





Lecture 2: The eschatology of lost decades


Paul Krugman




Growing surpluses


	2000	2007
Developing Asia	38.6	406.5
Newly Industrialized	38.9	103.6
Middle East	71.9	254.1
Japan	119.6	211
Germany	-32.6	250.3
Total	236.4	1225.5


European current accounts (\$billion)







Household debt as % of GDP








Employment cycles




Civilian Employment-Population Ratio (EMRATIO)




Shaded areas indicate US recessions.
2009 research.stlouisfed.org

Civilian Employment-Population Ratio (EMRATIO)




Shaded areas indicate US recessions.
2009 research.stlouisfed.org


Interest rate at start of recession



Runup change in interest rate




Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index Less Food and Energy (JCXFE)



Shaded areas indicate US recessions.


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The textbook adjustment process




But in the liquidity trap, it probably looks like this ...

Price level




Output

Historically, recovery from financial-crisis-led recessions has been export-led



Japan's recovery: export-driven



THE RECOVERY FROM THE GREAT PANIC OF 1873

Roger W. Babson, the Well-known Statistician, Tells of the Business Epochs That Followed That Period of Depression.

Our Father's Four Great Business Epochs After the Recovery from the Panic of 1873.

BY ROGER W. BABSON
of Wellesley Hills, Mass.

At the close of the last article we left our studies in the throes of the severe depression of 1873. It will be remembered that the real panic began with Black Friday in the Fall of 1873, and continued into 1875, but this was so sharp and sudden that there came a quick rebound in 1877, which lasted into 1879.

As stated in this previous article, all of our severe crises have consisted of two sharp movements about three years apart, followed by about three years of depressed business. Therefore, although the first and in many ways the severest blow of the "Panic of 1873" came in 1873 and 1875, the second and final blow did not come until 1914, which completed the second legislation begun three years previous.


Although the second blow is often not so severe as the first, yet the business is less able to withstand the second pressure, and the apparent disaster is much greater. Therefore the year 1914 was one of great industrial and industrial hardship.

In the Fall of 1873 the trouble really began, but it was first brought to an acute stage on April 26, 1875, when the Advertiser Bank failed. A flood of stocks was sold on the New York Stock Exchange, prices fell with great rapidity, and the market showed an almost continual decline until the Fall of the year. In the late Summer there was a slight rally, but this was shortly the fall before a sharp and in September, 1873, the New York Warehouse Company, a large and apparently prosperous concern, went to the wall. The New York National failed on the 15th of September, and Jay Cooke & Co., a great banker house of that day, closed on the following day.

The entire financial community was then in a state of great excitement, and confidence seemed to vanish. The New York Stock Exchange closed its doors on the 26th and did not open them until the 29th, while about 20 per cent. interest was charged for this money for a short period during the worst of the trouble.

gradual recovery. It is true that Stock Exchange transactions were very small, failures large, and clearings curtailed by declines; but the setback in business was comparatively short, and by 1876 everything was going again at full speed. As is usual, after even a severe panic, money is cheap, which condition generally prepares a foundation for a general upturn. Although Mr. Vanderbilt did all he could to stay the break of prices during 1873 and 1874, yet he saw that it was impracticable and decided to let go and sell the market short, so as to win whatever happened. Moreover, he made the best of his opportunities in 1874 and 1875 by purchasing the securities of several competitive roads, which resulted in the absorption by the New York Central of the West Shore and allied lines.

As is always the case following a severe panic, labor troubles again crop out, and 1886 stands out in the memory of all as the year of the fierce strike by New York, Chicago, and other cities. It was on May 4, 1886, that the bomb-throwing outrage was perpetrated in Chicago, which gave us another illustration of the unfortunate means which the public use to withstand the laws of nature. However, labor was not long out of work, as the wheels of industry again began to turn, and all the country was blessed with general crops, which resulted in gold imports and a general revival of building of all kinds. However, although our noble legislators in Washington at this time again attempted to tinker with the tariff, "in order to bring back good times," yet there was enough interest shown and conservatism to prevent this move, and the various bills aiming at a lower tariff and mill-wear-rate legislation were defeated. Under the stimulus of cheap money and favorable legislation, there were nearly 32,000 miles of new railroad constructed in 1887, which, according to my figures, is the greatest number of miles ever constructed in any one year. Eighteen hundred and eight-eight was another year of good business, and although St. Paul passed its dividend percentage downward to 20 per cent., and on Jan. 18, 1888, J. P. Morgan came to the front through the enactment of the famous "gentleman's agreement" between the trunk line officials. In fact, financial conditions continued to improve.



This is a plot of relative price movement of ten representative high-grade stocks and five representative high-grade bonds. The basic law that action and reaction are equal, when applied, is well illustrated here. Especially does it show that while the stock market sometimes discounts conditions, it does not always do so. The dotted line shows the major cycles. On account of the maturing feature of bonds the bond line shown in the plot of bond yields inverted, which indicates the varying cost to the investor. Note that the bond market does not rise and fall simultaneously with the stock market except in rare instances.

So how does it end?

Keynesian business cycle theory:

“use, decay, and obsolescence”

Koosian theory: rebuilding the balance sheets

Use, decay, and obsolescence:


US stock of autos: 135 million


May 2009 auto sales: 484,000

Annual rate of 6 million?

If so, more than 20 years to replace stock ...


Leverage ratios






Source: Richard Koo


Noncorporate debt as % of GDP



Federal debt as % of GDP




10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security, Constant Maturity (WFII10)



Shaded areas indicate US recessions.

2009 research.stlouisfed.org

Japanese debt and interest



Source: OECD