

Background Guide
Princeton Interactive Crisis Simulation 2005

Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure
Mission en l'Afrique Centrale

Chair: Vijay Paradkar

International Relations Council
Princeton University
February 17-20, 2005

Dear Delegates:

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the 2005 Princeton Interactive Crisis Simulation (PICSim). We've always tried to make sure our non-state actor committees provide you, as delegates, with perspectives on international politics that you'd be hard-pressed to come by in your academic experiences or in other Model UN conferences. I'm pleased to welcome you, therefore, to the DGSE Mission in Central Africa. Intelligence operations are one of the most critical and pivotal forces in the foreign policymaking of world powers, and also one of the least understood and appreciated mechanisms of state power. Understanding the way in which intelligence and cover operations are planned and executed can offer a better understanding of why world powers behave as they do and when they do, and how risk is managed and mitigated by policymakers. Most studies of state behavior in international politics focuses on diplomacy or military power, and looks to strategic requirements, historical antecedents, and economic interests as the primary drivers of state policy. However, intelligence serves both as an impetus for state policy (by providing policymakers with warning or actionable information) and as a means of execution of state policy (through penetration of foreign institutions, through covert operations, through evidence-gathering, etc.). By better understanding the nature of intelligence operations, the manner in which it constrains and shapes policy can be better understood, as can the dangers of allowing too much independence or too little flexibility in intelligence operations.

France provides an ideal choice for Central Africa, given its colonial history, its general economic presence and interests in the region, and the unpredictable nature of its policies. France is one of the hardest world powers to predict in terms of behavior on the international stage. At times it stands solidly behind the coalition of Western powers, and at other times it supports or succors developing nations, rogue states, and minority groups. France's foreign policy appears to be guided by a complex and calculated rationalization of state interests, as well as an emphasis on hedging its bets, or accommodating different future outcomes. Its policies both effectively prevent it from gaining the enmity of either the powerful West or the discontented rest, and ensure that it keeps competitors for power (other NATO and EU countries, etc.) off-balance and hesitant when it comes to relying on France to behave a certain way. Although France lacks the power and wealth of the United States, the more Machiavellian and realist approach to its foreign policy allows for an interesting (and perhaps at times terrifying) view of how intelligence operations can impact a regional balance of power. By simulating the DGSE, our committee will have considerable policy freedom and resource capabilities.

My name, by the way, is Vijay Paradkar '05. In addition to my experience with Model UN in high school and at Princeton (attending, organizing, and chairing for conferences), I have the privilege of being a founding member of PICSim, and served last year as Crisis Mastermind for the conference. I'm a past President of Princeton's International Relations Council, and a senior Politics major specializing in intelligence and national security. Please read the section titled 'A Note on Preparation'. I know this background guide is coming to you late, but I assure you that it will not hurt you in terms of preparing for and operating effectively at PICSim 2005. If you have any questions or require any assistance, please e-mail me, and I'll be happy to help.

Sincerely,

Vijay Paradkar, Chair
DGSE Task Force

DGSE TASK FORCE

The General Directorate for External Security is the primary foreign intelligence arm of the French Republic. France has long held substantial interests in central Africa, but cannot visibly or overtly exercise influence or apply pressure to the Central African states, given international political realities. France is also increasingly concerned with the primacy of US power, and in an effort to counter US dominion, is exploring options of more effectively exercising covert influence and power to further French interests. The DGSE therefore began planning for a special Central African Task Force in early 2004, to be made operational by November 2004. The task force will be allowed considerably more autonomy and decentralized operational flexibility than most DGSE units and operations, and will also be composed of a more diverse and versatile group of DGSE officers, both civilian and military, covering areas from signals intelligence to aerial surveillance to commercial espionage to political assassination. The desire is to see if a covert unit freed of central management but operating under carefully designed parameters and resource constraints can be more effective in assuring French interests in an unstable but exploitable region. The DGSE Mission is therefore tasked with intelligence collection and analysis, but also the planning and conduct of operations. These operations may include espionage, covert action, or full-fledged covert military force to support French political, security, and commercial interests, both in the near- and long-term. The task force must remain covert from both central African parties as well as Western intelligence agencies with conflicting interests. The success or failure of this task force could have spectacular or catastrophic

results for French foreign policy and status within the EU. Vive la France!

THE SCENARIO

France's interest in Africa date back to colonial days, but since the end of WWII and France's divestment of colonial holdings, the more direct means of exercising power and control are no longer available. France is increasingly marginalized role as a world power, as well as increased media attention and public support for human rights and political freedom in the developing world (the popularity of terms such as 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination'), require that France pursue her aims by more covert and subtle means than in previous decades.

Recent world events, particularly regarding US unilateralism and power as well as internal politics within NATO and the EU have caused some French policymakers to question whether a more aggressive stance must be taken to assure France's continued (or resumed) place as a world power, both economically and militarily.

While the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), France's foreign intelligence arm, has long operated in Africa, officials within the French Government have recently agreed, in early 2004, that a more active and less rigidly constrained force is required.

The DGSE has therefore secretly commissioned a specialized and autonomous Mission en l'Afrique Centrale. The codename for the mission is the Légion De Faucon. The true nature of the mission is only known to a handful of policymakers. All records pertaining to the Falcon Legion and its personnel have been sealed at the highest classification for the next fifty years, at a minimum. The funding, resource

allocations, and personnel transfers for the Legion are both classified and hidden in other budgets and programmes, and in addition, the Legion conducts much of its own financing independently of DGSE HQ.

Central Africa was picked as the target for the Legion since it is both highly politically instable and extremely mineral-rich, making it potentially the most exploitable region within the African continent.

Although the DGSE is an intelligence organization, it should be noted that the mandate and powers of the Falcon Legion go beyond mere intelligence. The collection and management of Intelligence is one of the primary goals of the Legion, but it is also empowered to respond and react to intelligence, and to undertake covert operations both for the collection of information and for the achievement of desired outcomes in support of the Legion's mission.

It should be noted that most of the Legion personnel are former DGSE or former Foreign Legion. Some are African-born (even African-bred) French, and the foreign character of the French Foreign Legion has allowed for the Falcon Legion to recruit a wide array of nationalities and races, allowing for deep cover operatives throughout African and expat communities in the region. The Legion is organized on the principle of secrecy, and most Legion personnel, agents, and operatives do not know the true nature of their employer or the objectives they are serving. Most Legion personnel are organized in highly distinct cells to prevent deep penetration by enemy forces and to preserve security of the organization as a whole.

In addition to paid informants and spies, the Legion also maintains limited forces for black operations, as well as active and

sleeper cells of auxiliary personnel (neither trained spies nor soldiers, but with limited espionage and paramilitary capabilities and full support capabilities) throughout the region.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GAME

The objective of the Falcon Legion is succinctly put: to win. The premise for the Legion and the perspective of its creators is that the world order is becoming more and more entrenched and difficult to challenge or change, and that France must acquire as much power and influence as it can to maintain its security, sovereignty, and prosperity. As Africa is the least politically developed continent, as well as one with significant reliable economic potential, therefore Africa is the geopolitical space into which France has the greatest opportunity and ability to expand.

The premise for the Legion is therefore that Africa is a contested space and that France must to the greatest degree possible, achieve dominance or influence and exclude competitors. This means that where France cannot currently achieve dominance, the Legion must attempt to prevent other developed nations from achieving that influence and has a vested interest in keeping the region instable and pliable enough that the French will be better able to secure a foothold when resources and circumstance permit in the future. Simply put, what France cannot take and hold, the Legion must deny to others and keep in a state of crisis.

FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE REGION

To a large degree, it will be up to the Legion to identify and triage French interests in Central Africa, working off the general

framework of France's current political and economic status and interests in the world, and the objectives outlined above. But some high-level interests can be perceived.

- The acceptance of French primacy and guidance by all former French colonies. France should be looked to both for leadership and support, rather than the US or any other entity. Where possible, this goal should be extended to other Central African states regardless of their colonial heritage.
- The expansion of French industries and commercial interests in the region, and the stabilization of areas in which a positive economic relationship exists, and the destabilization of regions where a negative or hostile relationship exists (both to deny the region's economic value to competitors, and to eventually show that with greater French involvement comes greater stability).
- The cultivation of regimes that can be influenced or controlled according to French interests, with checks on their power that France can exercise in the event of disobedience.
- The neutralization or marginalization of regimes hostile to French interests, and the cultivation of challengers to the power and stability of such regimes.
- The prevention of competitors or other entities from pursuing similar goals to the Legion in the area.
- The prevention of the export of violence or terrorism in Central Africa to France, her territories, allies, or interests outside of the region.
- The suppression of potential challenges to French dominion in Africa, including

the suppression of coordinated terrorist networks, WMD proliferation, and strong regional partnerships.

SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER

To prepare you for PICSim, here are two scenarios, with several possible options to contend with them. In truth, the analytical and planning process we will pursue is far more methodical and rigorous, but this should give you an idea of what kind of actions the Legion can choose to undertake.

Scenario #1:

Intelligence is acquired concerning a major upcoming offensive by a rebel group against the regime in power of a Central African state thus far aloof to French interests. Estimations say that the offensive may well succeed in toppling the government or at the very least casting the country into severe civil war.

Option #1:

Do nothing. Allow the rebel group to possibly destroy the government, and wait until turmoil ensues so as to deny any competitor economic opportunities in this country.

Option #2:

Warn the government and provide them intelligence and support (perhaps even arranging for the neutralization or bombing of the rebels) in exchange for favorable concessions to French interests.

Option #3:

Aid the rebels with planning, materiel, or even operational support, in exchange for favorable concessions and friendship upon the creation of a new regime.

A combination of 2 and 3 could be pursued to ensure that the government triumphs but is left much weaker, and must rely on French support to rebuild and reassert control.

Scenario #2:

An African terrorist group that has traditionally been supported due to its opposition to a hostile state power has now begun targeting French commercial interests.

Option #1:

Buy off rebels in exchange for a cessation of attacks on French installations.

Option #2:

Leak information or sow disinformation that will cause the rebel group to refocus on the hostile state power, and the state power to commit additional resources towards the destruction of the rebels. Encourage scenarios and faulty intelligence where both parties would inflict serious harm on the other and weaken each other.

Option #3:

Assassinate a key figure in the rebel group as a deterrent to further attacks on French interests.

Option #4:

Use attacks on French interests as a pretext for more overt security presence in region, allowing for mercenaries and proxy fighters to be brought in to secure French installations and serve as a deterrent to the rebel group and a threat to the state power.

Options 4 can be combined with any of Options 1-3.

A NOTE ON PREPARATION

Many of you are undoubtedly concerned that you're receiving this background guide only days before PICSim begins. This was an intentional calculation on our part, to try and avoid over-preparation on the parts of our delegates. Whereas other committees will be more engaged with existing facts and with operating within the status quo, it's important to remember that this committee is about challenging the status quo and about dynamically responding to various circumstances in pursuit of flexible policy objectives based on ever-changing constraints and limitations. Therefore please don't be concerned if you feel that you have not sufficiently researched the committee. While some research should be undertaken, and a general understanding of the region and of French interests will be crucial, what will matter in committee will not be how much you know, or how much you can glean from the existing status of the region, but how quickly you can process and respond to information. It is *how* you think, and not what you remember, that will be your critical test of success. In intelligence operations as in most other national security applications, it will be crucial that in the face of any crisis or opportunity or changed circumstance you rapidly and coherently identify what information you require, move to acquire it, and process the information effectively so as to assess the implications to French interests and the operational risks entailed in each possible response, before coming up with a risk-mitigated operational response. So once again, the emphasis is on achieving a rigorous analytical thought process towards achieving the committee's goals, rather than on relying on a wealth of static knowledge (that will likely be rendered outdated or obsolete soon into the simulation) to further a one-dimensional understanding of French interests. It's

important you make sure that you can think beyond your research, beyond what you know to be true about Africa today, because I assure you that by the end of the first session, any number of assumptions and reliable facts regarding the region will have gone out the window.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE & PROTOCOL

The Falcon Legion does not resemble any intelligence organization or unit known to exist, nor is it really a plausible organizational model. It was designed to suit the needs of PICSim, and to ensure that all the major elements of Legion operations and policy will be represented in a committee-style forum. To put things more simply, don't scrutinize the committee for power dynamics or relative superiority between roles. Even though some delegates will have larger portfolios or more glamorous mandates, bear in mind that all delegates are equals at the committee table, and the only rank that exists is that of the chair (whom all report to).

Committee Mission & Mandate

The mission of the DGSE Mission en l'Afrique Centrale is manifold:

- Collect information of value to France and her interests, whether political, military, economic, or other.
- Maintain absolute secrecy and contain all information regarding the Falcon Legion using strict security protocols. When security is compromised, ensure that culpability is placed elsewhere or sufficiently confused as to prevent a clear identification of French involvement.

- Gain and utilize influence in state regimes, military commands, NGOs of note, international organizations, MNCs, or other organizations of importance to further French interests
- Respond to regional events and socio-politico-economic climate to further French interests by any and all means necessary.
- Use whatever means necessary to deny influence or power from competitors and to degrade political institutions where French control is not yet possible, short of directly engaging in over hostilities with a Western ally.
- Foster popular support within the region for French intervention, mediation, peacekeeping, or friendship.
- Protect French interest from destabilization, disruption, or attack, where possible.
- Acquire significant financing and other support independently of DGSE HQ, to both support Legion missions and to maintain the cover of French non-involvement in the Legion's workings and affairs.

The mandate of this committee is broad, but constrained by its two most critical drivers:

- Resources are limited.
- Secrecy is imperative.

Committee Format & Rules

The committee will be run without parliamentary procedure. Debate will instead rotate between informal moderated caucus and unmoderated caucus. The chair will call upon and solicit opinions from delegates. Delegates will receive

intelligence, both raw and finished, and will be required to present their own analyses or operational plans to the committee. This committee will be run as an executive body, and not as a voting assembly. What that means is that all decisions will be made by the chair, and there will be no official voting procedure in the committee. The role of the delegates is two-fold. They are to advise and lobby the chair in the capacity of the position they are in, as well as to execute the duties and tasks peculiar to their position and the scope of their individual authority. While the specific background of your position will give you greater authority and awareness of some issues, your input is required on all matters, and you should not feel bound or limited by the position to which you have been assigned. The purpose of having all the experts in one room is so that they can each weigh in on all issues. Otherwise we could run this by telephone.

Despite the differences in rank or seniority within your own organizations, you are all considered to be of equal standing, subordinate to the chairs. We expect debate to be intelligent, productive, and at times lively, but always cordial. Given the very serious issues that will be debated over the course of the weekend (and the ruthless pragmatism that will guide this committee), we expect a high level of maturity from our delegates in dealing with sensitive issues that may have personal overtones for some. Imperialism and Western control in Africa, as well as espionage and some of the more unsavory elements of intelligence operations have had real consequences for real people, and it's important to not become so engrossed in the simulation that one forgets the gravity of what is being contemplated, debated, or executed. That being said, this committee is meant to be enjoyable and educational, and we encourage an appropriate sense of humor from each of you (mostly to balance out the irreverent and

inappropriate sense of humor I intend to bring)!

The committee is an ideal size given the fast pace I intend to set (10 delegates), but even so, strict regulation will be necessary to ensure that we remain on task and to ensure that everyone is heard. Another result of this is that delegates will have to learn to concisely articulate their points. In PICSim, we're competing with 9 other committees, and we will, more often than not, need to come to a carefully considered and rigorously designed conclusion or plan within a very short space of time. We'll all need to learn to be concise and coherent and to ensure that debate stays focused on real substance and not trivialities.

One aspect of a crisis committee such as this that delegates often fail to fully capitalize upon is that they possess significant authority and responsibility in the execution of their duties. For example, intelligence analysts are expected to remain in frequent, if not constant, contact with their parent agencies to gain new and pertinent information for the committee. Military officers and operational planners are expected to keep up to date with our capabilities and ongoing operations.

It is absolutely imperative that a delegate not become so immersed in the simulation that he or she takes to concocting information or initiating unauthorized operations. All information will come through the PICSim central staff, simulating parent agencies, and open sources of intelligence. This is critical to the integrity of the simulation. If people start breaking this rule, the whole conference suffers. As the dais staff is going to be the primary conduit of information between you and the crisis staff, please don't waste anyone's time by trying to concoct your own information or to fabricate crises. It is also crucial that you

stay ‘in character’. Your positions have been clearly defined and your character’s specialties deliberately constructed so as to create a certain balance and atmosphere within the committee. You may be required to take a stance that contravenes your personal feelings or opinions, but it will contribute greatly to the realism of the committee and will give you the opportunity to broaden your own understanding.

It is also crucial that no collaboration occur between delegates across other PICSim committees. To begin with, it will be difficult to conceal such collaboration from the chairs (especially in a committee about subterfuge and deception!), and moreover, it will reduce the quality of *everyone’s* committee experience.

This brings us to the subject of committee awards and judging. Our assessment will be based on how well you performed within the scope of your position, and how much you constructively and plausibly contributed to the committee’s operations. We will consider your performance given the information available to you at the time, meaning that if you come to a logical and sensible conclusion based on faulty intelligence, you will be rewarded more than if you accidentally stumbled across the right conclusion in a way that wasn’t corroborated by the intelligence at hand. As such, there is no advantage to collaborating with anyone on another committee. Judging is also specifically for this committee not about who comes in with the most background knowledge nor who speaks the loudest and longest nor who agrees obsequiously with the chairs. You will be judged on your ability to think on your feet in a strategic manner, and based on how quickly and effectively you grasp operational considerations and policy needs. You will also be judged on your ability to cooperate with the others for the benefit of the

committee and the furtherance of French interests.

Given the importance of our mission and what is at stake (as well as our competition/conflict with other PICSim committees), taking a hard-line stance is neither necessarily appropriate nor helpful. There are exceptions; certain positions and circumstances might require ideological or doctrinal purity more than others. For the most part, however, intelligence professionals are men of reason and risk-averse moderation, not radicals or extremists. They understand the value of compromise and settling for a lesser of evils in order to achieve higher goals. The business of intelligence requires pragmatism and operators must be accustomed to disappointment and failure without losing sight of the greater goal.

When deciding what actions to pursue, the chair will give stronger consideration to consensus recommendations. As such, it is helpful if you try not only to persuade the chairs, but also your fellow delegates. Finally, we will also consider the level to which each delegate contributes to an amicable and fun atmosphere in the committee (Read: make us laugh).

Committee Dossiers

Capitaine, Les Fantômes de Mort

The Captain of the Phantoms of Death (a fanciful name was picked to intentionally give the group an air of incredulity) is the operational commander of all Black Ops forces of the Falcon Legion. The Phantoms do not constitute an army or even a sizable mercenary force, but consists of multiple highly-trained and covert units capable of a host of missions, including intrusion, espionage, assassination, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, sabotage, deep

reconnaissance, civil disruption, interdiction, search & destroy, exfiltration, and more. In addition, one of the capabilities of the Phantoms is to serve as a force multiplier, and deploy in an advisory/directorial capacity with other forces, and serve, in effect, as the officer and NCO corps and execute a highly-coordinated and complex mission. This capability allows for the Phantoms to transform a poorly trained or equipped military or militia force into a more effective force mechanism. Additionally, the Phantoms have various auxiliary units both active and asleep in Central Africa that serve as equipment caches, safehouses, first aid centers, information networks, and more, and can also support the main Phantom units in limited capacities.

The Captain of the Phantoms is a retired Legionnaire (from the French Foreign Legion), with a calculated understanding of how force can be effectively and covertly applied in a region such as Central Africa. While the use of black operations is not as covert as other means at the Legion's disposal, a host of options exist so as to cover the Legion's involvement, including misinformation, casting blame on other parties, creating the appearance of an accident, etc. For this purpose, the Phantoms train extensively at mimicking other security forces and ensuring that its *modus operandi* does not too closely resemble that of Foreign Legion training.

Senior Control Officer, Oduduwa Ring

The Senior Control Officer of the Oduduwa Ring is the senior intelligence operations officer in Western Africa. The Oduduwa Ring is centered in Lagos, but extends across the West African region. The Senior Control Officer is responsible for directing and coordinating all human intelligence operations within West Africa, as well as

identifying requirements and coordinating operations regarding signals intercepts or imagery acquisition. The Oduduwa Ring is a network of spies that range from the military to the political to the economic to the humanitarian and include both assets in African society and governments, but also within expat communities and international or foreign organizations.

Senior Control Officer, Qamata Ring

The Senior Control Officer of the Qamata Ring is the senior intelligence operations officer in Southern Africa. The Oduduwa Ring is centered in Cape Town, but extends across the Southern African region. The Senior Control Officer is responsible for directing and coordinating all human intelligence operations within Southern Africa, as well as identifying requirements and coordinating operations regarding signals intercepts or imagery acquisition. The Qamata Ring is a network of spies that range from the military to the political to the economic to the humanitarian and include both assets in African society and governments, but also within expat communities and international or foreign organizations.

Senior Control Officer, Oranian Ring

The Senior Control Officer of the Oranian Ring is the senior intelligence operations officer in Northern Africa. The Oranian Ring is centered in Algiers (not, as many would suspect, Oran), but extends across the Northern African region. The Senior Control Officer is responsible for directing and coordinating all human intelligence operations within Northern Africa, as well as identifying requirements and coordinating operations regarding signals intercepts or imagery acquisition. The Oranian Ring is a network of spies that range from the military to the political to the economic to the

humanitarian and include both assets in African society and governments, but also within expat communities and international or foreign organizations.

Director – Mercenary Liaison, Proxy & Asymmetric Warfare

The Director of Mercenary Liaison, Proxy & Asymmetric Warfare has one of the most diverse and controversial areas of responsibility within the Falcon Legion. It is the job of this person to liaise with outside mercenary forces, and to coordinate and contend with asymmetric and proxy warfare in Central Africa. A part of this job requires the contracting or coordination of mercenary forces while posing as a party unrelated to the Legion and France.

This position must also consider the tactical and strategic ramifications of proxy warfare and asymmetric warfare in the region; i.e. how to effectively use proxy forces (the forces of another state or partisan to fight on behalf of or in support of Legion interests) and how to effectively plan for and contend with asymmetric warfare (conflict in which a major disparity exists between the size, capabilities, and infrastructure of two parties.). Asymmetric warfare is something the Legion must both prepare to engage in (since the Legion has limited funding and may, in some contingencies, need to take on larger and more powerful groups), and something that it must prepare to counter (how to prevent rebel or terrorist groups from attacking French interests or a regime supported by the Legion).

This role requires some understanding of mercenary politics in Africa, guerilla and terrorist tactics, and the means of co-opting, supporting, or otherwise acquiring the support of proxy forces or mercenaries (financing, equipment, trade, etc.).

Senior Political Analyst – Sub-Saharan Africa

The Senior Political Analyst should be familiar with the political climate of Sub-Saharan Africa and specifically Central Africa, and needs to be aware of the political figures and groups of note, as well as the political structures and relationships between power elite in the region.

Senior Economic Analyst – Sub-Saharan Africa

The Senior Economic Analyst should be conversant with the economic relationships and trade arrangements of Central Africa specifically and sub-Saharan Africa generally. It is important that this role have some understanding of the economic potential of the region, of relationships with developed countries and MNC politics, of controversial commodities such as blood diamonds, etc. It is also important that this position have some understanding of Africa's place in the world economic order, and of the limitations this creates and the opportunities it presents.

Senior Planning Officer – Human Intelligence Operations

The Senior Planning Officer for Human Intelligence Operations is an experienced intelligence officer from the DGSE. This role requires some understanding of how HUMINT (human intelligence) is targeted and collected. This role will be responsible for HUMINT operations in Central Africa and any major new HUMINT initiatives (that aren't already part of the existing Oduduwa, Qamata, and Oranian rings). Some knowledge of intelligence tradecraft and the limitations of HUMINT is required.

Senior Analytic Officer – Signals & Imagery Intelligence

The Senior Analytic Officer for Signals & Imagery Intelligence is responsible for all technical intelligence in Central Africa. SIGINT and IMINT are not necessarily as valuable or as straightforward as in other areas of the world. Valuable SIGINT requires a reliable and sophisticated telecommunications network. Infrastructure limitations in Africa somewhat constrain this, but opportunities for SIGINT (through cellphone, landline, cable, radio intercepts, etc.) do still exist, and must be exploited. IMINT is also potentially valuable, but the covert nature of the Legion and its limited resources limit its ability to capitalize on aerial photography. The Legion can request collection of satellite imagery from the DGSE and through other commercial means. The challenge of this role will be how to use technical means effectively given limited resources and limited opportunities.

Senior Policy Officer – DGSE Strategic Directorate

The Senior Policy Officer from the DGSE Strategic Directorate is responsible for tracking and assessing Legion actions for their alignment with French interests, and for identifying opportunities for Legion involvement to further French strategic objectives. Although the Legion is mostly an operationally-inclined task force, this role is more heavily focused on the policy implications of Legion action and on the policy imperatives of French interests.

FURTHER RESEARCH

The following site provides some background on the DGSE:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/france/dgse.htm>

The CIA World Factbook and the Library of Congress Country Studies are a good means

of gaining general info on countries within the region

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>

Reading recent news on Africa and special reports might also be helpful (some of these are older and therefore partially obsolete or incomplete):

<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/archive>

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/aids/>

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/congo/>

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/nigerian.elections/>

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/safrican.elections/>

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/africa/>

<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/zaire.focus/index.html>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/africa/>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/africa/centralafrica/>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/aidsinafrica/index.html>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/ebola/>

<http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/africa/index.html>

<http://www.economist.com/world/africa/>

Here's a good article about French-US dynamics in Central Africa:

http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/frp/history/frp97/frp00577.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%28%5B80%5D%28DGSE+%3CAND%3E+africa%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28%5B100%5D%28%5B100%5D%28DGSE+%3CAND%3E+africa%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAND%3E+%28%5B100%5D%28DGSE+%3CAND%3E+africa%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29&Prod_Name=FREP&

And finally, when in doubt...Google it.

www.google.com