1. Introduction

One of the most striking features in the mental life of human beings is that we can make up our minds on various attitudes that we hold, determining what we should think or desire or intend. We may not be able to make up our minds on whether to be envious or generous, angry or pleased — although such dispositions and feelings can certainly be affected by our active determinations. But we may be able to make up our minds about whether climate change is likely to be occurring, about whether it would be enjoyable to spend a vacation at home or about whether to go to the football game this weekend. And we know that if we can make such determinations, then we can form a belief one way or the other about climate change, a desire to stay at home or not over vacation, or an intention about whether to go to the game this weekend or do something else instead.

This observation means that we can do things intentionally to ensure that we form one or another attitude, whether of belief or desire or intention, in a certain domain. We may not be able to come intentionally to believe that p or desire R or intend to X. But we can come intentionally to form a belief on whether or not p, a desire for or against R, or an intention to X or not. How we make up our mind is a product of two sorts of factors. On the one hand, the intentional steps we take out of a wish to form one or another attitude; and on the other, the external inputs that taking those steps helps to trigger.

What are the steps we take to form an attitude one way or the other? Assume that we want our beliefs to correspond to the data or facts at our disposal, and that we want our desires and intentions to correspond to the desiderata or properties that matter to us most; this fits with the basic idea, accepted on many fronts, that an agent is a system that reliably acts for the satisfaction of its desires according to its
beliefs (List and Pettit 2011, Ch 1). The assumption means that as properly functioning agents we will take steps that are likely to expose us, as we see things, to the impact of the data relevant to our beliefs and the desiderata relevant to our desires and intentions. This is not to say that we will always be reflective about the steps we take in making up our minds about anything. It is only to hold that while the steps we take may be a matter of unreflective habit, perhaps inculcated by our parents and peers, we will generally be disposed to adjust the direction in which the habits lead us if we come to believe — rightly or wrongly — that they are not alerting us to relevant data or desiderata.

It is no accident that the capacity to make up our minds is characteristic of human beings. For what I want to argue here is that our use of natural language makes it possible and probable, even perhaps inevitable, that we have that capacity. I do not assume that the capacity belongs exclusively to us, or even that it requires the sort of natural language that distinguishes us from other species. I merely argue that our employment of natural language — presumably, something capable of evolutionary explanation (Tomasello 2008; 2014) — comes close to necessitating our ability to make up our minds about various matters.

This capacity has important implications on three fronts. It means that we can have a distinctive maker’s knowledge of the things that we believe and desire and intend in one or another area; that we can share that knowledge in a particularly compelling way with others; and that we are more or less bound to be personable beings: to be fit to command the responses from one another that mark off fully functional persons from other sorts of agents.

The paper is in four more sections. In the second section I turn to the argument for why natural language more or less necessitates the capacity to make up our minds. And in sections three to five I look in turn at the connection between that capacity and the other topics signaled: self-knowledge, self-knowability and personable status.
2. A method for making up your mind

For purposes of this paper I assume that within a single language we generally manage to attach the same meanings to our words and to the sentences we use words to construct, and that we can rely on those meanings to identify more or less accurately what it is any one of us wishes to communicate in this or that speech act. The assumption is certainly deserving of fuller examination and defense but it is borne out so routinely in ordinary practice that we can reasonably take it as granted. We may only have an incomplete grasp of the meanings of some words, of course — in particular, scientific or recherché terms — and may have to defer to experts in how they are to be interpreted, even in our own mouths; in that respect, we practice a division of linguistic labor (Burge 1979; Putnam 1975). But the assumption is that in more regular cases we each have fairly ready access to the meanings that words have for the community as a whole and that we can use this to determine what it is anyone says.

The assumption about shared meanings implies that when we use our words to communicate what we believe, asserting that this or that is the case, then we must not be generally misleading. We must not regularly get our beliefs wrong and miscommunicate them for lack of carefulness. We must not regularly get our beliefs right but miscommunicate them for want of truthfulness or sincerity. And when we speak carefully and truthfully we must generally believe the things that we assert to be so.

Suppose that this pattern did not generally obtain in our use of words; suppose that we were each routinely careless or insincere in the assertions we made or that even careful and truthfull assertions did not correspond with the beliefs we held. In that case there would be only a loose correlation between the sentences that anyone asserted and the situations that we would take them to confront. And so none of us would be able to determine the meanings that anyone else attached to their words, let alone enjoy access to presumptively shared meanings. We would be as mutually incomprehensible as the inhabitants of Babel.
Under the assumption of shared meanings, then, we must generally hold beliefs that answer to our assertions; otherwise we would be mutually incomprehensible. We must generally speak carefully and truthfully in making assertions, and when we do so we must hold by beliefs in the propositions we are disposed to assert. This means that if you are careful and truthful in making an assertion, you can generally rely on actually holding by a belief that corresponds to what you assert. If you assert any proposition truthfully, then you assent to that proposition. And if you assent to any proposition carefully then, whatever care requires, you can generally rely on believing that to which you assent.

But what does care require? What does it mean to take care in responding to a given proposition, seeking to determine whether to give or withhold your assent? One suggestion might be that you inspect your beliefs carefully, looking introspectively at your attitudes or looking retrospectively or prospectively at your behavior. But this is hardly what taking care can generally mean, since it would not allow for the possibility that you might form a new belief or disbelief in response to the care you take, or that you might change what you previously held. And it seems indisputable that in deciding whether to assent to a proposition, or dissent from it, you may often come to form a belief that you previously did not hold.

Consider an example. Is there a better chance of tails the next time around, given that there has been a sequence of six heads in tossing an unbiased coin? You may never have thought about the matter, or may have been sufficiently misled to endorse the gambler’s fallacy. But it seems clearly possible that as you take care in answering the question, you can form for the first time the correct belief that the chance of tails remains at a half.

This gives us reason to endorse the only plausible, alternative account of what it is to take care in determining whether to assent to a proposition or dissent from it. According to that account, taking care means being careful to identify the available data that bear on the proposition, and being careful to let those data, and

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1 The prospective approach would take you to how you would behave in various possible scenarios. See (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister and Sripada 2013)
those data only, dispose you to assent, dissent, or withhold judgment. In a phrase, you must be careful to defer to the data at your disposal, letting them do the job of eliciting your assent or dissent.

The upshot of our observations so far is that if you take care in the relevant sense about giving your assent to a proposition, then the fact that you find yourself disposed to assent is generally going to signify that you now hold that belief, whether or not you held it previously. There is a natural congruence between assent and belief. This congruence points us towards a method for making up your mind about whether to believe a proposition or not but before coming to that, we need to address a tricky issue that arises in the area.

On pain of triviality, the notion of belief employed in this congruence claim cannot identify it with a disposition to assent to a proposition, only with a disposition that plays an independent role. Plausibly, it must identify it with a disposition such that, perhaps in the presence of other dispositions, it is triggered by epistemic inputs and delivers practical or behavioral outputs; it serves a dual representational-cum-directive role. On this role-based or functional account, belief is a state in the agent such that, at least under plausibly normal conditions, it is responsive to external data — otherwise it would not count as a representation — and serves in tandem with other beliefs to direct an agent into acting so as to satisfy his or her desires. If beliefs are directionally well-behaved, to take up one aspect of their role, then they will channel the agent towards a pattern of action that promises to deliver desire-satisfaction, should the world be as the beliefs present it; and if the beliefs are representationally well-behaved, to take up the other aspect of their role, then they will present the world more or less accurately.²

The congruence asserted requires that on assenting to a proposition ‘p’ you believe that p; and this, whether or not it was only considering evidence for and

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² For a classic account see (Stalnaker 1984). I ignore the complexities raised for the account by beliefs in necessary truths and by entailments. And I ignore the fact that a belief may affect linguistic as well as non-linguistic behavior: it may impact on how you argue, for example, as well as on how you act. On related matters see (Pettit 1998).
against the proposition that led you for the first time to form the belief that p. By most accounts, however, belief in the functional sense at issue here is much more fine-grained than assent, perhaps because of being shaped, not just by the data you register in giving assent, but also by data that are registered sub-consciously. Beliefs have different degrees of grain under different theories but are maximally fine-grained under the Bayesian theory that identifies them with precise credences. These are states that function as in the manner of beliefs but come in finely calibrated degrees of confidence and interact with equally fine-grained desires or utilities in generating behavior; the pattern on which they generate it is tracked in standard decision theory.

As a worst-case scenario, assume that we do all instantiate systems of Bayesian credences, albeit perhaps systems that are gappy or incomplete. How then might we expect your assent to a proposition ‘p’ to correspond to a fine-grained credence? You may put a probability into the proposition to which you assent and, so we assume, thereby express a corresponding degree of credence that p. But you are likely to be able to do this only on a very coarse scale, using a phrase like ‘about 50% likely’, ‘more likely than not’ or ‘very very likely’. But how can we expect assent to a proposition that it is about 50% likely that something is the case — say, that Hillary Clinton will win the US presidency in 2016 — to match a credence of perhaps a very determinate degree of confidence, say 0.45, that that is so?³

There are two keys to the solution of this problem. The first is to recognize that in many situations there will be no behavioral significance attached to the distinction between believing with degree of confidence 0.45 — in effect, believing that it is probable to degree 0.45 — that Clinton will win the election and believing that it is probable to a degree of about 0.5% that she will win. If you are a U.S. Democrat, for example, either belief might show up in a degree of optimism sufficient to get you to campaign on her behalf. Either degree might lead you, regardless of your political affiliation, to take a great interest in reports about how the campaigning is going. And either belief might show up in your advising your

³ For a critical overview of positions on this question, see (Lyon 2015).
friends to take part in campaigning for her or to keep a close eye on the campaign progresses.

The second key to the solution of our problem is the observation that when you assent to a proposition — when you are disposed to assert it truthfully — you invariably do this in the context of various assumptions about what is at stake, so that whether or not you give your assent depends on the relevant context. If you are thinking about whether to take part in the Clinton campaign, for example, the stakes are such that nothing is likely to turn on whether you believe she will win to degree 0.45 or about degree 0.5. But suppose that you are wondering whether or not to put a heavy bet on her winning at the fifty-fifty odds that a bookmaker is offering you. Or suppose that a friend who is contemplating the same bet asks your opinion as to how likely it is that she will win. Whether you believe this to degree 0.45 or to about degree 0.5 will make all the difference to your taking up the bet or to your advising your friend to do so. And in that context, you are very unlikely to be willing to assent to the proposition that it is about 50% probable that Clinton will win or to assert it in response to your friend’s query.\footnote{The relevance of stakes is much discussed in connection with ascriptions of knowledge. See (de Rose 1992; Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Stanley 2005).}

With these two key observations in place, it should be clear how assent can match credence, despite the fact that they come in different degrees of grain. Given the available data, you will be ready to assent to the proposition that it is about 50% likely that Clinton will win the election just in case the contextual stakes are such that there is no behavioral significance attached to the difference between having a 0.5 degree of confidence that she will win and having your actual degree of confidence — by assumption, 0.45 — that she will win. More generally, you will be ready to assent to a non-probabilistic proposition ‘p’ just in case the contextual stakes are such that there is no behavioral significance attached to the distinction between having more or less full confidence in the proposition — this is what assent
to a probabilistically unqualified proposition might seem to express — and having the actual degree of confidence that you maintain.

This picture does not suppose that you have any awareness of your degrees of credence; by standard assumptions, these will show up in behavior without being reflectively accessible (Harman 1986). The idea is that assent can be congruent with belief, as we claimed, just insofar as the following condition is fulfilled. For any context in which you give assent to a proposition ‘p’, seeming to express a full degree of credence, your actual degree of credence will have the same behavioral implications as full credence under the assumptions about stakes that that context puts in play. It will be true for purposes relevant to that context that you believe that p, even if you do not quite have full credence in ‘p’.

It is worth recalling at this point that credences are theoretical posits, not empirical data, and that it is very unlikely that they can assume precise degrees of confidence as distinct from ranges of confidence. For that reason, the information that you believe that p, relative though it may be to contextual assumptions, need not count as a second-grade form of information about your credal profile; it may be close to as good as it gets.

But even if you instantiate fine-grained credences, the contextually relativized information that you believe that p will be of great interest and utility. In general the context supposed will be relevantly salient and stable. And the fact that the profile might be realized by any of a number of more precise credences does not mean that we would be better off knowing about the precise credence present. The information that you believe that p communicates that no matter how exactly the belief is realized at the level of credences — if indeed there are precise credences — you will act in the presence of the contextually salient stakes as if p were true. In the context assumed, that information will serve us as well as more specific information about the exact credence in place. Information about that credence would be excess to our requirements and would be of interest only in the special event of the stakes shifting, as they shift in the Clinton example discussed.
With these points in place, we can now identify a method for making up your mind about your beliefs. Suppose that you want to form a belief about whether or not it is the case that \( p \) — say, whether or not the gambler’s fallacy is a fallacy — in the context of certain stakes; we may assume, for simplicity, that \( p \) is not probabilistically qualified. The method would prescribe the following steps:

- Make sure that you are clear about the meaning of the sentence or proposition ‘\( p \)’.
- Identify the available data relevant to the proposition, taking care to overlook nothing.
- Defer to those data, letting them determine whether you assent or dissent or withhold judgment.
- If you assent to the proposition, that will generally mean that you believe it, and if you dissent that will generally mean that you disbelieve it.
- But if the proposition elicits neither assent nor dissent, that does not rule out your still believing or disbelieving it; each remains a possibility.

Why hedge the connection between assent and believe, dissent and disbelief by introducing the generality qualification? We postpone that question to the next section. But why downgrade even further the connection between the absence of assent and dissent, on the one side, and the absence of belief and disbelief on the other? Here the reason is plain. Even if you have a relatively high degree or range of confidence that \( p \), the evidence that sustains you in that credence may not be of the kind that shows up in the review of data that you conduct as you take care about whether to assent to the proposition or dissent from it. To take a stock example, there may be subliminal evidence that leads you to think that your partner is being unfaithful, even though all the evidence you consciously review in thinking about the possibility fails to push you towards assent or dissent. Thus while you may believe that your partner is unfaithful — believe it in your bones, as we say — you may not be able to identify grounds for assenting to that proposition, or indeed dissenting from it.
The points made so far not only identify a method whereby you can make up your mind in belief, acting with a view to forming a belief about some matter; they also direct us towards a parallel method whereby you can make up your mind in desire and intention, acting with a view to forming such a non-credal attitude. Assume that there are sentences that express desire or intention in the way that the sentence ‘p’ expresses the belief that p; more on this later. You make up your mind in forming the belief that p by finding data that prompt you to assent to that sentence. And, so the idea goes, you would be able to make up your mind in forming a desire for R or an intention to X by finding factors that prompt you to assent to a sentence expressive of the desire or intention.

What factors might serve in this role? The obvious candidates are the properties or features, the desiderata or attractors, that serve to make any option you desire attractive to you, perhaps even attractive enough to elicit an intention to realize it. More generally, they are the properties in virtue of whose presence any scenario draws you to it, leading you to prefer it to alternatives. The properties in question may be agent-relative, presenting the scenario as offering the prospect of succeeding in your projects or being able to help your children. Or they may be agent-neutral, promising to bring peace or happiness for all.

It is not uncontroversial to assume that such attractors play a reliable part in prompting desire and intention but it is surely reasonable. We would find it hard to make sense of someone who could not identify any property in an allegedly desired scenario that we can see as a potential attractor; think of how we would react to the person in Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1957) example who claims to want a saucer of mud but can’t identify any aspect under which it is attractive. And we would find it difficult to sustain the common picture of deliberation as the weighing of pro’s and con’s if we could not think of the agent as being responsive to the different properties registered in the options on offer.\(^5\)

\(^5\) The idea is opposed to the sort of psychological particularism that would deny that there are any properties that play this role, always contributing on the same side — that is, as considerations pro or con — in determining what you favor. Psychological
According to this theory, you can be led to form a preference or a desire or an intention by the attractors you discern in the option or scenario or activity in question. You think about squash and tennis, notice that squash takes less time, provides a better work-out and is more effective in getting your mind off work. And in treating those features as desiderata your are led to form the corresponding preference, just as in treating the evidence for a proposition as adequate, you are led to assent to it and form the corresponding belief. Again you think about taking a vacation, attend to the free time and relaxation it would provide, and find you are led to form a desire to go on holidays or even an intention to ask for leave.

Assuming that desiderata like these can elicit desire, you can use them to make up your mind about what to seek in the way you can use data to make up your mind as to what to believe. Taking any scenario as an object of contemplation, you can identify all the relevant desiderata, both on the pro and con side, and you can defer to those desiderata in letting a desire or intention form in response. And depending on where you are led in the exercise, you will form a desire for or against the scenario: you will become disposed to respond in a positive or negative fashion.

In deferring to data or evidence, you will be led to assent to a proposition, say ‘p’, and will simultaneously form the belief that p. And in deferring to attractors or desiderata, as we have just argued, you will be led to form the desire or intention say, the desire for R or the intention to X. But, to return to a question postponed earlier, what sentence will serve to express the desire that is formed in the other case? In the case of desire, the role might be played by a sentence like ‘R would be enjoyable’, where ‘enjoyable’ directs you to a relevant attractor, or perhaps even by an optative sentence like ‘Oh for R’. In the case of intention, the sentence that plays the required

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particularism may be presupposed in ethical particularism of the kind that Jonathan Dancy (2004) defends. For a full-scale critique of the ethical form of the doctrine see (Jackson, Pettit and Smith 1999) and for some more general, critical considerations see (Pettit 2015). The criticisms supported in these works bear in some measure on psychological particularism, not just ethical. For a defense of the view assumed here see (Pettit 1991) and for a general, formally developed schema that makes room for it, see (Dietrich and List 2013).
role would have to indicate that the action is not just desired under some aspect but desired outright. And here it might be a sentence like ‘X-ing is the thing to do’ or ‘X-ing, it is’ or even an imperative like ‘Let me X’.

3. Self-knowledge

The fact that you can make up your mind as to what you think or want or plan to do has direct implications for the basis on which you can know what you believe or desire or intend. It is a common and plausible assumption that you may speak for what you believe with greater authority than someone else, even someone who knows you intimately. Is this because you have better access to the data on what you believe than anyone else, as a Cartesian picture would suggest? Not necessarily (Bar-on 2004). If you make up your mind in regard to a belief, taking care to identify and defer to relevant data, then you can claim to know what belief you hold with a very special authority, practical rather than epistemic in character (McGeer 1996; 2008; Moran 1997; 2001).

Suppose, as we have argued, that you will generally form a belief that ‘p’ if you take care over identifying and deferring to the data relevant to whether or not p, and those data elicit your consent. And assume that this is a matter of common knowledge: the evidence being there for all to access, everyone knows that that is the case, knows that everyone knows and that is the case, and so on (Lewis 1969). It follows under either assumption that if you know that you have taken care about assenting to p, and been moved to give your assent, then you are positioned to know that you believe that p.

Might you be able to know that you are taking care to identify and defer to relevant data in assenting to ‘p’? Yes, of course you might. This is an intentional act on a par with taking a walk or kicking a ball or calling out to someone. And as there is no particular mystery about how you might know that you are taking a walk or kicking a ball or hailing another person, so there is none attached to claiming knowledge in this case.
In order to perform any intentional act you have to be disposed to adjust to potentially changing circumstances so as to bring off the effect sought. And you can know that you are so disposed insofar as it is clear to you — as it must be if you are to be a successful intentional agent — that you would vary your behavior in this or that manner across various possible changes of circumstances. You know that you are taking a walk — say, as distinct from walking to a particular destination — insofar as you know that were the street blocked at a certain point, then you would continue along another route, assuming that an acceptable alternative is available. You know that you are taking care to identify and defer to the relevant data in assenting to ‘p’ insofar as you know that were other data to appear relevant then, whatever the effect on your assent, you would extend your attention to them. And so on.

If you take the required pains in assenting to p, then by the argument of the last section, you will generally form the belief that p. But this is a matter accessible or knowable to anyone who understands what assent and belief involve. And so by knowing that you are taking care to identify and defer to relevant data in assenting to ‘p’ you know that in all likelihood you believe that p. Whether or not you believed that p prior to the exercise, the fact that you are assenting to it on the basis of relevant data will generally mean that it is now the case that you believe that p.

Your knowledge that you generally believe that p in such a case is not formed on the same sort of basis as an observer’s knowledge. I might know that you believe that p in virtue of seeing that you are confronted with what I take to be evidence that p or in virtue of observing that you take it for granted that p in your actions or arguments. But you yourself do not have to scan such evidence in order to ascertain whether you believe that p. Nor do you have to scan your states of mind introspectively to establish that that is so. You just have to know that you have made up your mind that p, on the basis of a careful review of data. That knowledge serves in combination with the knowledge that painstaking assent generally generates belief to give you a basis for knowing that in all likelihood you believe that p. In an
old phrase, you have a maker’s knowledge that you believe that p, not the knowledge of a mere observer.

But why introduce a generality or likelihood qualification to the claim that you will believe that p, if you assent to ‘p’ on the basis of a careful review of data? In a word, because the belief that would normally form in the course of giving your assent to the proposition may not catch: it may not gain a robust hold on your psychology. To count as believing that p it must be the case that absent a change in the data to which you defer, you can be relied upon to act as if it is the case that p in all circumstances where the would-be fact that p is relevant to what you do. Or this must be so at any rate for all circumstances that plausibly count as normal by independent criteria: they are circumstances, for example, where you are not affected by intoxication or paranoia, not misled by another’s deception or manipulation, or whatever.

Suppose that you review all the data relevant to whether the gambler’s fallacy is a fallacy, for example, and the data lead you to assent to the proposition that it is indeed a fallacy. Do you necessarily believe in the functional sense explained that it is a fallacy? You will count as believing it only if you are disposed to act as if the proposition is true across an open range of circumstances where the data remain unchanged and conditions are normal: you are not affected by intoxication or paranoia or whatever. But suppose that were you in a casino, you would not act as if it were true. Suppose that it is close to certain that presented with a run of blacks, you would act as if there were now an increased chance of a red coming up next. This would surely give us pause about assuming that you believe that the gambler’s fallacy is indeed a fallacy (McGeer and Pettit 2002).

What this observation shows is that in order to reduce the potential gap between assent and belief, it is not only necessary that you take care in giving your assent to be sensitive to relevant data; it is also necessary that you take care to remain sensitive to those data across situations where a different sort of factor — in our example, the excitement of the casino — is liable to inhibit your acting as if the proposition believed were true. The excitement of the casino may be described from
your point of view as a disrupter since you would not argue in the wake of the casino visit that you changed your mind while you were there; you would not treat the effect of the casino as you might treat the effect of new evidence presenting itself. The example teaches that in order to close the gap between assent and belief, or at least reduce it, you must take care on two fronts: first, in identifying and deferring to the data and, second, in guarding against any possible disruption of the belief that the data elicit, where disrupters are illusions or passions of the kind at work in the casino.

If you take care on both those fronts in assenting to a sentence ‘p’, then your claim to know that you believe that p on the basis of assenting to the proposition must become more secure. Your action in sensitizing yourself to relevant data and guarding at the same time against possible desensitization puts you in an excellent position to be able to claim to know that you believe that p. You know that you believe that p on the basis of a maker’s knowledge, where the making has these two distinct aspects.

The lessons we have been deriving about self-knowledge in the area of belief extend quite naturally to self-knowledge in the area of desire and intention, and indeed other attitudes. Take any desire or intention that can be formed on the basis of deferring to relevant attractors and endorsing the proposition expressive of the attitude. You are in a position to know that you will generally have such a desire or intention, if you are taking care to identify and defer to relevant attractors. And of course you will know that you are taking that action in almost any situation we can envisage. Thus, as with belief, you will be positioned to know in such a case that you hold in all likelihood by the desire or intention in question.

As in the case of belief, the likelihood qualification serves here to cover the possibility of disruption. You will count as desiring or intending that some scenario obtain only if you are disposed to act as it requires across an open range of circumstances where the attractors remain unchanged and conditions are normal: you are not affected, for example, by some malaise or upheaval in your psychology. But it may be that you would not act in the required manner if you were subject to
various capricious whims or yens or impulses: that is, disrupters that impact on your desires and intentions in the way that illusions and passions may impact on your beliefs. In that case you can be sure of maintaining the desire or intention generated by deferring carefully to relevant desiderata or attractors only if you are also careful, where relevant, to guard against possible disrupters.

If you act so as to sensitize yourself to the desiderata and to guard against desensitization, then the knowledge of what you are doing will put you in a particularly secure position to know that you hold the desire or intention at issue. As in the case of belief your action on those two fronts will put you in a position to have a maker’s knowledge that you have that attitude.

4. Self-knowability

Our ability to make up our minds affects not only our capacity for self-knowledge but also our capacity to make ourselves knowable to others. The assumption that we use words with common meanings, which we are making in this paper, leaves open the possibility that still we might be very uncertain about one another’s beliefs and desires and intentions. But it turns out that as creatures who can make up our minds, we are well-positioned to overcome this problem.

Suppose that we were unable to make up our minds and had to rely on observation of ourselves, perhaps introspective or behavioral, to determine the attitudes formed within us: to ascertain the beliefs, desires and intentions we harbored. In that case you would be able to communicate your attitudes only by reporting on them in the manner in which you report on the attitudes of someone else. You would look for the data on whether you believe that p or desire R or intend to X and, if truthful or sincere, would report on how things are with you according to that investigation: according to the beliefs you form about your attitudes.

How credible would I find such reports? You are going to want to be able to rely on others, and to be able to get others to rely on you, in the normal circumstances of life. And so I can assume that you will not want me to think — or worse, to report to others — that you are unreliable in the reports you give: that you
are not careful about determining what your attitudes are when you give a report on them or that you are not truthful in communicating the attitudes you actually identify.

But I can also see that in any instance where I find that you have misled me — you do not prove to have the attitude you advertised — you can have ready recourse to one of two epistemic excuses. You can claim that while all the evidence suggested that you had the attitude communicated, the evidence was misleading and led you to form the wrong view about yourself. Or you can claim that while you had the attitude communicated at the time of the report, you changed your mind between that time and the time when you failed to display it. This means that despite the wish to establish a reputation for reliability, words are relatively cheap and you may often be able to get away with misleading me by appealing to a misreading of your attitude or a change in your attitude.

It is often going to be in your interest to establish the credibility of your communication about your own attitudes. This may be essential for getting me to rely on you when you need my reliance and in any case it will give you an opportunity, having attracted reliance, to prove yourself reliable. You can take only limited measures to establish your reliability under the assumption that you are restricted to making reports on yourself. But it turns out that you can do much more on this front when, like the rest of us, you can make up your mind about what to believe or desire or intend.

Insofar as you make up your mind in that way, you do not have to rely on any evidence, introspective or otherwise, for determining an attitude that you wish to communicate. And that means that you can communicate that attitude while foreclosing appeal to the misread-mind excuse. Asked whether you believe that p, or

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6 Epistemic excuses for the falsehood of a report about an attitude presuppose that you truly reported the belief you held about the attitude but explain that that belief was mistaken, because you misread or changed that attitude. Practical excuses presuppose that you had a correct belief about your attitude but explain that for reasons of pressure — say, a coercive threat — you did not communicate it truthfully.
desire R, or intend to X, you might respond in the manner of a reporter, as in saying that it seems to you that your belief or desire or intention is such and such. But you can also respond in a more assertive manner, communicating that you believe that p, desire R or intend to X, while making clear that you will not appeal to the excuse of having misread your mind if you prove at a later point not to display that attitude. Rather than reporting the attitude, as we may say, you can avow it, where it is understood that avowal forecloses the misread-mind excuse. Avowing the attitude, your words are going to be less cheap, since they expose you to a special cost: that of being unable to invoke the misread-mind excuse in order to get off the hook, should you not display the attitude conveyed by your words.

Avowal is going to be a very attractive option for you and the rest of us and, that being manifest, it is no surprise that most forms of attitudinal self-ascription count as avowals. Asked whether you believe that p, you can avow that belief by saying just ‘p’, or ‘the data support “p”’, or even simply ‘Yes, I believe that p’. It will be assumed that you are foreclosing the misread-mind excuse unless you go out of your way to indicate that you are not doing this, as in saying that it seems to you that you believe that p, or that perhaps you do believe that p but cannot be sure.

Similar points apply to the words in which you convey desires and intentions. Asked whether you desire R, or intend to X, you can avow the attitude — you can manifestly set aside the misread-mind excuse — by any of a variety of locutions: ‘R would be enjoyable’ or just ‘I would love R’; ‘X-ing is the thing to do’ or just ‘I mean to X’. In these cases, as in the case with belief, it would betray a misunderstanding of the speech acts involved, to try to explain a failure to display the attitude conveyed by saying that you must have misread your desire or intention: you must have gotten your attitudes wrong. Being manifestly someone who can make up their mind about the attitudes in question, your utterance in each instance communicates

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7 Gareth Evans (1982) makes a congenial point in observing that on being asked whether we believe that p, we often think about whether or not it is the case that p, and answer by giving an avowal: ‘p’ or ‘not p’.
that this is an attitude you are responsible for forming, not an attitude you more or less dimly perceive within yourself.

These observations suggest that the bare fact that an avowal forecloses the misread-mind excuse makes it more costly and more credible. But the fact that you expose yourself to a special cost by choosing to avow the attitude rather than report it is going to be manifest to all; everyone will know that that is so, will know that everyone knows that that is so, and so on (Lewis 1969). And that means that not only do you take on the special cost, you do so in full awareness of the cost and of the fact that others will take you to be fully aware of the cost. Thus in taking on that cost, you are manifestly betting on yourself not to have to incur it; you are backing yourself to live up to the attitude you convey. If you fail to live up to your words, then, you will have to suffer a double cost. Not only will you face the difficulty of not being able to excuse the failure, at least if no other excuse is available; you will also have to eat humble pie: you will have to face the fact that you backed yourself and lost.

The lesson of these observations is that by virtue of being able to make up your own mind across a range of attitudes, you can not only have a special maker’s knowledge of such attitudes; you can also do much to put me and others in a position to know what your attitudes are. Assuming that you have a basic level of competence on relevant fronts, I can take the evidence of the words you utter in avowal effectively to rule out the possibility of your not having the attitude that they are meant to convey. Conscious that you have the ability to make up your mind in respect of the attitude, and that you are backing yourself in a costly manner to have that attitude, I can rest assured in many cases that you do indeed have it.

But having the capacity to make up your mind means you can even go one better than making avowals in communicating your attitudes to me. By the account given, you report an attitude when you leave two epistemic excuses open, one appealing to a misread mind, the other to a changed mind; and you avow the attitude when you foreclose the misread-mind excuse, leaving only the changed-mind excuse in place. But we may introduce a third kind of self-communication at
this point, holding that you pledge an attitude when you take a further step and foreclose both epistemic excuses; you deny yourself the possibility of excusing a miscommunication by appeal either to a misread mind or to a changed mind.

Might I be able to pledge a belief as distinct from just avowing it? Well, I might be able to pledge belief in a proposition that I take to be a priori, since I cannot envisage any data that would count against it. And I might be able to pledge belief in a proposition that I see as a matter of unquestioned revelation, say of a religious sort, since I will be disposed to ignore any data that would count against it. But I could never pledge to hold by a regular, empirically vulnerable belief. We live in a changing, incompletely grasped world and while I may think that there are enough data in support of a proposition 'p' for me to believe it, and avow a belief in it, I could never be sure that those data would not later be overturned or outweighed. Indeed for me to consider pledging such a belief would betray a misconception about the very attitude of belief. It would show that I did not treat it as responsive to potentially changing evidence.  

Might I be able to pledge any other attitudes besides belief? In order to do so, I would have to be able to identify attractors related to those attitudes. And I would have to be confident enough about their remaining effective — and about my ability to guard against disruption of their effect — to be able to foreclose the changed-mind as well as the misread-mind excuse. Is there any reason to think that I might be able to muster such confidence? Surprisingly, there is.

Were I to pledge a certain attitude, then the very fact of making the pledge would bring an attractor into existence that might serve in the required role. It would make it the case that sticking with the attitude had at least this appealing feature: it would show that I can be relied upon to keep my word. So the question, then, is whether I could rely on that feature to enable me to pledge a desire for R or an intention to X: say, a desire or preference for squash over tennis or an intention

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8 It is possible to be moved to hold a belief by practical considerations, such as the comfort derived from holding it, but it is hardly possible to maintain that you would stick by the belief for such reasons in face of counter-evidence.
to go to the movies. The answer is that I could rely on that feature to be able to pledge an intention but not to be able to pledge any of the other attitudes.

Suppose that I pledge to prefer squash over tennis, that many of the attractors that drew me to the game cease to be appealing, but that I continue to play squash because of wanting to show that my word is my bond. Would the preference for squash remain in place as a result of the pledge? No, it would not. I can hardly count as desiring squash in the relevant sense — that is, liking it more than tennis — when I only to continue to play it because of having given my word. Desire in the sense at issue here requires me to be attached to squash on the basis of attractors other than the attractor that a pledge would put in place. This same sort of problem arises with anything that we are likely to regard as a desire for a prospect R. I would not count as maintaining the desire just because I acted as if it were in place but only for the sake of presenting myself as faithful to my word.\(^9\)

This problem does not arise, however, with an intention or plan or anything of that kind. Suppose that in speaking with you I pledge an intention or plan to go to the movies, wanting to see a thriller that I have not seen before. And imagine that I discover that the film is not a thriller, or that I have seen it before, but turn up for the show because of having given you my word. Do I count as still holding and acting on the intention pledged? Yes, I do. With an intention to do something as distinct from a desire or affection or preference, the attitude does not have to be sourced in certain attractors in order to count as remaining in place. And so the attractor that pledging an attitude creates in favor of maintaining the attitude can serve in this sort of case — although only, it appears, in this sort of case — to give me the confidence required for being able to make a pledge.

We saw earlier that I put myself in a position to avow an attitude on the basis consciously deferring to a suitable body of data or attractors, where I am careful to register the data or attractors available and to guard against the possibility of

\(^9\) Of course I may pledge to work at maintaining a desire or preference, committing myself to take steps aimed at preserving the hold of suitable attractors on my sensibility.
disruption. I know that I think or feel something with sufficient confidence to be able to avow that attitude, by virtue of knowing that I defer those data or attractors: by virtue, in that sense, of a sort of maker’s knowledge. The same sort of maker’s knowledge will enable me to tell that I intend something with sufficient confidence to be able to pledge the intention. In consciously recognizing and deferring to the attractor that the very act of pledging brings into play — the attractor that consists in proving that I live up to my word — I can achieve the degree of confidence required. Or at least I can do this to the extent that I can guard against the disruption of my response to that attractor.

The notion of pledging an attitude, in particular an intention, reflects the more regular idea of promising to act in a corresponding way. But the notion of promising in ordinary usage has a strong moral or ethical flavor; it is represented as an act such that if I make a promise to do something, then I have an ethical obligation, however defeasible, to do it. Like avowing, pledging as introduced here need have no ethical connotations. When I make a pledge, as when I make an avowal, I certainly back myself to act as thereby advertised, manifestly exposing myself to serious reputational costs in the event of failure. But for all we have postulated, what I do may be more akin to making a side-bet that I will hold and act on the intention pledged — a side-bet strategically designed to entice you and others to rely on me — than it is to giving you a promise in the ordinary, moralized sense of that term.

5. Personable status

By the account given so far, you can make yourself knowable with a high degree of assurance by availing yourself of the capacity to make up your mind and by using avowals and pledges to communicate the attitudes on which you fix. Those speech acts involve your backing yourself to have the attitudes thereby advertised, effectively inviting us to take you at your word and to make our projections about how you are likely to act and interact on the basis of what you say. What you say has particular force, so the idea goes, because you do not convey your attitudes in the reportive, excuse-maintaining manner in which you might communicate the
attitudes of a distinct individual. You do not speak about yourself, as we might say; you speak for yourself.

In a famous chapter of *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes (1994, Ch 16) argues that to be a person — in particular an individual, natural person — is precisely to possess and exercise the capacity to speak for yourself in this manner. In speaking for yourself in that way, you authorize the words you utter in representation of your beliefs, desire and intentions, so that those words ‘can be considered your own’, as he puts it. You authorize your words in the sense that you allow yourself to be held to account in the event of not living up to them.

To represent yourself in this authorizing fashion, in Hobbes’s preferred term, is ‘to personate’: to adopt the persona of someone with the attitudes that the words bespeak; it is, as we might say, to serve as a spokesperson for yourself. For Hobbes even all animals, non-human as well as human, will constitute agents insofar as they act on their desires or appetites under the guidance of their beliefs or opinions, and update their beliefs or opinions in the light of the evidence at hand. Or at least insofar as they do this in normal circumstances where no independently plausible obstacles or limitations get in the way. But in Hobbes’s view human beings stand out from other animal agents because they are able to represent their own attitudes to others; and in particular able to represent them in such a way that they can be held to account for what they say. They cannot be held to account for not living up to what a third party says, without any license, about their attitudes. But they can be held to account for not living up to what they say of themselves. They speak for themselves in a way in which that third party does not (Pettit 2008).

These observations apply, under an appropriate interpretation, to your performance in making up your mind and then avowing or pledging the attitudes on which you settle. In avowing an attitude you manifestly set aside the excuse for not living up to it that would invoke a misread mind. And in pledging an attitude you also manifestly set aside the excuse for not living up to it that would invoke a change of mind. You play the role of a spokesperson, not a reporter, in speaking for how you think and how you are disposed to act. And in being ready to be held to account for a
failure to live up to an attitude avowed or pledged, you authorize yourself in that role.

This is to say, in Hobbes’s terminology, that you personate yourself. You hold out an authorized portrait of who you are and of what we can expect of you. In a nineteenth-century sense of the term, you give yourself a character — a letter of reference — on which others are invited to rely. You subscribe to an account of your guiding stars that is meant to enable others to orientate in their dealings with you.

For all we have said, it may seem that to personate in this sense — to give yourself a persona — may be to impersonate: to pretend to be something that in truth you are not. But personation in the Hobbesian sense need not be deceptive in the manner of impersonation. If you speak for yourself with the care that is required for making up your mind, and for making corresponding avowals and pledges, then what you do does not amount to the invention of a fictional self, adopted for its utility in dealing with others, that impersonation would involve. What you do amounts rather to discovering the self with which you identify, on the basis of the data and the desiderata that gain a grip on you. Those data and desiderata support robust beliefs, desires and intentions, and to use them as a basis in speaking for yourself is to identify with the robust bearer of those attitudes.

Thus the self or person you become in this exercise of personation is of necessity a robust self. You hold robustly by the beliefs you avow across situations where the data remain the same, and you hold robustly by the desires and intentions you avow or pledge across situations where the desiderata remain the same; or at least you do this in each case to the extent that circumstances remain otherwise normal. Many of the attitudes you hold will be dated to specific times, as in believing that now is the time for action or in intending to go to the movies tonight. But others will be temporally open, involving beliefs, desires or intentions that apply over large stretches of your life. By robustly maintaining and claiming to maintain those attitudes you will invite the expectation that short of a change in the data or desiderata that impact on your psychology, you will display constancy or stability over time. Purportedly stable attitudes will encompass intentions or plans
avowed or pledged, including the implicit pledges of love and friendship; desires you avow and display in the various services, projects and hobbies you undertake; and beliefs that you maintain over standing matters of morality and religion, science and politics, and the like.

The fact the robust self that you identify with has to be temporally stable in these respects has implications for how you must think of yourself as you relate to others and to yourself over time. It gives the lie to the idea that you could plausibly conceive of yourself, not as an enduring agent, but as a set of time-slices or time-stretches. It is an interesting thought experiment to represent the person as a series of temporally segmented moments or eras but it does not reflect our lived experience.\textsuperscript{10} The self you speak for is accountable over time for what you say and do, as your present actions are judged in terms of your past avowals and pledges, and your future actions held hostage to what you currently avow and pledge. And that bespoke self cannot help but constitute a person with a continuing identity across time.

But the robust, stable self that you identify with in the course of making up your mind, and making avowals and pledges of attitude, is always a self in process, an identity for which you continually have to struggle (McGeer 2008). For with every attitude you avow or pledge, there are disrupters ready to knock you off balance. Every belief is exposed to the sirens of illusion and wishful thinking, every desire to the winds of impulses and whim, every intention to the waves of akrasia and irresolution that can wash away your deepest plans. To prove yourself faithful to your avowals and pledges, maintaining the robust persona you assume and advertise in such overtures, you have to wrest that identity from the chaos threatened by a carnival of passing states.

\textsuperscript{10} For an interesting exploration of the availability and implications of the temporally segmented view of the self, see (Parfit 1984). And for a classic consideration of the metaphysical implications, see (Lewis 1983, Ch 5).
Although you may often fail in that enterprise, failure need not be fatal. We all allow in our lives together that there are occasions when we may act of character, not displaying our true selves. And as we lift ourselves up after episodes when pressure or temptation proved too much to resist, we each claim the right to ask, often with apology, that our failures not be held against us and not be taken to speak for who we are. Thus you may take advantage of this license and disown your failures, holding out the prospect that in the smooth run of your general performance they will seem like transient, insignificant blips.\(^{11}\)

These observations suggest that the robust persona or identity or self that you shape in making up your mind, and avowing and pledging your attitudes, is a construct: an artificial, if not a fictional self. But it is important to recognize that although you construct a persona or identity for yourself in this sense, you do not do so out of an explicit desire to build up a robust self-portrait. The line sketched does not go in any way to support the idea that you are a self-narrator, in a standard metaphor, and that your identity is the product of a narrative that you more or less consciously fabricate.\(^{12}\)

The narrative picture of the self would make the achievement we have been documenting into a contingent, self-conscious exercise. And it is nothing of the kind. When you assume the identity of a robust self in relation to yourself and others, you do so as an inescapable side-effect of an independent aspiration, not as an end sought for its own sake. The aspiration is to make up your mind on various matters and to speak for yourself on where you stand. If the pursuit of that goal leads you to assume a robust identity, giving you a projectible character or persona, it does so only because that is a byproduct of finding firm ground to stand on. You assume the

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\(^{11}\) This line of thought connects closely with the various positions on autonomy developed in the wake of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) arguments about freedom of the will.

\(^{12}\) For an example of someone supposedly conforming to this narrative form of self-construction see Jean Paul Sartre’s (1948) analysis of the anti-semite.
identity because of where your attitudes have come to settle; you do not let your attitudes settle there because of the identity you have chosen to assume.\textsuperscript{13}

The upshot of this line of thinking is that it is an essential part of the way in which we make up our minds and communicate them to others that our minds have a distinctive character. Our relationships with one another constrain us to assume an identity that makes us more or less projectible and reliable; our deepest need as social beings, after all, may be to be able to get others to rely on us and to be able to rely in turn on them. And our capacity to make up our minds, availing ourselves of the resources that language provides, makes it possible to meet that constraint. Exercising that mental capacity under the pressure of that social constraint, we are destined to display the sort of mind that enables us to hold one another to account — and by extension to hold ourselves to account — for the attitudes that we assume, for the robustness with which we maintain them, and for how reliably we give them expression in action.

The sort of mind we display under these pressures is essentially personable. Not only does it conform to the template that Hobbes has in mind when he associates persons with agents who speak for themselves in words that can be ‘considered their own’. It also conforms to a related template in which persons are distinguished by the fact that they can be held responsible over time for matching their actions to their words. John Locke (1975, s 26) articulates this conception of a person in his \textit{Essay Concerning Human Understanding}: ‘Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls \textit{himself}, there I think that another may say is the same \textit{Person}. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit’.\textsuperscript{14}

Confronted with the minds that nature enables other animals to display, we try to make predictions about their responses and to respond to them according to the predictions they clearly make about us; this can be a familiar source of mutual

\textsuperscript{13} I sympathize with Galen Strawson’s (2005) critique of the narrative theory of the self but he may take issue with the constancy that I think we human beings have other reasons to seek or cherish. My position may be closer in this respect to that which is defended by David Velleman (2000).

\textsuperscript{14} Carol Rovane (1997) usefully emphasizes this Lockean theme.
satisfaction, especially in dealings with our pets. But no matter how well-trained an animal, and no matter how endearing its responses, we cannot treat it as a person. It may communicate its expectations and feelings quite eloquently but it does not speak for itself in the manner of a Hobbesian personator. And of course it does not offer itself, therefore, as a subject that can be held to account for its attitudes or its actions in anything like Locke's forensic sense.

Like other animals, we inherit our minds from nature, benefitting from the long evolutionary history of our species. And we develop those minds, as other animals do, under the stimulation provided by circumstance and conspecifics. But we also do something more in the shaping of our minds. We let interaction with our parents and our peers transform our minds so that they conform to the robust patterns that interpersonal relationships require. And having achieved conformity with those patterns we even relate to ourselves as to a person of this sort. We may occasionally wallow in the stream of consciousness, letting experience and fancy take their natural, casual course. But we are always ready to call ourselves to book, as others will call us to book, and to shape up to the expectations that personable creatures must meet.
References