Nicaragua 1995
In the first presidential election after adoption of the 1987 constitution, Violeta Chamorro, candidate of a coalition of opposition parties (UNO) defeated incumbent President Daniel Ortega, head of the Sandinistas (FSLN) in February 1990. Chamorro's supporters also won a slight majority in the National Assembly. The Chamorro victory caught the FSLN by surprise and sparked considerable discord. The country was in severe economic and social crisis. Since 1987, civil conflict had caused more than 60,000 deaths and inflation rates had reached as high as 30,000 percent. Chamorro embarked on a severe austerity plan and undertook initiatives for economic and social reconciliation that sparked opposition from the Contras who took up arms against the Chamorro government in 1991. Many of the contending groups agreed on a Transition Protocol and a Tocontin Accord that sought to demobilize the Contras and bring about generalized demobilization.
With the 1990 election, constitutional reform was back on the table. Opposition parties had proposed amendments in earlier years to the 1987 constitution, but at the request of international mediators trying the effectuate Central American peace accords put their demands on hold in exchange for some changes in the election laws. There were disagreements in 1991 about the process for constitutional reform. One group simply sought amendments to the 1987 constitution through procedures spelled out in that document. Others wanted a new constituent assembly to produce a new constitution. The FSLN and some of the centrist parties signed an agreement in favor of the prescribed amendment process. This provided that the amendments could be considered and ratified by the National Assembly, the members of which were elected from multi-representative districts on the basis of proportional representation. In January 1994, the Assembly appointed a special commission to study the amendment proposals and offer an opinion. Membership on the commission was based on the proportion each party held in the National Assembly. The commission's work, except for some scheduled public forums and requests for comments sent to 59 social and political organizations, was conducted behind closed doors. The commission presented its recommendations to the Assembly in November 1994.
When the proposals reached the National Assembly, the debates were open to the public, but informal negotiations were secret. The advocates for change in 1991 made strange bedfellows. Sandinistas who had separated from the FSLN allied themselves with the other parties to seek greater empowerment of the legislature while Ortega joined with Chamorro in efforts to block reductions in the power of the presidency. Up to this point, the President neither participated nor intervened in the process.
On May 8, 1995, the Assembly voted in favor of changes, but President Chamorro refused to sign triggering a five-month constitutional crisis. The Supreme Court refused to accept the amendments without the President's signature. Foreign leaders and the church mediated the five-month constitutional confrontation and brokered a solution. In the end, the Assembly gave up some of its powers to tax in return for the President's acceptance of measures to limit some of the powers of the presidency.
On July 4, 1995, 80 out of 96 representatives, with two abstentions, voted on a revised set of amendments that increased the power of the Assembly and decreased those of the President. They also required a second round of voting whenever a candidate wins no more than 45% on the first round. Presidents were forbidden to hold office for two consecutive terms and are limited to two non-consecutive terms. Presidential terms were reduced from six to five years. The Supreme Court was expanded from nine to 12 justices. A referendum, about which there is little information, was held in mid-March 1995 on some of these issues.