Marco Battaglini
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
001 Fisher Hall,
Phone: 609-258-4002
Fax: 609-258-6419
e-mail: mbattagl "at" princeton.EDU
Curriculum Vitae
Fields of Interest: Economic Theory, Game Theory, Contract Theory, Political
Economy, Laboratory Experiments.
Working Papers:
"The Free Rider Problem:
a Dynamic Analysis," with Salvatore Nunnari and
Thomas Palfrey NEW
"Fiscal Policy and
Unemployment," with Stephen Coate NEW
"Cheap
Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis" *
with Uliana Makarov
"A Dynamic Theory of Electoral
Competition" * REVISED
"Legislative
Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," * with Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas Palfrey. REVISED
"Fiscal Policy over the Real
Business Cycle: A Positive Theory," *
with Levon
Barseghyan and Stephen Coate.
“On the Case for a Balanced
Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” * with M. Azzimonti and S.
Coate.
My research in the papers with a “*” is
supported by the National Science Foundation through a CAREER Award.
My research in the papers with a “*” is supported by the
National Science Foundation SES-0418150, 2004-2007.
Published or forthcoming papers:
“The Political Economy of Public Debt,” Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, 2011.
“The Dynamics of Redistributive
Politics,” * with Thomas Palfrey, Economic Theory, forthcoming.
“The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory,” * with Rebecca Morton and Thomas Palfrey. Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77
(1), pp. 61-89.
“Information and Pivotal Voter Models in Large Laboratory
Elections,’’ * with
Rebecca Morton and Thomas Palfrey.
American Economic Review Papers
and Proceedings, May 2008, v. 98, iss. 2, pp.
194-200.
“The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy,” * with Stephen Coate. Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, April-May 2008, v. 6, iss. 2-3, pp. 367-80.
“A Dynamic
Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," * with Stephen Coate. Read here the review in NAJ Economics. American Economic Review, March
2008, v. 98, iss. 1, pp. 201-36. Michael Wallerstein Award from
the American Political Science Association for best article published in 2008
in the area of political economy.
“Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities," * with Stephen Coate. Journal of Public Economics, April 2008, v. 92, iss. 3-4, pp. 844-68.
“Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms,’’ * with Rebecca Morton and Thomas Palfrey, American Political Science Review, Volume 101, Issue 03, August 2007, pp 409-424.
“Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," * with Stephen Coate, American Economic Review, Vol. 97, n. 1, March 2007, pp.118-149.
"Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," * , Games and Economic Behavior , Volume 60, Issue 2, August 2007, Pages 213-246.
"Joint Production in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 130, n.1, September
2006, pp.138-167.
"Self-control in
Peer Groups," Journal of Economic Theory with R.
Benabou and J. Tirole, Vol. 123, n. 2, August 2005,
pp. 81-220.
"Long-Term
Contracting with Markovian Consumers," * American Economic Review, Vol. 95, n.3,
June 2005, pp. 637-658.
"Sequential Voting with
Abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 51, n. 2,
"Policy Advice with
Imperfectly Informed Experts," Advances in Theoretical
Economics: Vol. 4: 2004, No. 1. Winner of the
2005 Kenneth Arrow Prize in Economics for Junior Faculty.
"Trust,
Coordination, and The Industrial Organization of Political Activism,"
Journal of the European Economic Association with Roland Benabou
Vol.1, issue 4, June 2003.
"Multiple Referrals
and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica , Vol.
70, n.4, July 2002, pp. 1379-1401.
"Should we Trust banks When they sit on the
Board of Directors?" with Francesco Giavazzi,
in Corporate Governance, Financial Markets and Global Convergence, 1998,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, M. Balling at al. (eds.).
Princeton Conference on Political
Economy
21st Jerusalem School in Economic
Theory (July 2010): my Lectures.
Teaching:
- Intermediate Microeconomics
- Topics in Economic Theory
- Economics and Politics