Who Participated in the Arab Spring? A Comparison of Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions

Authors:

Mark R. Beissinger, Henry W. Putnam Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University
237 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
T. 609-258-8261, F. 609-258-1110
mbeissin@princeton.edu

Amaney Jamal, Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University
241 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
T. 609-258-7340, F. 609-258-1110
ajamal@princeton.edu

Kevin Mazur, graduate student, Department of Politics, Princeton University
130 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ, 08544-1013
T. 312-771-9833, F. 609-258-1110

Abstract (190 words):

This study uses original survey data to examine who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions in light of theoretical expectations. We find that the middle class participated disproportionately in both revolutions, but participants in the Tunisian Revolution were younger and much more diverse in class composition than participants in the Egyptian Revolution. We also show that, despite the fact that both revolutions produced free-and-fair elections in their wake, most participants in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions prioritized economic concerns over desires for civil and political freedoms. In Egypt civil society association most strongly differentiated revolution participants prioritizing civil and political freedoms from other participants, whereas in Tunisia it was income. We explain these different patterns of participation across the two revolutions by reference to the disparate political and economic strategies pursued by incumbent regimes in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt. In spite of their broadly analogous attacks against arbitrary rule and corruption, these two revolutions relied on different coalitional configurations formed largely by the ways in which incumbent regime strategies of managing state-society relations in the years immediately preceding these revolutions provoked different patterns of societal grievance and opposition mobilizational structures.

The Arab Spring revolutions were massive political upheavals, with citizens in multiple countries taking to the streets against their respective regimes. In a matter of weeks, two longstanding authoritarian regimes—the Ben-Ali dictatorship in Tunisia and the Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt—fell, while leaders in other Arab countries braced for the worst. Commentators were quick to label these upheavals "democratic" revolutions, and free-and-fair elections did indeed follow in their wake. But these sudden explosions of discontent left more questions than answers. Other than impressionistic accounts of journalists and eyewitnesses, we know little, for instance, about who participated in these revolutions and how revolutionary participants were similar to or different from the societies from which they hailed. We also do not know whether those who participated were primarily motivated by a desire for democratic change, as some accounts presume, or by other matters such as economic concerns or Islamist beliefs. After all, in both Egypt and Tunisia Islamist parties—the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda—ultimately won elections held in the wake of these revolutions. Thus, this article asks who participated in revolutionary protests in Egypt and Tunisia and why, and what does this tell us about the political processes underlying the Arab Spring revolutions?

Theories of democratization and revolution provide some basic hypotheses about which individuals should have been expected to participate in the Arab Spring. But rarely do we have available the kind of information necessary for evaluating these expectations in a systematic manner. As we know, revolutions typically occur suddenly, taking observers and participants by surprise (Kuran 1995; Goodwin 2011). Therefore, it is unusual to have a detailed cross-sectional record of the attitudes and backgrounds of those participating in a revolution, or to be able to compare them with other members of society.[1] In this article we do this for two revolutions. Using an original dataset from the Second Wave Arab Barometer, which includes surveys

administered in Tunisia and Egypt shortly after the Arab Spring, we examine the extent to which the backgrounds, attitudes, and behaviors of those who participated in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions map onto theoretical expectations and extant accounts of these upheavals.

In doing so, we demonstrate a number of important findings. First, we show that economic grievances (and to a lesser extent, grievances over corruption) dominated the agendas of participants in both revolutions, while civil and political freedoms ranked lower for most participants. Given that both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions did produce free-and-fair elections in their wake, this finding is consistent with Rustow's (1970) observation that democratization is not the result of particular social forces, configurations of values, or cultural proclivities in society, but rather the by-product of political contention over issues often unrelated to the end result. Second, we show that the constituencies that mobilized in these two revolutions differed in important respects. In both revolutions participants disproportionately consisted of males, professionals, government employees, private sector employees,[2] and managers. But whereas participants in the Egyptian Revolution were disproportionately middle-aged, middle class, professional, and religious, participants in the Tunisian Revolution were younger, more secular, and significantly more diverse in social composition, with workers, students, and the unemployed also mobilizing in significant numbers. In this sense, the Tunisian Revolution represented more of a cross-class coalition than the Egyptian Revolution. Finally, we show that the factors most closely associated with whether participants understood these revolutions as struggles for democratic freedoms differed across these two revolutions. Whereas in Egypt participation in civil society associations more sharply distinguished revolution participants prioritizing civil and political freedoms from those who did not, in Tunisia personal income was important. Thus, revolutions within cross-national waves like the Arab Spring may

look outwardly similar in that they articulate broadly analogous anti-autocratic frames and result in broadly similar outcomes, but nevertheless be driven by quite different motivational and coalitional patterns.

In explaining these findings, we turn to an analysis of the different political and economic policies pursued by incumbent governments in the years immediately preceding these revolutions and how they provoked different patterns of grievance and left in place different oppositional mobilizing structures. As we show, Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare protections and co-opting rather than overtly repressing opposition created conducive conditions for an urban middle-class revolt fueled by economic grievances and led by civil society organization, while Ben Ali's corporatist and constrictive approach to rule undermined civil society organization but created the basis for a cross-class alliance initiated in the provinces and slowly spreading to the capital.

The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we review theories of democratization and revolution that purport to explain individual-level participation in mobilized regime-change, generating a series of hypotheses concerning participation in the Arab Spring to guide our empirical investigation. Where relevant, we link these hypotheses to the various "folk" explanations that have arisen concerning the Arab Spring. Second, using survey data, we examine the extent to which protesters in Tunisia and Egypt mirrored these hypothesized agents, in the process elucidating the distinctive patterns underlying these two revolutions. Third, we analyze how participants understood revolutionary participation and the concerns that dominated participants' agendas. Finally, we develop an explanation for the different patterns we observe through a comparative analysis of shifting patterns of state-society relations in Tunisia and Egypt on the eve of these revolutions.

Participation in the Arab Spring: Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses

The literatures on democratization and revolutions provide a basic roadmap for thinking about which citizens might be expected to play significant roles in bringing about instances of mobilized regime-change. Many of the classic works on democratization, for instance, linked democratization to underlying shifts in societal values associated with modernization (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Huntington 1991). These authors argued that as societies become more educated and urban, worldviews grow more cosmopolitan, universal, and favorable to democracy. Accordingly, if such theories help explain the Arab Spring, one would expect that those who took to the streets would be those most supportive of (and primarily motivated by) democratic ends (see, for instance, Dahl 1971: 132-160). Various versions of modernization theory identify different categories of citizens who should be at the forefront of democratizing change. Lipset (1959), for example, emphasized education as a key determinant of democratic values, leading one to believe that, if applied to the Arab Spring, one should find more highly educated citizens participating disproportionately in these revolutions and representing a democratic vanguard within them. In other modernization formulations, there is a built-in assumption that societies undergoing modernization experience cohort shifts in which younger generations hold more egalitarian and democratic worldviews (Inglehart 1990). If such theories help to explain the Arab Spring, youth should have been at the forefront of Arab revolutionary mobilizations. Indeed, several journalists, scholars, and policy makers covering the Arab Spring linked these events to a youth population oriented toward universal democratic values.[3] These "folk" accounts emphasized two inter-related points: that these revolutions were

largely championed by the youth of the region; and that many of these youth were opposed to Islamist/religious politics and embraced secular, democratic values.[4]

Other theories point to the important roles played by civil society associations in underpinning anti-authoritarian mobilizations and instilling democratic values, with civil society associations acting as schools for civic virtues, generators of social capital, and counterweights to authoritarian rulers (Diamond and Plattner 1989; Putnam 1993). A parallel literature within the social movement field emphasizes the importance of associational life for providing the coordination necessary for large-scale collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Olson 1971). Several accounts of the Arab Spring hold that labor unions and mosques played critical roles in these mobilizations (Beinin 2011b). Thus, for a number of theoretical reasons one might expect to find that those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions (and those who prioritized democratic values within these revolutions) were disproportionately individuals involved in civil society associations.[5]

Another set of accounts potentially relevant for the Arab Spring focuses on the role of religion in politics. The secularization thesis argues that as modernization proceeds, people become less religious and more supportive of toleration and political and civil rights (Inglehart and Norris 2003). A related argument specifically contends that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Huntington (1996) claims that Islam and democracy are inherently in tension, since Islam emphasizes community over the individual and recognizes no division between church and state. Fish (2002) similarly maintains that Islam hurts democracy because Muslims lack the tolerance towards women necessary for a society based on equality. These accounts would expect to find that those championing civil and political rights within the Arab Spring were the less religious.

Still other theories would lead one to expect that the middle class should have played the leading role in the Arab Spring and in demanding democratic rights within these revolutions. Both Moore (1966) and Huntington (1991), in different ways, highlighted the emergence of new social forces through economic development (in particular, the emergence of autonomous bourgeoisie and middle-class sectors) as critical to democratization. In Huntington's account, a broad and expanding middle class (consisting of businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians, and clerical and sales workers) sees democracy as a means for securing its own interests. By contrast, others influenced by developments in Latin America and Southern Europe have highlighted mobilized actions by the working class, especially organized labor, in bringing about democratizing political change (Bermeo 1997; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Alternatively, a significant strand within the literature on revolutions argues for the importance of cross-class alliances in underpinning successful revolutions (Dix 1984; Goodwin 2001; Thompson 2004). Indeed, Goldstone (2011) contends that those Arab Spring revolutions that succeeded drew on cross-class coalitions.

A recent strand within the literature on democratization envisages democratization emerging out of the threat of revolution due to objective inequalities and demands for redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003).[6] If such theories are relevant for explaining the Arab Spring, one would expect that those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions were the relatively disadvantaged, who prioritized economic gains and redistribution over democratic values. Additionally, the collective action paradigm, which focuses on the role of selective incentives in collective action, would lead one to believe that those most likely to participate in high-risk collective activism would be those who derive their income or resources

independently of the government and who would therefore be less subject to government selective incentives against participation (Hardin 1995; Olson 1971; Tullock 1971). From this perspective those not employed in the public sector should have participated disproportionately in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Thus, on the basis of these theoretical expectations, we stipulate a series of hypotheses as an initial guide for our inquiry. Our hypotheses fall broadly into four categories: modernization, civil society, class, and collective action hypotheses.

Modernization Hypotheses

H1A: More highly educated citizens should have participated disproportionately in the Arab Spring revolutions and should have been more likely to prioritize political and civil freedoms within these revolutions.

H1B: Youth should have participated disproportionately in the Arab Spring revolutions and should have been more likely to prioritize political and civil freedoms within these revolutions. Moreover, one should find patterns of revolutionary participation and support for political and civil freedoms among participants that gradually attenuate with age.

H1C: Among those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions, individuals who are less religious should have been more likely to prioritize civil and political freedoms within these revolutions.

Civil Society Hypothesis

H2: Members of civil society associations should have participated disproportionately in the Arab Spring revolutions and should have been more likely to prioritize civil and political freedoms within these revolutions.

Class Hypotheses

H3A: Those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions and who prioritized civil and political freedoms within these revolutions should have been predominantly from the urban middle class.

H3B: Those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions and who prioritized civil and political freedoms within these revolutions should have been predominantly from the working class.

H3C: Those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions should have constituted a national, cross-class coalition, recruited from a variety of classes.

H3D: Those who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions should have predominantly been the materially disadvantaged, who prioritized redistribution over civil and political freedoms.

Collective Action Hypothesis

H4: Those who were employed in the public sector should have been less likely to participate in the Arab Spring revolutions than those who were not.

Below, we evaluate these hypotheses in light of data on participation in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions from the Arab Barometer surveys. As we show, some theories receive more support than others, but revolutionary participation in each of these revolutions displayed certain distinctive features, raising questions about why different categories of citizens mobilized across these two revolutions.

Method and Sample

The data utilized in this analysis come from the second round of the Arab Barometer study, a set of nationally representative surveys about political life, governance, and political, social, and cultural values administered in eleven Arab countries. The survey was fielded in Egypt in June 2011 and in Tunisia in October 2011—shortly after the revolutionary tides that swept both countries. The Arab Barometer was not originally designed to study the Arab Spring revolutions. However, an additional battery of questions was added in this round that allows one to identify who participated in these revolutions, as well as individual attitudes toward and understanding of these revolutions. In Egypt, 1,220 people were surveyed, while in Tunisia the sample size was 1,196.[7]

In Egypt, 8 percent of the sample reported participating in revolutionary protests, compared to 16 percent of those surveyed in Tunisia.[8] These rates of participation may seem puzzling at first glance. However, as will be shown below, different segments of Egyptian and Tunisian societies mobilized in each revolution. Differences in population size and dispersion also provide some basic intuitions about participation rates in the two countries. Tunisia is a state of 10.7 million people, whereas Egypt's population is 82.5 million. Scaling participation rates up to total population (an exercise to be interpreted with caution, given our sample sizes) would imply that over six million Egyptians participated in the Egyptian Revolution, while less than two million Tunisians turned out in the Tunisian Revolution. Thus, although the percentage of individuals protesting in Egypt was smaller, the absolute number of people on the streets in Egypt was likely quite a bit larger than in Tunisia. The geographic pattern and timing of the revolutions could also account for divergent levels of turnout. The Tunisian protests began in a

small provincial town (Sidi Bouzid) and slowly made their way to the capital over the course of several weeks. The Egyptian protests, by contrast, began in the country's two major cities, Cairo and Alexandria, and had millions on the street within four days of the first protest. Because the Egyptian protests began rapidly in the place where all revolutionary movements aim to end up--the seat of power--they afforded less opportunity than the Tunisian protests for undecided individuals to throw in with the revolution.

Patterns of Revolutionary Participation

Revolution participants in both Tunisia and Egypt were overwhelmingly male, had above-average levels of income and education, and were disproportionately from professional or clerical occupational backgrounds. But the profiles of participants in each country differed in some striking ways. For one thing, revolutionary participants in the two countries differed significantly by age, with Tunisian youth comprising a larger portion of demonstrators than their Egyptian counterparts (see Table 1).[9] A multivariate regression of participation on age underscores this point; no age group is statistically different from the 35-44 year old group in Egypt, but the coefficient on the youngest Tunisian group is both substantively and statistically significant (see Table 2). These simple statistics give lie to folk theories that the Arab revolutions were uniformly caused by youth frustration or had a single set of causal factors common across these societies; whereas youth (and especially students) participated at high rates in Tunisia, a group nearing middle age formed the core of Egyptian protesters. Indeed, among students in the two societies there were starkly different revolutionary participation rates (8 percent in Egypt; 35 percent in Tunisia). The age of Egyptian protesters also indicates that modernization theories emphasizing value change due to cohort effects (Hypothesis 1B) were not operative in Egypt.

[Tables 1 and 2 here]

Similarly, religiosity does not appear to be systematically related to protest participation. To capture levels of piety, we constructed a fifteen-point scale measuring the frequency with which individuals perform five behaviors associated with religiosity, including reading the Quran or Bible and praying.[10] The average score for Egypt was 9.33 and for Tunisia--6.10, indicating that Egyptians on average reported significantly higher degrees of religious piety. In both countries average piety scores among those participating in these revolutions were slightly higher (9.70 for Egypt; 6.23 for Tunisia). We conducted a two-sided difference of means test for turnout rates between those above and below the mean piety score in each country. For neither country could we reject the null hypothesis that more religious people had the same underlying propensity to participate in these revolutions as the less religious.[11]

Explanations linking protest to absolute levels of material deprivation (Hypothesis 3D) are similarly unsupported by the data. Given the amount of scholarly and popular attention devoted to unemployment as a cause of frustration and revolution in the Arab world,[12] one might have expected unemployment to be a significant positive predictor of revolutionary participation. Yet unemployment is not a statistically significant predictor of participation in either country.[13] Income profiles lend further credence to the notion that absolute deprivation was not a major factor. If frustration among the most disadvantaged were the primary cause of participation in these revolutions, one should have expected high levels of turnout among the lowest income segments. Yet the poorest two income quintiles had the lowest rates of participation in both revolutions. Educational profiles provide further evidence that the poorest were not the catalysts for the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, as revolution participants in both Tunisia and Egypt were significantly more educated than non-participants. A bivariate regression of participation on

education is substantively and statistically significant in both cases, and this relationship holds when subjected to multivariate controls, providing some possible support for a Lipset interpretation of the Arab Spring (H1A).[14]

Accordingly, one might be tempted to interpret Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions as "middle class" revolts (H3A). In much of the contemporary literature the term "middle class" refers to a set of relatively new urban occupations.[15] The Arab Barometer contains detailed occupation information, with thirteen different categories, including groups outside the labor force. Four of the occupational categories accord with Huntington's definition of the urban middle class: professional, employer or director of an institution, government employee, and private sector employee. Taken as a whole, these four categories were overrepresented among revolution participants relative to their population shares in both states--particularly in Egypt, where they constituted 55 percent of the participants in the Egyptian Revolution but only 25 percent of the general population. In this respect, the Egyptian Revolution did indeed represent a middle class revolution, with a majority of participants coming from middle class occupations. Professionals stand out as an especially active group, constituting 17 percent of participants but only 5 percent of the population (A logistic regression of participation in the revolution on a professional dummy shows that the professional category remains statistically significant even when subjected to multivariate controls). In Tunisia, the four middle class occupational categories comprised 30 percent of revolution participants but only 19 percent of the population. However, the Tunisian Revolution was significantly more diverse in terms of participant class backgrounds, with workers constituting 17 percent of participants, students—19 percent, and the unemployed—21 percent. Thus, while the middle class was disproportionately represented among participants in the Tunisian Revolution relative to its size within the population, unlike

Egypt a majority of participants were not from the middle class, more closely approximating a cross-class alliance (H3C) in the sense indicated by Goldstone.

The high rate of participation among government employees (21 percent of Egyptian protesters versus 13 percent of the population; 12 percent of Tunisian protesters versus 7 percent of the population) also casts doubt on the proposition that individuals whose incomes were tied to the state were more quiescent (H4). The data on civil servant participation suggests that most civil servants were given insufficient incentives to bind them to the regime; indeed, in the Arab Barometer survey Egyptian government employees were at the 62nd percentile in terms of income distribution, and their Tunisian counterparts--at the 74th percentile.

In contrast to the middle class, the working class did not play a predominant role in either revolution. It is true that 58 percent of union and professional syndicate members in Tunisia participated in the revolution (compared to 15 percent of non-members); in Egypt 19 percent of Egyptian union members participated (compared to 7 percent of non-members). In this respect, unions did play important mobilizational roles. But an investigation into the occupational profiles of union members shows that they came overwhelmingly from the professional strata identified earlier. Of the total Egyptian sample, including participants and non-participants, only 2 percent of those identifying their occupation as "worker" were union members. Government employees constituted the largest occupational group of union members (39 percent), followed by professionals (23 percent). In Tunisia, none of the self-identified workers, whether revolution participants or not, were union members. Similar to Egypt, government employees constituted the largest group of union members (44 percent) among those who protested, followed by the "other employed" category (19 percent) and professionals (14 percent).[16] In both countries workers participated at average levels, constituting 9 percent of revolution participants (and 10

percent of the total sample) in Egypt, and 17 percent of revolution participants (and 14 percent of the sample) in Tunisia--findings in tension with working-class (H3B) and economic disadvantage (H3D) hypotheses.

Moreover, as Hypothesis 2 would predict, members of civil society associations were overrepresented among revolution participants relative to their presence in the overall population in both Egypt and Tunisia, and the relationship is robust to statistical controls for numerous covariates. But for reasons we will elaborate below, members of civil society associations comprised a much larger share of Egyptian protesters (46 percent) than of Tunisian participants (15 percent). In both Egypt and Tunisia civil society associations drew members from various segments of society, including professional and trade unions, charitable societies, and cultural or youth associations. Union membership—comprised primarily of skilled, white collar workers—formed a significant part of civil society participation, with members comprising 24 percent of Egyptian protestors but only 10 percent of the population. In Tunisia union membership formed a smaller part of the population (3 percent), but again contributed protesters at a rate disproportionate to their share (10 percent of all protesters). Though we have no direct evidence on the religious character of civil society associations, it is reasonable to infer that many were religious in orientation; Islamic charitable societies and religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia exemplify this tendency.[17] There is no evidence suggesting a prominent role for religious organizations in the early days of these uprisings (Neither Ennahda nor the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in organizing early protests),[18] but as these revolutions developed, religious associations were among the civil society associations mobilizing people to participate in both countries.

To sum up, this sketch of the backgrounds of revolution participants in Tunisia and Egypt

casts doubt upon a number of the theories advanced to explain these revolutions. The poorest segments of society were among the least likely to participate, indicating that protests were not born primarily of absolute levels of deprivation. Similarly, cohort-based value change and secularization seem not to have impelled participation in the revolutions. Rather, in both revolutions, participants were disproportionately recruited from the "middle class." Participants in both countries had higher levels of education and income than the general population and tended to be engaged in urban white-collar work. There were, however, important differences between the two revolutions. While Egyptian Revolution participants were overwhelmingly recruited from the middle class, a majority of participants in the Tunisian Revolution came from groups outside the middle class (workers, students, and the unemployed), making it more of a cross-class coalition. Tunisian participants were disproportionately from the youngest group in the survey, whereas the highest rates of participation in Egypt came from the middle-aged. Civil society participation was a reliable predictor of revolutionary turnout in both countries. But civil society association played a much greater role in Egypt than in Tunisia. Thus, while both revolutions articulated roughly analogous anti-incumbent frames, each relied on somewhat different configurations of and connections between actors. Before offering an explanation for these differences, we turn first to probe them further by examining the reasons participants identified for participation.

[Figure 1 here]

Reasons for Participation among Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutionaries

The Arab Barometer asked respondents to identify the most important and second most important reasons that they believed citizens participated in their society's respective

revolutions.[19] The answers of those who indicated that they had participated in revolutionary protests (n=98 for Egypt, n=192 for Tunisia) are presented in Table 3. We turned to this question as a way of identifying participants according to their differing priorities and motivations for participation. While we recognize that the question did not ask participants directly why they as individuals participated in the revolution, given that all of the respondents we are examining in this portion of the analysis were revolution participants, one would expect that their answers were likely informed by their own concerns and experiences. Indeed, subsequent analysis confirmed that the groupings of opinion on this question lined up with answers to other questions in ways that one would expect only if respondents answered this question with their own beliefs and experiences in mind. In the Egyptian sample, for instance, those participants who identified civil and political freedoms as a reason for why people protested during the revolution were also (in a separately answered question) three times more likely to identify democracy as one of the top two issues facing the country or as the top issue facing the Arab world than those who identified other reasons for the protests (chi2=4.692, significant at the .05 level). In another survey question this group also was much less likely to identify democracy with narrowing the gap between rich and poor (chi2=10.042, significant at the .001 level) or with providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) to every individual (chi2=2.995, significant at the .10 level) and much more likely to identify democracy with free elections (chi2=4.096, significant at the .05 level) and with equal political rights (chi2=4.923, significant at the .05 level) than participants in the Egyptian Revolution who identified other reasons for participation. And as one might expect, those revolution participants who chose the economy as a reason for participation also disproportionately answered that one of the most important features of democracy was "Narrowing the gap between rich and poor" (chi2=3.202, significant at the .10

level). If participants answered why people participated in these revolutions without any reference to their own experiences and priorities, then these patterns of response to other questions would not have been observed, and one would have instead found no statistically significant relationships between answers on these different questions. In sum, covariate analysis provides some support for our assumption that participants answered the question on why people participated in these revolutions mainly with reference to their own experiences. We recognize that this is a somewhat noisy instrument and that ideally a more direct measure would have been preferable. But we believe that this question does shed some light on the general pattern of priorities among those who participated in these revolutions. At a minimum it sheds light on how participants perceived what these revolutions were about.

[Table 3 here]

The responses to this question point to the key role played by economic demands (and to a lesser extent, corruption) in underpinning participation in both revolutions, as well as the relatively low priority accorded to civil and political freedoms. In both revolutions economic issues dominated the agendas of participants (identified by 37 percent of Egyptian and 58 percent of Tunisian participants as the primary reason for participation, with 30 percent of Egyptian and 19 percent of Tunisian participants indicating that the economy was a secondary reason for participation). Combating corruption also appeared prominently among the secondary reasons for participation in both revolutions, while in Egypt a group of participants identified the succession of Mubarak's son Gamal as a primary or secondary reason for participation. In both revolutions, however, only a small core of participants understood civil and political freedoms as the primary reason for participation (17 percent in Egypt, and 21 percent in Tunisia), while a

somewhat larger group in Tunisia (29 percent) identified civil and political freedoms as a secondary reason for participation than in Egypt (11 percent).

As respondents were asked to identify both a primary and a secondary reason for participation, we conducted a latent class cluster analysis in order to simplify discussion of how these two choices coincided.[20] For the Egyptian participants the results suggested a 4-cluster model, while for Tunisian participants they suggested a 5-cluster model. Among Egyptian participants the largest cluster (38 percent of participants) consisted of those who identified the reasons for participation as being primarily about the economy and secondarily about corruption, while another cluster (22 percent) identified these same reasons only in reverse order (i.e., primarily about corruption, and secondarily about the economy). A third cluster (22 percent) identified the main reason for participation as opposition to the succession of Mubarak's son Gamal; this group, however, was divided over the secondary reasons that they identified. The smallest cluster (18 percent) identified the main reason for participation as demands for civil and political freedoms (This group was also divided in the secondary reasons they identified).

Among participants in the Tunisian Revolution, the largest cluster of participants (32 percent) similarly identified the reasons for participation as mainly the economy and secondarily corruption, while a much smaller cluster (15 percent) identified the reasons for participation as mainly corruption and secondarily the economy. A third cluster (26 percent) understood the reasons for participation as mainly the economy and secondarily civil and political freedoms, while a fourth cluster (21 percent) identified civil and political freedoms as the main reason and corruption as a secondary reason. Finally, a small cluster (6 percent) identified establishing an Islamic regime as the main reason for participation. In short, in both revolutions participants

largely understood participation as being primarily about the economy, with demands for civil and political freedoms ranking relatively low.

We now turn to who identified civil and political freedoms as a primary or secondary reason for participation, and whether their backgrounds, behaviors, and attitudes correspond with what various theories might expect. Figure 2 provides a comparison of those who saw the achievement of civil and political freedoms as a primary or secondary reason underlying participation and those who did not. Revolution participants who identified civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation differed from other participants in some similar ways across both revolutions. They were more likely to be middle-aged, in the top two quintiles of income, and a member of a civil society association than other participants. In Egypt higher education was also associated with prioritizing civil and political liberties as a reason for participation (the pattern was less sharp in Tunisia), and Egyptian female participants (unlike their Tunisian counterparts) were more likely than male participants to believe that participation was motivated by the achievement of civil and political freedoms.

[Figure 2 here]

These findings raise further challenges to several hypothesized explanations of the Arab Spring revolutions. The fact that participants who understood revolution as a struggle for civil and political freedoms were, on average, older than other participants casts further doubt about a generational values explanation (H1B). In both Tunisia and Egypt the youngest participants (those below 25) were primarily concerned with the economy and secondarily with corruption, whereas those prioritizing civil and political freedoms were disproportionately 35 or older. The data also raise doubts about the secularization hypothesis (H1C); in both revolutions revolutionary participants who saw civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation were

slightly more religious in their personal practice than society as a whole and were about as religious as participants who did not prioritize civil and political rights. And though, as we saw earlier, the middle class participated disproportionately in both revolutions, the data on reasons for participation cast doubt on the democratic inclinations of white collar workers (H3A). Professionals in both revolutions were about as likely as not to list civil and political freedoms as one of the two most important reasons for revolutionary participation.

To test these relationships further, we created a binary variable, coded as 0 if a person did not identify civil and political freedoms as a primary or secondary reason for participation in the revolution, and 1 if the person did. We then performed bivariate and multivariate logistic regressions to probe which of the factors were most consistently associated with prioritizing civil and political freedoms as a reason for revolutionary participation (Table 4).[21] Interestingly, we found different results for the two revolutions. In Egypt, the most consistent factor differentiating revolution participants who prioritized civil and political freedoms from other participants was membership in a civil society association. The relationship remained significant even when controlling for other factors. In Egypt, membership in a civil society association increased the odds of identifying civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation over the odds of identifying a different reason by about 200 percent. But within Tunisia's broader cross-class revolutionary coalition, membership in a civil society association was not a statistically significant factor differentiating those who prioritized democratic change over other concerns. Rather, in Tunisia personal income was, with the proportion of participants citing civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation increasing monotonically with income.[22] By contrast, in Egypt the proportion prioritizing civil and political freedoms dipped sharply in the middle income quintile. As we detail below, this different relationship in Egypt between income

and the reasons identified for participation is a reflection of the economic discontent within the Egyptian middle class that fueled much of its participation in the revolution.

[Table 4 here]

Revolutionary Coalitions and Incumbent Regime Strategies

To sum up what we have found, many of the leading theories of regime-change used to explain the Arab Spring revolutions do not hold, hold in one revolution only, or hold only with significant qualification. As we saw, the majority of the participants in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions did not prioritize democratic ends over other concerns; each revolution consisted of different age groups, with youth prioritizing economic concerns over democratic values (H1B); participants were on average at least as religious as other members of society, though religion had little relationship with whether participants prioritized democratic change (H1C); participants were not disproportionately drawn from the working (H3B) or most disadvantaged classes (H3D); and they were disproportionately employed in the public sector, dependent on the state for their livelihood (H4), though not well remunerated for their labor. Participants in both revolutions were disproportionately middle class, with those more educated (H1A), in upper income categories, and from middle class occupations (H3A) participating in greater numbers than their representation within populations as a whole. But the degree to which the middle class was preponderant varied, with the Tunisian Revolution representing a cross-class coalition (H3C), while the Egyptian Revolution was more narrowly a middle class revolution (H3A). In neither revolution did the educated or the middle class predominantly view civil and political freedoms as a priority reason for participation; in Egypt in particular revolutionary participation was understood by relatively advantaged, middle-class participants as

having been driven by economic grievances. In Egypt participation in civil society association most strongly differentiated participants who prioritized civil and political freedoms from other participants, whereas in Tunisia it was income.

How, then, do we reconcile these complex and seemingly contradictory patterns? We argue that they make a great deal of sense when placed within the context of the disparate political and economic strategies of incumbent regimes in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt. We saw earlier that members of civil society associations proportionally were three times greater among participants in the Egyptian Revolution (46 percent) than among participants in the Tunisian Revolution (15 percent)—mirroring the fact that members of civil society associations were a significantly greater proportion of Egyptian society (15 percent) than of Tunisian society (7 percent). These sharp differences reflect the very different strategies of incumbent regime maintenance pursued in Tunisia and Egypt on the eve of these revolutions. In the 2000s, the Mubarak regime allowed a more independent press and vibrant political associational life to take root. Islamist candidates were permitted to run in the 2005 election; indeed, over fourteen new reform movements were founded in the lead-up to the election. While this period also saw widespread electoral fraud and the arrest of prominent challengers to the regime, the regime's toleration of electoral competition and some degree of civic life were indicative of a strategy geared towards co-opting and marginalizing opposition rather than repressing it outright (Shahin 105). Challenges to the Mubarak government from civil society continued after the 2005 election, with increasingly frequent labor strikes and protests for the first time by rank-and-file bureaucrats (Beinin 2011a, El-Ghobashy 2010). The latter group is notable because its members had formed the core of Egyptian state's supporters since the 1952 revolution (Kandil 2012). Though demonstrations tended to be small and were often brutally repressed, the fact that

challengers kept coming out and were at times tolerated speaks to the growing degree of civil society activity in the final years of the Mubarak regime.

By contrast, in the years leading up to the Tunisian Revolution the Ben Ali regime curbed a previously vibrant civil society through harassment, repression, and co-option, bringing all kinds of interest intermediation under its scope. This repression was effective enough that large scale protest by labor or professional unions was practically unheard of in the last decade of Ben Ali's rule. In its place came diffuse acts of resistance, including suicides among lower class youth and hunger strikes among prominent jurists and leaders of political parties (Powel and Sadiki 2010; Mabrouk 2011). Indeed, on the eve of these revolutions Powel and Sadiki drew a stark contrast between Tunisia and Egypt: "There is draconianism in Egypt and authoritarianism is well-entrenched. But Egyptian society has a vibrant press, and political parties, including the Islamists, have a margin of existence that remains absent in Tunisia, a country that is qualified [to have a more developed civil society] on the basis of homogeneity, high levels of literacy, association with the EU where nearly 7 per cent of the total Tunisian population work and live, and the country's constitutional heritage" (2010: 134).

Only about ten independent civil society groups existed in the years preceding the Tunisian revolution; these were routinely harassed by security agencies, denied legal recognition, and had their funds frozen. By contrast, there had been over 8,386 registered civil society associations in Tunisia in 2003. These groups had been subordinated to the state, and many became vehicles for distribution of resources gathered by the National Solidarity Fund (FSN), the centerpiece of the Tunisian government's corporatist welfare strategy (Hibou 2011: 95). Begun in 1993 and significantly expanded in the 2000s, the FSN was a broad initiative involving poverty alleviation programs for urban areas, housing initiatives, and funding for state-sponsored

civil associations. The programs were targeted at "eliminating zones of shadow," a euphemism for areas of unplanned urban development where many of Tunisia's poor live. The program aimed at securing compliance of both the poor it served and the better off through quasi-mandatory donations. Two million Tunisians (out of a population of ten million) "donated" to the fund in 2003 (Powel and Sadiki 2010: 189; Gobe 2010).

A stridently corporatist social bargain like the one crafted in Tunisia can be a double-edged sword. Those included are co-opted and have little ability to build oppositional networks; those not part of the corporatist bargain imposed from above are left without access to the new distributional networks created by the state. In the Tunisian case, this bargain fostered greater spatial inequalities between the capital and outlying areas. The overall jobless rate for Tunisia in 2010 was 13 percent, and much has been made of the fact that it was 44 percent for youth with university degrees. But the majority of unemployed (67 percent) had no university degree, and problems of long term unemployment were greater for low skilled youth. Regional disparities exacerbated this problem. Hibou et al. estimate that on the eve of the revolution 140 thousand individuals were added to the Tunisian labor market annually, but jobs were created at a rate of 80 to 85 thousand per year (2011, 38). Most of this job creation was in the Greater Tunis area, exacerbating unemployment and poverty in those regions of the country already struggling. Patterns of poverty alleviation between 2000 to 2010 substantiate this observation; the proportion of the population living below the state defined level of subsistence decreased from 4.3 to 1.1 percent for the Greater Tunis area (a 74 percent decrease) and from 25.5 to 14.3 percent in the Center West region (a 44 percent decrease), where protests initially broke out (Institut National de la Statistique 2012).

The contrast between the increasingly corporatist, solidaristic Tunisian welfare program that produced a regionally-distinct pattern of economic deprivation and the disintegrating Egyptian welfare state of the 2000s, whose shifting burdens fell increasingly on the middle class, is stark. The high water mark of Egyptian repression and solidarism was Nasser's and Sadat's Arab Socialist Union, the one-party state that was disbanded in the late 1970s. Fiscal crises of the 1980s and 1990s led the Egyptian state to reduce real wages of civil servants, borrow against pension and insurance funds held in government-run banks, and introduce new taxes that fell disproportionately on salaried workers and wage earners because of selective enforcement (Soliman 2011: 124). Though peasants and the urban poor undoubtedly suffered during this period, the group experiencing the greatest change in life chances in the years leading up to the revolution was the one the Egyptian state had historically taken the greatest pains to protect: the urban salariat.[23]

The progressive dismantling of this welfare state and the related one-party system of interest intermediation was supercharged by a "government of businessmen," appointed in 2004, that eviscerated an already shrinking social protection scheme (Amin 2011). A broad swathe of Egyptian society faced steeply declining economic prospects, and the frustrations of the Egyptian middle class as a whole were directed primarily towards economic issues. At the same time, those with desires for a liberalized polity were increasingly able to organize and make public their demands through the growth of civil society associations. By contrast, the Tunisian middle class was afforded a more slowly declining set of benefits from the state (the median annual income in Tunisia was $4,690—more than double Egypt's $1,937), so that middle class economic grievance in Tunisia was much less acute than in Egypt. Indeed, a much larger proportion of Tunisian participants (50 percent) identified civil and political liberties as a

primary or secondary reason for participating in the revolution than did Egyptian participants (28 percent), even though only 21 percent of Tunisian participants who prioritized civil and political freedoms were members of a civil society association (compared to 76 percent of Egyptian participants who championed civil and political freedoms).

Thus, in the years preceding the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions different incumbent regime strategies aimed at managing state-society relations shaped the character and distribution of economic grievances and gave rise to different patterns of oppositional mobilizing structures. These in turn produced different revolutionary coalitions in each of these countries and induced those prioritizing democratic freedoms to be more highly represented in disparate sectors of each society. Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare protections and co-opting rather than overtly repressing opposition created conducive conditions for an urban middle-class revolt fueled by economic grievances and led by civil society organization, while Ben Ali's corporatist and constrictive approach to rule that concentrated investment in the capital undermined civil society organization but created the basis for a cross-class alliance initiated in the provinces and slowly spreading to the capital.

Conclusion

In addition to providing an evaluation of relevant theoretical and folk accounts of the Arab Spring, our analysis raises a number of broader issues. For one thing, it demonstrates empirically that the recent wave of revolutions across the Arab world, in spite of their connections with one another and their broadly related attacks against arbitrary rule and corruption, do not fit a single mold. Rather, the constituencies participating in these revolutions varied considerably from country to country, their configurations depending largely on how

strategies of incumbent rule in the years immediately leading up to these upheavals provoked particular distributions of societal grievance and activated (or de-activated) opposition mobilizational structures. In Egypt a predominantly middle-class revolution prioritized economic grievances and focused its efforts through civil society associations—largely as a result of Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare benefits for the middle class and allowing the growth of civil society activity. By contrast, Tunisia's revolutionary cross-class alliance was forged out of corporatist policies that exacerbated regional disparities and eviscerated civil society associations. Thus, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to understanding revolutions, we would do well to pay attention to the ways in which specific pre-revolutionary regime policies incentivize and construct the forces that mobilize when opportunities to contest these regimes materialize.

Additionally, the findings raise significant questions about the degree of commitment to democracy within the very social forces purported in many accounts to have brought about democratization—even the supposedly sacred middle class. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the middle class mobilized against autocratic regimes in disproportionate numbers. But this turnout was driven predominantly by economic grievances, not by a desire for civil and political freedoms. Our analysis thus confirms Rustow's observation that democratizing regime-change is not the result of particular social forces, configurations of values, or cultural proclivities in society, but rather the by-product of political contention over issues often unrelated to the end result.

Finally, if most revolutionary participants in Egypt and Tunisia were not motivated by a desire for civil and political freedoms but by economic grievances (and to a lesser extent, corruption), post-revolutionary governments in both countries have failed in important respects.

Given the importance attached to economic concerns by those who overthrew Mubarak and Ben Ali, satisfying the economic frustrations that gave rise to these revolutions should have been the obvious priority of post-revolutionary regimes. In Egypt, however, the Morsi government quickly went about curtailing the rule of law and political freedoms while turning a blind eye to the country's economic decline, eventually prompting large-scale protests and a military coup that toppled it. In Tunisia, unemployment rose from 13 percent in 2010 (on the eve of the revolution) to 17 percent by 2013, while the ruling Nahda party has not confronted the corruption and political violence that remain prevalent in the country. Clearly, the future of post-revolutionary regimes in Egypt and Tunisia critically depends on their ability to tackle the issues that their predecessors proved incapable of addressing and that drove such large numbers in both societies to the streets in the first place.

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[1] For studies of revolutions that utilize surveys of participants, see Lohmann, 1994; Opp, Voss, and Gern, 1995; Beissinger 2013.

[2] The category "professionals" here includes lawyers, accountants, teachers, and doctors. The word used in the Arab Barometer questionnaire for government and private sector "employees" (*muwazzaf*) implies a clerical or administrative position distinguished from manual work.

[3] For example, Gardner (2011), writing in the *Financial Times*, argued that "There is a lot to celebrate that among the young [population] … [I]n an awakening Arab world there are, against all odds, democrats to democratize with" (See also Khoury 2011).

[4] Esposito (2011), writing for CNN, stated that "Having witnessed the failures of Islamist authoritarian regimes in Sudan, Iran, the Taliban's Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia and the terror of the Bin Laden's of the world, they [the youth] are not interested in theocracy but democracy with its greater equality, pluralism, freedoms and opportunities." Similarly, the UNDP's (2012) Arab Development Challenges Report claimed that the lack of democratic institutions was a central motivation for the uprisings.

[5] Civil society associations in authoritarian settings have sometimes been known to reflect the orientations of the regime (See Jamal 2007). Thus, while some forms of civil society may reinforce an existing regime, other types might serve as vehicles for change.

[6] But see alternatively Haggard & Kaufman 2012

[7] The Egyptian survey was administered by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies—led by Gamal Abdel Gawad. The survey in Tunisia was administered by Sigma Group—led by Youssef Meddeb. Both surveys relied on an area probability sampling.

[8] The question asked in Egypt/Tunisia was: "Did you participate in the protests against former president Hosni Mubarak/Ben Ali between January 25 and February 11, 2011/ December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011?" Respondents were constrained to answering "yes" or "no," making the response variable binary.

[9] These findings are consistent with those of a separate survey conducted by Moaddel (2012), who finds that Egyptian participants tended to be male, of higher socioeconomic status, and in their thirties and early forties rather than their early twenties.

[10] The measure is gender-neutral, as it evaluates religious activities done by both genders. Mosque attendance, a seemingly natural variable to include, is excluded because women are in many cases discouraged or prohibited from attending.

[11] P-values for the Egyptian and Tunisian t-tests were .135 and .789, respectively.

[12] See, for example, Qabbani 2011 and UNDP 2012.

[13] The results of a bivariate regression of participation on unemployment were statistically insignificant.

[14] See Table 3 and the online appendix. The multivariate specification excludes occupation and income variables because the high degree of correlation between these variables and education makes precise estimation of a fuller model difficult. As will be seen below, although education was associated with participation in these revolutions, it was not systematically associated with prioritizing democratic change among participants.

[15] A number of economists (Ravaillon 2009; Banerjee and Duflo 2008) have defined the middle class based solely on individual earnings. We found that while income was related to participation in both revolutions, income as a factor structuring participation did not stand up to multivariate controls.

[16] The occupational characteristics of union members sampled in the Arab Barometer are broadly consistent with national statistics about union participation in Tunisia and Egypt.

[17] Charitable society members comprised 21 percent of Egyptian protesters, compared with 5 percent of the overall population. Tunisian charitable society members were a relatively small portion of the overall population (2 percent) and of protesters as a whole (5 percent) .

[18] The Muslim Brotherhood leadership actively discouraged members from turning out in the early days of the Egyptian Revolution, and the Tunisian protests began through local organizing in Sidi Bouzid (See Slackman 2011; Whitaker 2010).

[19] The question asked: “A number of citizens participated in the protests between January 25 and February 11, 2011 [for Tunisia, December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011] for various reasons. In your opinion, what was the most important and the second most important reason for the protests?” Possible replies included the economic situation, civil and political liberties, corruption, replacing the current regime with an Islamic regime, protesting pro-Western state policy, protesting pro-Israel state policy (Egypt only), protesting passing leadership to Gamal Mubarak (Egypt only), or some other reason specified by the respondent that was not among those listed.

[20] See Vermunt and Magidson 2002. Latent Gold 4.5.0 was used to perform the analysis.

[21] Because of the close association between education and income, we tested for the effects of these variables separately.

[22] We also found a bivariate relationship between higher education and prioritizing civil and political freedoms among Egyptian participants. But the relationship was only marginally significant when controlled for other factors, and no such relationship existed among participants in the Tunisian Revolution, raising questions about Hypothesis 1A.

[23] A reevaluation of the largest incident of popular contention in Egypt between independence and the 2011 revolution—the 1977 bread riots—underscores the role of this group in the Egyptian social compact. Contrary to popular perceptions that it was the poor who protested subsidy cuts, the scholarly consensus is that the bread riots were “primarily the work of current and prospective civil servants” (Soliman 2011: 59).

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TABLE 1 – REVOLUTION PARTICIPATION BY CATEGORY

	Egypt		Tunisia	
	% total population	% demonstrators	% total population	% demonstrators
AVERAGE	8.1		16.0	
OCCUPATION				
Employer/director of institution	2.1	5.1	1.8	5.3
Professional	5.3	17.4	3.5	4.7
Government employee	12.5	21.4	6.5	12.1
Private sector employee	5.4	11.2	7.0	7.9
Manual laborer	5.5	4.1	10.5	10.5
Housewife	38.4	12.2	25.4	3.7
Student	3.2	3.1	8.6	19.0
Unemployed	5.4	5.1	17.7	21.6
AGE				
Age 18-24	13.4	13.3	19.1	35.4
Age 25-34	29.3	30.6	23.8	25.0
Age 35-44	21.8	28.6	20.2	15.6
Age 45-54	18.2	18.4	17.7	15.1
Age 55-64	12.3	7.1	10.8	6.3
Age 65 or over	5.0	2.0	8.5	2.6
GENDER				
Male	50.4	76.5	50.3	79.2
EDUCATION				
Elementary or less	38.0	15.5	46.4	20.3
Secondary/technical	42.9	38.1	36.4	51.6
Some BA or above	19.2	46.4	17.2	28.1
RELIGIOSITY				
Religious piety scale (0-15)	9.33	9.70	6.10	6.23
INTERNET USE				
Regular internet user	18.2	49.0	33.2	62.0
INCOME QUINTILES				
0-20 (poorest)		13.3		9.9
20-40		7.2		17.3
40-60		33.7		20.4
60-80		16.9		24.1
80-100 (richest)		28.9		28.4
GROUP MEMBERSHIP				
Any civil society association	14.7	42.9	6.0	18.8
Charitable society	5.1	21.4	1.7	10.4
Professional or trade union	9.9	23.5	3.1	9.9
Youth, cultural, or sports association	2.8	10.2	2.3	6.8

TABLE 2 – ORDINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION

EGYPT	Reference category	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Age 18-24	Age 35-44	1.103	(0.241)	0.937	(-0.171)	0.873	(-0.324)
Age 25-34	Age 35-44	0.971	(-0.0973)	0.908	(-0.317)	0.994	(-0.0179)
Age 45-54	Age 35-44	0.913	(-0.268)	0.973	(-0.0785)	0.887	(-0.320)
Age 55-64	Age 35-44	0.545	(-1.312)	0.579	(-1.171)	0.518	(-1.308)
Age 65 & up	Age 35-44	0.357	(-1.317)	0.307	(-1.519)	0.33	(-1.420)
Gender	Female	0.434***	(-3.152)	0.380***	(3.679)	0.324***	(3.771)
Internet use	Non-user	2.486***	(3.533)	2.246***	(3.011)	3.109***	(3.935)
Civic assoc.	Non-member	2.955***	(4.051)	2.949***	(4.028)	3.026***	(3.896)
Occupation	Non-middle class	1.740**	(2.038)				
Education	≤ elementary			1.514**	(-2.258)		
Income	Lowest quintile					1.083	(-0.782)
Constant		0.0613***	(-9.274)	0.0356***	(-7.555)	0.0562***	(-7.336)
Observations		1220		1217		1092	
Pseudo R-square		0.1554		0.1609		0.1681	
Log likelihood		-288.062		-283.936		-244.273	
Likelihood ratio chi-square		106.03		108.89		98.75	

TUNISIA	Reference category	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Age 18-24	Age 35-44	2.662***	(3.385)	2.259***	(2.926)	2.991***	(3.524)
Age 25-34	Age 35-44	1.143	(0.475)	1.025	(0.0872)	1.285	(0.817)
Age 45-54	Age 35-44	1.028	(0.0913)	1.073	(0.231)	1.146	(0.409)
Age 55-64	Age 35-44	0.688	(-0.967)	0.675	(-1.019)	0.714	(-0.791)
Age 65 & up	Age 35-44	0.410*	(-1.710)	0.407*	(-1.731)	0.385	(-1.473)
Gender	Female	0.206***	(-7.862)	0.198***	(-7.980)	0.191***	(-7.471)
Internet use	Non-user	2.211***	(3.894)	1.899***	(2.847)	1.787**	(2.440)
Civic assoc.	Non-member	3.759***	(4.858)	3.765***	(4.918)	3.467***	(3.972)
Occupation	Non-middle class	1.474*	(1.792)				
Education	≤ elementary			1.376**	(2.169)		
Income	Lowest quintile					1.094	(1.145)
Constant		0.156***	(-7.851)	0.109***	(-6.950)	0.140***	(-6.066)
Observations		1,196		1,191		968	
Pseudo R-square		0.1929		0.1938		0.185	
Log likelihood		-425.267		-424.083		-356.324	
Likelihood ratio chi-square		203.28		203.89		161.78	

TABLE 3 - REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN PROTESTS

	Egypt	Tunisia
MOST IMPORTANT REASON		
Demands for improving the economic situation	37%	58%
Demands for civil and political freedom	17%	21%
Demands for authority not to be passed down to Gamal Mubarak	21%	NA
Combat corruption	17%	15%
Replace the incumbent regime with an Islamic regime	2%	6%
SECOND MOST IMPORTANT REASON		
Demands for improving the economic situation	30%	19%
Demands for civil and political freedom	11%	29%
Demands for authority not to be passed down to Gamal Mubarak	15%	NA
Combat corruption	38%	44%
Replace the incumbent regime with an Islamic regime	4%	5%
	n=96	n=191

FIGURE 1 – MAJOR DIFFERENCES AMONG PARTICIPANTS IN THREE REVOLUTIONS

	Class within revolutionary coalition	Age	Civil society
Egypt	Narrow middle-class coalition, dominated by professional middle class	Primarily working age, 59% of participants between 25 and 44	Relatively broad presence in society, disproportionately active in revolution (15 percent of total population, 43 percent of demonstrators)
Tunisia	Broader cross-class coalition, dominated by middle class but also involving workers, students, and unemployed	Disproportionately young, 35% of participants under 25 years old	Limited presence in society, limited activity in revolution, (6 percent of total population, 19 percent of demonstrators)

FIGURE 2: CHARACTERISTICS AND BELIEFS OF REVOLUTION PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFYING CIVIL AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS AS A REASON FOR PARTICIPATION



TABLE 4: PRIORITIZATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS AMONG REVOLUTION PARTICIPANTS, LOGISTIC REGRESSION

	Bivariate relationship		Model 1		Model 2	
EGYPT	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Gender (0=male, 1=female)	1.895	(1.27)	2.665	(1.79)*	3.426	(1.83)*
Higher education (0/1)	2.263	(1.78)*	1.833	(1.16)		
Income quintiles	1.385	(1.65)*			1.073	(0.28)
Member of civil society association (0/1)	2.867	(2.27)**	2.676	(1.94)*	3.316	(2.07)**
High internet usage (0/1)	1.944	(1.46)	1.205	(0.35)	1.454	(0.58)
Religious practice (0-15)	1.013	(0.17)	1.009	(0.11)	0.946	(-0.59)
Constant			-2.155		-1.737	
Number of observations			97		83	
Pseudo R-square			0.087		0.102	
Log likelihood			-53.242		-44.813	
Likelihood ratio chi-square			(10.10)*		(10.21)*	

	Bivariate relationship		Model 1		Model 2	
TUNISIA			Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Gender (0=male, 1=female)	1.000	(0.00)	0.961	(-0.11)	0.806	(-0.53)
Higher education (0/1)	1.364	(0.96)	1.219	(0.58)		
Income quintiles	1.282	(2.03)**			1.297	(1.87)*
Member of civil society association (0/1)	1.464	(1.06)	1.248	(0.63)	0.960	(-0.09)
High internet usage (0/1)	1.491	(1.34)	1.404	(1.06)	0.961	(-0.11)
Religious practice (0-15)	1.012	(0.32)	1.017	(0.42)	0.996	(-0.09)
Constant			-0.412		-0.897	
Number of observations			192		162	
Pseudo R-square			0.011		0.020	
Log likelihood			-131.599		-109.809	
Likelihood ratio chi-square			(2.97)		(4.57)	