be elated?43 (1.3.1-2)

Later still (in 2.8), saying that other animals are works of god, too, he adds:

but not ones of the first rank, nor portions of the gods. But you are of the first rank,
you are a disjoint part (ἀπόσπασμα) of god, you have within you a portion of him. Why, then, are you ignorant of your kinship? Why do you not know what you have come from? Will you not bear in mind, when you are eating, who you are that eat and whom you are feeding? ... You are bearing god about with you, wretch, and you don’t know it! You think I am talking about some silver or gold god, outside? You are bearing him within yourself, and aren’t aware that you are defiling him with impure thoughts and sordid actions. ... When god himself is present within you, seeing and hearing everything, are you not ashamed (οὐκ ἁπλὰ πάντως) to be thinking and doing those things, unaware of your own nature, object of god’s wrath? ... Do you dishonor the workmanship of that craftsman when you are that workmanship yourself? Well? Do you even forget this, that he not only fashioned you but also entrusted and committed you to yourself alone—do you dishonor that trust too? ... He has delivered your own self into your keeping, saying, “I had no one more trustworthy than you; keep this person for me unchanged from what he is like by nature—with a sense of shame (αἰσθήματα), trustworthy (πιστόν), of lofty sentiments, undismayed, unimpassioned, unperturbed.” After that, do you fail to keep him like that?44 (2.8.11-14, 21-23)

We find very many such appeals in the Discourses to the pride, elation, sense of personal dignity, self-esteem, and self-confidence, which we should legitimately feel in recognizing ourselves, through our nature as possessors of reason, as creations of the first rank, true offspring, of Zeus the creator—and to the shame we ought to feel when we dishonor this heritage, and ourselves. At the end of the passage just cited, we find a very interesting claim (repeated, again, with variations, at many places in the work):45 that it belongs to our nature to feel these feelings, and others like them. Zeus made us of such a nature as to feel in these ways in relation to ourselves. This implies that it belongs to the nature of rational beings, at any rate ones like us that have bodies that our minds don’t in fact control, to feel in these ways, if we are not perverted somehow. In fact, Epictetus does maintain (this is how he introduces the whole topic of what is up to us and what is not, in Disc. 1.1) that of all our capacities or skills, native or ac-
quired, it is the power of reason (ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική) alone that “we have received to get knowledge both of itself—what it is and of what it is capable, and what a valuable thing it is to come to us—and likewise all the other capacities.” Given this naturally self-reflexive character of reason, grown-up humans (those beyond “the age of reason”—only they, for the Stoics, are rational beings, properly speaking) should be expected to know about themselves as rational. This would include knowing that their reason is by its nature free, but is absolutely free only in relation to its own acts, and does not have absolute control over anything else, not even over what occurs in one’s own body. Epictetus’s claim, then—a reasonable one, in this light—is that those who have that self-reflexive knowledge will also have these feelings about themselves, in recognition of that freedom.

Let us turn now to Epictetus’s efforts to encourage and sustain his own students’ moral improvement by appealing, specifically, to their feeling of shame (αἰδωσ) and to their sense of shame (τὸ αἰδημον in them). In 1.3, the initial lines of which I translated just above, Epictetus continues as follows:

As it is, however, we are not [elated], but since these two were commingled in our generation, on the one hand the body, which we have in common with the animals, and, on the other, reason and intelligence, which we have in common with the gods, some people incline toward the former kinship, which is unfortunate and dead, and only a few toward the divine and blessed one. ... [T]hese few, who think that they are born for trustworthiness (πίστιν), for feeling shame (αἰδωσ), and for a secure and steady use of impressions (πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν), have no mean or ignoble ideas about themselves, whereas the multitude do the opposite. “What really am I? Nothing but a downtrodden, miserable human,” say they, and, “Wretched little bag of flesh that I am!” Wretched indeed, but you have also something superior to your bag of flesh. Why then abandon that and cleave to this? (1.3.3-6)

Epictetus optimistically includes his students among these few, or hopes to draw on their feelings of shame and self-confidence (trustworthiness), here spoken of, so that they will enlist
themselves in that minority: through their instruction in Stoicism they have an advantage over others, in having learned a clearly articulated account precisely of the nature of their own generation as offspring of Zeus.

It is important, I think, not to lose sight, in one’s attention to Epictetus’s appeals to shame and his inclusion of the sense of shame among the attributes natural to human reason, of the other attribute he mentions here, that of “trustworthiness.” These two are constantly linked in the Discourses, and, as the passage cited above from 2.8 suggests, where Epictetus has Zeus tell us what we are like by our nature, they are thought of as working together. When Zeus declares that he had no one more trustworthy than oneself, into whose charge to leave one’s own mind, Epictetus is thinking of the capacity to stick consistently and unwaveringly to free self-direction, and not to shift off into taking things indifferent to be of fundamental concern, and so to enslave ourselves to them. This capacity, he says, belongs to us by our nature to exercise, and it can never be taken from us. It is sufficient of itself to achieve the result that we do live freely. It enables us not only to be trusted to do what we agree to, and not to infringe on the rights of other people, but, in general, to be trusted (by ourselves, as well as anyone else concerned) to hold fast to our own natural, moral, primary concern for our own free minds and their inner state. This involves, as I put it above, a sense of self-confidence on the part of each person when they are in their natural condition—a sense of themselves as trustworthy in this way. Thus when Epictetus has Zeus begin his list of the natural attributes of the human being by mentioning the sense of shame and trustworthiness, he stresses a negative, cautionary stance against falling away from the correct use of one’s own reason, alongside a complementary—positive—sense of commitment to sustain that correct use. The combination of this negative with this positive feeling about oneself, both present and working together right across the board in the emotional life of the perfected wise person, is Epictetus’s constantly repeated claim about our natural condition. It is to this double aspect of his students’ (hoped for) sense of themselves that he appeals as a means of encouraging and helping them to start upon and sustain their moral self-improvement.
I offer just two further quotations to illustrate these appeals:

When you subject what is your own to externals, from then on be a slave. Don’t let yourself be drawn this way and that, at one moment willing to be a slave, at another not. Be either this or that simply and with all your mind—either a freeman or a slave, either educated or uneducated, either a spirited fighting cock or a spiritless one; either endure to be beaten until you die, or give in at once. (Far be it from you to receive many blows and yet at the last give in!) But if that is disgraceful, begin this very moment to decide the question, where the nature of olds and goods is to be found. ...

(Disc. 2.2.12-14)

It’s a disgrace, something to be quite ashamed of, Epictetus points out here, if, by caring about externals as of fundamental value for your life, you throw away your mind’s natural freedom and make it become the slave of events. You should not dither, at times accepting your slave’s status, at others recovering your freedom: that itself is a sign of weakness. The only way out of disgrace is to opt firmly for freedom.

In 4.9, Epictetus imagines addressing some student of Stoicism who has fallen into a life of debauchery. He has gained the pleasures. Has he lost anything? Is he any the worse off? You used to have a sense of shame and now you don’t. Is that nothing to have lost?

Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno you now read [sex novels]. Is that nothing to have lost?

Instead of Socrates and Diogenes you have come to admire the man who can corrupt and seduce the largest number of women. ... You used to sleep as a man, leave the house as a man, wear a man’s clothes, say things that befit a good man. And then you tell me “I’ve lost nothing”? Is it nothing but small change that human beings lose in this way? Is not the feeling of shame (αἰδωλαί) lost, is not decency lost?

One who lives in any such way has lost his manhood, his humanity; as Epictetus says in many other places, he has reduced himself to the status of an animal—whether a lowly sheep or a destructive wolf.58

This passage is particularly interesting in that it makes it explicit that, in Epictetus’s
view, in losing in this way one's sense of shame, one is not merely departing from the natural condition of a human being (a condition one might never have been in anyhow). The person envisaged is one who has studied Stoicism and has tried to live according to its principles, and so he is credited with having actually had an active sense of shame, grounded in his (partial) understanding of the basic truths of Stoicism about human values. Thus he was earlier in just the condition that, as we have seen, Epictetus supposes his students are in, when he appeals to their sense of shame in attempting to further their moral progress. And, as I mentioned, Epictetus's term for this shame, αἰδως, is standardly used in Stoic theory for one of the εὐπτωθεῖα, officially reserved solely to the fully wise and perfect human being. The clear implication is, as I have said, that Epictetus is working with a conception of the moral sentiments that permits attributing to the nonwise some version of this feeling (and, equally, of the other εὐπτωθεῖα). Even if, on a careful and strict analysis, starting from Stoic first principles, these would have to count as (in principle) passionate emotions (in the way I suggested above, sect. VI), they deserve special recognition in any adequate theory, on Stoic lines, of the emotions and other feelings involved in the moral life. It is much to be regretted that such “intermediate” feelings were not formally recognized in Stoic theory in its classical, early form and given a full analysis there. It is also regrettable that Epictetus himself either did not attend to these implications of his own protreptic practice, or, if he did, that no record of any theory of their nature due to him was preserved for posterity.51

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FOOTNOTES

1 I should emphasize that my phrase “good feelings” is to be understood as an abbreviation of “good ways of feeling”; not all these are ways of feeling good about anything. My use of “good” is intended to capture the adverb εὖ, qualifying the verbal root -παθοῦ, in the term εὐπαθεία. I take it that the Stoics who co-opted this word for their theoretical purposes (despite its more ordinary use to mean, in the plural, enjoyments, luxuries, dainties (see Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek English Lexicon s.v.)), were relying on the idea, implied in the word’s formation, of being affected or moved emotionally in a good way, one that is acceptable and approved—virtuous, even—by contrast with (mere) πάθη, which were associated with vice in the Stoic account of human psychology. It is worth pointing out also that, according to ancient sources such as Arius Didymus, the εὐπαθεία were counted by the Stoics among things that are good (ἀγαθὰν): they contribute to the happy life, just as virtues and virtuous actions themselves do (though somewhat differently). See Ar. Did. apud Stobaeus, Eclogae, sect 5b, 2.58.5-9 in the edition of C. Wachsmuth (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884). (The text of Arius’ss Epitome of Stoic Ethics, preserved in Stobaeus, is available in English translation in Hellenistic Philosophy, Introductory Readings, ed. B. Inwood and L. Gerson, Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, ed. 2, 1997, pp. 203-232; also in a much less satisfactory translation, with revised Greek text and notes, in Arthur J. Pomeroy, Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999.)

2 The Stoics distinguished pleasure in this “emotional” sense from pleasurable sensations (of drinking when thirsty or eating tasty food, for example) or other pleasures got simply from the ways things feel or affect our sensibility, even though they seem to have used a single word, ἰδονία, to refer to both. The latter pleasures they did not regard as thoroughly bad things to experience (as the “emotional” sort were); these are counted as “indifferents,” neither good nor bad. See Diogenes Laertius VII 111-112, concerning “emotional” pleasure, which has as its contrasting opposite λύπη (distress), as against 102, concerning sensory pleasure, which is set against πόνος (physical pain) as its opposite. The different terms for the opposites in the two cases show clearly that the Stoics did distinguish these two senses of “pleasure.”

3 Our fullest exposition of the theory of both the “passionate” emotions and the “good feelings” is contained in the first part of a short treatise (On Emotions) handed down under the name of Andronicus, the first century BC (or AD) editor of Aristotle’s treatises (ed. A. Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes “Προς παθῶν,” Leiden: Brill, 1977); Greek text ed. Kreutner available in J. von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Vetterum Fragmenta (SVF) (Leipzig: Teubner, 1900-1920), III 397, 401, 409, 414, 432. Fairly full presentations of the theory of good feelings are also found in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV 11-14 and Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers VII 116. These three texts provide our main, and almost sole, evidence for the Stoic theory of “good feelings” and their relations to the “passionate” emotions. Strikingly, Arius Didymus, in his Epitome of Stoic Ethics (see above, n. 1), which is otherwise much the most complete and detailed presentation we have of Stoic ethical theory as a whole, does not include any section devoted to this part of Stoic theory. In fact, the word εὐπαθεία does not occur anywhere in the work, though Arius does tell us that “joy, cheerfulness, confidence and wish” count among the things that are good (5b, p. 58.8-9 in Wachsmuth’s edition) though they are not virtues—and all of these except confidence appear on pseudo-Andronicus’s and
Diog. Laertius’s lists of the “good feelings”; Arius names (some of) them as goods again at 5c (69.3W), 5g (72.2W), 5k (73.2-3W), and 6d (77.9W), but without defining or even going beyond barely naming them. At 9a (87.21-2W) he lists “wish” as one form of practical impulse or impulse to action and gives there the standard definition of it as “well-reasoned desire.”

4 The account of the εὐπάθεια in Diogenes Laertius, 7.116, speaks of these experiences specifically in connection with the wise person, but he does not say explicitly that they are such that only a wise person could experience them.

5 *Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1037f-1038a. So, it seems reasonable to think, already Chrysippus had a theory of εὐπάθεια, presumably all three of them and not just εὐλάβεια. Further, according to what Plutarch here gives as his account of caution, Chrysippus defined them, as later Stoic tradition did, as “reasonable” or “well-reasoned” impulses of one or another more specific kind; furthermore, he limited them to the wise person. Our principal sources for the full doctrine of εὐπάθεια (Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, pseudo-Andronicus) fail to mention any of the “founders” of the school (Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus) in this connection. This has encouraged scholars to speculate about its possible later origin. See Brad Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 305 n. 207, and the authors cited there. Following up a suggestion of Sandbach, Inwood wonders whether Chrysippus’s term for the εὐπάθεια might have been εὐπάθεια instead, corresponding to Cicero’s Latin term for them, constantiae. However this may be, the passage of Plutarch just cited provides strong evidence that Chrysippus had in fact developed a theory of a special sort of “feelings” that the wise person experiences, which were to be strongly distinguished from the corresponding but opposed “passionate” feelings of the nonwise, and, to judge from Chrysippus’s definition of “caution,” this followed the same lines as the theory we learn about from Cicero and the other later authors. In the light of this Plutarch passage, I take scholars’ doubts about whether the basic doctrine goes back to the time of the founders to be not well grounded. Perhaps Chrysippus did not use the term εὐπάθεια, but he plainly saw the need for a special theory of the “feelings” of the wise person, and gave the same account of them that the later tradition recorded and passed on.

6 It is worth emphasizing that, in feeling emotionally toward true goods, perfected persons, unlike ordinary people, do not limit themselves to, or in any way specially favor, goods of their own or those belonging to members of their own family or personal friends and fellow-countrymen—their own virtue, their own virtuous actions, and the accompaniments of these, or virtue and virtuous acts of those close to them in some such way. They are just as joyous over the virtue and virtuous actions of anyone else as they are over their own, and, indeed, their most constant and most appreciative joy is bestowed on Zeus’s own overpoweringly great and good acts of thought, the ones that produce almost all the rational ordering that is found anywhere in the world, and are the source and basis for anything else good in it. It is true, of course, that so far as “wishes” go, the primary object of their efforts will necessarily be themselves and their own actions, simply because no one can do an action of anyone but themselves; the most one can do in relation to another person is do one’s best to help them to see things the right way and so, through their own understanding, act rightly and well. Their “wishes,” insofar as they express more than a general pro-attitude toward perfected rationality wherever it may occur—in another person’s actions, or in the actions of Zeus—must be wishes,
in the first instance, for virtuous actions of their own; “wishes” about someone else’s virtue or virtuous actions can at best be “wishes” to aid them in some way in actions of their own. People do not, I think, take this sufficiently into account when they speak of Stoic “eudaemonism.” The perfected person of Stoic theory is not foocused throughout their life on their happiness or eudaimonia, as if that meant some neglect of others or preference for their own good before the good of others, or before that of the universe at large. The focus on one’s own eudaimonia that definitely is part of Stoic theory simply expresses the necessary fact that one can only do one’s own actions, no one else’s, that one can live only one life, one’s own. Even when feeling joy at Zeus’s actions, one is doing something that is a contribution to one’s own life, a sort of action of one’s own. But that very obviously does not mean that one only feels that joy because it contributes to one’s own good or happiness; one is joyous about it because of its own, inherent, goodness, and for no other reason. For the Stoics, the τέλος or overarching single goal of a good life is to live “happily,” by living virtuously. But an essential part of living virtuously is to look to, and, so far as one can, promote, true good done by or experienced by any one, without special favor even to oneself.

7 As with goods (see preceding n.), the perfected person is, in principle, equally concerned about bads done or threatened anywhere, not simply, or with any special disfavor, those (imagined to be) done by, or threatening, him or herself. So far as caution is concerned, it is true (and no basis for objection to the Stoic account) that one will mostly pay attention to one’s own circumstances, aiming to avoid doing anything vicious and bad oneself; other people’s situation will inevitably, given fundamental and unavoidable facts about human mentality, often not be objects of one’s own awareness at all, when they have to face threats to their own continued virtuous behavior. But insofar as one can reasonably expect, or try, to become aware of them, the perfected person certainly will experience caution in relation to them, too, as occasions demand—and take such steps, if there are any available, as might help to avert the danger. Accordingly, it will not be the case that a perfected person will never (think that they) find themselves in the presence of anything bad. On the contrary, though of course they will not be in the presence of anything bad in their own minds or actions, they will witness many many vicious people, vices in those people’s souls, and vicious actions. Cicero’s claim, on the Stoics’ behalf, is only that they will not be mentally or emotionally affected by these (praesentis mali autem sapientis adfectio nulla est is the Latin, T.D. 4. 14). He does not explain why not, but the point is presumably that these are the other person’s concern, it was up to them to do something to avoid them, and it is they who harbor them now, to their detriment. Hence, there is no point in another person’s feeling bad themselves about this. (One might, however, think that they might react with some sort of mild or resigned disappointment that the rational thing was not done by another person, when they had in fact all the rational capacities, and all the knowledge at least at their disposal, that they needed so as not to act in vicious ways. On this, see below, sect. IV.)

8 Diogenes Laertius (7.116) and pseudo-Andronicus (SVF 3.432) both give the following definitions for the three ευπάθειαι. Joy is a “well-reasoned uplift” (εύλογος ἔπαθος); caution a “well-reasoned avoidance” (εύλογος ἐκκλασις); and wish a “well-reasoned desire” (εύλογος ὁρέξεις).

Cicero suggests the tiones true different, petite, it is clear Classical at acting The inhibitions acting dicting sippus people, ings": in omnibus quae autem tant in quod videntur, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis inventur. Cicero speaks here, of course, only of “wishes,” but as he continues his exposition in T.D. 4. 13 the same impression is given also for the other two “good feelings”: all three of them, apparently, are being thought of as directed at ordinary objects of concern.

In this chapter (ch. 11) Plutarch is bent on finding Chrysippus contradicting elsewhere what he says in one place about the law: that it doesn’t prescribe anything to base, i.e. nonwise, people, but only issues prohibitions to them (while on the contrary prescribing actions to the wise but not prohibiting anything). He first finds Chrysippus guilty of saying or logically implying that the law does prescribe things to the base, and in this connection he argues that for Chrysippus it must be the case that, in particular, the law prescribes certain “appropriate actions” such as, presumably, paying legal debts or taxes, etc. He turns at 1037f to find him contradicting himself about the law’s relation to the wise. He presents a dilemma: given that the wise person’s reason does make him cautious about some things, and reason in that case must be prohibiting something, either the wise person’s reason is in conflict with the law (if the law really does not prohibit the wise anything) or the law does prohibit the wise some things, those of which they are cautious. Coming just after the reference to the legal prescription of “appropriate actions” to the base, the legal prohibitions to the wise are naturally understood as prohibitions of particular ways of acting viciously, by for example taking other people’s property. The corresponding caution of the wise in this regard would then be a caution directed not only at acting viciously (in general) but also at this particular way of acting, or, equivalently, at the property of others as such.

See also Plutarch, On Moral Virtue (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol 6, ed. W.C. Helmbold, Loeb Classical Library) 449a-b. Though Plutarch’s exact train of thought there is not easy to follow, it is clear enough that he is thinking of the Stoics’ wish, caution, and joy as replacing the appetite, fear, and pleasure of the unvirtuous simply by keeping the objects of the latter fixed, but, due to the correct use of reason, impelling the person toward or away from them on a different, correct basis (by not regarding them as either good or bad). The same seems to be true of Lactantius in his attack on the Stoic theory of emotions (and virtue) in Divinae Institutiones VI chapters 14-15 (in 3. 437 SVF offers three excerpts from chap. 15 particularly relevant to this issue; the second and third seem most clearly to presuppose that the objects of the supposed εὐπαθεῖαι are precisely the same ones as those of the rejected πάθη). (But Lactantius’s impatient Christianity makes him a very unthoughtful, even unintelligent, reader of Greek philosophy, so he is certainly not to be taken as any authority for actual Stoic theory. Still, that Lactantius was able, without apparent qualms, to publicly interpret the Stoics so does suggest that this interpretation was floating around in later ancient philosophical circles (4th c.). Also, if Lactantius got his interpretation from reading Cicero’s Tusculans IV, as seems quite likely, that confirms what I have said myself about the most natural reading of some of what Cicero says there in expounding the Stoic doctrine.)

See, for example, the hesitations and doubts of F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London: Chatto
and Windus, 1975), 76-8. M. Nussbaum (The Therapy of Desire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 398-401, seems just to assume that the objects of the “good feelings” are these indifferent objects of pursuit or avoidance, or favorable acceptance. T. Brennan, in “The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions” (The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 54-57, takes her to task over this, insisting, on the basis of the explicit definitions offered in pseudo-Andronicus and other sources, that the good feelings are not directed at all to those, but only to one’s own or someone else’s virtuous acts and condition.


13 At any rate, if they ever do get impulsive impressions of the sort just described, they never assent to them, and so never convert such an impression into an actual impulse to act. Their ingrained sense of “caution” is certain to prevent their assenting to any such impression that might arise in them, since to assent would itself be a grossly vicious act, an act expressing and confirming a vicious state of mind.

14 That is, when they assent to such an impression, the resulting impulse wants these results “with reservation,” i.e. only on the quite reasonable but provisional assumption that if they do make the effort they will be successful (or may be)—that is to say, on the assumption that it accords with Zeus’s will that they shall succeed. On this see Inwood, op. cit, 112, 119-126. Both the terminology and the idea of ἐπιβολή “reservation,” a word we do find once in Arist Didymus’s epitome of Stoic ethics (in Stobaeus, II 115, 7=SVF 3. 564), are more prominent in later Stoic authors, such as Seneca and Epictetus, but, as Inwood rightly points out, the basic conception is clearly presented, and insisted upon, in a marvelous passage Epictetus quotes from Chrysippus (Discourses 2.6.9-10).

15 See the passages of Arous Didymus, Philo, and Diogenes Laertius printed by von Arnim in SVF 3.557, 558, 560, 561, 563, and 564. Thus Ar. Did. (in Stobaeus Eclogae 2.65, 12-15 and 2. 66, 14-21 Wachsmuth=SVF 3. 557 and 560 respectively) says: “They also say that the wise person does everything [he or she does] in accordance with all the virtues. For every action of theirs is complete, so that it is not lacking in any virtue. ... And they say that the wise do everything they do well ... They thought that the doctrine that the wise do everything well follows from their completing everything in accordance with correct reasoning and in a way that is in accordance with virtue, which is the expertise that deals with life as a whole.” (Translation by Pomeroy, with changes, from Arous Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 23-25.)

16 This analysis is confirmed indirectly, but explicitly and decisively, by what we learn from Arous Didymus about the perfected person’s ἐπιβολή in 11s (2.115.5-9W) he tells us that nothing happens to such a person that goes contrary to their ἐπιβολή because they always do whatever they do “with reservation” (see above n. 14). Arous says about ἐπιβολή (9a, 87.14-16W) that it is a species of “impulse for action,” which must mean that it is a sub-species of “wish” (de-
spite the fact that it does not appear in either Diog. Laert.’s or pseudo-Andronicus’s lists of sub-species of wish). He defines it there as an “impulse preceding an impulse,” by contrast, among others, with an εγχειρησις, which is an “impulse towards something that is now in hand.” So an ἐπιβολη is a sort of preparatory impulse toward some action that is to be undertaken directly through a further impulse, as later circumstances suggest. But the “reservation” of the perfected person concerns not (of course) whether he will manage to do a virtuous action, but only whether he will achieve his particular objective in undertaking it: hence the ἐπιβολη that he does not act contrary to has to be an impulse directed toward that particular objective, viewed from in advance and before actually acting for it. Equally, when we are told, also in 11s, that ἐρως (i.e. the good desire of the perfect person for relations of friendship with a morally gifted young person, not the gross and bad mere sexual excitation of the ordinary base person) is an ἐπιβολη “for forming a friendship on account of the beauty displayed by young men in their prime,” this special sort of wish is manifestly implied to be one directed at winning the young man over and engaging in specific acts of some sort with him—not at virtuous action simply as such.

17 The price of not doing that would be to convert the action from a whole-hearted pursuit of the objective into something else—a shadow-game of trying to appear to be one pursuing that objective, of merely play-acting while waiting to see what eventuates. That is certainly not what Chrysippus had in mind for the virtuous agent to be doing. (In the preceding discussion of wishing I have had primarily in mind wishes concerned with an agent’s own ordinary needs or objectives in their daily life: to have a good meal, to protect their property from damage, to accomplish daily tasks, to aid a friend, etc. These correspond to the objects of ordinary people’s appetites. However, it is important not to forget that the wise also have wishes for other virtuous actions than their own, and for those actions’ objectives. The analysis I have provided applies, with complications I have omitted to go into, to those wishes, too.)

18 To be sure, there are plenty of other circumstances where the wise person will feel some caution: he will feel cautious when going into any situation where his virtue will be tested, for example one posing serious temptations for pleasure or profit of a sort that ordinary people succumb to. In such a case, his caution will be directed at the tempting object or situation, along the lines I have sketched. And, of course, those are not situations where the ordinary nonwise person would feel fear of the object at all. Still, especially prominent among the situations where the wise will feel caution toward external objects of avoidance are situations when ordinary, nonwise people feel fear in relation to the very same things.

19 Thus, on this account, caution and wish differ from one another in the precise way in which they are contrasted respectively with fear and appetite. Where appetite is for something conceived of and felt as good, wish is for that thing simply as appropriate to go for, because a preferred indifferent. But where fear is of something regarded as bad, caution is of that thing not—in parallel—simply as something appropriate to avoid, because a dispreferred indifferent. One feels caution toward it, instead, specifically as something that, besides being appropriate to avoid, human beings naturally find themselves inclined to fear, i.e. to regard as bad. This is because the wise person’s caution (like the fear of the nonwise) is toward the thing insofar as it is capable of harming him: and, given his understanding of what harm consists of, that can only be because of its tendency to bring him to regard it as harmful (bad). That, however, means that
when the wise feel caution toward something that a nonwise person fears, both of them are wary of it because of ways they think it might harm them. And so, after all, there is a close similarity in the respective relationships of fear and of caution to dangerous objects. Thus the wise person’s caution, in these specific sorts of circumstances, does put them in touch with the passage of events in ways that do parallel quite closely the fears of the nonwise.

20 Here one should bear in mind that the three “good feelings” are genera, under which are ranked potentially very many specific other feelings. Under wishing D.L. VII 116 lists four feelings, all of which are directed at persons, either exclusively or principally: “well-wishing” or “benevolence” (εὔνοια), “goodwill” or perhaps “friendly feeling” (εὐμενεία), “affection” (a welcoming feeling or attitude, ἀπασμοί), and “love” (ἀγάπη). There is no reason to suppose the Stoics limited the objects of these feelings to other wise people: the wise are said to love their children (VII 120), and there is no reason to suppose they will not also have affectionate attachments to many other people whom they come to know or simply grow up with on intimate terms (D.L. VII 120 says that, after the gods, they will revere or honor in second position their parents and siblings).

21 See Cicero T.D. 4.13, and pseudo-Andronicus’s definitions of the three sub-varieties he lists of “joy.” (His definition of χαρά itself, as with the other two generic states, leaves out all reference to its objects: χαρά is simply “well-reasoned” or “reasonable” “uplift,” as “caution” and “wish” are respectively “well-reasoned” or “reasonable” “avoidance” or “rejection,” and “desire.” (These definitions coincide with those provided by Diogenes Laertius, VII 116.) These varieties are defined as: joy that befits the benefits one gets (NB: benefits only come from goods, and ultimately from virtue as the source of the benefit in question, according to Stoic theory: see Arius Didymus in Stobaeus 5d, and Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 11.25-27), joy at the works of temperance, joy at the way everything goes on, or at there not being anything one needs to seek.


23 These limitations on what we can know are in fact essential aspects of our human rationality. Zeus willed and keeps on willing these limitations, as part of the continued history of the thoughts that lie behind the material world and cause it and the events in it.

24 I am excluding here cases where it was not really fully obvious to the wise person, with clear and strong reasons to back up, what outcome to try for. In those cases, even if on balance it might be clear what one should try for, one would at the same time be somewhat uncertain about whether this really was the outcome supported by a wider consideration of reasons pro and con than one is in a position to command oneself. Accordingly, one would quite readily accept the occurrence, despite one’s efforts, of one’s dispreferred outcome. Consider, by contrast with the case of the children taken up in my text just below, the situation when one’s aged parent is ill and one does all one can not only to succor them, but to help them recover. There, if one’s efforts fail, one might surely not be surprised, and would readily accept the death as what the overall thought lying behind the world’s events did require.
25 I noted above, n. 14, that all the assents of wise people are made “with reservation.” Hence when they do wish for something or cautiously work to avoid something, they do so with the implicit rider, deo volente. But, as my argument in this paragraph and the next makes clear, even when one wants something only on the condition that god wills it, one may nonetheless be opting, and in a quite definite and decisive way, for one outcome as the one that reason declares one should do one’s absolute best to promote. That is in fact the condition, extremely often, of the perfected person when he or she makes a decision: often, there is no hesitation or dubiety on their part in taking the specific action they do take, nor about the rational preferability of the outcome aimed at in it, over its opposite, or simply its non-occurrence. In those conditions, even if one silently, but very sincerely, adds “god willing” to what one decides to want, one is in a position, as I put it in the text, to hopefully expect that it will turn out that one was right, and that the preferred outcome will emerge as the one that the overall good itself requires, and Zeus’ss will brings about.

26 Thus it would not detract in any way from the wise person’s happiness—his or her “smooth flow of life.” It is important to emphasize this, since it seems clear that the Stoics’ reasons for not recognizing any fourth good feeling, parallel to the distress (λύπη) of ordinary life, is that they did not envisage that there could be negative feelings rather like regret that would nonetheless not disturb in the least the smooth flow of one’s life. Even with respect to recognizing other agents’ rationally inexplicable moral failings, they seem to have thought, the wise could not be conceived as experiencing any negative response in their feelings without saddling them, unacceptably, with such a burden. I think this is a mistake. Not all negative feelings, whether about other people’s moral failures or about one’s own lack of success in achieving one’s own morally well-supported preferred objectives, need to be or entail any sort of disturbance to one’s equanimity. Chrysippus’s failure to recognize this seems to me to show a lack of moral imagination.

27. Similar reasoning applies to the wise people’s reactions when they see how unreasonably and badly most people act. Often it really is clear what reason requires of us, and yet we constantly see people going badly wrong in their own feelings and actions. A wise person knows full well that, in such situations, all anyone needs to do is use their god-given power to reason out what is the appropriate thing to do, and then they will feel and act correctly; yet, they don’t. The wise know that Zeus has created human beings with the natural capacity and natural self-fulfillment of being fully rational, independent collaborators in carrying out his own gloriously coherent, rational plan for the development of the world order over time. Yet again and again they fail to develop in accordance with the inherent norms of their human nature. Zeus sees to it that it is in them, each and every one, to live with fully developed rational powers, in such a way as to be virtuous and act virtuously with an unassailable constancy. Knowing all this, it seems to me entirely suitable for wise people to react to vicious people and vicious actions that come to their notice with a well-reasoned, moderate but real feeling of disappointment—a resigned one, because they know there is nothing they can do about it, that each person has the responsibility (that too was part of Zeus’s plan) for their own moral condition, their own decisions, and their own actions. One could have hoped for something better. Moral feelings of this general sort do in fact occupy a significant place in the moral psychology presupposed by Epictetus’s encouragements to his young pupils in the Discourses; on this see below, section VII. It seems to me that the Stoic insistence that nothing can ever happen in the lives
of the wise that they will think merits such a feeling is overhasty, even facile. There is room, and I think serious need, within Stoic psychological theory for a fourth good feeling, a negative one of wistful regret when they witness really gross failures to act and feel reasonably—as well as for wistful regret in the cases of failure to achieve wished-for outcomes that I discuss in the main text.

28 See for example Arius Didymus’s account, Stobaeus vol 2. sects. 10-10a, pp. 88.7-90.6, where his basic definitions identify passionate emotion (πάθος) with “impulse which is excessive and disobedient to reason’s choices” and “irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature.” All impulses of the nonwise will meet both of these definitions, however mild-feeling and unim-passioned some of them might be in comparison with others. Any impulse of a vicious person, which all the nonwise are, will necessarily depend upon and reflect its disobedience to reason’s choices and be a movement contrary to nature, simply in that it rests centrally upon the mis-evaluation, endemic in the nonwise, of preferred or dispreferred things as good or bad.

29 So M. Graver seems to interpret him. See her commentary (Cicero on the Emotions, p. 91), where she paraphrases: “belief that some serious evil is present, that evil being of such a kind that it would be appropriate for him to be pained by it.” That this is a mistake on Cicero’s part seems to be shown by the roughly parallel passage of Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, Eclogae 10b, 90.7 ff.=SVF 3. 394 (we find almost the same language in pseudo-Andronicus, where he defines λύπη, On Emotions ch. 1=SVF 3. 391). Arius Didymus, who omits all reference to belief in a “great” bad, does not, I think, mean to make the relative clause, “at which it is appropriate to get shrunk up,” which modifies the bad, restrictive (implying that there are beliefs of the presence of bad where the person believes the bad is not such that getting shrunk up is appropriate), but simply an added (and highly relevant) characterization of the bads already referred to. (Graver, however, in citing this passage, translates him in the restrictive way—unjustifiably, in my opinion. On this see further below.)

30 Translation M. Graver, with modifications.

31 In fact, Galen gives us evidence that it definitely was not part of Chrysippus’s understanding of the emotions that the goods or bads that the agent believes to be present or in the offing are thought by him or her to be great. Discussing Chrysippus’s theory that certain pre-dispositions of a person to experience given πάθη count as “infirmities” of mind, he quotes Posidonius as supposing for the sake of argument that maybe Chrysippus had intended his account to restrict the relevant emotions to cases where something was thought of, not just as a good or a bad, but as a very great one—and as rejecting any such charitable construal (On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV 5. 24-27 (=SVF 3. 480)). This only makes sense if it was known not to be an explicit part of Chrysippus’s actual account that magnitude matters. See also IV 7.3-5=SVF 3. 481, where Galen objects to Chrysippus’s definiatory account of distress as involving a “fresh opinion” and remarks that it would have been more in keeping with his view of it if he had said instead “an opinion of the presence of a great or intolerable or unbearable evil.” This plainly implies that Chrysippus did not in fact so define it.

32 One of Chrysippus’s basic, repeated characterizations of πάθη, we hear, was that they are “excessive impulses” that “go beyond the due measure of nature” or “of reason,” that is, the
measure “that is conformable to reason and goes only as far as reason judges to be right.” I quote here from a passage that Galen professes to be quoting verbatim from Chrysippus’s *On Emotions (On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV 2. 14-18).* Clement of Alexandria (in *SVF* 3. 377) seems to be paraphrasing such passages when he explicates a προκόπτοντες as “impulse that is excessive or stretches beyond the measures that accord with reason.”

33 In what follows I believe I am presenting essentially the same account as Inwood gives on pp. 174-175 of his book.

34 Excluded from this division are any humans who have actually lost their minds (either permanently or only temporarily) and are not, strictly speaking, rational animals any more at all.

35. Inwood helpfully refers here to Seneca’s *Letter* 59, where Seneca laments in multifaceted ways the inconstant and wavering commitment that even the best of us can muster for self-improvement. See esp. 59.4: “although an ignorant man [i.e., a nonwise, foolish person] may experience ‘joy’ if the cause is a morally good one, yet, since his emotion is not under control and will likely soon take another direction, I call it ‘pleasure’; for it is set in motion by an opinion concerning a false good, uncontrolled and carried to excess” (tr. Gummere, modified).

36 One might compare here what Chrysippus is reported to have said about the use of the term “good”—that he wouldn’t make a fuss if someone wanted to count health a good (ps-Plutarch *On Nobility* ch. 17—*SVF* 3.148). Presumably that was meant simply as a concession to ordinary ways of speaking. No harm would be done, so long as one bore in mind the crucial distinction between the value of any such “good” and the value provided by, and only by, the perfection of a rational being as such, or virtue. See also *On Stoic Self-contradictions* 1034b (=*SVF* 3.698).

37 In antiquity the failure to understand the Stoic view is perhaps most pronounced in Plutarch’s essay “How One Can Become Aware of One’s Progress Toward Virtue” (ed. and tr. F.C. Babbitt, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927; Loeb Classical Library, *Plutarch’s Moralia* vol. 1).

38 Plutarch, *On Common Notions, Against the Stoics* 1063a (the same view is cited also by Cicero, *de Finibus* 3. 48). See also Diogenes Laertius 7. 127, stating the doctrine, which this image of the drowning person illustrates, that there is no “intermediate” condition between virtue and vice, in which one would neither be virtuous nor vicious, either one. The doctrine, referred to just below in my main text, denying degrees of virtue, is stated by Diogenes Laertius immediately afterward in the same section of his text.

39 It may be worthwhile noting that this category of persons, the ones “making progress,” did already receive explicit notice by Zeno (see Plutarch, *On How One May Know One is Making Progress Toward Virtue*, 82f), and again by Chrysippus. The latter is quoted in Arius Didymus as having used what was later the usual term for such people, προκόπτοντες, in a pair of passages that show very clearly that he had a well-developed view about the special condition of such persons, vis-à-vis both the wise and the grosser persons among the nonwise (Stobaeus 2. 103, 22 = *SVF* 3. 510). (One could add the probable reference to such progress, with the same verb, in a Chrysippus passage quoted by Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-contradictions* 1043d.) Thus
there was from the beginning substantial theoretical attention to the special characteristics of the progressive’s status. Lacking was attention to the specific moral sentiments a “progressing” person would feel.

40 In fact, Posidonius is quoted and discussed by Galen in books IV and V of On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (4.5.26-28, 4.7.6, 5.6.28) in terms that make it seem quite unlikely that he did recognize in people making moral progress any analogue of the “caution” of the wise (and this in turn suggests that he did not develop any account at all of such “good feeling”-like impulses). Galen makes a big point of what he reports was a criticism of Chrysippus’s account of the πάθη, wherein Posidonius objected that if Chrysippus’s intended view was that emotions were aroused only by what appeared as great goods or bads, then people making progress, who were quite aware of their own vice and knew it was something belonging to them that was in fact the greatest bad, ought to have been consumed with fear (and distress); but, he says, this does not happen. It seems Posidonius would not have been able to say that, or not without substantial qualification, if he recognized in such people some sort of caution-related shame or similar felt motivation aimed at avoiding vicious action and vice itself, to the extent possible, in the future.

41 We know nothing substantial about the contents of any independent philosophical theorizing Epictetus might have done in his classes, though evidence he provides himself makes it seem likely that his formal teaching consisted of reading with his students and commenting upon treatises of Chrysippus, Zeno, and other “classical” Stoics (as well, it seems, as teaching them Stoic logic). On logic, see 1.26.1, 1.26.13, 2.17.27. On reading and expounding “classic” texts, see 2.1.30, 2.16.20, 2.16.34, 2.14.1, 2.21.10 ff., 3.21.6-7, 3.23.10-11 and 16. (In some of these places Epictetus does not so much refer to or describe his own teaching as discuss the teaching a pupil is being imagined prematurely to aspire to, in imitation of himself and other teachers of philosophy.)

42 αἰδώς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν εὐλάβεια ὁρθοῦ ψόγου, pseudo-Andronicus in SVF 3. 432 (Diog. Laertius, 7. 116, names αἰδώς as a subvariety of caution, but does not offer a definition). (The definition of αἰδώς given in Nemesius, De natura hominis ch. 21, in SVF 3. 416, which makes it a subvariety of fear, and so a πάθος instead, is not Stoic. Though there are many elements apparently drawn from Stoic definitions, as we know them for example from pseudo-Andronicus, in this part of Nemesius’s treatise, his discussion of the πάθη takes its start (ch. 17) from the explicit recognition of a non-rational part of the soul, the “appetitive,” in which, as he says, pleasure and pain (distress) arise—a Peripatetic, not Stoic, assumption. On Peripatetic assumptions, there is no difference of fundamental psychological status between a kind of fear and a kind of caution. See M. Morani, ed., Nemesii Émeseni De natura hominis, Leipzig: Teubner, 1987, at pp. 75-82.)

43 Similar is Manual ch. 6. Note that the term for “elated” here, ἵππος, is a form of the same verb from which the noun derives that the standard definition of “joy” employs: joy is εὐλογος ἵππος, reasonable or well-reasoned uplift or elation.

This and all subsequent translations of Epictetus are based, but with alterations, on W.A. Oldfather, Epictetus, two vols., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925, 1928.
Epictetus’s focus here and throughout is on evoking sentiments of moral self-encouragement and self-reproach, but of course the line of thought in this passage would equally support feelings of shame (for humanity, so to speak) when witnessing the grosser forms of vice in another person, and pride, leading to a feeling of emulation, when witnessing virtuous-seeming actions of other fellow-progressives. So the general class of moral sentiments presupposed in Epictetus’s appeals in his moralizing addresses to his pupils would naturally include feelings akin to the joy in other wise persons’ virtuous acts and the resigned disappointment in vicious people’s vice that I took note of in sect. V above.

Besides the passages cited below, see 1.28.19-21, 2.1.11, 2.4.1-5, 3.7.27-28.

A recent article, by Rachana Kamtekar, on “Aiδως in Epictetus” (Classical Philology 93 (1998), 136-160, draws special attention to the role of shame in moral development, as Epictetus seems to conceive that, and discusses many of the passages I refer to.

F. H. Sandbach, quoting Disc. 2.8.11-14, provides a clear, and so far as it goes, admirable and, above all, balanced account of this pairing (The Stoics, 167-8).

As the passages already quoted show, Epictetus has a rich and varied repertoire of terms to draw upon when he wants to speak of our natural moral attributes, or what a person loses when he turns toward external objects and treats them as of fundamental concern in life. But almost always aiδως (or το Αιδημον) and πιστευς (or το πιστον) are the first (or last) listed, and so given special prominence. Sometimes to these states of feeling (as I am taking them both to be) he adds full virtues (justice, temperance, gratefulness, occasionally courage or piety), as he is entitled to do, since on his Stoic principles it is natural to human beings to develop the virtues (even if almost no actual person does develop to the point of actually possessing them): see Discourses 1.16.8, 1.28.23, 2.4.3, 2.22.29-30, 3.7.36, 3.14.13, 4.1.106, 4.2.8, 4.9.17; fragment 28b (from Marcus Aurelius 4.49.2-6). Sometimes he will refer to only one of these two most-emphasized conditions (depending upon special features of the context). But usually they are both mentioned, whatever else is or isn’t added for better measure. See (for both together), besides the passages quoted in the text above, Discourses 1.4.19 and 20, 1.28.21, 1.28.23, 2.2.4, 2.4.3, 2.10.29, 2.22.20 and 29-30, 3.3.9, 3.7.36, 3.13.4, 3.14.13, 3.17.3, 3.23.18, 4.1.162, 4.3.7, 4.9.17, 4.13.13-20; Manual 24.3-6.

As one would expect, Epictetus’s references to trust and the trustworthiness naturally found in human beings frequently come in contexts where he is thinking of them as grounding trustworthiness specifically in relation to other people’s interests and rights, or faithfulness in upholding undertakings of one sort or another to other people: see, e.g., 1.28.19-28, 2.4.1-7, 2.9.11-12, 2.10.22-23, 3.13.3, 3.20.5, 4.1.126, 4.1.159-161, 4.9.17, 4.13.10-24. In most of these passages, trustworthiness is linked with the possession of a sense of shame, but the latter seems to be thought of primarily as what grounds other behaviors, in distinct other areas of life (more private ones). But other passages strongly suggest the broader and more private application I describe in the text here, a person’s reliability in keeping free from overvaluing external objects or objectives quite generally (a reliability that, of course, would show itself also in the other sort of trustworthiness). Thus see 1.4.19 (where being “trustworthy” is explained in
terms of not being tossed to and fro in pursuit of externals, rather than sticking steadily to one consistent path), 1.4. 20 (a reference to “washing yourself as a trustworthy person”!), 2.14.13 (we ought to imitate the gods’ trustworthiness by being trustworthy ourselves—but for a Stoic a god’s trustworthiness rests in consistently rational behavior, and has nothing to do with keeping promises and the like), 2.22.25 (the bad man’s mind is not trustworthy, because it is prey to every passing impression), 3.23.18 (implying that what it is to be trustworthy is not easy to define), 3.26.24, 4.3.7.

50 See 2.9.1-12, 3.23.4, 4.5.20-21.

51 I thank Michael Frede for helpful comments on an early version of this paper that have led to significant improvements (see especially nn. 6 and 7). I thank also an audience at the University of Maryland, College Park, for their questions and comments when I read an abbreviated and condensed version at a departmental colloquium there in October, 2003. Further significant improvements were made after each subsequent presentation and discussion of the abbreviated version, at the University of Kentucky and Creighton University (where it formed the basis of the 2004 Reynard Lecture), and at the Universities of Otago and Christchurch, New Zealand, and the Australian National University, during the 2004 northern summer. Finally, I thank my commentator, Rachana Kamtekar, at the Spindel Conference in Memphis in October 2004, and the others who contributed to a spirited and, for me, very helpful discussion.