"Stakeholder Concentration and the Global Environment"
Abstract: What explains the form of international cooperation on global environmental problems? I contend that governments create integrated regimes for global environmental problems when national preferences converge on international cooperation. However, they use overlapping independent agreements and institutions when national preferences diverge. National preferences converge when actors responsible for the environmental externalities (“stakeholders”) are geographically or economically concentrated. However, governments are unable to lower mitigation costs when stakeholders are geographically and economically diffuse. Instead, they use overlapping independent agreements. In-depth qualitative data and panel data on 18 global environmental treaty processes support this theory. Governments make independent agreements on agriculture and land use but make integrated regimes on industrial pollutants. They tailor the form of international cooperation on global environmental problems to the concentration of stakeholders.
To be presented at the 2013 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association and the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
"Forms of Cooperation under Interdependence: Regional Water Management"
Abstract: I analyze the relationship between varying interdependence relationships among countries and the form of international cooperation on local water resources. Common-pool resources (CPRs) such as lakes and seas tend to involve relatively symmetrical interdependence, encouraging parties to share similar preferences over managing the water resources. Directional problems such as rivers tend to involve asymmetrical interdependence, encouraging more piece- meal cooperation consisting of independent agreements. Panel data on 75 rivers, lakes, and seas show that cooperation on lakes and seas becomes integrated over time while cooperation on rivers becomes more fragmented. Qualitative data from interviews and other sources elaborate how varying interdependence relationships have shaped the course of international cooperation on the Danube River Basin, Rhine River Basin, and the Baltic Sea. The findings indicate that interdependence relationships structure national preferences, affecting the form of international cooperation on water resources.
Presented at the 2012 Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations and the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. To be presented at the 2013 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association.
"Climate Change: The Origins of Fragmented Governance" (revise and resubmit)
Abstract: Why has the international regime for climate change become legally and institutionally fragmented over time? This paper describes how essential parties, institutional rules and membership diversity, and problem scope have contributed to the fragmented development of the international climate change regime. Using interviews and other primary source data, this paper analyzes institutional developments in the climate change regime from 1992 through 2012 and relationships among international institutions contributing to climate change governance. Each of the three variables contributing to fragmentation not only accounts for specific initiatives outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), but also helps to explain the form of institutional reactions to the UNFCCC. The analysis enriches our understanding of the historical evolution of international climate change governance. It also adds primary source evidence to support a growing policy initiative that can complement efforts under the UNFCCC.
"Bottom-Up and Top-Down Governance: Nested Surveys on Managing Chemicals and Land Use"
Abstract: Under what conditions do governments expect to use overlapping independent agreements for a global environmental problem? This paper explains when governments expect to use multiple treaties to regulate a global environmental problem legally under the mandate of a pre-existing treaty. Using field surveys at two recent global environmental negotiations, I show that parties are less likely to expect integrated agreements on a global environmental problem when stakeholders are diffuse and when parties are skeptical of technological solutions to mitigating the problem. The evidence shows that these beliefs about technology and about stakeholders are related to the perceived disagreement among parties over the main issues in the negotiations. Overall, this paper provides micro-level evidence from participants in United Nations negotiations to outline the constraints on integrated forms of global environmental cooperation.
"Danube River Cooperation in Comparative Perspective" Danube Watch. Published by the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (Vienna, Austria)