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The Middle East '06

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## CONTENTS

### [Pg. 1]

- Welcome Letter

### [Pg. 2]

- Committee Positions

### [Pg. 3]

- Critical Overview

### [Pg. 8]

- Pakistan and the Middle-East

### [Pg. 10]

- Looking Ahead: Goals and Prospects

## THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to PICSIM 2006! This is the only conference of its kind, so we're glad you're joining us for another year of fast-paced crisis simulation. Princeton's IRC (International Relations Council) operates the conference, and every year we learn new things about running PICSIM; this year will surely bring the same element of surprise which is unique to the conference. In spite of the nuances, the last few years have seen PICSIM emerge time and time again as an awesome experience for everyone.

For a personal introduction, my name is Safiyy Momen. I'm a junior in the Electrical Engineering department, and though my coursework revolves around robots and applied math, international relations occupies a large portion of my time. Besides being constantly attentive to global events, I've been involved in IRC since freshman year through regular meetings and Model UN conferences, as well as PICSIM; last year I worked behind the scenes as a mastermind, so I've already seen the other end of action here at PICSIM. Besides school, I hail from Congers, NY, and my parents are originally from Bangladesh. In my free time, I enjoy watching and playing any sports—especially soccer—and learning guitar.

You're all free to e-mail me with questions and concerns about anything, PICSIM or otherwise. This background guide will help you get acquainted with Pakistan's place in the Middle-Eastern political dynamic, which is sure to be a substantial one. Indeed, we primarily associate Pakistan with its conflict with neighboring India and involvement with the War on Terror, but under the right circumstances, Pakistan becomes so much more than the example of progressive Islamic politics it is currently trying to be. With that said, I haven't the slightest idea what the masterminds have in store for us, so feel free to conjure up circumstances not mentioned in this guide, and do necessary research which I haven't set forth here.

With that, I bid you a temporary farewell and look forward to meeting you soon at Princeton. Safe travels!



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**Princeton Interactive Crisis Simulation 2006**



## *Committee Positions*

The positions held by myself and delegates will consist of the supreme officials of the Pakistani federal republic, chosen to represent a diversity of perspective and knowledge. Rank will not play a large role in action/policy construction at PICSIM, but it is important to specialize in each respective role such that our group can speak for every major dimension of Pakistan's active bureaucracy. The following is a non-exhaustive list of positions at the table, subject to expansion before the conference:

### **President**

#### **General Pervez Musharraf**

The President and leader of the military. A commanding figure who will be discussed sufficiently.

### **Prime Minister and Finance Minister**

#### **Shaukat Aziz**

The role of the Prime Minister has conflicted with that of the president throughout Pakistani history. Suffice it to say that the Prime Minister holds executive powers primarily as the top advisor to the president; the president can no longer just dismiss the Prime Minister without Supreme Court Approval.

### **Senior Minister of Defence**

#### **Rao Sikandar Iqbal**

In charge of defending the republic, thus holding knowledge of defense capabilities, regional politics, and an accountability for logistics.

### **Foreign Minister**

#### **Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri**

Kasuri heads the office which retains the most prominent interactions with foreign countries. This position requires an understanding of regional geopolitics.

### **Minister of State for Defence**

#### **Zahid Hamid**

Similar to the Senior Minister of Defence, this position accounts for all policy and administrative matters pertaining to the three Armed Forces, with a focus on internal state matters. In conjunction with Iqbal, Mr. Hamid will coordinate and execute the Defence Policy of Pakistan.

### **Minister for the Interior**

#### **Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao**

This position is the domestic analogue of the foreign minister, also requiring an understanding of regional geopolitics with an emphasis on domestic sectarian unrest and territorial issues.

### **ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) Director-General , Chairman of Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff**

#### **Lieutenant General Ehsan-ul Haq**

The more prominent intelligence agency in Pakistan (versus military intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau), ISI raises controversy due to alleged links to Al-Qaeda terrorist networks



and affiliation with local extremist groups. Critics claim that ISI is, in reality, so powerful that it is not even answerable to the President and Prime Minister. Often suspected to be an “invisible government”, the ISI is in charge of the procurement of clandestine information from within the ranks of the government and outside of borders. Furthermore, the chairman of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff is head of the Army and, in principle, the highest ranking official in the military outside of Musharraf. Past coups have often started with the man in this position, who often ends up as chief executive.

### **Chief Spokesperson, General Headquarters (GHQ)**

#### **Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan**

Khan is an architect of words and communication with the international community. In many senses, our communication of our policy is requires a policy within itself; making the spokesperson a crucial element of national actions.

### ***Chief Spokesperson, Cabinet Division***

#### ***Mohammad Azam Rathor***

A similar position to that of Major Khan, although the GHQ generally focuses on defense actions and central military command. The Cabinet Division can speak more generally for the Musharraf regime’s policies; once again, this requires seamless involvement with our committee’s actions and policies.

## *A Critical Overview*

### **Geography**

Historically, it arguably sets forth the chain of events which results in Pakistan’s unique history, government, etc., as with any nation. But at PICSIM we are less concerned with the geographical influences on culture and history, but rather on how geography will effect our actions. So rather than let geography set the context of our understanding of Pakistan (as is traditionally done in academics), we understand geography as an element of regional geopolitics and, during the conference, military logistics.

For example, as you read, you can judge for yourself that the geography of Pakistan is favorable to poppy/opiate production, or can think for yourself how geography impacted its history. But after establishing some context, we note certain key elements of Pakistan’s geography: it neighbors India, and neighbors the Middle-East and Afghanistan, and the latter is of more immediate importance to us.

### **History**

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was originally produced by the 1947 de-colonization of the Indian subcontinent; the region was separated into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. The underdeveloped country has entered news in the last decade via its ongoing dispute with neighboring India, nuclear testing, and involvement in the War on Terror. We note such developments in the forthcoming descriptions.



## **Government**

A Federal Republic, Pakistan employs a Western three-branch government with a legal system based on a conjunction of English Common Law and Islamic Sha'aria.

Pakistan's so-called "Chief of State" or president is the General Pervez Musharraf, while the head of government is Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The Musharraf regime was established via the military coup of October 12, 1999, subsequent validation by the Supreme Court, and a 2002 referendum in favor of Musharraf as the head of a democratic federal republic. Both the president and prime minister hold office until 2007.

## **Economy**

Pakistan's economy is classified, by all counts, as underdeveloped. The economy suffers from insufficient foreign investment, costly ongoing conflicts with India, and internal political disputes. However, recent years mark a period of economic growth. Non-agricultural GDP is on a steady rise due to large-scale manufacturing. Circa June 30, 2005, Pakistan's GDP Growth Rate was second only to China's. Feel free to research more detailed recent trends in the Pakistani economy.

I'd like to note a few particulars that may prove more important to us than the general economic facts. Pakistan is a major producer of opium and hashish for the international drug trade, and in recent studies remains the world's third largest producer of opium. It follows that Pakistan is also a key junction for the transport of heroine, morphine, opium, and hashish which originate in Afghanistan and other neighboring countries; Pakistan often serves as a gateway for these drugs entering the international market. Finally, the drug trade introduces auxiliary problems of corruption and money laundering crimes, as well as connections to narcoterrorism.

## **Society**

The vast majority of Pakistan's population is Muslim. Of that Muslim population, about 75% are Sunni and 25% are Shiite.

The majority of Pakistani Muslims are devout but not quite radical. Ethnic, linguistic, and economic issues, not religious ones, have dominated Pakistani politics. The religious parties have never polled more than 2–3 percent in national elections, and some now question whether the parties' street power can threaten any military regime or democratically elected government or whether they will ever have the votes to win a free election.

## **Military**

### **a. Development and Foreign Interaction**

Before entering logistical details regarding the Pakistani military, note that the military has, by and large, been the most influential political institution in Pakistan's history. Often plagued by



sectarian violence and general civil unrest, Pakistan has routinely been held together by its stable military. Today's government is the product of a military coup, just as the nation is the product of a military conflict. While the higher ranks of the first Pakistani armed forces in 1947 were surely composed largely of Islamists, years since reveal a divergence of secular and religious ties within the army. Musharraf's coup tightened the secular ropes on the military, but Islamists within continue to encourage other fundamentalists to join the ranks and establish influence. Given Pakistan's history of military coups, Musharraf's regime has and will certainly clamp down using military force, particularly in contested areas.

Generally, Pakistan's powerful armed forces can be classified as a large, well-trained force with outdated Western technology. In 1953, the U.S. signed one of its numerous anti-Soviet military agreements with Pakistan, contributing many military supplies in the following decades to counter the spread of communism to bordering Afghanistan. Heavy defense modernization continued until 1990; a period of sanctions followed due to military coups and nuclear tests, but ended hastily upon the start of the War on Terror. As a key ally of the U.S., Pakistan continues to receive intelligence and strong military support in the form of naval destroyers, F-16 Aircraft, amongst other modern weaponry. A quick visit to [www.pakistanidefence.com](http://www.pakistanidefence.com) headlines can show you the importance of American aid to the Pakistani armed forces.

Military development has only been limited by past defense technology sanctions by the West (lifted at the beginning of the War on Terror) and Pakistan's limited fiscal resources. As one might imagine, the particular defense budget figures in a military government are shrouded in layers of secrecy and deception. What we do know is Pakistan benefits largely from aid from the U.S., and in the past decade developed deep military connections to China. Worried by India's military transactions with Russia, Pakistan responded with numerous modern missile and aircraft purchases from China, making China the largest arms supplier to Pakistan. China has also helped Pakistan build naval ports in the past decade and plays a large part in the training of personnel. China's interest in South Asia remains, seemingly, to maintain stable peace between Pakistan and India. In the process, it has developed publicly strong bilateral connections with Pakistan, underpinned by frequent military transaction.

The final key aspect of Pakistan's military development lies in its nuclear development program. In response to India's nuclear proliferation which dates back to the 70s, Pakistan has gradually developed its nuclear weapons programs in the past decades. Raw materials and technical expertise were acquired primarily from China, probably complemented by unconfirmed transactions with France, the Soviet Union and the Middle-East; the U.S. has cited nuclear ties between Iraq and Pakistan in the 80s. Missile technologies were developed via direct transactions with China (until 2000) and the reverse-engineering of Chinese missile technologies to engineer indigenous Pakistani warheads. These developments culminated in the controversial tests of 1998; six total tests, confirmed by fallout and seismic readings conducted by American agencies, eliminated any doubt of Pakistan's operational reactors, weapons-grade plutonium enrichment processes, and a structured nuclear weapons program. The structure is established by the National Command Authority, commissioned in 1999 to coordinate the development and strategies relevant to the nuclear arsenal. The NCA is headed by Musharraf and the Chairman of Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff, currently General Haq.



## **b. Logistics**

Today's Pakistani military might is, amongst the nations involved at PICSIM, a formidable force. With the planet's 7<sup>th</sup> largest active duty army, Naval and Air Forces, and a tested nuclear arsenal, I have little doubt that Pakistan's strong military capabilities will come into play during the conference.

### *i. Army*

We note again that the army is in charge of the government of Pakistan, and holds a nation of disparate peoples together. In the past decade, figures consistently indicate between 550,000 and 650,000 active duty personnel. Elite forces have been bolstered for anti-terrorist operations. The army's training regime is rigorous, and the force is equipped with tanks (virtually all Russian and Chinese variants, if not directly manufactured abroad), Russian manufactured Mi-17 Helicopters, and a long line of ballistic missiles reverse-engineered from the Chinese inventory.

You can find more specific figures at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan\\_Army](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Army) and [http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakArmy/Army\\_In\\_Detail.html](http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakArmy/Army_In_Detail.html).

### *ii. Navy*

Pakistan's aging naval forces are distributed across the southern coast of Pakistan, with the primary base at Karachi. The navy struggles to keep updated; its most advanced features are in recently purchased American destroyers, various modern French designed submarines, and newer ports to the west (further from India by intention) built with Chinese aid. Although no submarines are equipped with nuclear weapons, Pakistan claims such capabilities are readily deployable.

### *iii. Air Force*

The Air Headquarters as the HQ is called is situated in Rawalpindi. Major Airforce bases are at Shorkot, Karachi, Quetta, Kamra, Peshawar, Mianwali, Sargodha and Risalpur. The Air Force is equipped with nuclear delivery capable F-16s from the United States, numbering around 30 aircraft as of 2006. The remainder of the air force is primarily dedicated to close air support for the army, built on aging Chinese models of Soviet airplanes, and Mirage fighters acquired from Australia. The PAF holds about 150 operational Mirage fighters and 200 Chinese F-7 and F-7 variants.

### *iv. Strategic Weapons*

Due to Pakistan's refusal to sign nuclear test-ban and inspection treaties, many of Pakistan's nuclear details remain shrouded in secrecy. Today, it is speculated that Pakistan possesses between 25 and 50 warheads which, though acquired missile technology, are capable of carrying payloads a distance of up to 2500 km. Pakistan also holds sufficient stockpiles of raw materials





to produce 20-40 more weapons. Delivery would likely occur with F-16s or Chinese built A-5s. More information about the arsenal's history and deployment mechanisms can be found at:

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/>  
<http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/panukes.html>

## Domestic Considerations

Many political analysts argue that as a result of Musharraf's strategic policy realignments in response to the War on Terror, Pakistan is at greater risk of radical takeover than pre-Musharraf era. With the country's history of military coups, this is certainly a concern.

Islamism permeates all levels of Pakistani politics, despite the government's continual attempt to drive at a unified, socially accepted, progressive Islamic democracy. Musharraf's predecessors most often succeeded in constructing philosophies that could draw in both secular and Islamic voters. Musharraf wiped out their respective political parties, resulting in victories for the MMA, a coalition Islamist party, in key provinces even though Musharraf got the presidency. Musharraf's diligent support for the War on Terror has certainly strained his relationship with these more Islamist political contingencies.

As a result, the prime concern within Pakistan remains that of firm political control. The difficulty of maintaining a grip on religious forces while solving social epidemics has naturally made the military, a commanding physical force, the most influential political institution of Pakistan's history. But stability is always a question, and the seeds of instability arise from a few key positions.

Although Islamism has never truly won over social reform in Pakistani elections, the Islamic movement does command political power through the military and legislative bodies. That is, as Musharraf has tight-rope between U.S. pressures and party pressures, he must both root out radical Islamism and compromise in local politics, like he recently did in a ruling on blasphemy. Islamists hold sufficient power in the military and secret service (the ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence) to inspire anxiety, particularly if Musharraf's regime continues its failure to rectify socioeconomic dilemmas.

There are certainly reported links between the military ranks and ISI and Al-Qaeda, particularly in the form of financial transactions. To reiterate, Musharraf has been purging these bodies of radicalism, but can only go so far as the unified Islamic Party is what he relied on to win the elections.

There have already been attempts on Musharraf's life, allegedly coordinated by



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junior ranking military officers. More cynical analysts consider the current “stability” in the military to be a calm before the storm, as a quiet resentment against U.S. domination has seeped through the ranks. Similarly, the more secular Pakistan People’s Party feels antagonized by Musharraf’s stubborn oppression of their power, which ruled Pakistani politics in the 90s. The West often urges Musharraf to give them leeway, but his coalition (a left wing capitalist faction) refuses to concede any power.

The final notable domestic predicament lies in the regionalism and sectarianism which warrant a different treatment from the complex political battles we have just discussed. Nationalist tendencies are strong in the province of Baluchistan, western Pakistan. The tendencies have materialized in the form of clashes between local militia and national guard, damage to gas pipelines, and defiant opposition to the building of a port at Gwadar (being constructed with the aid of the Chinese). Baluchistan is full of gas, oil, copper, silver, gold, coal, uranium and other natural minerals. The Pakistani Establishment wants full control of these resources and tribal chiefs want control to be in their hands. Chinese and Western multinationals want to explore and exploit these resources, so Baluchistani threats and activist violence have thrown off plans of exploitation and construction of oil/gas pipelines from Iran. Though Baluchistan has historically posed the most trouble, similar insurgent tendencies can be found in the NWFP, the Northwest Frontier Province, which is controlled by the more fundamentalist MMA.

## *Pakistan and the Middle-East*

### **Context**

While Pakistan’s most public international dealings have primarily involved Kashmir, India, and its controversial pursuit of nuclear weapons, its social construct and geographic situation pull our attention to uniquely Middle-Eastern conflicts:

- Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and Iran has fueled an active pursuit of stable relationships with these nations.
- US Policy in the region has dragged Pakistan into the War on Terror, with a very intricate role on the borders with Afghanistan and domestically fighting fundamentalists; Pakistan’s balance of international allegiances and domestic policy is as delicate as any nation in this conference.
- Pakistan domestically hosts parties whose interests and policies are not connected to those of the government; these will require separate treatment.

The following sections will provide some more depth into these regional politics that will likely shape Pakistan’s involvement in PICSIM.

### **Established Ties with the Middle-East**

Pakistan’s ties with the Middle East reflect religious, strategic, political, and economic reasoning, though no direct involvement in the Middle-East has never truly realized the





magnitude and importance of all these ties. In 1955, Pakistan joined Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in the Baghdad Pact, a regional treaty aimed at economic co-development. This organization disbanded and was reinstated in 1984 as ECO, the Economic Cooperation Organization. Next to its original member states of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, ECO now groups all of the central Asian former Soviet satellites, from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan.

Despite popular support by many people in Pakistan for Iraq in 1991, the Pakistani government supported the coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and sent 11,600 troops. Politicians at home made comments in support of Iraq, and the embarrassed government removed these officials and quickly recovered its position in favor of Hussein's removal.

Generally, Pakistan attempts to gather the Middle-East to move toward a progressive Islamic World. As the second largest Islamic nation by population, and the only Islamic nation with fully developed nuclear capabilities, Pakistan certainly holds a certain leverage over its counterparts. The clearest manifestation of this leadership has been Pakistan's leading role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Pakistan imports oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, but the prime economic connection with the Middle-East remains that of oil and gas pipelines traveling into and out of Pakistan – oil pipelines from Afghanistan and Iran. As already mentioned, the civil conflicts in Baluchistan pose physical threats to such international economic development, and thus impact relations with Iran and Afghanistan.

In addition to economic development ties, Pakistan exports much labor to the Middle-East; the Persian Gulf states host 1.5 million expatriate workers today, who send substantial remittances home.

Now we reach the issue of Pakistani-Israeli relations. Naturally, Pakistan has traditionally held a hard-line stance against Israel, mostly out of Islamic solidarity since Pakistan was conceived as a nation for South-Asian Muslims. With open and vociferous criticisms of Israeli policy, support for the Palestinian cause, Pakistan's development into a nuclear power has certainly made it a potentially powerful player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Pakistan would also be concerned with Israel's traditionally warm diplomatic and military relations with India. Consequently, after years with no formal diplomatic ties, the two countries began talking in 2005. Note that Israel is still not recognized as a nation by Pakistan, and Musharraf refuses to do so until the settlement of the Palestinian conflict.

The Arabic-language television station al-Jazeera has quoted Musharraf as calling Sharon a "great soldier and courageous leader" after announcing his plan to end Israeli occupation of Gaza. The foreign ministers of Pakistan and Israel met for the first time in September to discuss a variety of policy issues including the Pakistani travel ban to Israel. Such a move could also please the United States and increase military and financial aid to Pakistan.

## **Terrorism and Pakistan**



The separation of this issue is not to say that Pakistani links to terrorism are not “established ties” or have nothing to do with the Middle-East. Rather, there are more speculative claims to be made here, some of which are better considered in the context of intelligence rather than politics and foreign policy.

Pakistan’s links to terrorism can be established on two fronts. First, like the U.S., Pakistan supported the *mujahadeen*, or holy warriors, in Afghanistan in the war against Soviet control. The *mujahadeen*, to recall some important history which resurfaced after 9/11, later developed and diverged into groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Pakistan continued to aid many of the fighters after the war; the relationship between the ISI (the Pakistani secret service) and Al-Qaeda is quite notorious, though not always well-documented. The purpose of any such link has probably been to train Islamist operatives for attacks against India, the Indian military in Kashmir, and Hindus in Kashmir.

This naturally brings us to the next front: Kashmir. Though we have not discussed this issue much (see final notes/ further research), it is important to note the religious context of the Kashmir conflict and the recent history. Musharraf’s coup was largely successful because his predecessor backed down on the 1999 showdown with India over Kashmir. India continually claims that Pakistan harbors and supports terrorism in Kashmir, as a result of the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, and the activities of the various Islamic separatist groups in the province. The separatist fighter population, all dubbed by India as terrorists, are still thought to number in the thousands in Kashmir. Furthermore, figures show that between 70,000 and 120,000 Kashmiris have been killed since the 80s, sometimes with flairs of mass killing which the Pakistanis blame on the Indian military, who in turn fault the “terrorists.” Note that some separatist groups (officially) fight in the name of Islam, others in the name of Pakistan, and others still in the name of Kashmiri independence.

These groups have been connected to Al-Qaeda and *Jamaat-e-Islami*, the largest political party component of the previously discussed “MMA” in Pakistan. *Jamaat-e-Islami* is very active in the MMA-controlled provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP. The latter is especially considered to be a terrorist hotbed and/or hotbed considering its borders with Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Since 9/11, it is well known that Musharraf is trying to cut ties with terrorism. Groups known to attack Churches and Shiite populations within Pakistan have been declared terrorist organizations (i.e. *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (The Army of Omar) and *Jaish-e-Mohammed*). Their assets have been frozen, and according to Musharraf, possible associates within the military and the ISI have been relieved of their duties. The crackdown has formally been extended to *madrasas*, Islamic schools which provide a feasible alternative to the lacking Pakistani education system in rural areas. These schools now have to register with the government; around 20% of the schools are reported to teach an extremist form of Islam.

Critics question how diligent Musharraf has been in executing these plans; are they honest attempts to root out terrorism, or convenient gestures to establish firm American political and economic support? Critics claim that many of the convicted terrorists from the ISI, armed forces, or otherwise, are released from jail much too quickly, while the new laws regarding *madrasas*



have not been strictly enforced. Neither of these claims is unreasonable considering the level of political pressure Musharraf is under.

Bombings in Karachi (including the American consulate in 2002, and a Kentucky Fried Chicken this past November), the brutal killing of American Journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in January 2002 (attributed to the terrorist group *Lashkar-e-Omar*), and death threats to high government officials are clear signs that Musharraf lacks control over militant organizations. Such a lack of control can produce unpredictable behavior which will likely materialize as crises during PICSIM.

### *Looking Ahead*

The order of the following sections is arbitrary, so if you're unclear or curious about something to this point, look ahead to "Final Notes and Further Research." Otherwise, we're on the same page right now; I'll try and set the stage for PICSIM, although I have no knowledge what crises the masterminds will throw at us!

#### **The Goals**

Up to this point, I have outlined the key issues that have faced Pakistan in recent years, and the circumstances which render Pakistan an important nation in the Middle-East. But Pakistan's political history, in particular, has not moved in any deterministic fashion. So in looking ahead to PICSIM, all we can really do is consider the delicate nature of Pakistan's international relations and civil conflicts, and thereafter, pose some general goals that can guide as we protect our "national interests":

*i.*

On the home front, it's important that we protect the Musharraf regime, using military means if necessary. Utilizing the military as a stabilizing force is nothing new in Pakistan's history. While Pakistan is moving towards a more Western democracy, groups with sufficient power can act on behalf of any number of issues in a way that genuinely threatens Musharraf's authority. The issues we face domestically will likely lack clarity, as interest groups can function against India, in favor of Kashmiri independence, in favor of international terrorism, against Musharraf's military stronghold, against Musharraf's socio-economic policies, in favor of Islamic fundamentalism to trump the progressive Islamic state, in favor of provincial independence, against American involvement and aid, or any combination of the above. Surely, such groups exist in many countries to question authority, but in Pakistan they yield concentrated power in key provinces and social/military ranks. It will be our job to protect the regime by either stomping on the threat or changing relevant policies accordingly.

*ii.*

Internationally, we are wary of India, cognizant of American power in the world and American need for Pakistani cooperation, constantly looking for economic development in conjunction with neighboring Iran and Afghanistan, and stand tall as a political leader of the Islamic world. We protect these interests as best we can, particularly in the face of domestic opposition to any of these interests; control of the military, if used wisely, can allow us to milk crucial American



resources while quelling enemies at home. How efficiently can we do this? Is there an issue of integrity here, as critics of Musharraf’s policies claim? This depends on how closely the West is watching our actions in fighting anti-terrorism, which is expensive both financially and politically. But we do realize the breed of terrorists we battle; many Al-Qaeda associates would gladly overthrow the Musharraf regime if given the opportunity. So perhaps we go just far enough to maintain power at home and image abroad.

After years of stressed relations with Iran and Afghanistan, economic co-development and friendly relations are at a premium. Insurgents near the border that threaten the construction of oil or gas pipelines should be controlled.

Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq concern us insofar as we urge progressive Islamic democracies. We weigh our political dealings very carefully, since we walk the rope tighter than any group at PICSIM. The majority of the public (reports cite between 60 and 70 percent) oppose the war and think it makes the world more dangerous. Musharraf has expressed a similar view, adding that once we are in Iraq, we must establish security and peace before leaving.

Finally, we protect our nuclear arsenal and nuclear secrets with vigor. The famous case of rogue scientist and father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, brings much distrust upon Pakistan. Khan, a national hero, and colleague Mohammed Farouq, are alleged to have supplied Libya and (more recently and importantly) Iran with nuclear secrets. In November 2003, the IAEA warned Pakistan of information leaks, and Pakistan proceeded to detain and question the scientists. Khan admitted to selling unauthorized technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. The underground network originally operated by Khan has been dismantled, according to a Pakistani report as of January 6<sup>th</sup>, but skepticism and fear persist around the world; the United States still wants to question A.Q. Khan. Many are still furious that Khan was not prosecuted in Pakistan, considering his notable impact on nuclear proliferation.

### *Final Notes and Further Research*

Obviously, everyone can use Google and Wikipedia to uncover basic facts and figures at their own necessity, so feel free to go that direction. I also included some helpful links throughout the background guide, which help elaborate on preceding points.

Pakistani policy research especially requires an understanding of biases, so be wary. Firstly, if this guide has not been sufficient as a “refresher” of sorts, I suggest reviewing major occurrences of the past decade primarily involving its nuclear testing and outbreaks of violence in Kashmir.

Now we move on to the relationships and conflicts which will dictate our PICSIM adventure. Firstly, here are a few documents I came across which illuminate U.S. – Pakistan relations:

<http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=134113>

<http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/26277.htm>



The Middle-East Institute provides the best analysis into Pakistan's complex dynamic with its neighbors; you'll have to navigate your way to the relevant pages, but it's a well-organized site.

<http://www.mideasti.org/>

And finally, the embassy Pakistan gives very general overviews of foreign policy and links to more detailed policy briefs.

<http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/>

If you want more sources or specific information on the many things I omitted, just drop me an e-mail at [smomen@princeton.edu](mailto:smomen@princeton.edu). I advise that you do some independent personal research like I did, as you will likely come across some sources I did not; this diversity of information and bias can be beneficial to your learning and to the committee.

With that, I look forward to greeting you all at PICSIM in February. This should be a thrilling weekend in all respects – with knowledge and creativity, we can address the minute-to-minute crises that arise in a manner consistent with policy and tightly wound to national interest. It's a challenge in which we are sure to prevail, with Pakistan emerging a progressive but powerful figure in Middle-Eastern politics.