|
Friday, April 7th and Saturday April 8th, 2006 Our motivation is simple. Despite extensive conceptual development in the economics literature and a central place in the deterrence literature, reputation in international relations research remains under-theorized, empirically contested, and fragmented. Recently, however, scholars in both IPE and Security have begun to focus on what we see as the central puzzle of reputation. Game theory strongly implies that the actions of states will affect their reputations, and astute observers such as Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger insist that reputation should matter, but empirical work has repeatedly failed to find such effects. The goal of the workshop is bring together scholars working on issues related to rationality and reputation to share their ideas and potentially build a larger research program. Among the important topics we anticipate participants will explore include:
Confirmed participants include:
List of memos. Directions to Nassau Inn and Robertson Hall. Final Agenda. Selected readings on reputation The workshop is by invitation only. If you have questions about the event, please contact Josh Busby at jbusby@princeton.edu |
