

# The Institutional Legacy of African Independence Movements\*

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## Abstract

We show that current cross-country differences in levels of democracy in Africa originate in most part from the nature of independence movements. We find that countries that experienced anti-colonial "rural insurgencies" (e.g., Cameroon and Kenya) tend to have autocratic regimes, while those that experienced "urban insurgencies" (e.g., Senegal and Ghana) tend to have democratic institutions. We provide evidence for causality of this relationship by using terrain ruggedness as an instrument for rural insurgency and by performing a number of falsification tests. Finally, we find that urban social movements against colonial rule facilitated post-Cold War democratization by generating more inclusive governments and stronger civil societies during the Cold War. More generally, our results indicate that democratization in Africa may result from the legacy of historical events, specifically from the forms of political dissent under colonial rule.

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# 1 Introduction

Modernization theory remains one of the most intense and open research questions in the social sciences. Following Lipset (1959) and Przeworski (1997), there have been a new wave of studies focusing on the role of income (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Benhabib et al. 2011), education (Glaeser et al. 2007), and factor mobility (Boix 2003). These studies provide mixed empirical evidence at best. While Glaeser et al. (2007) and Boix (2003) find that education and factor mobility, respectively, have a positive effect on democratization, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find that the inclusion of country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. In the context of Africa, the empirical evidence suggests that none of those factors have any predictive power on democracy. In other words, development-related variables seem to be uncorrelated with democratization in African countries<sup>1</sup>.

In this paper we turn our attention to political and historical factors. We find that countries that experienced major rural armed rebellions against colonial rule between 1900 and independence tend to be either autocratic or unstable democracies, specifically after the end of the Cold War, that is, from 1990 to 2010. In contrast, urban anti-colonial insurgencies generate the opposite effect during the same time period. Additionally, we find that more intense conflicts strengthen the institutional effect of insurgencies. Highly violent rural rebellions undermine the development of democratic regimes during and after the Cold-War. We also find that land or resource related conflicts during colonial times negatively affect democracy, regardless of the type of insurgency.

Our results are consistent with the view that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political development paths (Acemoglu et al. 2009:1043). The critical juncture for democratic change in Africa is the nature of its independence movements. The results are also consistent with the view that significant historic events can generate path-dependency and significantly shape future institutions and norms of behavior (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000). We contribute to the literature on the determinants of democracy by explaining what facilitates the emergence of democratic values in Africa. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that African countries with stable democracies are those with "wise" leaders and civil society organizations with strong democratic values (e.g., Bratton and Van de Walle

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<sup>1</sup>We replicated the results from Acemoglu et al. (2008) restricting the sample to African countries, and confirmed that income does not predict democracy when incorporating country fixed effects. For brevity purposes, these results are not reported in the present article, but they can be provided upon request.

1997; Joseph 1997). However, civil society strength and leadership style are highly endogenous. We therefore need to investigate political factors that facilitate the emergence of democratic values in the first place.

We provide evidence suggesting that anti-colonial insurgencies affect democracy through civil liberties and more open political institutions. Countries that have experienced urban mass uprisings tend to have more civil liberties after independence and during the Cold War, and this, ultimately, facilitates the success of democratic reforms after the Cold War. The reverse is to be true in countries with a legacy of violent rural rebellion: when the rebellion fails, political rights are severely restricted, and political participation is limited. When the rebellion succeeds, its leaders are likely to limit access to government only to those who "fought in the bush", and this generates a culture of political exclusion.

An alternative explanation to our findings is that pre-colonial state violence may have led to the emergence of a "warrior mentality" in parts of Africa (Mamdani 1996), which fosters the adoption of guerilla tactics by anti-colonial insurgents. In other words, pre-colonial states shape current democratic institutions through their effect on the nature of independence movements. Alternatively, urbanization, population density, and land size might be correlated with insurgency.

We establish that the relationship we uncover between insurgency and democracy is casual, by controlling for a host of pre-colonial and colonial variables and by using a terrain ruggedness index (Nunn and Puga, forthcoming) as an instrument for rural insurgency. We find that rugged terrain facilitates the adoption of rural guerilla tactics and does not have a direct effect on democratic change. We verify the exclusion restriction by showing that ruggedness affects democracy in African countries only through the experience of a major rural insurgency during colonial times.

Our results have important implications for the study of political development. They indicate that past social movements may have profound effects on current institutions. The results suggest that colonial history matters for African political development not only because of the policies enacted by the colonial administration, but also because of the way African pro-independence leaders chose to oppose them. Those who opposed them by setting up clandestine newspapers and strong unions, or by organizing mass protests left an enduring legacy of democratic values. On the contrary, those who fought colonialism by setting up rural rebel groups left a weak democratic, or rather autocratic institutional legacy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to highlight and identify the impact of historical events and social movements on democratization in Africa.

The article is organized as follows. We start by presenting the historical background and the theoretical framework of the study. Next, we describe our data sources, followed by an explanation of the empirical strategy employed to estimate the causal effect of insurgency type upon democracy levels. We then turn to present the main empirical results, and discuss possible channels of causality. The last section concludes the paper.

## 2 Historical Background and Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Historical Background

Post-war Africa (1945-1950) was a time of enormous political change. French and British empires were about to fall, and their leaders were trying to initiate major institutional reforms in order to maintain the status quo. In Francophone Africa, political liberalization that intended to turn Africans into French citizens ignited a revolutionary movement in which the new emerging political elites used the "language of imperial legitimacy to claim all the social entitlement of metropolitan citizens" (Cooper 2002: 39 ). In British colonies, the policy of gradual devolution of power to local governments was met by urban youth and labor movements pushing for independence.

The political conflicts of the late 1940s in Ghana and Senegal quickly spread to all colonies in diverse forms, with various degrees of intensity. By the end of 1959, a dozen African countries had experienced long, protracted rural insurgencies. This was the case in Kenya with the Mau Mau rebellion (1952-1960), one of the bloodiest episodes of British colonialism, and in Cameroon with UPC rebellions during which, according to estimates, half-a-million civilians and insurgents were killed. There were similar conflicts in Algeria (1956-1962), later in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. There were other less significant rural insurgencies in Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Chad. In total, 45 % of African independence movements were rural armed rebellions.

Despite the spread of political violence in most colonies, political elites in most cases maintained the earlier strategy of peaceful protests and uprisings in urban areas beginning in Senegal and Ghana. In Francophone Africa, the strategy evolved into active participation in legislative elections organized by the French government to ensure representation of the colonies in the French National Assembly. As a result, a new wave of democratically elected leaders emerged: Houphouet Boigny in Cote d'Ivoire, Lamine Gueye in Senegal, Modibo Keita in Mali, and Sourou-Migan Apithy in Dahomey/Benin. These

events would have major political consequences after independence, because they indicate that basic political rights, i.e. freedom of expression, political organization, rights to vote, etc., were clearly secured and already exercised in a number of former colonies.

A comparison between independence movements in Tanzania and Kenya illustrates quite well the way in which the nature of insurgency may affect post independence institutions. In Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was emblematic of a movement driven by mass mobilization. TANU received much of its dynamism from its grassroots, including from women's groups who organized support, held rallies, raised money, and more (Geiger 1996). While Kenyans also mobilized through urban political parties, Kenyan anti-colonialism emerged as well through armed rebellion. Rural Kikuyu mobilized militarily to fight the white settler state, particularly mobilizing around issues of control over land. The Mau Mau insurgency and the extraordinary brutality of the colonial state's crackdown reverberated through late colonial and independent Kenya.

The nature and significance of these historical events has been described, analyzed and debated by historians (see Cooper, 2002, and Mamdani, 1996). But several questions remain: Why did independence turn into armed rebellion in some places and not others? How and to what extent does the nature of African independence still matter today?

Cooper focuses on the nature of the initial responses by colonial administrations but never clearly distinguishes between the political development paths of the countries that have experienced urban uprisings from those that experienced armed rebellion. He did not investigate the specific roles that land conflict, the discovery of natural resources, or the geography of the colonies played in independence movements.

Mamdani compares the rural independence movements in Uganda to the urban anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and explains how they shaped the nature of colonial rule and pre-colonial institutions. The study was the first to investigate the way in which post-independence institutions are shaped by the nature of independence movement as well as pre-colonial and colonial institutions. However, by being focused on South Africa and Uganda, the study lacks external validity and underestimates the role of geographic and economic factors in shaping the nature of the conflict between African insurgents on one hand and British and French colonial powers on the other. The goal of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by empirically estimating the legacy of the African independence movements. But before presenting the data and the results, we discuss the theoretical framework of the study.

## 2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of the paper is based on the notion that democratic institutions are a contingent outcome of conflict (Przeworski, 1993). In other words, democracy can be an immediate and direct form of conflict resolution between rival political forces. But in fact, it is conceivable that conflict can lead to an intermediate "regime", which is not democratic, yet facilitates the eventual emergence of democracy. This could happen if, for instance, the conflict helps to develop norms of civic engagement and political participation. But conflict can also generate norms of violent political behavior and autocratic leadership styles that set the stage for autocratic regimes.

The logic of the argument is as follows: insurgencies, whether they are mass uprisings or armed rebellions, are risky collective actions. As such, individuals or groups' decisions to participate in them depend on their assessments of the likelihood that others would participate. In other words, insurgencies are coordination games between groups and individuals. According to the literature on risky collective action or revolutions, there are at least two possible mechanisms to solve the coordination problem. One way is through the use of violent actions to manipulate citizens' beliefs about the unpopularity of the government and to induce them to participate in the revolution (see Bueno de Mesquita, 2010). Insurgents can also hold an internal consultation or a vote to find out whether enough of them are willing to take part in the revolution. The outcome of the vote represents a public signal on the probability of success of the mass protest: it is a weakly dominated strategy for a member to vote in favor of a mass protest and not show up to the protest. This would make the movement more likely to fail, which is costly to every member of the group. (see Cabrales et al. 2010).

The type of public signals chosen -"armed rebellion" or "mass uprising" based upon voting- might depend on geography, demography and economic factors. For instance, they may choose violence if the country is covered mostly by rural mountainous terrain (See Fearon and Laitin 2003). In contrast, mass uprising is more likely to occur on flat terrain and in more urban settings.

Now the question: why does these two types of insurgencies leave opposing institutional legacies? Mass uprisings are social movements with relatively horizontal organization structure. By their very nature, they enable participants to learn values of peaceful political participation and expression as well as those of political compromise and openness. As such, mass uprisings provide the cultural and perhaps the institutional basis for civil liberties and liberal democracy (Dahl 1971).

In contrast, rural armed rebellions are violent social movements with relatively vertical, hierarchical organization structure. If they fail, they are likely to generate self-censorship as in Madagascar following the 1947 rebellion (see García-Ponce and Wantchekon, 2011). If they succeed, they can result in tighter state censorship and limits to free expression. As a result, armed rebellion may facilitate the emergence of autocratic regimes.

### 3 Data & Measurement

To analyze the institutional legacy of anti-colonial insurgencies in Africa, we combine data from a number of sources: (1) an in-depth review of historical events to code countries as either having a legacy of rural or urban insurgency; (2) measures of democracy, based on Polity IV and Freedom House scores; (3) pre-colonial and colonial data on institutional development and social structure characteristics, mainly based on George P. Murdock's classification (1957); (4) Nunn and Puga's (forthcoming) data on terrain ruggedness and other relevant geographical characteristics at the country level; and (5) a combination of Fearon & Laitin's data on civil wars (2003) with Przeworski's data set of political variables (2010).

#### 3.1 Rural vs. Urban Insurgency

Our independent variable of interest is type of insurgency. We distinguish between "rural" and "urban" anti-colonial insurgencies. This variable was coded by hand, based on in-depth reviews of historical events of each country, covering the period between 1900 and the year of independence (*circa* 1960)<sup>2</sup>. Countries that experienced major rural armed rebellions were coded as having a legacy of "rural insurgency". This type of insurgency involves a series of violently crushed uprisings, usually based on rural areas, and organized in the style of Mao's Red March. On the other hand, countries that experienced urban, and comparatively non-violent social movements were coded as being exposed to a legacy of "urban insurgency"<sup>3</sup>.

One obvious example of a rural anti-colonial insurgency is the Mau Mau uprising (1952-1960), which set the stage for Kenyan independence<sup>4</sup>. Another interesting example is the Malagasy Uprising (1947-

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<sup>2</sup>Only seven countries were independent before 1960: Egypt (1922), Libya (1951), Morocco (1953), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1956), Ghana (1957), and Guinea (1958). Likewise, only six countries achieved independence after the 1960s: Guinea Bissau (1974), Angola (1975), Mozambique (1975), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990), and Eritrea (1993).

<sup>3</sup>The authors' coding was double-checked and corrected (when needed) by five research assistants. A copy of the coding protocol can be found in the appendix (Figure A1).

<sup>4</sup>This insurgency against the British Empire is regarded as Africa's first modern guerrilla war. Mau Mau rebels imple-

1948), one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of Colonial Africa<sup>5</sup>. As for the cases of urban insurgency, countries such as Ghana and Senegal may illuminate our understanding of how a legacy of vibrant social movements in urban areas affects institutions in the long run. In both cases, unarmed manifestations and sporadic rioting in the cities were at the core of mobilization processes that eventually lead to independence<sup>6</sup>.

As of September 2011, there are 54 territories in Africa recognized as sovereign states by the United Nations. Our study only excludes 9 of these countries. Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles are dropped from the data set due to the lack of data on democracy levels. Liberia and Ethiopia are not considered in our analysis since they are exceptional cases that escaped the so-called European "scramble for Africa". Djibouti and Lesotho are treated as part of Somalia and South Africa, respectively. In the first case, it is practically impossible to treat both countries separately because Djibouti was part of Somalia before the 1960s. In the second case, the extremely porous borders between Lesotho and South Africa made the former highly sensitive to the political events of the latter. Finally, South Sudan is a newly formed country (July 2011) so we do not take it into account. Figure 1 shows a map of Africa with the type of insurgency experienced by each country. Table A1 in the appendix gives additional details about the insurgencies.<sup>7</sup>

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

### 3.2 Measures of Democracy

We use two different measures of degree of democratization: (i) the Polity IV scores, and (ii) the Freedom House index of political rights. Polity IV evaluates the openness of political regimes on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Components of this index include competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the

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mented typical guerrilla tactics aiming the capital while hiding in the highlands. Atrocities were inflicted by both sides of the conflict, and the death toll is estimated range into the thousands.

<sup>5</sup>In March 1947, a group of Malagasy nationalists revolted against the colonial rule. The uprising immediately spread over one-third of Madagascar's territory, but the French army crushed the rebellion after receiving reinforcements, suppressing all signs of insurrection by November 1948. Recent quantitative research suggests this event traumatized the population across generations in affected areas of the country (García-Ponce and Wantchekon 2011).

<sup>6</sup>In Ghana, for instance, social unrest was generated against the colonial rule because the government failed to meet demands from a working class largely affected by the rise of foodstuffs prices and the suspension of salary increases. The government's repressive response to peaceful manifestations was the breaking point that unleashed the riots in Accra on February 28, 1948. This incident is seen as the beginning of the process of independence.

<sup>7</sup>More exhaustive information will be available in an online appendix.

chief executive. The Freedom House index is an annual comparative assessment of political rights and civil liberties in 194 countries that has been published since 1972. Each country is assigned two numerical ratings—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on a 1 to 7 scale. To make our results perfectly comparable we normalized both Polity IV and Freedom House scores in a scale ranging from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 1 (strongly democratic).

We take into consideration annual scores of these indexes for all African countries between the year of independence and 2010. However, due to other data limitations most of our specifications are restricted to the 1960-2000 period. Figure 2 displays the relationship between type of insurgency and democracy scores over time. As we can see, countries exposed to a legacy of rural insurgency have had a tendency to be less democratic than their counterparts. This trend seems to run parallel to the so-called “third wave” of democratization, and is crystal clear after 1989, that is, after the end of the Cold War. Note, however, that some interesting patterns can be identified before 1989. For instance, democracy scores of urban-insurgency countries have tended to progressively increase since the 1980s, while democracy scores of rural-insurgency countries have fluctuated more over time, revealing the existence of unstable institutions.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

### 3.3 Terrain Ruggedness & Other Geographical Conditions

To explain why some countries have experienced rural, rather than urban, insurgencies one needs to understand the conditions that favor rural uprising. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the presence of mountainous terrain poorly served by roads seems to be a good predictor of insurgency and civil war. The problem with this measure is that it does not take into account other types of rough terrain, such as caves, swamps, and jungle, among others. We consider Nunn and Puga's (forthcoming) *terrain ruggedness* index as a better measure, since it captures small-scale terrain irregularities, such as caverns, caves and cliff walls, that could facilitate guerrilla tactics. Therefore, as we discuss in detail in the next section, our analysis utilizes rugged terrain as an instrument for rural insurgency, while controlling for other relevant geographical conditions such as land size, fertile soil, desert, tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, presence of oil, and gem diamond extraction.

### 3.4 Pre-colonial & Colonial Data

The way anti-colonial movements were organized may be correlated with pre-colonial institutions and/or demographics. More politically “sophisticated” societies may have resisted differently and more effectively to colonization. Likewise, one might expect the size of pre-colonial populations to be positively correlated with urban insurgency. Therefore, we incorporate population size in 1400 as an explanatory variable, as well as the number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, based on Murdock’s classification (1957). This gives us some information on the degree of institutional development before the colonizers arrived. In addition, we incorporate a set of covariates that reflect social and cultural changes introduced by the colonizers. We use slave exports between 1400-1900 (Nunn and Wantchekon, forthcoming), colonial rule indicators (either British, French or Portuguese), percentage of European descent (Nunn and Puga, forthcoming), population size in 1950, population density in 1950, urban population rate in 1950, growth of urban population between 1950-1955, and ethnic and religious fractionalization (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

### 3.5 Contemporaneous Data

We include a set of country-year characteristics that are plausibly relevant in shaping political institutions: lagged GDP p.c., population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a  $> 2$  change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in each country-year. These covariates are mostly taken from Fearon & Laitin’s data on civil wars (2003) and cover the period between year of independence and 2000. In addition, we use Przeworski’s dataset of political variables (2010) to explore potential mechanisms through which the institutional legacy of independence movements might operate. Specifically, we test the effects of insurgency type upon constitutional provisions concerning the mode of election of legislatures. We also use Barro’s transformation of Gastil, which maps the Gastil Civil Liberties onto a scale from 0 to 1 for the period 1970-2000.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

## 4 Empirical Approach

Our empirical approach follows the standard strategy used in other econometric analyses to estimate the determinants of democracy, but incorporates type of insurgency in the right-hand side of the equation. To be precise, we employ a times-series cross-sectional analysis, where the unit of analysis is the country year, the dependent variable is democracy, and the independent variable of interest is an indicator of type of insurgency (rural versus urban). The reduced-form linear regression that will be estimated is the following:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \tau_t + X'_{it}\beta_1 + \beta_2 Rural\_Insurgency_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the outcome of interest (either Polity IV or Freedom House scores) for country  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $X_{it}$  is a vector of control variables, which includes contemporaneous data (country-year characteristics), measures of pre-colonial and colonial institutions, and controls for natural resources and other geographical conditions<sup>8</sup>. Time fixed effects ( $\tau_t$ ) are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. The term  $\epsilon_i$  is a disturbance term, which is allowed to be correlated across years for the same country in all regressions. The parameter of interest is  $\beta_2$  and *Rural\_Insurgency* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country experienced a major rural anti-colonial insurgency, and 0 if independence or anti-colonial movements were rather channeled through urban uprisings. We do not use country fixed effects because rural insurgency is a time-invariant characteristic, so the unit effect dummies and this variable would be perfectly collinear.

To identify the effect of rural insurgency on deomcracy levels, we first estimate pooled OLS and random-effects models, the latter being the preferred estimation method. According to Plumper and Troeger (2007), random effects should perform better than pooled OLS. When time invariant variables preclude the estimation of unit fixed effects, random effects may serve as a viable second best option. We tested for random effects using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM), and rejected the null that variances across entities is zero with  $prob > \chi^2 = 0.0000$ . We therefore feel confident that the

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<sup>8</sup>Contemporaneous controls include lagged GDP p.c., population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability, lagged war, and number of wars in progress; pre-colonial and colonial controls include colonial rule indicators, slave exports (1400-1900), population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population between 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization; and resources and other geographical controls include % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest coast, land size, and indicators for presence of oil and gem diamond extraction.

random-effects model is a more appropriate strategy. One important methodological concern is that annual data on democracy may suffer from serial correlation, and lags of democracy are therefore likely to predict changes in democracy scores. To address this concern, we perform a couple of robustness checks using a single lag and five-year lags of democracy.

A major challenge to the identification of a causal effect of insurgency type on democracy is that rural and urban insurgency countries may differ in ways that are correlated with both democracy and the probability of having experienced a particular kind of insurgency. It might be the case that democratic features of pre-colonial institutional settings explain both the type of anti-colonial insurgency and the type of institutional arrangement after independence. In other words, type of insurgency could be endogenous to past “democratic” institutions or experiences. To address this potential problem of endogeneity bias, we compute IV estimates via 2SLS and G2SLS random-effects models using terrain ruggedness as an instrumental variable for rural insurgency. The second-stage equation that estimates the impact of rural insurgency on democracy is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \tau_t + X'_{it}\beta_1 + \beta_2(Rural\_Insurgency_i = Ruggedness_i) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Rural insurgency could also be instrumented by mountainous terrain. While the use of either mountainous or rugged terrain as an instrument for insurgency does not substantially alter any of the results shown in the following sections, we only report IV estimates based on the latter instrument <sup>9</sup>. As discussed in the Data section, terrain ruggedness is a better instrument for rural insurgency because it captures a wider variety of terrain irregularities associated with the implementation of guerrilla tactics.

Variation in terrain ruggedness is certainly exogenous to democratic institutions, and strongly correlated with rural insurgency. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the relationship between rural insurgency and rugged terrain is  $r = (+)0.44$ . To satisfy the exclusion restriction, our instrument should affect democracy outcomes only through anti-colonial rural insurgency. To verify this we conduct a number of falsification tests that estimate the potential effects of rugged terrain on democracy through post-independence civil conflict and GDP per capita.

Finally, as shown in Figure 2, the democracy time-series data seems to experience a structural break by the end of the 1980s. At first sight, this evidence is indicative of major changes in political institutions

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<sup>9</sup>Results using mountainous terrain as an instrument for rural insurgency will be provided upon request.

related to the end of the Cold War. While the Cold War period is characterized by accented political instability in African countries, more stable trends are observed in the aftermath of the war. To capture the influence of such structural change, our econometric analysis is conducted for two subsets of the sample: Cold-War years (c.1960-1989), and post-Cold War years (1990-2010).

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Effect of Ruggedness on Rural Insurgency

We start by reporting estimates of the effect of terrain ruggedness on anti-colonial rural insurgency. We control for potential confounders such as pre-colonial and colonial factors, socio-demographic characteristics, existence of valuable mineral resources and other geographical conditions. Since the outcome variable is time-invariant, we only estimate cross-sectional models at this point. Table 2 displays both OLS and Probit estimates. As it is shown, the effect of rugged terrain on rural insurgency is positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels across specifications and estimation methods.

We find these results indicative of a strong relationship between local terrain conditions and the forms of political dissent under colonial rule. It is very likely that anti-colonial movements in countries covered by mountains, jungle and other type of terrain irregularities exploited the peculiarities of their geography by implementing guerrilla tactics. On the other hand, opposition movements in countries where the terrain is rather flat may have found unfeasible to organize themselves as violent rebel groups, and decided to fight colonialism by conduction mass protests and implementing other urban insurgency strategies such as the creation of clandestine newspapers and underground political organizations.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

### 5.2 Effect of Rural Insurgency on Democracy

Table 3 displays pooled OLS, random-effects, and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the determinants of democracy for two different periods of time: Cold-War years (c.1960-1989), and post-Cold War years (1990-2000). We do not report first stage F-stats from the 2SLS and G2SLS regressions, but they are above 30.00 in all cases, which suggests that our instrument is indeed quite strong.

Overall, our results suggest that rural insurgency is a good predictor of democracy for the post-Cold War period, but not before then. When restricting the sample to the Cold War years, the IV estimates suggest that rural insurgency has a moderate, negative effect on Polity IV scores. But the size of the coefficient is quite small, and not significant at all when the outcome is based on Freedom House data. In contrast, rural insurgency is strongly and negatively correlated with democracy levels during the post-Cold War period. The effect is statistically significant across all specifications using both Polity IV and Freedom House data. Note that our results are robust to several controls, and both 2SLS and G2SLS IV estimates confirm the hypothesis of rural insurgency having a negative and statistically significant impact on democratic development after 1989. Experience of this particular kind of insurgency dramatically decreases democracy scores by between 0.37 and 0.54 points in a 0-1 scale.

The Cold War period is clearly difficult to interpret, probably due to the instability of regimes across the continent. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the (unreported) coefficient on British rule is positive and statistically significant for this period of time, which suggests that former British colonies were more likely to experience democracy (even if they were not stable regimes). For the period 1990-2010, our interpretation of the results is that the effect of insurgency becomes significant when African countries became relatively free from foreign pressure of the Cold War, that is, when domestic political actors could play a more significant role in shaping local institutions.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

### 5.3 Robustness Checks

Since annual data on democracy may suffer from serial correlation, lags of democracy are likely to predict changes in democracy. For this reason, we perform a number of robustness checks using a single lag and five-year lags of democracy. Table 4 displays the results of these tests. As we can see, 2SLS and G2SLS yield identical estimates when controlling for a single lag or five-year lags plus the set of covariates used in previous specifications. While democracy is strongly predicted by its lags, our findings suggest that the type of insurgency experienced during colonial times does not affect democratic development immediately after independence, but rather in the long run (after the so-called *third wave* of democratization).

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

## 5.4 Falsification Tests

If we assume the rugged terrain instrument is exogenous, then it has to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In other words, terrain ruggedness should affect democracy outcomes only through rural insurgency. One reasonable way to test this is to estimate whether rugged terrain affects democracy through channels other than rural insurgency: e.g., through economic growth, uneven access to resources, post-independence violence, among others. Following this approach, we test two alternative hypotheses, or channels through which rugged terrain may affect democracy. First, we use ruggedness as an instrument for post-independence GDP per capita. The argument here is that irregularities in the terrain may block access to resources, and hence affect income and democracy. Second, we use ruggedness as an instrument for post-independence civil conflict. The logic behind this argument is straightforward: rugged terrain may facilitate the adoption of guerrilla tactics not only before, but also after independence.

Table 5 reports estimates of the determinants of democracy instrumenting post-independence GDP p.c., and post-independence civil wars by rugged terrain. As it is shown, the results are consistent across all specifications for different subsets of the sample, and confirm that terrain ruggedness does not affect democracy scores through either growth or post-independence insurgencies. Thus, we feel confident in saying that the rugged terrain instrument is exogenous, and hence, the exclusion restriction is satisfied: ruggedness seem to affect democratic consolidation in African countries only through the experience of a major rural insurgency during colonial times.

As an additional exercise, we replicated the results from Fearon and Laitin (2003) incorporating the dummy for rural insurgency in the RHS of the equation. Interestingly, we find that the experience of an anti-colonial rural insurgency is a strong predictor of post-independence civil conflict. The results are shown in the appendix Table A2. These findings challenge the conventional notion of terrain conditions having a direct and atemporal effect on civil conflict. Instead, our results suggest that geographical conditions mattered during colonial times, when they facilitated the adoption of certain insurgency tactics. The decisions made then generated path-dependency and shaped post-independence institutions.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

## 5.5 Conflict Intensity and Democracy

Beyond the dichotomous definition of insurgency (rural versus urban), there is a sharp difference between countries in terms of conflict intensity. For example, the Accra riots in Ghana (1948) gave birth to a series of urban uprisings that lasted several years, while the anti-colonial struggles in Niger were merely labor strikes organized by the local chapter the of UGTAN ( Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire), based in Dakar. As for rural urgencies, the armed rebellions in Cameroon lasted five years with approximately half-a-million casualties (mostly civilians), while Morocco's independence movement involved an estimated death toll that ranges into the hundreds.

We extend the basic model by assuming that either type of insurgency can take on values of 1, 2, or 3. This captures low, average, and high conflict intensity, respectively. We hypothesize that more intense conflict would have more profound effect on our dependent variables, democracy levels during and after the cold war. Violence during the rebellion might generate lingering fear of repression that could limit demand for freedom (García-Ponce and Wantchekon 2011). In contrast, the legacy of more organized uprisings might strengthen the social bases for political rights. The results reported in Table 6 confirm our intuition. The effect of highly violent rural insurgency on democracy was far stronger both during after the Cold War.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

## 5.6 Land, Resources and Democracy

In addition to specific insurgency tactics employed to fight colonialism, the presence of land or resource related conflicts may have played a crucial role in determining post-independence institutional outcomes. For example, according to Woodberry (2011), settler colonies such as Kenya and Zimbabwe were prone to conflicts between white farmers and African landed elites trying to reclaim land expropriated by European settlements. Similarly, countries with abundant mineral and oil (e.g., Cameroon and Congo) experienced more fierce conflicts between colonial administration and African insurgents for control over those resources. These particularistic interests over resources or land may have played a decisive role in shaping institutional arrangements in some African countries.

In this subsection we investigate the way in which the presence of a resource or land problem affects the legacy of insurgency. To do so, we create a new indicator variable equal to 1 for colonies with either

resources or land conflicts, and 0 otherwise. We follow two econometric approaches. First, we estimate the effect of the interaction *Rural\_insurgency*  $\times$  *Land/resource\_problem* upon democracy scores. All the constituent terms are included in these interaction models and, in consistency with our previous specifications, we split the sample into Cold-War and post-Cold War years. Secondly, we compute IV estimates of the effect of rural insurgency restricting the sample to countries with land or resources related insurgencies (either urban or rural), and then to those countries with insurgencies or movements that were not either land or resources motivated

As we observe in Table 7, we find a negative statistical association between land/resources conflict and democracy. The results reported in columns (1) to (4) indicate that, regardless of the type of insurgency, the existence of land or resource conflicts under the colonial rule negatively affects the development of democracy. Likewise, the IV estimates reported in columns (5) to (8) suggest that the negative effect of having experienced an anti-colonial insurgency is more robust and stronger in countries that also experienced either land or resources conflicts. Again, our estimates confirm these effects were amplified after the end of the Cold War.

A comparison of Senegal and Ivory Coast independence movements illustrates the effect of land conflict even in the presence of urban social movements. Senegal and Ivory Coast both had strong urban social movements, with militant labor unions, student movements, and high social movement activity, strong political parties around the postwar expansion of suffrage. But in Cote d'Ivoire there was lingering conflict over land between the new agrarian elite and colonial administration. As a result, the colonial state's framework for dealing the uprisings in the two colonies was markedly different. In Senegal, the colonial administration propped up its old allies, Lamine Gueye's socialist party, against Léopold Sédar Senghor and Mamadou Dia's upstart party by cracking down on political protests, spying on party meetings, ballot stuffing, and forging voter lists. In other words, they viewed the problem through an entirely political (which is to say, electoral) framework. In Ivory Coast, on the other hand, colonial officials viewed the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) not as a political party -as we might expect- but as a parallel state. Colonial documents described the RDA's own police force, tax collection, justice system, health clinics, and organized boycotts against paying taxes to the colonial state.<sup>10</sup> The effect of this state policy in part explains the current political instability in Cote d'Ivoire.

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<sup>10</sup>See "Sur les activités ill'egales du P.D.C.I." 2 Mars 1950, *Archives Nationales, Archives du Gouvernement-Général*, 17G569 Bobine 457.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

## 6 Testing Potential Mechanisms: Civil Liberties & Legislatures

Our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that rural insurgencies tend to generate autocratic governments in the long run, while urban insurgencies tend to lead to democratic institutions. The question is then, what are the mechanisms through which the type of insurgency operated to institutionalize particular regime types? One interesting hypothesis is that urban insurgencies contributed to the strength of civil society organizations immediately after independence, and this enabled the development of democratic values as in the 19th century in Europe. On the other hand, rural insurgencies weakened civil society organizations after independence and this paved the way to autocratic rule.

To identify potential channels of causality we estimate the effects of rural insurgency on constitutional provisions and civil liberties during the Cold War. In the first case, we test whether the experience of an anti-colonial rural insurgency affected the composition and/or mode of election of the African legislatures during the Cold War period (c.1960-1989), based on data from Przeworski (2010). The outcome of interest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has a Lower House at least partially elected. In the second case, we test whether having experienced a rural insurgency has an impact upon civil liberties during the same time period. To do so, we use Barro's transformation of Gastil, which maps the Gastil Civil Liberties onto a scale from 0 to 1.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 shows probit and IV estimates, respectively, of the determinants having a Lower House at least partly elected during the Cold War <sup>11</sup>. As the data suggest, rural insurgency is negatively associated with having a legislature at least partly and directly elected. This suggests that countries that experienced urban social movements were more likely to create representative parliamentary institutions with direct modes of election. This is an interesting result that may help us understand how urban insurgencies strengthened civil society actors, which in turn enabled the consolidation of democratic regimes in the long term.

The results shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 indicate that rural insurgency has a negative, and statistically significant effect on civil liberties. This is indicative of how the way independence movements

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<sup>11</sup>Since binary time-series-cross-section observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of the logit regression, when estimating the probit model we employ the remedy suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998): we include a spell-identifier counter that marks the number of years since the last event of interest and three natural cubic splines. To save space, we do not report coefficients on covariates and cubic splines.

were conducted affected civic culture and democratic values in first place, and hence, influenced the creation of democratic institutions. While the effect of rural insurgency on democracy scores is not significant for the period immediately after independence (c.1960-1989), we find that countries that experienced major rural anti-colonial insurgencies tended to restrict civil liberties by -0.10 points, in a 0-1 scale, during the same period of time.

Columns (5)-(8) in Table 8 show estimates of the effect of rural insurgency on Post-Cold War democracy, controlling for average score of civil liberties and average number of partly elected legislatures during the Cold War. This allows us to identify to which extent civil liberties and constitutional provisions on legislatures during the Cold War era functioned as a mechanism of eventual democratization. Note that we also control for the set of covariates used in previous specifications. According to the results, the existence partially elected legislatures during the Cold War does not tell us much about the relationship between insurgency type and democracy, but an increase in civil liberties during the Cold War seems to be a strong predictor of democracy in the post-Cold War period.

The coefficient estimates from columns (6) and (8) of Table 8 are perfectly comparable with those reported in column (8) of Table 3, Panels A and B, respectively. By comparing these coefficients we can obtain a more accurate interpretation of the mechanisms through which rural insurgency leads to democratic failure. As we can observe, the original point estimates reported in Table 3 are heavily affected by the inclusion of Cold War civil liberties as a control, suggesting that about 60% of the estimated relationship between type of insurgency and democratic development can be explained by the deterioration or strengthening of civil liberties. In contrast, the statistical association between insurgency and democracy cannot be explained by the election mode of legislatures during the Cold War. The existence of a directly elected Lower House during that period is not necessarily linked to the development and consolidation of a democratic regime later on. To summarize, we find this piece of evidence illustrative of how the institutional legacy of independence movements affected civic culture first, and then lead to the consolidation of either democratic or autocratic institutions.

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

## 7 Concluding Remarks

Our results have important implications for the understanding of the historical determinants of political institutions and democratic culture in Africa. We have shown that the legacy of anti-colonial insurgencies has a long-term impact on institutional development. Countries that experienced major rural uprisings tend to be more autocratic and unstable, while those in which anti-colonialism was channeled through urban insurgency tactics tend to be more democratic. It is of particular importance that the institutional change immediately after independence does not seem to be correlated with the way anti-colonial movements were organized. The effect of rural insurgency on democratic development only becomes visible during the last decade of the 20th century.

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## Appendix

[TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE]

[FIGURE A1 ABOUT HERE]

## Figures

Figure 1: Map of Anti-Colonial Insurgencies in Africa






Figure 2: Relationship Between Democracy & Type of Insurgency



# Tables

Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Obs.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b><i>Dependent Variables</i></b>					
Polity IV	2208	-0.30	0.28	0.00	1.00
Freedom House	1484	0.29	0.28	0.00	1.00
<b><i>Independent Variable of Interest</i></b>					
Rural Insurgency	1732	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Instrument: Terrain Ruggedness	1732	0.87	1.04	0.11	6.20
<b><i>Covariates</i></b>					
% Fertile Soil	1732	31.36	21.33	0.01	81.70
% Desert	1732	7.32	15.48	0.00	74.86
% Tropical	1732	49.05	41.96	0.00	100.00
Distance to Coast	1732	0.48	0.34	0.01	1.25
Land Size	1732	10.39	1.54	5.31	12.38
Oil Country	1732	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Gemstones	1732	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
British Colony	1732	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
French Colony	1732	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
Portuguese Colony	1732	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
Slave Exports 1400-1900 (Log)	1732	12.72	13.32	0.00	15.09
Pre-Colonial Local Inst.	1553	2.99	0.39	2.40	4.00
Pre-Colonial Inst. Beyond Local	1553	2.40	0.83	1.00	5.00
% European Descent	1732	1.44	3.97	0.00	18.00
Population in 1400	1732	13.82	14.04	0.00	15.59
% Urban Population in 1950	1683	11.69	10.20	1.40	42.20
Urban Pop. Growth 1950-1955	1683	3.46	1.88	0.00	8.50
Population in 1950	1683	8.63	8.83	5.61	10.43
Population Density in 1950	1683	0.62	0.64	0.36	0.80
Ethnic Fractionalization	1732	0.65	0.25	0.04	0.95
Religious Fractionalization	1732	0.43	0.23	0.00	0.78
GDP p.c. (Log)	1705	6.87	0.69	5.28	9.31
Population (Log)	1730	8.68	1.19	5.98	11.71
Population Density	1730	0.85	0.12	0.58	1.33
New State	1732	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Political Instability	1729	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Lagged War	1732	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Wars in progress	1732	0.17	0.40	0.00	2.00
Partially Elected Leg.	1615	0.80	0.40	0.00	1.00
Existence of Legislature	1615	0.82	0.38	0.00	1.00
Directly Elected Leg.	1615	0.91	0.29	0.00	1.00
Civil Liberties	856	0.28	0.21	0.00	0.83
Year	2208	1985	15.44	1940	2010

Figure A1: Coding Protocol

**CODING PROTOCOL FOR INSURGENCY**

Coder: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of the group (and conflict if applicable): \_\_\_\_\_

Month/Year conflict starts: \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ Month/Year conflict ends: \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

Country code: \_\_\_\_\_ Region code(s): \_\_\_\_\_ District code(s): \_\_\_\_\_

---

**1. DEFINITION**

**P1.** Does the group aim to change the structure of the state by **non-legal means**?

1) Yes  2) No

**2. ORIGINS**

**P2.** Did this group operate in the country's **capital periphery**?

1) Capital  2) Periphery

**P3.** Is this location an urban or a rural area?

1) Urban  2) Rural

**P4.** What was the population size of this location at that time? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P5.** Does this location have a particular geographic characteristic (e.g., mountains, desert, jungle, etc)?

[Pre-coded options]

**P1.** Mountainous

**P2.** Dessert

**P3.** Jungle

**P4.** Rivers

**P5.** Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**P6.** What are the goals of the group?

1) Policy Change  2) Regime Change

3) Autonomy  4) Other

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

---

**3. STRUCTURE**

**P7.** Is the group of isolated cells or is it an advanced organization with a clear hierarchy?

1) Isolated cells  2) Clear hierarchy

**P8.** Is the group a popular movement with widespread support or small and isolated?

1) Small and isolated  2) Popular/widespread support

**P9.** Does the group have political affiliations, a political wing or a political party?

1) Yes  2) No

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**4. SUPPORT**

**P10.** Does the group have a military or armed wing?

1) Yes  2) No

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P11.** Has the group infiltrated or operated with civil society organizations such as student groups, unions, religious organizations, etc?

1) Yes  2) No

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

A. Political support?

1) Yes  2) No

B. Economic support?

1) Yes  2) No

C. Which countries? \_\_\_\_\_

---

**5. TACTICS/ACTIONS**

**P17.** How did the group communicate with outside? \_\_\_\_\_

[Pre-coded options]

1) Journals  2) Newspapers

3) Radio  4) Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**P18.** Which non-legal tactics were used? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P19.** Which violent tactics were used? \_\_\_\_\_

1) Sabotage/guerrilla tactics

2) Terrorism  3) Strikes?

4) Violence against civilians  5) Violence against gov. soldiers/police/officials

6) None  7) Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**P20.** What violent tactics were used by the government? \_\_\_\_\_

1) Mass arrests  2) Mass assassinations

3) Closing offices  4) Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**P20.5** How did actions or activities of the group change over time? \_\_\_\_\_

1) Tactics became more violent

2) Tactics became less violent

3) Tactics were constant  4) Other

---

**6. MEMBERSHIP/RECRUITMENT**

**P21.** What is the size of the group (membership)? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P22.** Was the recruitment forced or voluntary?

1) Forced  2) Voluntary

3) Other  Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P23.** Who joined: Educated elites? Unemployed youth? Criminal elements? Others? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P24.** How long did the group persist? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P24.5** In response to the insurgency, the government made: \_\_\_\_\_

1) Military responses  2) Institutional changes

3) Policy changes  4) None  5) Other

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

---

**7. IMPACT ON SOCIETY**

**P23.5** How did the size of the group change over the course of its existence? \_\_\_\_\_

1) Grew in size  2) Became smaller

3) Stayed the same (constant size)  Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P25.** How many casualties among governmental authorities? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P26.** How many casualties did the insurgency group suffer? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P27.** How many casualties from the conflict? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P28.** What forms of violent conflict were present? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P29.** How many casualties did the insurgency group suffer? \_\_\_\_\_

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

**P25.** If the group was successful in its original goals, what was the outcome? \_\_\_\_\_

0) Unsuccessful

1) Policy Change  2) Regime Change

3) Autonomy (policy change regarding periphery)  4) Other

Describe: \_\_\_\_\_

Table 2: Effect of Ruggedness on Anti-Colonial Rural Insurgency

Dep. Var.: Rural Insurgency (dummy)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	OLS	Probit	OLS	Probit	OLS	Probit	OLS	Probit
Terrain Ruggedness Index	0.28*** (0.06)	1.09** (0.42)	0.39*** (0.13)	1.80** (0.77)	0.55** (0.21)	3.82*** (1.43)	0.72*** (0.22)	9.52*** (3.08)
Intercept	0.25*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.32)	1.24** (0.56)	1.75 (1.89)	0.74 (0.82)	-0.31 (2.48)	-3.54* (1.94)	-26.85*** (9.95)
Pre-colonial & colonial institutions?	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographic characteristics?	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resources & geographic conditions?	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Observations	45	45	41	41	40	40	40	40
$\sigma$	0.17	-	0.48	-	0.48	-	0.40	-
$R^2$	0.46	-	0.26	-	0.40	-	0.69	-
Log. Likelihood	-28.32	-26.61	-23.67	-21.63	-18.71	-15.93	-5.33	-11.98

*Notes.* Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Pre-colonial & colonial institutions variables include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, and the number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times. Socio-demographic controls include: % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., right before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. Resources & geographic conditions controls include: % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 3: Effect of Rural Insurgency on Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pooled OLS	RE	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	Pooled OLS	RE	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS
<b>Panel A: Dep. Var. is Polity IV [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural Insurgency (instrumented by ruggedness)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.24* (0.14)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.50*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.17)
Observations	1107	1107	1107	1107	383	383	383	383
<b>Panel B: Dep. Var. is Freedom House [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural Insurgency (instrumented by ruggedness)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.12)	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.47*** (0.16)
Observations	711	711	711	711	379	379	379	379
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW

Notes. Pooled OLS estimates are based on a simple extension of ordinary least squares; RE estimates are based on random-effects regressions; IV-2SLS estimates are based on two-stage least-squares regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1)-(4) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (5)-(8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 4: Effect of Rural Insurgency on Democracy (Robustness Checks)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS
<b>Panel A: Dep. Var. is Polity IV [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural Insurgency (Instrumented by ruggedness)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.05)
Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	0.85*** (0.03)	0.85*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.09)	0.94*** (0.04)	0.64*** (0.05)	0.64*** (0.05)	0.73*** (0.06)	0.73*** (0.07)
Democracy <sub>t-2</sub>	- -	- -	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.14*** (0.05)	- -	- -	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.07)
Democracy <sub>t-3</sub>	- -	- -	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	- -	- -	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)
Democracy <sub>t-4</sub>	- -	- -	0.10 (0.07)	0.10** (0.05)	- -	- -	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.08)
Democracy <sub>t-5</sub>	- -	- -	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)	- -	- -	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)
Observations	1073	1073	919	919	382	382	378	378
<b>Panel B: Dep. Var. is Freedom House [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural Insurgency (Instrumented by ruggedness)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.06)
Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	0.76*** (0.04)	0.76*** (0.03)	0.80*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.04)	0.68*** (0.04)	0.70*** (0.08)	0.70*** (0.06)
Democracy <sub>t-2</sub>	- -	- -	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)	- -	- -	0.06 (0.10)	0.06 (0.07)
Democracy <sub>t-3</sub>	- -	- -	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.07)	- -	- -	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)
Democracy <sub>t-4</sub>	- -	- -	0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	- -	- -	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)
Democracy <sub>t-5</sub>	- -	- -	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	- -	- -	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)
Observations	621	621	473	473	378	378	370	370
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW

Notes. IV-2SLS estimates are based on two-stage least-squares regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1)-(4) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (5)-(8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 5: Effect of Ruggedness on Democracy through Post-colonial Conflict & Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS
<b>Panel A: Dep. Var. is Polity IV [0 to 1]</b>								
Post-independence civil war (Instrumented by ruggedness)	15.90 (22.95)	15.90 (19.31)	-14.11 (9.60)	-15.85 (61.73)				
Post-independence GDP p.c. (Instrumented by ruggedness)					-22.46 (317.87)	-22.49 (124.10)	7.43 (21.85)	2.67 (6.06)
Observations	1111	1111	390	390	1107	1107	383	383
<b>Panel B: Dep. Var. is Freedom House [0 to 1]</b>								
Post-independence civil war (Instrumented by ruggedness)	4.09 (4.54)	4.09* (2.25)	-11.61 (9.72)	-13.66 (39.09)				
Post-independence GDP p.c. (Instrumented by ruggedness)					13.78 (153.79)	2.24 (6.21)	6.03 (19.09)	8.76 (21.83)
Observations	711	711	379	379	711	711	379	379
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW

*Notes.* IV-2SLS estimates are based on two-stage least-squares regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., (except for models 5-8), population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 6: Intensity of Insurgencies and Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-2SLS	IV-G2SLS
<b>Panel A: Dep. Var. is Polity IV [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural insurgency intensity [0-3] (instrumented by ruggedness)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.06)				
Urban insurgency intensity [0-3] (instrumented by ruggedness)					0.10* (0.06)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.08)
Observations	1107	1107	383	383	1107	1107	383	383
<b>Panel B: Dep. Var. is Freedom House [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural insurgency intensity [0-3] (instrumented by ruggedness)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.07)				
Urban insurgency intensity [0-3] (instrumented by ruggedness)					0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.17** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.09)
Observations	711	711	379	379	711	711	379	379
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW

*Notes.* IV-2SLS estimates are based on two-stage least-squares regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Insurgency intensity is coded for each type [rural and urban] as follows: 0 = absence of [insert type] insurgency; 1 = low intensity; 2 = average intensity; and 3 = high intensity. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., (except for models 5-8), population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 7: Land/Resources-Related Insurgencies and Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pooled OLS	RE	Pooled OLS	RE	IV-G2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-G2SLS	IV-G2SLS
<b>Panel A: Dep. Var. is Polity IV [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural insurgency	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	0.63* (0.38)	0.83*** (0.11)	-3.53*** (0.99)	-1.03*** (0.15)
Land/Resource problem	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.12)	-0.37*** (0.12)	-	-	-	-
Rural ins. × Land/Resource	0.34*** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.33** (0.15)	0.33** (0.15)	-	-	-	-
Observations	1094	1094	383	383	427	667	143	240
<b>Panel B: Dep. Var. is Freedom House [0 to 1]</b>								
Rural insurgency	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.26 (0.41)	-0.28 (0.19)	-8.52*** (1.30)	-1.09*** (0.17)
Land/Resource problem	0.22** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.33*** (0.12)	-0.28** (0.14)	-	-	-	-
Rural ins. × Land/Resource	0.08 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.12 (0.18)	0.08 (0.19)	-	-	-	-
Observations	731	731	383	383	288	443	143	240
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Cold War & land or resource	Cold War w/o land or resource	Post-CW & land or resource	Post-CW w/o land or resource

Notes. Pooled OLS estimates are based on a simple extension of ordinary least squares; RE estimates are based on random-effects regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Insurgency intensity is coded for each type [rural and urban] as follows: 0 = absence of [insert type] insurgency; 1 = low intensity; 2 = average intensity; and 3 = high intensity. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., (except for models 5-8), population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. In addition, columns (5) and (7) restrict the sample to those insurgencies that were Land/resources related, whereas columns (6) and (8) restrict the sample to those insurgencies or movements that were not either land or resources motivated. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table 8: Legislatures, Civil Liberties, and Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Probit	IV-G2SLS	RE	IV-G2SLS	RE	IV-G2SLS	RE	IV-G2SLS
	<u>Elected Leg. (dummy)</u>		<u>Civil Liberties [0-1]</u>		<u>Polity IV [0-1]</u>		<u>Freedom House [0-1]</u>	
Rural Insurgency (Instrumented by ruggedness)	-1.52*** (0.28)	-0.24*** (0.08)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.07)	-0.29*** (0.09)	-0.18** (0.08)
Avg. Cold-War Elected Legs.	-	-	-	-	-0.08 (0.17)	0.08 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.23)	-0.01 (0.22)
Avg. Cold-War Civil Liberties	-	-	-	-	1.07*** (0.26)	1.13*** (0.24)	0.92** (0.39)	1.01*** (0.28)
Observations	1142	1143	604	604	333	333	329	329
Contemporaneous controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Cold War	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW	Post-CW

*Notes.* In the probit model, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if members of the lower house were selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election (and 0 otherwise); RE estimates are based on random-effects regressions; and IV-G2SLS estimates are based on GLS random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. Contemporaneous control variables include: one-year lagged GDP p.c., population size, population density, an indicator for newly formed states, political instability measured as a > 2 change in Polity IV in the last 3 years, an indicator for lagged war, and number of wars in progress in country-year. Year fixed effects are included to capture time trends that may be related to democracy levels. First-stage controls include: colonial rule indicators, slave exports 1400-1900, population size in 1400, number of jurisdictional hierarchies at the local and beyond the local community during pre-colonial times, % european descent, population size in 1950 (i.e., before independence), % urban population in 1950, population density in 1950, growth of urban population 1950-1955, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, % fertile soil, % desert, % tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, land size, an oil country indicator, and a gem diamond extraction indicator. Columns (1)-(4) restrict the sample to the Cold War years, i.e. the period between the year of independence of each country and 1989. Columns (5)-(8) restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period 1990-2000. \*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.

Table A1: Anti-Colonial Insurgencies in Africa

Country	Type of Insurgency	Conflict Intensity	Land/Resource Conflict?
Algeria	Rural	High	No
Angola	Rural	High	Yes
Benin	Urban	High	No
Botswana	Urban	Low	No
Burkina Faso	Rural	Average	No
Burundi	Rural	High	No
Cameroon	Rural	High	Yes
Cent. Af. Rep.	Rural	Low	No
Chad	Rural	Average	No
Congo	Urban	Average	Yes
Congo (DRC)	Urban	High	Yes
Cote d'Ivoire	Urban	High	Yes
Egypt	Urban	High	No
Equatorial Guinea	Urban	Low	No
Eritrea	Rural	High	No
Gabon	Urban	Average	Yes
Gambia	Urban	Average	No
Ghana	Urban	High	No
Guinea	Urban	High	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	Rural	High	Yes
Kenya	Rural	High	Yes
Libya	Rural	Average	No
Madagascar	Rural	High	No
Malawi	Urban	High	No
Mali	Urban	High	No
Mauritania	Urban	Average	No
Mauritius	Urban	Low	No
Morocco	Rural	High	No
Mozambique	Rural	High	No
Namibia	Rural	High	No
Niger	Urban	Average	No
Nigeria	Urban	High	Yes
Rwanda	Rural	High	No
South Africa	Urban	High	Yes
Senegal	Urban	High	No
Sierra Leone	Urban	Average	Yes
Somalia	Rural	Average	Yes
Sudan	Rural	Average	Yes
Swaziland	Rural	Average	No
Tanzania	Urban	High	No
Togo	Urban	Average	No
Tunisia	Urban	High	No
Uganda	Rural	High	No
Zambia	Urban	High	No
Zimbabwe	Rural	High	Yes

Table A2: Fearon and Laitin's (2003) Results with Rural Insurgency

	(1) Civil War	(2) Ethnic War	(3) Civil War	(4) Civl War (COW)
Anti-colonial Rural Ins.	1.33*** (0.49)	1.21** (0.49)	1.29*** (0.49)	2.30** (0.96)
Prior War	-1.65** (0.67)	-1.57** (0.67)	-1.70** (0.67)	-2.12** (0.87)
GDP p.c. (lagged)	-0.52 (0.39)	-0.63 (0.43)	-0.52 (0.39)	-1.79** (0.82)
Log(Pop.) (lagged)	0.49** (0.21)	0.47** (0.21)	0.46** (0.22)	1.06*** (0.38)
%Mountainous	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.11 (0.25)
Noncontiguous State	1.53 (1.18)	1.67 (1.22)	1.45 (1.18)	1.51 (1.44)
Oil	0.32 (0.69)	0.16 (0.76)	0.28 (0.69)	2.16** (0.97)
New State	1.45** (0.57)	1.42** (0.57)	1.53*** (0.57)	1.48** (0.73)
Instability	0.72* (0.43)	0.58 (0.45)	0.61 (0.44)	1.18** (0.55)
Polity IV	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-	-
Ethnic Frac.	-0.05 (0.80)	-0.14 (0.80)	-0.02 (0.78)	-1.65 (1.08)
Relig. Frac.	-0.41 (1.02)	-0.25 (1.05)	-0.40 (1.01)	0.28 (1.45)
Anocracy	-	-	0.65* (0.39)	0.30 (0.59)
Democracy (dummy)	-	-	-1.16 (1.05)	1.54* (0.80)
Intercept	-8.30*** (1.94)	-7.99*** (1.96)	-8.20*** (1.98)	-14.03*** (3.69)
Observations	1703	1663	1703	1402

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$