

The world's nations face a great challenge. If they can take advantage of the end of the Cold War to move toward a system of collective security—a system in which the United Nations Security Council and other multinational organizations, particularly the regional organizations, play major roles—then the risk of war between nations, and the risk of unrestrained conflict within nations, will be substantially reduced.

As a consequence, military expenditures across the globe can be cut dramatically.

Adapting to a Post-Cold War World

Although there was clear evidence for several years that the Cold War was ending, nations throughout the world have been slow to revise their foreign and defense policies, and slow to strengthen regional and multinational organizations to reflect that fact. Let me point to the U.S. as an example.

In this country, defense expenditures in 1992 approximated \$300 billion. In constant dollars, that was 10 percent more than a decade ago. Moreover, President Bush's 5-year defense program, presented to Congress in January 1992, projected that these expenditures would decline only very gradually over the next 5 years. Defense outlays in 1997, in constant dollars, were estimated to be approximately 10 percent higher than 21 years earlier, under President Nixon, in the midst of the Cold War.

Such a defense program is not consistent with my view of the post-Cold War world.

Before nations can respond in an optimum manner to the end of the Cold War, they need a vision of a world which will not be dominated by East-West rivalry, a rivalry which for more than 40 years has shaped foreign and defense policies across the globe.

The Inevitability of Conflict

As the military action in Iraq, the Yugoslavian civil war, and the turmoil in Somalia, Angola, and Cambodia demonstrate, (his post-Cold War world is not going to be a world without conflict. There will be conflict between disparate groups within nations, and conflict extending across national borders. Racial and ethnic differences will remain. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historical disputes over political boundaries will continue, and economic differentials among nations are going to increase as the technological revolution of the 21st century spreads unevenly across the globe.

In the past 45 years there have been 125 wars, resulting in 40 million deaths. Third World military expenditures now total almost \$200 billion per year, approximately 5 percent of GDP. They are only slightly less than the total expenditures in the developing world for health and education.

It is often suggested that the developing countries were turned into an ideological battleground by the Cold War and the rivalries of the great powers. That rivalry was a contributing factor, but the underlying causes for Third World conflict existed before the Cold War began, and they will almost certainly continue even though it has ended.

By
The Honorable
Robert S.
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A New World Order and Its Implications for Arms Reductions

"The U.S. will live in a multipolar world, and its foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to that reality"

Moreover, to disorder in the Third World may well be added the potential for strife in the states of the former Soviet Union.

In those respects, therefore, the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past—conflicts within nations and conflicts between nations will not disappear.

But it is also clear that in the 21st century relations among nations will differ dramatically from those of the postwar decades. In the post-World War II years the U.S. had the power—and to a considerable degree it exercised that power—to shape the world as it chose. In the next century that will not be possible. While remaining the world's strongest nation, the U.S. will live in a multipolar world, and its foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to that reality.

Japan is destined to play a larger and larger role on the world scene, exercising greater political power and, hopefully, assuming greater political and economic responsibility. The same can be said of Western Europe, which has just taken a dramatic step toward economic integration. From that is bound to follow greater political unity—despite the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty—and that greater unity will strengthen Europe's power in world politics.

And by the middle of the next century, several of the countries that in the past we have labeled as Third World nations will have so increased in size and economic power as to be major participants in decisions affecting relations among nations.

For example, there is likely to be a population of 1.6 billion in India, 400 million in Nigeria, and 300 million in Brazil. If China achieves its economic goal by the year 2000, and if it then moves forward during the next 50 years at satisfactory but not spectacular growth rates, the income per capita of its approximately 1.6 billion people by 2050 may

be roughly equal to that of the British in 1965. *China's total gross national product* would approximate that of the U.S., Western Europe, or Japan, and almost surely would substantially exceed that of Russia.

These figures are, of course, highly speculative. I point to them simply to emphasize the magnitude of the changes which lie ahead, and the need to begin now to adjust our goals, our policies, and our institutions to take account of them.

In such a multipolar world there clearly is need for developing new relationships, both among the great powers and between the great powers and other nations.

A New World Order

I believe that, at a minimum, the new world order should accomplish five objectives. It should:

1. Provide to all states guarantees against external aggression. Frontiers should not be changed by force.
2. Codify the rights of minorities and ethnic groups within states, and provide a process by which such groups that believe their rights have been violated may seek redress without resort to violence.
3. Establish a mechanism for resolution of regional conflicts, and conflicts within nations, without unilateral action by the great powers.
4. Increase the flow of technical and financial assistance to developing countries to help them accelerate their rates of social and economic advance, which are disgracefully low in parts of the world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa.
5. Assure preservation of the global environment as a basis of sustainable development for all.

In sum, I believe we should strive to move toward a world in which relations among nations would be based on the rule of law. a world in which national security would be supported by a system of collective security. The conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-keeping functions to accomplish the objectives outlined above would be performed by multinational institutions-organized and strengthened United Nations and new and expanded regional organizations.

That is my vision of the post-Cold War world.

Alternative Vision

In contrast to my vision. many political theorists predict a return to the power politics of the 19th century. They claim that with the elimination of ideological competition between West and East, there will be a reversion to more traditional power relationships. They say that major powers will be guided by basic territorial and economic imperatives: that the U. S., Russia, China, India, Japan, and Western Europe will seek to assert themselves in their own regions while while competing for dominance in other areas of the world where conditions are more fluid.

This view has been expressed by the realist school of political scientists, the leading advocate of which is Michael Sandell, a political theorist at Harvard, who has said:

"The end of the Cold War does not mean an end of global competition between the superpowers. Once the ideological dimension fades, what you're left with is not peace and harmony, but old-fashioned global politics based on dominant powers competing for influence and pursuing their internal interests. "

Professor Sandell conception of relations among nations in the post-Cold War world is historically' well-f(mndcd, but I would argue it is not consistent with the increasingly interdependent world-interdependent economically. environmentally, and politically in terms of security-into which we are moving. I n that interdependent world I do not believe any nation will be able to stand alone. The United Nations charter offers a far more appropriate framework for relations among nations i n such a world than does the doctrine of power politics.

In contrast to Professor Sandell, Carl Kazen, former director of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, wrote in *International Security*:

"The international system that relies on the national use of military force as the ultimate guarantor of security, and the threat of its use as the basis of order, is not the only possible one. To seek a different system. . . is no longer the pursuit of an illusion, but a necessary effort toward a necessary goal. "

That is exactly what I propose we undertake.

A System of Collective Security

To repeat, the new world order which I propose would require:

- Renunciation by the great powers of the use of force in disputes among themselves and renunciation of unilateral action in dealing with regional or national conflicts.
- Agreement by the Security Council that regional conflicts endangering territorial integrity, or national strife carrying the risk of widespread loss of life of the kind we are seeing in Bosnia today, will be dealt with

"... In the increasingly interdependent world into which we are moving, I do not believe any nation will be able to stand alone"

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through the application of economic sanctions and, if necessary, through military action. imposed by collective decisions and utilizing multinational forces.

Such a world will need leaders. The leadership role may shift among nations depending on the issues at hand. Often it will be fulfilled by the U.S. However, in such a system of collective security, whenever the U.S. does play a leadership role, it must accept collective decision making. We're not accustomed to that: it will be very difficult.

Correspondingly, if the system is to survive, other nations must accept a sharing of the risks and costs: the political risks, the financial costs, and, most importantly, the risks of casualties and bloodshed.

Had the U.S. and the other major powers made clear their conception of and support for such a system of collective security, and had they stated they would not only pursue their own political interests through diplomacy without the use of force, but would seek to protect nations against attack, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait might well have been deterred.

Arms Reduction

While steps are being taken to establish a worldwide system of collective security of the kind I have outlined, the arms control negotiations—including those relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—which have been underway in several different fora should be expanded in scope and accelerated in time.

Particular attention should be given to establishing long-term goals for nuclear forces, beyond those incorporated in the START II agreement signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush earlier this month.

Today there are approximately 40,000 nuclear warheads in the world, with a destructive power over 1 million times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Even assuming that the reductions called for by START II are implemented, the stock of nuclear warheads of the five existing nuclear powers is not likely to be reduced below 9,000 to 10,000 warheads by the year 2003.

So the danger of nuclear war—the risk of destruction of societies across the globe—will have been lowered, but surely it won't have been eliminated.

Can we go further? The answer must be yes.

If there was ever any reason to doubt that conclusion, it should have been swept away by the recent disclosures of how close the world came to nuclear disaster in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was a dramatic demonstration of human fallibility, of the degree to which political and military leaders are so often captives of misinformation, misjudgment, and miscalculations.

Retrospective View of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The actions of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the U.S. in October of 1962 brought those three nations to the verge of military conflict, and they brought the rest of the world to the brink of nuclear disaster.

None of these nations intended by its actions to create such risks. To understand what caused the crisis, and how to avoid such events in the future, participants in the decisions of the three nations were brought together by Harvard University, Brown University, and the governments of the Soviet Union and Cuba in a series of five conferences—the last of which was a meeting chaired by Fidel Castro in Havana, Cuba, in January 1992.

By the end of the third meeting, which was held in Moscow in January 1989, it had become clear that the decisions of each of the three powers immediately before and during the crisis had been distorted by misinformation, miscalculation, and misjudgment. I shall cite only four of many examples:

1. Before Soviet missiles were introduced into Cuba in the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union and Cuba believed the United States intended to invade the island in order to overthrow its president and its government. As I shall discuss more fully in a moment, we had no such intention.
2. The United States believed the Soviets would not move nuclear warheads outside the Soviet Union—they never had—but in fact they did. In Moscow we were told that by Oct. 28, 1962, the height of the crisis, Soviet strategic nuclear warheads had been delivered to Cuba, and their missiles were to be targeted on cities in the United States.
3. The Soviets believed the missiles could be introduced into Cuba secretly, without detection, and that when their presence was disclosed, the U.S. would not respond. Here, too, they were in error.
4. Those who urged President Kennedy to destroy the missiles by a U.S. air attack, which in all likelihood would have been followed by a land and sea invasion, were almost certainly mistaken in their belief that the Soviets would not respond with military action. At the time, the CIA had reported there were 10,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. At the Moscow conference, participants were told there were in fact 43,000, along with 270,000 well-armed Cuban troops. Both forces, in the words of their commanders, were determined to fight to the death. ” The Cuban offi-

cials estimated they would have suffered 100,000 casualties. The Soviets expressed utter disbelief we would have thought that, in the face of such a catastrophic defeat, they would not have responded militarily somewhere in the world. The result almost certainly would have been uncontrollable escalation.

By the end of the meeting in Moscow, we had all agreed we could draw two major lessons from our discussions. First, in this age of high-technology weaponry, crisis management is dangerous, difficult, and uncertain. Due to misjudgment, misinformation, and miscalculation of the kind I have referred to, it is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action between the great powers and their allies.

Second, therefore, we must direct our attention to crisis avoidance. At a minimum, crisis avoidance will require that potential adversaries take great care to try to understand how their actions will be interpreted by the other party. In this respect, we all performed poorly 30 years ago during the missile crisis. Let me illustrate my point by referring to an exchange at the opening of the Moscow meeting.

President Gorbachev's aide, Georgi Shakhnazarov, was the chairman. He asked me, as one of the U.S. participants present who had been a member of President Kennedy's Executive Committee during the crisis, to ask the first question. I said, "My question is a very obvious one, from our point of view. What was the purpose of the deployment of the nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba by the Soviet Union?"

Shakhnazarov asked, "Who wants to answer?"

Andrei Gromyko, who for over 27 years had been the Soviet Foreign Minister, and had been in the Foreign Minister in 1962, was present and he

"The Cuban Missile Crisis was a dramatic demonstration of human fallibility"

responded, "I can answer that question with a few words. Their action was intended to strengthen the defensive stability of Cuba, to avert the threats against it. I repeat, to strengthen the defensive capability of Cuba. That is all."

I then replied, "Mr. Chairman, that leads me to make two comments. My first comment is stimulated by the implication of Mr. Gromyko's answer—the implication being that the U.S. intended, prior to the placement of missiles, to invade Cuba, I want to make two points with respect to that implication. The first is, if I'd been a Cuban, I think I might have thought that. And I want to state quite frankly, with hindsight, if I had been a Cuban leader, I think I might have expected a U.S. invasion."

"We had authorized the Bay of Pigs invasion. We didn't support it. militarily—and I think this should be recognized and emphasized, as it was specifically the decision of President Kennedy not to support the operation with the use of military force—but, in any event, we had assisted in carrying it out."

"And after the debacle, there were many voices in the U.S. that said the error was not in approving the Bay of Pigs operation but in the failure to support it with military force. The implication was that at some time in the future, force would be applied."

"Secondly, there were U.S. covert operations in Cuba which extended over a long period of time. The Cubans knew that. My recollection is that the operations began in the late 1950s and extended into the period we're discussing, the summer and fall of 1962."

"And thirdly, there were important voices in the United States—important leaders of our Senate, important leaders of our House—who were calling for the invasion of Cuba."

"So I state quite frankly again that if I had been a Cuban leader at the time, I

might well have concluded there was a great risk of U.S. invasion. And I should say as well, if I had been a Soviet leader at the time, I might have come to the same conclusion."

"The second point I want to make—and I think it shows the degree of misperception that can exist and can influence both parties to a dispute—is (hat I can state unequivocally we had absolutely no intention of invading Cuba."

"I don't want to suggest there were no contingency plans. Obviously there were. But I state again, we had absolutely no intention of invading Cuba, and therefore the Soviet action to install missiles with that as its objective was, I think, based on a misconception—a clearly understandable one, and one that we, in part, were responsible for. I accept that."

Some of us, particularly President Kennedy and I, believed at the time that the U.S. faced great danger during the missile crisis. However, during the Havana Conference a year ago I learned we had greatly underestimated that danger."

While in Havana we were told by the Russians that the Soviet forces in Cuba in October of 1962—which, as I'VC said, numbered some 43,000 instead of the 10,000 reported by the CIA—possessed 36 strategic nuclear warheads for the 24 intermediate-range missiles that were capable of striking in the United States. At the time the CIA had stated they did not believe there were any nuclear warheads on the island."

We were also told by the Russians that their forces included six dual-purpose tactical launchers for which they had nine tactical missiles with nuclear warheads to be used against a U.S. invasion force. Most importantly, we learned that the authority to use those nuclear warheads had been delegated to the Soviet field commanders in Cuba; i.e., no

further authorization from Moscow was needed.

We need not speculate about what would have happened had a U.S. attack been launched, as many in the U.S. government were recommending to President Kennedy on those critical days, Saturday, Oct. 27, and Sunday, Oct. 28. We can predict the results with certainty.

The U.S. forces were prohibited from carrying nuclear weapons. The commander had sent a message to the joint chiefs and to me, asking for such authority, and we told him he was crazy.

He said, "We know we're going to face tactical nuclear weapons," and we replied, "It's beyond belief. You are prohibited from carrying nuclear weapons."

But no one should believe that the U.S. troops, had they been attacked with nuclear weapons, would have refrained from calling on the nuclear forces that were at the ready in the U.S. And where would it have ended? In utter disaster.

The Nuclear Power Debate

Human beings are fallible. We all make mistakes. In our daily lives they are costly, but we try to learn from them. In conventional wars, such mistakes cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if such mistakes were to affect decisions relating to the use of nuclear forces, they would result in the destruction of nations. Surely this must lead to the conclusion that, insofar as achievable, we should seek to return to a nonnuclear world.

An agreement among nations to eliminate nuclear weapons must provide, of course, for protection against violators. There are many ways by which this can be done. I won't discuss them here other than to say none of them would require retention, at most, of more than a few hundred weapons by the existing nuclear powers or by a supernational authority. Compare that figure with the 9,000 or

10,000 that are likely to remain in 2003 under the START II regime.

More and more political and military leaders are accepting that basic changes in the world's approach to nuclear weapons are required. Some are going so far as to agree that the long-term objective should be to return, insofar as practical, to a nonnuclear world.

But that's a very controversial proposition. Leading Western security experts, both military and civilian, continue to believe that the threat of use of nuclear weapons prevents war. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, has said with reference to a proposal for eliminating nuclear weapons: "It is a plan for making the world safe for conventional warfare. I am therefore not enthusiastic about it."

A report of an advisory committee, appointed by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, makes essentially the same point.

However, even if one accepts their argument, it must be recognized that their deterrent to conventional force aggression carries a very high long-term cost: the risk of a nuclear exchange.

John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, recognized this problem nearly 40 years ago. I was amazed to read a year or so ago that in 1954 he wrote in a very highly classified, top-secret assessment of nuclear strategy:

"The increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons is creating a situation in which national objectives could not be obtained through war, even if a military victory were won."

Dulles went so far as to state, "Atomic power is too vast a power to be left for the military use of any one country." Its

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use, he thought, should be "internationalized for security purposes." He proposed, therefore, to "universalize the capacity of atomic thermonuclear weapons to deter aggression" by transferring control of nuclear forces to a veto-less United Nations Security Council.

Dulles' concern in 1954 was echoed very recently by a committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in a report that carried a number of signatures, among them that of General David C. Jones, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report stated, "Nuclear weapons should serve no purpose beyond the deterrence of nuclear attack by others."

Should we not begin immediately to debate the merits of alternative long-term objectives for nuclear forces of the five declared nuclear powers, choosing from among three options:

1. A continuation of the present strategy of "extended deterrents"—as recommended in the above-mentioned report of Secretary Cheney's advisory committee—but with the U.S. and Russia each limited to approximately 3,500 warheads, the figure agreed upon by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush.
2. A minimum deterrent force—as recommended by the committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences—with each major nuclear power retaining 1,000 to 2,000 warheads.
3. As I strongly advocate, a return, insofar as practicable, to a nonnuclear world.

Controlling Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

While we're debating those issues, shouldn't we also debate how best to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among other nations?

Over the last three decades, efforts have been made to limit the spread of

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was agreed to in 1968, and the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. The treaties have done much to slow the spread of these weapons.

Yet today, at least three countries—Israel, India, and Pakistan—in addition to the five declared nuclear powers, are believed to possess the capability and the materials to rapidly assemble, if they have not already assembled, nuclear weapons. Others are said to have a biological weapons capability. And still others are carrying out research that could place them in these categories. Of equally great concern, about 25 countries have ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

It is clear that the international community needs to redouble its efforts to limit the spread and prevent the use of these weapons of mass destruction. Returning to a nonnuclear world, insofar as that's achievable, would greatly strengthen the hands of those who seek to control or limit the spread of other weapons of mass destruction.

One of the main complaints of the nonnuclear developing countries has been that the nonproliferation treaty is a discriminatory agreement which prevents them from acquiring nuclear weapons without requiring those already possessing weapons to dismantle their arsenals. From this point of view, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which do not distinguish between "haves" and "have nots," are preferable models.

I think it is time to confront the issue head on. If we truly want to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them, I see no alternative to some form of collective, coercive action by the Security Council. To begin with, the Council should agree

to prohibit the development, production, or purchase of any nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles by nations not now possessing them. Countries in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions would be subject initially to strict economic sanctions on the part of the international community. If those sanctions failed to alter their behavior, a United Nations military force would destroy the weapons.

Countries now in possession of such weapons of mass destruction would be subject to international inspection and control and **would be** asked to approve a treaty prohibiting "First Use."

Potential for Reductions in Military Expenditures

As we move toward a system providing for collective action against military aggression wherever it may occur, military budgets throughout the world can be reduced substantially. Those budgets now total nearly \$1 trillion per year, of which the U.S. accounts for roughly \$300 billion.

I believe that during this decade that trillion dollars could be cut in half. The huge savings of \$500 billion per year could be used to address the pressing human and physical infrastructure needs across the globe.

In the case of the U.S. it should be possible, within 6 or 8 years, to cut military expenditures from the 1989 level of 6% of GDP to below 3%.

Military expenditures of (developing countries, which as I've said come close to spending \$200 billion per year, approximately 5 percent of GDP, could be reduced by the end of the century to 2 or 2½ percent.

The costs of wars, the costs of arms procurement, and the costs of defense in these developing countries have caused a number of them to sacrifice social and economic advance, and let me turn to

Pakistan to illustrate this point. I turn to it not because it's the greatest offender, and certainly not because it's the only offender, but it an easy case to consider.

Pakistan's defense expenditures approximate 7 percent of GDP. It's a country with significant unmet political and economic development needs, and I believe those have been sacrificed to finance the defense program.

For example, in the late 1980s, only half of Pakistani school-aged children were enrolled in primary education facilities, and only one-fifth were receiving secondary education. The percentage of females in primary school and secondary education was less than the average—about half as much as the percentage of males.

Even in the lower-income and middle-income Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka or China, the primary school enrollment and the secondary school enrollment, as a percent of children in the age groups, was about twice the level of the enrollment in Pakistan.

Health statistics offer a similar picture. In countries such as Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama, the population per nurse is about 500; in Pakistan it's about 10 times that high. As a result, infant mortality in Pakistan is more than twice as high as in those other countries, and life expectancy is much less.

While it is extremely difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions about the relationship between poverty and military expenditures from statistics such as these, it is clear that a country such as Costa Rica, which has only an 8,000-person Civil and Rural Guard force, and which devotes less than 1 percent of its GDP to military-related expenditures, has more resources at its disposal for social and economic purposes than countries that spend nearly an order of magnitude more on the military.

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One of the most important effects of military expenditures, which has serious implications for political advance and for economic growth and development in the developing world, is the degree to which it strengthens the political influence of the armed forces at the expense of the civilian groups within society.

In many parts of the Third World, economic systems function primarily to benefit a relatively limited number of people, and political systems are frequently manipulated to guarantee continued benefits to the elite. If development that meets the needs of all social groups is to occur, if democracy is to spread, there must be, among other things, a relatively equitable distribution of resources. This, in turn, relies on the existence of a political system that both allows all groups to articulate their demands, and is capable of producing workable compromises between competing interests. The greater the political power of the security forces, the less likely it is that the requirements for democratic governance will be met.

Linking Financial Aid and Military Expenditures

The role of the military is, of course, the prerogative of each government. Nonetheless, the international community needs to identify ways in which it can reward those countries that reduce security-related expenditures in favor of development.

Therefore I strongly urge the linking of financial assistance, both from OECD nations and from multinational financial institutions, through conditionality, to movement toward "optimal levels" of military expenditures. The optimal levels should take into account the external threats to a given country.

The conditionality, this relationship between external financial aid and developing country military expenditures, can

take many different forms. One form was proposed in *Facing One World*, a report of a committee set up by the Secretary General of the United Nations and chaired by former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The group, which included ex-presidents or ex-prime ministers of both developed and developing countries, urged that, when decisions concerning allocations of foreign aid are made, special consideration be given to countries spending less than 2 percent of their GDP in the security sector.

I am conscious that application of conditionality, in whatever form it may take, will be difficult and contentious. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, an essential part of the solution to the waste represented by excessive military spending in poor countries.

Conclusion

In sum, with the end of the Cold War, I do believe we can create a new international order. And yet we have barely begun to move in that direction.

If together we are bold-if East and West and North and South dare break out of the mind-sets that have guided us for the past four decades-we can reshape international institutions, and relations among nations, and we can reduce military expenditures, and we can do so in ways which will lead to a more peaceful and far more prosperous world for all of the peoples of our interdependent globe.

It's the first time in my adult life we've had such an opportunity. Pray God we seize it.



Q How do you view the relationship between regional organizations and the larger world community?

I don't think the regional organizations have attempted to play a role. For example, the OAU (Organization of African Unity) is moribund. They can't agree they should play a major part in Somalia. I don't believe the people of the United States are going to put 25,(X)() people into another Somalia without the OAU being present.

We're going to have to allow a little time for these regional organizations to be strengthened. In the case of Somalia, for example, the OAU should be encouraged to address this issue, to lay down some standards of potential intervention.

I think the U.S. should assume a major part of the responsibility for the weakness of regional organizations today, as well as for the weakness of the United Nations. The U.N. has been ineffective for 30-odd years. It is still suffering from the determination of the West and the East that it would not succeed. It's going to take time to rebuild it.

Progress has been made. We're all deeply indebted to the U.N. Secretary General for his initiatives, but we've had tens of thousands killed in Bosnia, we've had tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands die of famine in Africa, we've had millions of refugees across the face of Europe and across Africa, and we stand the risk of many, many more of these conflicts.

We must turn to the regional organizations. There isn't even any such organization in the Pacific. We must bring together, in some form of structure, Russia. China. Japan, the U. S., and the major nations of the Pacific Rim, and talk about how we're going to address common security problems in that region.

It'll take time to do this, and while we're doing it. I think the U.N. is going to have to assume more responsibility than I believe ultimately it should.

Q *What do you think of the threat to world security as a result of the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels, extracting weapon-grade plutonium? Specifically, what do you think of Japan's current practice of shipping its spent nuclear fuel to France and Britain, where they are reprocessing it, keeping the waste, and then sending weapon-grade plutonium back to Japan? Can a high-technology nation like that, with the reservoir of plutonium, become a super nuclear power overnight?*

Japan can become a super nuclear power any time it wants to, whether it reprocesses the plutonium or doesn't, and I think it's about time we all recognized that, including the Chinese.

I attended a meeting a year ago in Beijing, and they tried to get the group to sign on to a proposition stating, "All foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign bases."

I said, "Let me tell you something. There isn't a Chinese in this room who on a secret ballot will, or should, vote for that proposition. What do you think would happen in the Pacific if we withdrew all our troops? Do you want Japan to be a nuclear power? If you don't, you'd better develop some long-term) stable security system for the Pacific. It doesn't exist today."

The U.S. has no legal obligation to defend Israel, but it does have a legal obligation to defend Japan. That situation is unstable unless there is a relationship in the Pacific that will permit us to carry out that legal obligation in ways that are appropriate to our own security. That absolutely requires that we maintain forces in the area. I don't think we have to maintain forces as large as we have, and I don't think we have to maintain the kind we have, but if we want Japan to refrain over the decades from developing

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nuclear weapons, we've got to address the basic security requirements of Japan and the region, and we haven't done so.

Q *What transformations are needed in the Security Council to realize your objective?*

Wouldn't it be necessary to bring in Japan and Germany, and wouldn't that create enormous pressures to bring in Brazil and other countries? If the Security Council gets very big, it won't be able to do what you want.

You're absolutely right. If you add Japan, you've got to bring in Germany, and if you bring in Germany you already have France and Britain. Are you going to have three from Western Europe, and not Brazil and not India, and not Nigeria? That's impossible.

On the other hand, to negotiate a deal in which you open this whole thing up, we might end up with the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), in a sense. The ECOSOC is a totally ineffective body. And whatever we think of the Security Council, it's a heck of a lot more effective than ECOSOC, so let's keep it that way.

Why don't we set up a mechanism? For example, why don't we agree that France, Britain, and the U.S.—permanent members of the Security Council—will not vote on anything in the Security Council without consultation with Japan and Germany? If you want to take it to the extreme, let's agree that those three permanent members won't cast their votes unless they are representative of the votes of all five countries.

Now, I'm not really suggesting you go that far, but what I'm saying is that we can do much more than we are doing.

Q *The second point of your five points describing the new world order was that minorities within states should have some means of redress, other than violence, through some*

international involvement. At the present moment, I doubt that would be acceptable to any country, including the United States. How do you propose to proceed from where we are today to a situation in which that would be accepted?

I think we should begin to discuss the problem. I don't know that it's unacceptable, and I'd take it step by step.

The first proposition I made in that point was to codify the rights of minorities and ethnic groups. Some might take the position it's already codified in the charter of the United Nations. To some degree that's true, but the codification is so general it doesn't help us very much in dealing with the situation in Yugoslavia, for example.

I think we could begin by expanding the definition of minority rights and ethnic rights. There would be objection to it, but it could be done, and then we could set up a process that could be used by minorities that feel the prescribed rights in the codification are being violated.

But what do you do if codified rights are being violated, the process is being followed, and no relief is in prospect? That's when you get to the point of disagreement, and there I think you would find that the Security Council might well, under certain circumstances, agree to intervention.

In the case of Bosnia, suppose that the Security Council would have agreed to some action before the killing started, or before it went very far. What action would we have proposed? And what would have triggered it? How much killing would we accept before we reached the point where we were moved to act?

Take the list of 125 wars over the past 40 years that have led to the death of 20 million people, and, with hindsight, say what should we do? We no longer have the East-West struggle. We didn't address those in the past largely because of

the East-West struggle. That's gone, that's no longer an excuse for not addressing it.

Q *How important do you think population growth is to international security, and what's your recommendation for the United States in this area?*

There are two revisionist schools of thought that are saying the population problem is not a problem, or, in any event, that the way we are talking about dealing with it is wrong. One is a school of economists that maintains if you just let market forces operate, this population problem will be taken care of by itself, that intelligent parents, properly educated, will make the right decisions.

There's much evidence to show that increasing female education, just through the primary level, will, over time, lead to substantial reductions in fertility. Today fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa is running on the order of 6.2. That means the average female during her reproductive years will produce 6.2 children.

This school of economists would say, let's be sure every girl child in Sub-Saharan Africa goes to school, and this problem will take care of itself. If you look at a long enough period of time, that's correct.

But by the time that period occurs, the 500 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa today are very likely to be five times that, or about 2.5 billion. So I don't agree at all with that school.

The other school of thought is populated by many of my feminist friends, who tell me I'm trying to impose on females some form of restriction. I'm not; I'm simply trying to make available to females the opportunity for them to guide their lives, and to guide the lives of their children.

Why am I so concerned about it? Well, there are many, many reasons. There's considerable evidence to show that where these fertility rates are as high as they are in, say, Sub-Saharan Africa—6.2 or 6.3—the infant mortality rates are very high. Maternal mortality rates are very high; illiteracy rates are very high; caloric intake is very low. Caloric intake for the average of the 500 million people of Sub-Saharan Africa today would have to be increased 25 percent to even reach that of China.

The Sub-Saharan Africa population I've pointed to, at roughly 500 million today, is projected in recent figures from the World Bank to stabilize at about 2.9 billion. If you take into account the effect of AIDS, World Bank projections show population won't stabilize below about 2.7 billion.

Is that consistent with optimal economic and social advance for females and children and others in Africa? Definitely not. What can we do about it?

The first thing to do is to make contraception available to all who want it, and that is not now being done. Studies have indicated that there is a substantial demand for contraception beyond what is presently being met, but I think one has to go beyond that, and this is where we begin to get into controversy.

We cannot wait until we put all the females through primary school, and have a natural demographic transition take place. If we do, the present population of the globe, whatever it is—5.2 or 5.5 billion—may not stabilize below 12 or 14 billion, and I think that raises very serious social problems, and it may raise some sustainability problems.

The U.S. can take a lead. We are already doing quite a bit. There is about \$800 million a year in foreign exchange assistance made available to the developing countries for fertility reduction and

“Sub-Saharan Africa, the contraception prevalence rate is about 10 percent; that needs to be quadrupled”

contraception prevalence increases. Of that \$800 million, the U.S. provides on the order of \$300 million. Japan provides about \$50 million.

In addition, we need to increase the world foreign exchange flows to the developing countries, so that during this decade contraception prevalence can be increased significantly. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the present contraception prevalence rate is about 10 percent; that needs to be quadrupled.

If it's quadrupled, and continues on after that, the 500 million, instead of stabilizing at 2.7 billion, can be brought down to a stabilization level of 1.5 billion, which is three times what they have now.

There's a tremendous problem here, and the U.S. can do far more than it has in dealing with it.

Q Could you give us your thoughts on the relation of the economic recovery in the former Marxist countries to our national security, and how far we should be going to aid them?

I would be in favor of the West providing whatever economic assistance can be effectively utilized by those nations, to advance their rates of economic and social advance. That applies particularly to such countries as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. I'm not at all certain how much external financial assistance can be utilized in Russia itself.

Russia needs much, much more than it is presently receiving in the form of technical assistance, to help it restructure its institutions—its political institutions, its legal structure, its financial systems, its governance.

As an illustration, I don't think they're going to be able to privatize quickly their very large Russian institutions, nor do I think they need to do so in order to greatly increase the effectiveness of those. They can commercialize them, they can begin to insist they follow accepted principles of accounting. They can begin to insist that they use what are called "shadow prices" for their labor and their goods, and they can begin to insist they use some incentives.

To put it very simply, I would provide from the West whatever economic and technical assistance can be effectively used.