

History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts

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The majority of coca leaf used to produce cocaine and other coca derivatives is grown in Peru and Bolivia (i.e., nearly 90 percent), whereas Colombian involvement largely centers on cocaine trafficking. Difficulty with controlling U.S. demand has fueled interest in reducing foreign production of narcotic crops such as coca. An examination of past opium poppy reduction efforts may provide some insights into ongoing coca supply reduction activities in the Andean nations.

INTRODUCTION

Institutions involved in the narcotics supply-reduction effort include: the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) and Agency for International Development (AID); the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), which includes what was once the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). These organizations and agencies use a variety of strategies to reduce or stop cultivation of illegal crops, including identifying viable substitute crops, providing training and assistance for national military enforcement and interdiction, and offering economic incentives for eradication.

International treaties and agreements developed over the past 80 years concentrated on identifying the narcotics abuse problem and encouraging controls by consuming countries. Later treaties integrated supply and demand control efforts (box 3-A). However, effectiveness of recent treaties is not clear, and one reason is the inadequacy of narcotics data for assessing narcotics control measures. Irrespective of data shortcomings, narcotics traffick-



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE/INM

Box 3-A-Selected Narcotics Control Treaties and Legislation

The Hague Opium Convention of 1912

The Hague Convention of 1912 was the first attempt at international oversight of narcotics production and trade (3). Treaty members **outlined** a system of production and trade regulations designed to **curtail** abuse of opium, its derivatives, and cocaine. Key points included **farm-level** production controls, processing controls, and international-trade controls (6). However, disputes over target narcotics and producing countries, and implementation mechanisms plagued the Convention **resulting** in a **fairly** ineffectual and narrow final text. **Ultimately**, the treaty required **all** parties to enact legislation **allowing** only medical use of opium, its derivatives, and cocaine.

The Harrison Act of 1914

The Harrison Act of 1914 marked the first attempt to regulate the distribution of narcotics in the United States and establish **national** narcotics record keeping. The Act included taxes and accounting of **narcotic-containing** "medicines." it had a profound effect on pharmaceutical and medical professions **in the United States and spurred a reduction in the psychotropic** drug content of "**over-the-counter**" medicines. The **act's** impact was further underscored by the emergence of **black** markets and higher prices for narcotics.

The Geneva Opium Convention of 1925

The **League** of Nations organized the Geneva **Opium** Convention of 1925 to discuss the regulation of international drug trade. **This Convention addressed an earlier** proposal that crop substitution programs be **developed** for opium-producing countries in order to help them **limit** production to **legitimate** needs (14). The **resulting** treaty required **all** raw materials and finished products in international trade to be **licensed**, but did not address production **levels** (6).

The Geneva Convention to Limit the Manufacture and **Regulate** the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931

This Convention **limited** any country's **ability** to manufacture narcotic drugs beyond the **levels** adequate to **supply** international **medical** needs as established by an international board. Consequently, many factories involved in opiate manufacture were **closed**. Analysts of the Convention suggest that this act led traffickers to establish their own laboratories.

Conference for the Suppression of the **Illegal Traffic** in Dangerous Drugs of 1936

in an effort to increase the effectiveness of interdiction activities, **the treaty called for international** cooperation of member countries in curtailing trafficking, and providing evidence and information **leading** to narcotics seizures.

The Opium **Protocol** of 1953

The 1953 Opium Protocol **limited** the number of countries that **could legally** produce opium poppies, created government **licensing** of poppy cultivation, and established government monopolies over **all** opium purchases. it made no reference to cocaine.

The **Single** Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961

in 1961, **all** of the international drug **treaties/conventions** since the Geneva Convention of 1925 were combined into the **Single** Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Whereas previous treaties **dealt** almost exclusively with the production and distribution of opium, the **Single** Convention extended the cultivation and **licensing** provisions of the 1953 Opium Protocol to **coca** and marijuana. it also included a specific provision requiring participating countries to phase out the practice of **coca-leaf** chewing by 1969, 25 years from the treaty's effective date. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse **Control (UNFDAC)** was established to **replace** the **League** of Nations as the body responsible for oversight and enforcement of international narcotics regulation.¹

¹ The UNFDAC is now integrated with the former separate International Narcotics Control Board and Division of Narcotic Drugs into a single organization-the United Nations International Drug Control Programme.

ing and abuse laws continue to be the primary counternarcotics approaches based on the assumption that they are a clear deterrent to present and potential drug traffickers and users. The focus of international narcotics control remains on how to improve enforcement of international and domestic regulations.

The United States has worked with security forces in the Andean region to reduce coca production. However, the public and the media have often viewed the efforts as heavy-handed and intrusive. The Bolivian response to U.S. military intervention, for example, has been no more favorable than their view of development-related eradication. One expert in Bolivia goes so far as to assert the "DEA has replaced the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in unpopularity" (10). Despite coordination efforts, conflicting goals of development and narcotics control have created difficulties for development personnel.

OPIUM-REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

Aggressive international drug control policies began in the early 1970s with the establishment of Inter-Agency Task Force One charged with identifying targets for supply-reduction efforts. Mexico was a key target because of opium poppy (the source of heroin) and marijuana production. Search-and-seizure border operations were undertaken, yet quickly abandoned for political reasons (i.e., contradicting the "good neighbor policy") (9). Heroin abuse subsequently was elevated to a national security problem, and the U.S. Government began investigating potential heroin supply-reduction tactics.

Turkey was identified as the most politically advantageous country for heroin supply-reduction efforts. The proximity of the country to European smuggling routes *and* laboratories convinced U.S. officials that Turkey was a key player in the heroin problem, despite the fact that only 4 percent of U.S. supply came from Turkey (31). U.S. supply-reduction goals were embraced by the Turkish military regime that gained power in



A disproportionate number of those arrested and imprisoned for illegal, coca-related activities are peasants. Eradication and crop substitution policies further heighten distress and conflict in coca-growing communities by forcing those least able to control the circumstances of their coca-trade dependency to risk impoverishment or imprisonment or both.

1971 (26). A ban on opium poppy cultivation was announced in 1971, declaring that all poppy production would be forbidden by 1972 (31). This move was followed by U.S. technical and monetary assistance to promote alternative production systems.

The Turkish program was deemed a success by the U.S. Government and the American public, and the heroin problem was briefly reduced. However, supplies from Mexico, Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, Afghanistan, and Pakistan quickly filled the gap (15).

Within 2 years, the Turkish Opium Ban was revoked for several reasons. The Turkish population felt that undue control was being exerted and insufficient compensation offered for the adverse effects of opium reduction on the Turkish economy and populace. Contributing to this sentiment was U.S. purchase of opium derivatives from other countries. Dwindling political support led Turkish politicians to pledge their allegiance to poppy growers and this quickly became a major theme in the 1973 election (30). The U.S. Government responded by cutting off monetary assistance (23,28).

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Pakistan became a primary opium supplier in the 1970s, complete with clandestine laboratories and trafficking organizations (29). The government of Pakistan complied with international drug treaties because of internal concerns over increasing addiction problems. Having met with little success in their own programs, the Pakistanis were willing to accept and support U.S. supply-reduction efforts.

Four major U.S.-supported projects were attempted in Pakistan, including:

- *The Buner Agricultural Development Project, 1976*-Crop substitution in key poppy production areas combined with eradication (26), sponsored by the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control;
- *Malakand Area Development Project, 1981*—Incorporated economic assistance for narcotics control organizations and enforced eradication (26), sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters;
- *Tribal Areas Development Project, 1982*—Focused on infrastructure development, education, and voluntary eradication (27), sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development; and
- *Northwest Frontier Area Development Project, 1983* (ongoing)-Combined eradication and development; components included introducing various high-yield crops, providing short-term relief, improving irrigation, and teaching farmers about long-term agricultural options (26). Vocational training is provided for those wishing to leave agricultural livelihoods, sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Although enforcement of opium poppy eradication is considered a critical aspect of the opium supply-reduction policy, AID acknowledged that its most successful projects were those that combined development with enforcement, and permitted eradication to occur gradually and in

conjunction with the emergence of new income opportunities. This method offered the local leadership and citizenry a greater role in assuring their financial security (26).

COCA REDUCTION EFFORTS: THE ANDEAN STRATEGY

Coca has been cultivated in the Andes for centuries, and the plant has traditional cultural significance. Although the governments of Bolivia and Peru allow some legal production of coca for traditional use, they have attempted to support U.S. efforts to eliminate all production above traditional and medical needs.

The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru have worked to reduce their supply of coca and cocaine using differing methods, according to specific regional problems and anticipated outcomes. Projects undertaken in Colombia, for instance, largely focus on interdiction because of Colombia's cocaine trafficking role. Conversely, approaches in Bolivia and Peru (the major leaf producers) incorporate development as well as enforcement approaches. Past mandatory eradication efforts in Bolivia and Peru have been suspended, in favor of encouraging voluntary eradication and identifying alternative crops for coca cultivators. Bolivia, and the Chapare region in particular, has been the primary focus in recent years as security declined in Peruvian coca-producing regions.

■ Bolivia and Coca Substitution Projects

Initial AID development efforts took the form of the Agricultural Development in the Coca Zones Project (ADCZP) (1975). ADCZP sought to identify alternative crops and evaluate them for production and marketing feasibility. However, viable alternatives were slow coming, and the project reached its deadline with its goal unfulfilled. Bolivia's economic concerns and coca's heritage presented some barriers to acceptance of the AID project (26).

The Department of Regional Development of the Organization of American States (OAS) worked with the Bolivian government between 1978 and 1980, to formulate an ambitious development strategy for the Chapare that included identifying investment opportunities for immediate implementation. First and foremost, the strategy provided a framework for coordinating the activities of some 54 international, national, regional, and private institutions promoting development in the Chapare at the time (17). The OAS plan remains the standard from which all subsequent Chapare development activities have been drawn, and included seven areas: 1) technology transfer; 2) provision of agricultural credit; 3) promotion of agroindustry; 4) zonal market development; 5) secondary road construction; 6) electrification; and 7) installation of potable water systems (19).

OAS foresaw a controversy that would characterize much of the discussion surrounding the Chapare and other coca-growing regions in the decade to come: that development would promote the production of coca leaf along with other economic activities. Recognizing farmer interest in coca leaf was in large measure the due to lack of other economic options, OAS acknowledged that coca leaf production might expand in response to development investment over the short-to-medium term. However, it felt that only as economic development opened opportunities to earn a reliable income through other activities, would the importance of coca leaf and cocaine diminish (19).

The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotic Matters (INM) funded the first effort specifically intended to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia. The project, *Proyecto de Desarrollo y Sustitución?* (Development and Substitution Project, PRODES), was to investigate the feasibility of crop substitution and produce a project proposal for implementing crop substitution through AID. The 1980 Bolivian coup halted PRODES activities and U.S. assistance was suspended (26). Drug related activities escalated



Many coca-growing regions lack sufficient infrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity, irrigation) for alternative development. How to improve infrastructure without unduly benefiting local narcotics traffickers presents a policy dilemma.

under the military regime. When democratic control was restored in 1982, the new government was unable to assert authority in the Chapare.

ORIGIN OF THE CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) was initiated in August 1983 as an agreement between the Bolivian Government and AID. New development efforts began in 1984 as control was regained in the region. It quickly became apparent that the CRDP effort could not proceed under its original design (21). Two practical problems confronted the CRDP and catalyzed the redesign effort:

- State control over the Chapare was and remains tenuous. Bolivian government presence in the Chapare is limited to a small group of development specialists and to a repressive police force, both funded largely by the United States. Effective efforts would require a continuous development presence in the Chapare.
- The overall production systems of Chapare farmers, and the relationships of those sys-

terns to the **physical capacity** of different parts of the **Chapare** to **support** sustained **agricultural production** were largely neglected. This problem had two dimensions. The one most fully appreciated before the redesign was that the cropping systems being promoted probably would not be sustainable in most parts of the Chapare. This raised the specter that, should crop substitution be successful, it could be the cause of an environmental disaster. The second dimension, was that potential alternate crops to coca leaf were assessed primarily in terms of the technical feasibility of cultivating them in the Chapare. Little attention was paid to where and if farmers would be able to sell their new crops (19).

A strategy to improve economic conditions in upland areas—the origin of most Chapare settlers and coca laborers—was developed by AID. The redesign was formalized in 1987 and incorporated the framework that continues expanding today—a combination of crop substitution in the Chapare and improving resource management activities in the Associated High Valleys (AHV) (cf: 17,19). The amendment recognized that the solution to the problem of widespread involvement in the production of coca leaf in the Chapare was not to be found exclusively in the tropical lowland valley itself (figure 3-1).

Migration created chronic labor scarcity in highland areas, and affected family capacity to manage on-farm resources effectively. Consequently, long-term agricultural production and livestock management strategies were neglected in favor of short-term gains. The resulting decline in agricultural productivity progressively intensified migratory pressures (19).

The Campero and Mizque provinces of southern Cochabamba Department were selected as the areas in which the AHV component would be implemented initially, based on a study by the *Corporación de Desarrollo de Cochabamba* (Regional Development Corporation of Cochabamba,

CORDECO). The study suggested the areas had potential to become a center of economic growth and a secondary area of population attraction (13). Through this effort, AID/Bolivia and Bolivian implementing agencies expected to gain experience relevant to an expanded AHV component.

THE REDESIGNED CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The redesigned CRDP suffered from political and institutional difficulties that diffused development efforts. Fighting political and institutional brushfires consumed a great amount of development personnel time. The link with narcotics control created a dual goal for development personnel, drawing resources toward nondevelopment activities. Similar difficulties were faced by the Bolivian institutions involved in the CRDP—the *Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca* (Subsecretariat for Alternative Development and Coca Substitution, SUBDESAL), the *Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo Regional* (Regional Program for Alternative Development, PDAR), and the *Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria* (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology, IBTA). Lack of staff continuity impeded CRDP progress in the late 1980s. These problems and others resulted in ineffectual implementation of CRDP activities (12,18,20). The CRDP likewise suffered criticism in Campero and Mizque because it had created expectations that were not being fulfilled, and results in the Chapare were equally modest. Activities largely concentrated on continuing agricultural research programs, although this research was frequently criticized in government circles and among unions representing coca growers as having little impact on Chapare farmers (18,22).

AID/Bolivia


The AID/Bolivia has been criticized as an overly passive manager, potentially unable to obtain the respect due the entity that finances existence of the two Bolivian institutions respon-

sible for the CRDP. Problems that have limited the effectiveness of the CRDP, include unnecessary bureaucratic awkwardness among participating institutions, a lack of connection between the objectives of individual CRDP activities and overall project goals, and use of CRDP resources to respond to parochial political party interests inconsistent with project goals (19).

AID officials suggest that several factors have hindered their ability to solve management problems confronting the CRDP:

- Staffing and other resources are inadequate to participate in day-to-day project management. This is exacerbated by the complexity of CRDP and associated bureaucratic procedures.
- The project is highly visible because of its link to narcotics, resulting in AID/Bolivia officials spending large amounts of time on nondevelopment related activities.
- Avenues exist to “bypass” the AID/Bolivia management structure with little avenue for AID recourse (19).

Figure 3-1—Evolution of the Cochabamba Regional Development Project



SOURCE: Adapted from Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI), *Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)—Bolivia*, Technical Proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).

Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca

The SUBDESAL was responsible for direction of the CRDP, and it had authority to change fundamental directions in the project without approval or coordination with implementing institutions. Directional changes made by SUBDESAL have been criticized for complicating implementation. In addition, the SUBDESAL heads up the council charged with coordinating the participation of international assistance organizations.¹ The SUBDESAL is the principal source of information for the ministers comprising the council, and primary interpreter of their wishes regarding implementation of drug policy. However, specific lines of authority and responsibility were not defined, sometimes leading to arbitrary and internally contradictory uses of power that prejudiced implementation of the redesigned CRDP (19).

Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo Regional

The PDAR has major responsibility for implementing development projects in the Chapare, like the CRDP, and coordinating the activities of state agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) that would be responsible for the bulk of implementation activities in the AHV.²

The PDAR would provide resources and administrative support to the state agencies and NGOs already involved in development activities to provide alternatives to migrating to the Chapare. The coordinating role was assigned for several reasons, including: 1) the substantial burden that its implementing role in the Chapare was expected to entail; 2) the large number of state agencies and NGOs involved in rural

development activities in upland Cochabamba (4); 3) the desire to maximize the immediate impacts of the AHV by tapping into existing efforts; and 4) the desire to promote participation in activities that supported the CRDP by as wide a range of Bolivian institutions as possible (19).

However, despite its strong technical abilities, PDAR has not been effective at planning, implementing, and evaluating individual projects in light of overall CRDP goals. This reflects the scarcity of skilled planners in Bolivia, and a reluctance to engage in this type of planning and implementation because of its potential to remove some flexibility for executive auspices. Consequently, while PDAR carries out a number of activities, the contribution of these activities to the goals of CRDP is insufficient. It has been suggested that the lack of AID/Bolivia authority may foster such poor administrative practices (19).

Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria

Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology, IBTA) is the inheritor of agricultural research begun under PRODES, and, thus, has acquired long-term tropical agriculture research experience. It has assembled what is widely regarded as an excellent team of agricultural scientists and technicians, and has conducted important research on a wide range of crops in the Chapare that might provide farmers with alternatives to coca-leaf production. However, research has focused primarily on technical feasibility and yield maximization, rather than product marketability. The IBTA-Chapare long

¹ Additional confusion was introduced when SUBDESAL threw the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) into the midst of the AID-funded institutions with no clarification of what their respective roles were to be (19).

² PDAR has undergone several name changes. At the time of the redesign of the CRDP, in 1987, the entity was called the *Subsecretaría para el Desarrollo del Trópico Boliviano* (Secretariat for Development of the Bolivian Tropics, SDTB) under the Ministry of Planning and Coordination. In July 1987, SDTB was placed under SUBDESAL authority and renamed the *Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo de Cochabamba* (Cochabamba Program for Alternative Development PDAC). In January 1990, this was changed to the *Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo Regional*, reflecting concern with regional development problems that extended beyond the boundaries of Cochabamba department (19).



KEVIN HEALY, INTERAMERICAN FOUNDATION

The poor, unemployed, and landless from neighboring communities often migrate to centers of coca-related activity. Thus, counter narcotics projects must also target areas of out-migration to reduce the lure of coca-related income. Here, vehicles pass a checkpoint before entering the Bolivian Chapare.

maintained that marketing issues were outside of their purview and that PDAR should be responsible for addressing these.³ However, past PDAR efforts on market issues had been inadequate (19).

THE CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SINCE 1989

Significant improvements were made in this bleak picture in mid-1989. PDAR staff and technical abilities increased during this period. A new government assumed power in August 1989, and with it came increased commitment to CRDP activities (18). PDAR initiated 29 ‘‘immediate impact projects’ in the Campero and Mizque provinces, which engendered considerable enthusiasm and participation by rural communities. During 1990, the number of projects carried out in the AHV increased to at least 40, and additional increases were projected for 1991. Institutional arrangements and responsibilities were defined (19).

Since 1989, SUBDESAL also has undergone several changes that improved the ability of the

CRDP to implement projects (18). SUBDESAL was placed in a chain of command with the Minister of Peasant Affairs and Agriculture clearly at the top, and a clear relationship between national policy objectives and the planning and implementation of local activities was established (25). Furthermore, some redefinition of the division of labor between SUBDESAL and PDAR occurred.

Increased attention also has been placed on marketing aspects in the CRDP (24), Technical assistance to PDAR and producer groups is now being strengthened, particularly in marketing. Irrespective of where market issues are addressed, an integrated production-to-market approach is needed for crop substitution efforts in the Chapare to be successful. Research might be prioritized by market availability for potential alternative crops. Thus, market identification and research would be closely integrated with agricultural research and extension.

Still, the CRDP was criticized for being unable to: address the development issues underlying participation of rural populations in coca production, conduct the necessary planning and coordination to repeat past successes and reduce or eliminate failures, or develop individual activities to reinforce one another to produce the multiplier effect needed for results to be long-term and significant beyond the local level. Problems continued to confront the major institutions involved in the CRDP (cf: 12,17,19). The CRDP was recently replaced by CORDEP (Cochabamba Regional Development Project), and CORDEP’S relationships with Bolivian Government agencies have been modified or redefined (figures 3-1 and 3-2), in part to address the kinds of problems referred to above.


■ Peru and Coca Substitution Projects

In the early eighties, the Peruvian Government, in cooperation with the United States, created

³ Nevertheless, IBTA–Chapare has, on the other hand, on several occasions invited input from international advisors on marketing issues, and is taking a larger role in this matter under CORDEP (19).

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Figure 3-2—Cochabamba Regional Development Project Organizational Structure



AID = Agency for International Development.

CORDEP. Cochabamba Regional Development Project.

IBTA = Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology).

MACA - Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agrícola (Ministry of Agriculture and Campesino Affairs).

NGO - Nongovernmental organization.

PDAR = Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo Regional (Regional Program for Alternative Development).

SNC = Servicio Nacional de Camines (National Road Service).

SUBDESAL - Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca (Subsecretariat for Alternative Development and Crop Substitution for Coca).

SOURCE: Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI), *Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)-80/ivia*, Technical Proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).

several special projects to develop the upper jungle, among them, the *Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga* (Alto Huallaga Special Project, PEAH) (figure 3-3). The general objectives of this set of projects were to:

- Increase regional agricultural productivity;
- Occupy upper and lower jungle areas;
- Economically matriculate the region by means of the Marginal Highway; and
- Maintain regional ecological equilibrium, rational exploitation of natural resources, and improvement in the living standards of the population (8).

PROYECTO ESPECIAL ALTO HUALLAGA

PEAH had peculiar characteristics that distinguished it from the other projects because of the need to address the problem of coca expansion. The Peruvian Government and AID/Peru designed a Project Paper for the execution of PEAH. The project design included research, extension, and training components; highway maintenance; and credit development components (19).

The Project Paper incorporated control and development strategies. It proposed massive coca eradication under direction of the *Proyecto de Control y Reducción de los Cultivos de Coca en el Alto Huallaga* (Project for the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga, CORAH) and a development plan to increase legal agricultural production in the region under the responsibility of PEAH. The second objective, however, was subordinate to the former (8). While the development objective is considered in some sections of the Project Paper as an independent one, in reality, both objectives were interrelated and even explicitly articulated.⁴ PEAH management assumed that eradication would oblige farmers to turn to legal production,

irrespective of the economic and historical processes that gave coca production in the Alto Huallaga its importance (19).

Several features of a national social, political, and economic nature were neglected and contributed to the failure of CORAH and PEAH. Some more notable of these include:


- The narrowly defined project area that excluded producers outside identified boundaries;
- The assumption that producers inside boundaries would remain after eradication irrespective of economic dysfunctions associated with legitimate agricultural production in the region;
- Failure to anticipate a violent reaction to eradication by the population, and subsequent expansion of subversive violence;
- Lack of development components appropriate to the producing areas (e.g., despite the suitability of the region for tropical forest production, a forestry component was lacking); and
- Failure to recognize the historical labor scarcity problem (8).

Labor shortages are one of the worst consequences of coca expansion in Alto Huallaga, and constitute an authentic bottleneck for the promotion of technical assistance and the extension of areas under legal crops (19). Those farmers who originally were unwilling to enter into coca production finally did so in the face of the pressure from increased production costs.

The Project Paper was amended in 1986 to emphasize agricultural extension above research and training, and also include a community development component. The principal objective of the extension component was to increase the

⁴ For example, the Project Paper said that regional development should minimize the negative social effects of coca eradication and that eradication and economic development formed two sides of the same coin, with economic development efforts depending on progress in eradication. The paper did not treat regional development as an end in itself and did not formulate significant proposals for an integrated program of economic development to include all farmers in the region, not just coca producers (8). Also, it did not consider how coca eradication might negatively affect possibilities for development.

Figure 3-3-Location of Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga



SOURCE: Adapted from ECONSULT, *Final Report on the Evaluation of AID Project No. 527-0244—Development of the Alto Huallaga Area* (Lima, Peru: ECONSULT S.A., 1987).

rate of adoption of new production technologies developed through agricultural research. The lack of a relatively stable market for most legal crops hindered extension efforts and made it difficult for legal crops to be as attractive to farmers as coca. In light of the importance of family labor, a stable market has always been important in making a legal crop an attractive alternative to coca. Family labor reduces price sensitivity and increases incentives to distribute labor inputs over longer periods (19).

The introduction of the community development subcomponent was a positive decision, resulting in a qualitative change in attitude among the farmers affected by the actions implemented by social promoters. Agricultural clubs and women's clubs, established and supported by the component, were capable of managing new cultivated plots and proved efficient in installing nurseries for cocoa and citrus plants and in rearing small livestock. Similarly, the community development subcomponent successfully carried out a range of activities including road construction, park beautification, and latrine construction. The community development operations were placed in the context of regional agricultural development **that took into account the most** important problems of coca expansion. Even though it was a positive step, community development was not placed within the principal objective of stimulating legal agriculture in the Alto Huallaga (19).

■ Colombian Narcotics Control and Eradication Projects

Only a small amount of coca is produced in Colombia (i.e., roughly 13 percent); its clandestine laboratories and an efficient trafficking network pose greater concerns. Therefore, narcotics control policies have focused on disruption and deterrence of drug processing and trafficking, often by military and police countermeasures. Furthermore, because relatively few Colombians grow coca, U.S.-assisted **eradication programs have a narrower social and economic impact and,**

thus, have been more politically feasible than is the case in Bolivia or Peru.

1978-1982

Early Colombian counternarcotics efforts began in the 1970s, aimed at marijuana trade on the Atlantic Coast. The marijuana industry permeated the economic and political fabric of the Guajira region, and with corruption and violence reaching anarchic proportions, the government feared loss of control in the area (1). Then, as now, the Colombian Government was under pressure to adopt U.S. counternarcotics policies in return for assistance. Two policies of fundamental importance in Colombian supply-reduction efforts were interdiction and eradication (1), (See also Extradition, in chapter 2.)

In November 1978, Colombia's President responded by instituting a National Security Statute, authorizing military participation in national governance and law enforcement. The Colombian Government then initiated *Operación Fulminante*, a U.S.-assisted, militarization- and manual eradication-based effort to curb the marijuana trade and regain control of the Guajira. Approximately 10,000 troops were deployed. Results of that campaign were mixed, and did not suggest success (1,2). For example:

- Although marijuana trade was reduced, it was not halted.
- To the extent that enforcement efforts were successful, they tended merely to displace production and trade activities to other parts of the country (the "balloon effect"'), rather than eliminate them.
- The Colombian military was susceptible to corruption.
- Traffickers proved able to reestablish activities quickly as military presence withdrew.
- Supply-sided eradication and interdiction campaigns were not coupled with parallel demand-reduction programs, thus reducing prospects of disrupting narcotics trafficking.

- The costs to the local population were high and deeply resented, and lacking rapid headway, the general public quickly concluded that repressive counternarcotics measures were not in Colombia's best interest, despite U.S. Government praise for the operation.

From the Colombian military's perspective, the guerrilla challenge was more important, and from the civilian perspective, increasing political violence and social unrest were of greater concern (2). In March 1980, the Colombian army announced that it was abandoning its anti-marijuana efforts in the Guajira region.

During this period, the Colombian Government commissioned a study on using herbicides to eradicate marijuana. However, Colombia's National Council of Dangerous Drugs (*Consejo Nacional de Estupificantes*) determined by consensus not to apply herbicides (1).

1982-1986

A new narcotics directive was established under President Betancur: no extradition on nationalist grounds, no militarization because of domestic considerations, and no herbicidal eradication for environmental reasons. Yet, despite its seemingly unaggressive agenda, the new administration quickly initiated an ambitious, DEA-backed interdiction effort. Furthermore, when narcotics traffickers retaliated by assassinating the Justice Minister, the new government promptly reversed its no-extradition and no-herbicide policies (1,5).

As had occurred with anti-marijuana operations, the narcotics trafficker's quickly adopted new tactics for evading interdiction. Processing was reverted to mobile, small-scale operations, and the powerful cartel bosses negotiated new trade routes and alliances through other countries. They also increased their use of bribery, murder, kidnapping, and other terrorist activities to protect themselves, and assure the loyalty of their employees (2).

Betancur initiated programs for herbicidal eradication of marijuana in 1984, and coca in 1985. Both programs were protested by the public, and neither achieved long-term success. Marijuana production declined only temporarily, and, again, many growers responded to the threat of eradication by reducing their plots, moving operations to less air-accessible canyons, and growing marijuana alongside legal crops (1).

1986-1990

In the mid-1980s, the Colombian Government faced conflicting images: though praised for cracking down on narcotics trafficking, it did not seem to have restricted the flow of cocaine. Moreover, the Colombian justice system had been decimated by drug-related violence, and the new administration faced the same daunting panorama of threats (e.g., guerrilla insurgences, drug-related corruption and killing, and rampant human rights abuses).

Marijuana and coca eradication programs continued, but the returns on these efforts, particularly for marijuana, began to decline relative to increases in the number of hectares under cultivation. Explanations for the declining rates included: 1) shifting of marijuana cultivation to other regions; 2) increasing profitability of other illegal drug markets, such as hashish and poppies; 3) declines in U.S. Government assistance; and 4) diverted government effort to militarization and extradition aspects of narcotics policy, as well as ongoing counter-insurgency concerns (1).

1990-PRESENT

Although production of narcotic plants has never weighed heavily in Colombia's involvement in narcotics industry, evidence indicates expansion of these activities. A January 1992 *Departamento Administrativa de Seguridad* report stated that Colombia had some 25,000 hectares of opium poppies under cultivation, while the U.S. Government estimated 10,000 hectares (16). The Colombian Government began eradicating opium poppy fields with glyphosate

in 1992, despite protests from the peasant population (16).

Coca eradication as a Colombian narcotics control policy has had short-term effects, although little chance to have a large impact. Growth of coca cultivation came *after* Colombians were deeply involved in the cocaine trade and, thus, the supply of coca leaves in the country grew in response to the growth of the cocaine industry. Most of the income obtained by Colombians from the coca and cocaine trade comes from the manufacturing and international distribution of cocaine and the drug “cartels” have already large investments in and out of the country. Thus, policies to disrupt illegal drug manufacturing and marketing, and to make it more difficult to use the capital accumulated, are likely to have a greater overall impact on the Colombian cocaine industry than eradication programs (1).

■ National Narcotics Enforcement and Effects on Development

In addition to the inherent difficulties faced by development projects in Bolivia and Peru, enforcement practices in both countries sometimes have compounded the task of generating local support for activities. Rather than fostering alternative means of livelihood, even limited eradication has notably impeded execution of some agricultural extension and community development efforts (8). Some experts suggest that competing goals of narcotics control and development generally contribute to this situation. Repressive actions on the part of some U. S.-sponsored institutions may be the single largest constraint on the success of U.S.-sponsored development efforts (19).

Unidad Móvil de Patrulla Rural (Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, UMOPAR) has primary responsibility for narcotics control activities in Bolivia. The organization has been accused of brutality against peasants involved in coca production as well as providing protection for narcotics traffickers on

occasion (11). Analysts suggest that increasing militarization of the “drug war” generally and U.S. sponsorship of UMOPAR particularly may constitute the largest constraints on success of U.S.-sponsored development efforts in Bolivia. Partly as a response to the problems with UMOPAR, the Bolivian Government, with U.S. sponsorship, has created a new counternarcotics force, the *Fuerza Especial en la Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico* (Special Force in the Struggle Against Drug Trafficking, FELCN), which began operations in late June 1991. Because of the corruption problems associated with UMOPAR, plans call for the FELCN to be “insulated” from the rest of the Bolivian police force. How this insulation is to be accomplished remains unclear. It is also unclear how the addition of a second counternarcotics unit will address the problems of abusive and violent behavior on the part of police that have undermined development efforts (19).

The effectiveness of Peru’s PEAH in working with coca farmers also was hampered by its association with repressive police action. This situation was provoked by the fact that CORAH received logistic support from the *Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural de la Guardia Civil del Perú* (Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Peruvian Civil Guard, UMOPAR of Peru). The coercive method used by the CORAH with the support of UMOPAR produced resistance by the affected coca farmers (8). The process of eradication also caused an important sector of rural and urban populations to fail to discriminate or distinguish between these three different institutions. Drug dealers and the *Sendero Luminoso* have taken advantage of this fact to distort the program of PEAH. This problem should also be analyzed in terms of the PEAH concept and its relation to the eradication process implemented by CORAH. While it is true that PEAH was designed to promote regional legal agricultural development, the emphasis on the need to assist former coca farmers constituted a risk inherent in the institutional life of the project. The violent image of CORAH and UMOPAR of Peru evidently affected PEAH’s image not only



The conflicting militarization and development assistance objectives of past counternarcotics programs have undermined their effectiveness and often generated lasting resentment among target populations. Here, demonstrators in Cochabamba, Bolivia, carry a poster that reads, ‘No to militarization! Yes to development!’

among coca producers, but also among other economic sectors, increasing the resentment of the farmers against CORAH as well as PEAH (19).

CONCLUSION

Crop substitution and eradication efforts are inherently slow. Coordination among development and enforcement organizations is critical; coordination can help ensure that they will not adversely affect one another in pursuit of their individual goals. In the past, they have worked in different areas with varied degrees of success. Development groups generally work to improve the region’s standard of living, whereas enforcement agencies work to impede production of illegal crops and their derivatives.

Colombia poses an interesting political problem because it is not a major coca producer and does not depend on U.S. development assistance. It is possible that Colombia’s involvement will change if supply is reduced, but concomitant demand reduction will be necessary to avoid the “balloon effect.”

Development organizations can maintain their original philosophies while working with enforcement agencies. “Phased eradication” has been most successful for crop substitution and eradication projects in the past, and existing U.S. organizations are well-equipped to adopt such a strategy.

AID and INM [Bureau of International Narcotics Matters] have fundamental differences in their

bureaucratic ethos and staff orientation. The former is essentially a development agency and its staff has expertise in overseas development. AID personnel tend to view the problem of narcotics control from a long-term development perspective and give priority to economic and social factors that affect coca production. INM has a narcotics control orientation and its staff is experienced in enforcement work. They tend to have a short-term perspective and believe enforcement must begin early in the project. These different attitudes can sometimes create barriers to cooperation and coordination efforts (26).

A proper blend of development assistance and enforcement and domestic and international agencies is needed. However, separation of enforcement and assistance activities should be clear at all levels. Determining the relative importance of each of these components, however, is problematic. Trust and education will probably prove to be the most important factors for success.

Ideally, public pressure for elimination of the drug problem should not be met with fewer options. Rather the effective translation of knowledge, scientific and historical, should enable the public to avoid over-simplification, and to exert influence based on more rational understanding (26).

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