


*Grassroots Development: The African
Development Foundation*

June 1988

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Foreword

Grassroots development, to some, is a contradiction in terms. They identify development with industrialization, with large-scale transportation systems and U.S.-style agriculture with its expensive equipment. To others, grassroots development is a means to achieve results, an approach that has been missing from too many foreign aid programs and partly to blame for their failures. For yet others, grassroots development is an end in itself because it promotes people's well-being and empowers self-help groups to expand and make their own choices and bring about change.

Grassroots development may be a little of all these things to the members of Congress who established the African Development Foundation (ADF) in **1980**. This report is about the Foundation - the only program wholly funded by the U.S. Congress to support grassroots development in Africa. Our analysis of ADF's experience is broadly drawn; it will be of interest to anyone involved in self-help efforts of any kind. What works? What doesn't? And why?

This is OTA'S third report on U.S. foreign aid and African agriculture and the most comprehensive look at a single program. It complements a larger, more general work in press on enhancing agriculture in Africa and its already-published companion report on the Sahel Development Program. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, its Subcommittee on Africa, and the House Select Committee on Hunger requested this study. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, endorsed their request.

OTA'S special thanks go to the Washington-based and African staff of the Foundation who openly discussed their philosophy, their work, and their plans at length and who spent their holidays reviewing our draft. Also, we gratefully acknowledge the help of the people who participate in the 12 ADF-funded projects that we visited in Africa. They contributed their time, resources, knowledge, and enthusiasm to this assessment and it could not have been done without their help. Many others shared their insights with us, both in Africa and here in Washington. Members and leaders of the field teams, workshop participants, reviewers, and members of OTA'S Low-Resource Agriculture Advisory Panel all deserve, and have, our appreciation. As with all OTA studies, the content of this report is solely OTA'S responsibility.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF	—African Development Foundation	IAF	—Inter-American Foundation
AFC	—Agricultural Finance Corporation (Zimbabwe)	IBM	—International Business Machines, Inc.
AID	—U.S. Agency for International Development	ICIPE	—International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology
AJAC	—Association of Young Farmers of the Casamance (Senegal; acronym for French name)	IFAD	—International Fund for Agricultural Development
ALDEP	—Arable Lands Development Program (Botswana)	IUCN	—International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
AMA	—Boiteko Agricultural Management Association (Botswana)	KFM	—Kungul Fado Mango (Niger; acronym for Fulani name)
app.	—appendix	MISEREOR	—German Catholic bishops development assistance program
ARAP	—Arable Rainfed Agricultural Program (Botswana)	NGK	—Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati Self-Help project (Kenya)
ATI	—Appropriate Technology International	NGO	—Non-governmental organization
CEBEMO	—Dutch Catholic development assistance program (acronym for Dutch name)	NOVIB	—Dutch private development assistance organization (acronym for Dutch name)
CONGAD	—Council of Nongovernmental Organizations Supporting Development (Senegal; acronym for French name)	OMB	—Office of Management and Budget
CRF	—Country Resource Facilitator (ADF)	OTA	—Office of Technology Assessment
Cuso	—Canadian University Service Organization	PACT	—Private Agencies Collaborating Together
DHC	—Dakoro Herders Cooperative (Niger)	PAM	—Project Assessment Memorandum (ADF)
FAO	—Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	Pm	—Partnership for Productivity/Kenya
FONGS	—Federation of Nongovernmental Organizations of Senegal (acronym for French name)	PRC	—Project Review Committee (ADF)
FR	—Foundation Representative (ADF)	Pvo	—Private voluntary organization
FSK	—Farming Systems Kenya	RLO	—Regional Liaison Officer (ADF)
FTE	—Full-time equivalent	SAED	—Government regional development agency for the Senegal River Valley (acronym for French name)
FY	—Fiscal year	UN	—United Nations
GAO	—General Accounting Office	UNIFEM	—United Nations Development Fund for Women
		WID	—Women in development

Chapter 1

Summary and Options

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Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

The African Development Foundation (ADF) is a small U.S. development assistance agency faced with a large task: supporting grassroots development in Africa. Congress created ADF in 1980 to "enable the poor to participate in the process of development." As of 1987, ADF has given grants to organizations in 19 African countries and its FY 88 appropriations were \$7.0 million (figure 1-1).

OTA'S assessment confirmed the validity of the assumptions on which ADF was created and found that most ADF-funded projects were doing reasonably well. While a number of areas for improvement were identified, OTA concluded that the Foundation's reauthorization is justified, ADF would need additional funding, however, if it is to implement recommended improvements without reducing the funds available for new grants.

Scope and Methods

This report, done at the request of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, its Subcommittee on Africa, and the House Select Committee on Hunger, is intended to assist Congress with decisions about the African Development Foundation's role in U.S. foreign assistance. Consequently, this is not an evaluation of specific ADF-funded projects. Most of the Foundation's projects are in early stages of implementation and any final analysis must await their completion. Nor is this the final word on ADF. The Foundation is young and evolving. It has had some successes, and some problems. This report suggests some ways to overcome these problems and thus enable the Foundation to fulfill more effectively the unique role that Congress has designated for it.

This report examines ADF's overall funding program with a special focus on its agriculture and renewable resources projects and the use

of technology. As Congress requested, it looks at the broad impacts of ADF's work: the results, replicability, and sustainability of its projects; and how it fosters the participation of Africans in their own social and economic development (figure 1-2).

The assessment began with an analysis of recent evaluations of similar organizations to compare different evaluation methods and identify common problems. In addition, experts in project and program evaluation, grassroots development, and field evaluation methods were interviewed. Project files in ADF's Washington office were carefully reviewed to provide an overview of the Foundation's funding program and highlight potential problem areas. Field visits to 12 representative ADF-funded projects (table 1-1) and interviews with African and donor officials in Africa formed the foundation of the report's findings. Three regional field teams visited 6 countries, spending a total of 285 person-days gathering and analyzing information and suggesting possible improvements that ADF could undertake.


The Foundation cooperated fully with all parts of this work. For example, discussions with ADF staff provided a broad picture of ADF's activities. Members of the Foundation's African staff accompanied the OTA field teams on their site visits and assisted with local arrangements. Also, ADF provided substantial review comments while this report was in draft form. At the same time, however, OTA sought to ensure that its results were independent: selection criteria stipulated that no field team members had previous or current contractual relationships with the Foundation; ADF field staff did not participate in most interviews, including meetings with project managers; and the Foundation did not have access to OTA'S field assessment materials or the three teams' reports.

Figure 1.1.—Countries With ADF.Funded Projects



Map adapted from the African-American Institute, Inc., copyright @ 1984.

Figure 1 -2.—Flow Chart of OTA'S Assessment Methods



KEY: Items printed in capital letters are reports or written materials
Items printed in bold are meetings

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988

ADF Yesterday and Today

The Foundation was established by Congress in 1980 to complement official bilateral and multilateral development assistance programs such as those of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the United Nations. ADF's legislation was modeled on the Inter-American Foundation but its history is quite different. ADF had a difficult start. First, the Administration delayed appointment of ADF's Board of Directors until 1983. This stalled the agency's start-up because ADF's legislation required that the U.S. President appoint a Board to be responsible for the Foundation's management and to select its president. Then, high-level staff resigned in 1984 creating more uncertainty about ADF's program. As a result, Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to assess ADF's management capacity to implement its mandate. Although GAO raised some difficult issues, its qualified endorsement of ADF's capabilities led Congress to reauthorize ADF for five years beginning in 1985.

In 1984, under the leadership of a new president, the Foundation began to develop its funding program in earnest. Procedures were devised to identify potential grantees, approve grants, and conduct project monitoring and evaluation. Some processes, such as project approval, have changed little since 1984. Others, such as research and evaluation procedures, are being developed further now as the first projects are reaching completion. Certain key activities, such as the responsibilities for project approval, are under continuing ADF review.

ADF's Washington and Africa-based staff grew to 52 full- and part-time employees, contractors, and interns by February 1988. Twenty-five staff members are full-time employees, within the Office of Management and Budget's 27 full-time employee limit. Virtually all funding decisions are made in Washington, e.g., screening, reviewing, and approving project proposals. The addition of ADF's African staff (4 regional officers and 14 part-time country resource facilitators) is recent, however, and may alter this high degree of centralization.

ADF has awarded grants to 114 projects in 19 countries in Africa totaling \$10.3 million in

Table 1: The 2 ADF Projects Visited by OTA Teams

Name of project ¹	Name of recipient organization	Country	Type of recipient organization	Project scope ²	Grant amount	Proposal submitted	FY grant committed	Grant period (FY to FY)	First check disbursed	No. of participants (groups)	Type of activity (sector)	Goods or services offered by ADF grant	Intended outcomes
1. Farm Rehabilitation for the Agricultural Society of Dagnare	Dagnare Agricultural Society	Niger	Intermediary (association of coops)	R	\$88,817	2/27/85	1986	1986-89 3 yrs.	3/6/87	660 (3 groups)	Fruit, vegetable, and cereal production	Equipment, technical assistance	Restore and modernize cooperative irrigated fields
2. Dakoro Herders Cooperative (DHC)	Dakoro Herders Cooperative	Niger	Grassroots	L	7,255	7/9/85	1985	1985-86 1 yr.	1/8/86	74	Livestock production	a. Project planning. b. Livestock, commodities, training	a. Develop project plan b. Reconstitute livestock herd, repair well, and increase self-sufficiency
a. Planning Grant b. DHC II					08,275	7/24/86	1987	1987-90 3 yrs.	0/9/87		small enterprise creation		
3. Equipment to Strengthen the Agricultural Activities of the Association	Youth Association of Ros-Bethio	Senegal	Grassroots	L	58,639	2/88	1986-88	1986-91 5 yrs.	2/5/86	265	Irrigated agriculture (rice and vegetables)	Irrigation equipment, vehicle	Increase irrigated and vegetable production
4. Union Kaoural	Kaoural Federation of Cooperatives	Senegal	Intermediary (association of coops)		3/8,86	1986	1986-88 2 yrs.		9/87	2,076 (25 youth groups)	Fruit, vegetable, cattle, health	Equipment, commodities, livestock, construction	Improve group income and health care
5. Integrated Food Development Program	Department/Diocese of Morogoro	Tanzania	Intermediary (church-based)		248,378	1/2/85	1986-89 3 yrs.		2/2/86	106 1986/87 521 1987/88 (27 parishes)	Credit for inputs, tractor hire, maize production training	Equipment, commodities, credit, training	Increase maize production
6. Conservation Education Project	Kikati Village Malindi Club	Tanzania	Intermediary (PVO)	L	66,168	1/30/86	1986	1986-87 1.5 yr.	4/24/87	900 families	Water supply, forestry	Equipment, technical assistance, training	Improve water supply, and reforestation
7. NGK Self-Help Water Project	Gitero Self-Help Water Project Committee	Kenya	L		12/24/84	1985	1985-87 2 yrs.		5/22/85	250 families (3 communities)	Water supply (domestic and farming use)	Equipment, technical assistance	Increase water supply, irrigated land and potable water
8. Kenya Small Enterprise and Credit Training Project	Partnership for Productivity/Kenya (PPP)	Kenya	Intermediary (PVO)		24,880	10/84	1985-87 2 yrs.		5/1/85	2,750 (92 women's groups)	Training, (management) credit	Training, loan fund	Provide women training and credit for small-scale enterprises and agricultural inputs
9. Poultry-Market Garden Project	Boileka Agricultural Management Association	Botswana	Grassroots	L	35,072	8/84	1984	1985-87 2 yrs.	4/4/85		Poultry, vegetable and citrus production	Technical assistance, irrigation equipment	Develop small scale vegetable and egg production enterprises
10. Tutume Tractor Hire Project	Tutume McConnell Community Trust	Botswana	Intermediary (PVO)	L	40,604	5/30/84	1985	1986-89 3 yrs.	11/19/85	62	Tractor hire	Commodities, equipment	Increase productivity of farmers
11. Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea Project	Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)	Zimbabwe	Intermediary (parastatal)	L	7,31/84		1986-89 3 yrs.		2/24/85	144 1985/86 214 1986/87 (4 coops)	Credit for tea and coffee production	loan fund	Increase number of coffee and tea enterprises
12. Silvera House Development Fund	Silvera House	Zimbabwe	Intermediary (church-based)	R	20,808	7/0/84	1985	1985-88 3 yrs.	7/3/85	150 (11 projects)	Farm and nonfarm projects	loan fund	Improve projects through loans

¹Key: Italics indicate short form of project name used in this report.

²Key for project scope: L = Local, R = Regional

SOURCES: ADF project files for columns 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Communication from ADF staff for columns 6 and 10. OTA teams for columns 4, 5, and 11 through 14.

the past 4 fiscal years (1984-1987). Individual grants range from \$700 to \$250,000; projects average approximately \$90,000, including grant amendments. Most commitments are for 2 to 3 years. Two-thirds of the projects have agricultural activities as a major component; some support other rural activities such as potable water supply and still others provide aid to urban organizations (20 percent). The Foundation awards grants to grassroots organizations and to intermediary organizations that provide services to local groups. Funded groups use ADF money to repair wells, build small-scale irrigation systems, improve animal health, plant vegetable gardens and orchards, rent tractors, raise chickens, obtain credit for fertilizer, form cooperatives, and many other activities. ADF grants enable intermediary organizations to provide services such as credit, training and technical assistance to grassroots groups.

How Well Are ADF-Funded Projects Doing?

People's participation in ADF-funded projects, the projects' sustainability over time, and their replicability from location to location are fundamental aspects of ADF's congressional mandate. And appreciable positive results, leading to social and economic development, are expected to be a major outcome of supporting grassroots efforts. Therefore, these were the four critical issues—participation, positive results, sustainability, and replicability—on which the performance of the 12 visited projects was assessed (table 1-2).

Table 1-2.—Rating the Critical Issues in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Critical issue	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall Degree of Participation . . .	6	2 ^a	4
Overall Results	4	6	2
Overall Sustainability (for next 3 to 5 years)	6	5	1
Overall Replicability in Region or Country	3	7	2

Participation

Fostering the participation of Africans in their own development is an important goal of ADF. This assessment of 12 ADF-funded projects showed high overall participation in one-half of the projects but low overall participation in one-third. These ratings were adjusted for the local context and were based on elements such as people's support for project design and its technologies; their access to the project and benefits in light of their contributions; their role in project decisionmaking; and how participatory the recipient organizations are.

A number of issues remain for ADF to settle and, if addressed, are likely to improve the Foundation's record on participation. For example, ADF must give increased attention to the various elements that characterize participation, rather than allowing one, local control, to supersede all others. A project may be controlled locally, yet people who contribute time or other resources may not support the activities undertaken or take part in decisionmaking. Involvement in decisionmaking seems to be key but ADF has little information on this or other elements of participation.

In the 12 cases studied, either an African grassroots group or intermediary organization originated the project in every case. Of the funded groups visited, four were grassroots organizations and eight were intermediary organizations. More intermediary organizations had low participation than grassroots groups. Both types of organizations face difficult questions of access. For example, women have a low degree of access to projects in one-third of the projects visited, and rarely participated in management.

Generally, participants were representative of the community, agreed the project addressed a need, and shared equitably in costs and benefits. On the other hand, usually participants did not take part in evaluation and financial decisionmaking. A third of the projects were judged low on participants' acceptance of the proposed technologies, their share in project

management, and participatory provision of technical assistance.

Results

One of ADF's main purposes is to help bring about social and economic development. A way to assess whether ADF is achieving this purpose is to evaluate the results of ADF-funded projects. OTA'S rating of results was based on whether projects achieved their objectives and, more importantly, whether positive economic and social impacts had occurred, or were likely to occur, without significant negative effects, including those on the environment.

Because of the early stage of most of the projects visited, project results could only be estimated. Actual impacts were observable in only half of the projects. Ten projects were judged likely to have positive impacts on social and economic development of poor people in the locale but the levels of impact varied from significant to negligible. One project brought about a 30 percent increase in income for women who received small agricultural loans; an irrigation project doubled land value in another. Two other projects, however, were unlikely to benefit the poor even though they were likely to reach some of their objectives.

To adequately assess the results, or outcomes, of **projects**, the benefits must be considered in relation to the costs. Thus, OTA considered the contributions of ADF, the local communities, and other donors.

Ž Grant size and numbers of participants varied widely. As a result, ADF's grant size per person ranged from \$50 to \$3,507, averaging \$650.

- Just under one-half of the money ADF is putting into the 12 visited projects is spent for equipment. Another 18 percent goes into revolving credit funds. About 10 percent is spent in each of three categories: 1) agricultural inputs, 2) salaries and office expenses, and 3) ADF audits, evaluations, and other expenses including contingency funds. The remainder funds vehicles, transportation, training, and technical assistance.

- Communities usually provide labor for projects. In six projects, a majority of participants also provide some money and materials.
- All 12 of the visited organizations were recipients of funds from other external donors in addition to ADF. In four of these cases, the specific project funded by ADF was also funded by other donors. The other donors include AID, the U.S. Ambassador's Self-Help Fund, European religious donors, European and U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOS), private foundations, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.

Sustainability

Sustainability generally means that project activities or results will continue after the grant period. OTA judged ADF-funded projects on several levels: sustainability of the project, of project-related activities, and of the local group and/or intermediary organization. Also, sustainability includes economic, environmental, technical, and social factors; each was assessed independently but then combined in an overall rating.

Almost all ADF-funded activities were judged to have a high or moderate potential to be sustainable over the next 3 to 5 years. Changes were underway in a number of projects, though, and their eventual form might differ considerably from that proposed in the original project documentation. Community support and the self-help nature of the projects were the strongest reasons for sustainability. But the lack of careful economic and environmental planning were common constraints threatening sustainability, especially in the longer term. The most common constraint to economic sustainability in ADF-funded projects is lack of provision for future ongoing, or recurrent, costs (affecting five projects). Three projects already show negative environmental consequences—soil erosion, soil compaction, and land clearing without adequate reforestation.

The poorer performance of ADF-funded projects regarding longer term sustainability also

relates to the technologies being used. Almost all of the projects were judged technologically sustainable in the short term. Technologies used in nine projects, however, were relatively high risk; those in five were relatively complex; and those in five were comparatively high cost.

Replicability

Donors seek replicability to increase the impact of their funding program. Grantmakers, such as ADF, that fund small-scale projects intend that their sponsored projects will benefit local people, but they also intend them to have wider impacts. Replicability refers to more than the duplication of project activities, it includes dissemination of technologies, organizational methods, or skills beyond the funded group. In judging replicability of projects, OTA considered 1) the potential for other groups in the region or country to use the technology or repeat the project activity and 2) whether aspects of the organization's management structure or style could be beneficial to other groups.

Ten of the ADF-funded projects visited showed a moderate or high degree of replicability in the region or country, and two a low degree. Self-help processes, such as the ways groups identified, planned, or managed their activities, were judged more likely to be replicable than the technologies used. The major constraint to replicability was the high cost of the project activities or technology. In seven projects, more than one-half of those visited, project activities were judged unlikely to be repeated for this reason. However, the majority of funded groups made some effort to spread what they learned. Most intermediary organizations planned to replicate project activities with additional local groups. In three cases, non-participants adopted technologies introduced by the ADF-funded projects.

Interestingly, three projects involving grassroots organizations have had an impact on national institutions. One was among the first village associations to obtain credit from the new National Agricultural Credit Bank in Senegal. Its successful irrigated rice project raised the expectation that other local associations could



Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

ADF funding allows groups to tap the wisdom and experience of their local leaders. This man leads a farmers' cooperative that produces tea and coffee in eastern Zimbabwe.

also handle credit. Another is seen by the Botswana Ministry of Agriculture as a successful pilot project on vegetable and poultry/egg production, worthy to be tried elsewhere by the Ministry. The third, a water supply and irrigation system built by residents of three communities, provides Kenyan officials with an example of lower cost local water projects.

How the Four Critical Issues Interact

Participation, positive results, short- and long-term sustainability, and replicability are all desirable but not necessarily simultaneously compatible. Generally, participation increases results. And positive results can increase participation and be a condition for replicability. On the other hand, over-emphasizing results can lessen participation, especially in the short term. And neither participation nor results are necessarily compatible with long-term sustainability, especially with environmental sustainability if dangers are dimly perceived. Thus ADF needs to balance the demands of these different aspects of its mandate in implementing its funding program.

ADF's Program and Possible improvements

Many of the ADF-funded projects that OTA examined are performing reasonably well. Some, however, have deficiencies regarding participation, sustainability, and replicability that are troubling given ADF's mandate. The Foundation inevitably made difficult choices as it translated its mandate into action. Together, those explicit and implicit choices have shaped ADF's funding program and they are reflected in the project findings discussed here.

The Foundation's choices in several areas have had clearly positive impacts. The Foundation has a highly committed staff with considerable African experience and it has contracted with qualified Africans to help carry out its program. It supports the growth of grassroots leadership and organizational capacity and its grant-making process is often flexible and responsive. The focus on agricultural projects is appropriate, and ADF's new evaluation program is promising.

In other areas, however, ADF is doing less than it could. Five major areas of improvement exist:

1. ADF's relationships with its applicants and grantees are not as effective as they could be. Decisions regarding ADF's evolving role vis a vis each funded group, such as the level of involvement, frequency of contact, and the balance between facilitation and evaluation, could be improved. Often ADF is too passive but at times it is too involved. In the former case, potential to assist the group's development is neglected. In the latter, the self-help process may be bypassed inappropriately.

2. Pre-funding analysis of project proposals is often inadequate in one or more of several critical areas: the socialpolitical context and organizational factors of the applicant group, technological choices, environmental implications, and the economic constraints and opportunities of the projected activities.

- Although ADF encourages a high degree of local control, other critical elements of participation, such as participants' involve-

ment in decisionmaking and access by women, minority groups, and the poor, are not sufficiently addressed. Thus, ADF is not fully meeting its mandate to foster participation by the poor in their own development.

- ADF's analysis of the stage of development—the growth and track record—of applicant groups and their relationship to government officials and other donors often is weak. Similarly, analysis of intermediary organizations and their relationships with grassroots groups has not been sufficient. As a result, ADF sometimes makes inappropriate decisions as to who, when, what or at what level to grant funding.
- Inadequate analysis of technical, environmental, and economic factors sometimes results in ADF funding projects with questionable technical soundness, economic and financial viability, and environmental sustainability. Also, ADF's work has not helped expand the choices of technologies available.

3. The way that ADF monitors projects often does not provide enough in-depth understanding and information to effectively facilitate implementation by project managers and participants. As a result, the Foundation misses opportunities to assist grantees and increase the likelihood of project success.

4. ADF African field staff are underused in pre-funding analysis and project monitoring. This slows decisionmaking, causes ADF to make funding decisions without the helpful analysis they could provide, and also means that funded groups are not receiving the best possible assistance.

5. ADF does not communicate sufficiently with other private and official development groups in Africa, so its ability to learn from others' experience and to help groups benefit from others' resources is reduced. Also, ADF does not prepare country-specific planning strategies to guide its use of sparse resources and place its work in context. This reduces its impact and makes it difficult for ADF to identify its specific role in each country.

In addition, other significant but lower priority problems exist. For instance, an unnecessarily long time passes between ADF's receipt of project proposals and the disbursement of project funds (12,5 months for the 12 visited projects). ADF has not yet completed agreements or reached informal understandings with the governments in 13 of the 19 countries in which it funds projects.¹ ADF's funding portfolio does not reflect the full range of possibilities granted in its legislation. The Foundation has not paid sufficient attention to evaluating its own funding program. Nor is its research program yet addressing issues raised by the organizations and activities it funds.

None of these problems is irremediable and ADF has begun to take steps to correct some already. For example, the Foundation is planning to expand the responsibilities of its African staff but has not yet clarified how to do this. The following suggestions could help correct these problems and are OTA'S high priority changes for ADF:

- revise and clarify the roles of staff in their working relationships with applicants and grantees,
- increase and improve pre-grant analysis and facilitate better planning by applicants during the project approval process,
- improve communication with the managers of funded projects and more actively help them identify problems and resources during project implementation,
- enhance the responsibilities of the African staff in project identification, approval, and monitoring, and
- increase communication with other development organizations, especially those that assist similar recipient groups. Begin to develop plans to guide its work in each country.

Each of these suggestions requires ADF to take a more active role as facilitator with its grantees, with its staff, and within the devel-

opment assistance community. OTA finds that such a role is consistent with the Foundation's mandate to support self-help efforts. This role, if it is pursued carefully, can be consistent with the Foundation's desire to encourage local control of funded projects and to avoid making funded groups dependent on the Foundation. For example, plans to guide ADF's work in each country that identify funding program priorities can be drawn up with the participation of grassroots and intermediary organizations. Also, they can be applied flexibly to be consistent with ADF's mandate to be responsive to local initiatives.

In implementing each of these suggestions, the emphasis should be on simple, inexpensive, and rapid methods. For example, existing appraisal methods could be used for collecting information quickly to enable ADF to make better decisions. OTA is not recommending expensive, large-scale feasibility or environmental impact studies. In some cases, small planning grants could enable ADF's applicants to conduct much of the pre-grant analysis themselves or to choose qualified consultants to do it for them. ADF, however, needs to select appropriate ways to verify independently the soundness of proposals and, when necessary, obtain outside expertise to appraise project plans. In most of these cases, African contractors could provide such verification by making short visits.

In addition to selected use of outside experts, ADF staff needs training (particularly in low-resource agricultural technology and economic and environmental analysis) to conduct better analysis of proposals and to assess the work of consultants.

Also, ADF should give some attention to these lower priority improvements:

- Streamline the project approval process and reduce unnecessary delays.
- Conclude agreements with African governments where appropriate.
- Evaluate and address issues regarding the limited scope of its current portfolio, such as ADF's emphasis on funding income-generating activities and the large portion of its grants for equipment.

¹ In early 1988, ADF completed agreements with Sierra Leone and Ghana, reducing the number of countries without agreements to 11 of 19.

A variety of private and official development assistance programs have developed specific programs and procedures that ADF could learn from to address these various problem areas. But ADF also has a unique role, different from other official U.S. development assistance programs. ADF should develop additional creative ways to meet the concerns discussed here.

Every suggestion carries a price tag. Improvements in efficiency of resource use would enable ADF to implement some suggestions without additional cost, but most of these changes will increase operational costs. If ADF is to maintain its current level of annual grants, it is unlikely that it could make the changes suggested here for less than a \$500,000 to \$700,000 increase in its annual budget. The majority of these funds should be used to increase the responsibilities of the African staff and provide them with the resources to carry out new duties. Some funds would be needed for additional Washington staff and increased travel. The remaining funds could be divided among short-term contracts, staff training, and ADF's research program.

Lessons For Other Organizations

Congress, in directing the Foundation to share the results of its work, expected that ADF

would learn from its successes and its disappointments and that other development assistance groups could benefit from ADF's learning. Indeed, ADF shares many of the deficiencies highlighted here with other funders and it can serve as a positive model in some areas.

The Foundation can successfully exemplify certain aspects of funding program management, such as maximizing local control of externally-funded work, using Africans to provide technical assistance and conduct evaluations, and providing funding for planning grants. Also, ADF has, by and large, established effective congressional relations that could be instructive for other government-funded agencies.

Finally, this assessment offers its own lessons to other evaluators: program and project assessments create complementary pictures of an organization's status and external evaluations are useful additions to ongoing internal ones. The findings of ADF's own internal project evaluations are confirmed by this assessment and they are parallel to those reached during evaluations of similar development assistance groups. This consistency indicates that the issues raised are of significance not only to ADF but also more generally to all programs designed to support grassroots development.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Congress has several tools available for influencing ADF's work—authorization, appropriations, and oversight. Each has been used in the past. For example, Congress examines ADF's appropriation annually when the Foundation testifies before the appropriations committees and when the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees set funding levels during the authorization process. The Foundation's staff have testified before other committees, and thorough congressional oversight has been conducted by congressional research agencies: 1) the General Accounting Office, in its 1984-1985 study of ADF's management capacity and, 2) the work reported here. Until this time, Congress had not conducted a broad ex-

amination of ADF's enabling legislation nor made substantive changes in it.

This section addresses how Congress could use these tools to improve ADF's effectiveness (table 1-3). The congressional options suggested here fall into two categories, according to their priority:

- High Priority Options
 - Reauthorize ADF.
 - Set overall levels of appropriations, e.g., increase appropriations by \$500,000 to \$700,000 per year for two years to enable ADF to make high priority changes in conducting its funding program or hold

appropriations constant until such changes are made.

- Withhold major oversight for an interim period; then, examine the changes implemented and consider increasing the annual appropriation for grants by \$2 to \$3 million.

Ž Other Options

- Amend ADF's authorizing legislation to:
 - a) remove the \$250,000 limit on ADF projects and b) require that ADF's Board of Directors be bipartisan.
- Amend ADF's appropriations and/or authorizing legislation to a) arrange for funds from terminated projects and loan repayments to return to ADF's account, b) allow grantees to keep project funds in interest-bearing accounts, and c) provide no-year funds.
- Conduct oversight regarding specific items such as women's participation in ADF-funded activities, environmental impacts, and funding delays.

Reauthorization: Permanent v. 5-Year

The Foundation's enabling legislation includes a provision for expiration of the Foundation's authority in 5 years. In 1985, ADF was reauthorized for its second 5-year period. Congress will face the issue of reauthorization once again before 1990.

Although ADF can make a number of important improvements, its problems are not serious enough to question the Foundation's authorization. Nor have the assumptions that justified ADF's creation been altered. To continue ADF, Congress could: 1) extend the Foundation's authority for another 5 years, or 2) delete the requirement for reauthorization, providing ADF with permanent authority. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. A 5-year reauthorization provides ADF with an impetus to make improvements because it will be re-evaluated in 5 years. Thus, reauthorization gives Congress another 5 years to appraise ADF's work and maximizes Congress' leverage over the Foundation. This approach, however,

Table 1-3.—Summary of Congressional Options

Reauthorization

1. Regarding reauthorization of the agency:
 - Ž delete provision requiring periodic reauthorization of ADF, or
 - reauthorize ADF for another five-year period following its expiration in 1990.

Appropriations

1. Regarding overall levels of appropriations for a 2-year interim period:
 - hold appropriations constant, pending high priority programmatic changes, or
 - Ž increase appropriations \$500,000 to \$700,000 to fund high priority program changes with or without earmarking, then conduct oversight on ADF's improvements and evaluate higher appropriations for grants.
2. Increase the annual appropriation for grants by \$2-\$3 million at the end of the interim period.

Oversight

1. Withhold major oversight for a 2-year interim implementation period.
2. After 2 years, conduct formal oversight on high-priority topics such as ADF's pre-funding analysis of projects; its relationships with grantees; project monitoring and evaluation processes; use of African staff; and communication with other funders.
3. Also, routinely discuss specific issues with ADF, such as women's participation in projects, environmental impacts, and funding delays.
4. Evaluate the qualifications of nominees to the ADF Board of Directors before Senate confirmation.

Other Legislative Options

1. Fine-tune authorizing legislation to make ADF more effective:
 - eliminate the \$250,000 project limit, and
 - specify bipartisan composition of the Board of Directors.
2. Amend appropriations or authorizing legislation to:
 - allow terminated grant funds and loan repayments to return to ADF's account,
 - provide ADF with no-year funds, and
 - allow guarantees to use interest-bearing accounts.

must be balanced against some disadvantages: temporary reauthorization may contribute to uncertainty about the Foundation's future and work against ADF's establishing the long term programs encouraged by the congressional mandate. Also, short term reauthorization increases pressures on the Foundation to fund projects with quick results, an approach that could jeopardize other important aspects of its mandate such as participation and sustainability.

As an alternative, permanent authorization, like that supporting the Inter-American Foundation, could be achieved by deleting the requirement for periodic reauthorization. This

could encourage ADF to take a longer term perspective. Congress could use other methods, such as appropriations decisions or oversight hearings, to provide ADF with incentives to make improvements.

Appropriations

The Foundation has sought increases in its appropriations every year since its inception; its FY 1988 appropriations are \$7.0 million. At the time of its 1985 Five Year Plan, ADF anticipated a many-fold increase by 1990, expecting to reach \$30 million. While congressional budget realities have dashed those expectations, ADF still seeks to expand its program, convinced that it has the capability to accomplish more in more places. Certainly as Congress experiences frustration with the poor development record of larger agencies, the temptation is strong to channel additional money to groups using alternative approaches.

ADF would have no shortage of activities to fund if more money were available. The Foundation receives requests to develop programs in countries not yet funded and to undertake more work in those countries where it already has programs. The Foundation estimates that it has received approximately 1,335 project proposals and 1,168 letter inquiries since commencing funding in fiscal year 1984. Although OTA has not estimated how many of those proposals are appropriate for funding, it is clear that the Foundation could expand its program to additional countries with serious interest, such as Burundi, Gabon, Madagascar, and Swaziland.

The contractors involved in OTA'S assessment each evaluated ADF's funding program and level of funding. Virtually all raised serious concerns about certain aspects of ADF's funding program: particularly the need for ADF to redefine its relationship with applicants and grantees, to perform better pre-grant analysis, to do more effective project monitoring, to increase reliance on its African staff, to improve communication with others in Africa, and to begin to prepare country plans.

None of OTA'S experts, however, judged that ADF's appropriations should be decreased. Almost all thought that increases in ADF's grant program were warranted, especially if the Foundation made the high priority changes discussed here. A few stressed the opinion that funding should remain constant until the changes were accomplished.

Should ADF's Funding Be Increased?

Congress has several options to consider regarding future funding for ADF: hold total appropriations constant, pending high priority programmatic changes; or increase appropriations for the types of changes suggested here, giving either general direction or specific earmarking regarding the money's use. Any increased funding for grants should be deferred until ADF successfully makes the suggested improvements.

Of these funding options, holding ADF's funding steady while asking for important changes is the least likely to be effective. OTA estimates that the changes suggested here could cost the Foundation \$500,000 to \$700,000 annually if undertaken all at once. The Foundation could not allocate this amount of money to new tasks without diverting funds from grants, thus reducing the amount available for new projects. If Congress used this option, ADF's non-grant costs would increase and its obligations for new grants would decline substantially.

Another option would be for Congress to increase ADF's appropriations by an amount adequate to make these high priority improvements for, perhaps, two years, then plan hearings to evaluate ADF's actions. This option could be implemented by 1) earmarking funds for specific types of reforms, or 2) providing non-earmarked funds with general direction regarding their use and then using oversight to ensure implementation. The first option gives Congress maximum control but cuts ADF's flexibility. Generally, OTA finds that congressional micro-management is inappropriate and that it decreases programs' effectiveness (46). In this case, some general congressional direction, i.e.,

to improve ADF's operation of its program rather than increasing funding for grants, seems warranted regarding the intended uses of interim funding increases. Detailed earmarking is probably not necessary, however.

Many people find ADF's mandate innovative and judge its projects at least as successful as those supported by other donors. OTA found that ADF could make use of more funds if its program were improved. Therefore increased appropriations for grants, as distinct from other administrative and program changes, could be provided at the end of an interim period if ADF demonstrated that improvements had been made. With more solid analysis underway, with increased responsibilities for African staff, and with improved, streamlined procedures in place, ADF probably could effectively absorb a \$2 to \$3 million increase in project funding by fiscal year 1991, bringing its total appropriations to \$9.5 to \$10.7 million (in 1988 dollars).

Options that designate new funds for making the changes suggested here will temporarily tip ADF's budget toward a larger proportion of administrative and other non-grant costs because the high priority changes are operational ones, such as expanding the use of African staff and providing additional staff training. Operational costs, in this report, refer to the broad category of all non-grant expenses, including administrative costs. Some people, however, feel that ADF's non-grant costs are already too high. The Foundation calculates its administrative costs at 38 percent for fiscal year 1986, 35 percent for fiscal year 1987, and 31 percent for fiscal year 1988 (using a method sim-

ilar to that used by the Inter-American Foundation). OTA calculates ADF's operational costs (comparing all non-grant expenses to the total committed appropriations) to be 42 percent in fiscal year 1986 and 43 percent in fiscal year 1987.

If ADF received new appropriations of \$500,000 to \$700,000 and used the money as discussed here to improve its operations, its non-grant costs could approximate 50 percent of the total budget in fiscal years 1989 and 1990. This shift to a higher percentage of non-grant costs should be temporary, however, and viewed as a short-term investment in ADF's long-term effectiveness. OTA expects that, over time, immediate, non-grant improvements would enable the Foundation to handle larger amounts of grant-related funding, thereby reducing the proportion of non-grant costs. Thus, discussions between Congress and ADF concerning ADF's operational costs should focus on the best use of non-grant funds to support an improved grants program rather than only on the proportion of non-grant costs. Temptations are strong to make easy cuts or to increase average grant size when pressures exist to curb the proportion of operational expenses. Many of those cuts, for example, in staff travel and training, could hurt the Foundation's grants program.

Congressional Oversight*

The Foundation's efforts for effective congressional liaison seem to be motivated by a sincere desire to keep Congress well acquainted with ADF's work and to create and maintain solid working relations. For example, the Foundation's attitude was cooperative and open throughout this assessment and it responded rapidly to requests for information. Evidence exists that ADF also is responsive to key congressional committees and that it has sought to improve its performance as a result of outside suggestions. The Foundation is aware already of many of the concerns highlighted in this report. It is tackling some of these problems now and, based on its record, is likely to respond conscientiously to OTA'S findings.

ADF's approach is different from other donors. Most ask the people to contribute to projects the donors have selected. These projects may meet a need, but are not a priority of the people. "please cooperate with us," they say. ADF's approach is "let the people decide."

Charles Keenja, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government and Cooperative Development, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. OTA interview, Sept. 1, 1987.

A Short-Term Reprieve From Major Oversight

No need exists for extensive congressional oversight immediately. ADF has hosted two major external examinations of its work in the past 4 years. These reviews are likely to improve ADF's effectiveness but each has absorbed a considerable amount of staff time and resources. Now that high priority areas for improvement have been identified, Congress could relieve ADF from further external investigation while it implements high priority improvements.

High Priority Oversight Topics

At the end of a 2-year period, however, ADF should be given the opportunity to demonstrate what it has accomplished of the high priority changes suggested in this report and how these alterations are affecting its budget. Congress could determine then whether further funding increases are appropriate.

Congress could, for example, ask the Foundation how it is:

- implementing more effective ways to relate to applicants and grantees that fulfill various elements of its innovative mandate?
- increasing the responsibilities of its African staff for pre-approval analysis and monitoring, and concomitantly adjusting the Washington staff's responsibilities?
- streamlining and improving its pre-grant analysis of social, organizational, technical, environmental, and economic factors?
- developing improved and more efficient processes for project approval and monitoring?
- consulting with other funders and coordinating work, when appropriate, and planning country programs?

Specific Areas **for** Congressional Oversight

Several areas exist that could require more specific congressional oversight. These are areas that Congress could ask ADF to address in its annual report to Congress (the **Congres-**

sional Presentation), in routine annual appropriations hearings, or in hearings conducted by the authorizing committees. Three areas to address include:

1. The participation of women, ethnic minorities, and the poor in ADF-funded projects is difficult to determine and this ambiguity indicates that ADF should direct increased attention to these issues. In general, women's contributions of time, labor, and energy is disproportionate to their participation in project decision-making and management, even when the local context is taken into account. Congress could use oversight to ensure that ADF take appropriate steps to increase the participation of women, ethnic minority groups, and the poor in its funded projects while recognizing ADF's need to work within local cultures and to fund viable projects.

2. ADF's attention to environmental issues also needs strengthening. In some cases, ADF-funded activities inadvertently contribute to environmental degradation although alternative technologies exist that have fewer negative impacts or that could help restore the environment. This, as well as a lack of simple and realistic economic and financial planning, constrains the projects' sustainability.

3. Congress has 15 days to review and disapprove ADF-funded projects, as it has for all Executive Branch expenditures not included in the previous year's **Congressional Presentation**. Notification is a way in which ADF informs Congress of new work. But the formal notification period sometimes can stretch project approval by as much as a month if Congress is in recess. Congress and ADF could work together to streamline this process. For example, ADF could send project notices to Congress during recesses, a practice that is not done now. Congress and ADF could agree to types of projects that should not be transmitted to Congress during recess (the first project in a given country, unusually large projects, etc.) and to a more succinct notification format that would decrease ADF's internal workload. Or, Congress could drop notification for projects below a specified amount of funds.

Senate Confirmation of ABM Board of Directors

Congress considered the role of ADF's Board of Directors important enough to set out detailed stipulations in the Foundation's enabling legislation. Therefore, Congress has an interest in the direction that the Board sets for ADF and could use oversight for keeping abreast of the Board's thinking,

The U.S. Senate confirms members of ADF's Board of Directors. This provides an important opportunity to oversee the Foundation's direction.² Up to now, Congress has rarely used this tool to ensure that prospective members have experience relevant to ADF's mandate and that they represent a range of views on African grassroots development. Members of Congress could inform the U.S. President of qualifications they consider essential for nominees or they could be more active in formal confirmation hearings.

Legislation

No Major Overhaul Needed

No need exists for a major revamping of ADF's enabling legislation. This law is far-sighted and based on a participatory approach to grassroots social and economic development that has proven successful. Also, it is a good example of Congress providing general direction without undue restrictions or unreasonable demands. It provides ADF with appropriately wide latitude, and remains consistent, in general terms, with what is known of effective grassroots development assistance (box 1-1),

Fine-Tuning for Effectiveness

Certain provisions of this or other legislation (such as appropriations laws) affecting ADF are problematic, however, and likely to become more so as ADF ages. Concerns exist in several areas:

- the \$250,000 cap on individual project funding,
- the partisan nature of ADF's Board of Directors,

Box 1-1.—ADF's Legislation in Brief: A Mandate for Grassroots Development

ADF was established by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533, Title V), and thus is not authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act. This has provided ADF with the flexibility to depart from types of work carried out by other U.S. agencies.

According to its legislation, ADF's purposes are four-fold:

- (1) "to strengthen the bonds of friendship and understanding between the people of Africa and the United States;
- (2) to support self-help activities at the local level designed to enlarge opportunities for community development;
- (3) to stimulate and assist effective and expanding participation of Africans in their development process; and
- (4) to encourage the establishment and growth of development institutions which are indigenous to particular countries in Africa and which can respond to the requirements of the poor. . . ."

Further, ADF is to carry out these activities with indigenous groups representative of the poor and to coordinate, to the extent possible, its work with U.S. government and private, regional, and international groups. Specifically, it may make grants, loans, and loan guarantees to: a) foster local development institutions and efforts initiated by communities, b) develop self-evaluation methods to transfer experience, c) develop research by Africans and transfer information within Africa, and d) procure technical or other assistance for its recipients. ADF is to give priority to projects which community groups undertake themselves, where there is participation by the poor.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1986*, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987).

²As of March, 1988, three vacancies of the five designated for private sector representatives existed on the Board. ADF's legislation specifies that five board members be from the private sector and two represent U.S. government agencies concerned with African affairs.

- ADF's inability to retain funds from terminated grants and loan repayments, and
- grantees' inability to keep project funds in interest-bearing accounts.

ne \$250,000 Cap on **Project Funding**

Some successful ADF-funded projects are now being affected by the \$250,000 per project funding limit. Pressures on organizations to attempt ever-new activities to qualify for another funded project can encourage them to attempt activities for which they are not ready rather than solidify positive results of earlier efforts. This problem is likely to increase as more ADF-funded projects reach maximum funding levels.

The Foundation is better positioned to determine the appropriate limit to single-project funding than Congress; this is a decision that most grant-making organizations make for themselves. For example, the Inter-American Foundation operates without a legislated project ceiling and has funded successful grassroots projects in excess of \$1 million.

Congress could amend ADF's authorizing legislation to eliminate the \$250,000 ceiling per project. However, this would not be an endorsement for ADF to increase the average size of its grants, nor to undertake more complex projects. Rather, this would enable ADF to better: sequence its support of various components of some projects; adjust for unexpected increases in costs; or provide a transition for an activity to become better established. The Foundation should approach the idea of funding projects in excess of \$250,000 cautiously. First, it might develop guidelines for gradually providing sequenced grants to individual groups. Congress can ensure by oversight that ADF keeps average grant size low without retaining the strict limit to project size.

The Partisan Nature of ADF's Board

The Foundation's legislation details many aspects of the structure of ADF's Board of Directors. It does not, however, require that members represent both political parties. It is in ADF's best interest to have a Board that represents a wide range of views regarding grass-

roots development and that potential partisan concerns not shape its work. Therefore, Congress could amend ADF's enabling legislation to ensure that Board members be drawn from both political parties in approximately equal numbers. Congress provided such protection for the Peace Corps National Advisory Council. A similar structure has proven successful for OTA's Technology Assessment Board.

Inability To Retain Funds From Terminated Projects and Loan Repayments

All grant-making groups need to terminate projects before completion when projects develop irresolvable problems. In fiscal year 1987, the Foundation terminated six such projects. These projects were funded in fiscal year 1985 when the Foundation had funds that could be spent in any fiscal year ("no-year funds"). Therefore, ADF will retain money deobligated from these projects and be able to use the funds for new work. Current single fiscal year funding requires that the money obligated, but not spent for a project, be deobligated then returned to the U.S. Treasury rather than ADF. Congress could amend this process so that ADF would be allowed to retain funds from terminated projects for use in other grants. U.S. AID has the power to retain deobligated money as long as it is reobligated for a similar project in the same geographic area (44). Congress could provide ADF with similar authority, allowing ADF to reallocate funds to other projects without requiring that they be spent in the same region or sectors.

Also, Congress could prevent this problem by providing ADF with no-year funding. Additional benefits exist to no-year funding as well. Fiscal year funding can constrain programs' effectiveness and absorb resources that could be better directed in longer-term efforts (46). ADF, like many groups that have single fiscal year funding, finds that project approval tends to accumulate at the end of the fiscal year. As a result, decisionmaking can become hasty. No-year funds are no panacea, however. The Sahel Development Program in AID, for example, was granted no-year funds, then hesitated

to use them for fear of congressional disapproval. Some AID officials felt that money unspent in one year would result in lowered congressional appropriations the following year. Also, no-year funds require oversight, since unobligated funds accumulating over several years may indicate that an organization's capacity to make grants has been exceeded. While Congress would need to monitor the situation if it provided ADF with no-year funds, accumulations of funds are unlikely to occur due to ADF's backlog of unfunded proposals.

Similar to allowing the return of terminated grant funds to ADF, Congress also could allow repayments of ADF loans to return to ADF. Under current rules, the U.S. Treasury, not ADF, would receive loan repayments if ADF established a loan program. So far, ADF does not provide loans or loan guarantees despite congressional authority to do so. A number of significant problems hamper development of these programs and OTA is not recommending that ADF give high priority to creating one at this time. However, Congress could legislate a provision that ADF receive loan repayments, ex-

pecting that ADF may appropriately begin loan and loan guarantee programs sometime in the future,

Grantees' Inability To Keep Money in Interest-Bearing Accounts

In these two cases—loss of terminated grant funds and of potential loan repayments—ADF's appropriations are in effect decreased. Current appropriations legislation also has the unanticipated effect of decreasing the worth of individual grants to organizations in Africa because project managers cannot keep ADF-provided funds in interest-bearing accounts (except for income generated from project activities). Grant size in real terms decreases then, especially in countries where inflation is high or where currency is devalued. Congress could legislate a provision for ADF whereby grantees could keep project funds in interest-bearing accounts, stipulating that all interest payments be used for project-related costs or returned to ADF. Congress provided the Inter-American Foundation with this authority in 1980,

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Chapter 2

OTA's Assessment Methods¹

SUMMARY

- OTA undertook this assessment at the request of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Select Committee on Hunger, with specific instructions to examine people's participation in projects funded by the African Development Foundation (ADF) and the projects' results, sustainability, and replicability. The committees also requested an assessment of the Foundation's overall performance and how it could be improved.
- The methods used to assess ADF activities included extensive interviews with development experts in Washington and Africa, including ADF staff; reviews of Foundation documents in Washington, D.C. related to participation, agricultural technology, and renewable resource management in ADF-funded projects; and workshops for OTA staff and contractors.
- Three five-member teams visited East, West, and Southern Africa for 23 days in 1987, observing 12 ADF-funded projects in 6 countries. Each group spoke with project participants, Foundation staff, local and national officials, U.S. ambassadors, AID mission directors, and representatives of other development and research organizations. The teams assessed ADF-funded projects, reviewed the Foundation's programs in each country, and suggested congressional options and ways for ADF to improve its work.

¹This chapter and app. D provide detailed information for readers with an interest in evaluation methods. In addition, apps. C, E, and F list many of this assessment's participants. The results of the assessment begin in the next chapter.

WHY THIS ASSESSMENT WAS REQUESTED

When the African Development Foundation (ADF) was founded, Congress intended that its grassroots approach complement other types of aid already provided to Africa by the United States. Now Congress is evaluating how well U.S. development assistance to Africa is doing and ADF, as one U.S.-funded development program, has come under scrutiny. This is part of Congress' continuing attempt to ensure that the United States provides the most effective assistance possible via the Agency for International Development (AID), the Peace Corps, multilateral institutions, private voluntary organizations, and other groups that receive U.S. funds directly or indirectly. Although the focus here is on ADF's program, this study has broader applicability. For example, the Foundation's enabling legislation stresses the need for Africans to participate in their own development and ADF's experience with participatory develop-

ment is relevant to the pending reauthorization of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Select Committee on Hunger requested this comprehensive assessment of ADF's funding program.² Their request noted the context in which U.S. aid to Africa takes place: "Strong humanitarian, political, and economic reasons exist for the U.S. to continue to participate in assisting African countries in their efforts to develop their human and physical resources." As the requesting committees

²Representatives Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Howard Wolpe, Chairman of its Subcommittee on Africa, and Mickey Leland, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, requested the study. Senator Paul Simon, Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported their request.

said, ADF was established because “one reason given for the failure of many programs funded by the major donors has been the lack of involvement of the intended beneficiaries, especially low-resource farmers, many of whom are women.” Their question was whether ADF had been any more successful in having an impact on development in Africa. The requesters specifically asked OTA to examine:

- the degree to which ADF’s activities fulfill the Foundation’s legislated mandate,
- whether ADF is supporting sustainable and replicable projects with positive impacts beyond the project level,
- the degree to which ADF is assisting the poor majority, and
- ways for ADF to improve its effectiveness.

In addition to these factors, OTA focused attention on the Foundation’s use of technology and technical assistance and narrowed the scope to include only those projects dealing with agriculture and renewable resources. This focus, which covered 67 percent (58 projects) of ADF’s portfolio, made the assessment manageable and allowed OTA to use its previous experience in these areas.

OTA’S involvement with U.S. assistance to Africa began in 1984 when the House Select Committee on Hunger requested an issues paper on technology, agriculture, and U.S. foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa (*Africa Tomorrow*, 1984). Then Congress requested a more detailed follow-up study examining agricultural technologies for low-resource African agriculture (*Enhancing Agriculture in Africa: A Role for U.S. Development Assistance*, in press, 1988). In 1986, OTA published an interim report based on that on-going assessment - *Continuing the Commitment: Agricultural Development in the Sahel*. This report included a one-month field visit to U.S.-funded development work in West Africa. The final report on low-resource agriculture in Africa provides a general framework for a resource-enhancing approach to African agriculture, discusses the overall role of technology, and details the potential of a number of technologies such as small-scale irrigation, agroforestry, and fertilizers.

This previous OTA work has emphasized the need to support participation of poor farmers, herders, fishers, and their organizations in the programs designed to assist them. An assess-

Box 2-I.—GAO’s Look at ADF Management

In mid-1984 the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations requested that the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) determine whether ADF had the management capacity to carry out its mandate and to handle larger appropriations efficiently. The study was requested because of the uncertainty which followed the resignations of the first President and Vice-President in April and May 1984, barely 6 months after ADF had begun operations. GAO’s analysis concluded that by late 1984 ADF had made progress in establishing its organizational structure. It had filled most of its authorized staff positions, established internal administrative procedures, grant agreements, and a project review committee, and was making plans for its accounting system.

GAO also concluded, however, that ADF should not focus on expanding its program significantly to approach the \$100 million it originally envisioned spending in 1990. (This number was revised to \$30 million in ADF’s 5-Year Plan published in May 1985.) GAO raised a number of other concerns as well. Some, such as the need for a 5-year plan, have been corrected. OTA considers other issues still relevant. For instance, GAO felt that ADF had not:

1. identified which countries would receive priority funding,
2. determined to what extent ADF would provide loans and loan guarantees,
3. settled the extent to which ADF would emphasize private sector initiatives as encouraged by the Board of Directors,
4. established how ADF would coordinate with other donors, and
5. decided how ADF would meet demands for project monitoring and handle staffing for these tasks.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, *Issues Affecting Appropriations for the African Development Foundation*, GAO/NSIAD-85-62, May 7, 1985.

ment of ADF thus builds on OTA'S experience by exploring, in depth, a program established to do just that.

OTA'S examination of ADF is the Foundation's second congressional review. The General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated ADF's management capacity in 1985 (box 2-1). GAO, OTA, and the congressional requesters con-

sulted in the early stages of this work, tapping GAO's previous work and exploring the possibility of a joint OTA/GAO effort. Finally, however, the committees requested that OTA conduct this assessment independently because OTA'S focus and experience better matched their need for an examination of the Foundation's impacts on development in Africa.

HOW OTA CONDUCTED THE ASSESSMENT

overview

This report presents findings about ADF's overall funding program in the area of agriculture and renewable resources, describes its performance, suggests areas for improvement, and notes opportunities for other development assistance organizations to learn from the Foundation's experience.

The work was conducted in several stages, each building on the previous one (figure 2-1). Field visits to 12 ADF-funded projects in Africa provided crucial information regarding ADF's field operations. OTA was not charged to evaluate the funded groups, however. Instead, teams visited projects to assess the overall ADF program.

In doing this assessment, OTA used a variety of methods to gather information at the program and project level, both in the United States and in Africa. In Washington, ADF staff and other experts were interviewed. Project documents, ADF's evaluations of 10 nearly completed projects, two country profiles, and additional information about its program were reviewed. In Africa, project managers and participants as well as national and local officials and other development funding groups were interviewed. These interviews provided abroad view of ADF's philosophy and policies as well as a measure of how well ADF implements its mission.

This assessment included several major steps. The assessment plan was developed in spring 1987; OTA organized the field teams and developed materials they would use that summer.


The reviews of ADF's Washington project files were conducted in August, the field teams went to Africa in September, and the synthesis meeting was held when the team leaders returned in October. This report represents only a snapshot in the life of the 12 ADF-funded projects and in the evolution of the organization. Changes in ADF's policies or practices made after the fall of 1987 are included in footnotes.

Designing the Assessment Plan

The congressional request identified critical issues related to ADF's mandate and suggested that the assessment include field visits to ADF-funded projects in Africa. To plan its assessment, OTA began in Washington with intensive interviews with approximately 30 experts in field evaluation methodologies and grassroots organizations. The most appropriate program evaluation methods were incorporated into OTA'S approach (see box 2-2). Also, ADF's staff were interviewed about their roles and work. An Advisory Panel established to guide OTA'S assessment of low-resource agriculture in Africa met in Washington at the end of April and was used to review the plan and begin developing field indicators to help assess four critical issues: participation, results, sustainability, and replicability. This panel suggested that the assessment teams lengthen their time in the field, that African team members be named for every country visited, and that data collected be disaggregated by gender.

OTA next conducted an initial analysis of ADF's project portfolio based on abstracts provided by ADF for each funded project. From

Figure 2-1. - Flow Chart of OTA'S Assessment Methods



KEY: Items printed in capital letters are reports or written materials
Items printed in bold are meetings

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988

this, OTA tabulated project information, including grant size, duration, maturity, geographic scope, activities, goods or services funded by the ADF grant, and intended outcomes. This analysis provided information on the range of project characteristics and average features so the countries and projects selected for visits would be representative of ADF's portfolio. The survey was limited to the 86 projects funded by ADF through September 31, 1986. Two-thirds of these, or 58, dealt substantively with agriculture or renewable resources and were considered within OTA'S scope of work.

This assessment of funded projects must be qualified by the newness of ADF's program. Its first projects are just now nearing completion. Thus, OTA'S major focus is on suggesting how ADF's overall funding program can be improved, not on providing a definitive statement judging the results of ADF projects.

Developing Field Team Methods

To develop methods for the field teams' use, OTA held a workshop with two purposes:

1. to review current field evaluation methods, and
2. to develop indicators to address the critical issues identified in Congress' request for this study.

The field research method used is a form of "rapid rural appraisal." In rapid appraisal, teams visit the field for a short time to obtain selected information needed for policymakers. This approach is quicker and more cost effective than some other research methods. It relies on individual and group interviews, observation, and local documentation where available (12,21).

In the methods workshop, OTA staff, team leaders, and three consultants with extensive evaluation experience (app. C) spent 2 days:

- defining the critical issues—participation, results, replicability, and sustainability;
- converting these definitions into concrete indicators that could be observed and measured in the field; and
- designing worksheets on which to collect data for each of these issues.

Each critical issue had multiple dimensions and thus required several indicators to use in the field. OTA used a variety of sources to help define each issue, including expressions of congressional interest, ADF's operational defini-

tions (from project proposal evaluation and monitoring checklists), suggested modifications by the Low-Resource Agriculture Advisory Panel, and relevant findings from OTA's previous work on low-resource agriculture in

Box 2-2.—Recent Similar Assessments

Four agencies, with programs in some respect similar to ADF's, were evaluated recently. OTA used these evaluations to suggest assessment methods for this effort, such as the need for desk reviews, the number of projects to visit, and the time required for field work. Also, these examinations of grassroots funding organizations identified important common approaches and problems. Each organization's purpose and the intent and method of its evaluation are summarized here. The results of OTA's assessment of ADF are compared to the findings of these evaluations in chapter 6.

Appropriate Technology International (ATI). ATI's mission is to develop innovative approaches to technology, directly involving organizations and entrepreneurs in developing countries. The Agency for International Development (AID) conducted an external, mid-term review to assess ATI's performance under its cooperative agreement with AID, to identify lessons regarding technology transfer and promoting small-and medium-scale enterprises, and to assess ATI's ability to replicate its successful innovations. The evaluation included an assessment of 18 ATI projects in 10 countries by a contractor-supplied team. Members used open-ended, improvised, interview questions in the field, standardized among regions. The evaluation, including orientation sessions, field visits, and a synthesis meeting, took place in a 6-month period (16).

Inter-American Foundation (IAF). IAF provides grants and loans directly to Latin American grassroots groups and is the model on which ADF was based. It operates outside of other official U.S. development assistance channels, responding to initiatives of indigenous groups for social, institutional, and economic development. This internal evaluation reviewed the foundation's goals, procedures, and policies; initiated a strategic planning effort; investigated IAF's accomplishments, its role in U.S. relations in Latin America, and its effectiveness as a pioneer. A team of 3 evaluators reviewed extensive written materials, including IAF's legislative history, and conducted interviews with at least 200 people. Individual members of the team visited between 1 and 3 countries each; the process took 3 months (50).

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). This multilateral agency works to increase food production in some of the poorest, food deficit countries and to improve the nutritional level and living conditions of the poorest populations. AID conducted this external review, examining IFAD's program relative to U.S. development assistance policy and providing a basis for decisions regarding U.S. participation in IFAD. The evaluation methods included desk reviews of written materials, field visits to IFAD projects throughout the world, interviews with IFAD staff and representatives of other institutions, and a synthesis meeting. Teams used an open-ended protocol and questionnaires in the field. In all, 9 AID staff members conducted the evaluation over a 4-month period, spending 3 to 5 days at each of 19 project sites (39).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) provides funding and direct technical assistance for women-specific projects and serves as a catalyst to ensure women's involvement in mainstream development activities. The agency conducted this internal evaluation to assess the extent to which it is carrying out its mandate, to show the impact of development assistance on women, to document the fund's activities relative to the U.N. Decade for Women, and to identify future priorities. This was the most extensive and field-oriented of the evaluations and the one from which OTA borrowed the most methodology. UNIFEM included desk reviews, orientation sessions, field evacuations of projects, mailed questionnaires, and input from regional commissions in this project and program assessment. Regional field teams visited 42 projects in 24 countries; members were drawn from experts resident in the country or region. The work lasted approximately 1 year (38).

Africa and other evaluations. OTA sought to develop indicators that blended quantitative and qualitative data.

The “participation” issue required the most complex set of indicators concerning who participates, when, and how. The focus was on equitable access to the project, the project participants’ roles in all phases of the project cycle, project control, and the recipient organization’s operational style. Indicators of equitable access, for example, were the types and levels of involvement of women and various ethnic, age, and income groups.

Assessing “results” included determining whether or not the project achieved its objectives. However, results also were defined to include a measure of the project’s broader effects on participants, the recipient organization, and the community. Information on broad project outcomes was used as well as data on specific project outputs. OTA attempted to identify intended and unintended effects of several kinds: economic, social, organizational, environmental, policy, and technological. These results were examined in terms of the project’s specific objectives as well as in terms of the local context and broader development goals.

“Sustainability” was considered the time related dimension of “results” while “replicability” was the spatially related dimension. Thus, effects beyond the grant period are considered under sustainability. Sustainability can be measured on several levels including maintenance of a resource, continuation of a project or activity, and persistence of an organization. Field measures included indicators for several levels, e.g., the institutional, social, economic, environmental, and technological sustainability of the ADF-funded projects.

Effects beyond the project locale were considered part of “replicability.” Like sustainability, replicability is implied in ADF’s purpose to achieve social and economic development in Africa through support of local self-help efforts. Ideally, even small projects should have an impact beyond their immediate location. This can occur in several ways: by serving as a model for other individuals or groups; by con-

tributing to spontaneous adoption of new technologies by others; or by effecting policy change on a regional or national level. Also, the learning process that occurs during project implementation itself can be replicated by a funded group or others to plan additional activities. Therefore, OTA assessed whether groups’ processes as well as their specific activities could be repeated.

The choice of technology has a direct bearing on participation, results, sustainability, and replicability in ADF-funded projects. Therefore, assessing the use of technology was also a part of OTA’S analysis of the four critical issues. Much research and experience in Africa shows that, in general, participation of poor farmers in increasing their productivity and incomes in a sustainable way is facilitated by technologies that are lower cost, use local resources, are readily learned, and increase incomes without unacceptably increasing risk. Distinguishing among high-cost, high-technology, high-input, and high-risk methods is important, however. And, ultimately, the appropriate use of technology must be judged by a careful analysis of a particular situation. Field teams were instructed to assess the appropriateness of technology choices only after interviewing project managers, researchers, and local officials in Africa familiar with the use of a given technology in that locale.

OTA staff used the input from the Methods Workshop to develop assessment materials for the three-field teams to use in Africa (app. D):

- Worksheets for teams to record data collected at project sites for each of the critical issues (Participation, Results, Sustainability, and Replicability);
- Project Assessment Forms for the teams to describe their analysis of project performance, based on information in the worksheets;
- Country Assessment Forms which teams used to assess ADF’s overall performance in the country based on project assessment information as well as from additional interviews in Africa and information from ADF; and

- Congressional Assessment Forms for team members to provide suggestions regarding levels of congressional appropriations for ADF, ways to improve ADF's work, and lessons for other donors.

The Desk Reviews

A desk review is an analysis based on project documents. The overview provided by a desk review is usually complemented by field visits to selected projects.

Three specialists with extensive African experience reviewed ADF's files on the 58 projects selected for this analysis (app. C). All three reviewed the same files, but each with a different focus. One examined participation, another agricultural technologies, and the third examined renewable resources. Each person spent about 2 weeks reviewing files, meeting with ADF staff, and preparing reports. These reviewers:

- developed topologies of participatory methods, technologies, and funded organizations;
- described characteristics of participation and technologies and analyzed their strengths and weaknesses;
- determined how types of participation and technical methods are chosen and by whom;
- discussed how technical assistance is provided, and by whom;
- analyzed the possible implications of their findings for participation, results, sustainability, and replicability;
- identified concerns for the field teams to examine more closely during their time in Africa; and
- provided suggestions for improving ADF's funding program.

Selection of Countries and Projects to Visit

Twelve projects were selected for visits, two in each of six countries. First, likely countries to visit were identified based on those with at

least three ADF-funded projects within the scope of work. Based on these considerations, OTA formed an East Africa team to visit Tanzania and Kenya, a West Africa team to visit Niger and Senegal, and a Southern Africa team to visit Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Specific projects were chosen for visits based on the analysis of ADF's project portfolio. The projects represented ADF's portfolio in these respects: grant size, duration, maturity, and geographic scope. Also, attempts were made to include projects illustrating the range of agricultural activities and organizations funded by ADF. No information about project performance was available at the time of project selection. However, 2 of the 12 projects were among 10 undergoing simultaneous evaluation by ADF teams (NGK and PfP in Kenya).

The final list of projects included two which were not on OTA'S original list. The Dakoro Herders' Association project in Niger was substituted for the Iniminak Pastoralists Project after ADF expressed concern that OTA could learn little by visiting the latter project due to its delayed start and strained relations with local officials. The Development Fund of Silveira House in Zimbabwe replaced the National Council of Disabled Persons project in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, due to concerns for the team's safety and validity of data collected in an area of dissident activity. Brief descriptions of the selected projects and summary project findings are included in appendix B.

Field Team Work

The three regional teams used the same methods so that their work could be compared across projects and across regions. Their work began in Washington with a 4-day Team Orientation Workshop. At this workshop, the U.S.-based field team members refined the methods and materials developed by OTA (app. D), prepared work plans, and met with ADF staff members.

Each team consisted of five members: three based in the United States (including the team leader) and an African member from each of the two countries to be visited (app. C). The Afri-



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can members joined the group upon arrival in each country. Members were chosen for their expertise in several of the following areas: evaluation methodology; technical expertise in agriculture, natural resource management, economics, or social sciences; foreign language skills, especially fluency in French for the West Africa team; and experience working with grassroots organizations in Africa. Most had extensive experience in at least one of the countries visited, Emphasis also was placed on balancing the teams with women and men. There were two women on the OTA teams in five of the six countries. Members could not have previous or ongoing contractual relationship with ADF.

Each team spent 23 days overseas, visiting two countries. On the first 2 days in the capital city of each country, they briefed the African team member, met with host country officials, and interviewed the U.S. ambassador, AID mission director, and representatives of other development agencies (listed in app. E). Approximately 2 days were spent at each project site interviewing project managers and staff, members of committees and the Board of Directors, and project participants (independently from project staff). To encourage their participation, groups of women were at times interviewed separately from men. Small group interviews were complemented with individual interviews and, in several instances, with large group meetings. Between 1 and 20 project subgroups were visited at various locations where the 12 projects were being carried out. Teams also met with local non-participants and others in the project area, such as:

- local officials to gather information, including average production, income levels, and government policies regarding aspects of the project;
- researchers to learn about how well certain technologies performed locally; and
- representatives of others with similar projects (listed in app. E).

In all, approximately 800 persons were interviewed in project locales.



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ADF has African field staff in five of the six countries visited. These ADF staff accompanied teams to the project sites and attended selected meetings between teams and project or national government personnel. OTA and ADF agreed at the outset that ADF staff would not be present at most meetings with project managers and participants in order to facilitate open discussions.

OTA team members included persons fluent in the languages used by local officials and project managers, except in one case where a secondary language understood by both the project leader and OTA team interviewer was used. In some instances, persons were hired to help translate interviews with project participants. Key information obtained from all interviews was cross checked and verified by additional sources.

During their final 3 days together in Africa, team members met to reach consensus on their findings. Together, teams made judgments

concerning how well ADF projects were performing and how well the ADF program supports its projects. Finally, each member individually suggested ways ADF could improve its work and how Congress could encourage these improvements.

Synthesis Meeting and Preparation of Report

Materials from the three teams were brought together during a Synthesis Meeting which included OTA staff and the three team leaders. Participants compared findings from the three areas, established the reliability of data in different parts of the worksheets, began to develop criteria for project rankings across regions, formed general conclusions about ADF's program, prepared congressional options, and began the report-drafting process. This led directly to the draft report and, after extensive outside review (app. F), including by ADF, to the final report.

Chapter 3

The African Development Foundation

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Chapter 3

The African Development Foundation

SUMMARY

- The African Development Foundation (ADF) had a difficult start, first with delayed appointment of the Board of Directors and then with unexpected turnover of top staff resulting in a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of its management capacity.
- After a new president was appointed, ADF developed workable funding procedures that consisted of outreach, grant approval, and monitoring processes.
- Between 1984 and 1987, ADF awarded grants to 114 projects in 19 African countries, distributing a total of \$10.3 million.
- Now that its first grants are nearing completion, ADF has begun evaluating these projects. ADF also awarded research grants to Africans and published public education materials.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

Origins

Congress established the African Development Foundation (ADF) in 1980 in an attempt to counter some of the limitations faced by official development assistance programs such as those of the World Bank and the Agency for International Development (AID). Inadequacies or gaps in official U.S. development assistance that Congress hoped ADF might overcome included: government-to-government programs failed to reach the majority of Africa's poor; standard grants were typically too large to be handled by grassroots organizations; funding approval in established assistance agencies was too slow, cumbersome, and cautious; and Americans and Europeans played too great a role in project design and implementation. Beginning in 1975, the planning unit of AID's Africa Bureau, the private Development Group for Alternative Policies, and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) played important roles in ADF's establishment, as did legislators who proposed it in five bills between 1977 and 1980 (1,28). The Foundation's legislation was modeled on IAF's, passed 11 years earlier. Both foundations have similar purposes and are based in congressional mandates "to enable the

poor to participate in the process of development" (ADF, Title V, Section 502). While some people have advocated ADF as an alternative to other U.S.-funded development programs, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 established ADF to "complement" them (43).

Getting Started: 1980 to 1984

President Carter signed the legislation establishing ADF into law in December 1980, but this was followed by a long delay in appointing ADF's Board of Directors. The legislation specified that the seven-person Board, comprised of five persons from the private sector and two from government agencies concerned with African affairs, be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The Reagan administration delayed naming this board and did not include funds for ADF in the budgets sent to Congress from 1981 through 1983. Congress, however, appropriated \$2.0 million in fiscal year 1981, \$2.0 million in fiscal year 1982, and \$2.0 million in fiscal year 1983 (table 3-1). These funds were earmarked in the Sahel Development Fund and were available to ADF regardless "of the year appropri-

Table 3-1.—ADF Appropriations and Obligations: Fiscal Years 1981-1988
(in millions of dollars)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Appropriations ¹	0.500 ²	2.000	2.000	3.000	1.000	3.706	6.614	7.000
Obligations				1.713	4.493	5.995	6.565 ⁴	
Grants ⁵				0.838	2.617	3.442	3.902	
Project Development and Evaluation ⁶				0.000	0.585	1.080	1.259	
Administration and Management				0.875	1.291	1.473	1.404	

NOTES: ¹ ADF did not become operational until 1984. Funds appropriated from FY 1981 to 1983 were no-year funds and were carried over for use in future years.

² \$2 million was appropriated but \$1.5 million was rescinded.

³ This table includes actual obligations, so projections for fiscal year 1988 are not listed. OTA used figures in this table to calculate the proportion of non-grant costs for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. ADF, however, now divides obligations into two, not three, categories and calculates its administrative costs based on the two-part classification.

⁴ \$40,000 of the FY 87 appropriations was not obligated and was returned to the U.S. Treasury.

⁵ A project has all its funds placed in the obligation line the fiscal year the grant agreement is signed (e.g., the funding for a 5-Year project signed in 1986 appears only under 1986). The grant line includes funding commitments for:

- projects (new commitments);
- amendments to previously committed projects: 12 totaling \$364,449 in 1986 and 47 totaling \$627,231 in 1987;
- research grants: five totaling \$250,000 in 1986 and two totaling \$58,939 in 1987; and
- cooperative agreements, which are principally for African Country Resource Facilitators, eight totaling \$144,975 in 1987.

⁶ The project development and evaluation line includes costs for contractors, including African Regional Liaison Officers, providing technical assistance and appraising, monitoring, and evaluating projects.

SOURCES: African Development Foundation, 1988. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government FY 1986, 1987, 1988, Appendix* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, 1986, 1987).

ated ("no year" funds). Congress rescinded \$1.5 million of the fiscal year 1981 appropriation, but retained \$0.5 million in startup funds. Thus, \$4.5 million in ADF funds was carried over to fiscal year 1984, by which time Congress had pressured the administration to name ADF's Board of Directors and appropriated an additional \$3 million for fiscal year 1984. The attendant political compromises set the stage for the new organization's difficult birth.

The Senate approved the administration's nominees for the ADF Board in October 1983. All seven board members were Republicans. The government officials named were the Undersecretary of State for African Affairs and AID's Assistant Administrator for Africa. Four of the five representatives of the private sector were businesspeople, and none had African experience. The Board appointed Constance Hilliard as president and Reginald Petty as vice-president. Pressures from the Hill to begin funding projects in Africa grew quickly. Tensions within the staff and between the staff and Board led to the resignations of the president and vice president in April and May 1984, which paralyzed the Foundation's activities and generated unfavorable press coverage about the delays in awarding grants (34). As a result, in June 1984 the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee requested a

General Accounting Office (GAO) study to determine if ADF had the management capacity to carry out its mandate (ch. 2).

ADF's Board appointed Leonard Robinson, Jr., acting President starting June 1, 1984. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he had represented the State Department at two ADF Board meetings. Robinson was a former Peace Corps volunteer and Associate Country Director in India. He appointed Percy Wilson vice-president. Wilson had directed community-level domestic anti-poverty programs and been Peace Corps Director in Sierra Leone. The organization was set up quickly under pressure: staff was hired on 6-month contracts, funding criteria and procedures were developed, and work began on a five-year plan while GAO auditors were in the office.

An explicit directive from key congressional members to fund projects before the end of the fiscal year took overwhelming precedence. Six consultants with experience in African development programs attended a week-long workshop in Washington in late July then went to Africa to bring back project proposals. Most of a variety of projects proposed by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOS) were rejected because they were not designed or con-

trolled by Africans. The consultants evaluated other already-submitted proposals in the field and relied on personal African contacts in those countries where they had worked before to seek additional fundable projects. They returned in 6 weeks with 86 proposals; 36 were presented to the newly formed staff Project Review Committee. In September 1984, just prior to the informal congressional deadline, the Board awarded grants to 11 projects totaling \$838,000: five from Lesotho, two from Botswana, and one each from Mali, Niger, Liberia, and Zambia.

By the end of September 1984, 11 permanent staff members had been hired, 6 others had been selected, and Robinson had been appointed president. The GAO report concluded that ADF was "putting into place the staff and administrative capacity to manage a grant program" (41). But GAO questioned aspects of ADF's operations, especially the fact that they projected their annual budget to rise to \$96 million by 1990. (This initial projection was later revised to \$30 million in ADF's Five Year Plan.) Subsequently, Congress reauthorized ADF through 1990.

Growth: From 1984 Through 1987

Expansion to 19 Countries

The Foundation was able to expand considerably from 1985 through 1987 due to the accumulation of "no year" funds and new appropriations. After publicizing the availability of funds for grassroots organizations, ADF received hundreds of proposals and in fiscal year 1985 awarded grants to 42 projects in 13 countries worth \$2.6 million. In fiscal year 1986 ADF awarded about \$2.8 million in grants to 33 more projects, expanding to 19 countries. The Foundation consolidated its program in fiscal year 1987, funding 28 new projects in the same countries for \$3.1 million. In addition, the Foundation awarded nearly \$1.0 million in 59 amendments to previous grants in 1986 and 1987 (table 3-1). In its first 4 years, then, the Foundation awarded \$10.3 million to 114 projects in 19 countries.

Which countries received funding depended in large part on the personal contacts of ADF staff because the Foundation did not have cri-

teria to select new countries. Also, selection depended on the Board's decision that ADF would fund projects only in countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States (see box 3-1).

The expansion of ADF's program in Africa required ADF to develop relationships with African governments. ADF only funds legally recognized organizations in Africa and it informs the appropriate African governments, through their embassies in Washington, of each grant. Although the Foundation does not allow African governments to decide who receives ADF funds, applicants often must obtain host country permission to receive outside funding.

In most countries, ADF representatives made initial contacts with African officials to inform them of ADF's program, but they did not attempt to reach a formal agreement specifying how ADF will operate in each country until later. Since mid-1986 ADF has given priority to negotiating accords with the governments of those countries where ADF has active programs. At that time ADF decided not to begin funding in any country until an accord is negotiated. By the end of 1987, accords or written understandings have been reached with nine governments (none in Southern or East Africa).⁷ The terms of the accords include a limited role for the national government in project implementation and exemptions from certain African customs payments by grant recipients. These are similar to the agreements most U.S. PVOS negotiate with African governments before beginning work there. The Foundation reached informal understandings with Benin and Congo/Brazzaville through an exchange of letters in lieu of a formal accord.

The Foundation's recognition of the need for a more systematic approach is reflected in its recent plan to collect and analyze information to design a funding strategy for each country. A manual on how to prepare Country Assessment Profiles was developed in 1986 and Profiles have been completed for Tanzania, Sene-

⁷Of these, 6 were in countries where ADF funded projects and ADF signed accords with Sierra Leone and Ghana in January and February 1988, respectively.

Box 3-1.—ADF's Place in U.S. Foreign Assistance

Congress established ADF as a public corporation, independent of other U.S. foreign assistance agencies and operating outside the constraints of short-term U.S. foreign policy considerations (13). One rationale for ADF's independence is that ADF primarily funds non-governmental, grassroots organizations, unlike most official U.S. programs which provide resources to foreign governments. Also, Congress anticipated that independence would:

- give the Foundation broader access to local groups,
- decrease the likelihood that political pressures from the United States or from host governments would override other considerations in making funding decisions, and
- build confidence in ADF as a reliable partner in long-term development.

The Foundation, with the support of its Board, has demonstrated its independence by funding projects in several countries with which the U.S. government disagrees. For example, ADF continues to fund grassroots groups in Zimbabwe even though AID froze funding there in 1986, and ADF still accepts proposals from Benin, where AID programs are ending also. The Foundation began funding projects in Tanzania in 1986, before AID's program was resumed in 1987 (aid, except for food aid, had been cut off in 1984 under the Brooke Amendment because Tanzania had fallen more than a year into default in repayment of loans to the United States). The Foundation has understandable reasons, such as the personal safety of its staff, for not funding projects in some African countries with which the U.S. government has had major disagreements, such as Angola and Mozambique.

Congress also intended ADF to be a complementary participant in U.S. development assistance. As such, ADF does not act inconsistently with long-term foreign policy considerations. It is wholly funded by Congress, two administration officials sit on its Board of Directors, and it funds projects only in countries which have diplomatic relations with the United States. In addition, most of the 19 countries within which ADF operates also participate in other U.S.-funded development assistance:

- 19 have AID programs,
- 15 have Peace Corps volunteers, and
- 19 have received Public Law 480 food commodities in the past 2 years.

ADF operates more like U.S. and European PVOS and private foundations than official assistance programs such as AID and the World Bank in project scale, grant size, and operating style. Many U.S. PVOS take part in official U.S. foreign assistance because they receive U.S. funds; a minority of U.S. PVOS, however, currently fund self-help programs of African organizations in a similar way to ADF. This dichotomy—ADF's being an official program but acting in some ways more like a private one—sometimes confuses representatives of official and private programs in the United States and in Africa. This distinction also provides the Foundation with an advantage in developing a special niche in U.S. foreign aid,

gal, Cameroons, Sao Tome, Congo, and Cape Verde. (ADF has funded projects only in the first three countries.) First, consultants in the United States prepare a report on the geography, history, population, government, and economy of the particular African country. A team of senior ADF staff is briefed on this material, then travels to Africa to interview officials in the ministry responsible for foreign affairs, other African officials, and representatives of PVOS, training and research institu-

tions, and other development assistance organizations. The ADF team identifies funding gaps, obtains other information relevant to ADF's funding program, and verifies information already received. Another part of the profile deals with the "viability and safety of operating" in the country. Ideally, profiles would be prepared before ADF begins funding in a country, but they were not done before ADF entered the first 19 countries.

Increasing ADF Staff in Washington and Africa

To expand ADF's funding program to 19 countries, the president enlarged the Foundation's staff to 27 full-time employees, 6 contractors, 1 intern, and 4 work study students in Washington and 15 full- and part-time staff in Africa by the end of fiscal year 1987. Now, four main functional offices are based in Washington, D. C.:

- Office of the President, which includes a president, vice president, general counsel, congressional liaison, and assistants;
- Office of Administration and Finance, which includes a director, budget and fiscal officer, personnel officer, and assistants;
- Office of Program and Field Operations, which includes a director, five regional Foundation Representatives, a grants coordinator, and three program assistants; and
- Office of Research and Evaluation, which includes a director, research associates, and an information officer.

The Foundation's 1985 Five Year Plan envisioned establishing five regional field offices in Africa to assist in monitoring projects. In 1986, ADF implemented that plan when it selected the first African Regional Liaison Officers (RLOS). According to their job descriptions, Regional Liaison Officers will help monitor projects; verify grantees' compliance with grants' conditions and reporting requirements; work with auditors, technical assistance providers, evaluators, and African officials; conduct outreach to potential applicants; and carry out administrative functions such as logistical support for ADF Washington staff visits. The Regional Liaison Officers perform these duties as assistants to the Washington-based Foundation Representatives. Currently, ADF has contracted four full-time Regional Liaison Officers based in Nairobi, Kenya; Dakar, Senegal; Harare, Zimbabwe; and Yaounde, Cameroon. Each has a small office and travel budget.

The Foundation began to select African personnel to serve as Country Resource Facilitators



Photo credit" ADF/Kerry Hanrahan

Africans help implement ADF's funding program in Africa. Besa Amenuvor (ADF's Country Resource Facilitator (CRF) for Ghana), Leonard Floyd (ADF's Washington-based Foundation Representative), and Koffi Adaba (CRF for Togo) were among those attending a 1988 conference in Togo for ADF's regional staff.

tors (CRFS) in 1987 on a part-time basis due to the difficulty and expense of travel within Africa and the wide distances between grantees. By November 1987, ADF had signed cooperative agreements with 11 Country Resource Facilitators.* The Country Resource Facilitators' primary responsibility is to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to funded groups. In reality, the Country Resource Facilitators also function as assistants to the ADF's Washington-based Foundation Representatives. The addition of Country Resource Facilitators was not envisioned in ADF's Five Year Plan. Therefore, the Foundation has re-evaluated the roles of the Regional Liaison Officers and plans to merge the regional and country positions by 1990.

ADF complements its full-time staff by hiring African and American consultants on a contract basis. For example, 72 contracts were awarded in fiscal year 1987 for project evaluations, and monitoring, translation, technical assistance, research, and administrative functions.

*By February 1988, ADF had signed cooperative agreements with 14 Country Resource Facilitators.

This growth in the Foundation's staff has been slower than was projected in the Five Year Plan and than was suggested in its enabling legislation, in part because appropriations have been lower than anticipated. The 1980 law set generous staff limits: 25 during the first year, 50 during the second, and 75 thereafter. The Office of Management and Budget, with authority to approve new staff positions, subsequently set ADF's limit at 27 full-time positions (FTEs).³

Although the size of the Foundation's staff has grown more slowly than expected, its increase has been larger than the relative increase in the number of grants and amount awarded. Consequently, ADF has been criticized for its staff size, relatively high salary levels, and substantial travel costs. Congressional staff and others have expressed concern regarding the high ratio of administrative and other operational costs in relation to grant commitments, estimated by OTA to be 42 percent in fiscal year 1986 and 43 percent in fiscal year 1987.⁴

³ADF has not exceeded this level. By February 1988, its staff consisted of 25 FTE employees, 7 contractors, and 2 student interns in Washington and 4 Regional Liaison Officers and 14 Country Resource Facilitators in Africa for a total of 52. The Country Resource Facilitators, interns and one contractor are part-time.

⁴OTA included in its grants category all project grants, amendments to grants, and research grants. Then OTA compared all non-grant costs to the total amount of money obligated in a given year. ADF, like the Inter-American Foundation, categorizes its costs differently. Beginning in fiscal year 1988 ADF's

Congress has exerted pressure on ADF to reduce its administrative costs. The Foundation responds that its high non-grant costs are justifiable, given expenses needed to establish a new agency, monitor grants in 19 countries and other factors. Also, ADF President Leonard Robinson, Jr., testified that he was attempting to reduce administrative costs to 31 percent for fiscal year 1988 (42).

Setting Up An Advisory Council

The Foundation's authorizing legislation required that ADF set up an Advisory Council of persons knowledgeable about development activities in Africa and that the Board consult with it at least once a year to discuss ADF objectives and activities. The 27-person Council met in March, June, November 1985, and November 1986, and 4 task forces made suggestions regarding 1) concepts of development, 2) ways to educate the public about ADF's work, 3) methods to work with Congress and other U.S. government groups, and 4) means to supplement the Foundation's appropriations with outside resources.

categories are 1) Program Support, or administrative costs and 2) Program Development, which includes grants, African staff, publication expenses, and work by contractors to appraise, monitor, evaluate and provide technical assistance to grantees. The Foundation retroactively estimated its administrative costs at 38 percent in fiscal year 1986 and 35 percent in fiscal year 1987.

ADF'S PROCESSES TO FUND PROJECTS AND ITS PROJECT PORTFOLIO

Outreach

The Foundation spreads information about its program by several methods:

- publications,
- meetings in Africa, and
- personal contacts.

ADF's brochure and newsletter, *Beyond Relief*, are especially important information tools. The brochure contains funding criteria and in-

formation on how to apply for grants in English, French, and Portuguese. Other organizations, including Africare and the World Council of Credit Unions, have publicized information about ADF's program in Africa.

Also, ADF staff publicizes its program through meetings with government officials, PVOS, and the media during initial trips to African countries where ADF intends to begin funding. For example, the local press has carried

articles about ADF and African radio and television stations have featured interviews with ADF staff. Following this type of publicity, ADF receives many requests, a large part of which are ineligible, such as requests for individual assistance and scholarships.

In the early days, ADF's most important method of informing African organizations of the availability of funds was via the personal contacts of ADF staff. ADF staff called on people and groups recommended by colleagues, who also helped spread the word about the Foundation. This method of communication remains important, although outreach is becoming more systematic. For example, dissemination of information about ADF's funding program is one purpose of the Foundation Representatives' trips to Africa. The African Regional Liaison Officers, who sometimes visit a neighboring country between Foundation Representative visits, and country representatives also explain ADF's program and procedures.

Once ADF funds several organizations in a country, word often spreads through networks of similar groups. This informal method of outreach becomes more important as additional projects are funded in a country.

Recently, ADF traced how its funded projects originally made contact with the Foundation. Of 102 projects, the greatest number, 35, resulted from Foundation Representative contacts. Another 23 proposals were submitted directly from Africa to Washington. Many projects were referred by others: 19 were referred by U.S. PVOS, 10 by African non-

governmental organizations (NGOS), five by African governments, three by African universities, three from U.S. government programs (AID, Ambassadors Self-Help Fund, Peace Corps), two from Regional Liaison Officers, one each from an international NGO and ADF initiative (6).

The OTA field teams found that an American or European resident in Africa was responsible for linking grassroots organizations with ADF in a quarter of the ADF projects they visited. These "brokers" were a Peace Corps Volunteer, a European volunteer, and an American photographer/writer.

Process for Approving Grants

The Foundation's process for approving grants has been modified only slightly since 1984, although the way the system functions in practice has evolved with the growth of the staff and portfolio (figure 3-1) (2,26). The Foundation Representatives are notified of the amount of funds available for grants in their region at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each is allocated the same amount, about \$700,000 during the past 2 years. They generally prefer to respond to individual proposals without concern about the number of grants to countries within the region. In at least one case, however, the Representative attempted to plan distribution by country within the region. Unallocated funds may be awarded to projects in any region during the final quarter of the fiscal year.

The initial contact between an applicant and the Washington office varies from submission of a sophisticated proposal to sending a simple letter requesting funds. Even with the addition of ADF's African staff, most request letters and applications come directly to Washington, although in a few cases the Regional Liaison Officer has seen the request or spoken with the potential applicant first,

Screening Proposals


The program assistant, under supervision of the Foundation Representative, first screens proposals and determines whether or not the request meets basic eligibility standards. These

We had to leave and go to Nigeria because of the drought. We were not happy there. [The ADF Representative] said she would help us and now we are back. . . . No one else would help.

Macao bii Gao, Dakoro Herders' Cooperative,
Bundu Eggó, Niger.

Translated and paraphrased from an OTA interview,
Sept. 22, 1987.

Figure 3-1. -ADF Project Approval Process



SOURCE: Teixeira Nash and Curtis Boykin, "The ADF Funding Process or How the Izuni Coop got an ADF Grant!" *Beyond Relief*, vol 1, No 3, November 1985, pp 1-4

eligibility criteria, with the exception of the legislated limit of \$250,000, reflect the ADF Board's evolving policies and interpretation of ADF's mandate: the applicant must be a non-governmental entity (while public entities are specifically allowed in the legislation, ADF Board policy is more restrictive); the beneficiary must consist of two or more individuals or families; large capital projects and scholarships are not eligible. An estimated 85 percent of applicants are screened out at this stage. Since ADF has not systematically recorded the numbers of applicants and reasons for their rejection, it is not known if this percentage has changed over time.⁵

The program assistant informs rejected applicants of the reasons why their proposals were rejected. Then ADF asks remaining applicants to complete ADF's grant application if they have not already done so. Applicants are asked to submit four to five pages of information an-

swering questions about their organization and proposed project. Most organizations funded by ADF submit proposals longer than requested but ADF has funded a few short, handwritten proposals. Proposals are usually submitted in English or French but proposals in other languages are eligible for consideration.

Review

The next step is a review of the proposal by the Foundation Representative, who generally asks applicants for additional information. Usually site visits occur during this stage. Although visits are commonly conducted by the Representative, sometimes a consultant visits the applicant. After reviewing all information, the Foundation Representative decides whether or not to recommend the proposal for funding. Representatives' reasons for rejection usually relate to the project's feasibility and ability of the applicant organization to carry it out. However, ADF has not documented the number of rejections at this stage and reasons for them.

The Representative then prepares a Project Assessment Memorandum (PAM) recommend-

⁵ADF is setting up a system to track numbers of applicants and reasons for rejection beginning in early 1988. A computerized management information system (PROMIS) will track information on applicants and funded projects.

ing the project. The format for this 10 to 15 page memo includes a brief summary of the proposal, the reasons for the recommendation, and brief sections designated for discussing sustainability, replicability, and environmental concerns. The Representative's concerns may be found in a section on conditions to be placed on the grant. In practice, the purpose of the memo is to convince the staff Project Review Committee to approve the proposal for funding.

After clearance by the director of the Office of Field Operations, the PAM and proposal are sent to the staff Project Review Committee, the next step in approval. The committee is headed by the vice president and consists of the president, directors of the three ADF offices, the general counsel, and one Foundation Representative other than the ones presenting proposals for approval at the weekly meeting. Prior to the meeting, members review the proposals and PAMs. During the meeting the Foundation Representative makes a brief presentation and committee members then question the Representative. The Representative defends the proposal and acts as an advocate for it. At the end of the discussion, committee members (but not the Foundation Representative) complete a Project Rating Sheet. An average of 70 points of a possible 100 is required for approval. These rating sheets are kept by the vice president rather than in the project file; however, the representative receives a copy of the meeting minutes. Proposals may be approved, approved with conditions, sent back for further information, or rejected. But the rejection may not be final as the representative can present the same project later if it scores between 65 and 69, either modified, with more information, or with more persuasive arguments. According to the vice president, the Project Review Committee rejects proposals for two major reasons: 1) they seem to be a violation of ADF policy or mandate, or 2) they are not conceptually sound or feasible. Over the past 4 years, the committee has rejected approximately 1 of every 10 projects.

Board Approval

The next step in the process is approval by a majority of the three members of a separate

Project Review Committee at the Board of Directors level, which meets at least monthly. The members of the Board selected for this committee live in Washington, saving travel expenses. One is the U.S. Department of State member, who is usually represented by a delegated foreign service officer. In all but four cases, the Board review committee approved proposals sent to it by the staff review committee. The views of the Board committee, however, have shaped the types of activities and organizations funded beyond this intervention in project approval. For example, their views put forward in formal and informal policies and conversations have affected project proposals before they are submitted to the Board committee.

Early on, the Board rejected the suggestion that it only approve grants greater than \$75,000. The Board committee has approved all grants and amendments to grants for most of ADF's history. However, the Board agreed in early 1987 that grant amendments less than \$10,000 could be approved by the Director of Program and Field Operations, and those between \$10,000 and \$25,000 could be approved by the vice president with concurrence by the president.⁷

Congressional Notification

Next, the project approval process requires congressional notification, as mandated by appropriations laws. The Foundation sends brief summaries of each project to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and their Subcommittees on Foreign Operations. If ADF hears nothing from the committees within 15 days, the grant can be obligated. No proposal has been rejected at this stage, but delays occur because ADF holds notifications whenever Congress is recessed.

⁷In mid-December, the Board approved a small project funding procedure for similarly funding grants of these sizes. Neither require staff Project Review Committee approval. In addition, the Board agreed to delegate to the president authority for approving projects of less than \$125,000, but limited this authority by requiring a 15 day notification period during which a majority of members of the Board Project Review Committee could disapprove funding.

Signing the Grant Agreement

After the two week wait, ADF's president sends the applicant a letter informing them of the approval and two copies of the Grant Agreement for their signature. The agreement includes the approved proposal and budget and may include conditions which must be met before ADF will award the grant. Announcements of the grant are sent to the ambassador in the United States of the nation concerned, to the U.S. ambassador, and, since 1986, to the AID director.

The average time elapsed between the first submission of the applicant's proposal and final approval (the signing of the Grant Agreement) is 9 months, a period longer than for other organizations that fund projects of comparable size, such as Ford Foundation and IAF (29,32). This period includes an average 3 months between ADF staff approval in the project review committee and the signing of the Grant Agreement. Some of this time may be required for the recipient to consider and comply with conditions on the grant. But this period is followed by another period of several months before the first check is disbursed from ADF. And transfer of funds can take several months to reach Africa because of long delays in disbursement of funds from Washington through the U.S. government budget and fiscal officer based in Paris. In 1987, ADF began to send funds through commercial banks to speed up transmission to Africa.

Process of Monitoring Grants

Monitoring includes program and financial oversight and facilitation of the grantees' efforts by the funder. According to ADF's president, "an appropriate monitoring strategy does not burden or intimidate grantees (but) encourages self-evaluation" (7). While many groups share this attitude, ADF's monitoring approach is unusual in that it gives its grantees much greater control of funds than government funding programs and most U.S. PVOS. Once the ADF Grant Agreement is signed and the first check sent, the recipient group has control of implementation, includ-



Photo credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Most ADF-funded agricultural projects involve production of crops primarily for sale. The Agricultural Finance Corporation in Zimbabwe received ADF funds to provide loans to small farmers growing coffee.

ing purchasing equipment and hiring technical assistance. Unlike recipients of other U. S.-funded programs, ADF grantees are not required to purchase American-made equipment and materials. This flexibility allows them to purchase equipment that may be less expensive, more readily available, more appropriate, or easier to maintain because of availability of spare parts. For example, ADF has, on behalf of the grantee, disbursed funds directly to a company in a country other than the recipients' in order to purchase imported equipment more quickly.

The ADF monitoring process, however, is similar to most other funders' in that quarterly reports and site visits are required. In the quarterly progress report, the project manager is asked to list project accomplishments and whether or not the activities occurred on time, and to identify any problems, plans to solve them, and those who participated in internal evaluation during the quarter. The quarterly financial report is based on a cash accounting method; recipients must list their expenditures and cash balances at the beginning and end of the quarter. To facilitate recordkeeping, ADF requires project managers to keep ADF funds in a separate bank account. Also, grantees are required to keep ADF funds in non-interest bearing accounts like other recipients of U.S. funds (program income generated from the grant, however, is excused from this requirement). This regulation lowers the value of grant funds, especially when inflation and currency devaluations occur,

Project managers send these reports to Washington, but not to ADF's African staff. Nor do they necessarily keep a copy for themselves. Often these reports are late and important information reaches Washington slowly. The Foundation now asks project managers to request checks 6 weeks before they need them. Thus, in a few cases, a grant's second check may be processed before ADF receives the first quarterly report, reducing ADF's leverage over the projects.

However, ADF exercises some control over grant funds through its monitoring and disbursement practices. Funds are disbursed during the grant period according to a schedule determined by project funding needs. The fact that many projects have high equipment budgets spent in the beginning of the grant period reduces ADF leverage over grant implementation, however. The Foundation uses African accounting firms to conduct reviews and audits at the end of major projects, and mid-term for certain projects. In some cases, ADF asks these firms to check on the accounting methods and capacities of grantees before disbursement of ADF funds. To date, 24 audits have been completed. The Foundation may also provide

grant funds for training and assistance in bookkeeping or financial and general management.

Once the quarterly reports arrive in Washington, they are handled by a number of persons. The Foundation Representative and the budget and fiscal officer each review the quarterly report; the Representative will discuss problems with the budget officer and the director of the Office of Field Operations. The grants coordinator and program assistants are also involved. The Foundation Representative may communicate back with project managers by letter or telex; they also talk by phone with the Regional Liaison Officer about once a week. ADF policy is that their staff visit each funded group in the first quarter of the grant year (in part to make sure that the grantee understands ADF monitoring forms and procedures) and once toward the end of the first grant year. The schedule of visits to Africa sometimes has not permitted this policy to be implemented, however. With the addition of African staff, ADF expects that projects will be visited more frequently.

ADF has been flexible in permitting revision of the activities, schedules, and budgets specified in the Grant Agreement. A number of projects have been extended and/or received additional funds with grant amendments. A few organizations were initially awarded a planning grant and subsequently a larger project grant,

Funds for end-of-project evaluations are provided in the original grant budgets. ADF earmarks 2 percent of the total grant for an external, end-of-project evaluation and another 2 percent for an audit of project funds, although it only requires audits of certain grantees. In addition, ADF includes the expenses of monitoring by its African staff as part of its overall grant commitments (table 3-I),

ADF Portfolio of Funded Projects: September 1984 Through September 1986


At the beginning of this assessment, OTA requested information from ADF on the 86 grants committed through the end of September 1986

(listed in the ADF *Congressional Presentation FY 1988*, app. A). The total committed to these projects in 19 countries by spring 1987 was slightly more than \$7 million, with the average awarded to each project \$81,500.⁷ Six of these were terminated by ADF by August 1987 for a variety of reasons including substantial problems with project start-up or performance. Others received grant amendments increasing the amount of ADF funds. Zimbabwe and Kenya had the largest number of funded projects: 13 each.

Grants ranged in size from \$700 to a pastoralist in the Sahel for a small trading center to the legal maximum of \$250,000 for a water supply for three communities in Kenya. Twenty-four percent (21 projects) were less than \$25,000; and 38 percent (33 projects) were at least \$100,000. Ten projects were at or near the \$250,000 ADF maximum limit.

Two-thirds of these projects deal with agriculture in a significant way. Of these, most aim to increase food production for sale and domestic consumption (figure 3-2). A large number (70 percent) involve production of cash crops primarily for marketing, such as vegetables, fruit, peanuts, coffee, tea, and rice. One-third involve livestock production and 13 percent involve poultry. Although 89 percent of agricultural projects are production-based, marketing is an important function in at least one-half (figure 3-3). Processing and storage are involved in 28 percent and 22 percent of projects, respectively, while resource conservation activities are only present in 10 percent. The technology profile of ADF's agricultural projects is equally diverse. Perhaps not surprising given the critical shortage of water and irrigation in much of Africa, 78 percent of the projects dealing with crop production include small-scale irrigation systems (figure 3-4). Many include the use of improved seeds (36 percent) or fertilizer (32 percent). More unexpectedly given the resources required to make tractor use sustainable, 36 percent of the agricultural projects


Figure 3-2. -Sectors of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects



^aCrops grown primarily for sale including vegetables, fruit, peanuts, soybeans, sunflowers, coffee, and tea.

SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987


Figure 3-3. -Functions of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects



SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

⁷By the end of fiscal year 1987, the average total amount awarded to each project, including grant amendments, had increased to \$90,755.

Figure 34.—Technological Components of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects •



^aTable refers only to projects involving crop production

SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

involve the use of tractors, while only 12 percent make use of animal traction.

A majority of the agricultural projects have multiple sectors, functions, and technological components. Nearly two-thirds involve more than one agricultural sector (table 3-2) and function (table 3-3) and 55 percent have more than one technological component (table 3-4). Looking at the sectors in another way, half of the ADF-funded agricultural projects deal with single or various combinations of crops only, 22 percent with animals only, and 27 percent with mixed crop and animal activity.

Forty-four percent of ADF's agricultural projects work with communally-owned farms only; 22 percent only with private farms; and 35 percent with a combination of communal and private farms (25). Several projects support agricultural-related enterprises, e.g., two assist fishers' cooperatives by repairing boat motors. Generally, credit programs use revolving loan funds to support numerous sub-projects, some

Table 3.2.—Number of Sectors of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects

	Sector(s)	Percent of projects	
One-sector projects	Cash Crop	11	36
	Livestock	9	
	Fish	9	
	Food Crops	7	
Two-sector projects	Cash/Food Crop	32	48
	Cash Crop/Livestock	7	
	Cash Crop/Poultry	5	
	Livestock/Poultry	2	
	Poultry/Fish	2	
Three-sector projects	Cash/Food Crop/Livestock	11	13
	Cash Crop/Livestock/Poultry	2	
Four-sector projects	Cash Crop/Food Crop/Livestock/Poultry	2	2
		99 ^a	99

^aTotal less than 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

Table 3-3.—Number of Functions of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects

	Function(s)	Percent of projects	
One-function projects	Production	29	39
	Conservation	6	
	Processing	4	
Two-function projects	Production/Marketing	24	34
	Production/Processing	8	
	Marketing/Storage	2	
Three-function projects	Production/Marketing/Storage	10	18
	Production/Marketing/Processing	6	
	Production/Processing/Storage	2	
	Production/Marketing/Processing/Storage	2	
Four-function projects	Production/Marketing/Processing/Storage	6	10
	Production/Marketing/Storage/Conservation	2	
	Production/Marketing/Processing/Conservation	2	
		101 ^a	101

^aTotal greater than 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

of which involve agricultural production, and others involve non-agricultural small-scale rural enterprises. The one-third of the ADF grants not classified as agricultural have gone to support non-agricultural activities in rural areas, such as potable water supply projects, or to fund

Table 3-4.—Number of Technological Components of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects^a

	Technologies	Percent of projects		
One-component projects	Irrigation	42		
	Tractors	4	1	46
Two-component projects	Irrigation/Tractors	8		
	Irrigation/Seeds	8		
	Seeds/Fertilizer	8		32
	Tractors/Animal Traction	8	1	
Three-component projects	Irrigation/Seeds/Fertilizer	8		
	Irrigation/Tractors/Fertilizer	4		16
	Seed/Tractors/Fertilizer	4	1	
Four-component projects	Irrigation/Seed/Tractors/Fertilizer	4		4
Five-component projects	Irrigation/Seed/Tractors/Fertilizer/Animal Traction	4		4
		102b		102

^aIncludes only projects involving crop production.^bTotal greater than 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: Peter Matlon, "Consultants Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

organizations in major cities and regional towns. ADF estimates that about 20 percent of its projects through fiscal year 1987 provide funding to urban organizations.

ADF has awarded two-thirds of its grants for periods of two or three years. Of the 86 grants:

- 15 (17%) were for 1 year,
- 31 (36%) for 2 years,
- 28 (32%) for 3 years,
- 7 (8%) for 4 years, and
- 5 (6%) for 5 years.

Projects differ in their geographic scope. Two-thirds (56 projects) were classified as local, encompassing a village or a number of communities in a given area. Twenty-two percent (19 projects) were regional projects covering a large area within a country; and 13 percent (11 projects) were national in scope.

EVALUATION, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: HOW ADF IS SHARING WHAT IT LEARNS

The Foundation's legislated purposes include the development of self-evaluation techniques, support for relevant development-related research by Africans and sharing lessons learned with others in Africa and the United States. Over the past 2 years, ADF has initiated various activities to carry out these functions.

Evaluations of Its Funded Projects by ADF

The Foundation's Office of Research and Evaluation was established in 1986, as envisioned in ADF's Five Year Plan. At the same time, ADF asked three American journalists familiar with African development issues to visit ADF-funded projects in six African countries. Each spent several weeks interviewing project participants and others in two countries; together they visited 18 ADF-funded projects. Their report, *Fulfilling the Mandate: An Assessment Report by Three Development Journalists*, described the concerns, activities, and results

of the projects visited (3). Their conclusions point to the strength of grassroots movements in Africa and the positive potential of ADF's support for them.

A number of ADF's first projects were nearing completion by 1987, thus more formal project evaluations could be carried out. ADF hired a consultant to design a methodology and identified five projects in West Africa and four in Kenya for this evaluation (however, 67 percent or less of the total grant had been disbursed to four of them). The Foundation selected 2 teams of African consultants, several based in the United States, to each spend 3 weeks visiting the projects between April and June of 1987. Earlier, ADF agreed to co-sponsor an evaluation with the Ford Foundation of a fifth Kenyan ADF-funded project, Partnership for Productivity (PFP), because it had received Ford Foundation funding also (31). These evaluations were conducted by and for ADF and in this sense are internal ADF evaluations even though they were external to the projects.

Self-Evaluations by Funded Groups

One of ADF's first efforts to stimulate self-evaluation by project participants was to host an evaluation conference for some 50 representatives of ADF-funded community groups in East and Southern Africa. Participants shared insights and experiences during a 3-day conference in Nairobi in January 1987. They explored problems and potential solutions; made recommendations to ADF about its funding program and procedures; and discussed their ideas about planning development activities, seeking financial and technical assistance, and planning for self-sufficiency to avoid dependence on donors (5,19). A similar conference is planned for representatives of West and Central African ADF-funded projects in early 1988.

The Foundation also is planning to train managers of ADF-funded projects to carry out participatory evaluation within their own organizations. A workshop on this topic was held during the fall 1987 meeting of the Foundation's African Regional Liaison Officers in Washington; follow-up technical assistance with representatives of funded groups is being planned.

ADF has provided funds so that leaders of ADF-funded projects could visit and provide assistance to more recently funded projects. For example, the director of a project that provided technical assistance and credit to small farmers in Kenya was sent to review a similar project starting up in Tanzania and make recommendations to increase its effectiveness. One grant in Botswana includes funds for a visit to a similar ADF-funded project elsewhere.

Research Grants

In 1986, ADF implemented a program to fund research by Africans on development issues related to the ADF mandate.^a The Senior Fel-

lowship program has supported 5 Africans to carry out 18-month research projects in Africa (obligating \$250,000 for these research grants in 1986). Their research topics included rural non-formal education in Uganda, health care in Nigeria, international PVOS in Somalia, food self-sufficiency in Malawi, and a community development program in Cape Verde. Of these five countries, ADF has a grant program only in Somalia. Research funding was suspended in 1987 pending Board approval of a policy paper clarifying funding objectives, criteria, and procedures. An additional \$250,000 is projected for 1988. The Foundation's Office of Research and Evaluation intends to support research on broad issues of relevance to efforts of funded groups.

ADF began a Doctoral Fellowship program in 1987 to support research in Africa by Africans studying for their PhDs in U.S. universities. So far, 2 African graduate students have been funded for 12 months. Their work is examining *ujamaa* policy in Tanzania and refugee policy in Somalia. Three additional fellows are projected for 1988, with a total of \$78,500 for the five, pending approval of the Foundation's research position paper. Proposals for fellowships are screened by an external Research Advisory Review Panel consisting of five experts on Africa (three Africans, two Americans) based at universities in Washington, D.C. before being submitted to ADF's staff Project Review Committee.

Public Education

ADF has made a number of efforts to educate Americans and others about its work in Africa. In addition to its publications, the Foundation's staff have participated in conferences in the United States, Europe, and Africa. ADF has hosted educational visits to its funded projects in Africa by ADF Board members, con-

^aADF's research programs differ from those of the Fellowship Program of the Inter-American Foundation in several ways. While the majority of IAF awards fund field work in Latin America by American graduate and postdoctoral researchers, ADF restricts its program to Africans. In 1982 IAF began granting fellowships to Latin American junior researchers and development professionals to obtain advanced training in U.S. universities;

on the other hand, ADF research grant recipients are not necessarily affiliated with an American university. Unlike ADF, IAF has funded projects of overseas research organizations in its regular grants program. Also, IAF has contracted with developing country research organizations and universities to provide technical assistance and conduct feasibility and evaluation studies of their funded projects to a greater extent than ADF.

gressional staff, and others. In several instances, it has supported visits by its African staff and project leaders to the United States, primarily for their own learning but also to share their experiences with Americans. Also, ADF has provided funds for its project leaders to attend meetings about grassroots development in Africa.

The information officer is responsible for ADF publications: a 12 page newsletter, *Beyond Relief*; a professional journal dealing with issues of grassroots development in Africa, *Advance*; and 1986 and 1987 *ADF-Funded Projects* booklets. Three issues of *Beyond Relief* were published in 1985, one in 1986, and one in 1987. An average of 6,000 copies were distributed in English; one issue, featuring ADF's funding process, was published in French (3,500 copies). The newsletter features articles about ADF-funded projects, ADF programs, and development topics written by Africans, staff, and Board members. The newsletter is distributed free to a diverse readership including development organizations, PVOS, interested members of Congress, the media, Federal agencies, African embassies in Washington, and individuals and academic institutions with an interest in Africa.

The first issue of *Advance*, published by the Government Printing Office in June 1987, contained articles by several ADF-funded project managers, the head of the African Development Bank, a professor at American University, and ADF's director of research and evaluation. The 5,000 copies were distributed to U.S. PVOS, officials in development assistance agencies, African government officials and private organizations, and individuals. Several members of the ADF Advisory Council and the State Department representative on the Board are on the *Advance* Editorial Board. *Advance* will be published with French summaries to facilitate its wider dissemination in Africa. The booklets with short descriptions of ADF-funded projects are available in English and French.

The Foundation also is exploring new ways to inform people about its activities. In two cases visited by OTA, ADF demonstrated its interest in the audio-visual documentation of its projects. Twenty-three percent of the budget for its Dakoro project in Niger is slated for a documentary film. Also, ADF has contracted a Kenyan film company to record the story of an ADF-funded community water supply project.

Chapter 4

OTA's Findings About **ADF-Funded Projects**

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Chapter 4

OTA's Findings About ADF-Funded Projects

SUMMARY

- The four critical issues addressed here are participation, results, sustainability, and replicability (table 4-1). These issues were chosen because of their importance to ADF's mandate and the interests of the congressional committees that requested this work.
- One-half of the 12 African groups visited by OTA teams were judged to have a high degree of overall participation in the ADF-funded project activity; one-third, however, were rated low on participation. In a majority of projects, participants did not share in evaluation and financial decisionmaking and women rarely participated in project management.
- Most of the projects visited were in early stages of implementation so OTA's teams estimated future results when possible; actual impacts could be observed in only half of the projects. Ten projects were judged likely to have a positive impact on the social and economic development of the poor in the locale. But the level of expected impact ranged from significant to negligible.
- Eleven ADF-funded activities had a high or moderate potential to be sustained over the next 3 to 5 years, although not necessarily in the same form as in the approved proposal. Community support and the self-help nature of the projects were the strongest reasons for sustainability. But the lack of careful economic and environmental planning were common constraints threatening sustainability, especially in the longer term.
- Ten of the projects had a moderate or high degree of replicability in the region or country but two were rated low. Self-help processes were judged more replicable than many of the technologies used. The relatively high cost of the technologies involved was a major constraint to replicability of project activities.

Table 4-1.—Rating the Critical Issues in 12 ADF Projects

Critical issue	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall degree of participation	6	2	4
Overall results	4	6	2
Overall sustainability (for next 3 to 5 years)	6	5	1
Overall replicability in region or country	3	7	2

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the results of site visits to 12 ADF-funded projects (table 4-2). It is organized around the four critical issues that Congress asked OTA to investigate: participation, project results, sustainability, and replicability. In each case, ADF's approach to the issue introduces the discussion. Then OTA's operational definitions follow, along with the overall and detailed findings. The final section con-

siders links between these issues and their relationship to ADF's funding program. Detailed descriptions of these projects are in appendix B. Since these projects were selected to be representative, chapter 5 discusses the implications for ADF's program and gives suggestions about how ADF can improve the effectiveness of its funding program.

Table 4.2.—The 12 ADF Projects Visited by OTA Teams

Name of project ¹	Name of recipient organization	Country	Type of recipient organization	Project scope ²	Project amount	Proposal submitted	FY grant committed	Grant period (FY to FY) years	First check disbursed	No. of participants (groups)	Type of activity offered by ADF grant	Intended outcomes
1 Farm Rehabilitation for the Agricultural Society of Dagnare Cooperative (DHC) Grant	Dagnare Agricultural Society	Niger	Intermediary (association of coops)	L	2,255	7/9/85	1986-89	3 yrs.	3/6/87	660 (3 groups)	Fruit, vegetable, and cereal production	Restore and modernize cooperative irrigated fields
2 Dakoro Herders Cooperative (DHC) Grant	Dakoro Herders Cooperative	Niger	Grassroots	L	7,255	7/9/85	1985-86	1 yr.	8/86	74	Livestock production, literacy, small enterprise creation	a. Develop project plan b. Reconstitute livestock herd, repair well, and increase self-sufficiency
3 Equipment to Strengthen the Activities of the Association	Youth Association of Ross-Belgio	Senegal	Grassroots	L	58,639	2/86	1986-91	5 yrs.	2/5/86	265	Irrigated agriculture (rice and vegetables)	Increase irrigated rice and vegetable production
4 Union Kaoural	Kaoural Federation of Cooperatives	Tanzania	Intermediary (association of coops)	R	03,832	3/18/86	1986-88	2 yrs.	87	2,076 (25 youth groups)	Fruit, vegetable, cattle, health	Improve group income and health care
5 Integrated Food Development Program	Department of Morogoro	Tanzania	Intermediary (church-based)	L	248,378	2/85	1986-89	3 yrs.	86	106 1986/87 521 1987/88 (27 parishes)	Credit for inputs, tractor hire, maize production	Increase maize production
6 Conservation Education Project	Kikafiri Village Malihai Club	Tanzania	Intermediary (PVO)	L	4,000	3/30/86	1986-87	1.5 yr.	4/24/87	900 families	Water supply, forestry	Improve water supply, and reforestation
7 NGK Self-Help Water Project	Gtero Self-Help Water Project Committee	Kenya	Grassroots	L	1,000	12/24/84	1985-87	2 yrs.	5/22/85	250 families (3 communities)	Water supply (domestic and farming use)	Increase water supply, irrigated land and potable water
8 Kenya Small Enterprise and Credit Training Project	Partnership for Productivity/Kenya (PIP)	Kenya	Intermediary (PVO)	L	4,000	10/84	1985-87	2 yrs.	5/85	2,750 (92 women's groups)	Training, (management) credit	Provide women training and credit for small-scale enterprises and agricultural inputs
9 Poultry-Market Garden Project	Boireko Agricultural Management Association	Botswana	Grassroots	L	1,500	8/84	1985-87	2 yrs.	4/4/85	0	Poultry, vegetable and citrus production	Develop small scale vegetable and egg production enterprises
10 Tutume Tractor Hire Project	Tutume McConnell Community Trust	Zimbabwe	Intermediary (PVO)	L	40,604	5/30/84	1986-89	3 yrs.	9/85	62	Tractor hire	Increase productivity of farmers
11 Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea Project	Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)	Zimbabwe	Intermediary (parastatal)	L	537	7/3 84	1986-89	3 yrs.	12/24/85	144 1985-86 214 1986-87 (4 coops)	Credit for tea and coffee production	Increase number of coffee and tea enterprises
12 Silvera House Development Fund	Silvera House	Zimbabwe	Intermediary (church-based)	R	20,808	7/10/84	1985-88	3 yrs.	7-3/85	150 (11 projects)	Farm and nonfarm projects	Improve projects through loans

¹Key: Italics indicate short form of project name used

²Key for project scope: L = Local, R = Regional

SOURCES: ADF project files for columns 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Throughout this work, OTA makes important distinctions between: a) beneficiary and participant, b) project and organization, c) grassroots and intermediary organizations.

Beneficiary and Participant

Project “beneficiary” and project “participant” are often used interchangeably and vaguely. A beneficiary gains from the project activity; the benefit may be direct or indirect, and intended or unintended (10). Participants take part in or contribute to project activities but they do not necessarily benefit. For example, in one credit project more women have taken part by contributing to local savings clubs than have received loans from them. In other cases, people benefit from projects without participating, such as receiving irrigation water from systems which they did not help build. Participation in project activities and directly benefiting from them are included here in measures of “participation,” but the two are considered separately,

Project and Organization

The term “project” refers to the activity or activities supported by the ADF grant (as described in the approved proposal). The group sponsoring the activity and/or receiving the grant funds is the recipient “organization.” This distinction is especially important when considering sustainability and replicability. Sometimes organizations are sustainable but specific activities are not. Organizational processes may

be replicable but certain activities too site-specific for repetition. OTA’S assessment of these two critical issues included project and organizational elements.

Grassroots and Intermediary Organizations

Grassroots organizations (sometimes called primary or base groups) are defined as “small aggregations of individuals or households who regularly engage in some joint development activity as an expression of collective interest” (11). Most are community-level associations, although they may include members from several communities. Intermediary organizations, or grassroots support organizations, provide services to grassroots groups. One type has professionals in leadership positions; another type consists of higher level membership organizations, such as confederations of cooperatives or associations of community organizations (11). In this assessment, intermediary organizations may refer to national, regional, or local private voluntary organizations (PVOS), church-based groups, associations of cooperatives, or parastatal organizations. OTA visited four grassroots organizations and eight intermediary organizations. The intermediary organizations consisted of three regional PVOS, two associations of village cooperatives, two church-related groups, and one parastatal. Grassroots groups and intermediary organizations are distinguished throughout this assessment.

PARTICIPATION

What is Participation and How Can It Be Measured?

The Foundation’s legislation specifically emphasizes participation, directing ADF to give priority to projects in which community groups foster their own development and which have “the maximum feasible participation of the poor in project initiation, design, implementation, and evaluation.” ADF has translated this

direction into operational criteria. Some of these criteria deal primarily with the timing of participation in the project cycle, others with modes of participation. ADF examines the following components of participation in its project approval and monitoring checklist:

- participation of beneficiaries in project design, implementation, management, and evaluation;

- community members contribute to the project and share in benefits; and
- achievement of project objectives enhances continued participation.

However, ADF recently stated it gives priority to self-determination and local control, allowing recipient organizations to select their own modes of participation (8).

The elements of participation ADF uses in its appraisal checklist were considered appropriate but OTA found that some additional elements were needed for its field assessment. A careful review of ADF's project files identified

a lack of specific ADF data on participation, especially gender-disaggregated data; raised issues about participation in intermediary organizations; and highlighted decisionmaking as a probable critical element of participation (box 4-I). The specific data that field teams collected to evaluate project participation are included in appendix D, "Field Team Methods: The Assessment Materials."

Participation in ADF-funded projects was assessed on the basis of multiple factors. The following were most useful in comparing projects in different regions and in reaching overall project ratings:

Box 4-1.—A Look at ADF's Files: Participation

OTA examined ADF's files of projects related to agriculture and renewable resources to gather information on the way ADF is implementing its congressional mandate for participation. Overall, it appears that ADF has pursued the spirit of its mandate. For example, ADF has hired Africans to represent the Foundation in Africa, Africans provide most of its technical assistance, and African contractors perform its evaluations. Unfortunately, however, ADF does not document how it is increasing the participation of people as decisionmakers in the projects it funds. Existing files lack the data necessary to say if projects are as participatory as Congress intended.

OTA'S review of ADF's files identified these major findings:

1. ADF has little specific documentation to support the Foundation's claims of participation by African community members in project decisionmaking. For example, questions regarding key aspects of participation in ADF's grant application form are vague and seldom answered by applicants. ADF staff say they evaluate participation during the project approval process but do not document it. As a result, ADF has little documentation of the amount and type of participation that occurs.
2. ADF does not make an organized attempt to gather gender-disaggregated data. Therefore, ADF does not know whether women participate fully in project activities.
3. Methods of participation in ADF-funded projects differ according to the type of organization receiving the grant. Grassroots groups, which provide benefits directly to their members, tended to have strong participation by their membership or the members' representatives, sometimes with a special place for community elite. Intermediary organizations, which provide benefits to grassroots groups that pass benefits along to members, seemed to have less participation by potential beneficiaries and more by the groups' Boards of Directors, management, and staff. These differences have as-yet unexamined implications for how ADF assesses participation. Since a significant portion of ADF grants goes to intermediary groups, these implications are significant.
4. Effective participation means participation as a decisionmaker, not only as a beneficiary. For example, women were beneficiaries but not decisionmakers in the Kenya Beekeepers Organization; their needs were ignored, and the project was failing as a result. Women's role as decisionmakers can be problematic because OTA'S data suggest that women tend not to be decisionmakers in projects in which both men and women participate. Again, this is something that ADF needs to address in its work.

SOURCE: Virginia DeLancey, "Aspects of Participation in Projects Funded by the African Development Foundation," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

1. Participation in project identification and design: who originated the project, identified the need, proposed the activity, designed the project, and made technology choices? Were participants consulted, and do they agree to the activity and with the project design?
2. How participatory is the organization receiving the grant: What is the structure of local groups? How do members share in decisionmaking? Do they agree with leaders' decisions, and do members' suggestions result in changes? How, and how often, do intermediary organizations relate to local groups? How are group leaders selected?
3. Who has access to the project: Do participants represent the community? Do women take part? Is any group (ethnic, age, etc.) excluded and why? Who are selected to be participants and how? Do the poorest one-third in the locale and country participate?
4. Participation in decisionmaking, paying costs, and sharing in benefits: What do participants contribute and gain? How do par-

ticipants share in decisionmaking and management of the project?

5. Participation in technical assistance: Who makes initial and ongoing technology choices? Who provides technical expertise and how? Is the process based on two-way communication; is the advice imposed?
6. Participation in project evaluations: Who takes part in evaluation? When and how?

Each project was rated using several aspects of the factors listed above (table 4-3). Then, a rating for overall participation was given to each project. The following factors were given greater weight than others: participant input into decisionmaking; their understanding and support for the project activity; and, in the case of intermediary organizations, the quality of the relationship between the intermediary organization and community groups. The ratings took into account the local context, since the 12 projects took place in varying settings with a variety

Table 4.3.—Rating Participation in 12 ADF Projects

Elements of participation	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall degree of participation	6	2	4
1. Participation in project identification and design			
Input into origin of project	6	2	4
participants identified/agreed to need	7	3	2
participants proposed/agreed to activity	6	2	4
Input into design of project	3	4	5
participants agreed with design	3	6	3
participants made/accepted technology choices	5	3	4
Participants understand and agree with project	6	5	1
2. How participatory is organization receiving the grant?			
local organization	6	4	2
intermediary organization	2	2	4
3. Who has access to the project?			
Participants are representative of community	5	6	1
Women have equitable access to project	4	4	4
4. Participation in decisionmaking, costs and benefits			
Participants share in project management	5	3	4
Members have access to fiscal decisions and records	3	2	7
Women share in project management	1	5	6
Members share equitably in costs and benefits ^b	6	4	0
Women bear equitable share of project costs ^c	3	7	1
Women have equitable share of project benefits ^c	4	7	0
5. Participation in provision of technical assistance	6	2	4
6. Participation in project evaluation	0	1	4

NOTES

^aEight grant recipients visited were intermediary organizations

^bThis refers to equitable share within male or female subgroups. It was too soon to evaluate distribution of project benefits

^cIn one case, in another case, insufficient data was available to judge.

^dIt was too soon to judge in one case

^eIn the other seven projects, participants did not share in project evaluation

of modes of participation, all far from the American cultural context,

Assessing Participation in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: One-half of the ADF-funded projects visited were judged to have a high overall degree of participation, but one-third were rated low overall.

Six of the twelve groups had a high degree of participation in the ADF-funded project activity (table 4-3). The six represented a wide spectrum of modes of participation. For example, projects rating high in overall participation included a herder group with a traditional hierarchical system of decisionmaking (Dakoro in Niger) and an intermediary organization with several thousand members in nearly a hundred local groups (Partnership for Productivity/Kenya, PfP). Another strong example is the poultry and vegetable growing project by the Boiteko Agricultural Management Association in Botswana, notable because of its open management style. The 10 women members share in all project decisionmaking, the financial report is presented on the blackboard at monthly meetings, and leadership rotates. While technical assistance is provided by a man (the project manager of the ADF grant) and one woman is acknowledged to be "the mother" of the group, training has been provided for all members so they are able to share fully in decisionmaking regarding project activities,

The fact that a third of the projects rated low overall on participation is a serious concern given the importance assigned to participation in the legislation establishing ADF. Two of the low-rated projects appeared to have considerable problems related to participation (Kikatiti in Tanzania, and Union Kaoural in Senegal); interviews at the other two low-ranking projects (Dagnare in Niger, and Tutume in Botswana) raised even more fundamental concerns about their appropriateness for ADF funding explained below. The Dagnare project was rejected twice by ADF's Project Review Committee before it was approved,

Another reason for concern is the trend over time. Of the 12 projects visited, 5 were awarded grants in 1986, 6 in 1985, and 1 in 1984. Yet of the most recent grants, those awarded in 1986, only one of the six projects rated high on participation overall and three rated low,

Finding: The ADF projects visited generally rated well on some aspects of participation, such as meeting recognized needs and encouraging contributions of labor, but poorly on other aspects. In a majority of projects, participants did not share in financial decisionmaking or evaluation, and women rarely participated in management.

1. Participation in Project Identification and Design

To assess the elements regarding project identification and design included in table 4-3, OTA began by asking who originated the project. In every case either a local group leader or an indigenous intermediary organization originated the project, in this sense, fulfilling the legislative intent that projects be designed by Africans. Typically a local leader worked with a regional PVO to propose the project; in several cases, the local leader was a member of the larger organization. Sometimes outsiders provided help at early stages. For example, a Peace Corps volunteer linked a tri-community water committee with ADF and with the Kenyan water officials who designed the technical aspects of the project. But the NGK committee originally had the idea to obtain water from the slopes of Mt. Kenya. Additional groups, such as Boiteko, conceptualized their project, but sought technical help from outside to design the project and select specific technologies. ADF funded a grant for technical assistance in Dakoro, Niger, and the provider designed the project. Usually African professionals provided external technical assistance.

Identifying the need for the project is another important element in project origination. Participants took part in this step or agreed that the project addressed a real need to a high degree in seven cases, a low degree in two. If the project addressed a strongly felt need, such as



Photo credit: ADF/Wendy Wilson

Successful participation takes many forms. ADF-funded activities build on traditional systems of community decisionmaking in the Dakoro Herders Cooperative in Niger.

for water or increasing food production, the beneficiaries generally supported it.

In the cases studied, the participants usually agreed with the project activity and design. However, one-third of the projects received a fairly low degree of support for the activities proposed and technologies selected; one-fourth of the projects faced a low acceptance of the project design. For example, the farmers agreed with the concept of a credit program in the Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea project but not with the repayment schedule or pesticides proposed by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Sometimes participants supported one activity over others: Kikatiti members were much more interested in obtaining water from a restored borehole than in the reforestation part of the project strongly supported by the intermediary organization. In the Dakoro project, herders were dissatisfied with changes imposed by local government officials. In these two cases, where participants supported only some project objectives, those objectives were judged to be the ones most likely to be achieved.

Lack of participant involvement in project design was a major problem in some cases. For example, two cases where participation was judged unacceptably low, the Tutume and Dag-

nare projects, were designed with minimal involvement of the intended beneficiaries, who had virtually no idea of what was to come. In the Union Kaoural project, the intermediary group designed the project and decided which villages would participate and how.

In other cases, however, the lack of active involvement by the beneficiaries in the early stages of project design was not a problem. Involving everyone in detailed project design generally is infeasible. Participants in these instances agreed with technology choices even if few were involved in actually designing the project. Decisions usually were made either by a small group of leaders with external technical assistance available locally or by the intermediary organization staff. In several cases, ADF personnel decisively shaped the project proposal,

A key consideration was the quality of the relationship between the initiators, designers, and participants. Positive participation ratings in project identification and design were most often related to participants' support of choices made by their leaders or by the African intermediary organizations,

2. How Participatory Is the Organization Receiving the ADF Grant?

Overall participation generally was rated high in organizations judged to have the support of their members, whether the recipient organization was a grassroots organization or an intermediary group. OTA visited four grassroots organizations; two were rated highly participatory organizations and two were rated moderately participatory. Three of these four projects had high ratings on overall participation, suggesting that grassroots groups may have an advantage in achieving participation. The management structure of these highly-rated groups ranged from elected representatives (from three communities to a central management committee in NGK), to traditional leadership (Dakoro), to open meetings of all participants (Boiteko). Leadership style varied from a small group of tightly disciplined elected leaders who made

decisions (Ross Bethio in Senegal) to consensus-building approaches.

Participation in the eight intermediary organizations was more problematic, confirming the findings of the review of ADF's files. All four projects with low ratings for overall participation were intermediary organizations. However, three of the eight intermediary organizations did receive high overall ratings in participation; two were the church-related intermediary organizations (Silveira House in Zimbabwe and Morogoro Diocese in Tanzania), the third (PfP) was begun and led by Kenyans, most of whom are Quakers. The three highly-rated intermediary organizations have a long history of sponsoring development projects and providing training to local groups and have an explicit philosophy to foster participation.

High overall participation was strongly correlated with the quality of the relationship between intermediary organizations and local groups. In the two projects with the poorest overall participation ratings, the intermediary groups were not actually working with local groups. In the Dagnare project in Niger, a group of retired civil servants nominally agreed to share the benefits of the ADF grant with two other communities, thus making themselves technically an intermediary organization and more likely to receive ADF funding. The project primarily will benefit the retired civil servants. In Tutume, Botswana, a private organization sponsored a tractor hire and demonstration plot to serve individuals they selected, but these farmers had no role in project design, nor do they have a role in implementation, decision-making, or evaluation. They are not members of the organization receiving the ADF grant, nor, after several years of receiving the service, have they joined any group. While the project may be considered self-help in the sense that it is run by Botswana, it is not self-help in the sense that beneficiaries have a role in its management or decisionmaking.

Different types and levels of participation are appropriate for intermediary organizations and local groups, as well as for different stages in the development of the intermediary organiza-

tion, the local groups, and the project activity. However, problems in the relationship between the intermediary organization and local groups can arise from many sources:

- the two may have different objectives and perspectives about the project;
- too much financial and technical control may be given to the intermediary organization;
- intermediary organizations may make decisions without the input and acceptance of local groups;
- intermediary organizations may not understand the need for participatory development; or
- intermediary organizations may not have the experience and capability needed to work with local groups.

The assessment teams looked at different aspects of the relationship between the intermediary organizations and local groups and they judged how each functioned. They found that the local groups had little input in the intermediary organization's decisionmaking in seven of eight projects. Only in Morogoro, Tanzania, had the intermediary organization established a working structure for the local group to share decisionmaking regarding the project. There, village-level congregations elect a "contact" committee for development projects; officers of several committees comprise a parish committee, whose officers sit, in turn, on higher-level committees. This interlocking committee structure, developed over a number of years and recently applied to the tractor hire and maize production project funded by ADF, builds on a democratic church structure and allows for two-way information flow.

In determining the level of participation in projects involving intermediary organizations, learning how decisionmaking occurs can be more critical than knowing management structures. Intermediary groups without formal structures for direct local input into project design were able to compensate for these structural deficiencies if they had good relationships with local groups. For example, the PfP project in Kenya received good ratings for being a par-

ticipatory intermediary organization even though it had no formal structure for local input. This organization has a large number of extension agents who are in close contact with the local groups and have generally good relationships with them. This provides an informal mechanism for participants' suggestions to influence decisions made by the intermediary organization. The Silveira House project in Zimbabwe similarly maintains extensive extension and training programs; while Kenya's PfP works with pre-existing groups, Silveira House programs encourage local participation among previously unorganized groups. In the case of the Union Kaoural in Senegal, however, the existence of formal structures for representation was not sufficient to provide for adequate participant input into decisionmaking. These structures tended to be used for one-way, top-down communication.

Some intermediary groups do not seem to know how to relate to local organizations. For example, farmer groups taking part in the AFC project have little influence on AFC policy despite a directive from the Zimbabwe government that AFC work with communal farmers. The AFC is attempting to shift its emphasis from large-scale commercial farmers to those of the communal areas, but it has not yet developed an organizational response to this directive, although it has established a working relationship with local cooperatives. In this case, the local groups themselves are strong and participatory, but the intermediary organization's relationships with the local groups are not,

3. Who Has Access to the ADF-Funded Project?

Access to ADF-funded projects is open in most cases, but women have a low degree of access in one-third of the projects visited. Otherwise, participants generally represent the community in all but one case (Dagnare, Niger).

In some cases, a certain amount of exclusion may be justified, even necessary, for group cohesion and identity. For example, donor efforts to include persons other than the group propos-

ing the activity (which occurred in the Dakoro project) can weaken participation and negatively affect results. But sometimes exclusion is not justified, and often it is implicit or hidden. The most common problems related to access include: lack of access by the poorest third of the population and women, land tenure issues, religious affiliation of participants, and the criteria for selecting participants, especially those used by intermediary groups.

The Poorest One-Third of the Population. One ADF goal is to reach poor people in Africa. In this review, the poorest one-third of the people in the area seemed able to participate in ADF-funded projects, although no reliable socioeconomic data have been collected by funded groups or ADF to prove this. The one clear exception is Dagnare, Niger, where participation in the core project was limited to relatively better-off civil servants and their families.

Trade-offs sometimes exist between access of the poor and other important aspects such as projects' economic viability. For example, the entry fee for a piggery subproject of Silveira House in Zimbabwe restricts participation to the affluent because each entrant is required to purchase a costly pig. Similarly, conditions for receiving AFC loans exclude some poor people, such as Mozambican refugees because they



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lack long-term access to land. Exclusion from the piggery subproject may not have been justified because it could have been designed so that participants contributed labor or other resources, or purchased their pigs over time. However, ADF was justified in supporting the AFC project because the participants are poor and representative of small farmers in the area.

The answer to a related question—do the project participants represent the poorest one-third of the people in the country or region?—is more difficult to determine. In only a third of the cases could the assessment teams respond with a firm “yes,” based on interviews with local officials and others outside the project. The other cases involved better-off participants, either because the project was situated in a part of the country with higher rainfall and/or better infrastructure, or it was sponsored by a relatively affluent group (for example, owners of farm plots in a Kenyan land resettlement area in the NGK project).

Land Tenure and Displacement. Schemes to expand cultivation or provide irrigation also can be ways to secure rights to lands that customarily were under the use of others. Research on development projects in Africa has shown that pastoralists are especially vulnerable to loss of grazing rights and access to land caused by development schemes. Women’s plots can be lost when cultivation is expanded for crops that bring cash to men. Irrigation projects may disrupt downstream crop production or grazing lands. Projects that increase the land’s value (e.g., irrigation) in areas where sales of land occur can increase the chance that more marginal farmers will lose land to the more politically and economically powerful.

Development projects can exacerbate these problems if the funder does not have a detailed understanding of local patterns of landholding and use. In certain cases, ADF does not seem to have sought this information. Rights to use of the land put into crop production by the Youth Association of Ross Bethio in Senegal, for example, were previously held by a minority group of Fulani herders. The youth group legally acquired those rights. The herders, provided with alternate but poorer grazing land,

tried to block installation of the group’s irrigation system. Eventually, local authorities with armed guards dislodged the herders. In the Morogoro project, block farms will be cultivated by tractors on land that is traditional grazing land of the Maasai in Tanzania. In both cases, herders are a different ethnic group from the farmers and most project participants.

Women’s Access to Projects. Women constituted at least 90 percent of the participants in 2 of the 12 projects visited, Boiteko and Pfp. The sample of projects visited is representative of ADF’s portfolio in this respect. Grants to women’s projects or organizations also represent 17 percent of total ADF-funded grants through fiscal year 1987.

Women had a high degree of access to the project relative to local norms in 2 other projects visited, a moderate degree in 4, and a low degree of access in 4 of the 12. Access was judged by whether or not women were or could become eligible to participate in project activities and to receive project benefits at least in the same proportion as their involvement in the activity in the locale.

In some cases, women were able to participate in activities from which they usually were excluded and which often result in their displacement from land. In Ross Bethio, for example, Senegalese women were given access to irrigated land. In AFC, a few women were given credit for coffee and tea production in eastern Zimbabwe. Women are a majority of participants in Ross Bethio, and although they receive far lower benefits than the men, their inclusion in the project was judged an advance in the local context. But in Zimbabwe, where women commonly are eligible for rural credit programs, the small number included in the AFC project was not sufficient to be considered an advance, and women were judged to have a low degree of access to the project.

In the four projects where women’s access was rated low, the fact that the projects address work done by women could negatively affect achievement of project objectives. Women in Kikatiti, Tanzania, for example, are excluded from the committees directing a village project

that focuses on water and fuelwood, areas of their responsibility.

Issues of access for minority ethnic or religious groups can be similar to those involving women,

Lack of Clear Criteria for Project Access, The lack of clear criteria for selecting participants was identified as a problem for ADF-funded intermediary organizations in particular (e.g., Tutume; AFC). When the service provided is one that many individuals or groups want, organizations need clear criteria and a fair process for selecting who will and will not participate. Some groups required participants to register, others included only dues-paying members, and others considered anyone who contributed labor to be project members. OTA'S assessment teams noted that ADF often did not verify whether project participants were representative of the local community, nor identify whether selection criteria and processes were perceived as fair.

The two religious-based intermediary organizations visited by the teams were rated highly participatory and appropriate for ADF funding because participants were representative of the general community. Nevertheless, funding such groups raises additional questions regarding access. In these cases, access to project benefits was open to eligible participants without regard to religious affiliation. While most participants in the tractor hire project in Morogoro are Anglicans (because church committees register members and the demand for services is far greater than the supply), a significant portion of small farmers in the area were Anglican and management and resource constraints justified the focus. With the exception of the piggery sub-project of the revolving fund of Silveira House whose high entry fee restricted access to the affluent, participants of both projects were representative of the community and poor.

4. Contributing to Costs, Sharing in Benefits, and Participating in Decisionmaking

Costs and benefits were equitably shared among participants to a high or moderate de-

gree in every case studied. Distinguishing between project participants and beneficiaries, however, shows that in some projects the two groups are different people. For example, fewer people helped build the water systems in East African projects than will receive water; in PfP, more women contributed to the savings clubs than have been able to receive loans.

Also, OTA specifically examined how women participants shared in project costs and benefits (table 4-3). This was judged to be equitable in most cases, even when women did not receive precisely equal benefits. For example, women participants in Ross Bethio did not consider their lesser share of project benefits unfair. The one low rating was given to the Tutume project in Botswana because female, single heads of households in practice had to contribute more labor to receive the same benefit as male-headed households.

However, equitable sharing in costs and benefits alone, without sharing in project management and decisionmaking, constitutes a low level of participation. OTA judged the former a necessary but not sufficient condition for meeting the ADF participation mandate.

A low degree of sharing in decisionmaking during project implementation existed in one-third of the projects (table 4-3). This rating was highly correlated with the rating for overall participation. A special problem for intermediary organizations and grassroots groups was the lack of participation in financial decisions found in more than half the cases. Often the local group had accurate records of time and funds contributed by its own members, but little access to the financial records of the intermediary organization or the technical assistance provider who controlled funds provided by outside donors.

Women's participation in management and decisionmaking rated low in half the projects, including PfP, which provides credit to 3,000 women. One reason for this is because all members of the PfP board of directors and the majority of the staff are men. Thus, funding a women's project or women's organization does not guarantee that women participate appropriately in management. In only one case, the



Photo credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Women participate in many ADF-funded projects, such as this successful one in Botswana (Boiteko).

other predominantly women's project of the 12, Boiteko, was women's participation in management rated high. An ADF-sponsored evaluation of five Kenyan projects concluded that the lack of women's participation in management harmed project results, especially those with a majority of women participants (22).

S. Participation in Providing Technical Assistance

All 12 ADF-funded projects received some technical assistance during their design and implementation stages. ADF policy encourages recipients to select their own technical assistance and pay the provider with ADF grant funds. This policy is unique and consistent with

the Foundation's mandate. So is their attempt to have technical assistance provided by Africans where possible. Africans provided technical assistance in 10 of the 12 cases. Often an intermediary group will provide technical assistance to its local groups. But the roles of the technical assistance providers and their relationship with the local group and participants differed among the projects studied.

OTA found that technical assistance was provided in a non-participatory way in one-third of the projects (table 4-3). Project managers or participants had little two-way interaction with technical assistance providers, they were not given an opportunity to provide input to technology choices, or they were dissatisfied with providers' methods. Providers were representatives of intermediary organizations in two of the cases ranked low, a Dutch volunteer in one and local government officials in one. Three of the projects with non-participatory technical assistance also had a low rating on overall participation.

6. Participation in Project Evaluations

One consistent problem noted was the lack of participation in internal project evaluations. Until recently, ADF did not encourage or help funded groups participate in evaluations. Only PfP had even a moderate level of member participation in its evaluation process. Although only half of the projects studied were fully operational, their grants had been committed for at least 12 months. Preliminary evaluations, based on early project activities, would have been appropriate by this point.

Factors Affecting Participation

Finally, OTA teams assessed factors fostering and limiting participation in each project. Sometimes external circumstances helped participation, such as good markets, rainfall, and roads. Others, such as illiteracy, hindered. Commonly cited positive factors include:

- effective and trusted leadership,
- group cohesion,
- building on existing traditions of communal effort,

- project activity matching needs of community,
- using familiar technologies,
- regular meetings, and
- clear project scope.

Factors constraining participation in the 12 projects included:

- unclear membership criteria,

- exclusion of women from project management committees,
- overly complex organizational structure,
- production system requiring centralized decisionmaking,
- inadequate information sharing,
- too prominent a role for outsiders, and
- centralized decisionmaking in intermediary organization.

RESULTS

What Are Results and How Can They Be Measured?

A main purpose of ADF is social and economic development. The Foundation weighs the social and economic impacts of its projects in terms of:

- achieving project objectives,
- attaining community needs,
- effects on the environment and health, and
- benefits to participants and others.

Like most donors, however, ADF directs most of its post-approval efforts toward tracking its own project inputs (e. g., monitoring expenditures of grant funds for purchases of materials and technical assistance) and the project outputs—the goods and services that the ADF grant was expected to produce (a working irrigation system, credit provided to small farmers, or tractor-hire services, etc.). Little systematic attention is given by ADF or its project managers to project outcomes, i.e., what the beneficiaries actually do with the service and how it changes their lives and the life of the community and of the organizations to which they belong. Tracking outcomes is an important way to determine a project's progress, identify gaps where other resources are needed, and involve participants in evaluating project activities. It also is a way to determine whether the project is attaining the broader development goals of the grantee and funder.

Project outputs and outcomes both were included in OTA'S assessment of project results and data on a wide variety of relevant indica-

tors were collected (app. D). The following criteria were used to assess results:

1. Degree to which the project is meeting its objectives: how well is the ADF-funded project doing relative to similar projects supported by other funders; what fosters and what hampers achieving objectives?
2. Actual or likely economic impacts on participants: how many beneficiaries are there; what are the amount and the value of benefits and contributions per person?
3. Actual or likely social impacts on community and organizational impacts on the local groups and intermediary organizations.
4. Actual or likely environmental impacts during the grant period.

OTA attempted to quantify intended and unintended results and their economic, social, organizational, and environmental impacts on participants and the community. Data were disaggregate by gender. If an activity was meeting its objectives and had, on balance, positive economic, social, and organizational effects for poor people and no serious negative environmental impacts, OTA rated its overall results positively in terms of achieving social and economic development.

Assessing Results in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: OTA judged that 10 projects were likely to have a positive impact on the social and economic development of the poor people in

the locale. However, the level of impact ranged from significant to negligible.

Because of the early stage of implementation of the projects visited, OTA teams were required to estimate likely results. Some actual results could be seen in only one-half of the projects. However, 10 were judged likely to have a moderate to high positive impact on the social and economic development of poor people (table 4-4). Overall ratings were similar for projects with some actual results compared with those starting up; however, grants committed in 1985 were rated somewhat higher (3 high, 2 moderate, 1 low) than those committed in 1986 (1 high, 3 moderate, 1 low). In addition, grassroots groups rated significantly better than intermediary organizations (3 high and 1 moderate vs. 1 high, 5 moderate, and 2 low).

Participants from several projects told OTA teams about dramatically increased production and incomes, e.g., a 30 percent increase in income for women who received PfP's farm input loans. In addition to a significant impact on individuals in this project, a large number of people in other communities in western Kenya were affected positively. Similarly, most family incomes increased considerably following the completion of the water and irrigation

system in the NGK project in Kenya, the one project visited which had completed its ADF grant period. Additional specific information on project results is included in the project descriptions (app. B).

Benefits to poor people in two cases, however, were judged likely to be low. Dagnare and Tutume were judged likely to achieve some of their objectives, but not benefit the poor segment of the population very much. The Tutume project in Botswana provided free tractor plowing. However, no longer-term benefits to the sponsoring organization were evident, agricultural production had not increased, and soil erosion threatened to lower future production. In addition, participants were relatively affluent in both projects.

1. Degree to Which ADF-Funded Projects Are Meeting Their Objectives

Despite the preliminary stage of one-half the projects visited, 11 were judged to be meeting or likely to meet their objectives to a high or moderate degree. However, a project can meet its objectives, in the sense of providing the planned service or outputs, but have little impact on improving peoples' lives or achieving

Table 4-4.—Rating Results of 12 ADF Projects

Elements of results	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall results			
Actual or likely positive impact on social and economic development of the poor in locale	4	6	2
1. Degree to which project is meeting or is likely to meet its objectives.	5	6	1
	No. of projects rated		
	Positive	No Change	Negative
2. Actual or likely economic impacts on participants	10	2	0
3. Actual or likely social and organizational impacts			
Actual or likely social impacts	9	2	1
Actual or likely organizational impacts overall ^a	9	1	1
Impacts on local groups	10	1	1
Impacts on intermediary organizations	4	3	1
4. Actual or likely environmental impacts during grant period	1	8	3

NOTES:

^aIn one case, impacts were rated positive on local groups but negative on the intermediary organization so no overall ranking was given.

^bEight grant recipients visited were intermediary organizations.

other development goals, as seen above (Tutume).

Conversely, a project can be behind schedule in meeting objectives, or only partially meet them, and still have important impact. For example, the one project with a low rating on meeting its objectives (Morogoro, Tanzania) had notable impact on many participants during the first agricultural season. Participants who received the entire range of project services (tractor plowing, improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and extension advice) increased their maize production significantly in a year of lower-than-average rainfall. But projected numbers of participants were overambitious and one tractor arrived rather than three, and that one late. Only 150 acres were plowed, less than one-tenth of what was planned for the first year. Overall, however, the OTA team assessed this project's likely future impact favorably. Thus, the types and values of actual benefits and the number of beneficiaries are more important than rigidly meeting project objectives. To measure impact accurately, baseline data and data on specific effects on beneficiaries must be collected, but in only one case had any attempt been made to collect this information (PfP).


OTA teams assessed what factors helped and hindered projects in achieving their objectives and goals. Common positive factors were good leadership, organizational strength, a ready market for production, simple available technology, and either government support or complementarity with government policies. Commonly cited factors constraining results were lack of markets, poor production plans, and the lack of provision for maintenance and repairs. Feasible strategies to meet recurrent costs and replacement reserves did not exist in most projects. In a number of instances, organizational and management weaknesses were also cited. Finally, delays in project startup and in disbursement of funds affected five of the agricultural projects visited.

Team members also attempted to evaluate whether ADF's projects achieved, or were likely to achieve, their objectives more often than sim-

ilar projects funded by others. Based on interviews with outside researchers, donors, and government officials, this was judged true in two-thirds of the projects, but not in the other one-third. The comparison, generally, was to past bilateral or multilateral governmental programs rather than to programs supported by PVOS or other private funders because few examples of the latter were available. This finding needs to be placed in a broader context, however: many of these types of projects (irrigation, tractor-hire, rural water supply, and rural credit) have a poor track record in Africa.

2. Actual or Likely Economic Benefits

Ten projects had, or were likely to have, positive economic outcomes for the participants



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and no change was probable in two (table 4-4). The specific benefits, the number of people receiving them, and their value are described in the project summaries (app. B). These values were estimated based on interviews with participants because the projects had neither collected baseline data nor data about increased production and income resulting from project activities.

A project's economic effect in most cases was greater beneficiary income due to increased production of crops or livestock. In 7 of the 12 projects, an important component of the increased production was (or will be) provision of water; in 4, provision of credit; in another 4, provision of agricultural inputs with extension advice.

Other economic benefits include increases in the value of land or in saving time collecting firewood, carrying water, or plowing. For example, the value of land in one community in Kenya rose from \$625 per acre to \$1,250 an acre as a result of construction of the NGK water supply. But the distribution of the economic benefits ranged widely.

Beneficiaries totaled fewer than 100 persons in 4 of the projects; in 2, more than 2,000 (table 4-2). The value of the increased yearly production caused by the ADF-funded activities ranged from \$540 per year per person in the Boiteko project to \$14 in the Morogoro project. But the \$14 represented a 10 percent increase in annual income for the participating farmers in Gairo, Tanzania. Usually other members of households benefited indirectly in some way.

Finally, OTA calculated the cost to ADF per participant by dividing the grant amount by number of participants. The cost to ADF per participant averaged \$650—Morogoro's was \$624 in the first year—and ranged from \$50 (Union Kaoural) to \$3,507 (Boiteko). After these projects have completed several years, it will be possible to calculate the ratios of ADF-costs-per-participant to benefits-per-participant to provide a measure of the economic efficiency of ADF's funding. The Foundation as yet has not used simple cost/benefit analysis as an element in making funding decisions.

3. Actual or Likely Social and Organizational Impacts

Three-fourths of the projects that OTA visited were judged to have, or be likely to have, positive social and organizational impacts. The positive social impacts on the community principally flowed from the concrete benefits the project brought or would bring. Less tangible effects identified by project leaders and/or participants and communicated to OTA teams were a sense of pride in themselves and their community, the skills learned while implementing the project, and the sense of power that accompanied the knowledge that the group could successfully carry out development activities. Negative social effects included actual or potential conflicts with those who lost control of assets or were left out such as herders in Ross Bethio and Morogoro and farmers downstream from NGK's water project. But because of other effects in these cases, the net social benefits to the local community were still rated positively.

Likewise, projects had positive effects on funded organizations related to the experience of planning and implementing their projects and from the organization's ability to deliver goods or services to members. The ADF projects were judged to have positive effects on all four grassroots groups, but only one-half of the intermediary organization seemed likely to benefit. In one case, the project activity strengthened participating local groups but contributed to divisiveness between some groups and the intermediary organization (Union Kaoural). In others, benefits principally flowed to the local group with little organizational effect on the intermediary organization.

4. Actual or Likely Environmental Impacts During Grant Period

The findings on environmental impacts were less positive than on economic and organizational effects (table 4-4). Only one project (AFC) was judged to have a positive environmental impact because planting tea on mountain slopes in Zimbabwe can help prevent erosion. Simultaneously, however, coffee planting is increasing due to declining tea prices and the erosion

potential of coffee can be high. Negative environmental impacts could already be seen in three projects. In installing its 100 hectare irrigation system near the Senegal River, the Ross-Bethio Association bulldozed a considerable number of trees and shrubs and destroyed some grassland. This degradation was poorly balanced with only modest reforestation efforts. Removing tree stumps and plowing during low rainfall years has led to soil erosion in Tutume, Botswana. Compaction is beginning to affect soil structure in the Boiteko project in Botswana. Eight projects were judged likely to have no significant negative environmental impact during the rest of the grant period. However, negative impacts may appear in the mid- to long-term.

What Do ADF and the Community Put Into ADF-Funded Projects?

Since project results should be considered in relation to their costs, or inputs, OTA also sought to identify the resources contributed by ADF, the community, and other donors.

The Foundation's grant funds were allocated to the 12 projects for the following uses:

- 46 percent for equipment: construction, infrastructure costs for wells and/or irrigation systems in 7 projects, tractors in 2;
- 5 percent for vehicles/transportation: trucks or motorcycles were purchased in 5 projects, rented in 1;
- 18 percent for revolving credit funds, a component of 4 projects;
- 10 percent for agricultural inputs: seeds, fertilizer, implements for individual farmers in 4 projects;
- 9 percent for salaries and office expenses: while 9 projects had staff, ADF funds paid staff salaries in only 5 cases;
- 4 percent for training and technical assistance obtained outside the project; and
- 9 percent for other expenses: ADF audits and evaluations, contingency funds, and an ADF documentary film.¹

¹Total greater than 100 percent because of rounding.

Typically, ADF provides money for materials and the community provides labor. Often the community also provides funds, through individual fees, community fundraising efforts and materials. The community contributions to the ADF projects are measures of their support of the project. Contributions include:

- labor: in nine projects most participants contributed labor; in two others, one-half did. For example, in the NGK water project participants contributed an average of 115 days' labor digging trenches in a year and one-half. At Boiteko, the women continue to contribute substantial labor in vegetable production and raising chickens. But in Dagnare, members hired laborers to work for them.
- money: in one-half the projects most participants contributed some money in support of project activities. Usually this was a small amount in relation to total project Cost.
- material: in one-half the Projects more than half of the participant; contributed material.

The Role of Other Donors in ADF-Funded Projects

All 12 organizations visited had external funding sources in addition to ADF, and 4 used those funds for the ADF-funded project. In 9 of the 12, more than one outside donor supported the organization and/or ADF-funded project. The outside donors included U.S. AID (PfP; Ross Bethio), the World Bank and African Development Bank (AFC), other bilateral donors (Dakoro; Union Kaoural; PfP), European religious donors (Morogoro; Silveira House), European PVOS (Ross Bethio; Union Kaoural), U.S. PVOS (PfP; Malihai), private foundations (Dakoro; PfP), and the U.S. Ambassador's Self-Help Fund (NGK; Ross Bethio),

OTA teams found that in four cases some alternative funding was available for the project had ADF funds not been provided. Alternative funding was less certain in six cases; in two cases, no viable alternative funding was available for the project.

Therefore, the Foundation is not the only funder of its grantee groups nor, in many cases, of their projects. Often its money is being used with that of other donors to provide larger amounts of funding than would be available from a single source or to provide for continuity of projects from one grant to another. In a

few cases, ADF-funded activities also obtained some African government funding (Tutume) or government-supplied technical assistance. For example, district water officials in Kenya designed the NGK water system and supervised technical aspects of its construction.

SUSTAINABILITY

What is Sustainability and How Can It Be Measured?

Sustainability is generally understood to mean that the project activity and/or its positive results will continue after the grant period ends. It can be judged on several levels: sustainability of the resource, of certain activities, of the project, of the local group and/or the intermediary organization. Also, sustainability has economic, environmental, technical, and social elements, and policy factors can intervene. Therefore, sustainability depends on many dimensions of an activity and failure in one area can jeopardize sustainability overall.

The Foundation includes most of these elements in its project appraisal checklist:

- financial sustainability;
- project self-sufficiency, generating enough income to cover costs;
- probability that the funded organization will pursue other projects after the funded one; and
- effects on the environment.

These criteria were expanded for this assessment. For example, expecting that environmental sustainability might be a problem for ADF as it has been for other donors, OTA based its considerations of environmental sustainability, in part, on questions that emerged from the reviews of ADF's project files regarding renewable resource technologies (box 4-2). Teams sought a range of specific data during site visits and other interviews in Africa (app, D).

Key elements of sustainability for rating the 12 projects were:

- economic aspects, including market for the product, provision for recurrent costs, preparation of business plans, and financial management capabilities;
- organizational/social aspects, including quality of leadership, track record of the organization, participation of members in decisionmaking, access of the organization to financial resources, and whether or not current activities would continue and other activities were planned, how the funded activities contributed to growth of the group;
- environmental aspects over the next 3 to 5 years and longer, including positive and negative impacts on renewable resources and identification of any measures to mitigate negative impacts;
- technological aspects, including site specificity (whether or not the technology was sustainable in the locale), access to training and technical assistance, and conformity to national development plans and policies regarding the technology.

Ultimately, sustainability can be judged only after a grant is completed. Just 1 of the 12 projects visited (NGK) had completed the ADF grant period, and that only recently. But planning and decisionmaking for sustainability should occur throughout the project cycle. Therefore, the presence or absence of these elements often are indicators of what will happen in the future. These rankings define the near future as 3 to 5 years.

Box 4-2.—A Look at ADF's Files: ADF's Use of Renewable Resource Technologies

OTA examined ADF's files of projects relating to agriculture and renewable resources, identifying the types of technologies used and attempting to determine how ADF accounts for environmental sustainability.

ADF's grassroots mandate appears to have high potential. ADF is well placed to become the primary assistance agency that blends ecological concerns with the urgency for Africans to raise adequate food and to provide adequate water. The Foundation is positioned to help Africans "break the infernal cycle of people being forced to misuse their natural resource base," as one African forester describes it. Even without such an ambitious goal, however, ADF could make improvements in its work to avoid environmental problems.

This review's most important finding is that ADF project documents contain little information on field-tested and accepted technologies that could:

- mitigate additional stress on existing resources, and
- help increase farm yields and incomes on a sustainable basis via proven methods such as water conservation, windbreaks, terracing, native trees, sand stabilization, and agroforestry plantations.

Files tend to yield incomplete and insufficient information to determine what resource-related activities are underway and to identify the environmental impacts of agricultural projects. Evidence is strong, however, that ADF-funded organizations could use resource-related technologies much more often as primary and adjunct project activities.

Yet the Foundation is not ignoring the need for environmental protection and the use of resource-related methods. For example, ADF has funded several activities that integrate resource concerns into predominantly agricultural projects. Of 56 projects examined, 3 dealt significantly with resource-related activities and 9 projects had resource activities as accompanying measures. The Foundation could do more, however, to account for such concerns on a more sophisticated level, more thoroughly, and more systematically. Agricultural projects that involve mechanical soil preparation, land clearing, or water development efforts where yields are large should raise flags in the minds of ADF staff.

The Foundation's position is difficult because it responds to local initiatives and many Africans, like many other agriculturalists and donors, presently do not give environmental protection high priority. Yet, according to the OTA desk reviewer:

"Any organization dispensing development funds, regardless whether local people, at present, place any emphasis on the ecological sustainability of their resource base or not, needs some sort of 'ecologic malpractice protection'. . . . If this is not done, those who authorized funding. . . may be responsible (after .5, 10, or 20 years) for having contributed to making matters worse instead of better; good intentions and focusing on other, important criteria notwithstanding."

The key is providing new information so that local people are more completely informed about alternatives that might better serve them. The Foundation's expanding outreach and training activities could help fill this need,

SOURCE: Fred R. Weber, "Desk and Office Review of ADF Activities: Renewable Resource Technologies," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

Assessing Sustainability in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: One-half the ADF-funded projects were judged to have a high potential to be sustained over the next 3 to 5 years; another 5 were judged to have a moderate chance to be sustained over the same period, although not necessarily in the same form as proposed. Longer-term sustainability was not ascertain.

Finding: Strong community support for the activity and the local organization was identified as an important factor fostering sustainability of the projects visited, while the lack of careful economic and environmental planning were common constraints to sustainability.

Six ADF-funded projects were judged to have a high potential for sustainability over the next 3 to 5 years (table 4-5). Sustainability means the project activity was judged likely to continue for this period. Overall, projects sponsored by grassroots organizations were rated more sustainable than those of intermediary organizations, and projects awarded grants in 1985 rated slightly better than those funded in 1986.

These six projects are more likely to reach a greater number of people and/or have an expanded impact on those involved. An excellent example is the recently completed water and irrigation system in Kenya (NGK). Vegetable and milk production has significantly increased as a result of the water supply to each farm. The management committee is discussing plans

for vegetable marketing and milk processing. They have hopes of purchasing a truck and building a storage cooler for produce. Only one project was judged to have a low chance of being sustained: the team identified economic, organizational, technical, and environmental factors that jeopardized sustainability of the Tutume tractor-hire scheme in Botswana. The other five projects may be continued but with their effects decreasing over time.

In some cases, a particular activity within the project is more likely to be sustained than another, however, suggesting that projects often will change with time. For example, OTA teams felt that the activities most strongly supported by participants would have a better chance to continue: herd reconstitution rather than literacy in Dakoro, Niger; water supply rather than reforestation in Kikatiti, Tanzania. Flexibility in adapting to new circumstances was assumed to be an important component of sustainability.

1. Economic Sustainability of ADF-Funded Activities

Three-quarters of the ADF-funded projects were judged to have a moderate to high chance of being sustained economically, but one-quarter faced a low chance (table 4-5). For example, OTA found a good to very good market for the products of four projects, an adequate market in four, and a poor market in two. But when OTA teams asked whether or not formal or informal, simple market analyses and business plans had been prepared for the activities,

Table 4-5.—Rating Sustainability of 12 ADF Projects

Elements of sustainability	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall sustainability for next 3 to 5 years	6	5	1
1. Economic sustainability of activity.	5	4	3
2. Organizational/social sustainability			
Local group/s	6	4	2
Intermediary organization	5	2	1
3. Environmental sustainability			
For next 3 to 5 years	8	3	1
After 5 years	2	9	1
4. Technological sustainability.	7	4	1

NOTES:

aEight grant recipients visited were intermediary organizations.

they found that only three had market analyses and only one a business plan (AFC).

A greater problem was lack of provision for recurrent costs of the activity after ADF funding ended: five projects rated low, three average, and four high. While six projects had formal or informal strategies to cover costs, too often it was not based on careful or accurate economic analysis. Recurrent costs of the activity were expected to be covered by income produced by the project activity, income from a related activity (e.g., rental of the truck in two projects was not only paying for itself, but would provide income for the project), outside donors (PfP), African government subsidies (Tutume), or community fundraising efforts.

While criticizing the lack of financial planning to cover future costs of maintaining project activities, OTA teams still judged several projects to have a moderate chance of being sustained because of the level of support of the community and their past record in raising funds internally and externally (e.g., the Kikatiti water system). Traditional community fundraising efforts can best meet sporadic needs, such as the breakdown of a pump, but not regular expenses such as paying the monthly electric bill and the system's guard. But the local groups' affiliation with an intermediary organization, in this example the National Malihai Club, could assist them obtain additional outside resources.

Financial management was rated high in four projects (all southern Africa projects), moderate in six, and low in two. In both the low cases, problems centered around accountability between the intermediary organization and local groups regarding use and control of ADF funds. For example, intermediary organizations did not communicate openly and share decision-making with local groups regarding ADF funds. Eight groups had received some financial technical assistance or training, and three had plans to receive financial training.

2. Organizational and Social Sustainability

Sustainability of the project activity often is closely linked to the future of the group funded.

OTA'S assessment teams considered a number of factors related to the organizational sustainability of grassroots groups, intermediary organizations and their local sub-groups. The organizational sustainability of local groups was similar to that of the intermediary organizations (table 4-5). But the two had different strengths. For example, seven of eight intermediary organizations were rated high on leadership; six were low on members' decisionmaking; seven had high or moderate access to financial resources. Local groups, on the other hand, rated better on members' decisionmaking (10 of 12 projects were high or moderate) but lower on leadership (one-half were high) and access to financial resources (4 were low and 6 moderate). Intermediary groups have certain advantages for sustainability, such as access to out-



Photo credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Sustainability is implicit in ADF's mandate: future generations should benefit from current development projects.

side resources; however, they also have special problems. PfP, for example, maybe unable to continue successful work because external funds are shrinking.

Artificial organizations established with little rationale other than obtaining an ADF grant (e.g., Dagnare) had a poor chance of being sustainable. Other groups' continuation may be more certain than that of their project activities, especially if such activities are new to them (Malihai, AFC). Long-established groups (Silveira House) were judged to have a better chance of survival than a project sub-group primarily organized to carry out one activity with resources from the intermediary organization.

Management training can help promote organizational sustainability and innovation. Eight projects had received such assistance and another three had plans to obtain it. For example, one of NGK's project leaders received community development training from a Kenyan training institute and his skill was an important reason for the success of the water project.

3. Environmental Sustainability of ADF-Funded Activities

Environmental sustainability was assessed in the short- and medium-term and a number of concerns were identified. Two-thirds of ADF-funded projects were judged to have a high potential for short-term environmental sustainability (table 4-5). Far greater uncertainty exists about their long-term environmental sustainability.

The kinds of agricultural projects that ADF funds are known to have a variety of negative environmental impacts. Government officials, outside experts, and project managers varied in their awareness of this. The Foundation and project managers often made no clear assessment of potential problems. A few organizations, however, had carried out some activities which increased awareness or helped improve conditions. For example, one project helped participants practice intercropping (PfP) and two conducted some conservation education (Kikatiti, PfP). Several ADF-funded organizations mentioned plans to plant trees or shelter-

belts (Kikatiti, Morogoro, Ross Bethio) or use integrated pest management methods (Boiteko) to minimize negative environmental effects in the future. But implementation of these plans was disappointing.

A number of specific concerns warrant greater consideration by ADF and project managers:

- for tractor hire projects: the danger of increased soil erosion and weeds and concomitant risk to farmers' future production; destruction of grasslands and trees;
- for irrigation projects: the danger of water-logging, salinization, soil erosion and compaction; destruction of trees, grasslands; and potential health problems;
- dangers to health and soil fertility with increased pesticide use;
- dangers of monocropping to soil fertility, pest resistance and diversified diets and income; and
- the potential of increased water supplies to cause overstocking and overgrazing by livestock.

The differing judgments between short- and longer-term environmental sustainability were closely related to an assessment of the appropriateness of the technologies chosen by projects.

4. Technological Sustainability of ADF-Funded Activities

The Foundation's funded activities were technologically sustainable for 11 of 12 cases (table 4-5). Teams judged that 5 of the 12 projects entailed relatively high-technology approaches, another 5 used relatively high-cost technologies, and 9 included relatively high-risk technologies. The latter, especially, seemed to call long-term sustainability into question. But based on interviews with local researchers, other experts, and government officials, the teams considered that technology choices were probably appropriate in every case but one, and that they were not too high-risk to the participants involved given the context.

Team members in one case were convinced by local experts that a technology known to

have detrimental effects elsewhere was sustainable in their locale. Researchers at Sokoine University in Tanzania felt that tractor-hire schemes could be an appropriate way to increase sustainable agriculture in parts of the Morogoro region because of rainfall, population density, compensating practices to conserve the land, government policy, and other factors. But questions about long-term environmental impacts remain, and a need exists to 1) document effects on soil and grasslands of the tractor plowing schemes being implemented now by the government and others, 2) design and carry out mitigating measures, and 3) do comparative studies with ox-plow use to determine in which areas, and with which farmers, animal traction is more advantageous. While this tractor-hire program was judged appropriate, the other one visited in Botswana was not. Tutume was the one project where the technology did not seem sustainable for environmental and economic reasons, even though it was government-subsidized.

In judging sustainability of the technologies, OTA teams also considered whether the specific activity was in conformity with national development plans because a favorable policy environment and supportive public services can complement an activity. For example, Tanzanians interviewed argued the tractor schemes of the 1980s would be more successful than the failed ones of the 1960s and 1970s in part because spare parts and petroleum were available from government programs favoring mechanization. Technologies were in conformity with

government priorities in all cases but one (PfP). In that case the activity had the strong support of local Kenyan officials interviewed precisely because it was meeting a recognized gap in public programs by providing rural credit for women.

Factors Fostering and Constraining Sustainability

OTA teams identified the following factors that contribute to the sustainability of a number of ADF-funded projects:

- availability of technical assistance and training,
- strong intermediary organization with good track record,
- good local leadership,
- environmentally sound activities,
- adequate financial management and planning,
- good markets,
- low-risk technologies for participants, and
- complementary government policy.

The following were identified as constraints to sustainability:

- lack of or poor financial or environmental planning,
- intermediary organization deficiencies in target group identification and monitoring, and
- women not involved in management of projects relating to their work.

REPLICABILITY

What Is Replicability and How Can It Be Measured?

Replicability is often desired by donors because it can increase the impact of their project funding. Groups such as ADF that fund small-scale projects intend not only that the projects will benefit local people, but also that they will have larger impacts on social and economic development. The assumption is that the activity is beneficial and should be replicated.

Replicability usually refers to extending the impact of the funded activity, or its benefits, beyond the group originally included in the proposal. Some experts consider replicability as the “multiplier effect.” Often, replicability refers to adoption of an activity or technology by non-participants or by those in other geographic areas without additional funding from the donor.

Replicability rarely means an exact duplication of projects using a “cookie cutter” model

or “blueprint” approach. Such attempts have failed in the past because of ecological, social, cultural, economic, and other differences between regions and groups.

ADF is concerned that its projects be replicable; its criteria for replicability include:

- results are likely to be disseminated, and
- the project is likely to be repeated.

OTA expanded ADF’s criteria and collected information on several elements of replicability for the 12 projects visited (app. D). Replicability of project activities, technologies, and organizational processes were each considered separately because the same or other groups might replicate the problem-solving or planning process used for a project, but not the project activity itself. And the process of taking best advantage of a situation and recognizing the unusual conditions necessary for an activity to succeed can be replicable even though unique social, cultural, physical and other aspects of each particular situation might make project activities non-repeatable. The following measures were incorporated into the final assessment of replicability:

- technological replicability: the degree to which other groups have financial and physical resources (including infrastructure) to use the technology; whether technologies can be readily learned;
- organizational replicability: which management structures, processes, and styles could be used by others;
- level of dissemination: efforts by funded organizations to spread what they learned;

adoption of technologies by non-participants.

Evidence of project impacts on national policies and institutions was also sought.

Assessing Replicability in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: Ten of the ADF-funded projects were rated to have a moderate or high degree of replicability, and two a low chance of being replicated. Self-help processes were judged more replicable than the technologies supported. The relatively high cost of the technologies and high equipment expenses were major constraints to replicability of project activities.

Replicability of technologies and of organizational processes was weighed in overall ratings for each project (table 4-6). These overall ratings were similar for grassroots groups and intermediary organizations. Projects awarded grants in 1984 and 1985 rated higher in replicability than those committed in 1986. For example, PfP’s project was judged highly replicable. Since 1980, PfP in Kenya had tested methods to work with and train local women’s groups, to help them establish savings clubs and loan committees, and to administer revolving loan funds. Many staff had worked with PfP for at least a decade. PfP recently had applied this methodology to credit for agricultural inputs and its methodology was applicable to other groups.

Table 4-6.—Rating Replicability of 12 ADF Projects

Elements of replicability	No. of projects rated		
	High	Moderate	Low
Overall replicability in region/country.	3	7	2
1. Technological replicability	5	5	2
other groups have access to financial resources.	2	3	7
other groups have needed physical resource base	3	7	2
technologies readily learnable.	8	3	1
2. Organizational replicability.	7		3
3. Level of dissemination	2	2	2

NOTES:

^aDue to the preliminary stage of two projects, it was impossible to judge dissemination of Project results.

Replicability is not the only measure of project impact, however. One successful project (NGK) was rated low on replicability. Another project, the Tutume project in Botswana, was being replicated by the sponsoring intermediary organization using government subsidies. But the OTA team found that the flaws of the project were serious enough to question whether replication was desirable.

1. Technological Replicability

Almost all of the technologies used by ADF-funded projects can be replicated (table 4-6). The greatest constraint, however, is that many could not be repeated without a large grant from ADF or another external funder. There was a low chance in seven cases that other groups could implement the activity since they did not

have access to funds. Thus, for those who consider repetition of the technology or the specific sector activity by another group as the core of replicability, more than half of ADF projects were not replicable.

The lack of other suitable physical settings or infrastructures generally was not a serious constraint to technology transfer, nor were the technologies too difficult for other local people to learn. In one case, lack of capability to control access to the benefits of the activity was identified as a constraint to replicability. While NGK successfully completed its water and irrigation system, OTA'S assessment team gave it a low rating on overall replicability because self-help construction of gravity-fed water systems is possible in only a few regions in Kenya. More important, none of these regions are in



Photo credit: OTA/Scott McCormick

Not all projects should be replicated. Unacceptable levels of soil erosion may result because the tractor-hire project in Tutume, Botswana, plowed this land.

newly resettled areas where local groups can control access to the water. Also, the water system was expensive and few funders, including the Kenyan government, provide such large amounts of funding to small communities. Thus, the circumstances critical for success limited the project's ability to be replicated elsewhere.

2. Organizational Replicability

Aspects of the sponsoring group's management structure, function, or style could be beneficial to other groups in three-quarters of the projects (table 4-6). Examples of promising organizational elements included the open management style of Boiteko, the interlocking church committee structure of Morogoro, the tri-village management committee of NGK, and national union membership to share information illustrated in Ross Bethio. Generally, OTA found that the processes, like project activities, cannot be rigidly repeated. For example, one weakness of the Union Kaoural project in Senegal was that the intermediary organization's leaders imposed an inflexible project model on all participating villages.

Few, if any, project activities or technologies funded by ADF were innovative in themselves. Using the technologies was often an innovative experience for the project participants or an innovative activity for the locale, however. The uniqueness of each group and its setting means that each group must develop its own activity, assess its own resources and needs, and make decisions about the best way to reach its goals. These activities are at the core of the development process. Enabling other groups to engage in these activities may be the most replicable work ADF funds.

3. Level of Dissemination

A majority of the funded groups made some effort to spread what they learned (table 4-6). Most intermediary organizations, for example, intend to implement the ADF-funded activity in a number of locations, then to expand further. PfP, for example, expected to train 30 women's groups in managing small revolving

loan funds during the 2-year grant period. Instead, it provided training and loans to 92 groups and cannot meet further demand. Grassroots organizations can disseminate results through active membership in larger organizations. For example, Ross Bethio is sharing what it learned about the organization of irrigated rice production through its membership in FONGS, a national association of village groups in Senegal.

However, in only three cases (PfP, Morogoro, and Ross-Bethio), was there evidence that non-participants had adopted the technologies introduced by ADF-funded projects. Demonstrated yield increases in these examples led outsiders to begin to copy some of their neighbors' successful activities.

Finding: Three of the projects had some positive impact on national-level institutions.

Three projects had an impact on national institutions; all were successful projects run by small grassroots organizations. Ross Bethio in Senegal was among the first village associations to obtain credit from a new National Agricultural Credit Bank; its success has led to the expectation that others can follow. In Botswana, Boiteko's success with its vegetable garden and poultryegg production has influenced thinking in the Ministry of Agriculture where it is seen as a successful pilot project. Leaders have provided technical assistance to a similar horticultural project funded by ADF in Botswana. Water and agriculture officials from other districts in Kenya are looking at NGK with interest. Government water/irrigation projects often are not completed and are more costly than NGK's project.

Factors Fostering and Constraining Replicability

In addition to the constraints listed previously, another problem is that organizations rarely documented concrete results that project activities brought to the participants, limiting their ability to publicize results to other communities and outsiders, including government officials and outside donors. ADF promoted

shared learning in several cases by funding travel costs for exchange visits between projects and for managers to attend meetings. Good communication of project leaders with local officials enables the officials to bring the project to the attention of others.

Replicability often depends on conditions outside of a group's control, such as market prices. For example, late government payments for maize were limiting PFP's ability to assist new groups in Kenya.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PARTICIPATION, RESULTS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND REPLICABILITY

An analysis of the interconnections between participation, results, sustainability, and replicability has implications about what ADF funding can accomplish. It also can improve ADF's ability to select and monitor projects. Although this sample is too small to provide a rigorous test of correlation, some interesting patterns emerge from this review of 12 projects. Complementarities, or positive correlations among the four critical issues, suggest that more than one desirable outcome can be achieved simultaneously and that proposal analysis and project monitoring must be done holistically. Trade-offs, or negative correlations, identify dilemmas for the Foundation and other development organizations because they may suggest that achieving certain results can have undesirable costs in other areas.

Complementarities

ADF's legislation is based on the assumption that increased participation improves results. Generally, this report confirms that assumption. For example, projects that rated high on participation also rated high or moderate in results, while projects that rated low on participation also rated low or moderate in results. NGK's successful completion of the water system was due, in large part, to the labor and other contributions of the residents. High levels of participation allowed local groups to overcome deficiencies in other areas in all cases, but especially in Dakoro and NGK. In these cases, a sense of "ownership" by the local group increased the potential for the continuation of activities. Since the activities meet real needs, people work to maintain them, even if the initial external investment was beyond their

means. Nevertheless, participation alone is not always enough to ensure the success of an activity.

Success in bringing benefits to participants helped sponsoring organizations gain support and widen participation in the activity and group. Examples include the large numbers of local women's groups who want to join PFP's credit program and farmers who want to register for Morogoro's tractor-hire/input program and AFC'S credit program. The positive effect of results on participation is consistent with development literature and the experience of schools that provide training and technical assistance to community organizations in the United States (e.g., the Industrial Areas Foundation in New York City, New York). According to this view, organizations develop by identifying realistic actions that bring participants concrete benefits due to their collective effort. Thus, OTA'S team members were concerned that some ADF staff believe that ADF-funded groups grow as much through failure as success and attributed some problems in ADF's grant monitoring to this attitude.

Success in bringing concrete improvements to participants was found to be a condition of replicability. For example, the financial success of the Boiteko group is the reason other groups want to start similar projects in Botswana. But not every successful project is considered highly replicable.

Trade-offs

Trade-offs also exist, however, between participation and results. If board members or other decisionmakers are chosen from elite

groups, such as more highly-educated persons and government officials, they often can help local groups gain access to financial and technical resources, but they also tend to dominate groups. This was seen in the Kikatiti, Tutume, and Union Kaoural projects. The same tendency is true for technical assistance providers, although OTA also saw exceptions to both, for example, in the Boiteko project.

Placing too great an emphasis on achieving ambitious project results in too short a time period can restrict participation, just as too much emphasis on participation can lessen results, at least in the short-term. Slowing down the pace of change and gradually increasing participation can help bring about longer-lasting results. Since cultural norms, such as women's low participation in decisionmaking, do not change quickly, ADF should be expected to fund groups in which women's participation may not be equal but which are at least moving in the direction of becoming more participatory within the local context. The perceived conflict between participation and results may be, in fact, only a problem in the short-term.

Another apparent conflict, between replicability and participation, was seen in attempts to impose external models, which hampered achieving results in one project, Union Kaoural, precisely because the desires of the local groups were not taken into account. This inflexible approach to replicability was a problem for some intermediary organizations as they attempted to expand their programs to new sub-groups, and for some persons selected to provide technical assistance to grassroots groups. Flexibility in adapting to new circumstances, by project managers and funders, was identified as important in achieving results, sustainability, and replicability.

Funding intermediary versus grassroots groups also involves trade-offs. Projects of intermediary organizations may have the potential for broader results, greater sustainability,

and better replicability than those of grassroots groups but these advantages are not automatic and often occur at the cost of less participation of beneficiaries in project design and implementation. But possible advantages of grassroots groups in participation may correspond with lesser results. In certain instances, their impact, while affecting fewer people directly, may be deeper. Given the proper context and careful effort, successful grassroots projects can be models for others and even affect national policy. Alternatively, changing the ways intermediary organizations do business may have a profound impact on the national setting and alter the structures that constrain or enhance local efforts. Understanding these potential differences is important for tapping the actual strengths of each.

Also trade-offs exist between participation and sustainability, particularly environmental sustainability. Often the environmental problems presented by new technologies are dimly perceived and take a back seat to the immediate, pressing need for increased water or agricultural production. For example, the people in Tutume, Botswana, wanted tractor plowing but the OTA team concluded that the long-term results of plowing are likely to be disadvantageous. While this is a problem for all donors, it poses an especially difficult challenge for ADF because of its mandate to support self-help efforts.

A related trade-off is evidenced in the likelihood that the success of some project activities can cause environmental problems, e.g., Ross Bethio's irrigation of 100 acres and the acreage plowed by the Tutume and Morogoro projects. Typically project beneficiaries will not experience the negative economic impact of environmental damage for some time, even though in Tutume the harm is sufficient to threaten short-term economic benefits. The donor's role is to help project managers see the potential dangers and plan ways to minimize them.

PROJECT FINDINGS, PROGRAM CHOICES, AND ADF'S MANDATE

OTA'S assessment of 12 ADF-funded projects identified many areas where the projects' performance is good. But in several key areas, ADF is falling short of its mandate. This is especially true for important aspects of participation, sustainability, and replicability. One-third of the visited projects had low overall levels of participation, even considering the local context; ADF's decision to fund two of them was questionable. Although ADF-funded projects visited were judged likely to attain short-term objectives and benefit some people, a number raised questions regarding the overall impact and aspects of longer-term sustainability. Of special concern to OTA was the portion of agricultural projects using relatively high-risk technologies and the lack of consideration of environmental impacts. Only two projects rated low in overall replicability, using a generous measure that includes replicability of management processes. By a more conventional definition, over half of the projects would be difficult to replicate.

Participation, sustainability, and replicability are fundamental to ADF's mandate, making weaknesses in these areas a particular concern. The need for participatory development permeated congressional testimony and debate during the long process of the Foundation's inception and is a recurring theme throughout the authorizing legislation. Sustainability and replicability were implicit in the discussions preceding ADF's establishment. Appreciable positive impacts over time and across locations were expected to be a major outcome of supporting grassroots development. Congress codified these expectations by specifying that ADF's funded efforts contribute to "social and economic development."

The findings regarding the 12 ADF-funded projects discussed here appear to be applicable to the Foundation's larger portfolio. First,

OTA'S review of ADF's files in Washington, which looked at 58 projects, pointed to a similar lack of attention to participation and concerns regarding financial or economic viability, technical soundness, and environmental sustainability. Second, interviews with U.S. ambassadors, AID mission staff, representatives from other public and private development agencies, and ADF's in-country staff led to the conclusion that the projects visited were typical of the country programs in at least five of the six countries visited. In the sixth country, Kenya, the 2 projects visited seemed to be performing better than all but 1 of the 13 other ADF-funded projects, based on information including ADF's own evaluations of its projects in Kenya. Third, OTA'S findings parallel and confirm many conclusions reached by the authors of ADF's 1987 evaluations of 10 projects,

The Foundation has had just 4 years to turn its legislative mandate into an operational program. ADF faced difficult choices along the way, given the complexity of its mandate and the challenges of African grassroots development. It has had to balance the distinct and, at times, apparently contradictory aspects of the mandate in allocating resources (time, money, and staff) and setting priorities. The Foundation's choices sometimes were influenced by external factors such as congressional pressure to quickly obligate funds following its own false start, staff and budget limitations, and the varied circumstances it faced in each African country. These combined choices are reflected in the project results discussed here. The next chapter presents OTA'S findings on how ADF's choices have produced both positive and negative results for its funding program. Also, chapter 5 suggests how different choices may improve ADF's performance in relation to its mandate.

Chapter 5

OTA's Findings About ADF's Funding Program

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Chapter 5

OTA's Findings About ADF's Funding Program

SUMMARY

- ADF has a committed staff with considerable African experience and has contracted with qualified Africans to help carry out its program. It has supported the growth of grassroots leadership and organizational capacity and the majority of the projects it has funded are agricultural projects.
- A number of high priority changes would improve ADF's ability to meet its mandate:
 - revise and clarify the roles of staff in their working relationships with applicants and grantees;
 - improve ADF's social, organizational, technical, environmental, and economic analysis and facilitate better planning by applicants during the project approval process;
 - improve communication with project managers and be a more active facilitator to assist them identify problems and resources during project implementation;
 - progressively enhance the responsibilities of ADF's African staff in project identification, approval, and monitoring; and
 - increase communication with other development organizations, especially those that assist similar recipients, in the countries where ADF has programs. The Foundation should begin to develop country strategies, identifying its niche in each country.
- A number of lower priority but important changes also would contribute to ADF's effectiveness:
 - streamline the project approval process and reduce unnecessary delays,
 - conclude agreements with African governments where appropriate, and
 - address issues regarding the scope of ADF's current portfolio of funded projects, e.g., consider funding a more balanced mix of social and economic development activities and projects, and linking research and funding programs more closely.

INTRODUCTION

The project findings presented in chapter 4 are an important starting point for looking at ADF's program in detail. This chapter integrates that information on ADF-funded projects with information gained from interviews with ADF staff in Washington and Africa, the review of ADF's Washington files, recent ADF evaluations of 10 projects, and meetings with other donors and technical assistance providers, researchers, and African officials.

Although one function of OTA'S assessment was to provide a snapshot of ADF's current program, a more important goal was to identify ways that ADF could improve its program. The emphasis of this chapter, then, is on areas where ADF could enhance its ability to meet its congressional mandate. However, a discussion of possible improvements in ADF's funding program is best placed in the context of what the Foundation is doing well.

WHAT'S WORKING WELL

ADF has a strongly committed staff with considerable African experience. Most of the Washington-based staff have lived and worked in Africa, typically as Peace Corps Volunteers or staff and, thus, know something of the local cultures and languages in at least one African country. In addition, ADF is selecting qualified Africans to be Regional Liaison Officers (RLO), Country Resource Facilitators (CRF), and technical consultants to support its program.

Most significantly, relative to its mandate, ADF-funded projects have enhanced grassroots leadership and the capacity of funded organizations to manage their own activities. The Foundation makes a laudable effort to allow control of the project to remain in the hands of funded groups. For example, ADF disburses money directly to African organizations, which manage their own funds. In most cases, ADF allows the groups to choose their own technical assistance for project design and during implementation. Three groups have used ADF-funded planning grants to design their projects. Generally, project leaders interviewed by OTA said they had cordial relations with ADF.

The Foundation provided helpful support and suggestions while some of the 12 visited groups were developing their proposals: ADF awarded a planning grant to the Dakoro project in Niger, suggested that participants provide labor at NGK in Kenya, and wrote or helped write proposals based on suggestions of the group in the projects from southern Africa. Also, ADF asked the director of a successful agricultural project, Farming Systems Kenya, to advise another project being developed in Morogoro, Tanzania.

Usually, the Foundation has been flexible and responsive to changes suggested by project leaders during project design and implementation. In Ross Bethio in Senegal, for example, ADF allowed project managers to switch to new providers of technical assistance and to different models for pumps and the project vehicle after signing the Grant Agreement. ADF's flexibility in allowing grant amendments, increas-



Photo credit: ADF/Tom Katus

Paul Maina, shown examining seedlings with farmers, directs the Farming Systems Kenya (FSK) project but he has shared FSK'S experience with additional ADF-funded organizations.

ing funding for revised activities or costs and extending the grant period, assisted several projects. In at least one case, ADF used its simplified procedures for approving amendments under \$25,000.

OTA found some additional examples of helpful actions by ADF while monitoring grants. Concerns about financial accountability and reporting, including sending outside consultants to check on use of ADF funds, resulted in improved recordkeeping and bookkeeping in several projects. ADF follow-up on the role of technical assistance helped a male advisor provide more participatory help to a group of female participants at the Boiteko project in Botswana. Visits by the ADF African Country Resource Facilitator helped improve relations with local officials in the Dakoro project in Niger.

The high proportion of agricultural projects in ADF's portfolio is appropriate given the per-

centage of the African population engaged in agriculture. The focus on increasing food production and rural incomes is consistent with the goals of many African national development plans and other U.S. development assistance programs. Using the simple yardstick of meeting stated objectives, OTA'S team members felt that the performance of ADF-funded projects is at least equal to that of most funding programs in Africa.

The Foundation has begun a promising evaluation process by contracting African professionals to conduct evaluations of 10 projects and by sponsoring the first evaluation conference of project managers. Its funding of re-

search by African development professionals is different from and more flexible than most other research funding programs; the recipients need not be affiliated with an African government agency or university or, during their research, with an American university.

In addition, ADF has made an effort to spread its work through publications such as *Advance, Beyond Relief* and the *Assessment by Development Journalists*. It has taken the need for good congressional relations seriously. ADF has established and maintained good relations with many African government officials, on national and local levels, and with African ambassadors in Washington.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

This assessment also identified significant areas for improvement. Overall, OTA determined that ADF could be making better decisions about what projects to fund, and that ADF staff often has ineffective contact and communication with applicants and grantees and could better support their self-help efforts. Recurring problems are identified in the findings that follow, but each is not applicable to all projects, or to the same degree, or equally relevant to all countries where the Foundation has programs. Of necessity, the findings and the suggestions for dealing with them often overlap.

The areas identified for improvement are listed in two groups: the first five are of highest priority and reflect a broad consensus among the OTA assessment's participants. Staff roles in relation to applicants and grantees, project approval and monitoring practices, and responsibilities of African staff were most commonly cited as areas needing improvement. Considerations about country-level communication and planning, also included in the first group, can help improve project selection and follow-up. The second group includes lower priority issues, such as the need to reduce the average time taken for project approval and start up, reach agreements with African governments where appropriate, and increase ADF's

own internal assessments of its funding program and portfolio.

Each of the following sections identifies actions ADF should take and suggests ways that they can be accomplished. Also, a variety of additional ideas are provided to supplement the initial suggestions. The suggestions are drawn from the experiences of a variety of private and official development assistance programs. Much of this experience is relevant to ADF but the Foundation has a unique mandate that differs from other official U.S. development assistance organizations. Fulfilling its mandate should include learning lessons from others and applying them creatively. Also, ADF should be able to suggest additional ways to meet the concerns discussed.

The analysis in this chapter is based largely on a late 1987 "snapshot" image of ADF's program, which continues to evolve. ADF has indicated it is aware of and in the process of addressing many of these issues.

Every suggestion carries a price tag in time or money. In some cases, suggestions *would* add to ADF's non-grant costs and to the already long grant approval process. In other cases, these suggestions could make better and more timely use of existing resources. Such considerations are noted below.

High Priority Improvements

1. ADF's Relationship With Applicants and Grantees

Finding: Too often ADF has had an ineffective relationship with applicants and grantees. Often ADF is too passive, but at times it is too involved. In the former case, potential to assist the group's development is neglected. In the latter, the self-help process may be bypassed inappropriately. The resulting inadequate information, insufficient analysis, and inappropriate follow-up action has limited the degree to which the Foundation's funded projects are meeting ADF's mandate.

Discussion.—ADF often takes a passive, hands-off approach to its applicants and grantees. As a result, the Foundation's working relationships are often less effective than they could be. This approach is in part the outgrowth of a valid rejection of other approaches which deny participants control; it is also due to an implicit and debatable assumption that the lack of capital is the only constraint to rural development. And it is the outcome of logistical limitations imposed by distance. One major concern is ADF's handling of the approval process. Often ADF is too accepting of proposals, in part because it too strictly interprets its mandate to support self-help projects designed by African groups. ADF assigns priority to local control, assuming that local participation accompanies it. This focus on local control also leads them to doubt the need for technical expertise on staff (8). However, this lack of balance in ADF's approach works against its fulfillment of its mandate to *foster* participation and *support* self-help efforts.

In other cases, ADF has not hesitated to suggest and require changes in project design. This inconsistency causes some confusion among ADF staff and its grantees about ADF's role in relation to project design and implementation. Although some efforts have been taken to clarify and explain ADF's expectations, more needs to be done.¹ OTA teams found instances where ADF provided helpful advice, but they also

¹Workshops held in Togo and Zimbabwe in early 1988, with sessions for applicants on how to prepare a proposal for ADF and for grantees on ADF's monitoring procedures, are a step in this direction.

found as many cases of inappropriate interventions with negative consequences and poor follow-up on good recommendations.

ADF made major changes in project design in several cases without significant input from participants. In each of these cases, ADF had some basis for making the changes and the project leaders formally accepted the changes by signing the grant agreement. But the alterations hurt the project's ability to meet ADF's goals to foster local participation in self-help efforts.

For example, in a project in Senegal, ADF removed the participants' highest priority—cereal banks—from Union Kaoural's original proposal and dropped another element—pharmacies—in one-half of the villages. Union leaders continue to disagree with the consultant's findings that these two priorities would duplicate existing services. ADF's decision was cited by the Union's leadership as one factor that increased tensions among its members; ultimately a majority of the member groups left the association.

In another case, ADF compromised with local government officials who insisted on substantial changes to the project proposed by a herders group in Niger. Placed in an awkward position by mistakenly bypassing these officials earlier, ADF agreed to several unnecessary project modifications and to placing an inappropriate degree of control in the hands of these officials. ADF accepted a budget for technical assistance prepared by the officials which included payments for services that already were included in their government job descriptions. Project leaders and participants were unaware of these provisions and expressed disagreement after details of the technical assistance budget (which represented at least 20 percent of the total project budget) were described.²

²ADF had a different understanding than local officials in Dakoro regarding payments to the government technicians. ADF's understanding was that the technician would be removed from the government payroll during project implementation. Since the departure of the OTA team the government technician has been transferred and ADF reports that a private technician has been identified to fill that position.

OTA's concerns regarding government involvement during the purchase and distribution of livestock to participants have been lessened with more active involvement of ADF's Niger staff member during those operations.

Inappropriate design changes were made in other cases in response to justifiable ADF concerns. For example, in the Dagnare project in Niger, an artificial organization was established of groups with little previous organizational connection but including poorer farmers to overcome ADF's reservations about the income level of the original applicants.

Sometimes good recommendations to deal with valid ADF concerns were not followed through effectively. The Kikatiti project in Tanzania offers several examples: ADF put conditions on the grant requiring that a maintenance plan for the water system be developed and that a Tanzanian firm audit the village treasurer's books before funds were disbursed. ADF also recommended that the group receive training and technical assistance from two related Kenyan projects. But a year later the maintenance plan bore little relationship to the actual costs of maintaining the system, parts of it were not feasible, and the proposed users' fee was not accepted by the beneficiaries. ADF disbursed grant funds to the Malihai Arusha organization based on an audit showing village books in arrears for 13 months, but did not require a timetable for turning over the management of project funds to the community which would have to maintain the system. Project leaders did not attend the planned training at the Greenbelt Movement headquarters in Nairobi nor was some recommended technical assistance provided.

Suggestions for Improvement.—Because of these problems, ADF should reconsider the implications of the various aspects of its mandate concerning its relationships with applicants and grantees. In particular, ADF should better balance the various parts of its mandate. For example, elements of participation (in addition to local control) and contributions to social and economic development should be addressed more effectively in those relationships. To do this the Foundation will need to revise the responsibilities of its staff in project approval and monitoring.

Although specific relationships should accommodate each situation, one staff role during approval would be that of facilitator. This would entail informed, active, and sensitive dia-

log with applicants, helping ensure that various options have been considered. It assumes that leaders of local organizations are capable of analyzing their needs and selecting among options if provided with adequate information. Another staff responsibility would be to evaluate critically the appropriateness of ADF's funding of the project relative to the various aspects of its mandate and the Foundation's accountability as a publicly-funded institution. This entails obtaining independent verification of the information received from project leaders,

ADF should also revise its approach to project monitoring. The Foundation should develop a clearer policy regarding staff responsibilities, including guidelines about when and how to become involved that are consistent with the entirety of its mandate and its responsibility as a funder.

In this process, the Foundation should review and revise job descriptions for the Foundation Representatives, the Regional Liaison Officers, and the Country Resource Facilitators to reflect more conscious roles as facilitators and evaluators. Also, ADF should determine and discuss with potential grantees the nature of their relationship early on, for example, agreeing how actively ADF will be involved during the approval and implementation periods. This relationship should be flexible and renegotiable based on periodic review.

Other ways that ADF could examine the implications of all aspects of its mandate for staff responsibilities include:

- hold a staff retreat to discuss the relationship between the various components of ADF's mandate and revised staff roles in relation to applicants and grantees,
- examine how other organizations with similar funding programs work out the potential conflicts between responsibility as a funder for ensuring that money is well spent and responsibility to grantees to support their control of their own projects, and
- invite organizations, such as the Council on Foundations or the Ford Foundation, to provide staff training on reviewing and monitoring grants, emphasizing methods appropriate to the evolving relationships between ADF and its grantees.

2. Improved Analysis Before Funding Grants

Finding: ADF's pre-funding analysis of project proposals is often inadequate in one or more of several critical areas: the social-political context, organizational factors, technological choices, environmental implications, and economic constraints and opportunities.

Discussion.—ADF has neglected some important elements in pre-funding analysis, in part because of a lack of financial and staff resources. Also, **its** reluctance to engage applicants in dialog and one-sided emphasis on local **control** often have discouraged more effective pre-approval analysis. The resulting lack of information and adequate analysis has led **to** funding at least **some** projects whose ability **to meet** their own objectives and ADF's goals is problematic.

Every ADF-funded project does **not have all** of the weaknesses discussed here, nor do they **exist** in the **same** degree in every instance. Therefore, the suggestions should be applied on **a** case-by-case basis. The ability **to select** appropriate approaches for each funded project is **one** that every successful funder needs and ADF needs to strengthen its skills in this area.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should improve pre-funding analysis, stressing simple and inexpensive methods of gathering and analyzing data. This analysis then needs to be better incorporated into funding decisions.

To accomplish this better pre-approval analysis, the Foundation should make better use of its existing Project Approval Guidelines, Rating Sheet, and the Project Assessment Memo (See ch. 3). For example, the Foundation Representatives and field staff should provide better supporting documentation for major or problematic aspects of a project. Also, staff should spend more time (e.g., 3 days) in the field prior to presenting a proposal to ADF's Project Review Committee, meeting with prospective project leaders and participants separately and verifying the information received from applicants with independent experts. In addition, staff should receive training in analytical methods such as rapid rural appraisal so that they can quickly obtain the most needed information.

Also, ADF could:

- use planning grants more extensively to enable funded groups to take part in pre-grant analysis and improve preparation of their projects,
- review the adequacy of the Grant Application Form, Project Approval Checklist, Rating Sheet, and the Project Assessment Memo, and
- study and adapt the pre-funding analysis methods used by other funders with similar mandates.

Finding: Critical elements of participation, such **as** participants' involvement in decisionmaking and their support for project activities, **as well as access to** projects by women, minority groups, and poor people often **are not** sufficiently addressed in ADF's pre-funding analysis. OTA'S review of ADF's funding program indicates that **it is** only partially fulfilling its congressional mandate **to foster the** participation of poor people in their **own development**.

Discussion.—ADF's emphasis on local control has not been supplemented with sufficient analysis of these and other issues relating to participation. Key data are not collected and, therefore, cannot be included in ADF's ongoing evaluation of its work. For example, ADF has made little attempt to disaggregate data collection to reflect the participation of significant subgroups, particularly women, in its projects.

Suggestions for Improvement.—**The Foundation should more carefully analyze participants' support for, access to, and decisionmaking in the proposed activities and in organizations seeking funding. Also, ADF should encourage improved participation in all projects based on this analysis.**

To make these changes, ADF should disaggregate its data collection regarding project participants, decisionmakers, and beneficiaries by gender, ethnic group, and economic status.³ Also, ADF should establish standards for re-

³ADF plans to collect this data in its computerized information system beginning in 1988.

jecting proposals on the basis of a lack of participation; its standards should be linked to community norms. ADF should also track changes in participation during its monitoring process,

The Foundation could use these methods to implement this suggestion:

- revise the grant application form so that applicants themselves provide disaggregated information about project leaders, participants, and the community, and
- hold workshops for project leaders to develop ways to encourage participation.

Finding: ADF's pre-approval analysis of applicant organizations is often weak, especially regarding their social-political context, stage of development and, in the case of intermediary organizations, their relationship with local groups. As a result, **ADF sometimes makes inappropriate funding decisions.**

Discussion.—ADF needs better information regarding organizational history, strengths, weaknesses, and local context of applicant organizations. Lack of knowledge of local realities in some cases led ADF to accept problematic aspects of proposals without question. For example, in the Ross Bethio project in Senegal ADF accepted farmers' assertions of their land claims and was unaware of the existence or vehemence of the rival claim. Had it been better informed, ADF could have encouraged mediation or, like the Ford Foundation, decided not to fund the group at that time.

While establishing a working relationship with local government officials is the responsibility of the applicant, ADF can play a broker role and verify that an acceptable relationship has been established prior to project approval. This can bring increased access to resources needed by the project. For example, local water officials designed and supervised the construction of the NGK water system in Kenya. But in Kikatiti, Tanzania, because such a relationship could not be worked out, ADF justifiably funded a private contractor, leaving local officials without an investment in maintaining the system. Poor relationships with local officials

were also a problem in two other projects (Dakoro, Niger; Union Kaoural, Senegal). ADF did not seem to identify the extent of the problem or incorporate it in funding decisions.

The lack of in-depth knowledge about the funded groups could be a factor in the high proportion of intermediary group projects in which participation is low. For example, several of the intermediary organizations visited had difficulty working with subgroups (AFC, Malihai); had this been identified as a problem early on, some provision could have been agreed on to assist the intermediary organization. Knowledge about the larger organizations' track record, stage of development, experience with the proposed activity and local groups, and other sources of funding are critical in making appropriate decisions regarding the timing and level of funding. Without such knowledge, determining the best level of interaction with a grantee during project planning and implementation is difficult.

Finally, since each of the 12 organizations visited had received outside funds, more consideration of the relationship of the ADF grant to the work supported by other funders and the rate of growth of the organization would have been important. ADF grants need to be considered in relation to each other as well. For example, in Senegal ADF gave one small community (5 kilometers from Union Kaoural's headquarters) a grant of \$80,000 at the same time it awarded Union Kaoural a \$106,000 grant for similar activities in 25 communities in the area. Tension among villages increased as a result. Funding an activity without considering its impact on other development efforts in the locale may inadvertently undermine wider efforts.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should improve its analysis of organizations' strengths and weaknesses and the likely impact of the funded activity on them before approving grants. This involves analyzing the social and political setting in which the organization works, including its relationship with local officials, funders, other development efforts, and local groups. Also, ADF should in-

involve prospective grantee organizations in pre-funding analysis, which would help build institutions, an important aspect of ADF's mandate.

To better understand organizations' strengths and weaknesses, the Foundation should differentiate between intermediary organizations and grassroots groups in its pre-funding analysis, modify its current forms to reflect this distinction, and obtain information about their stage of development and future plans. Also, ADF should contact other funders of prospective grantees more consistently to assess the group's track record, its access to other resources, and the relationship of the new grant to ones already funded or proposed.

In addition, ADF could:

- use planning grants to build institutional capacity, especially to increase grantees' management and technical skills and the ability of intermediary organizations to work with local community groups,
- provide ADF's African staff with small budgets to assist applicants with training (e.g., for bookkeeping, management) as needs become apparent,
- consider disbursing funding to train project managers prior to funding other aspects of project activities, such as providing equipment and materials, and
- consider increasing funding for training components of grants where appropriate.

To foster institutional capacity, ADF could support steady growth of an organization as opposed to supporting overly ambitious short-term plans. In some of the projects reviewed by OTA, the ADF grant more than doubled the organization's budget. The Foundation could consider the applicant's experience managing increasing amounts of funds, and not award large grants to organizations without adequate experience. It could use a series of increasing grants to help build capacity gradually. Also, ADF could review the impacts of its current practice of disbursing the majority of its funds early in the grant period.

Finding: Pre-funding analysis of technical and environmental factors by ADF and applicant

organizations often is inadequate, resulting in decisions to fund some projects with questionable technical soundness and, often, problematic environmental sustainability. Also, ADF's approach has not worked to expand the choices of technologies available to potential grantees.

Discussion.—ADF's project approval process inadequately provides for verifying the technical soundness of proposals (box 5-I; table 5-1). Potential problems and negative evidence are rarely identified in appraisal documents. Foundation staff currently lack sufficient technical skills for some of this analysis. Generally, ADF has not facilitated the use of alternative technologies nor has its funding program advanced the development of improved indigenous technologies. While several ADF-funded groups gained improved access to technical information as a result of ADF's approval process, such cases are in the minority. Some examples of the consequences of insufficient technical analysis include: unrealistic well-repair plans (Dakoro, Niger), overly optimistic production projections (Union Kaoural, Senegal), overlooked environmental degradation (Tutume, Botswana), and unknown capacity of water source (NGK, Kenya).

Many agricultural technologies that ADF funds are those with a poor track record in Africa, e.g., irrigation, rural water supply, rural credit, and tractor-hire programs. This provides ADF an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the self-help approach where others have failed but it also adds to the burden of verifying feasibility. Nine of the projects visited used relatively high-risk technologies. Much current research questions the sustainability of higher-risk technologies. OTA teams, after conducting interviews with local researchers and other experts, judged that technology choices were probably appropriate in 11 of the 12 projects, but were concerned that in most cases ADF apparently had not attempted to confirm whether or not they were appropriate. More appropriate technologies might have been available but ADF had not asked project managers if they considered other options, nor provided information on low-cost technologies

Box 5-1.—A Look at the Files: ADF's Use of Agricultural Technologies

OTA examined 27 ADF project files in depth and an additional 30 less intensively to evaluate the types of technologies used in ADF-funded projects and to determine the technical and economic soundness of these projects. Certain findings were positive: project documentation shows consistent improvement over time, the Foundation uses an excellent checklist for approving projects, and ADF's senior management recognizes and is willing to correct weaknesses in technical staffing. Other, serious concerns remain.

No rigorous analytical framework is applied consistently to assess a project's technical coherence and feasibility and economic soundness, sustainability, and replicability (table 5-1). The qualitative application of the approval checklist allows criteria to be met without providing supporting data or analysis. The generally poor performance of ADF-funded irrigation projects in Kenya and Mali, documented in ADF evaluations, demonstrates ADF's lack of understanding of technical factors that can make or break a project. Apparently, ADF has not fully learned the lessons of these early problems and the Foundation continues to give too little priority to ensuring technical soundness. The files, for example, do not address explicitly the complex factors that determine whether tractors make technical sense. Yet one-third of ADF's agricultural projects include support for tractors. Also:

- Many ADF-funded projects include multiple-sectors but the combinations sometimes are not the most advantageous. For example, irrigation projects also could introduce fertilizer and improved seeds, but most apparently do not. ADF could support more integrated crop/livestock systems, a particularly appropriate type of multiple-sector activity. But since this work is very demanding of technical and managerial resources, it is often advisable to pursue single sector projects or sequence sectors over time.
- Technical assistance is used infrequently during project preparation, although it is more common during implementation.
- Production and marketing activities dominate ADF's portfolio. Natural resource-related activities play a relatively minor role in ADF's portfolio (only 10 percent of projects) relative to the magnitude of environmental problems in Africa where agricultural intensification is increasing pressures on the resource base.

Some of these problems can be attributed to the ADF staff's lack of training and experience in the key technical areas of a majority of ADF agricultural projects: agronomy, crop and livestock science, agricultural engineering, and hydrology. Senior management notes that budget limitations prevent hiring additional technical staff. The Foundation chooses to hire generalists with community development and cross-cultural experience for the Representative positions and has recently hired part-time in-country staff with technical skills. OTA's examination of ADF's files shows clearly that ADF does not adequately increase grantees' access to improved technical advice.

SOURCE: Peter J. Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

blending indigenous and outside approaches in new ways.

Other evaluators looking at different ADF projects came to the same or even stronger conclusions. The ADF team evaluating five West Africa projects recommended that "no project should be financed" until the applicant conducts a feasibility study, addresses the problems identified, and has the revised plan approved by an ADF expert consultant.⁴

⁴Abdoulaye Djegal, "A Report on the Evaluation of Five ADF Projects in West Africa," ADF, July 1987, p. 26 (Dalakana Project), and pp. 27-28 (Narena Project).

Some ADF staff resist improving in-house technical capacity. They are mistakenly concerned:

... that emphasis in key design and implementation issues would shift away from local "responsibilization" and capacity building—to which they give highest priority among project objectives—toward technical *feasibility* which they appear to associate with a top-down imposition of foreign expertise and loss of local control. . . . this is a false dichotomy which can be solved through more imaginative approaches. . . . if done properly, solid technical input to assess project feasibility and to refine

Table 5-1.—Desk Reviewer's Assessment of Agricultural Project^a Soundness

	Percent of Projects			Uncertain/ lack information
	Adequate/ feasible	Inadequate/ infeasible	Not done	
A. 12 projects with major irrigation component				
1. Quality of technical assessment	—	58	—	42
2. Use of technical assistance in performing assessment	—	25	42	33
3. Desk reviewer's assessment of technical feasibility	25	—	—	75
4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done	—	8	92	—
5. Economic sustainability	25	17	—	58
6. Environmental sustainability	42	—	—	58
B. 5 projects with major tractor component				
1. Quality of technical assessment	—	60	—	40
2. Use of technical assistance in performing assessment	—	20	—	80
3. Desk reviewer's assessment of technical feasibility	20	—	—	80
4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done	—	20	80	—
5. Economic sustainability	20	40	—	40
6. Environmental sustainability	—	—	—	100
C. 8 projects with major seed/fertilizer component				
1. Quality of technical assessment	—	50	—	50
2. Use of technical assistance in performing assessment	—	13	25	62
3. Desk reviewer's assessment of technical feasibility	25	13	—	62
4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done	—	12	88	—
5. Economic sustainability	25	38	—	38
6. Environmental sustainability	50	—	—	50

^aBased on 25 projects reviewed in depth

SOURCE: Peter J. Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

elements in design do not contradict the fostering of local competence and confidence. Rather it can contribute directly to it.⁵

As another team of ADF's evaluators of a failing project in Kenya said:

Projects should have feasibility studies carried out before they are funded to determine their viability. Unsuccessful projects tend to discourage people, lower their morale, and kill their initiative. They also lose confidence in the management and the sponsor and it becomes difficult to motivate them again for similar activities.⁶

The Foundation's lack of attention to issues of environmental sustainability and risk are

striking in a continent where the limits of production systems make such concerns of critical importance. Potential negative impacts on the environment, and measures to mitigate them, have not been identified early enough in a number of ADF projects. For example, ADF's end-of-project evaluation of NGK in Kenya noted that irrigation could lead to soil erosion. The suggested mitigating measures would have been easier to implement if this study had been conducted before the construction of the water system began. Projects including tractor-hire and irrigation schemes raise red flags for those with experience in conservation of renewable resources. Too often, ADF has failed to recognize such flags.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should perform sufficient technical analysis to be reasonably certain that proposed technologies are workable and sustainable. Also, ADF should encourage applicants to consider a range of tech-

⁵Peter J. Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987, pp. 18-19, and 23.

⁶Hilda Kohnhiriwa, et al. "KWAHO/Taita Integrated Rural Community Water Project (TIRCOWAP), Project Evaluation Report," ADF, July 1987, p. 25.



Photo credit: OTA/George Scharffenberger

Improved pre-funding analysis would have identified technical problems in the plans to repair this well at Bundu Eggo, Niger.

nologies and suggest alternatives where appropriate. In this process, ADF should identify the potential environmental effects of project activities and encourage applicants to minimize negative effects and build on positive changes. **ADF should devise various ways to ensure that sufficient analysis is done by applicants themselves.**

ADF should develop a variety of ways to verify technical soundness and decide which would be appropriate for each project. For example, ADF could ask applicants to obtain written verification from local researchers or experts testifying to project soundness and detailing what additional planning may be needed. ADF staff should itself obtain such verification during the pre-approval process. Or ADF could hire in-country consultants to check on project plans, spending a day or two on site.

OTA is not recommending expensive AID-type feasibility studies, but brief, independent verification by a qualified professional, usually available in-country. Outside verification is needed even if the applicant organization has some technical expertise. If an applicant shows sufficient promise, but insufficient planning, a small planning grant would enable them to obtain technical or other help needed to plan their project adequately or test various approaches on a small scale. The plan would then be reviewed by ADF or a local contractor with relevant expertise.

The Foundation can improve its technical analysis of project proposals by increasing the staff's capability for making technically sound funding decisions, especially Foundation Representatives. ADF should initiate a training program to familiarize the Representatives and the Africa-based staff with a broader range of technologies, including "low-resource" **and other methods that build from local resources and skills.**

ADF staff needs additional skills in issues related to technical and economic feasibility and training in sharpening community development skills. The addition of African Country Resource Facilitators to provide technical assistance is a step in the right direction, although the experience and skills of the people selected should reflect the types of projects funded if they are to best fulfill their responsibilities.

Additional training could be offered to existing staff in a number of substantive areas, depending on the priority needs of the individual. ADF could invite technical experts to provide workshops to its staff, or ADF could send staff members elsewhere for training. The Foundation could identify institutions in Africa which provide training in rural organizing or community development and attend the training alongside community leaders, or they might benefit from attending intensive 7 to 10 day trainings at one of the community organizing schools in the United States, for example.

ADF staff may lack qualifications necessary to appraise the work of technical consultants for some projects, even with additional train-

ing. **Some** of OTA'S contractors felt this could be corrected with contracts for activity-specific technical skills. Others felt that ADF needs more staff with technical backgrounds to define and **assess** the work of technical contractors and who could be trained in participatory community development if needed.

At the same time, ADF should emphasize to its technical consultants and providers of technical assistance that, although local decision-making is to be respected, they have the respon-

sibility **to** suggest options to grantees and provide ADF with a critical analysis of the project plans. Revised work statements and orientation sessions could accomplish this. ADF could develop guidelines for what should be included in these analyses (box 5-2) and for the qualifications of persons conducting them. The analysis suggested is to verify that applicants' plans are adequate and sound, and identify where improvements are needed. It is not a substitute for the applicants' own planning. The approach should stress dialog among equals

Box 5-Z.—Factors in Assessing Agricultural Technology

A complex set of factors determine the success of agricultural projects. Irrigation, tractor, and seed/fertilizer projects are unlikely to have their intended results if these factors are neglected. ADF and its funded groups need to take them into account for their activities to be sustainable. Expensive or elaborate studies are not needed. Instead, ADF and applicants should seek a brief independent review, i.e., external professional verification that the proposed project plans adequately account for the following factors. ADF might award a planning grant if further analysis is warranted. While problems in some areas could be resolved at once, others might require monitoring and project changes throughout the grant period.

(1) Irrigation project components:

- hydrological parameters,
- crop mix and extent of complementary input use,
- expected input levels and yield response,
- rules for water access and water management procedures,
- water quality, drainage, and possibility of long-term salt build-up,
- labor conflicts with rainfed activities,
- farmers' familiarity with irrigated agriculture, and
- market depth, factor and output prices, and price impacts of the project.

(2) Tractor project components:

- initial capital costs without subsidies (non-replicable attribute),
- access to fuel, spare parts, maintenance,
- field size distributions, fragmentation, and dispersion,
- soil types and crop mix (yield response),
- rules determining access to tractor services,
- density and quality of secondary roads,
- slope and topography, and
- soil erodibility and rainfall intensity.

(3) Seed/fertilizer project components:

- availability of improved cultivars—their input, response and yield stability (source of performance information: research station results or on-farm tests?),
- types and amounts of fertilizers,
- crop/fertilizer price ratios, and
- long-term effects of fertilizer use,

SOURCE: Peter J. Matlon, "Consultant's Report to OTA," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

and two-way communication between ADF's contractors and project managers. The scope of work could include recommendations to improve the project activity and an assessment of the degree to which these recommendations are acceptable to participants. ADF could also provide training in community development methods for these experts, stressing the need to include the group in all stages of their work.

ADF could use additional means to improve technical analysis, such as:

- . implement streamlined ways of making decision regarding environmental impact, e.g., Webster's decision tree (box 5-3),
- identify several in-country technical experts to review project proposals in their individual areas of expertise, e.g., irrigation, agronomy, animal science,
- identify several U. S.-based technical experts who could provide a technical review of proposals, and
- require that the Project Assessment Memo include information on technical analysis, whether or not the applicant has explored other technology options, tried a small pilot project, knows of others who have conducted similar activities; and whether or not a small planning grant is preferable.

Box 5-3.—A Renewable Resource Decision Tree

Avoiding resource degradation requires that project-related decisions be made knowledgeably and consciously. A decision tree such as the one below could help ADF and its funded groups ensure that this is the case.

1. Does the proposed activity alter renewable resources?
 - 1a. If no, resource sustainability is not an issue; make a statement to that effect in project documents. No further action is required on the subject.
 - 1b. If yes, go to #2.
2. Determine the extent of planned or expected environmental consequences. Whether changes are "small" or not, depends on the eco- or agro-climatic zone the project site is in. Develop and use simple field guidelines with illustrative criteria such as:
 - Normally, total land-clearing less than 1 hectare (2.5 acres) is not severe, provided slopes are gentle (under 10 percent).
 - Normally, irrigation schemes less than 5 hectares (12.5 acres) do not have significant adverse consequences, especially if trees and shrubs are planted along drainage canals, roads, etc.
 - Water development schemes delivering less than 5 cubic meters of total, additional water per day are sufficiently small not to cause additional stress on other resources.

Do these guidelines indicate that the effects of the project are minor?

 - 2a. If yes, ascertain that basic mitigation techniques have been added (if they are not incorporated into the program already).
 - 2b. If no, or if, based on experience with similar projects, other reasons exist to suspect potentially adverse impacts on natural resources, go to #3.
3. Undertake an expanded resource analysis. Elaborate the magnitude of adverse consequences and recommend specific, practical ways to avoid or mitigate problems. For example, suggest that where tractors are introduced, all ground preparation be done along contours (instead of in the fall-line of slopes). Or introduce trees and shrubs along drain ditches and access roads and provide each farm unit with a corner for fruit and food trees in irrigation schemes. Where land clearing is involved, leave strips of natural vegetation: 10 meters wide every 50 or 100 meters of cleared land; if slopes are cleared, these strips should be placed parallel to the contour lines, etc.

SOURCE Fred R Weber, "Desk and Office Review of ADF Activities Renewable Resource Technologies," contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

Finding: Pm-approval economic analysis by applicants and ADF has been lacking or poor for many ADF-funded projects. Therefore, ADF has funded a number of projects with questionable economic and financial viability.

Discussion.—Income-generating projects need simple market analyses and business plans. All projects need plans to cover maintenance and repair, especially of vehicles and waterirrigation systems, and other recurrent costs. Such plans do not exist for a number of ADF funded projects. Where done, they are often inadequate and ADF had not verified their accuracy.

Project documents show little attention to analysis of whether or not project benefits will be sufficient to ensure participants' continued involvement. ADF does not verify assumptions regarding availability of inputs, estimates of recurrent costs and potential market demand, and production and selling price. Considering the 12 projects visited by OTA, simple economic analysis of key proposal components

would have raised questions about the Dakoro project's cooperative store (such stores have a poor track record in the Sahel and previous stores run by the same managers failed); Morogoro's plan to purchase maize produced by project participants (dropped by project managers as unrealistic by the time of the OTA visit); and the plans to maintain the NGK and Kikatiti water systems (fundraising plans approved by project leaders would not meet projected costs of maintaining the systems). The need to include economic and financial analysis in proposals was also noted in ADF's internal evaluations of projects in West Africa and Kenya. Finally, in making choices among prospective grantees, the Foundation has not included calculations of benefits and costs per participant or overall economic return.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should do more to encourage and help applicants do better pm-grant economic planning. Simultaneously, ADF should do better economic analysis of project proposals. The methods used should be simple, straightforward, and inexpensive.



Photo credit: ADF/Tom Katus

The products of many ADF-funded projects are sold in markets such as this one in Morogoro, Tanzania. Ensuring that applicants have adequate marketing plans should be a crucial part of ADF's project approval process.

ADF should require applicants to use simple financial and economic planning appropriate to the project proposal, i.e., simple market analysis, production plans, and plans for obtaining inputs, maintaining and replacing equipment, and providing for recurrent costs. ADF could require applicants to submit these plans with their application. The Foundation should independently verify the economic sustainability of projects by its own analyses, either by ADF staff or consultants, or others outside of the project. ADF's evaluation of project financial planning should be documented in the Project Assessment Memorandum. Also, ADF should explore realistic ways to integrate rough estimates of costs and benefits per participant and overall economic return into the Foundation's funding decisions.

Also, the Foundation could consider:

- providing training and technical assistance to project managers to assist them in developing their economic plans,
- providing planning grants or written materials, such as how-to guidelines of what economic plans to include in project proposals, and
- training ADF staff in simple economic analyses,

3. Project Monitoring

Finding: The way that ADF monitors projects does not provide enough information for ADF to be an effective facilitator during project implementation. Therefore, ADF misses timely opportunities to assist grantees and increase the likelihood of project success.

Discussion.—All funders find that grant modifications must be made as projects are implemented, especially if pre-planning has been less than ideal. ADF has shown a high degree of flexibility in some cases in the face of changing project circumstances and this should be continued. However, in other cases, ADF's lack of information and passivity at critical junctures let opportunities slip away to assist grantees in addressing problems and to reinforce their success.

Omissions during monitoring can affect the ability of the group to carry out its planned project. For example, lack of close monitoring and dialog with project managers led to confusion over the role of the intermediary organization in Kikatiti, Tanzania. The Foundation's distance was also at least partially responsible for lack of follow-up on developing realistic plans to finance repair and maintenance for Kikatiti's water system. More seriously, ADF was unaware of major differences developing between the proposal and actual project activities *in several* cases. The most dramatic instance was Ross Bethio, Senegal, where ADF was unaware of the conflict over land rights and the fact that its funds were used to remove Fulani herders from the lands they traditionally used for grazing. In the Union Kaoural project, two-thirds of the recipient groups were changed without ADF's awareness.

Generally, systematic follow-up was lacking regarding participation in decisionmaking, economic and financial planning, technical assistance needs, negative environmental impacts, and self-evaluation. Many problems and suggestions identified by ADF evaluators who reviewed 10 projects in West Africa and Kenya could have been identified and dealt with earlier if ADF's monitoring was stronger,

parallel to pre-funding analysis, confusion about ADF's monitoring role is due in part to a "hands off" approach, an outcome of ADF's perception of its mandate to maintain local control. Determined not to diminish local control or foster dependency, ADF has often shunned the more active role of a facilitator during project implementation, opting instead for the more cautious role of observer. Although ADF has developed a good monitoring checklist, it is not completed by ADF staff after reading progress reports or making site visits. Nor are staff required to document information on this checklist.

Lack of funds for staff travel to project sites in Africa at times contributes to inadequate monitoring. While most projects are visited once a year, often it is a quick visit. ADF staff accompany project managers, especially of the

intermediary organizations, and have little time to talk privately with participants or outside experts.

Quarterly progress reports could be an important monitoring tool but the instructions of what project managers should include in these reports are sketchy and they usually do not contain critical information. Project information flows to Washington too often without the Foundation providing constructive feedback to grantees. Many project managers, and at least one African staff member, complained of the lack of feedback on these reports. The Foundation's own evaluation of East African projects found the same need for improved monitoring and increased feedback.

The Foundation is aware that monitoring cannot be done from afar and decided to contract with staff who are closer to the funded groups. However, ADF has not optimized their role in project monitoring. For example, Country Resource Facilitators have been instructed not to become involved in issues related to project management and they do not regularly receive copies of quarterly reports.⁷ Nor do they have sufficient funds for transportation to visit projects regularly.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should increase and improve its project monitoring. At a minimum, this means that ADF should spend more time with grantees, especially with project participants other than leaders and with non-participants. Also, ADF should make better use of its monitoring checklist (for example, to review quarterly reports, document findings of field visits, and suggest follow-up actions) and increase timely feedback to project managers. ADF should evaluate the effectiveness of the technical assistance provided with grant funds.

⁷ADF reports that their African staff now receive copies of project quarterly reports. ADF staff, at a conference in October 1987, made a number of additional suggestions about the monitoring system including improving information received in the quarterly reports, use of the computerized management information system to improve follow up, and more frequent visits by the Country Resource Facilitators. ADF plans to implement these suggestions in 1988.

In general, ADF should give higher priority to monitoring by spending additional time and resources in the field. ADF projects could be visited at least twice a year (at least once by the Foundation Representative). Sufficient time should be allowed for dialog with project managers, local project committees, and participants as well as for meetings with persons outside of the project to obtain independent views. The degree and kind of monitoring depends on the needs of each project. For example, when serious problems arise, more frequent meetings could be planned between ADF staff and project managers.

Also, ADF should continue to develop and implement its plans for internal and external evaluation of funded projects, recognizing the different purposes and timing of each. Internal evaluation and monitoring procedures are primarily designed to help the funded group learn and to assist in its planning. Thus, such evaluation should be conducted by the group throughout the project cycle. External evaluations are primarily for accountability and learning about project impacts by the donor and others. They are normally conducted at the end of projects or midstream in longer projects. Both can be done in participatory ways and require collection of baseline data so that progress can be checked against the situation before project activities began.

The Foundation could also address concerns regarding monitoring by:

- revising its quarterly progress report form to clarify what information is needed and reducing the processing time (and steps) in Washington,
- organizing workshops for project managers that address common issues such as project management and participatory evaluation.^a For example, a workshop could help grantees develop ways to collect information on socio-economic characteristics of the people served and on

^aADF's workshops for project managers, held in Togo and Zimbabwe in early 1988, helped explain ADF's monitoring procedures.

project impacts on yields, the environment, and participants (30,9), and

- studying monitoring systems of other funders of community organizations, such as the workshops that the Kellogg Foundation sponsors for its overseas grantees, and exploring ways to reduce reporting requirements when there are several funders of one project.

4. Use of African Staff

Finding: ADF African field staff are underused in pre-funding analysis of projects and in project monitoring. As a result, ADF's decisionmaking procedures are slowed, the Foundation misses helpful analysis regarding applicants and grantees, and the projects miss the benefits of closer facilitation. Also, ADF is losing important opportunities to

strengthen Africans' capabilities, another aspect of its mandate.

Discussion.—An improved project appraisal and monitoring process would be difficult to implement without having ADF staff in-country. African staff now play primarily an administrative role with little analytical or decisionmaking responsibility for project approval and monitoring. The terms of the new cooperative agreements with the Country Resource Facilitators address only some of these issues. For example, the current agreements with both Regional Liaison Officers and Country Resource Facilitators emphasize monitoring responsibilities, but do not mention a role in analysis during the approval process. In fact, one African staff person understood his responsibility was to pass proposals to Washington without comment on their merits. ADF staff



Photo credit: ADF/Joe Kuria

The Foundation could tap the expertise of its African staff by assigning them greater responsibility. Here, Gilbert Maeda (Country Resource Facilitator for Tanzania) and Tom Katus (Foundation Representative) discuss the Albalal Water Development Project in northern Tanzania with Maasai project participants.

has discussed expansion of the roles of the Regional Liaison Officers and Country Resource Facilitators, but current emphasis is placed on familiarizing new staff with ADF.

African field staff could play a key role in working with applicants during development of their projects and/or in helping ADF weigh project proposals. This will require carefully balancing responsibilities to two clients: the applicants, to whom the field staff could provide assistance directly or indirectly, and ADF, to whom the field staff would provide critical evaluations of proposals' merits. Like staff of any funding organization, they would be expected to disclose previous associations with applicants, and in case of conflict of interest, decline to take part in decisions regarding funding.

African and American staff would need additional resources for training and transportation to assume these increased responsibilities. Training in working with community groups, techniques for rapid rural appraisal, and specific technical training would be particularly helpful. Giving increased responsibility to its field staff would make ADF a more participatory organization and add another dimension to ADF's role of building African institutions.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should progressively increase its African staff's responsibilities for outreach, project identification, assistance to applicants, pre-funding analysis, monitoring, and evaluation. In the process, ADF should restructure other staff responsibilities, especially those of the Foundation Representatives, to reflect the increased responsibilities of African staff. Also, ADF should explore giving its African staff increased responsibilities for project approval, for example, for projects below a specified funding level.

This will require that ADF revise job descriptions for staff to reflect new responsibilities and make other institutional adjustments. For example, upgrading the Country Resource Facilitator job description could eliminate the need for Regional Liaison Officers, since one field staff person per country is sufficient given the

size of ADF's program. ADF is already moving to merge the two positions. Also, ADF would need to increase contract time and supply African staff with budgets adequate to carry out their greater responsibilities.

Careful recruitment, selection, and training of African staff to fill the new country coordinator positions would be an opportunity to improve ADF's analytical abilities. For example, the new ADF country coordinators could further develop a roster or talent bank of technical consultants and research groups in the country to help ADF review proposals, help applicants develop proposals, and provide ongoing technical support, monitoring, and evaluation. Each could identify an expert agronomist, livestock scientist, and irrigation specialist to provide an in-country review of relevant proposals. While ADF could request these experts to provide *bono* services, they should be prepared to pay professional rates. Also, Country Resource Facilitators could help broker other support services, including those of local governments, PVOS, and other funders.

The new country coordinators could be given discretion over a small fund to provide training or technical assistance to groups, or to assist ADF in project appraisal. For example, field staff could use these funds for exchange visits of project managers or to allow recipients to attend conferences. They could also identify information relating to technologies used by grantees or their other needs and resource centers where this information is available. ADF could also explore giving the African staff a greater role in project approval beyond proposal analysis.

As the responsibility of African staff increases, the responsibilities of the Washington-based Foundation Representatives would need to be adjusted accordingly. They could, for example, supervise and train field staff, develop regional funding and training strategies, and coordinate the development of country plans. The Representatives could provide general direction and oversight but leave increased decisionmaking to the country coordinators, for example for small grants.

A related issue involves decentralization of funding decisions. Eventually ADF might consider establishing formal regional offices in Africa. One option would be to move the Foundation Representatives from Washington to the field to head up such offices.⁹ However, such a major change in ADF's structure is unwarranted at this time because it would be prohibitively expensive in relation to the size of ADF's project portfolio. A sufficient number of skilled Africans exist to make Africa-based Americans unnecessary at the country level.

Another option would be to allow regional staff (Foundation Representatives and country coordinators) to assume larger roles in grant-making decisions while the Washington review committee's power was reduced. The Ford Foundation, for example, allows regional offices in Africa to make funding decisions below \$50,000. All applications are received and acted on at the regional office. Proposals over this amount require approval in New York, but monitoring is done by the regional office.

S. Plans, Communication, and Coordination at We Country Level

Finding: ADF's inadequate communication and lack of coordination with other private and official development groups limit its ability to learn from their experience and help ADF-funded projects obtain additional resources.

Discussion.—The Foundation has been lax in contacting other donors about prospective projects. There has been insufficient communication in Africa between ADF and private funders, including U.S. and European PVOS, and between ADF and official U.S. development efforts such as the Agency for International Development (AID). Often there is little or no interaction even when ADF is funding the same African organization or project. As a result, critical information has been over-

looked and opportunities for greater impact have been lost.

While it is common for a new organization to stress its uniqueness and difference from other programs, this "go it alone" approach has prevented ADF from taking advantage of experiential learning of others committed to similar goals. It has resulted in missed opportunities for the Foundation to improve its performance and for ADF to share valuable insights with others.

Insufficient communication exists between ADF and the U.S. embassy and AID in most countries. In certain circumstances, such as when a dispute exists between the African and U.S. governments, it is advantageous for ADF to maintain distance from other official U.S. programs. But adopting an arm's length approach for all countries is not always advantageous. Several ambassadors and AID directors feel that ADF's grant size, falling between the small grants of the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund and large AID grants, gives ADF a natural niche in U.S. development assistance. AID officials, likewise, consistently mentioned the lack of communication with ADF, even when ADF funded a group AID had previously worked with or was currently funding. AID staff felt that its experience and technical expertise could be useful to ADF. At least one mission director felt that they would have much to learn from the Foundation,

Better communication does not mean, however, a loss of independence. ADF's legislated mandate and its status as an independent agency not tied to short-term U.S. foreign policy objectives make it inappropriate for AID officials to expect ADF funding to conform to AID development assistance strategies, such as those enunciated in the Country Development Strategy Statements. Nor should AID or the U.S. Embassy have a role in project approval (13).

Communication with the Peace Corps *is* somewhat better and has been helped because many ADF staff formerly worked for the Peace Corps, including two of the Regional Liaison Officers and at least one Country Resource

⁹ADF, like the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), has decided not to establish full regional offices. But IAF Foundation Representatives are responsible for one country (and a number of countries have more than one IAF representative). ADF Foundation Representatives have responsibilities for three to four countries with active programs (i.e., where ADF has awarded grants).

Facilitator, and many staff maintain professional ties with their former colleagues. In one case visited, a Peace Corps Volunteer was the contact who informed the community about ADF (the NGK project in Kenya).

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should increase communication with other development agencies. At a minimum, the Foundation should meet with those groups that share funding of projects and organizations to discuss plans regarding funding and to determine if collaboration is appropriate.

ADF was established as an independent but complementary organization which should coordinate with other U.S. development assistance activities "to the extent possible" (Section 504b) and share its learning with others.



Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

Efforts to promote tractor use have a mixed record in Africa and ADF should learn from other donors' successes and failures with tractor projects.

Some experts feel ADF could best fill gaps in U.S. development assistance by emphasizing its complementarities with rather than differences from other groups. For example, cooperating with some private agencies could enable ADF to take advantage of its special arrangement with U.S. government and African officials; cooperating with official programs could allow ADF to take advantage of its greater flexibility to be an innovator.

Improved communication might become collaboration in some cases. Who to collaborate with and how would differ from country to country, based on each project's particular needs and the resources of ADF and the other donors.

For example, ADF could meet with the administrator of the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund (or representatives of the small grants programs of the Canadian government and the European Economic Community) to review portfolios. This might help ADF locate local organizations that have successfully planned and carried out a project with a small amount of outside funds and that are ready for a larger grant that ADF could provide. Or ADF could consider tapping the technical expertise of AID or other private or official donors familiar with similar activities or organizations in the locale of a ADF applicant to verify the potential sustainability of activities proposed by the applicant. ADF could benefit from checking with other donors familiar with the ADF applicant or its proposed activity in the locale to obtain additional sources of information on the project. However, U.S. agencies or other donors should not have any approval authority.

AID and ADF might consider cofunding projects at the same time, or AID might fund a project after ADF funding has been completed. This, however, could entail some loss of local control by the funded group. The same constraint might apply even if AID funding were provided indirectly through a PVO. But the problem of donors exercising too much control over a project is not restricted to official programs and ultimately the African organization must choose which constraints are accept-

able. In the case of the women's credit program of PfP/Kenya, AID's Women in Development office funded it directly before ADF and AID is continuing to fund it after ADF through another organization, World Education's Rural Enterprise Program, with good chances of PfP's maintaining local control,

Also, ADF could consider other ways of increasing coordination:

- compile information on other funders' programs to refer applicants not eligible or less suitable for ADF funding to others,
- explore opportunities to share office space and technical resources, including technical libraries and resource data bases, with organizations such as the Peace Corps, international research programs, and PVOS, and
- study the funding processes of other donors, especially those funding similar kinds of organizations and activities.

Finding: ADF does not prepare country-specific planning strategies to guide its use of resources and relate its work to the context of other local development efforts. Therefore, the Foundation's impact is lessened and it has yet to find its niche in each country.

Discussion.—Little evidence exists, despite claims, that the Foundation is seeking and finding funding opportunities untapped by other donors, ADF's funding portfolios do not appear to be tailored to each country's needs and, in some cases, seem to be overly influenced by staff preferences. Outreach and project identification are haphazard and not well linked to long-range planning.

The Foundation Representatives prepare regional strategy memos that vary in format and depth. These internal memos are more like work plans containing information on the status of ADF's funding program, on particular grants, travel plans, budget, and selection of African staff. In only a few instances do they identify funding program priorities.

Annual country plans are best placed in the context of long-range planning. The Founda-

tion's Country Profiles come closest to being country-specific long-range plans. However, ADF has not prepared Country Profiles for 16 of the 19 countries where it has funded projects. The profiles for Senegal and Tanzania contain basic information available elsewhere and some insightful interpretation (e.g., references to what certain official policies have meant for poor people), but give a fairly superficial analysis of the context of grassroots development efforts. Both profiles were based on interviews with African, American, and European representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOS), grassroots organizations (not in Senegal), research and training organizations, and donors. Although both profiles made some important program recommendations (e.g., identified opportunities for ADF involvement), neither included preliminary funding priorities nor proposed an outreach strategy for ADF in that country. Nor has there been follow up to fill in the gaps. ADF makes little attempt to relate each country's funding program to its profile.

Suggestions for Improvement.—**The Foundation should develop brief (10-20 page) annual country plans and use them to guide its funding program in each country.** These papers should present a profile of the Foundation's funding program that year and project its direction for the next year, e.g., identify priority program areas and perhaps geographic areas and types of groups for funding. Also, ADF should attempt to develop a clear niche in each country.

ADF staff should more carefully identify its niche in each country and how it can effectively fill it. That niche will be different for each country, since it should be tailored to the needs, opportunities, and government situation of each, and it should be developed in concert with others concerned with grassroots development. The rationale for the suggested program focus for the year could include discussion of how ADF's funding strategy complements those of other donors in the country. These can only emerge after much communication with others in each country. The program areas identified in the country plan then become the basis for



Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

A country strategy should identify a few high priority funding areas to best use scarce resources. In Zimbabwe, for example, ADF funds are helping the national Agricultural Finance Corporation carry out its strategic plan to help small farmers' groups such as this one in the Pungwe Valley.

designing an outreach program and/or selecting among a large number of applicant proposals.

The country plans would sharpen and update the general funding goals identified in the Country Profiles, where these exist. The country plans or strategies could also build on the Country Profiles by specifying the best overall approach or mix of approaches to support local development. Of critical importance are decisions about ADF's levels of operation (i.e., funding community groups, intermediary organizations, parastatals, individual enterprises, and even the possibility of collaborating with government programs).

The profiles and plans should identify funding gaps without narrowing the focus to a single sector or issue, which would be inconsistent with ADF's purpose to support local initiatives. Nor should they be inflexibly applied and prevent ADF from responding to new opportunities.

Plans for outreach to specific kinds of grassroots groups in specific areas of the country for certain kinds of activities could be part of the country strategy, as could be plans for coordination with other donors and government officials. The Foundation could provide its staff with a budget (in addition to the allocation for project-related expenses) to carry out activities to support the development of the country plan,

such as funds to attend workshops, interview researchers, and visit projects funded by others. ADF's African field staff could have major responsibility in developing country plans.

The revised profiles also could identify any unique social-political characteristics of the country that might affect ADF's work. For example, the OTA team that visited Southern Africa concluded the present approach of ADF to official U.S. programs characterized by lack of contact was appropriate in Zimbabwe, where the U.S. political presence is not entirely welcome, but inappropriate in Botswana, where this constraint does not exist. The country profiles and plans could include a discussion of how ADF can cooperate most advantageously with local authorities, which must be based on an understanding of the government's development plans. For example, Kenya's "District Focus on Rural Development" presents an opportunity for ADF to support activities of grassroots groups for which complementary services and resources are available at the local level. If ADF decides to continue actively involving senior staff in the preparation of the revised profiles, it could prepare only one or two a year. ADF could delegate the preparation of the new profiles to Foundation Representatives and African staff. Also, the Foundation could benefit from:

- studying the planning processes used by others. The Ford Foundation's regional

strategies and IAF's biannual country "review/preview" processes might suggest ideas,¹⁰) and

- preparing streamlined profiles, identifying its particular niche and funding priorities in each country (focusing on the types of information now included in Volume 11 of the Country Assessment Profiles), with help from ADF's African field staff.

Lower Priority Improvements

In addition to the high priority suggestions for improving ADF's operations, several other areas were identified. These include shortening the time taken for project approval and start-up, completing operating agreements with African governments of countries where ADF has funded projects, and directing more attention to evaluating ADF's own funding portfolio and funding program.

1. Timeliness of ADF's Practices

Finding: An unnecessarily long time passes between ADF's receipt of project proposals and first allocation of funds to successful applicants. As a result, some project results are jeopardized and ADF's credibility is decreased.

Discussion.—ADF's approval process is unduly long compared to other funders which fund grants of comparable size (e.g., private foundations, IAF, PVOS). For the 12 visited projects, an average of 12.5 months elapsed between the date the proposal was first submitted to ADF and the date the first check was disbursed (table 4-I). Within this period, an average of 5.5 months elapsed between submission and approval by the Project Review Committee (PRC) and seven months between such approval and the date the first check was sent. Following approval by the PRC, approval is required by the Board of Directors, followed by congressional notification, and then the Grant Agreement is sent to Africa for signature. Fur-

ther internal processing and preparation for startup took an average 3.5 months between ADF signing the Agreement and disbursement of the first check.

The long time required for project approval, start up, and actual transmission of funds negatively affected projects in nearly half of the cases visited; two projects lost a year's production (Dagnare in Niger, Morogoro in Tanzania). Delays also discouraged participants and undermined support for project leadership in the Dakoro project in Niger; led to a hastily constructed irrigation system in Ross Bethio, Senegal, which may result in technical flaws; and generally contributed to internal tensions within groups. Delays in disbursing ADF funds also were identified as a serious problem by the ADF team evaluating Kenyan projects,

These delays were costly because of currency devaluations in Botswana and Tanzania and inflation in Zimbabwe and other countries. As a result, project costs to the applicants were increased and funding was effectively lowered. In at least one case (Boiteko), ADF did not adjust the grant following a currency devaluation and thereby the group suffered a loss in the grant's value.

Some delays are outside of ADF's control. But other delays are caused by the inefficient execution of and/or the many steps in the ADF approval process in Washington and faulty communication with project managers in Africa. Some delays could be avoided by working more closely with promising applicants,

Suggestions for Improvement.—**The Foundation should streamline its project application, review, and approval processes. At a minimum, ADF should publicize what it does not fund as a way to decrease the number of ineligible applications received. Then it should improve the application screening process to eliminate the applications with the least promise for meeting ADF's mandate early so staff will have more time to spend working with the more promising candidates. The key is for ADF to develop ways to streamline this process while at the same time improving its approval and monitoring practices. Also, the Foundation should con-**

¹⁰For an example of applying an IAF country strategy and rationale for program priorities, see Bradford Smith, "Why Fund a Day Care Center in Sao Paulo?" *Grassroots Development*, *Journal of the Inter-American Foundation*, vol. 11, No. 2, 1987.

tinue to identify ways to speed transmission of funds to grantees.

Better initial data collection and increased involvement of African field staff could speed the consideration of proposals. For example, spending more time up-front in site visits, requiring better planning by applicants before they submit proposals, and clearly identifying and dealing with problems early in the process can save time in the long run.

The Foundation should be more selective at each stage of the approval process, starting with project identification. A more systematic approach to outreach and initial screening would enable ADF to reduce the amount of time spent on inappropriate funding requests. For example, ADF could study the large number of request letters and initial applications that have not been funded and publish lists of what it generally does not fund in the ADF brochure, flyer, and newsletter.

Also, ADF could work more with others to identify groups that best meet ADF criteria, especially after identifying country program priorities. A good example is ADF's identification of the Morogoro Diocese project. An ADF team interviewed staff of the Development Services Department of the Christian Council of Tanzania, who provide technical services to grassroots development projects, while developing the Tanzania Country Profile. ADF's Representative reviewed a number of proposals from the Council's member organizations, identified one as a likely candidate for funding, and then met with the Development Department of the Morogoro Diocese to discuss project funding.

Also, ADF could streamline its processes in these ways:

- examine other funders' pre-application processes for ways to design its own. Develop pre-application forms used to make the first screening decisions before prospective grantees submit complete proposals,
- send project notifications to Congress even during recesses and work with the Ap-

propriations Committees to simplify notification procedures further,

- monitor how recent changes in the Board of Directors' approval of projects affect the time involved and whether sending money through the commercial bank selected by ADF speeds the transmission of funds from ADF to projects in every country, and
- identify the reasons causing the average 3.5 month delay between ADF's signing the Grant Agreement and actual disbursement of the first check to develop ways to speed the process.

2. Agreements With African Governments

Finding: ADF has not yet completed accords or reached informal understandings with 13 of the 19 countries in which it funds projects.¹¹ This can lead to confusion regarding African governments' roles in ADF-funded projects, delay project implementation, and may hamper the Foundation's ability to resolve conflicts with local officials.

Discussion.—For most official and major PVO funding programs, agreements spelling out the purposes of funding and the roles of donors, recipient organizations, and government officials are generally reached before funding begins. These agreements could help clarify the roles of local officials in relation to ADF projects. ADF has suspended new funding in Kenya since early 1987 due to the lack of an official accord. In certain cases, an African government may prefer an informal written understanding, eliminating the need for a formal agreement.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should complete formal and informal agreements expeditiously, continuing to communicate with and use the assistance of the American embassy in negotiating the accord.

¹¹In early 1988, ADF signed agreements with Sierra Leone and Ghana, reducing the number of countries without agreements to 11 of 19.

3. Program Evaluation and Research

Finding: ADF's funding portfolio does not reflect the full range of possibilities granted in its legislation. While some of these limitations may be justified, the Foundation may be narrowing its impact unnecessarily.

Discussion.—The vast majority of ADF's project portfolio emphasize economic development, while its legislative mandate also includes social development. Nearly 75 percent of 86 project abstracts reviewed had a small-enterprise component and 25 percent a revolving credit component. Many ADF-funded economic projects contain social development components, such as training, but these areas usually receive a small percentage of the ADF grant funds. A high proportion of funds go to construction, equipment, and vehicles (51 percent in the 12 projects visited) versus skill development (4 percent for training and technical assistance).

ADF's decision to emphasize income-generating activities over social development projects has major implications for the way it is implementing its mandate. While income-generating projects certainly can be consistent with the mandate, the Foundation's expectation that income-generating projects become completely self-supporting within a 2 to 3 year average grant period seems unrealistic. Evaluations of other funding programs show how difficult it is for economic development projects to become self-sustaining. Grants and loans to economic projects of low-income groups have a relatively high failure rate (24,33,36).

Applying the same standards to social development efforts is even more unreasonable. Most successful social programs in the United States could not have fulfilled a similar criterion. The Foundation has not funded social development projects because of concerns that they are not sustainable without continued dependency on donors or governments. This is not always true, however. Some social development projects may be short-term, e.g., a leadership training course. For others the real question might be less that of self-sufficiency and more of developing realistic plans detail-

ing how project expenses will be raised after the grant period ends from a variety of sources including program income, grassroots fundraising, support from other donors, government programs, and membership dues.

The Foundation has made no loans or loan guarantees, although both are allowed by its legislation.¹² While the Board of Directors has supported making loans, budget and OMB-determined staff ceilings prevented ADF from hiring personnel with the expertise to analyze loan applications. In addition, ADF is discouraged by the fact that loan repayments would go to the U.S. Treasury. Thus, ADF has decided to award grants to African intermediary organizations for revolving loan funds instead of making loans or loan guarantees (23).

Current ADF practice is to fund only private non-profit groups. ADF policy now disallows the funding of parastatals¹³ (although ADF funded two parastatals in Zimbabwe in 1985). The legislation, however, also allows funding for public and for-profit groups. The Board of Directors' decision has constrained ADF funding to some intermediary organizations, especially in countries with socialist governments, and has exacerbated tensions among intermediary organizations, local groups, local officials, and ADF. For example, the major reason for the delay in start-up of the Kikatiti grant in Tanzania was the 9 months it took the organization to obtain its non-profit status so it could meet ADF criteria. Such projects managed by village officials may be de *facto* projects of local governments. Designating such groups as PVOS may obscure important issues relating to local participation.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should periodically evaluate the sectors it funds, the types of projects it funds, and the uses to which its funds are put. For example, ADF should examine the balance between projects that have economic versus social development goals and between expenditures on capital goods

¹²IAFalsohasnotmade any loans or loan guarantees.

¹³Aparastatalorganization has a mixture of public and Private ownership or management, usually with public control.

(such as equipment) versus those that build people's skills and the capacity of their organizations. Also, ADF could consider eventually developing loan and loan guarantee programs. The Foundation could develop guidelines for funding public entities and private for-profit groups when local realities make that desirable.

Social development projects include community organizing projects, programs of networks or coalitions, leadership training programs, legal assistance/advocacy programs, self-help cultural and educational projects, and alternative health education projects. They also include training in management, organizational development, human resource development, membership development, fundraising, and financial planning—activities designed to strengthen a group's capacity to carry out its purposes.

ADF's Board of Directors and staff could discuss the mixture of social and economic development activities in ADF's portfolio and consider a wider range of perspectives on grassroots development. The Foundation could tap the experience of its Advisory Council to develop criteria for funding social development projects. ADF staff could visit organizations providing training to grassroots groups and PVO coalitions while developing its country profiles and strategies.

In the future, ADF could consider making loan guarantees to encourage African banks or other institutions to provide credit to small farmers or community groups which the institutions might otherwise be reluctant to make. This would reduce ADF's responsibility for itself managing a loan portfolio as well as use ADF funds to leverage additional resources for grassroots groups. For example, the Ford Foundation is developing a loan guarantee program to encourage Senegal's National Agricultural Credit Bank to increase loans to members of a national federation of village and regional PVOS. Later, ADF might consider making loans on a pilot basis to grantees that have already successfully implemented activities. Or ADF could combine grants and loans to groups with a solid track record. A change in ADF's legislation would allow loan repayments to return to ADF and thus facilitate ADF's initiation of

loan guarantees and/or loans. However, ADF should first implement priority improvements in its grants program, making it inadvisable to begin a loan program in the immediate future.

ADF's Board of Directors and staff also could develop guidelines for funding organizations which are public in some respect. This would prevent confusion and misunderstanding between ADF and the applicants who now must present themselves as totally private entities. The guidelines, especially those related to participation of beneficiaries in decisionmaking, need not be substantially different from those for private, non-profit entities. Guidelines might have to be country-specific, however, since each country differs in designating public and private status. Similarly, guidelines could be developed for funding private for-profit entities where appropriate.

Finding: The Foundation has not paid sufficient attention to evaluating its own funding program (as opposed to evaluating its funded projects). Nor is its research program responding to the issues raised by its funding program. As a result, ADF is losing opportunities to make the most effective use of its own experience and to share that knowledge with others.

Discussion.—ADF has not yet examined the strategic choices about development implied in its funding portfolio, such as its emphasis on economic over social development activities and the technology choices it is supporting, particularly within agricultural projects. The Foundation has yet to tailor its research funding programs to its regular funding program. Research grants have had little relevance to the issues of participation, sustainability, and technology choices of the groups ADF is funding. Nor has the Foundation critically analyzed its expansion into new countries, the distribution of funds among regions, and among countries within regions. Despite, or perhaps because of, the criticism it has received about its administrative costs, ADF has not done its own analysis of the optimal balance between grant and non-grant costs.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should periodically review its portfolio and address

some of the major policy issues identified here such as the technologies it supports, the allocation of funds among and within regions, and the balance between grant and non-grant expenses. ADF should postpone expansion into new countries until it has made high priority improvements, then received a significant increase in congressional appropriations. The ADF research program should be redirected to respond to the needs of the funding program.

Reviewing its portfolio and redirecting its research program are both issues for strategic planning and may be appropriate issues for ADF to address as it prepares its next Five Year Plan,

ADF's research program has an important role to play as ADF faces these and other policy issues, ADF could:

- do brief (5-10 page) biennial assessments of its country programs and use them to provide guidance for the research program,

- broaden its portfolio by using the research program to support research related to technologies appropriate for grassroots development. Previous OTA reports have identified the need to bridge the technology gap for PVOS and grassroots groups, establish information banks on low-resource technologies, and collect and store traditional knowledge before it is lost. For example, few donors are supporting local resource management, such as indigenous grazing and irrigation efforts, ADF could study its funded projects for lessons in these areas that might be applicable to other projects,
- develop a rationale to guide regional and country-by-country distribution of ADF funds, and
- prepare criteria to guide expansion into new countries.



THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING OTA'S SUGGESTIONS

This chapter has identified priority areas where changes would improve ADF's ability to more fully implement its mandate. Within each section, "shoulds" (general approaches and measures that are likely to be necessary for ADF to better meet its mandate) are distinguished from "coulds" (other complementary ways to address the same issues). Also, the discussions covered how time can be saved, while accomplishing more, especially during project appraisal and planning.

Implementing these suggestions, however, will be costly. Using existing resources more efficiently would enable ADF to implement some of these suggestions at minimal cost. Nevertheless, added resources are needed to support the suggested changes to enable ADF to do improved pre-funding analysis and to take a more active facilitator role with promising applicants and grantees. The major recommendations cited here could be implemented for an additional \$500,000 to \$700,000 a year, according to OTA's review of ADF's estimates for salaries, workshops, travel, and contracts. An apportionment reflecting the priorities set out in this report would result in a majority of the increase going to ADF's African staff, approximately 25 percent for additional Washington staff and their travel, and the remainder for short-term contracts for technical analysis, training for staff and consultants, and the research program.

The additional funds going to Africa would increase African staff time and the resources they would need to take on the suggested new responsibilities (funds for salaries, office space, travel, and a small amount for project support). Additional Washington staff could include more program assistants, a Foundation Representative, and/or technical expertise. Some funds could be used for short-term contracts, principally in Africa, for appraising proposals

for ADF and providing more extensive assistance to applicants and grantees. Some funds would cover increased travel to Africa, especially by Foundation Representatives.

Using funds for these purposes will temporarily increase the proportion of costs that ADF spends for non-grant purposes, yet some people maintain that these costs are already too high. While a thorough review of ADF's expenditures for overhead and grant-making was beyond the scope of this study, OTA found that concerns regarding ADF's proportion of non-grant costs may be overstated. Two organizations provide guidelines on appropriate levels of overhead costs for philanthropic organizations, which ADF resembles in some ways. The Council of Better Business Bureaus advocates that at least 50 percent of all income be spent on programs and activities directly related to the organization's purposes (14). The National Charities Information Bureau expects management and fundraising costs to be less than 40 percent and program expenses at least 60 percent (27). ADF's non-grant costs (43 percent in fiscal year 1987) are not unreasonable by these measures.

Often ADF's non-grant costs are compared inappropriately to PVO levels. The Foundation does not stretch its staff with volunteers and, as a U.S. government agency, pays salaries mandated by the U.S. Civil Service. ADF uses federally-controlled regulations for travel, which is inherently expensive because of the distances involved. Monitoring more than 100 small-scale, grassroots efforts in 19 countries is staff- and travel-intensive by nature. Also, the Foundation's congressionally-mandated efforts to disseminate its results are costly. In addition, start-up periods, which often stretch for several years, are administratively expensive for any new organization.



Chapter 6

Lessons for Other Development Assistance Organizations

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Lessons for Other Development Assistance Organizations

SUMMARY

- OTA'S findings regarding the African Development Foundation's (ADF) funding program are similar to those of the Foundation's 1987 internal evaluations of 10 projects as well as recent evaluations of Appropriate Technology International, the Inter-American Foundation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the U.N. Development Fund for Women, and U.S. private voluntary organizations.
- ADF can serve as a model for other groups in certain aspects of its funding program, for example, maximizing local control of externally funded activities, using Africans to provide technical assistance and to conduct evaluations, and awarding grants for planning to local groups. Also, the Foundation's work with African intermediary organizations provides an example for other organizations wishing to contribute to grassroots development.
- The Foundation has established effective working relations with Congress, characterized by direct communication, that are instructive for other official or publicly funded groups.
- Many organizations face similar issues regarding the composition and roles of their Boards of Directors.
- This report contains lessons that could help others 'who seek to evaluate development assistance programs. For instance, conducting both program and project assessments creates complementary pictures of an organization's status while external evaluations are useful additions to internal ones.

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, ADF and its funded projects share the problems faced by others; in some ways ADF can be an example for other development assistance organizations. The strengths and weaknesses of ADF-funded activities, analyzed in chapter 4, are common to similar efforts funded by others. Chapter 5 highlighted what OTA learned about ADF's funding program and suggested possible improvements regarding the role of African staff, pre-grant social, economic, technical, and environmental analysis, project monitoring, and other issues. The Foundation's deficiencies in these areas, too, are shared with other development assistance organizations and recent evaluations of similar organizations raise many of the same concerns (box 6-1).

Private voluntary organizations also often share common problems: limited replicability, lack of sustainability, isolated programming context, insufficient planning and management, and weak databases and evaluation (40). Because ADF in some ways resembles a private funder more than governmental development agencies such as AID (e.g., projects and grants are generally small and its operating style is flexible and participatory) it is not surprising that ADF shares some of the problems identified as common among PVOS, especially those that fund community groups in Africa. Governmental funders, PVOS, and others have much to learn from each other in tackling these shared problems and ADF can contribute to, as well as learn from, such a discussion.

Box 6-1.—The Common Problems of Groups Similar to ADF

Chapter 2 notes four agencies that have programs in some respect similar to ADF's. Recent evaluations show that the groups share many common problems such as the need to work out relationships with other funders and the need to address project impact and replicability. These evaluations raised the following concerns:

Appropriate Technology International's (ATI) evaluation was conducted by AID. It noted ATI's need to: improve its technical and commercial appraisals of projects; give higher priority to "soft" technologies such as market analysis; improve the management of field operations, monitoring, and evaluation; strengthen attempts to replicate its work; increase efforts to disseminate lessons learned; consider making mid-course adjustments more often; and find ways to maximize its impact (16).

Inter-American Foundation. This internal evaluation highlighted concerns regarding: the lack of clear articulation of funding priorities within Latin American countries, economic sectors, and development objectives; ad hoc project selection; and the relationship of the Foundation to other organizations (50).

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). This evaluation, conducted by AID, raised concerns about: IFAD's relationships with other donors (e.g., finding its own niche and providing co-financing); the sustainability of its efforts; how well it is reaching women; problems with monitoring and evaluation; dissemination of its knowledge; and sponsoring a program potentially with too broad a focus (39).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Important program issues arising from this internal evaluation include: links between UNIFEM'S activities and those of other development groups; fuller involvement of local experts and leaders; improved delivery systems; concentration on projects with the greatest potential impact; support for a variety of multi-faceted projects. Project-related concerns also were raised, including:

- the impacts of external factors on project success or failure,
- monitoring local and national activities,
- accounting for divisions of family labor in project design,
- assessing and building institutional viability, and
- providing technical training for extension workers (38).

Grassroots development efforts in Africa have had some success i-reproving food production and conserving natural resources (20,37,48) and the Foundation is among the funders supporting creative approaches and achieving positive results. In particular, ADF is setting a good ex-

ample by relying on Africans to provide technical assistance and conduct evaluations, by providing planning grants to local groups, and by leaving control in the hands of funded organizations. These are the kinds of lessons that ADF can share with other organizations.

LESSONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION

Many development assistance groups claim to support grassroots development, which entails the effective participation of beneficiaries in development. However, ADF often succeeds in maximizing the control of local groups and organizations over their projects, which enhances the results because people feel a sense

of ownership in the work. Larger donors, such as U.S. AID, differ from ADF in important ways—size of funded activities, pressure from various interest groups, government-to-government funding, legal framework, and other factors. Thus they cannot duplicate ADF's approach entirely. However, they could adapt

certain of ADF's methods, such as favoring African initiatives and ensuring that important project-related decisions are made by African participants. Other ADF approaches to local control—such as encouraging funded groups to select their own technical assistance—are more directly transferable to private grant-makers, including some PVOS and others working at the local level.

The Foundation's experience shows that supporting participatory development requires careful analysis of who participates, when and the various ways that people participate. Avoiding approaches that place expatriates in de *facto* charge of African projects is an important first step. Although giving funds directly to African organizations can reduce the problem of external control, participation by beneficiaries can still be lacking and additional efforts may be appropriate to foster broad participation. Participation in decisionmaking is key to effective overall participation but funders often fail to assess roles of all the people involved in enough detail to determine whether the beneficiaries really take part in this process. It is also important to measure progress in enhancing participation in terms of the local context. This re-

quires understanding the local context and sound baseline data on factors such as income, gender, social relations, ethnic groups, and the local political context, as well as information on project activities. Although ADF has much to improve in addressing these more difficult aspects of participation, its experience trying to balance different aspects of its mandate—supporting local control and stimulating expanding participation of the poor—will be relevant to other organizations.

Like participation, other key concepts in development assistance require redefinition and more effective implementation in the face of a history fraught with less-than-expected results. The Foundation and OTA agree that replicability, for example, depends less on replicating actual project activities than on the replicability of the processes that the projects had engendered. The Foundation, with its explicit mandate to learn from and share its experiences, its access to U.S. Government resources, and its opportunity to forge connections with private groups, is well-placed to take part in defining and implementing approaches with impacts beyond the projects themselves.

LESSONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF AFRICAN STAFF AND AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

Encouraging Africans to take positions as staff members or consultants in development assistance groups has real benefits. Africans know the local situation, especially its cultural, political, and macroeconomic contexts; their support is more cost-effective because housing, overseas travel, and per diem costs are often less (not because they are paid less for their professional services but because other expenses can be less); and impacts beyond the immediate project results snowball as ever-greater numbers of Africans are given opportunities to use and enhance their skills and spread their knowledge. The Foundation has demonstrated that it is possible to find a wide variety of African experts for tasks many other funders assign to expatriates and that clear statements of their work increase the likelihood

that expectations will be met. ADF's ability to identify and contract with Africans deserves recognition; other groups could follow its example.

Many African non-governmental groups are attempting to forge new relationships with their American counterparts. African organizations seek to use their growing expertise to help American and European organizations plan, manage, and evaluate externally funded activities. Often, this requires that U.S. PVOS and private donors reconsider how they work in Africa: how should they shift more responsibility to African staff; how should they support African groups rather than or in addition to their own activities?



M M M D m g S m K D

Simultaneously, additional U.S. development assistance money is being used to help develop public and private African institutions. For example, larger amounts of official development assistance are being channeled via U.S. PVOS to assist in strengthening local organizations. Thus, questions like these will need to be answered within the official U.S. and private development assistance community. ADF has been in the vanguard of American funders which support private African organizations. Thus, ADF's experience is likely to become increasingly important to others given this ongoing evolution of African/U.S. PVO relationships.

The Foundation's experience can highlight specific areas to address as these new relation-

ships form. For example, ADF has an opportunity to further learn about, then share, the results of its work with private African intermediary organizations. This assessment of ADF's work shows that projects of intermediary organizations require different approaches to pre-funding analysis and monitoring than those for local organizations, especially when participation is a goal of the donor. Moreover, intermediary organizations commonly have special technical assistance needs as they begin to work with local groups or poor farmers.

Also, intermediary groups, American and African staff of U.S. groups, and providers of technical assistance all need clear guidance regarding ways to relate to local groups that foster self-reliance. This has been a focus of the

ADF funding program from the beginning. Long-term institutional change can be facilitated as African government officials become aware of the successes of grassroots development efforts. ADF can use its special status as a U.S. Government-funded organization and good relations with many African governments

to help bring about that awareness. Also, ADF may be able to share its positive experiences working with African governments with outside development assistance organizations that have been cautious about entering into closer relationships with local officials.

A LESSON ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CAPITOL HILL

The Foundation has nurtured its relationship with Members of Congress and staff on Capitol Hill. ADF's senior staff have a good working relationship with high-level officials both in Congress and the Administration and have an admirable and unusual directness in providing information. As a result, ADF has a reputation for cooperation and responsiveness similar to some PVOS that receive government

funds. The Foundation's small size and its history of congressional support may contribute to this situation, factors that larger organizations such as U.S. AID do not share. Whatever the reasons, however, ADF's work is not hampered by the quasi-adversarial attitude that sometimes shapes AID's congressional relations (46).

LESSONS ABOUT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND ADVISORY GROUPS

Many organizations are reconsidering the roles played by their boards of directors and advisory groups. In some cases, they are finding that advisory functions can be filled more cost-effectively without official groups (e. g., by bringing in individuals to conduct seminars on state-of-the-art topics). In other cases, members' unavailability for frequent meetings may suggest giving more responsibility to staff. Staff planning retreats, for example, can sometimes substitute for the strategic planning that aboard" or advisory committee might provide.

The Foundation's experience with a new board and one shaped to a large degree by par-

tisan considerations suggests some important lessons. A politically balanced board, for example, can be an asset to publicly funded organizations and can help avoid program disruptions during changes of administrations. Appointing board members with an understanding of a group's mandate can reduce the time it takes to educate new board members. In addition, defining clear roles for the board that focus on policy oversight is a way to tap the strengths of members and help prevent inappropriate micromanagement.

LESSONS FOR OTHERS CONDUCTING ASSESSMENTS

This assessment has shown how important it is to conduct program assessments in conjunction with project evaluations. The results of each highlight different aspects of an organization's work and suggest different ways to improve its effectiveness. By examining ADF's

broader program, many things were learned that might not have been evident by studying the project level alone. At the same time, the findings about the functioning of the funding program were obtained by a careful examination of specific projects.

Unfortunately, the costs of combined program and project assessments are high and grassroots groups and private funders often lack the resources to undertake such a comprehensive assessment. Therefore, every effort should be made to draw on previous work and to communicate with others before undertaking new assessments. Defining critical issues and selecting minimum data sets can be done on the basis of past and similar assessments at little expense.

Also, this effort illustrates ways for internally conducted assessments to complement those done by external groups. For instance, some issues identified by OTA'S work were raised in ADF's first project evaluations, thus providing partial confirmation of the Foundation's internal evaluations. Although internal efforts are always important, occasional external examinations can provide information that only outsiders, with fresh viewpoints, are likely to provide.

Certain of OTA'S methods, such as conducting a single brief visit to each project, are appropriate only for comparable outside evaluators. Alternately, self-evaluations conducted throughout an individual project's lifetime could be more participatory and provide more specific, helpful, and timely feedback to project managers, for example, and be a significant aspect of project management. Methodological lessons from this work that are applicable to most outside assessments include the need for: placing Africans and women on every field team to increase understanding of the local setting and to ensure access to the greatest number of project participants; allowing enough time to visit each project to accommodate the professional and social needs of the evaluators and the people being visited; interviewing participants, managers, and others independently of each other to get beyond the "official" view of project activities; and providing for review and feedback by the staff of the organization under examination.

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Appendix A

ADF Projects Awarded From Fiscal Year 1984 Through Fiscal Year 1987

ADF Projects Country	Obligated Through Fiscal Year 1986 Project Name	*Type/Sector	Grant
Benin	L'Amicale des Ressortissants de Houndjohoundji	A: 10	\$ 26,613
Benin	Songhai Project	A: 4,9	150,872
Botswana	Tutume	A: 4	40,144
Botswana	Boiteko Agricultural Management Association.	A: 4	27,288
Botswana	Tswelopele Production Project	A: 4,9	3,400
Botswana	Blockmaking Production Project	A: 7,9	37,523
Cameroon	Binshua Water Project	A: 10	123,457
Cameroon	CEDAC	A:4,7	250,000
Cameroon	NDU Water Supply	A: 10	48,826
Egypt	Integrated Rural Technology Center (IRTECTAP)	/1:2,3	119,545
Ghana	Osu Canoe Fishing Shop	A: 4,9	32,025
Ghana	LMK Labadi Community Bank	A: 7,9	62,400
Ghana	Rural Small Scale Dev. Scheme and Swine Project	C: 4,9	39,637
Guinea	Kaback Village Fishing Project	A: 4,9	189,388
Guinea	Kindia Pineapple Producers	A: 4,9	225,687
Kenya	ATAC Appropriate Technology Advisory Comm.	A: 2,7	83,040
Kenya	Kenya Beekeeper's Association (KBA)/Kibwezi.	A: 2,7,9	75,871
Kenya	KWAHO/TIROCOWAP Taita**	A: 2,5,10	108,773
Kenya	Farming Systems Kenya, Ltd.**	A C: 2,4	111,245
Kenya	Mwenda Women's Group	A C: 4,9	3,428
Kenya	Kenya Dental Association	A: 7,5	40,115
Kenya	Human Care Alliance	A: 5,6	25,794
Kenya	Kenya Women Financial Trust**	AC: 2,7	152,625
Kenya	Njoguini, Gitero, and Kabati**	A: 3,10	247,313
Kenya	Partnership For Productivity**	AC: 2,7	198,478
Kenya	Ushindi Youth Project	A: 7,9	34,500
Kenya	Songa Development Committee Projects	A: 3,10	11,585
Kenya	GBM Green Belt Movement	A: 2	58,745
Lesotho	LDTC Research on Group Training	AC: 2	100,719
Lesotho	Levi's Nek Training Program	A: 2,9	21,777
Lesotho	Morija Vocational School	AB: 2	42,804
Lesotho	Moteng Women in Self-Help	A: 2,9	15,022
Lesotho	Ramosebo Village Development	AC: 2,7,9	25,347
Lesotho	Ha Sematle Village Development	A C: 9	17,584
Lesotho	Lesotho Handspun Mohair	A: 7,9	105,415
Liberia	Agro-Industrial Company	A: 4,9	17,784
Liberia	Boys Town**	A: 4,10	141,931
Mali	L'Association Malienne d'Assistance Technique Villageoise	A: 4	34,152
Mali	COPCC Sewing and Training School**	A: 2	50,774
Mali	Narena Village Dev, Project**	A:4,10	242,703
Mali	UNFM Segou/Soke Cooperative**	A: 4	109,687
Mali	GTB Women's Dye Craft Cooperative	A: 9	14,500
Mali	Private Agricultural Coed Training Center	A: 2	74,830
Mali	Dalakana Integrated Village Development	A: 4,5,10	250,000
Niger	Dagnare Agricultural Society	AC: 4,10	89,619
Niger	Iniminak**	A: 4	13,463

Sector: 1 = Communication 4 = Agriculture/Crops/Animals 7 = Management/Capacity Building
 2 = Education 5 = Health Care 8 = Multi-Sector
 3 = Energy 6 = Housing 9 = Small Business
 10 = Water Resources

SOURCE: African Development Foundation, *Congressional Presentation*: Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington, DC: February 1987).

ADF Projects Obligated in Fiscal Year 1987		
Country	Project Name	Grant \$
Benin	Agricultural Community Development Project	1,5 00
Botswana	Backyard Gardening Project	48,152
Botswana	Micro-Enterprise Credit Project.,	133,488
Botswana	Nthoo Typing School Project	11,999
Cameroon	CEDAC Food Production and Marketing Project	250,000
Ghana	Peki-Dzogbati Oil Palm Nursery Project.,	182,133
Lesotho	Village Workshop and Revolving Fund Project	116,143
Liberia	Self-Help School, Health and Agricultural Project	93,365
Liberia	United Liberia Inland Church Academy Project.	24,694
Mali	Agro-Nord Project	97,488
Niger	Dakoro Herders' Cooperative Project II	107,922
Senegal	Post-Symposium: Development Alternatives Project.	19,387
Senegal	Revolving Loan Fund for Grassroots Initiatives Project	215,301
Sierra Leone	YEA Agricultural and Food Production Project	250,000
Sierra Leone	Yele Rural Electrification Project . . .,	250,000
Somalia	Daryeel Planning Study Project	7,864
Somalia	Gum Resin Development Project	159,947
Tanzania	Feasibility Study for the Albalbal Water Project	3,822
Tanzania	Albalbal Water Development Project	233,077
Tanzania	Marangu Schoolmarm Project	40,588
Togo	Agoto-Godo Agricultural/Livestock Infrastructural Project	71,740
Togo	FUCECs Baseline Study	23,672
Togo	Novissi Onion Production Project ,.....	8,395
Togo	Produce Storage Project	11,006
Togo	UNICOOPEMA Pilot Credit Program	250,000
Togo	Watsidome Gardening/Small Animal Husbandry Project	22,087
Zimbabwe	Furniture Manufacturing project	220,624
Zimbabwe	Matsvaire Village Development Project	103,270

SOURCE: African Development Foundation, January 1988.

Summaries of 12 ADF-Funded Projects Visited by OTA¹

Farm Rehabilitation for the Agricultural Society of Dagnare

Organization: Dagnare Agricultural Society
 Site: Three sites in western Niger (Dagnare, Lamorde, and Ganky-Bassarou)
 Activities: Rehabilitate irrigated fields (pumps, pipes, canals, control gates, wells) and provide tools and technical assistance.
 Grant Size: \$88,817

The Setting.—The fields of the Dagnare Agricultural Society (a form of village-level cooperative known as a *mutuel* in French) are the first that will be rehabilitated under this project; they are located across the Niger River from Niger's capital, Niamey. The lands to be irrigated for the Lamorde Agricultural Society are located several kilometers upstream, on the outskirts of Niamey. Those of Ganky-Bassarou are approximately 45 miles south.

The OTA team visited two of the three sites. The contrast between the membership of the two groups is striking. In Dagnare, the participants are relatively well-off civil servants (mostly retired) or other salaried workers; poor farmers predominate in Ganky, although a definitive profile is impossible since eventual participation in the project for the Ganky *Mutuel* is still undetermined. Dagnare members describe the participants in the Lamorde *Mutuel* as falling somewhere between the other two in terms of socio-economic profile.

The *mutuel* form of agricultural organization is encouraged by the Niger government as the most appropriate ownership/management formula to implement its strategy of small-scale production projects. The Dagnare *MutueZ* is one of the oldest *mutueh* in Niger. It began in 1965 with a government grant of land and credit to its original founders—a small group of 13 influential civil servants. The breakdown of its pump in the mid-1970s and a decline in political favor following the fall of former President Diiori disrupted the irrigation



Photo credit: OTA/George Scharffenberger

Leaders of the project at Dagnare.

scheme. Despite the fact that little production has taken place over the decade, the group remains well-organized, cohesive, and participatory due largely to dynamic leadership, the educational level of its members, and the improved prospects provided by ADF funding. The group has regained much of its lost influence and includes members of several of the capitol's most powerful families. Six of the fourteen members are women, most widows of original members. Several are active in group management and decisionmaking.

By contrast, the Ganky *MutueZ* is new and poorly organized, and has uncertain objectives. The village received brief fame 2 years ago when the Niger government held up the community's initiative in dry-season manioc production as a model for the rest of Niger. In fact, however, production and marketing was largely on an individual basis rather than through the *mutuel*.

Interviews with community members show that they have poor information about the proposed ADF-sponsored activity (especially women), a low level of participation in project design and a concentration of control in decisionmaking in one family (the family of the president of the Dagnare group). A *mutuel* does exist in Ganky but written records were inaccessible or non-existent and its officers were uncertain as to who was or was not

¹These 12 summaries provide an overview of the 12 ADF projects in Africa that were visited by OTA's field assessment teams. Each contains details about the project, its setting, the sponsoring organization, and the findings of the OTA team.

a member or how membership was determined. Group leaders estimated the members at 300. Community members made little distinction between the local cooperative (a larger unit grouping several villages) and the village-level Ganky Mutuel. The question of access to the irrigation scheme was equally unclear.

Increased variability in the timing and quantity of rainfall across Niger has exaggerated the vulnerability of its rainfed cropping systems. For the individual farm household, this has translated into erratic and generally lower income and food supplies. Although Niger has performed better than many Sahelian nations facing similar conditions and its exports of uranium did provide some respite, the decline in agricultural production has meant increased fiscal and trade deficits. Tapping the irrigation potential of the Niger River is seen by both farmers and the government as one means of breaking this decline. As a host of problems have surfaced to dampen the high level of expectations associated with large irrigation schemes, Niger has begun to encourage small-scale irrigation as a viable alternative.

The Project.—The Dagnare project began as a proposal from the Dagnare group to finance the rehabilitation of their existing irrigation scheme—principally by providing new electric pumps and repairing canals, gates, and other facilities. The group attempted to get commercial credit since 1976 but was unsuccessful. A number of private voluntary organizations (PVOS) were also contacted but the proposal was rejected because of the group's relative wealth. Encouraged by the ADF Foundation Representative, Ganky and Lamorde were included in the proposal after ADF had rejected it twice because of inappropriate economic level of the Dagnare participants. A new organization was proposed which would link the three agricultural societies. Dagnare is to play a leading role and provide technical assistance and support to the other two areas.

The details of the Dagnare efforts are the best documented in the proposal but many aspects remain to be worked out by the Dagnare group with the help of ADF-funded technical assistance. Details of the other groups' plans have been left to a later date. A key element of the proposal is that each group will pay back 20 percent of its grant into a revolving fund that would be used to support future credit needs for the three groups or others,

As of the OTA visit, little had been accomplished. Although the Dagnare group had received funds after considerable delays (caused by problems with

the group's legal status and ADF's fund transfer mechanism), the funds remained untouched in the group's account for 2 months. The Dagnare president felt they had not received clear instructions from ADF that they could begin. The group had held planning meetings and made contacts with the equipment suppliers and technical services they would need to implement their scheme. In Ganky, four meetings on the ADF project had been held but the level of understanding and preparation for the project is low among the members of the community. One reason for the delay is that the family head on whose land the project is to be installed is ill. Related to this, the OTA team raised questions about the security of land rights for the project, since everyone in the community referred to the area as "the old man's land." The land is currently being farmed during the dry season by women who use it to grow vegetables. When asked, village leaders informed the team that only family heads (i.e., men) would be given plots in the new irrigation scheme. Women, they said, would be given other land to grow their vegetables.

Conclusion.—OTA'S assessment team was unanimous in its conclusion that the Dagnare project should not have been funded in its present form. Although the logic of ADF's argument in funding a relatively better off group of people who would use their higher level of education and organization to assist poorer farmer groups is persuasive, the team felt that such an outcome was unlikely in this case. The Dagnare group has not proven themselves to be effective farmers, they view the irrigation scheme only as a supplement to their income rather than a principal economic activity, the economic viability of their own scheme is questionable, and the group members expressed serious reservations about their role as advisors to other groups. Finally, the Dagnare members were largely unaware of and opposed to the idea of reimbursing 20 percent of the grant sum for loans to other groups. Since there is little likelihood that Dagnare will be an effective catalyst to help poorer farmers develop their productive potential, there is little justification for supporting them under ADF's mandate.

One alternative ADF could have used would have been to fund the other groups directly without going through Dagnare. Providing those groups with a technical assistance fund to pay for the services that the Dagnare group is supposed to provide could have been as effective and certainly less expensive if the main objective of the project were to help these poorer groups. This solution would have been

equally problematic, however, because the Ganky group clearly lacks organizational strengths, it has shown a low level of participation in program design, and questions exist about that scheme's technical and economic feasibility.

The OTA team's prognosis for the future of the Dagnare project is not enthusiastic. The dynamism and know-how of the Dagnare core group will probably lead them to reach their own objectives in the short to medium term, but these objectives are much less grandiose and altruistic than those in the project documentation. Ganky's and Lamorde's fate are less certain and much more problematic.²

Dakoro Herders' Cooperative

Organization: Dakoro Herders' Cooperative
 Site: Bundu Eggo, Niger
 Activities: Reconstitute livestock herd, repair well, establish cooperative store, provide literacy training, and improve animal and human health.
 Grant Size: \$7,255 (planning grant); \$108,275

The Setting.—Bundu Eggo (literally Eggo's well) is a nomad camp consisting of a 74-family community founded by the ancestor of the current population who dug the well and gave it his name. The well is also used by other communities living in the surrounding valley. During the rainy season, Bundu Eggo is home to only a few members of the community who live in its four mud and thatch huts. During the dry season, depending on that year's grazing and watering strategies, other members of the community come to stay, building temporary structures from poles, hides, canvas, and cloth. The camp is 60 kilometers north of the local administrative town, Dakoro, which in turn is a 10-hour drive, mostly on good paved road, east of Niger's capital, Niamey. Bundu Eggo is connected with Dakoro by a dirt track in generally poor condition. Just outside Dakoro, rainfed cultivation ceases because rainfall is too scarce and uncertain. It is an area of wide undulating plains punctuated by widely dispersed sand dunes—the border zone between the true desert to the north and the arable savannah.

The vast majority of the participants involved in the Dakoro Herders' Cooperative project (50 of the 74 families) are from the Bundu Eggo camp and are nomadic herders of the Kasasawa group of woodabe—a sub-family of the Fulani ethnic group. The other

participants (10 from the Farfarou sub-family of the Fulani and 14 of the Touareg ethnic group) are from other camps in the same valley. All participants are men selected for participation by the traditional hierarchies of the individual groups. For the Kasasawa, need as well as willingness to maintain livestock were major factors in selection for participation, according to the project's leader. A disadvantaged minority in a very poor country, the nomadic herders who will participate in the project are easily among the poorest one-third of the total population.

The project idea originated with the Kasasawa who, in response to the loss of large proportions of their herds in the early 1980s, had formed "Kungal Fado Mango" or KFM—literally, "the organization born of large strides." KFM built on and strengthened traditional family and community bonds to seek common solutions to their threatened way of life. The other groups were added as beneficiaries of what came to be called the Dakoro Herders' Cooperative project at the insistence of the administrative authorities in Dakoro, who feared potential difficulties in favoring one ethnic group over the others. Although the other groups were accepted by the Kasasawa as beneficiaries of new livestock, the Kasasawa did not plan to include them in other components or in decisionmaking. No meetings uniting all participants or beneficiaries had taken place other than those organized by ADF or its contractors.

As stated above, the project is primarily in response to a major loss of livestock experienced in the drought years of 1983 and 1984. An ADF-funded technician calculated this drought killed nearly 40 percent of all livestock. Its other components address additional concerns which support a strategy of increased sedentarization. The negative experience of having to flee with their herds into Nigeria several years earlier had motivated several of the group's leaders to seek external support to lower their vulnerability during drought years and permit the Kasasawa to stay in their own grazing areas. The Bundu Eggo group has a longstanding relationship with an American photographer, Carol Beckwith, whose book and articles have provided them with special access to the outside world. It was Ms. Beckwith who introduced the group to the future ADF Foundation Representative, who was then in Niger working for a different organization. These contacts provided the avenue that led to ADF support.

The Project.—The Dakoro project represents two ADF grants. In late 1985, ADF approved a \$7,255 planning grant to provide technical assistance to

²ADF reports that subsequent to the OTA team visit, the Lamorde Agriculture Society has been dropped from the Dagnare project.

the cooperative to formulate a specific proposal. Financing delays, problems in finding appropriate technical assistance, and the logistical challenges of working with a distant nomadic group meant that a proposal was not completed until 1 year later. At that point, local government officials who had been bypassed in the project design process objected and threatened to block the project. At their insistence changes were made which substantially altered the shape of the project. In addition to the inclusion of the other ethnic groups mentioned above, the officials insisted that the dry season agriculture component be dropped, and that purchases of goats and sheep be substituted for cattle. A local government technical service agent was designated as the technical coordinator of the project and counterpart to the cooperative's leader. Project participants agreed to these changes when informed by ADF that they had little choice. Due to overestimates in the original planning grant budget, only half of that first grant was actually disbursed.

The second Grant Agreement for approximately \$85,000 to implement the new plan was signed just prior to the OTA team visit in September 1987. No funds from the second grant had been received. The project budget, developed by the Dakoro local government officials, contains five main components: \$35,000 for the purchase of sheep, goats, camels, and donkeys to replace approximately 10 percent of the herd lost in the recent drought; \$8,250 to build and stock a cooperative store that would provide basic necessities for the community; \$6,750 for a literacy program; \$8,550 for repairs to the community well; \$1000 for basic medicines for both livestock and people; and \$17,500 for the technical assistance to support the project (approximately one-half for local government technical service agents). Over \$26,000 (nearly 30 percent of the total grant amount) is earmarked for ADF's documentation of the project.

Interviews with the project participants indicated that the replacement of livestock was their highest priority and there was considerable disappointment that the cattle had been replaced by sheep and goats. Milk from cows is the main element in the Woodabe diet. The repair of Eggo's ancient well was their second priority. Few community members were aware of the project's other components and many expressed opposition to the idea of literacy training, which they saw as an imposition on their way of life. There was an equal degree of confusion and disagreement regarding the role of the local government technical agent in the project although some felt that the government presence would assure a fairer distribution of livestock. The

distribution plan, according to the cooperative leader, had only been discussed with those who would receive livestock and not with the entire group. Local experts interviewed by the OTA team felt that this type of indirect decisionmaking, involving considerable one-on-one interactions rather than large public meetings, was consistent with traditional norms.

Conclusion.—The OTA team found numerous flaws in the Dakoro project design but were unanimous in their high rating of the project as consistent with ADF's mandate. ADF is one of only a few organizations in Niger which support initiatives of semi-nomadic herders to modestly adapt their threatened lifestyles and systems of production. Herder groups such as the Kasasawa are clearly among the poorest of the poor throughout the Sahel and have been bypassed by most government and foreign donor development programs. ADF is notable in its attempts to maintain a modicum of control in the hands of the herders themselves, the compromise with local officials notwithstanding. It was readily apparent to the OTA team that the herders of Bundu Eggo feel deep appreciation and respect for ADF and its Representative.

The largest concern raised by the OTA team with respect to the Dakoro project was that of the role given local government authorities. The opposition engendered by ADF's lack of contact with local officials and ADF's determination to do something for the Bundu Eggo group left ADF in a poor bargaining position. It is ironic that the conflicts engendered by ADF's approach in Niger have led to more government control in several ADF projects than in those of PVOS which have been willing to "play the game" by involving officials in their programming activities from the beginning.

Specifically, the OTA team had concerns that unless closely supervised by ADF's local Country Resource Facilitator, the purchase and distribution of livestock could result in an undue portion of the benefits accruing to merchants and officials rather than participants.³ The OTA team found the salary and benefits expected by government officials to do what is already their job as inappropriate.⁴ Other problematic aspects included: the technical

³ADF has subsequently reported that ADF's Country Resource Facilitator in Niger did indeed actively participate in the purchase and distribution of livestock and that the concerns expressed by the OTA team were not realized.

⁴ADF had a different understanding than the local officials in Dakoro regarding payments to the government technicians. ADF's understanding was that the technician would be removed from the government payroll during project implementation. Since the departure of the OTA team the government technician has been transferred and ADF reports that a private technician has been identified to fill that position.

feasibility of the proposed well repair (dangerous at best and likely to be impossible given the state of the existing well); the financial viability of the cooperative store, given limited management/commercial experience and the negative experiences of previous, much smaller stores run by the same individuals; and the disagreement regarding the need for literacy. A more gradual approach, with more training at its earlier stages would have had fewer financial and management risks. Experts consulted in Niger could not reach consensus regarding a final concern, the problem of the long-term environmental impact of the grazing systems being perpetuated by this project. Nor was there agreement on the significance of the change from cattle to sheep—a point felt by some to be immaterial since the Kasasawa were likely to sell a portion of the small ruminants received from ADF to buy cattle anyway.

These concerns notwithstanding the team felt that the most important component of the project, the purchase of livestock, would meet its objective. Once received, the herders were likely to manage them successfully according to traditional systems with or without the advice of the government technician. The other components are more problematic but also of less significance to the beneficiaries. The “bottom line” for the Dakoro project is whether or not the project will provide or at least move toward a long-term solution to the vulnerability of the herders’ current existence. It is too early to tell the outcome, but the fact that the project has given the community a temporary respite, experience in problem solving, and most of all, hope, is more than enough justification.

Equipment So Strengthen the Agricultural Activities of the Youth Association of Ross Bethio

Organization: Youth Association of Ross Bethio
Site: Ross Bethio, Senegal
Activities: Irrigated agriculture—rice, tomato and vegetable production.
Grant Size: \$158,639

The Setting.—Ross Bethio is located on the Senegal River in the north of the country, four hours drive on paved roads from the capital, Dakar. It is located in an area where rainfed agriculture has been particularly hard hit by the downward trend in rainfall and where irrigated agriculture has taken on growing importance. As a center for a state-owned agricultural development organization

(SAED), many Ross Bethio farmers have had access to irrigated lands for two generations. Although SAED’S strategies have often resulted in high debt for many farmers, access to irrigated land and the possibilities of salaried positions with sugar and tomato canning operations nearby and in the regional capital of St. Louis, translate into higher average income levels in Ross Bethio than many other areas of the country. All people have not, however, benefitted equally. Access to irrigation and to employment is restricted and is becoming more critical with population growth and general economic decline. Local herders have been particularly hard hit by recurrent drought and have had generally less access to irrigation or employment alternatives.

The Youth Association of Ross Bethio is among the more dynamic of many similar organizations of young adults throughout the country. The vast majority of its 265 members (100 men and 165 women) are between the ages of 15 and 35. About 35 percent (mostly men) have attended primary school and 20 participants have gone on to secondary school.

The problem of access to irrigated land is particularly acute for this age group. Although many of them come from families with access to irrigation, those plots are still in the hands of their elders or risk being divided into uneconomically small plots when passed on to this generation. For many people, the solution has been to seek local salaried employment or emigrate to the urban centers of St. Louis or Dakar—strategies that are proving to be increasingly unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the current development of water and salinity control along the Senegal River and the government’s land policies regarding the development of irrigation have raised fears that outsiders, either Senegalese or foreign, will be given rights to land around Ross Bethio.

The Youth Association of Ross Bethio was formed in 1974 in response to the challenges posed by drought. Its well-organized structure, active membership, group discipline, and capable leadership have led to a series of successful activities in small-scale irrigation, reforestation, livestock, and the improvement of community infrastructure (roads, mosque, village pharmacy, women’s center, etc.). Its activities have attracted attention and financial support from a number of external donors. The Association’s success with its first 40 hectare irrigation system (financed by the Dutch organization NOVIB) led them to seek funding for expansion. The ambitiousness of their plan caused them to be turned down by several donors before coming to ADF,

The Project.—The ADF-funded project has added over 100 hectares of irrigated land to the Association's fields, thus providing a major increase in the land available to its members. ADF's grant has paid for two irrigation pumps to draw water from a large irrigation canal; the clearing and preparation of the new irrigated fields, including the construction of canals and dikes; and a small pick-up truck to transport supplies, produce, and participants.

Rice production began in September 1987 despite major delays in the transmission of funds from ADF to the Association, low levels of water in the source canal, and a land dispute involving the local herders who had traditional grazing rights to the area developed under the project. The Association followed due process to gain title to the land and an eventual "amicable settlement" was reached, but the dispute required the intervention of armed police to remove the herders from the land—an operation partially financed by ADF-supplied funds according to an Association official. On the more positive side, the Association's determination to succeed is shown in their tremendous efforts to begin production, despite limited water in the source canal, by moving tons of mud by hand to dig channels to feed their irrigation system.

Production is impressively organized. Male members of the Association run the irrigation system, supply 200 hours of work per season in collective teams. Land access rights for men and women as well as the distribution of benefits to each are organized differently. Men are given individual fields averaging 3/4 hectare. Production is on an individual basis, although operations where timing is critical such as planting are performed by the collective work groups. Allocation is on a year-to-year basis and considers the number of mouths to feed and the level of effort contributed to collective work teams. The 165 women involved have been allocated only 20 hectares to be worked collectively in teams. Although production, cost, and total benefits are still uncertain, project staff estimate benefits on the order of \$90 for men and between \$50 and \$115 for women. Division of benefits on the women's fields will be made on the basis of the number of days worked and the amount of effort contributed. Cost and production estimates used by the Association to arrive at these figures were judged realistic by local experts, although the fuel costs of the pumps chosen by the group were not known since the model of pump is new to the area.

All inputs (diesel fuel, seed, fertilizer, etc.) are being provided by the Association through its own budget (bolstered by funds from the Dutch organiza-

tion NOVIB) and through credit arranged through Senegal's new National Agricultural Credit Bank. The Association is one of the first to receive production credit from the bank.

Although women expressed the hope of having access to more land in the future, they favored the collective formula for working their land and did not complain about the disparity of access and benefits between men and women. In fact, for many this was their first access to irrigated lands of their own,

Conclusion.—The Youth Association of Ross Bethio fits well into the ADF mandate. While perhaps not among the poorest of Senegal's poor, the group's identification of access to irrigation as a major determinant of future well-being is correct and farsighted. The project already has begun to achieve one of its principal goals—the return of village youth from the urban centers. Apart from the regrettable incident of forcing the herders off the land to make way for the irrigation project and the unresolved long-term impacts of irrigation on land and water resources, the project gives evidence of attaining the kind of sustainable results and expansion of opportunity called for in ADF's mandate.

The Association's operations are based on a high degree of centralized decisionmaking and discipline, but it is an effective and probably unavoidable management method given the high degree of coordination and timing inherent in a 100+ hectare irrigation scheme. Participants expressed high levels of confidence in the group's leaders and there was evidence that leadership was responsive to and held accountable by the members.

Organization issues are likely to become acute in the short to medium term, especially the on-going allocation of land within the irrigated area. Will the leadership's method for allocation according to need and effort continue to go unchallenged? How will new members be accommodated? What will happen as the "youths" grow older? The Association's proposed solution (further expansion of the irrigated area) may be unrealistic because few outside organizations are willing to commit the level of funding provided by ADF. Also, several experts believe that at 150 hectares the scale of operations is already beyond the maximum point of efficient production,

A further challenge will be to maintain access to short-term credit to finance the high costs of inputs. The credit from the National Agricultural Bank this year cannot be assumed to be on-going and, according to Association officials, was far less than needed. The unproven cost and maintenance rec-

ord of the Association's choice of pumps is an additional cause for concern. The OTA team's feeling is, however, that the group's performance in the past, the resourcefulness and dynamism of its leadership, and the dedication of its members will find solutions to these problems. The prognosis for the long-term future is clouded only by the economic and ecological uncertainties facing irrigated rice and tomato production along the Senegal River.

Union Kaoural

Organization: Kaoural Federation of Cooperatives
 Site: Twenty-five village associations in the Kolda region of Senegal
 Activities: Collective orchards and gardens; dairy cattle feeding centers and village pharmacies.
 Grant Size: \$103,832

The Setting.—The Union Kaoural is an association of village youth groups based in the village of Media Koundie (30 kilometers to the east of Kolda). The Kolda Region, although connected by good roads to the rest of Senegal, is among the country's most isolated and disadvantaged areas in terms of social and productive infrastructure. This is partly explained by the distance to Dakar (8 hours by road), and partly due to the fact that, for political and economic reasons, it had been relatively neglected by government development programs. Outside attention to agricultural development in the zone has also been lacking despite the fact that the region is less constrained by rainfall patterns, depleted soils, and population densities than much of arable land in Senegal. It is a zone where a sedentary branch of the Fulani ethnic group is traditionally dominant.

The Union Kaoural is estimated by its leaders to include over 3,000 members in 79 village groups. Observations and interviews by OTA team members indicate that a considerably lower number are actually active in the group's activities. Approximately 45 percent of the members are women, and 75 percent are between the ages of 15 and 30. In the Medina Koundie village group, fewer than 10 percent have gone to school. All but a few village groups are predominantly Fulani. Members broadly reflect the income level of their communities but the leadership comes from relatively more affluent and powerful families.

Low income and underemployment, particularly during the dry season, are major facts of life in the Kolda region, even more than in other areas of Senegal. The lack of alternative employment and government assistance to farmers through extension

services and input support has left people with few options beyond moving to other regional capitals or Dakar.

Village-level youth associations are traditional in Senegal. In recent years, many of these groups have been energized anew and have formed regional and national level associations. The Association of Young Farmers of the Casamance (AJAC in French) has been one of the more dynamic regional associations. It in turn has encouraged the formation of sub-regional unions of village groups such as the Union Kaoural, which began in 1982. The Union Kaoural is highly structured with a Board of Directors and a constituent assembly with representatives of its member groups. The reality, however, is less participatory or cohesive with a high degree of centralized control resting in a few individuals and considerable instability of membership.

Thirty-nine village groups were in the Union when ADF negotiated its grant. Since then, 63 new groups have joined but 27 have withdrawn (the majority leaving with some rancor and despite the fact that they were slated to receive benefits from the ADF project). Two additional segments of the Union are in the process of being spun off more amicably. The village-level associations visited by the OTA team expressed confidence in the Union leadership (OTA did not visit any groups that had withdrawn) and showed evidence of being participatory and enthusiastic about the proposed activities. The dedication and hard work of several of the Union's leaders was evident. The Union has received operational and project funding from a range of NGO donors, mostly through the aegis of AJAC.

The Project.—The Union Kaoural project being funded by ADF is designed to provide collective opportunities for income generation. The project is a scaled down version of the original proposal presented to ADF. The Union's first priority (a cereal bank) was dropped from the proposal at the suggestion of an ADF consultant and a second component, village pharmacies, was reduced by one-half. The remaining project includes four principal activities that have been allocated among the 25 villages chosen by the Union's leadership to benefit from the program.

ADF funding will provide materials for 10 collective orchards, 10 collective gardens, 2 dairy cattle feeding centers, and 5 village pharmacies. Both dairy centers (15 percent of the project budget) are being built in Medina Koundie—one for an association of herders who are not members of the Union. The other components are identical "cookie-cutter" activities where the Union provides mate-

rial inputs and the local village association provides labor. All purchasing of materials and their distribution is being handled by the Union, including the contracting and payment of salaries for the well diggers and masons. The Union has used ADF funds to provide bookkeeping training to the treasurers of the local groups. Its leaders also talked of providing some technical assistance and further training in vegetable gardening and fruit tree production directly or in conjunction with AJAC.

As of the OTA visit, wells and basins had been completed and tools and fencing delivered to 8 of the 10 villages that are slated to receive gardens. Wells had been started in two others. The buildings for the two dairy centers also were complete, but in the opinion of the OTA team one of the buildings and both of the wells shown were built prior to ADF funding. Purchase of the cattle was partially completed. The team was told that materials for the orchards were ordered and would be soon delivered.

Overall, the project is behind schedule. Part of the delay was reported to come from slowness in communications and especially in the transfer of funds from ADF to the Union. Opposition from local government officials, particularly over the village pharmacies, was another problem which, although not altogether resolved, gave indications of being addressed. A further problem has been the tight control exercised by the Union's manager (animateur in French). His illness and lack of a deputy at one point in the negotiations caused significant delay. Poor planning was a final problem. Adequate allowance was not made for the costs of transporting the materials from the purchase point to Medina Koundie and then out to the remote village members.

Financial records on the use of ADF funds were non-existent or "not available." Those records that did exist, combined with interviews with project staff and participants, as well as observation, all indicate the possibility that substantially less materials and money were being used in construction and equipment than was planned for in the project proposal.

Conclusion.—The individual village-level organizations and their members seem to fit the ADF mandate, but OTA team's visit raised questions regarding significant aspects of the project's design. The Union Kaoural appears to be going through a period of instability where the exigencies of a project of this magnitude give evidence of having a negative influence. The centralization of its de facto structure, internal management and organizational deficiencies, the lack of basic financial records, and the

logistical difficulties in implementing a project in 25 villages spread across an area of hundreds of kilometers with only one good road and one small vehicle raise tremendous questions as to ultimate outcomes. The fact that some progress can be seen is to their credit.

The lack of effective individual input into project planning and implementation is equally disturbing. Each component was designed by the core group in Medina Koundie, which also decided which village should get what activity. Each is being implemented according to an identical plan with the Union controlling all the funds, hiring all the skilled labor, and supervising all the work. Not only is this method likely to cause difficulties given the difference between the membership, environments, and organizations of the individual village groups but it also precludes the development opportunity that could have been provided by giving the local groups a greater role in project design and implementation. Although village participants seemed generally knowledgeable about the project, they were unaware of its financial aspects and several were unclear about what was expected from them. There were several instances where the village groups failed to take important action while they awaited instructions from the Union.

The lack of basic feasibility studies raises additional questions. No evidence exists to show that thought had been given either at the village or Union level to eventually marketing what will be produced. Poor transportation infrastructure and the lack of local markets could cause disappointing returns. Records from the vegetable production activities of the Medina Koundie village group showed net losses for the past two years despite their location on a paved road and in closer proximity to the larger market town of Kolda than many of the other participating villages. The distribution of any proceeds generated is a further unresolved and potentially thorny issue. Most groups talked of all proceeds remaining in the group for investment in community infrastructure or to be used for social obligations of the members (a common practice in small income generating activities of village youth groups, but more problematic with larger projects). This form of distribution might be inconsistent with the objective of increasing income possibilities and stemming rural to urban migration. The proposed plan of the Union's leaders to "tax" village groups 40 percent of their profits to establish a revolving fund that could be used to do similar projects in other member villages was not known by many groups and not popular with those that were informed. Two added cautions: the success of village pharmacies

and cattle feeding centers has been extremely low elsewhere in Senegal.

Given these uncertainties, the future prognosis is less than bright for the type of profitable collective group enterprises envisioned in the project proposal. A number of the groups however, showed determination and creativity. The high quality of the wells being built, and the benefits of good fencing and quality tools will undoubtedly benefit at least some of the participants. The opportunity to undertake the individual micro-projects (the heavy handed control of the Union notwithstanding) is also likely to benefit many of the individual village groups, giving them experience in management, new production techniques, marketing, and organization. A more thoughtful, realistic, and gradual approach to assisting the Union Kaoural would have enhanced these benefits.

Integrated Food Development Program

Organization: Diocese of Morogoro, Development Department
 Site: Morogoro, Tanzania
 Activities: Tractor hire; credit for inputs for maize production.
 Grant Size: \$248,378

The Setting.—The Anglican Diocese of Morogoro encompasses nearly 400 villages in 3 districts in central Tanzania, a region including productive areas with sufficient rainfall for farming and drier areas severely impacted by drought. The area where the ADF project was first implemented in 1986 and 1987 lies at the edge of the vast rolling plains of the Maasai Steppe. The town of Gairo is halfway between Morogoro and the new capital Dodoma. Most of the people farm plots averaging several acres and graze small herds of cattle on communal lands.

A charismatic minister, Reverend Chitemo, is a main force behind local development efforts. He became bishop when the new Anglican diocese was formed shortly after Independence in 1964. Anglicans are the predominant Christian religion in the area. The Development Committee of the diocese has sponsored a variety of agricultural projects since 1970 to improve the nutrition and standard of living of the Uluglu people. Rabbit, poultry, citrus tree, and beekeeping projects are on-going. More recently, the diocese began a dairy and goat project. Missionaries working in the diocese obtained support for these activities from English and Australian religious funders such as Christian Aid.

Early failures taught the Bishop important lessons—the need for technical expertise and training, and especially, the active participation of the people in development efforts. As a result, a participatory church structure was developed to encourage a two-way information flow between the diocese and the local villages. Each congregation, which include several villages, elects a contact committee; three leaders of several congregation committees form a parish committee; representatives of several parishes form a deanery-level committee; the several deanery committees feed into the diocesan Planning and Development Committee. Farmers, women's groups, youth groups, and pastors from each parish are involved in planning and carrying out projects.

The Project.—The project the Development Committee submitted to ADF, which it met through the Christian Council of Tanzania (a coalition of protestant churches), is its most ambitious yet. It aims to introduce modern farm inputs—mainly improved seeds, fertilizer, and pesticide—and tractor hire services together with extension advice and credit to farmers to increase production of their major crop, maize. The Development Committee initially planned to purchase, store, and market the maize produced. The goal is to increase productivity per acre and acreage under cultivation.

ADF funds would buy 3 tractors to plow group farms for congregations (3 acres each), women's groups (2 acres), youth groups (1 acre), and individual farms (1 acre each). The first year, each tractor was to plow 10 to 20 acres per day, for a total of 1,080 to 1,800 acres; a specific package of seed, fertilizers, and insecticides was to be applied by registered farmers who would get one acre plowed at a charge of about \$10. Maize yields were projected to increase from an average of 1.5 bags per acre to 10 bags. ADF funds would build storage depots and buy a truck. Shortly after awarding the grant ADF sent a representative of another ADF-funded project, Paul Maina, director of Farming Systems Kenya, to review plans and make recommendations to the Development Committee. Since the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was sending several hundred Fiat tractors to the Morogoro region, the diocese decided to purchase Fiat tractors, to take advantage of the supplies of spare parts in garages set up to service the FAO tractors.

The project was late getting started: a director and agronomist were not recruited until February 1987; only one tractor arrived and that in the middle of the planting season; the fertilizer also arrived late. Thus, only 156 acres were plowed, an average of

3.5 per day due to breakdowns and the fact that the sites were scattered. Some farmers had more than one acre plowed; some who were not registered in the program hired the tractor or purchased inputs. Not all farmers accepted the whole package, given their aversion to the risk of adopting radically new farming practices. Maize yields of project participants averaged 5 bags per acre, which were higher than past yields but lower than planned, mainly because of lower than usual rainfall in the area. Household incomes thus increased \$14 (less than the \$44 planned), roughly equivalent to a 10 percent increase.

The OTA team arrived before the second planting season and found participants enthusiastic about the results and many more wanting to participate than could. The management had learned valuable lessons: more careful planning and record keeping; better training of the contact committees who selected participants; better effort to recruit women farmers (nearly one-third of the individual farmers registered for the second year), some of whom would obtain inputs on credit; farmers would sell maize through regular marketing channels rather than to the diocese committee and repay their loans to the committee; if the two tractors did not arrive on time, project managers would consider renting them. They would plow at least one "block farm" on uncultivated land, which they told the OTA team would not disturb the persons who grazed their cattle herds since there was plenty of open land. (Most Maasai, among the herders using the area proposed for the block farm, are not Anglican.)

Conclusion.—The OTA team was especially impressed with the mechanism for two way communication and input from participants as well as the increased yields of the first year participants. Although most beneficiaries were Anglicans, they were a representative group of the area and included poor people. In general, the team felt the project had been overambitious in its proposal, but the new managers were making corrections based on the first year. OTA concerns about participation were the lack of clarity on how to register and careful supervision of plowing. The interlocking committee structure would help replicate the project within the diocese, extending its impact. In some instances, neighbors already imitated farming practices that participants learned from the project extension agents.

The church's long experience with development projects should help ensure sustainability after the Bishop retires in late 1987. The team's main con-

cerns related to sustainability were economic and environmental. Careful financial planning about how to continue the project has not been done. For example, a market analysis would determine whether the plan to purchase and market farmers' produce is realistic or would lead to major losses for the Committee. Estimating the costs of maintaining, and eventually replacing, the tractors would help determine if the current rate charged to plow each acre, somewhat less than the market rate, is feasible.

Nor has the Development Committee clearly identified potential negative environmental impacts, although the project managers' plan to plant citrus trees on the block farms to improve the people's diet could also help prevent erosion. OTA members asked if they considered ox plows for some areas, and expressed concern about monocropping (which could eventually reduce soil fertility, decrease production of pulses which provide protein, and increase risk if the price of maize was to decline). Some danger exists of losing sight of the value of the integrated food program envisioned by the Bishop and overlooking the other agricultural projects in the enthusiasm for maize and tractors.

Conservation Education Project

Organization: Kikatiti Village Malihai Club
 Site: Kikatiti and Arusha, Tanzania
 Activities: Water supply and reforestation
 Grant Size: \$66,168

The Setting.—Kikatiti, situated at the base of the mountains between Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro about 22 kilometers from Arusha, has a growing population estimated at 1,300 families. Because of its higher elevation and rainfall, the area near Arusha was favored by the white settlers and remains an area of high agricultural potential in Tanzania. Most of the Chaga people in the community are small farmers, with about 2 to 5 acres of land, and in conformity with government regulations to reduce pressure of cattle herds on the land, admit to raising one cow per acre. Water is a pressing problem. Women wait in long lines at the well. Sometimes they must draw water for household use from the nearby spring-fed pond used by cattle, with negative consequences for health of their far-dies. The women also walk long distances in search of fuelwood.

In nearby Arusha, a group of environmentalists established the Malihai ("living wealth") Club of

Tanzania to educate Tanzanians, especially through boys clubs in secondary schools, to appreciate the wildlife in Tanzania's national parks and help preserve them. Originally within the National Parks (headquartered in Arusha), the Malihai Club of Tanzania was established in 1983 and obtained funding from the African Wildlife Foundation and World Wildlife Fund/IUCN. The staff still is on the payroll of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Awareness of the need to deal with the development problems of people living adjacent to the parks, to prevent their poaching of wildlife, wood, and water from the parks, led to the concept of helping communities in "buffer zones" near the parks. Malihai Arusha picked Kikatiti as their first village project for several reasons, including that they thought it was an area where wood was being poached from Arusha National Park. And a former principal, whose school had sponsored a Malihai Club, moved to Kikatiti and came to the national organization of Malihai for assistance.

Malihai Arusha showed audiovisual materials about the need to preserve the parks and plant trees during town meetings. In 1985, Kikatiti set up their own club, consisting of all members of the village and headed by the elected leaders of the village, to be in charge of environmental issues. While women could be dues-paying members, they were excluded from management committees,

The Project.—The director of the Malihai Club of Tanzania first wrote ADF seeking funding for the national organization. Later, after ADF explained that Malihai's proposed work with villages was more appropriate for funding, he submitted a proposal for an improved water supply and reforestation project in Kikatiti. The water project had several components: a borehole previously dug with AID funds, 4 kilometers away, would be linked to the village, with separate waterpoints for domestic use and for livestock. The people would dig the trenches; ADF funds would provide pipe, electric pump, technical assistance, a motorcycle, and repair and spare parts for a van for Malihai Arusha. The forestry component was a small part of the grant. Since the Tanzanian Forest Department provides seedlings, ADF funds would help build a village nursery.

ADF awarded the grant to Kikatiti Malihai Club with a condition that they develop a maintenance plan. But following a review by ADF's auditors, Coopers and Lybrand Tanzania, which showed village books were 13 months in arrears, ADF decided to disburse funds to Malihai Arusha. (While technically ADF funds were in a joint account, actual control of these funds was given to the national

organization.) Since the district government water engineer would not provide services without pay, Malihai Arusha eventually contracted a private firm for an engineer, who added a 20,000 gallon water storage tank to the plans. Thus, much of the control of the project rested in Malihai Arusha, even though ADF continued to address its communication to the Kikatiti Chairman. For example, Malihai Arusha prepares all quarterly reports. The new ADF Country Resource Facilitator lives nearby and has visited the project often, but his role is limited to technical matters; he was instructed not to get involved in problems related to project management.

The delays in project start-up were in part due to problems in obtaining engineering services and the needed equipment (pipes, pump) from Nairobi, Kenya, since the supplies were not available in Tanzania. The main problem, however, was the long time it took for the Kikatiti Club to obtain tax exempt status needed to import materials tax free. At the time of the OTA visit, the trenches had been dug by most of the men in the village on several Saturdays of collective action, and the pipes had just arrived from Nairobi. The pump had not yet arrived, and the storage tank and water points were not built. Still, public support for the water system was high.

However, less support was evident for the forestry component. The nursery near the pond was in poor condition, the fence broken by cattle, with few small trees. Community leaders agreed the nursery was not working as planned; but might do better when the water supply was completed. (\$4,000 in ADF funds are for a future nursery, perhaps on the same site.) OTA team members noted that planting trees around the pond, while it could help protect the pond, would not affect the watershed. Kikatiti leaders said most seedlings were planted on individual plots and denied that women obtained fuelwood from the national park since it was some distance away.

Kikatiti leaders had no idea how much it would cost to maintain the water system (e.g., pay the monthly electric bill, hire someone to oversee the system, and set up a fund for eventual replacement of the pump) and noted that during a town meeting members had not accepted the monthly fee (about \$1.00) proposed by the committee and substituted a \$1.25 annual fee per household. Nor did they plan to charge fees from users from outside the village. OTA team members were unable to meet with the Kikatiti treasurer. Despite repeated requests, OTA team members were also not able to speak to women in Kikatiti.

Conclusion.—Kikatiti was recognized as a local government when it registered under the Tanzania government-sponsored *ujamaa* program. Since the community had successfully completed a number of on-going projects (e.g., grain mill, cattle dip, and store) and would have to maintain the water supply, OTA team concluded that (1) a planned disengagement of Malihai Arusha from management and financial control of the project would have helped; (2) the water should not be connected until Kikatiti develops an economically feasible plan to sustain the system. Despite the lack of financial planning, the fact that the community successfully managed other projects and that water was such a critical need led the OTA team to conclude that the water project would probably be sustained by the people. It was unlikely that the district water officials would provide much support. However, the nursery did not seem to have strong support, even though many recognized the need for more trees. Involvement of women in the committees could have helped.

Within the district, few communities have built their own water supply. Since the government of Tanzania does not have the resources to provide water to many rural communities, self-help water projects definitely meet a need. However, replicability of this system is limited because few villages have access to the relatively large amount of outside funds needed for construction, or reliable sources of electricity. Better relations with the district water officials might help others reduce costs of technical assistance and maintain the system.

The Malihai Club of Tanzania's plan to help people who live in buffer areas near the national parks meet their needs is innovative. But to work more effectively with other village development projects, they need to improve their community development skills, learn to work in concert with local leaders, and establish a relationship of trust with them.

Njoguini, Giteroo, and Kabati Self-Help Water Project

Organization: NGK Self-Help Water Project Committee

Site: Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati, Kenya

Activities: Water supply for domestic use and irrigated plots.

Grant Size: \$250,000

The Setting.—The village of Njoguini is located below the forest in the foothills of Mount Kenya, snowcapped year round. The villages of Gitero and Kabati are down in the dry plains which were once vast wheat farms held by British settlers. Follow-

ing independence in 1963, this area of the highlands was part of the Million Acre Resettlement scheme intended to compensate white settlers and redistribute their land to African farmers. But public funds and donor contributions fell short and so private land buying companies were formed to combine individuals' savings, purchase large farms, and subdivide them among the new owners. Gitero was the first of the three communities to begin resettlement in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, 250 families had settled on the 350 plots in 3 new communities. Shares were for 1 acre in Njoguini, 2 in Kabati, 3 in Gitero; but half the families obtained 3 to 5 acres and a few up to 20. Most of the new settlers were Kikuyu, but about half in Njoguini were Meru.

The Gitero Self-Help Committee was formed in 1982 to obtain water needed by the new residents. Before he left, the white settler who had owned the large estate sold the windmill that had been the principal source of power for the old borehole, the only water source. The community raised funds to repair the well and diesel pump. A Peace Corps Volunteer assigned to the adjoining district's water office put the committee in touch with the U.S. Ambassadors Self-Help Fund, which provided \$10,000 to replace the windmill in 1983. But the drought of 1984 was devastating. Crops failed, three-fourths of the communities' cattle died, and the people were forced to depend on food aid for survival.

The Project.—To better ensure water supplies, the people decided to pipe water from a river fed by glaciers on Mount Kenya so that each household could have enough water for domestic use, for their livestock, and to irrigate 1 acre of land. The management committee expanded to include seven elected representatives of each of the three communities, Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati (NGK). The lo-



Photo credit* ADF/Michael Maren

NGK's first water tank nearing completion in 1986.

cal chief and community development assistant were added as the government's representatives. Each committee coordinated fundraising and work for its village and elected representatives to the central committee. The central committee approached the Provincial Water Engineer who began to conduct a survey and design a gravity-fed water system and asked the Peace Corp volunteer to prepare a proposal to ADF and be the project manager. ADF's representative suggested that the labor be contributed by the residents, rather than paid by the grant. The residents began to clear the course and dug 3 kilometers of trenches by the end of 1984.

In spring 1985, ADF awarded \$149,000 for the project's first phase and later another \$98,000 for the second two phases. The objectives were to dig a 13 kilometer trench for the main trunk line down the mountain and 18 kilometers of distribution lines; to build two 50,000-gallon storage tanks and an intake. The design allowed each household to have an individual tap and for 200 acres to be irrigated. ADF funds paid the salaries of the manager and a counterpart who would be trained to manage the system, pipes, and materials for the storage tanks.

Each community worked one day a week and all three worked on Saturdays, when large meetings were held; committee records show each person worked an average of 115 days. The community raised money for the intake high in the rainforest (which had to be protected from roving elephants) through harambee fundraisers and a \$31 subscription fee. Large boulders were cracked by warming them with fire and then throwing cold water over them. They received permission for the pipeline to cross the Kenyan Vice President's very large farm and for the second storage tank to be located on it. District water officials who designed the system supervised its construction.

By the time of the OTA visit, the main distribution lines, intake, and two storage tanks were complete, and many residents had completed water installation (but not hooked up household water taps) to their farms at their own expense. The trained counterpart was supervising the system. About 100 to 130 acres were being irrigated. It was unknown if the approximately 100 absentee landowners could afford the hookup fee (\$425) to pay for the 115 days of labor and the additional costs of bringing the line to their farms. While the system was designed for 200 irrigated acres, some people were irrigating 2 or 3 acres, and there are 350 farms. Local extension agents had provided training in irrigated production prior to arrival of the water, and lush vegetable gardens were in evidence on the irrigated plots.

Women were growing cabbage, pepper, carrots, and tomatoes in the dry season. Cattle were producing more milk.

There were benefits in addition to increased income from the sale of vegetables. Women no longer spend long hours carrying water, and they complain of fewer backaches; children have improved hygiene, diets, and time to attend school. In addition, land values doubled as a result of the water supply: rising from \$625 to \$1250 an acre in Gitero (current land values in Kabati were cited as \$750 to \$950 an acre; in Ngoguini, \$1818 an acre).

Bouyed by success, the central management committee plans to build a storage shed to market vegetables in nearby cities, form a dairy cooperative with a milk processing plant, and bring electricity to the area.

Conclusion.—The OTA team was impressed both with the participation of the people and the results of their effort. The tri-village management structure, providing a voice for people of different ethnic groups and geographic areas, could be replicated in other areas. Other factors fostering participation were the fact that it is a new settlement without entrenched social or political factions, a clearly defined area, the leaders are perceived to be honest, and the chief had community development training.

The team had some concerns about sustainability of the project, although the track record of the group indicates they will probably meet future challenges. The proposed maintenance charge bears no relation to the costs of repair, replacement, and payment of supervisors of the system. A careful analysis of these costs has not yet been done. Nor has a market analysis been done of the impact of the increased vegetable production that could result in lower prices. Not much consideration has been given to mitigating negative environmental impacts of irrigation on soil fertility, such as waterlogging and erosion. Nor has a soil analysis been done to determine which areas are more suitable for irrigation. Terracing and agroforestry could be considered.

The management committee also needs to plan for competing claims on the system in the future. Residents across the road have complained to local officials they do not have access to water for irrigation; others have complained of the diversion of their potential water source. Also, households currently irrigating will be reluctant to cut back their irrigated acreage once new households come on line.

According to research by government water officials, only 1 in 15 self-help water projects in Kenya

is completed. But few have direct access to the outside resources that NGK received from ADF. While a gravity-fed system is relatively simple, there are limited sites available for gravity systems in Kenya. Areas for new settlement of entities with the ability to control access to the water and manage its use are equally scarce. Still, water and agriculture officials have looked with interest at NGK, recognizing the contribution of the residents was one-third the cost of the project. At least one other community in the district has begun its own water project.

Kenya Small Enterprise and Credit Training Project

Organization: Partnership for Productivity (PfP)/Kenya
 Site: Nairobi and Kakamega, Kenya
 Activities: Provide women's groups with training and credit for small-scale enterprises and agricultural inputs,
 Grant Size: \$228,800

The Setting.—Partnership for Productivity (PfP)/Kenya is a private voluntary organization which was started by some American Friends (Quakers) in the Western Province of Kenya in 1969. Since 1975, it has been autonomous with a Kenyan Board of Directors and staff, many of whom are Quakers. Yet PfP/Kenya continued to receive training and other support from the U.S.-based PfP through 1986. Its purpose is "to promote both socioeconomic development and human potential development in rural Kenya by focusing on income-generating" projects.

Most activities have been centered in three western provinces, densely populated areas with high rainfall and high potential for rainfed agriculture. Cash crops such as sugar, tea, and coffee are replacing production of food crops, especially near Lake Victoria.

PfP's early efforts were to provide management assistance to individual small-scale business operators. In 1974, PfP began a rural extension service to help small entrepreneurs with legal assistance, training in business management and financial planning, as well as some specialized assistance in agriculture and energy conserving technologies. Credit was provided to complement the training and technical assistance. By 1980, PfP decided to work with groups so it could reach more people.

In 1981, PfP initiated a successful pilot project, funded by AID's Women in Development program

and the Ford Foundation, to help rural women become more self-sufficient. Since credit and commercial institutions in Kenya require land title deeds, traditionally in the name of the husband, as collateral for loans, rural women are unable to obtain credit. PfP provided women with business management training and access to credit. During the pilot project 18 women's groups received loans, with a loan recovery rate of 90 percent, and 54 groups received farm inputs on credit. PfP demonstrated that it had developed a methodology that helped improve the incomes of rural women.

The Project.—ADF awarded a 2-year grant to PfP/Kenya in 1985, which was later increased to \$229,000, to provide: 1) training in credit and business management to 30 women's groups in three districts and 2) credit to these groups for income-generating projects and agricultural inputs. Initial ADF grant funds were to provide for staff salaries, including eight new extension agents, and the credit fund. Since PfP's Board of Directors consists of 8 men and its 5 field supervisors are men, it recruited women extension agents for this program (by 1987, 8 of 20 extension agents were women). The ADF grant was amended to allow the purchase of four motorcycles so the agents can visit the women's groups more frequently.

At the time of the OTA visit near the end of the ADF grant period, about 4,000 women were active in credit groups in western Kenya. PfP had provided training and credit to 92 groups, more than three times the number projected. Three officers from each of the groups had attended special business training workshops sponsored by PfP. The local groups vary in size from 20 to 45 members and include landless women, heads of households, and non-literate persons. Although group leaders appear to be more affluent than members, the team did not see this as a problem. Each group has a constitution and is registered with the Ministry of Social Services. Building on traditional savings clubs and the harambee tradition, the groups demonstrated cohesion and the ability to handle complex financial transactions and loan repayments. Most of the women understand simple cash flow analysis and non-literate women have mastered a red-bag/green-bag system of money management, in which their working capital is kept in red bags and the surplus in green bags. The records of the 15 groups visited by OTA team members were clear, up to date and open to all.

PfP capitalized 50 revolving loan funds with \$625 each. Since the individual loan size allocated is \$62, only 10 women in each group could get loans at first.

Each group was expected to show savings of 15 percent (about \$100) before PfP capitalized the fund. With repayments, monthly savings contributions, and group fundraising, new loans are made as funds are available. Each group sets its own interest rate, some charging as much as 120 percent interest, so the loan fund will appreciate more quickly. PfP charges the market rate, increasing its charge on the initial loan to the groups to 14 percent. An internal evaluation by PfP in 1986 indicated that recipients of these loans have increased their income by 30 percent.

The OTA team was particularly interested in the loans for agricultural inputs made to 62 groups which received the inputs on credit. Interviews confirmed the finding of the internal evaluation that these loans led to an increase in productivity.

- pre-loan: average yield per acre was 3 to 5 bags of maize (\$45).

- post-loan: average yield per acre was 18 bags of maize (\$205).

OTA team members were impressed with the extension advice that combined conservation techniques, such as multicropping, rotation, planting trees, using oxen and contour plowing, with improved inputs.

OTA found that most of ADF's \$80,000 in the credit fund had been disbursed and repaid principal and interest had begun to be given out as new credit. If the past track record is any indication, a three-fold multiplier can be expected. However, loan repayment of the local groups to PfP is currently low, especially when compared to past PfP programs. Some 63 percent of the groups were late payers, though only 3 of every 10 members were late. The primary reason for the lateness, according to PfP staff, was that the government national maize buying board had not paid farmers for their last season's crops 6 months after the harvest.

Conclusion.—Informed sources confirmed that few, if any, other organizations currently operating in Kenya provide rural credit as well as PfP. OTA team members concluded that project outcomes could be enhanced in two ways. First, PfP could develop a more coherent strategy for taking its advanced members into higher income-generating activities, either in the formal or informal sector. Second, PfP needs a donor who can assist it over an extended period of time in developing ways to be more self-supporting. Currently PfP is in desperate need of outside financing; 94 percent of its budget comes from outside donors and those who funded PfP (e.g., PACT, IBM, Ford, FAO) did not continue their grants ending in 1986-87,

Since early 1987, budget reductions had forced ADF to lay off half of its staff, some of whom had been with the organization for years. The only new funder at the time of OTA's visit was Kenya's Rural Enterprise program which channeled AID funds to PfP for an agricultural service center designed to provide income to PfP.⁵

The mechanism by which women can get loans without collateral depends on their participation in a group. This model, developed in Latin America and tested elsewhere, has proven replicable. This is its first use in East Africa, and it is likely to work elsewhere in Kenya. But whether the funds, and local groups, can maintain themselves without PfP oversight is not known.

Poultry-Market Gardon Project

Organization: Boiteko Agricultural Management Association

Site: Serowe, Botswana

Activities: Vegetable, poultry, and egg production.

Grant Size: \$35,072

The Setting.—The Boiteko Agricultural Management Association (AMA) conducts a horticultural and poultry project in the village of Serowe, in eastern Botswana, approximately 300 kilometers north of the capitol of Gaborone. Nine women and one man from the village comprise the AMA group that runs the project, with assistance from a technical manager and a financial consultant.

The area surrounding Serowe, known as the hardveld, is semi-arid. Arable agriculture normally is constrained by inadequate and variable precipitation during most rainfall seasons. In a good year, the area can expect to receive between 400 and 450 millimeters of rain. Reliable supplies of water cannot be depended on for any production activity, especially horticulture, and the situation has been exacerbated by a six year drought that has decimated the country's cereal production.

During the last 3 years, the Ministry of Agriculture has strongly encouraged the development of horticulture projects as a means of increasing rural employment while decreasing dependence on South Africa for the importation of most of the country's vegetables. The Ministry supports small scale producers by limiting the importation of vegetables

⁵In January 1988, ADF's Project Review Committee approved a new Institutional Revolving Credit grant of \$248,000 to PfP which addresses both OTA points.

that are grown domestically and by providing technical assistance.

The Project.—The Boiteko project attempts to provide a reliable income source and employment for rural people while providing a reliable source of vegetables and eggs for the local market within Serowe.

The Boiteko group has a long history of project experience. The present AMA represents the remaining core of a group started in the early 1970s as a production unit of the Serowe Brigades, a private vocational training/income generating movement started by a teacher from South Africa, Patrick Van Rensburg. The original Boiteko group was involved in weaving and vegetable gardening and had over 100 members. However, with the decline of the Serowe Brigades throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, and some inappropriate technical assistance, the Boiteko group disintegrated.

During 1984, the Southern Region Field Representative for ADF heard from Van Rensburg, then the head of a non-governmental organization, that the remaining members of the Boiteko group had hired a technical advisor and wished to continue their horticultural scheme and add an egg laying operation. The objectives of the group were to provide members with a consistent supply of income and provide the village and the group with vegetables.

The group so far has accomplished a great deal. With the original ADF grant, the group has been able to purchase wire fencing to enclose a 1 hectare plot for the vegetable and egg production operations as well as build a chicken house. Other grants from an AID-sponsored appropriate technology project and from the Canadian University Service Organization provided a windmill for the irrigation borehole, a mechanical tiller, and netting for the vegetable nursery. From the proceeds of the project, the group pays its members approximately \$45 per month and the members have expanded their operations to include a citrus orchard. The vegetable operation grosses between \$120 and \$240 per month and the egg laying operation between \$420 and \$540 per month.

One recurring problem has been a reliable source of water. The windmill, purchased with a grant to the group, is a prototype for Botswana and has frequently broken down. Recently, the group asked for and received from ADF an amendment to their original grant for a diesel engine pump and irrigation piping, which will alleviate their immediate water supply problems.

The group feels they have accomplished their objectives, but have hope further that the operation

will eventually increase their present incomes. They also hope to become self-sufficient in technical and financial management of the project.

Conclusion.—The group and the project both face a potentially very productive future because of the strength of the group's organizational and participatory structure. Their open style of management and sharing of responsibilities have become models for group development in Botswana. The project faces some obstacles because of environmental concerns over the resistance of pests to insecticides and the compaction of the soil. In addition, the group faces somewhat severe undercapitalization which forces lag periods in production while waiting to replace inputs.

The most encouraging sign for sustaining the project is the support the group gets from other donors and the Ministry of Agriculture. Boiteko has become a symbol of success for horticultural projects and there appears to be a committed effort to ensure its longevity. The ministry hopes that projects similar to Boiteko can be replicated, and it appears that other non-governmental groups in the country are following the model. Other horticultural groups have formed in the villages of Ramotswa and Kanye. However, the one powerful force of the Boiteko group is its solidarity. Many people have commented on the uniqueness of the group and it maybe that because of the conditions under which it formed and sustained itself, the success of this project may be difficult to replicate.

Tutume Tractor Hire Project

Organization: Tutume McConnell Community Trust

Site: Francistown, Botswana

Activities: Rent tractors for plowing and hauling.

Grant Size: \$40,604

The Setting.—The Tutume McConnell Community Trust is an enterprise of the brigade located in Tutume, a village 110 kilometers northeast of Francistown, in northeast Botswana. The brigades are private training programs for school leavers which also provide some employment opportunities and sponsor some businesses to cover their costs. The brigade's mandate is to provide vocational training within profit-making production units.

Arable agriculture in Botswana is rarely a full time occupation. Most households follow a very diverse strategy of income generation, relying on formal and informal employment opportunities and live-

stock production supplemented by food production. Households face significant constraints because of the paucity and variance of rainfall and the lack of draught power for plowing. The draught power constraint severely affects female-headed households as they are generally the last to be able to borrow or hire oxen for plowing. Since plowing must be timed to coincide with unpredictable rainfall patterns, those who plow last suffer diminished or insignificant harvests.

The government of Botswana has initiated several programs in attempts to become more self-sufficient in food production. Both of the principle programs, the Arable Lands Development Program (ALDEP) and the Arable Rainfed Agricultural Program (ARAP), provide grants and subsidies for draught power. ALDEP is an on-going program and ARAP is a drought relief program intended to encourage farmers to plow during the drought.

The Project.—In April 1984, the Tutume McConnell Trust Brigade proposed a tractor hire scheme as a solution to the draught power constraints of farmers in the Tutume area. The objectives of the project were to alleviate the shortage of draught power, to increase food production in the area, to haul manure during the season, and haul bricks and sand for the brigades during the off-season. The project was intended to improve the agricultural incomes of the area's farmers and the operating income of the brigade. An amendment to the original grant provided for a 10 hectare demonstration plot for the brigade.

The project has provided plowing for approximately 60 farmers during the initial season of operation. On average, each woman has had approximately 1.8 hectares ploughed and each man 2.4 hectares. However, the results of the project must be viewed in the light of some of the complicating factors. First, the success of the project depends on the affordability of the tractor service. Presently, ARAP provides any farmer a subsidy of \$30 per hectare for hiring draught power. The subsidy means that during the drought, the Tutume area farmers receive the tractor service at no monetary cost. The project is therefore demand driven based on the subsidy offered by the government. In addition, even the first farmers who received the service did not get their lands plowed until late December, far into the agricultural season and decreasing their chances of realizing a productive harvest.

The project has operated for one agricultural season. The objectives of the brigade have only been partially fulfilled: tractor plowing has been provided to several farmers in the area and the brigade has been able to use the tractor to haul materials dur-

ing the off-season. However, there is no evidence that food production has, or will be, increased because of the project for several reasons. First, the brigade intends to use the tractor to plow its own demonstration plot before proceeding to plow farmers' fields. Because agricultural production is so dependent on the timing of plowing coincident with the start of the rains, it is questionable that this pattern will allow any increase in local production. Second, the brigade has had a serious problem matching the technology to the soil conditions of the area. A moldboard plow could not be used successfully because of the predominance of tree-stumps in most of the fields. In switching to a disc plow to offset the problem, the upper horizons of the soil structure of the plowed fields has been damaged leaving them susceptible to wind and water erosion.

Conclusion.—The project appears to be economically sustainable only as long as the subsidy makes the project affordable to the farmers. Several planners at the district and the national level have commented that the subsidy is intended as drought relief and will be discontinued in the near future. There is also the question of who will be able to afford the plowing services after the removal of the subsidy. Definitely, the poorer farm households were not able to afford such a service before the drought and it is unlikely that they will be able to afford it in the future.

Environmentally, the project faces an even bleaker future. Even though the technical problems leading to increased soil erosion maybe worked out, it is still questionable whether increased farmland should be opened up to monocropping in a fragile semi-arid ecological zone. The removal of trees and the plowing of large areas of land may have already made the area more susceptible to environmental damage.

Organizationally, the project is not sustainable. The farmers receiving the services of the brigade have no say in the decisionmaking of the project or in the demonstration plot research being conducted by the agricultural unit of the brigade. This top-down form of consultation does not allow input from the farmers and makes later field trials irrelevant with respect to meeting the needs of farmers. There is no learning or process of group empowerment, as no primary groups exist.

Finally, the project has passed on the large risk of farming in a semi-arid environment to the farmers. Any increase in soil erosion, or financial risk due to planting increased hectareage, is passed on through ADF and the brigades to the rural households. Past demonstration tractor hire schemes in

Botswana have not increased agricultural production sufficiently to cover the costs of production.

At present the project appears to be replicable because the brigades and other NGOS have embraced the idea and are promoting it. At least two other brigades in Botswana have expressed interest in a tractor hire scheme in their area. As long as the subsidy remains, such a project has the potential for tremendous popularity. However, the question here is not "Can the project be replicated?" but "Should the project be replicated?" From available evidence and past experience in Botswana, the answer appears to be negative.

Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea Project

Organization: Agricultural Finance Corporation
 Site: Honde and Pungwe Valleys, Zimbabwe
 Activities: Revolving credit fund for coffee and tea production.
 Grant Size: \$101,537

The Setting.—After independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe faced the difficult task of restructuring the rural economy of the country to provide services to the African smallholders previously excluded from participating in economic development. Agricultural production in pre-independent Zimbabwe favored the large-scale commercial sector and institutionally the delivery of inputs and services was directed toward the larger farmers. The present objective is to provide access to inputs and services for the smallholding low-resource farmers of the country.

The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) of Zimbabwe is a parastatal credit institution that was founded to provide loans for agricultural activities. Previously, its experience was mostly with the larger commercial agricultural sector. For the last seven years, the AFC has been redirecting its attention to provide loans to smallholders for both marketable food and cash crop production. They make loans available for the short-, medium-, and long-term for crop production expenses including land preparation, the purchase of fertilizers and chemicals, harvesting, transportation and marketing.

The Project.—The ADF funds for the Zimbabwe Tea and Coffee Project allowed the group to establish a revolving credit fund for the production of tea and coffee by smallholders in the Honde and Pungwe Valleys of eastern Zimbabwe. The Honde and Pungwe Valleys stretch from the Nyanga-Mutare road northeast to the Mozambique border.

The area provides a favorable region for the production of tea and coffee in addition to several different food crops.

The AFC has two important credit schemes in the valleys, one of which is funded with European Economic Community funds and the other financed by ADF. The ADF project provided medium- to long-term loans for the purchase of tea and coffee seedlings, and expenses related to land preparation and fertilizers and chemicals. Initially, approximately 144 farmers received loans of approximately \$600 spread out over 3 years. The interest rate charged is 13 percent per year. The projected numbers of farmers to receive loans under the revolving credit fund are 214 in 1986-87 and 383 in 1987-88. In total, there are 500 farm households in the area.

Because both tea and coffee take a number of years to mature, no returns to the farmers have been measured. Estimates made by the AFC and AGRITEX, the government agricultural research and extension agency, anticipate returns per farmer of approximately \$700 to \$1,000 per hectare per year for tea and a higher return for coffee. With the average size of a combined tea/coffee plot being one hectare per household, the expectations are that each household will be able to repay the loan starting in year 3 or 4 and have a reasonable profit.

The project has not been able to yet recover the value of the loans because they are not yet due for repayment. However, it is anticipated that there will be a high repayment rate because of the favorable conditions under which the farmers operate, because of the potentially high returns for coffee, and because the AFC will be repaid directly by the marketing societies before the farmers receive any returns from the sale of crops.

Conclusion.—The possibility of sustainability for this project is relatively high. Economically, the funds are being used to support fairly high-value cash crops. As long as coffee prices paid to the farmers offset the depressed price of tea, the prospects for increased income and for the continuance of the revolving credit scheme are high. However, it is not clear if the economic feasibility plans of the project accurately reflect the changing conditions for the marketing of these cash crops. In the area, several farmers who have long-term experience with the production of tea have had to sell food crops to repay AFC loans.

The project has increased the potential of organizational sustainability at the primary cooperative level and for the AFC. The cooperatives associated with the project appear very democratic and participatory, except possibly with respect to women's access to the project. As institutions, they

have experienced substantial empowerment because of their involvement in the production of tea and coffee.

The AFC has also benefited from the shift in emphasis from the large-scale commercial to the small-holder sector. The ADF funds contributed to sustaining this shift, but did not produce the major incentive for it.

Environmentally, the replacement of food crops grown on steep slopes by the more soil-protecting tea crop benefits soil conservation. However, it is not clear how the continuing shift from tea to coffee will affect the degree of groundcover in the area. Alternatively, little or no research has been done on the possibility of intercropping the tree crops with food crops for soil conservation. There has also been no analysis of the potential for surface and ground water contamination (or the potential for increased incidence of health problems) caused by the increased use of pesticides in the area.

The last issue of sustainability involves the lack of monitoring being done by the AFC, ADF, or the primary organizations. The AFC is attempting to increase their computer capability to track loans and recipients, but they must also ensure that data is collected on who is being served and the impacts on the target group.

The AFC revolving credit scheme for tea and coffee production has little potential for replicability in the rest of Zimbabwe because of the specific ecological conditions necessary for the production of these crops. However, the lessons learned by the AFC with regard to repayment procedures and the success of the primary groups could be adapted for other crops and situations within Zimbabwe. This project has the potential for a significant impact on the income levels of low-resource farmers and for the growth of indigenous institutions involved in improving access to previously excluded portions of the farming sector, but efforts must be made to build in monitoring procedures that allow organizations to determine the populations actually being served and the benefits to them.

Silveira House Development Fund

Organization: Silveira House
 Site: Nine communities, Zimbabwe
 Activities: Dressmaking cooperative; animal and storage facilities; store; farm inputs and equipment.
 Grant Size: \$20,808

The Setting.—Zimbabwe contains a plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGOS) involved



Photo credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Women learn dressmaking as part of the Silveira House Project

in rural development. Some are non-denominational, while others are religiously based. One of the more respected religious-based institutions is Silveira House. It began as an institution in 1964 with the major objective being to provide a place where people could gather to discuss political issues. In 1970, Silveira House started an agricultural program centered around groups using the traditional nimbe cooperative labor group for organizing purposes. Within several years their activities expanded to cover over 500 groups within their diocese.

Silveira House derives most of its present budget from lay contributions solicited by institutions representative of the German Catholic Bishops (MIS-EREOR) and from funds awarded by a Dutch Catholic development organization (C EBEMO). Its total budget is approximately \$500,000 per year. Their agricultural program is one of the most expensive, approximately \$120,000 per year.

The Project.—In 1983, the director of Silveira House felt that a discretionary fund would be a useful method of providing loans and grants to communities for small-scale projects. This fund would allow rapid responses to groups' and communities' needs. ADF approached Silveira House at the suggestion of an Oxfam staff member familiar with the idea, and in March 1985, ADF gave a grant for \$15,510. Subsequent grant amendments brought the total up to \$20,808.

With the ADF money, Silveira House has provided funds for dressmaking cooperatives, livestock dip tanks, piggery construction, the stocking of a community store, building sheds for the storage of farm inputs, and purchase of farm inputs and processing equipment. In all, groups from 10 communities are scheduled to be assisted with ADF funds.

The results so far have been concentrated in nine of the communities and interest-free loans have been made totaling approximately \$8,000. The remaining monies of the discretionary fund will be dispersed when the groups' projects are ready for funding. An additional \$3,298 is budgeted for the purchase of a motorcycle for the agricultural field staff; however, some problems with the transfer of funds between the ADF and Silveira House have delayed its purchase.

Conclusion.—Silveira House remains one of the most stable and respected NGOS in Zimbabwe, thus ensuring the sustainability of the group beyond the end of the project. It is also likely that because of the training and organizing skills transferred from Silveira House to local communities that the recipient groups will continue to prosper after the ADF funds have been used. Finally, the activity of a revolving credit scheme being funded by ADF encourages the sustainability of the project's activities.

Several pros and cons of this use of ADF funds are apparent. The advantages are those of sustainability listed above, plus the probability that the funds are being used by an institution with a mandate sim-

ilar to ADF's. Silveira House has a strong training program and works closely with government group development programs and the groups themselves to strengthen local institutions. However, little data exist to suggest that the target groups reached by Silveira House represent the poorer segments of the communities. Of the several activities visited by the OTA teams, for example, the piggery project at Mwanza and the cattle dip in Chishawasha, principally benefited the more affluent small farmers, those who could afford the entry fee for the piggery project and those who owned cattle. Another concern is that some of the projects encourage women to learn traditional skills such as dressmaking which are less remunerative than agricultural activities.

On the positive side, Silveira House has a fairly large and consistent budget commitment of which the ADF grant is a very small portion. Were the ADF funds not available, Silveira House most likely would have been able to secure funds for the discretionary credit scheme from other sources. When the ADF grant is disbursed, Silveira House will likely be able to use its contacts with other donors to raise additional funds.

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“Aspects of Participation in Projects Funded by the African Development Foundation” by

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“Consultant’s Report to OTA” by

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“Desk and Office Review of ADF Activities: Renewable Resource Technologies” by

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Appendix D

Field Team Methods: The Assessment Materials

Appendix D contains the forms used by the OTA field teams in their assessments of participation, results, sustainability, and replicability in 12 ADF projects; for their assessment of ADF's country programs; and for their assessment of ADF concerning congressional options.

PROJECT COVER SHEET

(To be filled out from information supplied in interviews with project managers, cross-checked with information from others.)

1. Project Name _____ start date: _____

Organization Name _____ start date: _____

2. Amount of money received to date from ADF: US \$ _____

Other funding sources of project/amount/purpose:

Other funding sources of organization/amount/purpose:

Percent of organization's budget received from ADF:

3. Number and characteristics of persons involved

Total Nos.		Average income level/occupation	
male	female	male	female

Board of Directors

Staff (of project)

Staff (of organization)

Members of organization

Project participants

Beneficiaries

Community

Comments:

4. Who makes major decisions?

Board of Directors _____ Officers _____ other _____ (specify)

• how selected?: elected _____ ' appointed _____, assumed _____

• frequency of meetings: _____

• minutes of meetings: yes _____ no _____

5. Staff view of project objectives (in priority order)

a.

b.

c.

Do participants' view of objectives differ from staff's? yes no If
so, how?

6. List records kept (eg., meeting minutes, financial records) and rate quality (excellent, adequate, poor). Explain rating.
7. List previous evaluations (of project and organization), by whom and when
8. List any differences from data on chart (ADF Funded Projects: September 1984 thru September 31, 1986)
9. Relationship with ADF
 - When and how did the organization come in contact with ADF?
 - number of ADF visits in last year _____
 - visits by whom?
 - What do recipients find helpful about the relationship with ADF?
 - What do recipients think could be improved?
10. Notes re: information sources and reliability of data on this form.

Name of project: _____

2. Number of responses (under each category) of project management to the following questions:

a) most, b) half, c) very few, d) none

3. Number of responses (yes and no) of project participants to the following questions on the checklist for participants:

- participated in design
- participated in evaluation
- have access to project records
- could be an officeholder
- have elections for officers
- new people get elected
- efforts to get new people involved
- usually agree with leaders' decisions
- some groups have more influence

If yes, who and why?

Comments on data:

4. Who originated the project?

☐ local leader (type: _____)
☐ local indigenous PVO
☐ intermediary organization
☐ church _____ indigenous PVO (_____ regional, _____ national)
☐ parastatal _____ for profit
☐ ADF
☐ other (specify) _____

5. Evidence of changes in project direction due to participant/beneficiary input: _____ yes _____ no. If yes, give examples

6. Specific benefits to participants (e.g., cash, in kind) as a result of activity

<u>Benefit</u>	<u>No. of participants</u>		<u>Average value/amt</u>	
	(men)	(women)	(men)	(women)

a.

b.

c*

7. Specific contributions of participants (e.g., cash, labor) materials) to activities

<u>Contribution</u>	<u>No. contributing</u>		<u>Average value/amt</u>	
	(men)	(women)	(men)	(women)

a.

b.

c.

8. Number of responses of non-participants to questions on checklist:
Yes No

- familiar with project
- were invited to be in project
- benefit from the project
- could join the project now
- feel benefits distributed fairly

Summary of reasons persons are not participants and/or why they think project is unfair.

9. Meetings/activities in past year (name of group, committee, etc.)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Type of meeting</u>	<u>No. attending</u> (M) (F)	<u>No. possible</u> (M) (F)	<u>Minutes/decisions</u> <u>reflect input</u> (Y,N)
-------------	------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------------	--

Number at meeting with OTA team: men _____, women _____
 percent speaking: men _____, women _____

10. Perceptions regarding role of outsiders (interview project staff/leaders)
 Rating: 1) helpful; 2) ineffective 3) harmful

a. Technical assistance providers

<u>Type</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Comments on TA relationship</u> <u>effectiveness</u>	<u>Average rating</u>
-------------	---------------------	--	-----------------------

1)

2)

3)

b. Other outsiders

Comments

11. For projects of intermediary organizations

- a. No. of subgroups receiving assistance as result of project _____
 b. How are they selected?

c. Subgroups' relation to intermediary organization:

- represented on board of intermediary (yes) (n o) _____
- frequency of contact: _____ times per _____ Who made contact?

- change adopted in intermediary group program due to input from subgroups: (yes) _____ (no) _____ e.g.

Comments

12. Other observations regarding participation:

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT PARTICIPATION

Name of project _____

1. In what ways and to what extent have intended beneficiaries participated in this project? Assess factors fostering and limiting that participation.
2. Are the poorest one-third able to participate in the program? Have any groups been excluded from the project? If so, why and how?
- 3* How equitably have benefits and costs been distributed?
4. What specific measures or actions would enhance participation of project participants/beneficiaries? How can the impact of these measures on participation be monitored and measured?
- 5* Has the level of participation affected project impact (results, sustainability and replicability)? Describe.

WORKSHEET 2--MINIMUM DATA SET: RESULTS

Name of project: _____

10. Principle goods and services delivered by project operations to date:

<u>output</u>	<u>Amount/Value</u>	<u>Intended</u> (yes/no)	<u>Data Source</u>
---------------	---------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------

a.

b.

c.

d.

2. What intended outputs have not been achieved?

a.

b.

3. Is there any evidence that participants are better off than non-participants as a result of this project? If SO, give details. Are certain groups of participants (e.g., elites) benefiting more than others?

4. Summary of perceptions of increased welfare among participants and non-participant beneficiaries (if applicable) interviewed. (Give numbers).

<u>Participants</u>	<u>Non-participant beneficiaries</u>
<u>Men</u> <u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u> <u>Women</u>

Feel project will make
them much better off

Feel project will make
them a little better off

Feel project won't help
them or will make worse

How were data obtained (e.g., group or individual interviews).

5. How has the project documented results? How complete is the information?

6. Change in number of organization's members (and/or project participants) since project began. Give numbers of new participants and dropouts. Provide data source.

7* List specific evidence of outcomes (impacts, responses, what people are doing differently) that can be related to project implementation or outputs.

	<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Intended</u> (Y) (N)	<u>Data Source</u>
a.	Economic		
b.	Organizational		
c*	Social		
d.	Environmental		
e.	Local or national policy		
f*	Technical		

8. Other observations regarding results:

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT RESULTS

Name of project _____

1. To what degree (high or low) is the project accomplishing its stated objectives? Why?
2. How does project performance compare to that of similar projects by other groups?
3. What might have happened had there not been ADF support?
4. What are the key factors responsible for project outcomes or effects?
 - a. economic
 - b. organizational
 - c. social
 - d. environmental
 - e. local/national policy
 - f. technical
5. How could project outcomes be enhanced?

 WORKSHEET 3 -- MINIMUM DATA SET: SUSTAINABILITY

Name of project: _____

 1. Was there project activity before the ADF grant? Yes ____ No ____
 If so, what?

2* Is the ADF funded activity intended to continue after grant?

 30 Project and group (if applicable) has:

	<u>Project</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Comments</u>
	(y) (N)	(Y,N,N A)	

a. Strategy to maintain leadership, member participation, group cohesion

b. Strategy to cope with negative environmental impacts

c. Strategy to cope with negative social impacts

d. Plan to maintain activity financially/economically after ADF grant (eg, recurrent costs)

 e. If small-scale enterprise
 --market analysis
 --business plan

 f. Training program
 --management
 --technical
 --financial

g. Strategy to gain access to technical assistance/know-how

h. Plan to do other activities

i. Strategy to deal with potential opposition to project/group

J

Strategy to mobilize and generate
complementary resources

4. Evidence of adaptation in project design/group organization (objectives, activities, organization, etc.) in response to changing circumstances

What

Why

a.

b.

c.

5. Resources critical to continuation of project/effort and source (local, national, external)

6. Prospects for continued support of project activity. Or, if project is not intended to continue, prospects for other activities by the group.

7. Other observations regarding sustainability:

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

Name of project _____

1. What specific factors indicate the likelihood that project outcomes (economic/financial, organizational/ social, environmental, technological, policy outcomes) will be sustained over time? What are constraints to sustainability?
2. What specific changes would increase the likelihood of sustainable outcomes? How can they be monitored by ADF?
3. To what extent has the project changed local technologies and management, and what influence does that have on project/group continuation?

WORKSHEET 4 -- MINIMUM DATA SET: REPLICABILITY

Name of project _____

1. promising project elements (technologies, organizations, process, etc.):

<u>Element</u>	<u>Innovative</u> (y) (N)	<u>Conditions required for wider use</u>
----------------	-----------------------------------	--

a.

b.

c.

Comments:

2. Incidence of adoption of specific project methods or technologies among non-participants

<u>What</u>	<u>Who</u>	<u>Where</u>
-------------	------------	--------------

3. Efforts made by the group or ADF to spread knowledge gained (e.g., radio, newspaper, conferences, exchange visits)

a. by project

b. by ADF

c* by others

4. Other observations regarding replicability:

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT REPLICABILITY

Name of project _____

1. What promising project elements (e.g., process, organization mode, technologies) are particularly applicable to other groups and/or to further activities by this group? Why?
2. Which of these elements are innovative compared to those used in other projects addressing similar issues or situations?
3. What effects (if any) have there been (or are there likely to be) outside the locale of the ADF-funded project? How can these effects be enhanced?
4. What lessons have been learned (by ADF, project managers, participants, and others) from this project?

COUNTRY PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

(Team responses based on all project data, observations and interviews relevant to ADF program in this country).

Name of Country: _____

1. What is your overall assessment of ADF in _____? What impact is it having on social and economic development and how could it be enhanced?
2. Is there evidence that the projects you visited are/are not typical of other ADF projects in the country? Explain.
3. What is ADF's track record in comparison with other donors?
4. What alternative project(s) might the same funds have supported which could have resulted in greater impacts along the lines of ADF's mandate?
- 5* Does ADF appear to respond to real needs?
6. Is there anything unique or different about ADF? Comment on the effectiveness and appropriateness of that contribution.

CONGRESSIONAL ASSESMENT

Name of team member: _____

1. On the basis of all you have learned, would you recommend that ADF's funding level be increased, decreased or remain the same? Why?
2. What are your specific recommendations for improving ADF's performance? (You may include changes in ADF implementation and interpretation of the legislation as well as changes in the Legislation.) List as many as you wish, and indicate your priorities.
3. What lessons came out of the ADF assessment that are relevant to other agencies (AID, U.S. PVOS, others) working in African development?

Appendix E

Field Interviews

The OTA field teams interviewed ADF staff in Africa and spoke with nearly 800 people associated with the 12 projects visited. Project managers, participants, staff and board members of funded organizations provided OTA with a great deal of information about their activities. While too numerous to list, they all have our appreciation. The directors of the 12 projects are listed here.

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The field teams also met with others in Africa who are not associated with ADF or the 12 ADF-funded projects visited. These included officials of the host governments, U.S. and other development assistance agencies as well as representatives of private organizations. This group of interviewees is listed here.

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Appendix F

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In addition to the 15 members of the OTA field teams, the following staff members of ADF, outside reviewers, and members of OTA'S Advisory Panel on Low-Resource Agriculture in Africa reviewed the draft report.

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Appendix 6

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