

Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and Technical Requirements

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LESSONS FROM RECENT OPERATIONS

“Their (the UN Security Council’s) work must be based on the (UN) Charter.”

Mr. Makins, Australia, first President of the Security Council, on its first meeting, London, January 17, 1946.

“The world has failed, and is continuing to fail to help me with support to get the job done.”

Shaharyar Mohammed Khan, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Rwanda, March 1995.

The above two statements are repeated to provide a theme for this paper. The statements were written at a time when the willingness and ability of the world to provide the resources required for the execution of an operation were being questioned around the world. In this case, it relates to the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia) operations being carried out under the mandate of the UN Charter. In its preparation, the author read again an article by Australian Senator Gareth Evans, in the Fall 1994 issue of *Foreign Policy*, in which he wrote:

Although many of the criticisms are justified, most responsibility rests not with the UN as an institution so much as with the failure of member states to provide the commitment and resources necessary to enact the needed reforms. It is hardly reasonable for states to deny the UN desperately needed funds, then blame it for the failures that lack of resources inevitably generate. Nor is it reasonable to blame the UN as an institution for the

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failures of member states in the Security Council to provide the decisive leadership.

This paragraph contains three words on which the author intends to concentrate, conscious that this may duplicate what others have already contributed, or will contribute: reform, resources and leadership.

Requirements in organization, planning, and operations are examined as they relate to the UN and its capacity for organizing and planning such operations, because it is from there that all else stems. These requirements are also examined where the application of technologies could have significantly improved the prospects for success, based on lessons learned from examples of “Extended Peacekeeping” and “Peace Enforcement.” Several technological essentials, rather than desirables, will be mentioned and a suggestion as to what the UN must do if reforms and requirements are to be satisfied. However, the UN’s bible, the Charter, must be looked at first.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT LESSONS

In strict UN Charter terms, only Korea, the Congo, Somalia and Kuwait qualify as true Chapter VII Peace Enforcement operations. Somalia is being covered as a special case by Admiral Jonathan Howe, and it would be impertinent of me to tiptoe into his territory. Korea and the Congo, both hardly recent, were special cases of a different nature; furthermore military technology has moved on since then, making many of their lessons less than currently relevant. Desert Storm also could be said to have been special because, in the field, it was essentially United States and not UN led. It has been evaluated often, and in many different ways, the inevitability of its outcome being explained as much by the differing standards of technology available to each side as by the ability of their soldiers to exploit it. So what are the relevant lessons from recent operations, that can help to improve the prospects for future peace operations?

PEACEKEEPING DEFINITIONS

Before attempting to identify those, and in order to eliminate confusion, the definitions of Traditional Peacekeeping, “Extended” Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement that will be used are those contained in the recently published U.K. Army Field Manual Volume 5, Operations Other Than War, Part 2, “Wider Peacekeeping” (the term the United Kingdom prefers to “Extended”).

- Traditional Peacekeeping is: “Operations carried out with the consent of belligerent parties, in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace, in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.”
- Wider Peacekeeping: “The wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.”
- Peace Enforcement: “Operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.”

THE UN CHARTER

The action that the UN may take “with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” called Peace Enforcement, is mandated by Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Article 41 says:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

and Article 42:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may

include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land force of Members of the United Nations.

Any examination of potential improvements to the execution of such operations must look at whether conditions will allow the various demands to be satisfied, and suggest what needs to be done to ensure that they can. But, referring back to Mr Makins, it must also include an examination of the Charter to see whether it too is adequate for its task, on the assumption that all action must be based upon it.

So far this Workshop has concentrated on Traditional and Wider Peacekeeping, usually conducted by ad hoc contributions from Member Nations. There has been much criticism of such ad hoc grouping, because of the problems present from trying to integrate many individual elements with widely differing capability and equipment. The one overarching lesson from all Peace Enforcement operations, including Desert Storm, is that any ad hoc grouping will not do in what is essentially war fighting, which must be conducted by a commander and staff trained and equipped for war fighting. The UN does not possess such a capability, although the pressure for it to maintain some form of standing force is again mounting, and a proposal will be mentioned later. Therefore, it has to fall back on Articles 43, 48 and 52. Article 43 states that:

1. All Members of the United Nations, to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and according to a special agreement or agreements assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

Article 48 allows particular forces to be employed in particular circumstances:

The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of

international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

Article 52 says that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements of agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Because Peace Enforcement amounts to little less than war fighting, many suggest that all that is required is the deployment of national contingents trained and equipped for high intensity conflict acting in the name of the UN. NATO nations will suggest that the most effective Peace Enforcement grouping can only come from NATO itself, using NATO procedures designed to deal with such a demand, employed under the Charter Articles quoted above. The Partnership for Peace countries involved in the current Enlargement of NATO, have been quick to recognize that the imperative of being able to take part in a NATO led Peace Enforcement operation provides a very valid reason for mastering and adopting those operational techniques and procedures that will enable them to do so effectively. In fact Desert Storm could be described as a NATO deployment in the name of the UN, to which non-NATO forces were added. However, because these forces were not familiar with operational procedures (which is not to say that they were not combat capable) they were given discrete missions, which contributed to the overall concept. NATO troops operated together on one part of the front, and non-NATO on another. In essence that is true, and suggests one way for the future, which has already been advocated by Kofi Annan, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Namely, that a lead nation should always be appointed in such circumstances, responsible not just for providing a command Headquarters, but for laying down

interoperability requirements and procedures to enable the force to operate coherently.

But when looking to the future, the political implications of NATO involvement cannot be ignored, because of its limited geographical area of interest. There are no similar politico/military structures in other regions such as the OAS or OAU. Therefore, unless NATO is to act “out of area,” this important operational lesson can only be “noted” elsewhere, hopefully encouraging the UN to find out how Peace Enforcement operations might be conducted outside the NATO area. Cambodia, as we have heard, was not a Peace Enforcement operation. Somalia contains several examples of how not to do it, with the whole U.S. contingent not being under the command of the Force Commander and some elements being commanded and controlled from Florida rather than Mogadishu. This is an organizational and planning point rather than a technological one, but it has implications for the employment of technology.

To revert to the employment of an agent such as NATO as military force provider, one particular benefit of current operations in the former Yugoslavia is that the UN and it have had to hammer out “dual-key” arrangements. These arrangements concern the use of air power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in support of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. NATO as an agent of the UN under the authority of the Security Council responds to requests made following violations of those resolutions. This is a pattern familiar to those who have been involved in internal security operations, as the British call them. To take Northern Ireland as an example, should the Police find that a situation is beyond their capacity to deal, such as a riot or a cordon and search, they hand it over to the Army, who use military means to solve the problem, and then hand back command to the Police. Translated into Peace Enforcement terms it should be possible for the UN to hand a situation over to a lead nation or an organization such as NATO, invite them to enforce a solution by military means, and then take over the post conflict “Peace Building” or “Reconstruction” part of a

mandate. Problems should only arise if the agent is tempted to take unilateral military action, which may seem perfectly reasonable, and even desirable, in military terms, but which conflicts with the overall direction of the UN Mission.

The example that most readily comes to mind is the NATO wish to take out air defense assets before bombing airfields from which air attacks had been mounted in Bosnia. Their removal, and the technology to facilitate this, entirely normal in war, could have made the UN look like a participant in, rather than a preventer of war. But the example introduces the point that because the UN does not own any high technology equipment, it must determine what is required and then ask for it to be made available. Who is to make that appreciation? After a brief look at the world in which the UN must plan and organize, the Organization itself must be examined to see exactly what special provision for Peace Enforcement is required.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY

There now exists a multiplicity of non-military threats to the way of life, safety, and well-being of the peoples of this planet, which deserve all our attention. In the future the most serious risk to the security of a nation may come from ethnic and religious conflicts, border disputes, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders), the collapse of governmental authority within a state or states, or many other problems with a potential for regional destabilization. Among these must be included: international terrorism, international crime, drugs and overpopulation in poorer and more troubled countries, which could lead to a migratory flood from them to the richer and more peaceful, bringing not only social chaos but rising racial antagonisms. This in turn could lead to resource wars over diminishing stocks of water, grazing land, timber and the like, nor should the effects of environmental damage be excluded.

What all this adds up to is that national security is becoming increasingly inseparable from international security. Threats to the security of a

nation must include anything, anywhere on the globe, which threatens the health, economic well-being, social stability and political peace of its people. Such threats can only be countered by the peoples of the world, but this will require the same kind of coordinated response as is afforded to countering military threats.

THE UN RESPONSE

The Charter, and the United Nations Organization itself, are children of World War II, and describe the world of the founding fathers, in which it was presumed that the problems with which it would have to deal were between nation states. Similarly the League of Nations, and its Charter, were the children of World War I. The UN was an update of the League of Nations, but there has been no such update since the end of the Cold War, other than the two documents (*An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*), on which member states have commented. That is not to say that many member states, and individuals, have not put forward many ideas about what needs to be done, but, so far, without any major result. The fact remains, that intervention in any of the circumstances described above risks breaking a cardinal principle of the UN, namely that it will not interfere with the internal affairs of any state. That was all very well when the world was made up of nation states, and it was disputes between them that had to be umpired, with their consent. The break up of these states however, leading to situations where any internal dispute is likely to spill across international borders, and where the only way to prevent this is to interfere, is changing the name of the game.

It is not suggested that a new Charter or a new United Nations is required, but rather a fundamental review of both, to ensure that they reflect current needs, and satisfy member states that their organization is both structured and mandated to cope with the problems thrown up by the break up of the 1914-1989 World order, and the emergence of its successor. But, to carry out that revision, member states must have a vision of

what additions and alterations they would like to be made, and why, so that they can instigate and evaluate what is required and proposed.

It is suggested that such a revision should be based on the premise that all UN activities are interventions in one form or another. And, that Peace Operations are a continuum of several interrelated activities, designed to cater for many different situations that may require action. Like all revisions it will require compromise between conflicting national views, but, if the end is agreed, the means should be easier to achieve.

Describing how the UN should tackle its tasks, Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace*, lists six “instruments for peace and security”:

- preventive diplomacy and peace making,
- peacekeeping,
- post-conflict peace-rebuilding,
- disarmament,
- sanctions, and
- enforcement action.

In a recent article in *Survival*, Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to Kofi Annan in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, lists five “different, though sometimes overlapping” kinds of activity in which UN peacekeepers are currently engaged in Europe:

- traditional peacekeeping—in Central Bosnia and Croatia,
- preventive deployment—in Macedonia,
- observation of a non-UN peacekeeping force—UNOMIG (in the nation of Georgia), and
- humanitarian relief—in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- conflict mitigation—in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Shashi Tharoor describes humanitarian relief as:

deploying UN peacekeepers tasked to mitigate an ongoing conflict by limiting the parties’ recourse to certain military means (in this case, maintaining an interdiction on the use of aircraft for combat purposes) or to attacks upon certain cities (protection of ‘safe areas’), in both cases backed up by the threat of military force pro-

vided by a regional security organization (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)).

The Secretary-General's six, and Tharoor's five can be compressed into three instruments:

1. preventive action,
2. conflict or chaos resolution, and
3. post-conflict rebuilding.

These instruments are not mutually exclusive and all of which are being implemented now in UNPROFOR. The deployment of peacekeepers in Macedonia is to deter rather than resolve conflict, therefore preventive; traditional peacekeeping and conflict mitigation are being used to attempt to resolve; humanitarian relief is attempting to do all three. But they represent the application of military and humanitarian means to political direction, if not a political aim, the lack of which has been so cruelly and starkly exposed in recent weeks. Those who preach that it is now time to switch to Peace Enforcement should bear in mind that Enforcement is the extreme method of Resolution. Its introduction must be weighed against the effect that it would have on all the other UN-related activities that are being conducted in the area.

Peace Enforcement will only be undertaken when Preventive Action has failed, and should be followed by planned and structured Reconstruction. Any intervention against or within a country without its consent, is nothing short of war, declared by the world community, for a particular purpose, and, hopefully, for a limited time. Therefore, unlike contributions to Traditional or Wider Peacekeeping, the major lesson for all contributors to Peace Enforcement operations is that, besides being under conflict capable command, all committed forces must be conflict capable, anything less being wholly inappropriate in circumstances in which all the modern technologies of war will be employed. It simply is not acceptable to send anyone naked on to the modern battlefield, which means being ill-trained or ill-equipped to fight and survive. This is seen very starkly in Yugoslavia, where some contingents lack any form of personal protection against the wide range of weaponry that can be brought to bear against them. Only the British,

French, Canadians, and Danes can be said to be satisfactorily equipped, which limits the deployment options of the Force Commander. The UN must establish a mechanism for evaluating contingent capability, which will now be considered.

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN THE UN

The organizational and planning shortcomings of the UN, and such essentials as unity of command, with full and common operational control of all assigned and contributed assets being vested in the force commander, will have been discussed already in the workshop, and therefore only a check list of points will be made here. None of them are new, but all arise from lessons learned. They are in no order of priority, but are based on an appreciation that it is the task of the UN to plan, mount and sustain, not command, operations.

The role of the Secretary General will remain the same. Every Mission mandate must be endorsed by the Security Council.

One has only to look through the bewildering number of Security Council resolutions on the former Yugoslavia to realize how unsatisfactory this process is in military terms. This state of affairs is understandable, given that resolutions reflect the political and diplomatic compromise possible among current members of the Security Council. But incredible and undeliverable mandates reflect on the credibility of the organization as a whole. This may not matter too much when more general activities are at stake, but it must not be so when Peace Enforcement is involved. By its very nature it implies military action, and that needs clear and unambiguous direction, particularly if it is being effected in the name of the world community. This highlights the need for such clear direction, from the UN, and again it is worth looking back at what the founding fathers intended for that purpose.

All military operations must have a clear aim. The problem of Security Council resolutions is that they translate into neither an aim, nor a clear military directive. The founding fathers, foresee-

ing this problem, intended there to be a Military Staff Committee under Article 47 of the Charter, whose responsibility and role would be to guide the Security Council. This was to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, and the Committee is now a vital missing link that could provide the solution to many of the problems mentioned. It should be reinstated now, not as the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five, but separately for each Mission, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of all nations contributing to a Mission. Its Chairman desirably, but not essentially, an ex-UN Force Commander should also be Military Advisor to the Security Council, and Secretary-General. This committee should be served by a small International Military Staff that would act as a military judgement panel on all Security Council resolutions with a military content.

The Committee should convene to confirm such essentials as force structures, the command status of national contingents and the powers of force commanders over them, rules of engagement, interoperability guidelines, intercommunication, staff procedures, equipment scales and technology requirements. All these are looked at in an ad hoc way, by inexperienced and limited staffs, at present. This is one of the principal reasons why there are so many shortcomings in the conduct of UN operations. Whether or not a nation has been invited to take the lead, ideally Force Commanders should be appointed early enough for them to take part in all this work, as well as having a say in the composition of their own Headquarters. This is an organization and planning essential, and a lesson from every single UN operation.

The role and responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will not change, but its staffing must be enhanced. A key element in this is the expansion of the role of the recently appointed Assistant Secretary General for Planning and Support, who is, in effect, Inspector General for Doctrine and Training, whose responsibilities should include:

- The preparation, issue and supervision of a common UN Peacekeeping doctrine.

- Identifying which nations can provide operational force multipliers such as Intelligence, Communications, Air, Logistics and Special Forces.
- Ensuring commonality of training standards.
- Laying down minimum interoperability standards for both battlefield procedures and logistics, and inspecting Member Nations to ensure compliance.
- Staff College training, to ensure that common procedures are understood.

He is the natural candidate for the task of contingent capability evaluation. Other organizational support to the UN points include:

- On the subject of a standing force, something much advocated to enable the Secretary-General to be able to undertake more effective Preventive Action, whether or not it is to be followed by Peace Enforcement deployment, it is suggested that the Allied Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)) be adopted as a model. Nations contribute troops, who live and train in their own countries, coming together only for exercises. It has a Headquarters, Communications, Fire Coordination Center and Logistics Headquarters, into which all contributing nations can plug. It is a model not just for the UN but for regional organizations such as the OAS and OAU, to enable them to act quickly in their own region.
- Field Operations Division, is increasing in capacity and competence. The Stand By Forces and Logistics studies have provided a much better data base of what resources are available among member nations.
- The newly appointed Under Secretaries General for Administration and Management and Internal Oversight Services have introduced a new spirit of realism into the commercial and procurement side of the UN which has long been needed. New personnel staffs are tackling the problem of identifying suitable people to serve on UN staffs, at all levels.
- Contingency planning remains the province of the Department of Political Affairs, as does the obtaining of political and strategic intelligence from member nations.

- The Department of Peacekeeping Operations remains responsible for maintaining 24 hr contact with an operational Headquarters, and for the provision of operational intelligence if this is required.
- On the subject of intelligence, although equipment is discussed later, a plea is made for the adoption of the Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR) procedures. Under this a commander is required to assess what intelligence is critical to him in the execution of his mission. His staff, and his superiors, will assess from where that information can be obtained, and then ask for it, on the grounds that it is "Mission critical." That obtaining includes the tasking of sources, technical or otherwise. When introduced within NATO, this procedure was designed to help staffs filter the increasing amount of information that was becoming available to them. If introduced within the UN, from the Security Council downwards, it could help to overcome the inhibitions of nations who, for entirely understandable reasons, are concerned that intelligence that they regard as a national asset might get into the hands of some who might use it against them. The reputation of the UN as a leaking sieve as far as information is concerned needs to be rectified if full advantage of the procedure is to be taken.

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN THE FIELD

The principal command and control lesson from Desert Storm has been mentioned already, namely that it is essential that only properly trained operational headquarters should be used to command Peace Enforcement operations, particularly if they are in the high-intensity conflict spectrum. That stricture applies to sea, land, and air operations, over which it may be tactful and sensible to appoint a Joint Force Commander, as was done on that occasion. At the tactical level it will always be better to leave national force contingents together, rather than be tempted to break them up. They have trained together, understand

their own battle procedures and techniques that apply at the level at which they will be fighting, and will make a far more effective contribution if allowed to operate in that way.

Within the assigned operational Headquarters, some branches must be internationalized, to enhance cohesion and understanding. This applies to four branches in particular—intelligence, personnel, logistics and public affairs, based on the premise that nations tend to be much more ready to cooperate if they are dealing with one of their own. The sensitivities of intelligence operations have already been mentioned. Personnel issues, particularly if casualties are suffered, are a major cause of political sensitivity, and disciplinary issues also have national overtones. Catering for logistic special needs and interoperability shortcomings is a major factor to be considered. Finally, there is the matter of public affairs. Nations also prefer to hear the story from their own people, told in their own way. The numbers of correspondents, and the ease of communicating, make censorship a practical impossibility, but control of operational information is an essential, particularly in Peace Enforcement, where secrecy is as much a need on occasions as in any other form of warfare. There are many other roles for the media, in the country of operations, and national media also have a most important role to play in the vital activity of encouraging governments and people to stay the course. Therefore, they must be handled with care, and coordinated direction of this process directed from the top.

TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS

All this is spelled out to suggest that the overriding organizational, planning and technical requirements of Peace Enforcement operations match those required in war, some of which are inherent in national armed forces and some of which must be ensured by the UN if such a Mission is to be conducted in its name. Weaponry requirements will have to be worked out in relation to the needs of a particular operation and the capability of the opponent. Desert Storm is an

admirable example of high technology contributing to the speedy execution of a Mission, something that the world community will always be anxious to achieve.

But the technology that is essential to the conduct, let alone the success, of a Mission is in the command and control area, particularly for communications and intelligence collection, collation, and dissemination. **The lunacy of not having secure communications was most recently illustrated in Bosnia, where the Bosnian Serb artillery fire was corrected onto Tuzla airfield by Bosnian Serbs listening in to the Norwegian contingent deployed at the airfield reporting on the artillery fire.** Thankfully, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) has been made available by the United States and so there is a degree of security between the UN Headquarters and Mission Headquarters. But it needs to go further than this, as operations in Somalia proved with secure communications down to sub-unit level, and even UN monitor level, must be the procurement aim.

But if communications are an essential for successful command and control, and only the best systems, such as the British Ptarmigan, will do. The UN attitude to intelligence, for far too long regarded as a dirty word, is another subject deserving at least a paper on its own. To quote from the report of the Commission of Enquiry established by the Security Council to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel:

The need to satisfy the UN's requirement for reliable information and intelligence gathering capability is important if peace enforcement operations are to be successfully carried out.

Peace Enforcement intelligence requirements are the same as in war, namely:

- Strategic intelligence, obviously required to understand the political situation between the parties to a conflict before UN involvement, and, once peacemakers are deployed, to anticipate the political moves of governments or factions, especially if there is a risk of violence.

- Political intelligence.
- Information about the economy and society of the country concerned.
- Operational intelligence, required to plan the most effective deployment of resources and to carry out the UN mandate. It will be particularly important in fluid and political situations.
- Tactical intelligence, needed by troops on the ground, to support Peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring cease fires in border areas, and to alert personnel to potential dangers. The management of intelligence at the tactical level can be influential in maintaining or losing the UN's credibility among the parties to a conflict.
- Counter intelligence against the parties hostile to the UN.

The UN cannot provide for all these, nor is it suggested that it should obtain them. All its needs can be met by member states, who own the technology, and who should be asked to provide it. This is where CCIR procedures come into play. Traditionally, nations collect, analyze and use intelligence for their own national purposes, retaining it under national control, and sharing it only with those whom they wish to share it. The UN, which presumably qualifies as a friendly government, requires intelligence for the good of the international community, and in the spirit of that integrity and impartiality that it seeks to maintain, must be quite open about what it needs and why. If, within a Peace Enforcement command and control structure, a commander assesses a piece of information as "Mission critical," then he should be able to ask for it, confident that it will be provided under that tag. That may require the tasking of collection means, such as satellites, information from which has just been offered by the United States in Bosnia. To divert to Wider Peacekeeping for a moment, the author is firmly of the opinion that lack of intelligence gathering, analyzing and disseminating capability is one of the most severe limitations on the capability of the Force Commanders, which is why the offer of U.S. assistance in Bosnia is to be applauded. But, in Peace Enforcement it would be sensible if one nation were

asked to provide a C3I system, which limits those nations with the necessary technology as the only viable providers.

There are two other high technology issues that must be mentioned, both associated with Peace Enforcement, but both relating to other instruments as well. The first, connected to Arms Control, a key ingredient of Preventive Action, which impacts on Conflict resolution and Post-conflict Reconstruction, is battlefield Explosive Ordnance Disposal. There is not enough space to cover this vast subject either in this paper, but the conference to review the 1980 *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* is an important one for the world community. Land mines, for example, are all too accessible, and, without demining, there can be no development. Therefore any UN Peace Mission must be equipped not just to take action to enable armed forces to move around a battlefield, but also to begin the task of clearing up afterwards so that normal life can be resumed.

The second is the burgeoning problem of non-lethal weaponry. The point is that the possession of these multiplies the effectiveness of any potential opponent, and defensive techniques against them are not only expensive in terms of men, money and machines, but also risk crossing the dividing line of impartiality and consent, that takes Wider Peacekeeping into Peace Enforcement. This is a subject that must not be ignored in the future, either in terms of what it may be appropriate to employ, or whose availability must be monitored.

CONCLUSION

So where does this leave us? Two major conclusions can be drawn, within each of which are a multiplicity of implications.

- First, as far as Peace Enforcement is concerned, every recent and current operation confirms that there is an urgent requirement for the UN to be reorganized so that it is capable of organizing and planning operations of that complexity. The lessons suggest that this reorganization must include all parts of the UN, for which the foundations are there for this to be done without a major upheaval, but without which command and control will continue to be flawed, and the credibility of the Organization diminished.
- Second, and arising from that, unless the best communications and intelligence handling technologies are employed, the UN will be unable to conduct such operations. It should not be tempted to try to establish these for itself, but rather to employ them, and those who can operate them, from those nations who own them. This may infuriate the Fifth Committee, who will seek a more international involvement in the process. But their involvement is that of a user, not a provider, of a force multiplier that they would be foolish to jeopardize. It may be that use in Peace Operations encourages more nations to procure such equipment, which is all to the good, provided the UN lays down the interoperability standards, because that should ensure swifter cohesion in any global force structure needed to enforce peace.