Sovereignty and Humanitarian Military Intervention

Michael W. Doyle
Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs,
Law and Political Science
Columbia University
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The United Nations General Assembly has described intervention as dictatorial interference in the political independence and territorial integrity of a sovereign state. Traditionally, intervention was prohibited by international law. This principle of nonintervention, its justification and possible exceptions to it have been much discussed (Vincent, 1974; Graham, 1987; Beitz, 1988; Teson, 1997; Abiew, 1999; Garrett, 1999; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003).

Nonintervention has been an especially important principle for liberal statesmen and moralists with a commitment to universal human rights. On the one hand, Liberals have provided some of the strongest reasons to abide by a strict form of the nonintervention doctrine. It was only within secure borders that Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill thought that peoples could govern themselves as free citizens. On the other hand, those same principles of universal human dignity have provided justifications for overriding the principle of nonintervention. In explaining this I first present an interpretive summary of Mill’s arguments against and for intervention, stressing more than has been conventional the consequentialist character of the ethics of intervention. It makes a difference whether we think that an intervention will do more good than harm,

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and some of the factors that determine the outcome are matters of strategy and institutional choice. I then explore the significance of multilateral authorization and implementation – in part to see whether they can substitute for elements that are often missing in unilateral interventions.

Mill’s Principles of Nonintervention and Intervention

John Stuart Mill developed the core of a modern understanding of human dignity and its implications for hard political choices. He saw humans as fundamentally equal, sentient beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. Our natural sympathy should thus lead us to choose acts and rules that maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest number. Importantly, Mill wanted to constrain this maximization of utility by the freedom to lead unrestricted lives that did not harm the freedom of others. And he insisted that not all pleasures and pains were equal: Some were higher, some lower; some expressed human creativity, others did not: poetry was better than pushpin (a nineteenth century version of “Gameboy®” or “Nintendo”).

Politically, two principles followed from his application of utilitarian ethics. The first was maximum equal liberty, allowing each adult to develop his or her own potentiality on the view that each individual was the best judge of what was and was not in his or her interest, so long however as no one interfered with the equal liberty of others. The second was representative government. To maximize the utility value of collective decisions it would be best to give decisive weight to the preferences of the majority, as represented by knowledgeable politicians.
Internationally, one might think that these principles would give rise to a commitment to an international version of the US Constitution’s “Guarantee Clause” (Art. IV:4) in which each state is guaranteed (i.e. required to have) a republican representative form of government and the XIV'th Amendment which requires all states to provide equal protection of the laws to all citizens. But for Mill this was not so. He argues against that kind of a global guarantee, drawing thereby an important line between domestic and international justice.

Nonintervention.

Arguments against intervention have taken the form of both direct principles and indirect, or procedural, considerations. Like many liberals, Mill dismissed without much attention Realist arguments in favor of intervention to promote national power, prestige or profits. However prevalent those motives have been in history, they lack moral significance, as for that matter would justifications associated with intervening to promote an idea or ideology.

The most important direct consideration for the liberals was that nonintervention reflected and protected human dignity (or rights, though Mill disliked the word). Nonintervention could enable citizens to determine their own way of life without outside interference. If democratic rights and liberal freedoms were to mean something, they had to be worked out among those who shared them and were making them through their own participation. Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” (1795) had earlier made a strong case for respecting the right of nonintervention because it afforded a polity the necessary territorial space and political independence in which free and equal citizens could work
out what their own way of life would be (Kant, 1970). For Mill, intervention undermined
the authenticity of domestic struggles for liberty. A free government achieved by means
of intervention would not be authentic or self-determining but determined by others and
not one that local citizens had themselves defined through their own actions. (Good
governance was more like poetry than pushpin.)

John Stuart Mill provided a second powerful direct argument for nonintervention,
one focusing on likely consequences, when he explained in his famous 1859 essay,
“Nonintervention,” that it would be a great mistake to export freedom to a foreign people
that was not in a position to win it on its own (Mill, 1859). A people given freedom by a
foreign intervention would not, he argued, be able to hold on to it. It’s only by winning
and holding on to freedom through local effort that one acquired a true sense of its value.
Moreover, it was only by winning freedom that one acquired the political capacities to
defend it adequately against threats both at home and abroad. The struggle mobilized
citizens into what could become a national army and mobilized as well a capacity and
willingness to tax themselves for public purposes.

If, on the other hand, liberal government were to be introduced into a foreign
society, in the “knapsack”, so to speak, of a conquering liberal army, the local liberals
placed in power would find themselves immediately in a difficult situation. Not having
been able to win political power on their own, they would have few domestic supporters
and many non-liberal domestic enemies. They then would wind up doing one of three
different things:

Either (1) begin to rule as did previous governments, that is the repress their
opposition. The intervention would have done no good; it simply would have created
another oppressive government. Or (2) simply collapse in an ensuing civil war. Intervention, therefore, would have produced not freedom and progress, but a civil war with all its attendant violence. Or (3) the interveners would have continually to send in foreign support. Rather than having set up a free government, one that reflected the participation of the citizens of the state, the intervention would have set up a puppet government, one that would reflect the wills and interests of the intervening, the truly sovereign state (Ellis, 1992).

A third argument against intervention was difficulties of transparency. Historically, it has proven difficult to identify authentic “freedom fighters.” Particular national regimes of liberty and oppression are difficult for foreigners to “unpack,” reflecting, sometimes, complicated historical compromises and contracts of a Burkean sort among the dead, the living and the yet to be born. Michael Walzer, as did Mill, acknowledges that sovereignty and nonintervention ultimately depend upon consent. If the people welcome an intervention, or refuse to resist, something less than aggression has occurred (Walzer, 1985). But we cannot make those judgments reliably in advance. We should assume, he suggests, that foreigners will be resisted, that nationals will protect their state from foreign aggression. For even if the state is unjust, it’s their state, not ours. We have no standing to decide what their state should be. We do not happen to be engaged full time, as they are, in the national historical project of creating it. All the injustices, therefore, which do justify a domestic revolution, do not always justify a foreign intervention. Following Mill, Walzer says that domestic revolutions need to be left to domestic citizens. Foreign interventions to achieve a domestic revolution are likely over the long run to be ineffective and cause more harm than they eliminate. It is
for these reasons that we should want to respect locally negotiated amnesties even when perpetrators of crimes are known, as in South Africa or El Salvador. The amnesty can represent the price of peace or the difficulty of finding local clean hands.

Fourth, the necessary “dirty hands” of violent means often become “dangerous hands” in international interventions. International history is rife with interventions justified by high-sounding principles – ending the slave trade or suttee or introducing law and order and civilized behavior – turning into self-serving, imperialist “rescues” in which the intervener stays to profit and control. Requiring that the intervener be impartial, looking for something more than a unilateral decision, and respecting the multilateral processes of international law are thus important procedural considerations in weighing the justice of an intervention.

Fifth, interventions can violate the principles of proportionality and last resort. Villages should not be destroyed in order to be saved and negotiation should be tried before dictatorial means are adopted.

Indirect reasons for nonintervention, those bearing on other valued ends, have also been important constraints. Interventions foster militarism and expend resources needed for other national and international goals. But key among the indirect considerations are the rules of international law among sovereign civilized states prohibited intervention and the laws embodied the value of coordination and consensual legitimacy. Rules, any rules, have a value in themselves by helping to avoid unintended clashes and their consequences to human life. They serve as focal points for coordination – rules of road, such as “drive on the right.” Without some rule, unsought strife would ensue. International laws, moreover, were painstakingly achieved compromises among
diverse moralities. The mere process of achieving consent made them legitimate. They were agreed upon and *pacta sunt servanda* (Nardin, 1983; Franck, 1995).

**Intervention.**

[N]ever forget if we can do this here, and if we can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.

President Bill Clinton, addressing KFOR troops, June 22, 1999 (Clinton, 1999)

Liberal arguments supporting intervention fall into various camps. Some liberals, strong cosmopolitans, hold that the rights of cosmopolitan freedom are valuable for all people. Any violation of them should be resisted wherever it occurs, provided that we can do so without causing more harm than we seek to avoid (Arkes, 1986; Luban, 1980). But others take more seriously the full range of Kantian and Millian grounds for nonintervention. Some give reasons to override the nonintervention principle; others to disregard the principle. In the first, the principles in favor of nonintervention still hold, but other considerations seem more important. In the second, the principles do not apply to the particular case.
J.S. Mill argued that there were three good reasons to override what should be the usual prohibition against intervention.

In an internationalized civil war such as that waged between Protestantism and Catholicism in the sixteenth century, or liberalism and despotism in Mill’s own time, nonintervention can neglect vital transnational sources of national security. If each group truly aligns with its fellows overseas irrespective of inter-state borders and if others are intervening in support of their faction, then not intervening in support of yours is dangerous. While this argument is logical on its face, its historical accuracy is questionable. Even in the polarizing religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, one of Elizabeth the Great’s best admirals was a Catholic, and France under Cardinal Richelieu wisely aligned with the Protestant principalities that would support her.

Second, following a just war, the victor, rather than halting his armed forces at the restored border, can intervene to remove a “perpetual” or a standing “menace” to peace, whether a person or a regime. Mill’s reference was the sending of Napoleon to Elba (and then, as if to prove the point, further away, to St. Helena). Reconstruction in the US South drew inspiration from these considerations. In our time, the reference is ‘de-nazification’ in Germany following World War Two and the breaking up of the zaibatsu in Japan.

Most pertinently for today’s debates on intervention, Mill argues that some civil wars become so protracted, that a common sense of sympathy for the suffering of the noncombatant population calls for an outside intervention to halt the fighting in order to see if some negotiated solution might be achieved under the aegis of foreign arms. Mill here cites the partial success of outsiders who halted and helped settle the protracted mid-
century Portuguese civil war and the Greek-Turkish conflict. Greece was thus separated from Turkey and Belgium from Holland in 1830 following the forceful mediation of two liberal statesmen, Palmerston and Guizot. Later impartial mediation imposed power-sharing reconciliation on Portugal in the 1850’s, which produced two generations of peace among the contesting factions under the rule of King Pedro.

There are other injustices that justify us in disregarding the prohibition against intervention. Sometimes the national self determination that nonintervention is designed to protect are so clearly undermined by the domestic oppression and suffering that borders permit that nonintervention is not relevant. In these circumstances, the local government in effect loses its claim to singular national authenticity. Building on Mill’s classic essay, Michael Walzer offers us three cases where an intervention serves the underlying purposes that nonintervention was designed to uphold (Walzer, 1977).

The first is when too many nations contest one piece of territory. When an imperial government opposes the independence of a subordinate nation or when there are two distinct peoples, one attempting to crush the other, then national self-determination cannot be a reason to shun intervention. What is missing is the “one” nation. Here foreigners can intervene to help the liberation of the oppressed people, once that people has demonstrated through its own “arduous struggle” that it truly is another nation. Then decolonization is the principle that should rule, allowing a people to form its own destiny. One model of this might be the American Revolution against Britain; another in Mill’s time was the 1848-49 Hungarian rebellion against the Austria; and in our time the many anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia that quickly won recognition and, in a few cases, support from the international community.
The second instance in which the principle against intervention should be disregarded is counter-intervention in a civil war. When conflicting factions of one people are struggling to define what sort of society and government should rule, only that struggle should decide the outcomes, not foreigners. But when an external power intervenes on behalf of one of the participants in a civil war, then another foreign power can counter-intervene to balance the first intervention. This second intervention serves the purposes of self-determination, which the first intervention sought to undermine. Even if, Mill argued, the Hungarian rebellion were not clearly a national rebellion against “a foreign yoke,” it was clearly the case that Russia should not have intervened to assist Austria in its suppression. By doing so, Moscow gave others a right to counter-intervene.

Third, one can intervene for humanitarian purposes -- to halt what appears to be a gross violation of the rights to survival of a population. When we see a pattern of massacres or of genocide, the institutionalization of slavery – violations that “shock the conscience of mankind” – one has good ground to question whether there is any national connection between the population and the state that is so brutally oppressing it. Under those circumstances, outsiders may intervene. But the intervener should have a morally defensible motive and share the purpose of ending the slaughter and establishing a self-determining people. (Self-serving interventions promote imperialism.) Furthermore, interveners should act only as a “last resort,” after exploring peaceful resolution. They should then act only when it is clear that they will save more lives than the intervention itself will almost inevitably wind up costing, and even then with minimum necessary force. It makes no moral sense to rescue a village and start World War Three or destroy a village in order to save it. Michael Walzer has suggested that the Indian invasion of
East Pakistan in 1971, designed to save the people of what became Bangladesh from the massacre that was being inflicted upon them by their own government (headquartered in West Pakistan), is a case of legitimate humanitarian intervention. It allowed the people of East Pakistan to survive and form their own state.

Today, Mill’s most controversial case would be benign colonialism. His principles of nonintervention only hold among “civilized” nations. “Uncivilized” peoples, among whom Mill dumps most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, are not fit for the principle of nonintervention. Like Oude (in India), they suffer four debilitating infirmities – despotism, anarchy, amoral presentism and familism -- that make them incapable of self-determination. The people are imposed upon by a “despot… so oppressive and extortionate as to devastate the country.” Despotism long endured has produced “such a state of nerveless imbecility that everyone subject to their will, who had not the means of defending himself by his own armed followers, was the prey of anybody who had a band of ruffians in his pay.” The people as a result deteriorate into amoral relations in which the present overwhelms the future and no contracts can be relied upon. Moral duties extend no further than the family; national or civic identity is altogether absent.

In these circumstances, Mill claims, benign colonialism is best for the population. Normal relations cannot be maintained in such an anarchic and lawless environment. It is important to note that Mill advocates neither exploitation nor racialist domination. He applies the same reasoning to once primitive northern Europeans who benefited from the imperial rule imposed by civilized Romans. The duties of paternal care, moreover, are real, precluding oppression and exploitation and requiring care and education designed to
one day fit the colonized people for independent national existence. Nonetheless, the argument also rests on (wildly distorted) readings of the history and culture of Africa and Asia and Latin America. Anarchy and despotic oppression did afflict many of the peoples in these regions, but ancient cultures embodying deep senses of social obligation made nonsense of presentism and familism.

Shorn of its cultural “Orientalism,” Mill’s argument for trusteeship addresses one serious gap in our strategies of humanitarian assistance: the devastations that cannot be readily redressed by a quick intervention designed to liberate an oppressed people from the clutches of foreign oppression or a domestic despot. But how does one prevent benign trusteeship from becoming malign imperialism, particularly when one recalls the flowery words and humanitarian intentions that accompanied the conquerors of Africa? How far is it from the Anti-Slavery Campaign and the Aborigine Rights Protection Society to King Leopold’s Congo and Joseph Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness”?

The New Multilateral Substitution

“Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading.”

Kofi Annan (Annan, 1999).

Mill objected even to benign intervention because it was, first, inauthentic, substituting the decisions on self-determination of foreigners for decisions that should be made by locals, and, second, harmful, inviting civil war and a return to oppression in the
wake of well-motivated interventions. Moreover, third, when national self-determination is over-ridden, fair observers wonder whether the decisions are equitable across cases and made in a representative fashion. The new multilateral substitution addresses all these concerns, though far from perfectly.

Developments in the 1990’s have responded to Millian concerns and contributed to a new sense of when and how to intervene. The first is a revived role for international multilateral authorization, the second is a new set of multilateral peacekeeping strategies that mix consent and coercion and the third is multilateral representation. The three are connected. The second would not be seen as legitimate or in fact be effective without genuine multilateral authorization; the new authorization for multilateral intervention would not be tolerated as legitimate without global representation and unless it could be done less intrusively and with better effect on long-run stability and human rights than the usual outcomes of traditional unilateral interventions.

First, multilateral authorization substitutes for national consent. In the early 1990's, with the end of the Cold War, the agenda for multilateral as opposed to solely national peace and security rapidly expanded. At the request of the UN Security Council Summit of January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security both international and domestic disputes in his seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992).

At the same time, the revived Security Council both reaffirmed after years of Cold War neglect of the UN Charter’s Art. 2(7) principle of nonintervention and expanded the operational meaning of 2(7)’s authority to override domestic sovereignty under Article 39 (Malone, 1998). The UN thus claimed a “cleaner hands” monopoly on a broader
definition legitimate intervention. Although Article 39 prohibited UN authorizations of force other than as a response to threats or breaches of "international" peace, the Genocide Convention and the record of condemnation of colonialism and apartheid opened a legitimate basis for involvement in domestic conflict. The Security Council’s practice thus broadened the traditional reasons for intervention, including aspects of domestic political oppression short of massacre and human suffering associated with economic misfeasance—the so-called “failed states” and the droit d’ingerence (Damrosch, 1993; Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; Mortimer 1998) that brought the UN into Somalia and Bosnia. Indeed, “threat to the peace..” etc. came to mean severe domestic violations of human rights, civil wars and humanitarian emergencies and almost, whatever a Security Council majority (absent a Permanent Member veto) said it was (Goodrich, 1969).

These developments had roots in the striking changes in the international system that emerged at the end of the Cold War. A new spirit of multilateral cooperation from the USSR, beginning with President Gorbachev's reforms, met a new spirit of tolerance from the United States. Together the two former adversaries broke the forty-year gridlock in the UN Security Council. Post-Cold War cooperation meant that the Security Council was now functioning as the global guardian of peace and security. The Security Council had now become what it was supposed to have been since 1945—the continuation, incorporated in the design of the UN Charter, of the World War Two Grand Alliance. At the same time, there also emerged an ideological community of democratic values that gave specific content to the cooperative initiatives of these years. The Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993) and President Gorbachev's plea before the General
Assembly for “Global Human Values” signified that human rights were no longer merely a Western, but rather a global principle of good governance (UN, 1993). Sovereignty was redefined to incorporate a global interest in human rights protection. A newly functioning United Nations, moreover, was seen to be a legitimate agent to decide when sovereignty was and was not violated.

Regions differed on sovereignty. The Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) remained a bastion of strict sovereignty and nonintervention is the norm. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the other hand defined standards of (1990) “good governance” that included democracy and declared (3 July 1993) that internal disputes were matters of regional concern and, in 2006, the African Union, the OAU successor, declared that Sudan’s sovereignty should not stand in the way of the deployment of a major UN peacekeeping force in Darfur (BBC, 1/16/06). Strikingly, the OAS (in Res. 1080 and in the “Santiago Commitment of 1991”) declared coups against democracy illegitimate and adopted economic sanctions against coups in Haiti and Peru. The European Union makes democracy an element in the criteria it demands for consideration in membership.

In an important recent report that completes the extension of responsibility from national to global agency, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has called upon the Security Council to recognize “a responsibility to protect” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). States of course have the first responsibility to protect the basic rights and welfare of their citizens, but if they should fail to do so through lack of will or capacity, the responsibility should devolve, the Commission argues, onto the international community, with the
Security Council as its agent. All 191 member states of the United Nations adopted this principle at the September, 2005, summit. Authentic ex ante consent, now has two venues, the national and the global, and citizens have two equally valid protectors, national as first resort and global as second. (This is far from a perfect substitute for popular consent, but together with the ex post forms of consent I mention below a significant improvement over unilateral intervention is being developed.)

But, second, cleaner hands need not mean better hands. J. S. Mill had convincingly argued that even well-meaning interventions were likely to produce harm because they would not reflect the authentic consent of the populations that were being rescued and because post-intervention regimes would not be self-sustaining. Contemporary strategic peacebuilding addresses some of these concerns (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Multilateral peacebuilding in the wake of a civil war or humanitarian crisis is different from occupation or colonialism. It either rests upon consent of the key domestic parties or it is a multilateral rescue of a country that has experienced a humanitarian crisis, as did for example Somalia, Bosnia or East Timor. It is an occupation that is designed to promote human rights and local self-determination, devoid of the controlling national interest of any particular occupier.

There have been many successes in establishing self-sustaining self-government: Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor. By “success,” I mean an end to large scale civil war (<1000 battle deaths) and something very modest on the scale of democratic rule-- that is, some degree of participation, a national election that restores (ex post) popular self-determination, but not necessarily a resolution of all the other
problems that we know that are associated with early democracy. There have also been equally striking failures to transfer democratic rule, including Rwanda, Bosnia, Angola, Liberia and Somalia.

The international community is beginning to learn the key factors in success. They appear to be twofold:

1. Elite Consent through a comprehensive, negotiated peace settlement. A genuine, comprehensive, negotiated agreement, bringing all the relevant players together to negotiate a future -- not just a truce, but envisioning a future form of rule – seems to make a difference. The "occupation" is consent-based even when extensive authority has been transferred to the UN, as in Cambodia and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia). When the UN enters without consent, as in Bosnia or Somalia, or with heavily coerced consent, as NATO did in Bosnia after Dayton, achieving a successful participatory peace is much more difficult. It is not impossible; the peace in East Timor and between East Timor and Indonesia is still holding, but only because of exceptional investment in the second factor, below.

2. A major international investment of peacebuilding resources. Multidimensional peacebuilding on the cheap is a prescription for failure. According to the studies that Nicholas Sambanis and I have done about resolving civil wars, one needs to have as much international capacity as is needed to counterbalance the local level of hostility and the local level of poverty (local capacity). The more the “local hostility” (measured by deaths, refugee displacements and the stronger, more numerous and hostile the factions) and the less the “local capacity” (measured by government capacity and poverty); then the larger the “international capacity” needs to be in terms of troops, money, and
authority in order to offset the first two and launch a process of peacebuilding that restores order, builds new institutions and launches economic development. These can be seen as constituting three dimensions of a triangle, whose “area” is the peacebuilding probability, the prospect for peace, and whose shape differs for each country.

If the international community engages in a conflict area such as was Rwanda in 1993-94 with a cheap operation designed merely to monitor and facilitate, when the extremists are determined and all factions are hostile and distrustful, one is asking for disaster, which of course is what occurred. But democratic peace-building can be done effectively, and successes in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and East Timor are the result of significant international efforts to help transfer democratic institutions to societies that are otherwise extremely problematic prospects for democratic rule. The keys were matching the right degree of international authority (from monitoring to quasi-sovereign trusteeship), military and civilian governance assistance and economic redevelopment to the nature of the dispute in question – the amount of destruction sustained and deaths and displacements suffered.

Third, it was also important that the “international community” had a newly legitimate, indeed virtually representative, means of deliberating over and expressing its collective will on an internationally impartial basis. The Security Council (SC) lays claim to being the equivalent of a “global parliament” or “global jury” (Farer, 1993; Franck, 1993) representing not merely the individual states of which it is composed but also a collective will and voice of the “international community.” The SC includes five permanent members (US, Russia, France, UK, and China) and ten nonpermanent, elected members, always including members from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its
authorization for an intervention requires the affirmative vote of 9 states, including no negative votes from the five permanent members (the P5) and four positive votes from the 10 elected countries. Such a vote would usually have to incorporate representatives of a majority of major races and religions. It would always include representatives of large and small countries, nominally capitalist and socialist economies and democratic and non-democratic polities. If the mandated operation is UN directed and if troops and funding are required, many other troop contributing states will be needed and they can say, “No,” in practice. The combination makes for a genuinely international impartial intervention, and hence “cleaner hands.” When the Security Council fails to act, as it has on notable occasions, we can sometimes hope for a democratic substitution. A coalition of democracies can step in to authorize an intervention while requiring post facto confirmation that holds states accountable both that have unjustifiably intervened and unjustifiably opposed a justified intervention for costs incurred. (Buchanan and Keohane, 2004).

**Conclusion**

No one should argue that the ethical problems have been solved by multilateral authorization and new strategies of peacebuilding (Bass, 2000; Walzer, 2004; Sriram, 2004; Feldman, 2004). They manifestly haven’t. On too many occasions the international community as represented in the Security Council has chosen to authorize less than adequate missions – think of Rwanda and Srebrenica. Under pressure from a Security Council unwilling to expend resources and assign troops, General Dallaire, the force commander of the UN operation in Rwanda, was told to “situate the estimate” – to
design the mission to fit available resources rather to fit the challenges on the ground (Dallaire, 2003, 56). Elsewhere, the Security Council has refused to act or taken measures clearly inadequate toward ending the humanitarian emergencies with which it has been confronted -- Bosnia before 1995 and Darfur today come to mind.

Nonetheless, with the revival of the Security Council after the Cold War, multilateral authorization evolved to avoid many of the dangers of unilateral exploitation. With the slow build up of lessons in what worked and what did not, multilateral intervention acquired the tools to avoid both political collapse and dependency. It learned, moreover, how to help build self-sustaining, self-determining peace. We should not, therefore, be judging these new forms on interventionism by the same tropes we have used to judge unilateral interventions. They can be different and, sometimes, justifiable.

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