

## A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt

By MARCO BATTAGLINI AND STEPHEN COATE\*

*This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy. Policy choices are made by a legislature that can raise revenues via an income tax and by borrowing. Revenues can be used to finance a public good, whose value is stochastic, and pork-barrel spending. Policymaking cycles between a “business-as-usual” regime in which legislators bargain over pork, and a “responsible policymaking” regime in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. Equilibrium tax rates are too high, public good provision is too low, and debt levels are too high. (JEL D72, E62, H20, H50, H60)*

This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation, and debt. The theory builds on the well-known tax smoothing approach to fiscal policy pioneered by Robert Barro (1979). This approach predicts that governments will use budget surpluses and deficits as a buffer to prevent tax rates from changing too sharply. Thus, governments will run deficits in times of high government spending needs and surpluses when needs are low. Underlying the approach are the assumptions that governments are benevolent, that government spending needs fluctuate over time, and that the deadweight costs of income taxes are a convex function of the tax rate. The economic environment underlying our theory is similar to that in the tax smoothing literature. Our key departure is that policy decisions are made by a legislature rather than a benevolent planner. Moreover, we introduce the friction that legislators can distribute revenues back to their districts via pork-barrel spending.

More specifically, our theory assumes that policy choices are made by a legislature comprised of representatives elected by single-member, geographically defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and by borrowing in the capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing risk-free one-period bonds. The legislature can also purchase bonds and use the interest earnings to help finance future public spending if it so chooses. Public revenues are used to finance the provision of a public good that benefits all citizens and to provide targeted district-specific transfers, which are interpreted as pork-barrel spending. The value of the public good to citizens is stochastic, reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters. The legislature makes policy decisions by majority (or super-majority) rule and legislative policymaking in each period is modelled using the legislative bargaining approach of David Baron and John Ferejohn (1989). The level of public debt acts as a state variable, creating a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods.

\* Battaglini: Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (e-mail: mbattagl@princeton.edu); Coate: Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 (e-mail: scl63@cornell.edu). For detailed comments, we thank Jon Eguia, Mark Gertler, Aleh Tsyvinski, and two anonymous referees. We also thank Andrew Atkeson, Marina Azzimonti, Roland Benabou, Tim Besley, Faruk Gul, Per Krusell, and seminar participants at UC Berkeley, Cal Tech, Cambridge University, University of Chicago, Cornell University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, LSE, University of Michigan, University of Munich, NBER, Northwestern University, NYU, Ohio State University, Oxford University, University of Pittsburgh, Princeton University, Queen's University, University of Rochester, Stanford University, UCLA, University of Virginia, and University of Wisconsin for helpful feedback. Battaglini gratefully acknowledges financial support from an NSF CAREER Award (SES 0547748).

Incorporating political decision making in this way resolves an important theoretical difficulty with the tax smoothing approach first pointed out by S. Rao Aiyagari et al. (2002). While Barro's original analysis assumes that the government perfectly anticipates its fluctuating spending needs, Aiyagari et al. tackle the more relevant case of uncertainty. They demonstrate that the tax smoothing logic does not necessarily imply the countercyclical theory of deficits and surpluses that it had been presumed to. In some environments, the optimal policy is for the government to gradually acquire sufficient bond holdings so as eventually to be able to finance any level of spending with the interest earnings from these holdings. This permits the financing of government spending without distortionary taxation. Interest earnings in excess of spending needs are rebated to citizens via lump sum transfers. Obviously, the prediction of a steady state with huge government asset accumulation and zero taxes is unsatisfactory. This prediction is avoided if exogenous limits on the amount of debt that the government can hold are imposed, but Aiyagari et al. rightly criticize these as "ad hoc."<sup>1</sup>

Intuitively, it seems likely that legislators entrusted with a large stock of government assets would run it down and distribute the proceeds back to their districts, and this is precisely the force that our theory captures. Thus, despite the fact that there are no ad hoc debt limits, the long-run level of government bond holdings in political equilibrium is below the efficient level. Moreover, equilibrium policies display the dynamic pattern suggested by Barro; namely, debt goes up when the value of public goods is high and down when it is low. In addition, debt serves to smooth taxes.

Our theory offers a number of other advantages over the basic tax smoothing approach. First, it allows for the possibility that the government can be in perpetual debt. Second, it provides predictions concerning the dynamics of legislative policymaking and on the mix of public spending between pork and public goods. Third, it provides a sharp account of how political decision making "distorts" public policies. Fourth, the theory permits a welfare analysis of fiscal restraints such as balanced budget rules.

That pork-barrel spending gives rise to inefficiencies in legislative decision making is a core idea of political economy. Moreover, it is now well understood that in dynamic environments, redistributive considerations can lead legislatures to be present-biased. What is novel about our paper is that we incorporate these ideas into a dynamic general equilibrium model that contains the key assumptions of the tax smoothing literature. This allows us to better integrate the political economy and tax smoothing literatures. In particular, we can study how the political forces favoring present bias in legislative policymaking interact with the economic forces favoring the use of debt for tax smoothing purposes. The interplay between these forces gives rise to what is, in our judgement, a richer and more satisfying theory of fiscal policy.

Our basic approach to incorporating legislative decision making into a dynamic general equilibrium model follows our earlier work in Battaglini and Coate (2007). In that paper, we explored how pork-barrel spending affects the overall size of government and distorts investment in public capital goods. We analyzed an environment in which, in each period, the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and these revenues can be used to finance investment in a public good and in pork-barrel spending. The environment we study in this paper differs in three key ways. First, the government can borrow as well as levy income taxes. Second, the public good is not an investment good. Third, the value of the public good is stochastic. This makes for a very different application, with the key dynamic linkage across periods created by the level of debt rather than the stock of public good.

<sup>1</sup> Yongseok Shin (2006) shows that this prediction can be avoided if citizens face idiosyncratic and uninsurable productivity shocks.

The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the model. Section II provides a benchmark by describing the planning solution for the economy. Section III characterizes the political equilibrium and develops the positive predictions of the theory. Section IV explains precisely how political decision making distorts the efficient solution. Section V discusses the empirical implications of the theory, and Section VI applies the theory to analyze the desirability of a balanced budget requirement. Section VII discusses the related political economy literature and Section VIII offers a brief conclusion. The Appendix contains the proofs of the propositions.<sup>2</sup>

## I. The Model

### A. The Economic Environment

A continuum of infinitely lived citizens live in  $n$  identical districts indexed by  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . The size of the population in each district is normalized to one. There is a single (nonstorable) consumption good, denoted by  $z$ , that is produced using a single factor, labor, denoted by  $l$ , with the linear technology  $z = wl$ . There is also a public good, denoted by  $g$ , that can be produced from the consumption good according to the linear technology  $g = z/p$ .

Citizens consume the consumption good, benefit from the public good, and supply labor. Each citizen's per period utility function is

$$(1) \quad z + Ag^\alpha - \frac{l^{(1+1/\varepsilon)}}{\varepsilon + 1},$$

where  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $\varepsilon > 0$ . The parameter  $A$  measures the value of the public good to the citizens. Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate  $\delta$ .

The value of the public good varies across periods in a random way, reflecting shocks to the society such as wars and natural disasters. Specifically, in each period,  $A$  is the realization of a random variable with range  $[\underline{A}, \bar{A}]$  (where  $0 < \underline{A} < \bar{A}$ ) and cumulative distribution function  $G(A)$ . The function  $G$  is continuously differentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly below by some positive constant  $\xi > 0$ , so that for any pair of realizations such that  $A < A'$ , the difference  $G(A') - G(A)$  is at least as big as  $\xi(A' - A)$ . Thus,  $G$  assigns positive probability to all nondegenerate subintervals of  $[\underline{A}, \bar{A}]$ .

There is a competitive labor market and competitive production of the public good. Thus, the wage rate is equal to  $w$  and the price of the public good is  $p$ . There is also a market in risk-free one-period bonds. The assumption of a constant marginal utility of consumption implies that the equilibrium interest rate on these bonds must be  $\rho = 1/\delta - 1$ . At this interest rate, citizens will be indifferent as to their allocation of consumption across time.

### B. Government Policies

The public good is provided by the government. The government can raise revenue by levying a proportional tax on labor income. It can also borrow and lend in the bond market by selling and buying risk-free one-period bonds.<sup>3</sup> Revenues can not only be used to finance the provision

<sup>2</sup> More detailed proofs can be found in the Web Appendix (available at <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.1.201>).

<sup>3</sup> Thus we do not consider state-contingent debt as in Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey (1983). We believe that this is the appropriate assumption for a positive analysis. We also do not consider debt with different maturity structures.

of the public good, but can also be diverted to finance targeted district-specific transfers, which are interpreted as (nondistortionary) pork-barrel spending.

Government policy in any period is described by an  $n + 3$ -tuple  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ , where  $r$  is the income tax rate;  $g$  is the amount of the public good provided;  $x$  is the amount of bonds sold; and  $s_i$  is the proposed transfer to district  $i$ 's residents. When  $x$  is negative, the government is buying bonds. In each period, the government must also repay any bonds that it sold in the previous period. Thus, if it sold  $b$  bonds in the previous period, it must repay  $(1 + \rho)b$  in the current period. The government's initial debt level in period 1 is given exogenously and is denoted by  $b_0$ .

In a period in which government policy is  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ , each citizen will supply an amount of labor

$$(2) \quad l^*(w(1 - r)) = \arg \max_l \left\{ w(1 - r)l - \frac{l^{(1+1/\varepsilon)}}{\varepsilon + 1} \right\}.$$

It is straightforward to show that  $l^*(w(1 - r)) = (\varepsilon w(1 - r))^\varepsilon$ , so that  $\varepsilon$  is the elasticity of labor supply. A citizen in district  $i$  who simply consumes his net of tax earnings and his transfer will obtain a per period utility of  $u(w(1 - r), g; A) + s_i$ , where

$$(3) \quad u(w(1 - r), g; A) = \frac{\varepsilon^\varepsilon (w(1 - r))^{\varepsilon+1}}{\varepsilon + 1} + Ag^\alpha.$$

Since citizens are indifferent as to their allocation of consumption across time, their lifetime expected utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoff they would obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period.

Government policies must satisfy three feasibility constraints. The first is that revenues must be sufficient to cover expenditures. To see what this implies, consider a period in which the initial level of government debt is  $b$  and the policy choice is  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ . Expenditure on public goods and debt repayment is  $pg + (1 + \rho)b$ ; tax revenue is

$$(4) \quad R(r) = nrwl^*(w(1 - r)) = nrw(\varepsilon w(1 - r))^\varepsilon;$$

and revenue from bond sales is  $x$ . Letting the *net of transfer surplus* (i.e., the difference between revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment) be denoted by

$$(5) \quad B(r, g, x; b) = R(r) - pg + x - (1 + \rho)b,$$

the constraint requires that  $B(r, g, x; b) \geq \sum_i s_i$ .

The second constraint is that the district-specific transfers must be nonnegative (i.e.,  $s_i \geq 0$  for all  $i$ ). This rules out financing public spending via district-specific lump sum taxes. With lump sum taxes, there would be no need to impose the distortionary labor tax and hence no tax smoothing problem.

The third and final constraint is that the amount of government borrowing must be feasible. In particular, there is an upper limit  $\bar{x}$  on the amount of bonds the government can sell. This is motivated by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold bonds that they know will not be repaid. If the government were borrowing an amount  $x$  such that the interest payments exceeded the

---

While George-Marios Angeletos (2002) has argued that maturity structures can substitute for state-contingent debt, his argument does not apply in our model because the interest rate is constant.

maximum possible tax revenues, i.e.,  $\rho x > \max_r R(r)$ , then it would be unable to repay the debt even if it provided no public goods or transfers. Thus, the maximum level of debt is certainly less than this level, implying that  $\bar{x} \leq \max_r R(r)/\rho$ . In fact, we will assume that  $\bar{x}$  is slightly smaller than  $\max_r R(r)/\rho$ . This is because if  $\bar{x}$  equals  $\max_r R(r)/\rho$ , then if government debt ever reached  $\bar{x}$  it would stay there forever, because the legislature could never pay it off. For our dynamic results, it is convenient to assume away this (relatively uninteresting) possibility.

We avoid assuming that there is any ad hoc limit on the amount of bonds that the government can purchase (see Aiyagari et al. 2002). In particular, the government is allowed to hold sufficient bonds to permit it to always finance the Samuelson level of the public good from the interest earnings. This level of bonds is given by  $\underline{x} = -pg_S(\bar{A})/\rho$ , where  $g_S(A)$  is the level of the public good that satisfies the *Samuelson Rule* when the value of the public good is  $A$ .<sup>4</sup> Since the government will never want to hold more bonds than this, there is no loss of generality in constraining the choice of debt to the interval  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ , and we will do this below.<sup>5</sup> We also assume that the initial level of government debt,  $b_0$ , belongs to the interval  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ .

### C. The Political Process

Government policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of the  $n$  districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district's representative. Since all citizens have the same policy preferences, the identity of the representative is immaterial and hence the selection process can be ignored.<sup>6</sup> The legislature meets at the beginning of each period. These meetings take only an insignificant amount of time, and representatives undertake private sector work in the rest of the period just like everybody else. The affirmative votes of  $q < n$  representatives are required to enact any legislation.

To describe how legislative decision making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is  $b$  and the value of the public good is  $A$ . One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the first proposal, with each representative having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is a policy  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  that satisfies the feasibility constraints. If the first proposal is accepted by  $q$  legislators, then it is implemented and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature meets again, with the difference being that the initial level of public debt is  $x$  and there is a new realization of the value of public goods. If, on the other hand, the first proposal is not accepted, another legislator is chosen to make a proposal. There are  $T \geq 2$  such proposal rounds, each of which takes a negligible amount of time. If the process continues until proposal round  $T$ , and the proposal made at that stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose a default policy. The only restrictions on the choice of a default policy are that it be feasible and that it involve a uniform district-specific transfer (i.e.,  $s_i = s_j$  for all  $i, j$ ).

<sup>4</sup> The Samuelson Rule is that the sum of marginal benefits equals the marginal cost, which means that  $g_S(A)$  satisfies the first-order condition that  $na\alpha g^{\alpha-1} = p$ .

<sup>5</sup> By assuming that the government can choose to borrow any amount in the interval  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ , we are implicitly assuming that the wage is sufficiently high that the amount spent on public goods is never higher than national income. To see this, imagine that the initial level of government debt is  $b$  and the government chooses the policy  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ . Then, feasibility demands that the amount borrowed,  $x$ , must be less than the total amount of private sector income. The latter is given by  $\sum_i s_i + (1 + \rho)b + n(1 - r)w(\epsilon w(1 - r))^\epsilon$ . Assuming government budget balance, we know that  $\sum_i s_i + (1 + \rho)b$  is equal to  $x + R(r) - pg$ . Substituting this in, the feasibility condition amounts to the requirement that  $nw(\epsilon w(1 - r))^\epsilon$  (which is national income) exceed  $pg$ . In either the equilibrium or the planner's solution, national income always exceeds  $nw\{\epsilon w[\epsilon/(1 + \epsilon)]\}^\epsilon$  and public good spending is always less than  $pg_S(\bar{A})$ . Thus, a sufficient condition is that  $nw\{\epsilon w[\epsilon/(1 + \epsilon)]\}^\epsilon > pg_S(\bar{A})$ . Of course, such a condition would not be required in the case of a small open economy which could borrow from abroad.

<sup>6</sup> While citizens may differ in their bond holdings, this has no impact on their policy preferences.

## II. The Social Planner's Solution

To establish a normative benchmark with which to compare the political equilibrium, we begin by describing the policies that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective was to maximize aggregate utility. This is basically the problem considered by Aiyagari et al. (2002). However, we will derive the solution in a way that sets the stage for the more complicated analysis of the political equilibrium.<sup>7</sup>

The planner's problem can be formulated recursively. The *state* of the economy is summarized by the current level of public debt  $b$  and the value of the public good  $A$ . Let  $v(b, A)$  denote maximal average citizen expected utility (net of the value of initial bond holdings) at the beginning of a period in which the state is  $(b, A)$ .<sup>8</sup> Then, in a period in which the state is  $(b, A)$ , the planner's problem is to choose a policy  $\{r, g, x, s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  to solve

$$(6) \quad \begin{aligned} \max u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{\sum_i s_i}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ \text{s.t. } \sum_i s_i \leq B(r, g, x; b), \\ s_i \geq 0 \text{ for all } i, \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]. \end{aligned}$$

The three constraints are the feasibility constraints described in Section IB.

This problem can be simplified by observing that if the net of transfer surplus  $B(r, g, x; b)$  were positive, the planner would use it to finance transfers, and hence  $\sum_i s_i = B(r, g, x; b)$ . Thus, we can eliminate the choice variables  $(s_1, \dots, s_n)$  and reformulate the problem as choosing a tax rate–public good–public debt triple  $(r, g, x)$  to solve

$$(7) \quad \begin{aligned} \max u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ \text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]. \end{aligned}$$

The problem in this form is fairly standard. The planner's value function must satisfy the functional equation

$$(8) \quad v(b, A) = \max_{(r, g, x)} \left\{ u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') : B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \right\}.$$

Familiar arguments can be applied to show that such a value function exists and that  $E v(\cdot, A)$  is differentiable and strictly concave. From this, the properties of the optimal policies may be deduced.

<sup>7</sup> Aiyagari et al. allow for more general preferences, focusing on the quasi-linear case as a leading example. This complicates the model because interest rates are affected by government policy. These complications require them to use a less transparent solution method.

<sup>8</sup> Maximal average expected utility will be  $b(1 + \rho)/n + v(b, A)$ .

### A. The Optimal Policies

Using equations (3) and (4) and letting  $\lambda$  denote the multiplier on the budget constraint, we can write the first-order conditions for the maximization problem in (8) as follows:

$$(9) \quad 1 + \lambda = \frac{1 - r}{1 - r(1 + \varepsilon)},$$

$$(10) \quad n\alpha Ag^{\alpha-1} = \left[ \frac{1 - r}{1 - r(1 + \varepsilon)} \right] p,$$

and

$$(11) \quad \frac{1 - r}{1 - r(1 + \varepsilon)} \geq -\delta n E \left[ \frac{\partial v(x, A')}{\partial x} \right] (= \text{if } x < \bar{x}).$$

To interpret these, note that  $(1 - r)/(1 - r(1 + \varepsilon))$  measures the marginal cost of taxation—the social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. It exceeds unity whenever the tax rate ( $r$ ) is positive, because taxation is distortionary. For a given tax rate, the marginal cost of taxation is higher the more elastic is labor supply; that is, the higher is  $\varepsilon$ . Condition (9) therefore says that the benefit of raising an additional unit of revenue—which is measured by  $1 + \lambda$ —must equal the marginal cost of taxation. Condition (10) says that the marginal social benefit of the public good must equal its price times the marginal cost of taxation. This is basically the Samuelson Rule modified to take into account the fact that taxation is distortionary. Condition (11) says that the benefit of increasing debt in terms of reducing taxes must equal the marginal cost of an increase in the debt level. This cost is that there is a higher initial level of debt next period. The condition can hold as an inequality, if the debt level is at its ceiling.

In any particular state  $(b, A)$ , there are two possibilities. The first is that the planner is making transfers to the citizens, in which case  $\lambda = 0$ . In this case, conditions (9) and (10) imply that the tax rate  $r$  must be zero and the level of the public good  $g$  must equal the Samuelson level  $g_S(A)$ . Intuitively, if  $r$  were positive, the planner would find it strictly optimal to reduce transfers and the tax rate simultaneously: this would reduce the deadweight loss of taxation and increase citizen welfare. Similarly, if the public good level were less than the Samuelson level, the planner could reduce transfers and increase public good provision. The debt level in this case, which we denote by  $x^\circ$ , must satisfy the requirement that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals one. We will investigate what this implies below.

The second possibility is that the planner is making no transfers. In this case, the optimal tax rate–public good–public debt triple is implicitly defined by equations (10), (11), and the requirement that the net of transfer surplus is zero; i.e.,

$$(12) \quad B(r, g, x; b) = 0.$$

A positive value of  $\lambda$  implies that the tax rate  $r$  must exceed zero and the level of the public good  $g$  is less than the Samuelson level  $g_S(A)$ . Moreover, the level of debt exceeds  $x^\circ$ . The tax rate and debt level are increasing in  $b$  and  $A$ , while the public good level is decreasing in  $b$  and increasing in  $A$ .<sup>9</sup> Intuitively, an increase in  $b$  makes the budget harder to satisfy, forcing the planner to raise

<sup>9</sup> These facts are established in the Web Appendix.

more revenues and scrimp on the public good. An increase in  $A$  makes the public good more valuable and leads the planner to raise taxes and debt to finance more public spending.

In which states will the two possibilities arise? Let  $A^o(b, x^o)$  be the largest value of  $A$  consistent with the triple  $(0, g_s(A), x^o)$  satisfying the constraint that  $B(0, g_s(A), x^o; b) \geq 0$ .<sup>10</sup> Then, if the state  $(b, A)$  is such that  $A < A^o(b, x^o)$ , the optimal policy involves transfers, while if  $A \geq A^o(b, x^o)$ , it does not.

B. The Debt Level  $x^o$

The next step is to characterize the debt level,  $x^o$ , the planner chooses when he makes transfers. Intuitively, if the planner is willing to rebate scarce revenues back to citizens, then he must expect not to be imposing taxes in the next period; otherwise, he would be better off reducing transfers and acquiring more bonds. This suggests that the debt level  $x^o$  must be such that future taxes are equal to zero, implying that  $x^o$  equals  $\underline{x}$ . This is indeed the case but it is instructive to derive it formally.

Recall that  $x^o$  is such that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals one. Given the discussion above, we can write the value function as

$$(13) \quad v(x, A) = \begin{cases} \max_{\{r, g, z\}} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, z; x)}{n} + \delta Ev(z, A') \\ B(r, g, z; x) \geq 0 \text{ and } z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\} & \text{if } A \geq A^o(x, x^o) \\ u(w, g_s(A); A) + \frac{B(0, g_s(A), x^o; x)}{n} + \delta Ev(x^o, A') & \text{if } A < A^o(x, x^o) \end{cases} .$$

Then, by the *Envelope Theorem*:

$$(14) \quad \frac{\partial v(x, A)}{\partial x} = \begin{cases} -\left(\frac{1 - r^o(x, A)}{1 - r^o(x, A)(1 + \varepsilon)}\right) \left(\frac{1 + \rho}{n}\right) & \text{if } A \geq A^o(x, x^o) \\ -\left(\frac{1 + \rho}{n}\right) & \text{if } A < A^o(x, x^o) \end{cases} ,$$

where  $r^o(x, A)$  is the optimal tax rate. Notice that this derivative is continuous at  $A = A^o(x, x^o)$  since  $r^o(x, A^o) = 0$ . Taking expectations, we have that the expected marginal social cost of debt is

$$(15) \quad -\delta n E \left[ \frac{\partial v(x, A)}{\partial x} \right] = G(A^o(x, x^o)) + \int_{A^o(x, x^o)}^{\bar{A}} \left( \frac{1 - r^o(x, A)}{1 - r^o(x, A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) dG(A).$$

<sup>10</sup> If  $B(0, 0, x^o; b) < 0$ , let  $A^o(b, x^o) = 0$ .

Thus, the debt level  $x^o$  must satisfy the following equation:

$$(16) \quad 1 = G(A^o(x^o, x^o)) + \int_{A^o(x^o, x^o)}^{\bar{A}} \left( \frac{1 - r^o(x^o, A)}{1 - r^o(x^o, A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) dG(A).$$

This implies that  $A^o(x^o, x^o) = \bar{A}$ , which in turn means that  $x^o = \underline{x}$ .

### C. Dynamics

The optimal policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the long run, this sequence of debt distributions converges to the distribution that puts point mass on the debt level  $\underline{x}$ . To understand this, first note that since  $A^o(\underline{x}, \underline{x}) = \bar{A}$ , it is clear that once the planner has accumulated a level of bonds equal to  $-\underline{x}$ , he will maintain it. On the other hand, when the planner has bond holdings less than  $-\underline{x}$ , he must anticipate using distortionary taxation in the future. To smooth taxes, he has an incentive to acquire additional bonds when the value of the public good is low in the current period. This leads to an upward drift in government bond holdings over time.

Pulling all this together, we have the following proposition.

**PROPOSITION 1:** *The social planner's solution converges to a steady state in which the debt level is  $\underline{x}$ , the tax rate is 0, the public good level is  $g_s(A)$ , and citizens receive  $\rho(-\underline{x}) - pg_s(A)$  in transfers.*

This result illustrates, in the context of our model, the problem with the tax smoothing approach identified by Aiyagari et al. Though the planner cannot issue state contingent bonds, he can smooth taxation across states by accumulating assets. As shown in Aiyagari et al. by numerical methods, this phenomenon is general and can characterize the planner's solution under less restrictive assumptions on the functional forms of the citizens' utilities and the stochastic process of government spending.

One way to avoid the absorbing state in which  $x = \underline{x}$  is to assume that the social planner faces what Aiyagari et al. call ad hoc constraints on asset accumulation. If the planner is not allowed to accumulate more bonds than, say,  $-z$  where  $z \in (\underline{x}, 0)$ , then even in the long run the optimal debt level will fluctuate and taxes will be positive at least some of the time.<sup>11</sup> This is because, by definition of  $\underline{x}$ , even when the planner has accumulated  $-z$  in bonds he cannot finance the Samuelson level of public goods from the interest earnings when  $A$  is very high. In these high realizations, it will be optimal to finance additional public good provision by a combination of levying taxes and reducing bond holdings. Reducing bond holdings temporarily allows the planner to smooth taxes. The dynamic pattern of debt suggested by Barro is created by the rebuilding of bond holdings in future periods when  $A$  is low. However, the difficulty with this resolution of the problem is obvious: why should the planner be so constrained, and, if he is, what should determine the level  $z$ ?

### III. Political Equilibrium

We look for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in which any representative selected to propose at round  $\tau \in \{1, \dots, T\}$  of the meeting at some time  $t$  makes the same proposal and this

<sup>11</sup> In order for taxes to *always* be positive it must be the case that  $\rho(-z) < pg_s(A)$ .

depends only on the current level of public debt ( $b$ ) and the value of the public good ( $A$ ).<sup>12</sup> As standard in the theory of legislative voting, we assume that legislators vote for a proposal if they prefer it (weakly) to continuing on to the next proposal round.<sup>13</sup> We focus, without loss of generality, on equilibria in which at each round  $\tau$ , proposals are immediately accepted by at least  $q$  legislators, so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal round. Accordingly, the policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium are those proposed in the first round.

Let  $\{r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)\}$  denote the tax rate, public good, and public debt policies that are implemented in equilibrium, and let  $B(b,A)$  be the total amount of revenues devoted to transfers (i.e.,  $B(b,A) = B(r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A); b)$ ). In addition, let  $v(b,A)$  denote the legislators' common (net of initial bond holdings) value function. Reflecting the fact that legislators are ex ante equally likely to receive transfers, this is defined recursively by

$$(17) \quad v(b,A) = u(w(1 - r(b,A)), g(b,A); b) + \frac{B(b,A)}{n} + \delta Ev(x(b,A), A).$$

This is also the (net of initial bond holdings) value function for each citizen, since, as noted earlier, representatives have the same policy preferences as their constituents.<sup>14</sup>

We restrict attention to a particular type of equilibrium, which we refer to as a “well-behaved equilibrium.” To define what this is, call the interval of debt levels  $[\inf_{(b,A)} x(b,A), \bar{x}]$  the *policy domain*. Levels of debt outside this range will never be observed except when exogenously assumed at date zero. An equilibrium is said to be *well behaved* if the associated legislators' value function satisfies the following three properties: (a)  $v$  is continuous on the state space; (b) for all  $A$ ,  $v(\cdot, A)$  is concave on  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$  and  $Ev(\cdot, A)$  is strictly concave on the policy domain; and (c) for all  $b$ ,  $v(\cdot, A)$  is differentiable at  $b$  for almost all  $A$ . In the Appendix, we demonstrate:

**PROPOSITION 2:** *There exists a unique well-behaved equilibrium.*

This is the equilibrium that we characterize in what follows.

### A. The Equilibrium Policies

The basic structure of the equilibrium policies is easily understood. To get support for his proposal, the proposer must obtain the votes of  $q - 1$  other representatives. Accordingly, given that

<sup>12</sup> A Markov perfect equilibrium is a particular type of subgame perfect equilibrium in which strategies do not depend on payoff-irrelevant past events. By focusing on Markov perfect equilibria, we rule out, for example, equilibria in which proposers punish earlier proposers for not providing their districts with transfers. Markov games (such as the game studied here) generally have a large set of subgame perfect equilibria and the Markov perfect requirement allows us to dramatically shrink this set. Non-Markov equilibria are often supported by complex strategies, or by strategies that (even when they are simple) require unrealistic degrees of coordination from the players. Markov equilibria do not require coordination and are very simple. The idea of simplicity has been formalized by Baron and Ehud Kalai (1993) for the static Baron and Ferejohn game. Given a standard definition of simplicity (Kalai and William Stanford 1988), they have shown that the unique, simplest equilibrium of this game is stationary (i.e., Markov). Stationarity is also supported in a recent laboratory experiment. Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel, and Massimo Morelli (2005) have shown that there is no evidence of nonstationary behavior in the data of their experimental study of the Baron and Ferejohn game.

<sup>13</sup> As in all voting games, it is possible to construct equilibria in which legislators vote against a proposal even if they strictly prefer it to continuing on to the next proposal round. If all voters always vote no to a proposal and there are three or more voters, then no voter will be pivotal and voting no will be weakly optimal no matter what preferences are. These equilibria are implausible and uninteresting. This assumption on legislators' voting behavior rules them out.

<sup>14</sup> The expected lifetime payoff of a citizen with bond holdings  $y$  at the beginning of a period in which the state is  $(b,A)$  will be  $y(1 + \rho) + v(b,A)$ .

utility is transferable, he is effectively making decisions to maximize the utility of  $q$  legislators.<sup>15</sup> It is therefore *as if* a randomly chosen coalition of  $q$  representatives is selected in each period, and this coalition chooses a policy choice to maximize its aggregate utility.

The proposer's policy will depend upon the state  $(b, A)$ . As in the social planner's solution, there are two possibilities: either the proposer will propose transfers for his coalition or he will not. Because the proposer is taking into account only the welfare of  $q$  legislators, and transfers are financed collectively, his incentive to choose transfers is obviously greater than the planner's. Nonetheless, transfers require reducing public good spending or increasing taxation in the present or the future (if financed by issuing additional debt). When  $b$  and/or  $A$  are sufficiently high, the marginal benefit of spending on the public good and the marginal cost of increasing taxation may be too high to make this attractive. In this case, the proposer will not propose transfers and the outcome will be *as if* the proposer is maximizing the utility of the legislature as a whole.

In equilibrium, therefore, there will exist a cut-off value of the public good, inversely related to the level of public debt, that divides the state space into two ranges. Above the cut-off, the proposer will propose a no-transfer policy package that maximizes aggregate legislator utility. This proposal will be supported by the entire legislature. Below the cut-off, the proposer chooses a policy package that provides pork for his own district and those of a minimum winning coalition of representatives. The transfer paid out to coalition members will be just sufficient to make them favor accepting the proposal. Thus, only those legislators whose districts receive pork vote for the proposal. We will refer to the first regime as *responsible policymaking* (RPM) and the second as *business-as-usual* (BAU).

To develop this more precisely, consider the problem of choosing the tax rate–public good–public debt triple that maximizes the collective utility of  $q$  representatives under the assumption that they divide the net of transfer surplus among their districts and that the constraint that this surplus be nonnegative is nonbinding. Formally, the problem is

$$(18) \quad \max_{(r, g, x)} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{q} + \delta E v(x, A')$$

$$\text{s.t. } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}].$$

Using the first-order conditions for this problem, the solution is  $(r^*, g^*(A), x^*)$ , where the tax rate  $r^*$  satisfies the condition that

$$(19) \quad \frac{1}{q} = \frac{\left[ \frac{1-r^*}{1-r^*(1+\varepsilon)} \right]}{n},$$

the public good level  $g^*(A)$  satisfies the condition that

$$(20) \quad \alpha A g^*(A)^{\alpha-1} = \frac{p}{q},$$

<sup>15</sup> This is demonstrated formally in the Web Appendix.

and the public debt level  $x^*$  satisfies

$$(21) \quad \frac{1}{q} \geq -\delta E \left[ \frac{\partial v(x^*, A')}{\partial x} \right] \quad (= \text{if } x^* < \bar{x}).$$

Condition (19) says that the benefit of raising taxes in terms of increasing the per-legislator transfer ( $1/q$ ) must equal the per-capita cost of the increase in the tax rate. Condition (20) says that the per-capita benefit of increasing the public good must equal the per-legislator reduction in transfers that providing the additional unit necessitates. Condition (21) tells us that the benefit of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-legislator transfer must equal the per-capita cost of an increase in the debt level.

Now define  $A^*(b, x)$  to be the largest value of  $A$  consistent with the triple  $(r^*, g^*(A), x)$  satisfying the constraint that  $B(r^*, g^*(A), x; b) \geq 0$ .<sup>16</sup> Then, if the state  $(b, A)$  is such that  $A < A^*(b, x^*)$ , the proposer proposes the triple  $(r^*, g^*(A), x^*)$  together with a transfer just sufficient to induce members of the coalition to accept the proposal, and the legislature is in the BAU regime. If  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$ , then the constraint that  $B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0$  must bind and the solution equals that which maximizes aggregate legislator utility. The legislature is therefore in the RPM regime. Thus, we have:

LEMMA 1: *There exists some debt level  $x^*$  such that, if  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$ ,*

$$(r(b, A), g(b, A), x(b, A)) = \arg \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\}$$

and  $B(b, A) = 0$ , while if  $A < A^*(b, x^*)$ ,

$$(r(b, A), g(b, A), x(b, A)) = (r^*, g^*(A), x^*)$$

and  $B(b, A) > 0$ .

In the RPM regime (i.e., when  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$ ), just as in the social planner's solution, the equilibrium tax rate–public good–public debt triple is implicitly defined by conditions (10), (11), and (12) (obviously, with the equilibrium value function). Thus, as in the planner's problem, the tax rate and debt level are increasing in  $b$  and  $A$ , while the public good level is decreasing in  $b$  and increasing in  $A$ .

Note that at  $A = A^*(b, x^*)$ , the triple that maximizes aggregate legislator utility equals  $(r^*, g^*(A), x^*)$ . To see this, note first that  $(r^*, g^*(A), x^*)$  satisfies the budget balance condition (12) at  $A = A^*(b, x^*)$ . In addition, using the definition of  $r^*$  in (19), we may write the first-order conditions (20) and (21) in the same form as (10) and (11). Thus, the equilibrium policy proposal is a continuous function of the state  $(b, A)$ . Moreover, given the monotonicity properties of the solution in the RPM regime, it follows that when  $A > A^*(b, x^*)$ , the equilibrium policy proposal involves

<sup>16</sup> If  $B(r^*, 0, x; b) < 0$ , let  $A^*(b, x) = 0$ .

a tax rate higher than  $r^*$ , the provision of a public good level below  $g^*(A)$ , and a level of debt that exceeds  $x^*$ . Thus, in the political equilibrium, the government's debt level is always at least  $x^*$ , the tax rate is always at least  $r^*$ , and the public good level is always no greater than  $g^*(A)$ .

B. The Debt Level  $x^*$

The next step is to characterize the debt level  $x^*$  that the proposer chooses when providing pork to his coalition. We use a similar strategy to that used to characterize  $x^o$  in the planner's problem. From Lemma 1 we know that, in equilibrium,

$$(22) \quad v(x,A) = \begin{cases} \max_{\{r,g,z\}} \left\{ \begin{aligned} & u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,z;x)}{n} + \delta Ev(z,A') \\ & B(r,g,z;x) \geq 0 \text{ and } z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{aligned} \right\} & \text{if } A \geq A^*(x,x^*) \\ u(w(1-r^*),g^*(A);A) + \frac{B(r^*,g^*(A),x^*;x)}{n} + \delta Ev(x^*,A') & \text{if } A < A^*(x,x^*) \end{cases} .$$

Thus, by the *Envelope Theorem*:

$$(23) \quad \frac{\partial v(x,A)}{\partial x} = \begin{cases} -\left(\frac{1-r(x,A)}{1-r(x,A)(1+\varepsilon)}\right)\left(\frac{1+\rho}{n}\right) & \text{if } A \geq A^*(x,x^*) \\ -\left(\frac{1+\rho}{n}\right) & \text{if } A < A^*(x,x^*) \end{cases} .$$

In contrast to the planner's solution, there is a discontinuity in the derivative of the value function when  $A = A^*(x,x^*)$ . This reflects the fact that the tax rate  $r(x,A^*)$  equals  $r^*$  and hence the marginal cost of taxation strictly exceeds 1. Intuitively, a higher future level of debt reduces pork if the legislature is in the BAU regime and increases taxes if the legislature is in the RPM regime. Increasing taxes is more costly than reducing pork because taxes are positive in RPM and thus the marginal cost of public funds exceeds one.

Using this expression to compute the expected marginal cost of borrowing and using our first-order condition (21), we find that  $x^*$  must satisfy

$$(24) \quad \frac{n}{q} \geq G(A^*(x^*,x^*)) + \int_{A^*(x^*,x^*)}^{\bar{A}} \left(\frac{1-r(x^*,A)}{1-r(x^*,A)(1+\varepsilon)}\right) dG(A) \text{ (if } x^* < \bar{x}\text{)}.$$

Our assumption concerning the maximum debt level  $\bar{x}$  implies that  $A^*(\bar{x},\bar{x}) < \underline{A}$ . Thus, since taxes exceed  $r^*$  in the RPM regime, condition (19) implies that the expected marginal social cost of debt must exceed  $n/q$  when  $x^* = \bar{x}$ . It follows that  $x^*$  is strictly less than  $\bar{x}$ , and condition (24) must hold as an equality.

Notice that for condition (24) to be satisfied,  $A^*(x^*, x^*)$  must lie strictly between  $\underline{A}$  and  $\bar{A}$ . Intuitively, this means that the debt level  $x^*$  must be such that the legislature will transition out of BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. This has important implications for the magnitude of  $x^*$ , which we will draw out below.

### C. Dynamics

The equilibrium policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the Appendix, we show that this sequence of debt distributions converges to a unique invariant distribution. Thus, no matter what the economy's initial debt level, the same distribution of debt emerges in the long run. The lower bound of the support of this distribution is  $x^*$ —the level of public debt chosen in the BAU regime. There is a mass point at this debt level, since the probability of remaining at  $x^*$  once having reached it is  $G(A^*(x^*, x^*))$ —which is positive. However, the distribution of debt is nondegenerate because, as just noted,  $x^*$  must be such that there is a positive probability of leaving the BAU regime.

Combining this with our earlier discussion yields the following proposition:

**PROPOSITION 3:** *The equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique invariant distribution whose support is a subset of  $[x^*, \bar{x}]$ . This distribution has a mass point at  $x^*$  but is nondegenerate. When the debt level is  $x^*$ , the tax rate is  $r^*$ , the public good level is  $g^*(A)$ , and a minimum winning coalition of districts receives transfers. When the debt level exceeds  $x^*$ , the tax rate exceeds  $r^*$ , the public good level is less than  $g^*(A)$ , and no districts receive transfers.*

The dynamics of the equilibrium are such that, in the long run, legislative policymaking oscillates between BAU and RPM. Periods of BAU are brought to an end by high realizations of the value of public goods. These trigger an increase in debt and taxes to finance higher public good spending and a cessation of pork-barrel spending. Once in the RPM regime, further high realizations of the value of the public good trigger further increases in debt and higher taxes. Policymaking returns to BAU only after a suitable sequence of low realizations of the value of the public good. The larger the amount of debt that has been built up, the greater the expected time before returning to BAU.

To get a graphical feel for the long-run dynamics of the system, let  $A_L$  be less than  $A^*(x^*, x^*)$  and  $A_H$  be larger than  $A^*(x^*, x^*)$ . Suppose that the legislature is in BAU in period  $t - 1$  so that the level of debt is  $x^*$  at the beginning of period  $t$ . Further suppose that in periods  $t$  through  $t_L$  the value of the public good is  $A_L$ ; in periods  $t_L + 1$  through  $t_H$  the value of the public good is  $A_H$ ; and in periods  $t_H + 1$  and beyond the value of the public good returns to  $A_L$ . Then, the dynamic pattern of debt, tax rates, and public good provision is as represented in Figure 1. At date  $t_L + 1$ , debt, taxes, and public good levels jump in response to the increase in  $A$ . During periods  $t_L + 1$  through  $t_H$ , debt and taxes continue to rise, while public good provision falls. In period  $t_H + 1$ , public good provision drops in response to the fall in  $A$ , overshooting its natural level  $g^*(A_L)$ . After period  $t_H + 1$ , debt and taxes start to fall and public good provision increases. Eventually, the legislature returns to BAU.

If the debt level  $x^*$  is positive, the economy is in perpetual debt, with the extent of debt spiking up after a sequence of high values of the public good. When  $x^*$  is negative, the government will have positive asset holdings at least some of the time. A key question is therefore what determines the magnitude of  $x^*$ . As noted earlier,  $x^*$  must be such that the legislature will transition out of BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. We now use this observation to shed light on the determinants of  $x^*$ .

Given the definition of the function  $A^*$ , the critical value  $A^*(x^*, x^*)$  satisfies the equation  $R(r^*) - \rho x^* = pg^*(A)$ . Thus, since  $A^*(x^*, x^*)$  must lie between  $\underline{A}$  and  $\bar{A}$ , if  $R(r^*)$  exceeds  $pg^*(\bar{A})$ ,




FIGURE 1. DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM

then  $x^*$  must be positive. Intuitively, if  $x^*$  were equal to zero, the legislature would be in BAU with probability one, so interest payments must be positive to soak up some of the surplus revenues. On the other hand, if  $R(r^*)$  is less than  $pg^*(A)$ , then  $x^*$  must be negative. If  $x^*$  were equal to zero, the legislature would be in RPM with probability one so interest earnings must be positive to supplement scarce tax revenues. The key determinant of the magnitude of  $x^*$  is, therefore, the size of the tax base as measured by  $R(r^*)$  relative to the economy's desired public good spending as measured by  $pg^*(A)$ . The greater the relative size of the tax base, the larger is the debt level chosen in the BAU regime. Paradoxically, therefore, it is economies with relatively larger tax bases that are more likely to be in perpetual debt.

**IV. Political Distortions**

A central mission of the contemporary literature on political economy is to understand how political decision making distorts policy choices. Propositions 1 and 3 tell us precisely how the equilibrium policy sequence differs from the planner's policy sequence. Specifically, in the long run, the level of debt held by the government is too high relative to the optimal level, tax rates are too high, and public good levels are too low. Moreover, tax rates

are too volatile. Since in both the planner's solution and the equilibrium all citizens receive the same expected utility (modulo any differences in initial bond holdings), these distortions mean that the political equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the planner's solution. Thus, the equilibrium exhibits political failure in the sense defined by Timothy Besley and Coate (1998).

This inefficiency notwithstanding, in the RPM regime, legislators behave exactly as the social planner would want them to, given the constraint that future policy choices are politically determined. This suggests the intriguing idea that the equilibrium policies might solve an appropriately constrained planning problem. The following proposition makes this idea precise.

**PROPOSITION 4:** *The equilibrium value function  $v(b,A)$  solves the functional equation*

$$v(b,A) = \max_{(r,g,x)} \left\{ u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,x;b)}{n} + \delta Ev(x,A') : \right. \\ \left. B(r,g,x;b) \geq 0, r \geq r^*, g \leq g^*(A), \text{ and } x \in [x^*, \bar{x}] \right\},$$

and the equilibrium policies  $\{r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)\}$  are the optimal policy functions for this program.

Comparing the program described in the proposition with that in (8), we see that political determination imposes three constraints on the planning problem. First, the tax rate cannot be below  $r^*$ . Were it to be so, the proposer could benefit his coalition by raising the income tax rate and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Second, the public good level cannot be above  $g^*(A)$ . If it were, the proposer could benefit his coalition by reducing public good spending and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Third, the debt level cannot be below  $x^*$ . If it were, the proposer could benefit his coalition by borrowing more and dividing the proceeds among coalition members.

The proposition is interesting because it tells us that political determination can be interpreted as imposing additional constraints on the planner's problem, rather than fundamentally changing the nature of fiscal policy. The result affirms that the principles of tax smoothing operate even when the assumption of a benevolent government is relaxed. Indeed, since the constraints serve to break the unpalatable implication of zero taxation in the long run, adding political determination increases the relevance of the basic tax smoothing idea. The result also helps develop intuition on the nature of the political equilibrium: the planner's problem in the tax smoothing context is already reasonably well understood and it is relatively straightforward to think through the consequences of the additional constraints.

The proposition makes clear that political economy considerations give rise to distortions in taxes and public good spending, as well as in debt. Importantly, the equilibrium policy choices are not the same as those obtained from the tax smoothing problem with a constraint that the government's debt level must exceed  $x^*$  (which is the problem studied by Aiyagari et al.). Constraints on the tax rate and public good level must also be imposed for the solution to be declared a positive prediction. The distortions in the tax rate and the public good level are *static distortions* in the sense that, within any period in which the constraints are binding, aggregate citizen welfare would be higher if the tax rate were reduced and the public good level increased. The distortion in the debt level is a *dynamic distortion* in the sense that the future benefits to citizens from lower debt offset the costs of lower revenues in the present.

There are two basic reasons for the distortions arising from political decision making. First, the fact that  $q$  is less than  $n$  means that the decisive coalition does not fully internalize the costs of raising taxes or reducing public good spending. If the legislature operated by unanimity rule (i.e.,  $q = n$ ), then legislative decision making would reproduce the planner's solution. This follows immediately from Proposition 4 once it is noted that with  $q = n$ , the tax rate  $r^*$  is 0, the public good level  $g^*(A)$  is just the Samuelson level  $g_s(A)$ , and the debt level  $x^*$  is  $\underline{x}$ . More generally, moving from majority to super-majority rule will improve welfare, since raising  $q$  reduces  $r^*$  and  $x^*$  and raises  $g^*(A)$ , thereby relaxing the constraints on the planning problem.

Second, the random allocation of proposal power in the legislature creates uncertainty about the identity of the minimum winning coalition. If the proposer is making transfers to his coalition and anticipates that the legislature will be in BAU the next period, this uncertainty means that he will always want to issue more debt. Issuing an additional dollar of debt would gain  $1/q$  units for each legislator in the minimum winning coalition and would lead to a one-unit reduction in pork in the next period. This has an expected cost of only  $1/n$  because members of the current minimum winning coalition are not sure they will be included in the next period. The critical role of uncertainty can be appreciated by noting that if the identity of the minimum winning coalition were constant through time, the resulting equilibrium policy sequence would be Pareto efficient.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> We conjecture that in this "oligarchic" case in which a constant coalition of  $q$  representatives chooses policy, the economy would converge to a deterministic steady state in which the tax rate is  $r^*$ , the public good level is  $g^*(A)$ , and the debt level is such that  $\rho(-x) + R(r^*) \geq pg^*(A)$ . Excess revenues would be shared by the  $q$  representatives.

### V. Empirical Implications of the Theory

Our theory has two types of empirical implications. First, for a given economy, it has implications for the pattern of debt, taxes, public spending, and legislative voting behavior.<sup>18</sup> Second, comparing across economies, it provides predictions on how the distributions of debt, taxes, and public spending should vary with the underlying fundamentals.

For a given economy, the most obvious implication of the theory concerns the impact of an increase in the value of public goods as a result of, say, a war or natural disaster. Recall that the equilibrium public good level is strictly increasing in  $A$ , while the equilibrium tax and debt levels are constant in  $A$  in the BAU regime and increasing in the RPM regime. Moreover, a sufficiently high realization of  $A$  must shift the equilibrium from BAU to RPM. Thus, the theory predicts that we should observe increases in debt, taxes, and public good spending following a significant increase in the value of public goods. This prediction is consistent with the fact that historically the debt/GDP ratio in the United States and the United Kingdom tends to have increased in periods of high government spending needs and decreased in periods of low needs (Barro 1979, 1986, 1987). The theory also suggests that we should see a reduction in pork-barrel spending and an increase in the size of majorities passing budget bills. While there are issues here concerning the empirical measurement of pork, it would be well worth trying to investigate these auxiliary predictions.

The theory also has implications for how the equilibrium policies should depend on the current stock of debt. Recall that the equilibrium public good level is constant in  $b$  in the BAU regime and decreasing in the RPM regime, while the equilibrium tax and debt levels are constant in  $b$  in BAU and increasing in RPM. Moreover, the economy is more likely to be in RPM the higher is  $b$ . Combining these observations, it is possible to derive some interesting implications for the relationship between what is known as the “primary surplus” and the level of debt. The primary surplus is the difference between tax revenues and public spending other than interest payments. In our model, it is the difference between tax revenues and spending on the public good and pork. Using the budget constraint, we may write this as  $PS(b,A) = (1 + \rho)b - x(b,A)$ . To understand what happens to the primary surplus when debt increases, consider a small increase  $\Delta b$  in  $b$  while holding  $A$  constant. If the legislature is in BAU, then because  $x(b,A)$  is constant,  $\Delta PS(b,A)/\Delta b = (1 + \rho)$ . On the other hand, if the legislature is in RPM, then  $\Delta PS(b,A)/\Delta b = (1 + \rho) - \Delta x(b,A)/\Delta b$ , which is positive but less than  $1 + \rho$  since  $x(b,A)$  is increasing in  $b$  but at a rate smaller than  $1 + \rho$ .<sup>19</sup> In both cases, therefore, the relationship between the primary surplus and debt is positive, but the effect is smaller in the RPM regime. The first implication is consistent with the work of Henning Bohn (1998) who finds that for the US federal government the relationship between the primary surplus and debt is positive. However, since the economy is more likely to be in the RPM regime when  $b$  is high, the second implication is inconsistent with Bohn’s finding that the relationship is convex. It seems plausible that  $x(b,A)$  might be concave in the RPM regime, which would yield Bohn’s finding for sufficiently high levels of debt but, unfortunately, this is not something that can be established analytically.

With respect to the impact of the current debt level, the theory also has an interesting implication for winning margins in the legislature. The expected size of the coalition voting in favor of the winning proposal with debt level  $b$  is  $G(A^*(b,x^*))q + (1 - G(A^*(b,x^*)))n$ , which is increasing

<sup>18</sup> In light of Proposition 4, these implications are obviously going to be similar to those of a tax smoothing model with an ad hoc limit on bond accumulation.

<sup>19</sup> This follows from the facts that, in the RPM regime,  $x(b,A) + R(r(b,A))$  equals  $(1 + \rho)b + pg(b,A)$ ,  $r(b,A)$  is increasing in  $b$ , and  $g(b,A)$  is decreasing in  $b$ .

in *b*. Thus, the winning margin on budget bills should be increasing in the current debt level. This is a novel prediction which is well worth investigating.

Comparing across economies, the model has three groups of underlying parameters: *preference parameters*, which include the labor supply elasticity  $\varepsilon$ , the discount rate  $\delta$ , and the distribution of public good values  $G(A)$ ; *technological parameters*, which consist of labor productivity  $w$  and the price of public goods  $p$ ; and *institutional parameters*, which consist of the number of districts  $n$  and the size of the majorities required to pass legislation  $q$ . For any given set of parameters, the model predicts a unique long-run distribution of debt and associated distributions of tax rates, public good spending, and voting coalitions. In principle, therefore, it is possible to explore how changes in each of these parameters have an impact on these distributions. For example, one could ask how moving from a high- to a low-productivity economy would affect the distribution of debt. This type of comparative static exercise could be quite valuable, as it would allow the development of predictions concerning cross-country (or state) debt distributions, which is something the tax smoothing model has trouble explaining (see Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti 1995; Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey Sachs 1989). Unfortunately, however, it is something that appears difficult to do analytically. Thus, it requires computing a calibrated version of the equilibrium which, while feasible, would take us well beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>20</sup>

Notwithstanding the difficulties in characterizing the comparative statics, it is possible to make some general informed speculations based on what we know about the underlying logic of the model. The key equilibrium variable is  $x^*$ —the level of debt that is chosen in the BAU regime. As we have explained,  $x^*$  adjusts to ensure that in BAU the economy transitions to RPM with a probability that is positive but less than one. The equilibrium debt distribution has a mass point at  $x^*$  and it seems likely that if  $x^*$  increases, the debt distribution will shift rightward. We have identified the relative size of the tax base as being the key factor in the determination of  $x^*$ . Thus, parameters that raise  $R(r^*)$  relative to  $Epg^*(A)$  would seem likely to raise the average level of debt. This suggests that the average level of debt will be decreasing in  $\varepsilon$ ,  $q/n$ , and rightward shifts in  $G(A)$ , and increasing in  $w$ .

While we are not aware of empirical evidence on the relationship between debt levels and our specific parameters, there is a literature investigating the relationship between fiscal policy and political variables in the OECD countries.<sup>21</sup> A central theme of this literature is that a “fragmented” policymaking process leads to present-biased fiscal outcomes. Influenced by the “common pool” view of fiscal policy (see Section VII below for discussion), Roberto Perotti and Yianos Kontopoulos (2002) define fragmentation as “the degree to which individual fiscal policymakers internalize the costs of one dollar of aggregate expenditure.” Using a number of empirical measures of this variable, they have shown that it is positively correlated with higher deficits.<sup>22</sup> In our model, as we argued in Section IIIA, fiscal policy is effectively chosen collectively in each period by a coalition of  $q$  randomly chosen representatives. Thus, the sole “fiscal policymaker” is the group of  $q$  representatives, and this group internalizes  $q/n$  of the cost of any dollar of spending. Accordingly, a prediction that average debt levels are decreasing in  $q/n$  would appear consonant with this literature.

<sup>20</sup> We are currently working on computing the model with coauthor Marina Azzimonti.

<sup>21</sup> Our theory is designed to apply to political systems (like that of the United States) in which political parties are relatively weak and legislators care a great deal about bringing resources back to their districts. Since the strength of parties and the importance of pork-barrel spending in motivating legislators seem to vary significantly across the OECD countries, the US states may be the most natural place to look to test the cross-economy implications of the theory. That said, in the spirit of Alesina and Guido Tabellini (1990), it is possible to interpret the  $n$  legislators as distinct political parties and the pork-barrel spending as transfers to party constituents. The coalition of  $q$  legislators choosing policy in each period could then be interpreted as that election cycle’s governing coalition.

<sup>22</sup> See also Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Bjorn Volkerink and Jakob de Haan (2001) for related findings.

## VI. An Application of the Theory

To illustrate the potential usefulness of the theory for policy analysis, we briefly explore its implications for the desirability of *balanced budget requirements*. There has been considerable debate in academic and policy circles concerning this issue.<sup>23</sup> Many of the US states have some form of balanced budget requirement, and there is evidence that they do have an effect.<sup>24</sup> Proponents argue that they dampen politicians' ability to borrow and then spend inappropriately. Opponents point out that they restrict the state's ability to adjust to revenue and spending shocks without having to raise taxes. Both positions seem reasonable, but to provide sharper policy guidance it is necessary to understand the features of the environment that determine when the benefits outweigh the potential costs.<sup>25</sup>

We consider a fiscal restraint that requires the legislature to ensure that tax revenues equal public spending in every period. We assume that in the first period the government begins with no debt (i.e.,  $b_0 = 0$ ), so that spending is just on public goods and transfers. We seek to understand when citizens' welfare will be enhanced by the constraint that public spending be financed solely by tax revenues.

Let  $(r_c(A), g_c(A))$  denote the equilibrium tax rate and public good level when the value of the public good is  $A$  under the balanced budget requirement. Then, following the logic of Lemma 1, we have that

$$(25) \quad (r_c(A), g_c(A)) = \begin{cases} \arg \max \left\{ u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, 0; 0)}{n} : B(r, g, 0; 0) \geq 0 \right\} & \text{if } A \geq A^*(0, 0) \\ (r^*, g^*(A)) & \text{if } A < A^*(0, 0) \end{cases}.$$

Thus, if  $A < A^*(0, 0)$ , the legislature is in the BAU regime and districts receive pork, while if  $A \geq A^*(0, 0)$ , the legislature is in the RPM regime. The solution is stationary because government cannot issue debt or acquire bonds. If  $v_c(A)$  denotes citizen expected utility under the balanced budget requirement, given that the current value of the public good is  $A$ , then

$$(26) \quad v_c(A) = u(w(1-r_c(A)), g_c(A); A) + \frac{B(r_c(A), g_c(A), 0; 0)}{n} + \delta E v_c(A').$$

Expected citizen welfare under the constraint is  $E v_c(A)$  and equation (26) implies that

$$(27) \quad E v_c(A) = \int_A^{\bar{A}} \left[ u(w(1-r_c(A)), g_c(A); A) + \frac{B(r_c(A), g_c(A), 0; 0)}{n} \right] dG(A)/(1-\delta).$$

<sup>23</sup> For relevant discussion see Bohn and Robert Inman (1996), Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1980), William Niskanen (1992), James Poterba (1994, 1995), Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen (1999), and David Primo (2007).

<sup>24</sup> For example, Poterba (1994) shows that states with restraints were quicker to reduce spending and/or raise taxes in response to negative revenue shocks than those without.

<sup>25</sup> There appears to be surprisingly little welfare analysis of fiscal restraints beyond the original work of Brennan and Buchanan (1980). Besley and Michael Smart (2007) provide a general treatment of restraints in the context of a two-period political agency model. Marco Bassetto and Sargent (2006) study the welfare case for separating capital and ordinary government budgets and allowing the government to issue debt only to finance capital items.

As in Section III, let  $\{r(b,A), g(b,A), x(b,A)\}$  denote the tax rate, public good, and public debt policies that are implemented in the unconstrained equilibrium, and let  $v(b,A)$  denote the legislators' value function. Starting from a situation in which the government has no debt, citizen expected utility in the unconstrained equilibrium is  $Ev(0,A)$ . Thus, a balanced budget requirement will be desirable if and only if  $Ev_c(A) > Ev(0,A)$ .

Our first result is that when the revenues raised by the tax rate  $r^*$  are *never* sufficient to cover the cost of the optimal level of public goods, a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.

**PROPOSITION 5:** *If  $R(r^*) \leq pg^*(\underline{A})$ , a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.*

To see this, recall from Section III that the condition of the proposition implies that  $x^*$  must be nonpositive, so that in the BAU regime, the winning proposals involve the purchase of bonds. These bond holdings allow the legislature to lower taxes and provide higher levels of public goods in the long run. Moreover, the legislature issues debt only in the RPM regime, which means that borrowing will be used only when it will raise aggregate utility. Such borrowing must therefore be socially beneficial.

An interesting feature of this case is that, under a balanced budget requirement, the legislature never engages in pork-barrel spending. (This follows from the fact that the condition implies that  $A^*(0,0) \leq \underline{A}$ .) By contrast, in the unconstrained equilibrium, the legislature does provide pork in the BAU regime. Thus, the balanced budget requirement is undesirable despite eliminating transfers. This underscores the lesson that there is nothing necessarily undesirable about transfers—indeed, in the planner's solution, the government redistributes excess revenues from its interest earnings back to the citizens in each period.

Our second result is the mirror image of the first: when the revenues raised by the tax rate  $r^*$  are *always* sufficient to cover the cost of the optimal level of public goods when the tax rate is  $r^*$ , a balanced budget requirement is desirable.

**PROPOSITION 6:** *If  $R(r^*) \geq pg^*(\bar{A})$ , a balanced budget requirement is desirable.*

To see this, note that with a balanced budget restraint, the equilibrium will involve the tax rate  $r^*$  and the public good level  $g^*(A)$  in every period. Without the restraint, the equilibrium will involve the legislature immediately borrowing  $x^*$  and using the revenues to finance extra pork. The amount  $x^*$  must be sufficiently large that in future periods there is positive probability that the tax rate will exceed  $r^*$  and the public good level will be less than  $g^*(A)$ . There is no offsetting benefit, and hence eliminating the government's ability to borrow increases citizen welfare.

If  $R(r^*)$  is between  $pg^*(\underline{A})$  and  $pg^*(\bar{A})$ , but  $x^*$  is nonpositive, then the argument underlying Proposition 5 remains, and imposing a balanced budget requirement will be harmful. If  $x^*$  is positive, however, the picture is murkier because there are offsetting effects from imposing the requirement. On one hand, the government does not need to service the debt and hence long-run taxes and public good levels must be lower on average with the requirement. On the other, the government's ability to smooth tax rates and public good levels by varying the debt level is lost.

Intuitively, it seems natural to suppose that the larger the size of the tax base as measured by  $R(r^*)$ , the more likely is a balanced budget requirement to be desirable. After all, the larger the tax base, the less the need to borrow to meet desired public good spending and the greater the debt level that will need to be financed when there is no restraint. This idea can be investigated formally by noting that the size of  $R(r^*)$  is determined by the magnitude of the private sector wage  $w$ . From (4), we see that  $R(r^*)$  equals  $pg^*(A)$  if and only if  $w = [pg^*(A)/nr^* \varepsilon^\varepsilon (1 - r^*)^\varepsilon]^{1/(1+\varepsilon)}$ . Thus, as we increase  $w$  between  $[pg^*(\underline{A})/nr^* \varepsilon^\varepsilon (1 - r^*)^\varepsilon]^{1/(1+\varepsilon)}$  and  $[pg^*(\bar{A})/nr^* \varepsilon^\varepsilon (1 - r^*)^\varepsilon]^{1/(1+\varepsilon)}$ , we move the size of the tax base through the interval  $(pg^*(\underline{A}), pg^*(\bar{A}))$ . Our conjecture is that

there must exist a critical wage  $w^*$  greater than  $[pg^*(\bar{A})/nr^*\varepsilon^\varepsilon(1-r^*)^\varepsilon]^{1/(1+\varepsilon)}$  but less than  $[pg^*(\bar{A})/nr^*\varepsilon^\varepsilon(1-r^*)^\varepsilon]^{1/(1+\varepsilon)}$  such that a balanced budget requirement is desirable if and only  $w$  exceeds  $w^*$ . Unfortunately, however, the argument that this is indeed the case has so far proven elusive.

To summarize: *the theory suggests that the key determinant of the desirability of a balanced budget requirement is the size of the tax base relative to the economy's desired public good spending.* When this size is large, a balanced budget requirement is a good idea, and when it is small, the opposite conclusion holds. The relative size of the tax base will be reflected in the magnitude of the debt level that is chosen in the BAU regime. Thus, the theory supports the common sense conclusion that economies with large and perpetual deficits should introduce balanced budget requirements.

## VII. Related Political Economy Literature

This paper is related to two established branches of the political economy literature.<sup>26</sup> The first concerns the implications of pork-barrel spending for the efficiency of legislative policymaking. In a well-known paper, Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen (1981) argue that pork-barrel spending will lead to a government that is too large. They do not model the process of passing legislation, assuming instead that legislative policymaking is governed by a norm of universalism. Under this norm, each legislator unilaterally decides on the level of spending he would like on projects in his own district, and the aggregate level of taxation is determined by the need to balance the budget. Policymaking then becomes a pure common pool problem.

More recently, the bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) has emerged as the standard way to model legislative decision making, and a number of papers have employed it to study the efficiency implications of pork-barrel spending.<sup>27</sup> In a one period model, Baron (1991) shows that legislators may propose projects whose aggregate benefits are less than their costs, when these benefits can be targeted to particular districts.<sup>28</sup> This is because the decisive coalition does not fully internalize the costs of financing projects. In a similar static framework, Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman (2007) study the allocation of a fixed budget between public goods and pork-barrel spending and show that public goods will be underprovided in some circumstances. In the context of a finite horizon dynamic model, William LeBlanc, James Snyder, and Mickey Tripathi (2000) argue that legislatures will underinvest in public capital. In their model, in each period a legislature allocates a fixed amount of revenue between targeted transfers and a public investment that serves to increase the amount of revenue available in the next period.<sup>29</sup>

The second related branch of political economy literature discusses public debt. This literature offers two main explanations for why governments may run deficits, even when there is no social role for so doing. Following Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), the first explanation is based on viewing the accumulation of public debt as a dynamic common pool problem (see,

<sup>26</sup> For excellent reviews of this literature, see Alan Drazen (2000) and Torsten Persson and Tabellini (2000).

<sup>27</sup> The main criticism of the common pool perspective is that it does not model the voting process. For game theoretic approaches that are alternatives to Baron-Ferejohn, see V. V. Chari and Harold Cole (1995) and Morelli (1999). For experimental studies of the Baron and Ferejohn model, see Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005), who study the classic static divide-the-dollar version, and Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey (2007), who study a dynamic version.

<sup>28</sup> Related models are elaborated by David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).

<sup>29</sup> As noted in the introduction, our earlier paper (Battaglini and Coate 2007) also explores how pork-barrel spending distorts investment in public capital goods. Our model differs from that of LeBlanc et al. in that it is an infinite horizon model in which the government can levy taxes as well as allocate public revenues, and public investment yields benefits for more than one period. We find conditions under which the equilibrium size of government is too large and the level of public goods too low; but we also show that there are conditions under which legislative decisions are efficient and/or government is too small.

for example, Robert Inman 1990; Jurgen von Hagen and Ian Harden 1995). A formal model of this type is developed by Andres Velasco (2000). While there is no economic role for debt in his model, he demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which deficits and debt accumulation continue unabated until the government's debt ceiling is reached. Chari and Cole (1993) present a related two-period model, where legislators facing a common pool problem that drives spending too high try to restrain second-period spending by issuing excessive levels of debt in the first period.

The second explanation is based on political instability. The basic idea is that when politicians choose current policy, they realize that with some probability they will not be choosing policy in the future. This may induce too much borrowing because the costs in terms of future spending cuts are not fully internalized. This idea was introduced independently by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Lars Svensson (1989). Alesina and Tabellini consider a model in which, in each period, two political parties hold office with exogenous probability. There are two goods that may be publicly provided, but each party's constituency values only one. The government may finance public provision with debt and/or distortionary taxation. In each period, the winning party chooses taxes, debt, and how much to spend on the good its constituency cares about. Alesina and Tabellini present conditions under which the steady-state debt level is positive even though the optimal debt level is zero. Persson and Svensson consider a two-period model featuring two political parties that differ in their preferences on the level of spending. Spending is financed by debt and distortionary taxes. They show that the party that prefers less spending may run a deficit in the first period to constrain the spending choices of the second-period government.<sup>30</sup>

While both these arguments require policy-motivated political parties, Alessandro Lizzeri (1999) shows that the same logic works even in a world with Downsian parties. He considers a two-period economy in which elections are held at the beginning of each period. Parties can make binding promises before the elections as to how they will redistribute the available resources across voters and over time. Rational voters reward myopic behavior, however, favoring a party promising to distribute all resources today, because resources left for the future may be spent on others by the opposing party if the first period incumbent is not reelected. Lizzeri refers to the force generating the present bias as "redistributive uncertainty."

It is evident that the arguments underlying the political distortions in our model are similar to those made in these two branches of the political economy literature. The static distortions in taxes and public goods parallel those that emerge in other legislative bargaining models with pork-barrel spending, and the logic of the dynamic distortion is similar to that underlying the various models of political instability. As noted in the introduction, what is novel about our analysis is that we incorporate these types of forces into a tax smoothing model in which there is a social role for debt.<sup>31</sup> Our analysis thus provides insights into how economic and political considerations interact to determine the dynamic pattern of fiscal policy. Rather than seeing political economy models as alternatives to the tax smoothing model, our work shows how the two approaches can be profitably integrated to reduce the shortcomings of each approach individually taken.

The objective of incorporating political decision making into a tax smoothing model is also shared by the recent work of Pierre Yared (2007). However, he analyzes the complete market

<sup>30</sup> An incumbent government may want to choose debt issue strategically for another reason, namely, to influence its likelihood of reelection. This argument is developed by Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1990).

<sup>31</sup> Giancarlo Corsetti and Roubini (1997) introduce a motive for tax smoothing into a two-period version of the Alesina and Tabellini (1990) model. They show in numerical simulations that the effect of this motive on the first-period deficit is largely independent of the political incentives to run deficits as measured by the probability that the first-period incumbent is reelected.

version of the tax smoothing model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which state contingent debt is available. He also adopts a more stylized model of the political process than we do, assuming that citizens choose the income tax rate, but a self-interested, infinitely lived ruler chooses borrowing and allocates the budget between public goods, his own consumption, and debt repayment. He looks at non-Markov equilibria, in which citizens punish the ruler by levying no taxes if he “abuses” his executive power, and the ruler punishes the citizens by underfunding public goods if they provide too little revenue. To solve the problem of multiple subgame perfect equilibria, he assumes that players can coordinate on equilibria on the Pareto frontier, and the bulk of his analysis focuses on the equilibrium that maximizes the citizens’ welfare—the “efficient sustainable equilibrium.” In the spirit of our Proposition 4, he shows that it is possible to represent this equilibrium as the solution of a particular constrained planner’s problem.<sup>32</sup> His main finding is that efficient sustainable taxes and debt respond more persistently to shocks than do taxes and debt in Lucas and Stokey’s planning problem. Thus, political constraints may explain why an economy with complete markets may behave as observed in the empirical literature (and predicted by Barro’s incomplete markets tax smoothing model).

### VIII. Conclusion

This paper has presented a dynamic theory of public spending, taxation, and debt. The theory brings together ideas from the optimal taxation and political economy literatures. From the former, the theory adopts the basic framework underlying the tax smoothing approach to fiscal policy. From the latter, the theory incorporates pork-barrel spending and employs the legislative bargaining approach to modelling policymaking. The result is a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that yields a rich set of predictions concerning the dynamics of fiscal policy and permits a rigorous analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium policies.

There are numerous ways the theory might usefully be extended. A particularly interesting extension would be to introduce cyclical fluctuations in tax revenues due to the business cycle. This could be achieved by specifying a stochastic process (with persistence) for the private sector wage. Such a model would deliver predictions concerning the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. While the tax smoothing paradigm suggests that deficits might be observed in recessions and surpluses in booms, observed fiscal policy is often procyclical (Alesina and Tabellini 2005). It would be interesting to know what the type of theory developed here predicts.

### APPENDIX

#### PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:

From the analysis in the text, we know that if  $A \leq A^o(b, \underline{x})$ , the planner would select a tax rate of 0, a public good level of  $g_S(A)$ , a debt level of  $\underline{x}$ , and transfer  $B(0, g_S(A), \underline{x}, b)$  to the citizens. Since  $A^o(\underline{x}, \underline{x}) = \bar{A}$ , it follows that once the planner has selected the debt level  $\underline{x}$ , the economy enters a deterministic steady state in which the debt level is  $\underline{x}$ , the tax rate is 0, the public good level is  $g_S(A)$ , and citizens receive  $\rho(-\underline{x}) - pg_S(A)$  in transfers. Thus, it remains to show only that whatever the initial debt level, the planner will eventually select the debt level  $\underline{x}$  with probability one. We will establish this following the proof of Proposition 4 below.

<sup>32</sup> Yared’s work draws on Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2006a), who characterize efficient sustainable equilibria in a dynamic economy with a self-interested ruler. However, their model is a dynamic Mirrlees model rather than a tax smoothing model. Like Yared, they demonstrate that it is possible to represent the efficient sustainable equilibrium as the solution to a planner’s problem with constraints. Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2006b) present a similar result for a simpler economic model with a richer political process in which political power fluctuates between distinct social groups.

## DEFINITION OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM:

As background for the analysis to follow, we need to provide a more precise definition of political equilibrium. An equilibrium is described by a collection of proposal functions:  $\{r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A), s_\tau(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$ . Here  $r_\tau(b, A)$  is the income tax rate that is proposed at round  $\tau$  when the state is  $(b, A)$ ;  $g_\tau(b, A)$  is the level of the public good;  $x_\tau(b, A)$  is the new level of public debt; and  $s_\tau(b, A)$  is a transfer the proposer offers to the districts of  $q - 1$  randomly selected representatives.<sup>33</sup> Any remaining surplus revenues are used to finance a transfer for the proposer's own district. Following the notation used in Section III, we will sometimes drop the subscript and refer to the first-round policy proposal as  $\{r(b, A), g(b, A), x(b, A), s(b, A)\}$ .

The collection of proposal functions  $\{r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A), s_\tau(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  is an *equilibrium* if, at each proposal round  $\tau$  and all states  $(b, A)$ , the prescribed proposal maximizes the proposer's payoff subject to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of affirmative votes and the appropriate feasibility constraints. To state this formally, let  $v_\tau(b, A)$  denote the legislators' value function at round  $\tau$  which describes the expected future payoff of a legislator at the beginning of proposal round  $\tau$  in a period in which the state is  $(b, A)$ . Again, following the notation of Section III, we refer to the value function at round 1 as  $v(b, A)$ . Then, for each proposal round  $\tau$  and all states  $(b, A)$ , the proposal  $(r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A), s_\tau(b, A))$  must solve the problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{(r, g, x, s)} u(w(1 - r), g; A) + B(r, g, x; b) - (q - 1)s + \delta Ev(x, A') \\ & \text{s.t. } u(w(1 - r), g; A) + s + \delta Ev(x, A') \geq v_{\tau+1}(b, A), \\ & B(r, g, x; b) \geq (q - 1)s, s \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]. \end{aligned}$$

The first constraint is the incentive constraint and the remainder are feasibility constraints. The formulation reflects the assumption that, on the equilibrium path, the proposal made in the first proposal round is accepted.

As noted in the text, the legislators' round one value function is defined recursively by (17). To understand this, recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round one with probability  $1/n$ . If chosen to propose, he obtains a payoff in that period of

$$u(w(1 - r(b, A)), g(b, A); A) + B(r(b, A), g(b, A), x(b, A); b) - (q - 1)s(b, A).$$

If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the minimum winning coalition, he obtains  $u(w(1 - r(b, A)), g(b, A); A) + s(b, A)$ , and, if he is not included, he obtains just  $u(w(1 - r(b, A)), g(b, A); A)$ . The probability that he will be included in the minimum winning coalition, conditional on not being chosen to propose, is  $(q - 1)/(n - 1)$ . Taking expectations, the pork-barrel transfers  $s(b, A)$  cancel and the period payoff is as described in (17).

Once we have the round one value function, the other value functions can be readily derived. For all proposal rounds  $\tau = 1, \dots, T - 1$ , the expected future payoff of a legislator if the round  $\tau$  proposal is rejected is

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\tau+1}(b, A) &= u(w(1 - r_{\tau+1}(b, A)), g_{\tau+1}(b, A); A) + \frac{B(r_{\tau+1}(b, A), g_{\tau+1}(b, A), x_{\tau+1}(b, A); b)}{n} \\ &+ \delta Ev(x_{\tau+1}(b, A), A'). \end{aligned}$$

<sup>33</sup> It should be clear that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the proposer offers transfers only to  $q - 1$  representatives.

This reflects the assumption that the round  $\tau + 1$  proposal will be accepted. Recall that if the round  $T$  proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose a default tax rate, public goods level, level of debt, and a uniform transfer. Thus,

$$v_{\tau+1}(b,A) = \max_{(r,g,x)} \left\{ u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,x;b)}{n} + \delta Ev(x,A') : B(r,g,x;b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \right\}.$$

**PROOF OF LEMMA 1:**

We begin by establishing the claim made in the text that, given that utility is transferable, the proposer is effectively making decisions to maximize the collective utility of  $q$  legislators under the assumption that they get to divide any surplus revenues among their districts.

**LEMMA A1:** *Let  $\{r_\tau(b,A), g_\tau(b,A), x_\tau(b,A), s_\tau(b,A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  be an equilibrium with associated value function  $v(b,A)$ . Then, for all states  $(b,A)$ , the tax rate–public good–public debt triple  $(r_\tau(b,A), g_\tau(b,A), x_\tau(b,A))$  proposed in any round  $\tau$  solves the problem*

$$\max_{(r,g,x)} u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,x;b)}{q} + \delta Ev(x,A') \quad \text{s.t. } B(r,g,x;b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}].$$

Moreover, the transfer to coalition members is given by

$$s_\tau(b,A) = v_{\tau+1}(b,A) - u(w(1-r_\tau(b,A),g_\tau(b,A);A) - \delta Ev(x_\tau(b,A),A')).$$

**PROOF:**

See Web Appendix.

Using this result, we can prove:

**LEMMA A2:** *Let  $\{r_\tau(b,A), g_\tau(b,A), x_\tau(b,A), s_\tau(b,A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  be an equilibrium with associated value function  $v(b,A)$ . Then, there exists some debt level  $x^*$  such that for any proposal round  $\tau$  if  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$*

$$(r_\tau(b,A), g_\tau(b,A), x_\tau(b,A)) = \arg \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,x;b)}{n} + \delta Ev(x,A') \\ B(r,g,x;b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\},$$

and  $s_\tau(b,A) = 0$ , while if  $A < A^*(b, x^*)$

$$(r_\tau(b,A), g_\tau(b,A), x_\tau(b,A)) = (r^*, g^*(A), x^*),$$

and

$$s_\tau(b,A) = \begin{cases} \frac{B(r^*, g^*(A), x^*; b)}{n} & \text{if } \tau = 1, \dots, T - 1 \\ v_{T+1}(b,A) - u(w(1-r^*), g^*(A); A) - \delta Ev(x^*, A') & \text{if } \tau = T \end{cases}.$$

PROOF:

The argument in Section III of the paper, together with Lemma A1, implies that, for any proposal round  $\tau$  if  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$ ,

$$(r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A)) = \arg \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\},$$

while if  $A < A^*(b, x^*)$ ,

$$(r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A)) = (r^*, g^*(A), x^*).$$

Turning to the equilibrium transfers, it is clear that, since there are no surplus revenues when  $A \geq A^*(b, x^*)$ , transfers are zero. If  $A < A^*(b, x^*)$ , it follows that for all proposal rounds  $\tau = 1, \dots, T - 1$ , we have that

$$v_{\tau+1}(b, A) = u(w(1-r^*, g^*(A)); A) + \frac{B(r^*, g^*(A), x^*; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x^*, A').$$

Thus, Lemma A1 implies that the transfers to coalition members are given by

$$s_\tau(b, A) = \begin{cases} B(r^*, g^*(A), x^*; b)/n & \tau = 1, \dots, T - 1 \\ v_{\tau+1}(b, A) - u(w(1-r^*, g^*(A)); A) - \delta E v(x^*, A') & \tau = T \end{cases}.$$

This completes the proof of Lemma A2.

Lemma 1 now follows immediately from Lemma A2.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:

We begin by proving the existence of an equilibrium. The proof is divided into seven steps.

**Step 1:** Let  $F$  denote the set of all real valued functions  $v(\cdot, \cdot)$  defined over the compact set  $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \times [\underline{A}, \bar{A}]$ . Let  $F^*$  be the subset of these functions that are continuous and concave in  $x$  for all  $A$ . For any  $z \in [(R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A}))/\rho, \bar{x}]$  and  $v \in F^*$ , consider the maximization problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(r, g, x)} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ \text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0, r \geq r^*, g \leq g^*(A) \text{ and } x \in [z, \bar{x}]. \end{aligned}$$

For all  $\mu > 0$ , let

$$X_z^\mu(v) = \arg \max_x \left\{ \frac{x}{\mu} + \delta E v(x, A') : x \in [z, \bar{x}] \right\},$$

and let  $x_z^\mu(v)$  be the largest element of the compact set  $X_z^\mu(v)$ . Notice that  $x_z^\mu(v)$  is nonincreasing in  $\mu$ .

Suppose that  $(r, g, x)$  is a solution to the maximization problem. It is straightforward to show that (i) if  $A \leq A^*(b, x_z^n(v))$  then  $(r, g) = (r^*, g^*(A))$  and  $x \in X_z^n(v) \cap \{x : B(r^*, g^*(A), x; b) \geq 0\}$ ; (ii) if  $A \in (A^*(b, x_z^n(v)), A^*(b, x_z^g(v))]$  then  $(r, g) = (r^*, g^*(A))$  and  $B(r^*, g^*(A), x; b) = 0$ ; and (iii) if  $A > A^*(b, x_z^g(v))$ ,  $(r, g, x)$  is uniquely defined and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,  $r > r^*$  and  $g < g^*(A)$ . Note that in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely defined.

**Step 2:** For any  $z \in [(R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A}))/\rho, \bar{x}]$ , define the operator  $T_z: F^* \rightarrow F$  as follows:

$$T_z(v)(b, A) = \max_{(r, g, x)} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v(x, A') \\ B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0, r \geq r^*, g \leq g^*(A) \text{ and } x \in [z, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\}.$$

It can be verified that  $T_z(v) \in F^*$  and that  $T_z$  is a contraction. Thus, there exists a unique fixed point  $v_z(b, A)$  which is continuous and concave in  $b$  for all  $A$ . This fixed point satisfies the functional equation

$$v_z(b, A) = \max_{(r, g, x)} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta E v_z(x, A') \\ B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0, r \geq r^*, g \leq g^*(A) \text{ and } x \in [z, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\}.$$

Let  $(b, A)$  be given and let  $(r, g, x)$  denote an optimal policy. By Step 1, we have that (i) if  $A \leq A^*(b, x_z^n(v_z))$  then  $(r, g) = (r^*, g^*(A))$  and  $x \in X_z^n(v_z) \cap \{x : B(r^*, g^*(A), x; b) \geq 0\}$ ; (ii) if  $A \in (A^*(b, x_z^n(v_z)), A^*(b, x_z^g(v_z))]$  then  $(r, g) = (r^*, g^*(A))$  and  $B(r^*, g^*(A), x; b) = 0$ ; and (iii) if  $A > A^*(b, x_z^g(v_z))$ ,  $(r, g, x)$  is uniquely defined and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,  $r > r^*$  and  $g < g^*(A)$ . Again, in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely defined. Let these be given by  $(r_z(b, A), g_z(b, A))$ —these are also continuous functions on the state space.

**Step 3:** For any  $z \in [(R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A}))/\rho, \bar{x}]$ , the expected value function  $E v_z(\cdot, A)$  is strictly concave on the set  $\{b \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] : A^*(b, x_z^g(v_z)) < \bar{A}\}$ .

PROOF:

See the Web Appendix.

**Step 4:** For any  $z \in [(R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A}))/\rho, \bar{x}]$ , let

$$M(z) = \arg \max \left\{ \frac{x}{q} + \delta E v_z(x, A) : x \in \left[ \frac{R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A})}{\rho}, \bar{x} \right] \right\}.$$

Then there exists  $z^* \in [(R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A}))/\rho, \bar{x}]$  such that  $z^* \in M(z^*)$ .

PROOF:

See the Web Appendix.

**Step 5:** Let  $z^*$  be such that  $z^* \in M(z^*)$ . Then,  $x_{z^*}^g(v_{z^*}) = z^*$ .

PROOF:

By definition,  $x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})$  is the largest element in the set  $X_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})$ . By construction,  $z^*$  belongs to the set

$$M(z^*) = \arg \max \left\{ \frac{x}{q} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x, A) : x \in \left[ \frac{R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A})}{\rho}, \bar{x} \right] \right\}.$$

Since  $z^*$  obviously satisfies the constraint that  $x \geq z^*$ , it must be the case that  $z^* \in X_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})$ . If  $z^* \neq x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})$ , then it must be the case that  $z^* < x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})$  and that

$$\frac{x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})}{q} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*}), A) = \frac{z^*}{q} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(z^*, A).$$

This implies that the expected value function  $Ev_{z^*}(\cdot, A)$  is linear on the interval  $[z^*, x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})]$ . However, we know that

$$x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*}) > z^* \geq \frac{R(r^*) - pg^*(\bar{A})}{\rho},$$

which implies that  $pg^*(\bar{A}) + \rho x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*}) > R(r^*)$ , and hence that  $A^*(x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*}), x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})) < \bar{A}$ . By continuity, therefore, there must exist an interval  $[x', x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})] \subset [z^*, x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})]$  such that, for all  $x$  in this interval,  $A^*(x, x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})) < \bar{A}$ . But by Step 3, the expected value function  $Ev_{z^*}(\cdot, A)$  is strictly concave on the interval  $[x', x_{z^*}^q(v_{z^*})]$ —a contradiction.

**Step 6:** Let  $z^*$  be such that  $z^* \in M(z^*)$ . Then, the function  $v_{z^*}(\cdot, A)$  is differentiable for all  $b$  such that  $A \neq A^*(b, z^*)$ . Moreover:

$$\frac{\partial v_{z^*}(b, A)}{\partial x} = \begin{cases} -\left( \frac{1 - r_{z^*}(b, A)}{1 - r_{z^*}(b, A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) \left( \frac{1 + \rho}{n} \right) & \text{if } A > A^*(b, z^*) \\ -\left( \frac{1 + \rho}{n} \right) & \text{if } A < A^*(b, z^*) \end{cases}.$$

PROOF:

See the Web Appendix.

**Step 7:** Let  $z^*$  be such that  $z^* \in M(z^*)$ . Then, the following constitutes an equilibrium. For each proposal round  $\tau$ ,

$$(r_\tau(b, A), g_\tau(b, A), x_\tau(b, A)) = (r_{z^*}(b, A), g_{z^*}(b, A), x_{z^*}(b, A));$$

for proposal rounds  $\tau = 1, \dots, T - 1$ ,

$$s_\tau(b, A) = B(r_{z^*}(b, A), g_{z^*}(b, A), x_{z^*}(b, A); b)/n;$$

and for proposal round  $T$ ,

$$s_T(b, A) = v_{T+1}(b, A) - u(w(1 - r_{z^*}(b, A)), g_{z^*}(b, A); A) - \delta Ev_{z^*}(x_{z^*}(b, A), A'),$$

where

$$v_{T+1}(b,A) = \max_{(r,g,x)} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u(w(1-r),g;A) + \frac{B(r,g,x;b)}{n} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x,A') \\ \text{s.t. } B(r,g,x;b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \end{array} \right\}.$$

PROOF:

Given these proposals, the legislators' round one value function is given by  $v_{z^*}(b,A)$ . This follows from the fact that

$$v(b,A) = u(w(1-r_{z^*}(b,A)),g_{z^*}(b,A);A) + \frac{B(r_{z^*}(b,A),g_{z^*}(b,A),x_{z^*}(b,A);b)}{n} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x_{z^*}(b,A),A') = v_{z^*}(b,A).$$

Similarly, the round  $\tau = 2, \dots, T$  legislators' value function  $v_{\tau}(b,A)$  is given by  $v_{z^*}(b,A)$ . It follows from Steps 3 and 6 that the value function  $v_{z^*}(b,A)$  has the properties required for an equilibrium to be well behaved. Thus, we need only show: (i) that, for proposal rounds  $\tau = 1, \dots, T - 1$ , the proposal

$$\left( r_{z^*}(b,A), g_{z^*}(b,A), x_{z^*}(b,A), \frac{B(r_{z^*}(b,A), g_{z^*}(b,A), x_{z^*}(b,A); b)}{n} \right)$$

solves the problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{(r,g,x,s)} u(w(1-r),g;A) + B(r,g,x;b) - (q-1)s + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x,A') \\ & \text{s.t. } u(w(1-r),g;A) + s + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x,A') \geq v_{z^*}(b,A), \\ & B(r,g,x;b) \geq (q-1)s, s \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}], \end{aligned}$$

and (ii) that, for proposal round  $T$ , the proposal

$$(r_{z^*}(b,A), g_{z^*}(b,A), x_{z^*}(b,A), v_{T+1}(b,A) - u(w(1-r_{z^*}(b,A)),g_{z^*}(b,A);A) - \delta Ev_{z^*}(x_{z^*}(b,A),A'))$$

solves the problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{(r,g,x,s)} u(w(1-r),g;A) + B(r,g,x;b) - (q-1)s + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x,A') \\ & \text{s.t. } u(w(1-r),g;A) + s + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x,A') \geq v_{T+1}(b,A), \\ & B(r,g,x;b) \geq (q-1)s, s \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]. \end{aligned}$$

We show only (i)—the argument for (ii) being analogous.

Consider some proposal round  $\tau = 1, \dots, T - 1$ . Let  $(b,A)$  be given. To simplify notation, let

$$(\hat{r}, \hat{g}, \hat{x}, \hat{s}) = \left( r_{z^*}(b,A), g_{z^*}(b,A), x_{z^*}(b,A), \frac{B(r_{z^*}(b,A), g_{z^*}(b,A), x_{z^*}(b,A); b)}{n} \right).$$

It is clear from Step 5 and the argument in the text that  $(\hat{r}, \hat{g}, \hat{x})$  solves the problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(r, g, x)} & u(w(1 - r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{q} + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x, A') \\ \text{s.t.} & B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}], \end{aligned}$$

and that  $\hat{s} = v_{z^*}(b, A) - u(w(1 - \hat{r}), \hat{g}; A) - \delta Ev_{z^*}(\hat{x}, A')$ . Suppose that  $(\hat{r}, \hat{g}, \hat{x}, \hat{s})$  does not solve the round  $\tau$  proposer's problem. Then, there exist some  $(r', g', x', s')$  which achieves a higher value of the proposer's objective function. We know that  $s' \geq v_{z^*}(b, A) - u(w(1 - r'), g'; A) - \delta Ev_{z^*}(x', A')$ . Thus, we have that the value of the proposer's objective function satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} & u(w(1 - r'), g'; A) + B(r', g', x'; b) - (q - 1)s' + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x', A') \\ & \leq q[u(w(1 - r'), g'; A) + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x', A')] + B(r', g', x'; b). \end{aligned}$$

Since  $B(r', g', x'; b) \geq 0$ , we know that

$$\begin{aligned} & q[u(w(1 - r'), g'; A) + \delta Ev_{z^*}(x', A')] + B(r', g', x'; b) \\ & \leq q[u(w(1 - \hat{r}), \hat{g}; A) + \delta Ev_{z^*}(\hat{x}, A')] + B(\hat{r}, \hat{g}, \hat{x}; b). \end{aligned}$$

But the right-hand side of the inequality is the value of the proposer's objective function under the proposal  $(\hat{r}, \hat{g}, \hat{x}, \hat{s})$ . This, therefore, contradicts the assumption that  $(r', g', x', s')$  achieves a higher value for the proposer's problem.

We now turn to proving that the equilibrium is unique. Let  $\{r_\tau^0(b, A), g_\tau^0(b, A), x_\tau^0(b, A), s_\tau^0(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  and  $\{r_\tau^1(b, A), g_\tau^1(b, A), x_\tau^1(b, A), s_\tau^1(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  be two equilibria with associated round one value functions  $v^0(b, A)$  and  $v^1(b, A)$ . Let  $x_0^*$  and  $x_1^*$  be the debt levels chosen in the BAU regimes of the two equilibria, and suppose that  $x_0^* \leq x_1^*$ . We will demonstrate that it must be the case that  $x_0^* = x_1^*$ . To do this, we will show that the assumption that  $x_0^* < x_1^*$  results in a contradiction.

As in the proof of existence, define the operator  $T_z : F^* \rightarrow F$  as follows:

$$T_z(v)(b, A) = \max_{(r, g, x) \left\{ \begin{aligned} & u(w(1 - r), g; A) + \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{n} + \delta Ev(x, A') \\ & B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0, g \leq g^*(A), r \geq r^* \text{ and } x \in [z, \bar{x}] \end{aligned} \right.}$$

We know that  $T_z(v) \in F^*$  and that  $T_z$  is a contraction. Moreover, for  $i \in \{0, 1\}$ , we have that  $T_{x_i^*}(v^i) = v^i$ .

Now, let  $v \in F^*$  be such that for all  $b$ ,  $v(\cdot, A)$  is differentiable at  $b$  for almost all  $A$ , and for each  $i \in \{0, 1\}$  consider the sequence of functions  $\langle v_k^i \rangle_{k=1}^\infty$  defined inductively as follows:  $v_k^i = T_{x_i^*}(v)$ , and  $v_{k+1}^i = T_{x_i^*}(v_k^i)$ . Notice that since  $T_{x_i^*}$  is a contraction,  $\langle v_k^i \rangle_{k=1}^\infty$  converges to  $v^i$ . We now establish the following result:

CLAIM: Let  $\rho' \in (0, \rho)$ . Then, for all  $k$  and for any  $x \in [x_1^*, \bar{x}]$ , we have that

$$-E\left(\frac{\partial v_k^1(x, A)}{\partial b}\right) > -E\left(\frac{\partial v_k^0\left(x - \frac{x_1^* - x_0^*}{1 + \rho'}, A\right)}{\partial b}\right).$$

PROOF:

The result is established via induction and the details can be found in the Web Appendix.

To complete the uniqueness proof, observe that for  $i \in \{0, 1\}$  the function  $E(v^i(\cdot, A))$  is concave and differentiable. In addition,  $\langle E(v_k^i(\cdot, A)) \rangle$  is a sequence of concave and differentiable functions such that for all  $x$   $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} E(v_k^i(x, A)) = E(v^i(x, A))$ . Thus, by Theorem 25.7 of R. Tyrrell Rockafellar (1970), we know that  $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} dE(v_k^i(x, A))/dx = dE(v^i(x, A))/dx$ . It follows that, for any  $x \in [x_1^*, \bar{x}]$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^1(x, A)}{\partial b}\right) &= \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v_k^1(x, A)}{\partial b}\right) \\
 &\geq \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v_k^0\left(x - \frac{(x_1^* - x_0^*)}{1 + \rho'}, A\right)}{\partial b}\right) = -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^0\left(x - \frac{(x_1^* - x_0^*)}{1 + \rho'}, A\right)}{\partial b}\right).
 \end{aligned}$$

From equation (21) in the text, we know that

$$-\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^1(x_1^*, A)}{\partial b}\right) = -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^0(x_0^*, A)}{\partial x}\right) = \frac{1}{q}.$$

Thus, it follows that

$$-\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^0\left(x_1^* - \frac{(x_1^* - x_0^*)}{1 + \rho'}, A\right)}{\partial b}\right) \leq -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^1(x_1^*, A)}{\partial b}\right) = -\delta E\left(\frac{\partial v^0(x_0^*, A)}{\partial b}\right).$$

But this implies that  $x_1^* - (x_1^* - x_0^*)/(1 + \rho') \leq x_0^*$ , which contradicts the fact that  $x_1^* > x_0^*$ .

It follows that  $x_0^* = x_1^*$ . This, in turn, implies that  $v^0 = v^1$  and hence that  $\{r_\tau^0(b, A), g_\tau^0(b, A), x_\tau^0(b, A), s_\tau^0(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$  equals  $\{r_\tau^1(b, A), g_\tau^1(b, A), x_\tau^1(b, A), s_\tau^1(b, A)\}_{\tau=1}^T$ .

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:

Given the discussion in the text, the only thing we need to show is that the equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique invariant distribution. Let  $\psi_t(x)$  denote the distribution function of the current level of debt at the beginning of period  $t$ . The distribution function  $\psi_1(x)$  is exogenous and is determined by the economy's initial level of debt  $b_0$ . To describe the distribution of debt in periods  $t \geq 2$ , we must first describe the *transition function* implied by the equilibrium. First, define the function  $\hat{A} : [x, \bar{x}] \times (x^*, \bar{x}) \rightarrow [A, \bar{A}]$  as follows:

$$\hat{A}(b, x) = \begin{cases} \underline{A} & \text{if } x < x(b, \underline{A}) \\ \min\{A \in [\underline{A}, \bar{A}] : x(b, A) = x\} & \text{if } x \in [x(b, \underline{A}), x(b, \bar{A})] \\ \bar{A} & \text{if } x > x(b, \bar{A}) \end{cases} .$$

Intuitively,  $\hat{A}(b, x)$  is the smallest value of public goods under which the equilibrium debt level would be  $x$ , given an initial level of debt  $b$ . Then, the transition function is given by

$$H(b, x) = \begin{cases} G(\hat{A}(b, x)) & \text{if } x \in (x^*, \bar{x}] \\ G(A^*(b, x^*)) & \text{if } x = x^* \end{cases}.$$

Intuitively,  $H(b, x)$  is the probability that in the next period the initial level of debt will be less than or equal to  $x \in [x^*, \bar{x}]$  if the current level of debt is  $b$ . Using this notation, the distribution of debt at the beginning of any period  $t \geq 2$  is defined inductively by

$$\psi_t(x) = \int_b H(b, x) d\psi_{t-1}(b).$$

The sequence of distributions  $\langle \psi_t(x) \rangle$  converges to the distribution  $\psi(x)$  if for all  $x \in [x^*, \bar{x}]$ , we have that  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \psi_t(x) = \psi(x)$ .<sup>34</sup> Moreover,  $\psi^*(x)$  is an *invariant distribution* if

$$\psi^*(x) = \int_b H(b, x) d\psi^*(b).$$

We can now establish that the sequence of debt distributions  $\langle \psi_t(x) \rangle$  converges to a unique invariant distribution  $\psi^*(x)$ .

It is easy to prove that the transition function  $H(b, x)$  has the Feller Property and that it is monotonic in  $b$  (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, chap.12.4) for definitions). By Theorem 12.12 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), therefore, the result follows if the following “mixing condition” is satisfied:

**MIXING CONDITION:** *There exists an  $\varepsilon > 0$  and  $m \geq 1$ , such that  $H^m(\bar{x}, x^*) \geq \varepsilon$  and  $1 - H^m(\underline{x}, x^*) \geq \varepsilon$ , where the function  $H^m(b, x)$  is defined inductively by  $H^1(b, x) = H(b, x)$  and  $H^m(b, x) = \int_{\underline{z}} H(z, x) dH^{m-1}(b, z)$ .*

Intuitively, this condition requires that if we start out with the highest level of debt  $\bar{x}$ , we will end up at  $x^*$  with probability greater than  $\varepsilon$  after  $m$  periods, while if we start out with the lowest level of debt  $\underline{x}$ , we will end up above  $x^*$  with probability greater than  $\varepsilon$  in  $m$  periods. For any  $b \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$  and  $A \in [\underline{A}, \bar{A}]$ , define the sequence  $\langle \phi_m(b, A) \rangle$  as follows:  $\phi_0(b, A) = b$ ,  $\phi_{m+1}(b, A) = x(\phi_m(b, A), A)$ . Thus,  $\phi_m(b, A)$  is the level of debt if the debt level were  $b$  at time 0 and the shock were  $A$  in periods 1 through  $m$ . Recall that, by assumption, there exists some positive constant  $\xi > 0$ , such that for any pair of realizations satisfying  $A < A'$ , the difference  $G(A') - G(A)$  is at least as big as  $\xi(A' - A)$ . This implies that for any  $b \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ ,  $H^m(b, \phi_m(b, \underline{A} + \lambda)) - H^m(b, \phi_m(b, \underline{A})) \geq \xi^m \lambda^m$  for all  $\lambda$  such that  $0 < \lambda < \bar{A} - \underline{A}$ . Using this observation, we can prove:

**CLAIM 1:** *For  $m$  sufficiently large,  $H^m(\bar{x}, x^*) > 0$ .*

<sup>34</sup> In the present environment, this definition is equivalent to the requirement that the sequence of probability measures associated with  $\langle \psi_t(x) \rangle$  converges weakly to the probability measure associated with  $\psi(x)$  (see Stokey, Lucas, and Edward Prescott 1989, Theorem 12.8).

PROOF:

It suffices to show that for  $m$  sufficiently large  $A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), x^*) > \underline{A}$ . Then, for any such  $m$ , by continuity, there is a  $\lambda_m$  small enough such that  $A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A} + \lambda_m), x^*) > \underline{A}$ . It then follows that

$$\begin{aligned} H^m(\bar{x}, x^*) &= \int_{\underline{z}} H(z, x^*) dH^{m-1}(\bar{x}, z) = \int_{\underline{z}} G(A^*(z, x^*)) dH^{m-1}(\bar{x}, z) \\ &\geq \int_{\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A})}^{\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A} + \lambda_m)} G(A^*(z, x^*)) dH^{m-1}(\bar{x}, z) \\ &\geq G(A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A} + \lambda_m), x^*)) [H^{m-1}(\bar{x}, \phi_{m-1}(\bar{x}, \underline{A} + \lambda_m)) - H^{m-1}(\bar{x}, \phi_{m-1}(\bar{x}, \underline{A}))] \\ &\geq G(A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A} + \lambda_m), x^*)) (\xi \lambda_m)^{m-1} > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose, to the contrary, that for all  $m$  we have that  $A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), x^*) \leq \underline{A}$ . Then, it must be the case that the sequence  $\langle \phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A}) \rangle$  is decreasing. To see this, note that since  $r(b, A)$  is increasing in  $A$ , we have that

$$\frac{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})}{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})(1 + \varepsilon)} < \int_{\underline{A}}^{\bar{A}} \left( \frac{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)}{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) dG(A).$$

But the first-order condition for  $x(b, A)$  (i.e., (11) with the appropriate value function) and the derivative of the value function (23) imply that

$$(A.1) \quad \frac{1 - r(\phi_{k-1}(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})}{1 - r(\phi_{k-1}(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})(1 + \varepsilon)} = \int_{\underline{A}}^{\bar{A}} \left( \frac{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)}{1 - r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) dG(A).$$

Since  $r(b, \underline{A})$  is increasing in  $b$  and  $A$ , this implies  $\phi_{k-1}(\bar{x}, \underline{A}) > \phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A})$ .

We can therefore assume, without loss of generality, that  $\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A})$  converges to some finite  $\beta \geq \underline{x}$ . We now prove that this yields a contradiction. Taking the limit as  $m \rightarrow \infty$ , continuity of  $r(\cdot, \underline{A})$  would imply  $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} r(\phi_k(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A) = r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)$  for all  $A$ . Using condition (A.1):

$$\frac{1 - r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})}{1 - r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), \underline{A})(1 + \varepsilon)} = \int_{\underline{A}}^{\bar{A}} \left( \frac{1 - r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)}{1 - r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) dG(A),$$

which is impossible since  $r(\phi_\infty(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), A)$  is strictly increasing in  $A$ . We conclude, therefore, that for  $m$  sufficiently large,  $A^*(\phi_m(\bar{x}, \underline{A}), x^*) > \underline{A}$ , which yields the result.

Next, we can establish:

CLAIM 2: For all  $m \geq 2$ ,  $1 - H^m(\underline{x}, x^*) \geq G(A^*(\underline{x}, x^*))G(A^*(x^*, x^*))^{m-2}[1 - G(A^*(x^*, x^*))]$ .

PROOF:

With probability  $G(A^*(\underline{x}, x^*))$ , the level of debt chosen in period 1 is  $x^*$  when the initial level of debt is  $\underline{x}$ ; so with probability  $G(A^*(\underline{x}, x^*))G(A^*(x^*, x^*))^{m-2}$ , the level of debt is  $x^*$  for the first  $m - 1$

periods. Given this, the probability that the level of debt is larger than  $x^*$  in period  $m$  is at least  $G(A^*(\underline{x}, x^*))G(A^*(x^*, x^*))^{m-2}[1 - G(A^*(x^*, x^*))]$ .

These two claims imply that the Mixing Condition is satisfied if  $q < n$ . To see this, choose  $m$  sufficiently large so that  $H^m(\bar{x}, x^*) > 0$ . This is always possible by Claim 1. Now, let

$$\varepsilon = \min \{G(A^*(\underline{x}, x^*))G(A^*(x^*, x^*))^{m-2}[1 - G(A^*(x^*, x^*))]; H^m(\bar{x}, x^*)\}.$$

Assuming that  $q < n$ , we know from the definition of  $x^*$  that  $A^*(x^*, x^*) \in (\underline{A}, \bar{A})$  (see equation (24)) and  $A^*(\underline{x}, x^*) > A^*(x^*, x^*) > \underline{A}$ . Thus,  $\varepsilon > 0$  and the condition is satisfied.

#### PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:

This result follows from Step 7 of the existence part of the proof of Proposition 2.

#### COMPLETION OF PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:

As discussed in the text, Proposition 4 implies that legislative decision making delivers the planner's solution when  $q = n$ . Thus, we need only show that when  $q = n$ , the equilibrium debt level will reach  $\underline{x}$  with probability one. Since  $x^* = \underline{x}$  when  $q = n$ , Claim 1 of Proposition 3 implies that there exists a  $\varepsilon > 0$  and a  $m$  such that for any initial  $b$ , the probability that  $x = \underline{x}$  in the next  $m$  periods is at least  $\varepsilon$ . Thus, the probability that  $x$  is never equal to  $\underline{x}$  in the next  $j \cdot m$  periods is not larger than  $(1 - \varepsilon)^j$ . Since  $\lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} (1 - \varepsilon)^j = 0$ , we conclude that the probability that  $x$  is never equal to  $\underline{x}$  is zero.

#### REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski.** 2006a. "Markets versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12224.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski.** 2006b. "Political Economy and the Structure of Taxation." Unpublished.
- Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton.** 1990. "Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of Default: A Politico-Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt." In *Public Debt Management: Theory and History*, ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and Mario Draghi, 315–45. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Aiyagari, S. Rao, Albert Marcet, Thomas Sargent, and Juha Seppala.** 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt." *Journal of Political Economy*, 110(6): 1220–54.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti.** 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits." *IMF Staff Papers*: 1–31.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini.** 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt." *Review of Economic Studies*, 57(3): 403–14.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini.** 2005. "Why Is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11600.
- Angeletos, George-Marios.** 2002. "Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(3): 1105–31.
- Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks.** 2005. *Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Baron, David.** 1991. "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(1): 57–90.
- Baron, David, and John Ferejohn.** 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review*, 83(4): 1181–1206.
- Baron, David, and Ehud Kalai.** 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game." *Journal of Economic Theory*, 61(2): 290–301.
- Barro, Robert J.** 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt." *Journal of Political Economy*, 87(5): 940–71.
- Barro, Robert J.** 1986. "U.S. Deficits since World War I." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 88(1): 195–222.

- Barro, Robert J.** 1987. "Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices, and Budget Deficits in the United Kingdom, 1701–1918." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 20(2): 221–47.
- Bassetto, Marco, and Thomas J. Sargent.** 2006. "Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(4): 1167–1210.
- Battaglini, Marco, and Stephen Coate.** 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis." *American Economic Review*, 97(1): 118–49.
- Battaglini, Marco, and Thomas Palfrey.** 2007. "The Dynamics of Distributive Politics." Unpublished.
- Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate.** 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis." *American Economic Review*, 88(1): 139–56.
- Besley, Timothy, and Michael Smart.** 2007. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare." *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(3–4): 755–73.
- Bohn, Henning.** 1998. "The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deficits." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(3): 949–63.
- Bohn, Henning, and Robert P. Inman.** 1996. "Balanced-Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States." *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy*, 45: 13–76.
- Brennan, Geoffrey, and James Buchanan.** 1980. *The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Chari, V. V., and Harold Cole.** 1993. "Why Are Representative Democracies Fiscally Irresponsible?" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 163.
- Chari, V. V., and Harold Cole.** 1995. "A Contribution to the Theory of Pork Barrel Spending." Unpublished.
- Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Nouriel Roubini.** 1997. "Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies." *Economics and Politics*, 9(1): 27–54.
- Drazen, Allan.** 2000. *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel, and Massimo Morelli.** 2005. "Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers." *Econometrica*, 73(6): 1893–1937.
- Inman, Robert P.** 1990. "Public Debts and Fiscal Politics: How to Decide?" *American Economic Review*, 80(2): 81–85.
- Kalai, Ehud, and William Stanford.** 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games." *Econometrica*, 56(2): 397–410.
- Leblanc, William, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Micky Tripathi.** 2000. "Majority-Rule Bargaining and the Under Provision of Public Investment Goods." *Journal of Public Economics*, 75(1): 21–47.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro.** 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics." *Review of Economic Studies*, 66(4): 909–28.
- Lucas, Robert, and Nancy Stokey.** 1983. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 12(1): 55–93.
- Morelli, Massimo.** 1999. "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining." *American Political Science Review*, 93(4): 809–20.
- Niskanen, William A.** 1992. "The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 6(2): 13–24.
- Perotti, Roberto, and Yianos Kontopoulos.** 2002. "Fragmented Fiscal Policy." *Journal of Public Economics*, 86(2): 191–222.
- Persson, Torsten, and Lars E. O. Svensson.** 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 104(2): 325–45.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini.** 2000. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Poterba, James M.** 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics." *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4): 799–821.
- Poterba, James M.** 1995. "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States." *National Tax Journal*, 48(3): 329–36.
- Poterba, James M., and Jurgen von Hagen, ed.** 1999. *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Primo, David.** 2007. *Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rockafellar, R. Tyrrell.** 1970. *Convex Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roubini, Nouriel, and Jeffrey Sachs.** 1989. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies." *European Economic Review*, 33: 903–38.
- Shin, Yongseok.** 2006. "Ramsey Meets Bewley: Optimal Government Financing with Incomplete Markets." Unpublished.

- Stokey, Nancy, Robert Lucas, and Edward Prescott.** 1989. *Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Velasco, Andres.** 2000. "Debts and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking." *Journal of Public Economics*, 76(1): 105–25.
- Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman.** 2007. "Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods." *American Political Science Review*, 101(1): 79–92.
- Volkerink, Bjorn, and Jakob De Haan.** 2001. "Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence." *Public Choice*, 109(3-4): 221–42.
- von Hagen, Jurgen, and Ian Harden.** 1995. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline." *European Economic Review*, 39(3-4): 771–79.
- Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen.** 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics." *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(4): 642–64.
- Yared, Pierre.** 2007. "Politicians, Taxes, and Debt." Unpublished.