||CV - JOB MARKET PAPER- OTHER RESEARCH - CURRENT TEACHING|
PhD candidate in Economics
Department of Economics
001 Fisher Hall, Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-2098, USA
|Research interests: microeconomic theory, industrial organization, decision theory, game theory, learning, bounded rationality|
|Advisors: Faruk Gul (chair) - Stephen Morris - Wolfgang Pesendorfer|
|Placement director: Dilip Abreu|
|JOB MARKET PAPER|
|"Dynamic monopoly pricing when competing with
new experience substitutes" [download]
ABSTRACT | In this paper, I study the dynamic problem of a monopolistic seller who suddenly finds the dominant market position of her product challenged by the appearance of a competitively supplied substitute of uncertain value for her customers. I construct Markov perfect equilibria with and without price discrimination for the case of two types of consumers who may learn their idiosyncratic valuation stochastically as they try out the new product. If the seller can tailor her pricing policy to individual consumer experience, the equilibrium is efficient. Without the ability to charge different prices, dynamic inefficiencies arise, since consumers experiment too much. However, the asymptotic outcomes are almost surely efficient.
expected utility" [download]
(supplementary appendix [download])
ABSTRACT | This paper studies the conditions under which multiple (incomplete) preferences over lotteries are simultaneously consistent with a single expected utility representation. I apply the analysis to develop a revealed preference theory under risk and to extend Anscombe-Aumann’s model to cases in which the set of available prizes varies with the state.
systems and the common prior assumption" [download]
ABSTRACT | In this paper, I offer a characterization of the set of priors which are consistent with any given finite system of posterior beliefs. Moreover, I identify a significant class of systems for which the existence of a common prior is equivalent to the weaker requirement that posterior beliefs are locally coherent.
representation for preferences over menus in finite choice
ABSTRACT | I prove that the additive representation of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) is consistent with any preference relation among the deterministic alternatives in their model. The result yields an additive representation which relaxes both the monotonicity and ordinal submodularity axioms in Kreps (1979) flexibility representation theorem.
|"The impossibility of tie-breaking von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences" [download]
ABSTRACT | This note shows that the trivial preference declaring every lottery indifferent is the only vNM preference which admits a vNM tie-breaker deciding some of its indifference.
|Notes for Eco501
|- "Simple probabilistic construction of
utility representations" [download]
- "Continuity and convexity notions for preferences" [download]
- "Continuity of the Hicksian demand" [download]
- "Convergence of preferences" [download]
|Eco501 Fall 2011-2012 - Ratings [download] - Comments [download]|
|Eco501 Fall 2010-2011 - Ratings [download] - Comments [download]|