Chapter 3

Republican Political Theory

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Republic in political philosophy is a term in use since the early 19th century. It is derived from the Latin word "res publica," which means "public thing." The term was used to describe a form of political organization in which power is held by the people as a whole, rather than by a monarch or a ruling class. The term has been used to describe a wide range of political systems, from ancient Rome to modern-day democracies.

The Republican Ideal of Freedom

The concept of freedom is central to the Republican Ideal of Freedom. Freedom is defined as the ability to act according to one's own will, without being constrained by external forces. The Republican Ideal of Freedom is based on the idea that individuals have the right to pursue their own interests and make their own decisions, without interference from the state or other external forces.

The Republican Ideal of Freedom has been influenced by a variety of political and philosophical traditions. The classical Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, were important influences on Republican theory. The political thought of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau also played a significant role in the development of the Republican Ideal of Freedom.

The Republican Ideal of Freedom has been a major influence on political thought in modern times. It has been a key influence on the development of democratic theory and practice, and has been a central theme in the political thought of many contemporary philosophers.

The Republican Ideal of Freedom is not without its critics, however. Some have argued that the Republican Ideal of Freedom is too individualistic, and that it fails to take into account the need for social cooperation and the common good. Others have argued that the Republican Ideal of Freedom is too focused on individual freedom, and that it neglects the importance of collective rights and responsibilities.

Despite these criticisms, the Republican Ideal of Freedom remains a central theme in political thought, and continues to be a source of inspiration for political philosophers and practitioners alike.
control shall. The liberty of the ancients is the most prominent form of what Isaiah Berlin (1998) later called positive freedom.

The most important observation in introducing the republican conception of freedom is to recognize Constant's image of the liberty of the ancients as an image that served to hide the true republican way of thinking, only recently so prominent, from his contemporaries' eyes. Constant may not have been consciously propagandizing, but what he achieved was to matureize late generations into thinking that the only possible, perhaps the only sensible, notion of freedom was the liberal idea of freedom as non-interference. The liberty of the ancients is no match for freedom as non-interference — even if it is thought desirable, it must be judged to be unattainable. The eyes of setting up the two as the only relevant alternatives was grossly inattentive, to the liberal ideal.

The republican way of thinking about freedom, effectively suppressed by Constant, exists as a notion of non-domination, not as direct democratic standing. And the difference between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination is not easily expressed. Of course the true notion that one person dominates another to the extent that he/she have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily — to interfere on an arbitrary basis — in some or all of the other's choices (Fenit 1996: 1997). Freedom as non-interference makes the absence of interference sufficient for freedom; in contrast, freedom as non-domination requires the absence of a capacity on the part of anyone else — an individual or corporate agent — to interfere arbitrarily in their life or affairs. The difference between these ways of conceiving of liberty may seem slight, but a little reflection will reveal hidden dimensions to the contrast.

Interference and Arbitrary Intference

The two conceptions of freedom both invoke the notions of interference. and we may begin our exploration of the contest between the two ways of conceiving liberty with a comment on this. The first thing to note is that, on almost all accounts, the intrusions that count as interference have to be intentional acts, or at least acts for which the agent can be held responsible (Miller 1999: 35); they have to be intentional or quasi-intentional. The reason for this stipulation is that freedom under most accounts is a condition defined in relation to other intentional agents, not a condition defined by reference to favours bestowed by a more: not a condition defined by how far a person escapes various brute, non-intentionally imposed limitations (see Spitz 1995: 396-2).

The intrusions that constitute interference may be restricted to acts that make certain options impossible for the agent; or they may be extended to include acts that coerce or manipulate the agent in choosing between options. I shall assume that, for both conceptions of freedom, interference is to be understood in the broader fashion. Under this way of taking them, acts of interference include any acts that worsen the agent's situation: or at least worsen it significant: namely by reducing the alternatives available in choice, or by raising the actual or expected costs associated with some of the alternatives. Thus the agent may be stopped from doing something the agent may be threatened with some extra cost, see some penalty; in the event of doing it; or the agent may simply be penalized for having done the act in question.

Freedom as non-interference invokes the notion of interference; freedom as non-domination goes further and invokes arbitrary interference: interference on an arbitrary basis. What makes an act of interference arbitrary, then, in the sense of being perpetrated on an arbitrary basis? An act is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis, we can say, if it is subject only to the arbitration, the decision or judgment, of the agent; the agent was in a position to choose it or not to choose it, at their pleasure. When we say that an act of interference is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis, then, we mean that like any arbitrary act it is chosen or not chosen at the agent's pleasure. And in particular, since interference with others is involved, we imply that it is chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests of those others require according to their own judgments.

Under this conception of arbitrariness, then, an act of interference is non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference. Since the interests and ideals of the person involved may make inconsistent demands, non-arbitrariness consists in recognition of the relevant ones. I now have an interest in the state imposing certain taxes on me. or punishing certain offenders, for example, and the state may pursue these ends according to procedures that conform to my ideas about appropriate means. But I may still not want the state to impose taxes on me. or I may think that I ought not to be punished in the appropriate manner, even though I have been convicted of an offence. In such a case, my relevant interests and ideas are those that are shared in common with others, not those that treat me as exceptional, since the state is meant to serve others as well as me. And so, in these cases, the interference of the state in taxing or punishing me is not conducted on an arbitrary basis and does not represent domination.

The republican tradition of thinking took a distinctive view of what is required for an act of interference — in particular, an act of legal or government interference — to be non-arbitrary, and I follow that tradition in giving this account. Consider the complaint of Tom Paine
A regime of freedom requires that people experience freedom in the context of others. This is because freedom is not simply the absence of interference, but also the presence of opportunities for meaningful activity. The idea of freedom is often associated with the concept of liberty, which is typically understood as the absence of constraints on individual action. However, this understanding of freedom is too narrow. Freedom also includes the ability to interact with others, to engage in social relationships, and to participate in public life. This means that freedom is not just about individual rights, but also about the social context in which those rights are exercised.

In the context of this understanding of freedom, the role of government and other institutions is crucial. Governments have a responsibility to protect freedom by ensuring that individuals are not interfered with by others in ways that undermine their ability to live a meaningful life. At the same time, governments must also ensure that individuals are not allowed to interfere with others in ways that undermine their freedom.

The challenge, then, is to strike a balance between these two aspects of freedom. This requires a careful consideration of the interests and values of all individuals involved. It also requires a recognition that freedom is not just an individual right, but also a social good. By promoting freedom as a social good, we can create a society in which individuals are free to pursue their own interests and goals, while also respecting the freedom of others.

This approach to freedom is not only more inclusive, but also more realistic. It recognizes that freedom is not just a matter of individual rights, but also a matter of social relationships. It recognizes that freedom is not just a matter of individual liberty, but also a matter of social justice. And it recognizes that freedom is not just a matter of personal choice, but also a matter of collective action.

By adopting this approach to freedom, we can create a society that is more just, more equitable, and more free. We can create a society in which individuals are free to pursue their own interests and goals, while also respecting the freedom of others. And we can create a society in which freedom is not just an individual right, but also a social good. This is the kind of society that we should all strive to build.
Harrington 1992: 8). And the same view enabled Bentham and those friends of his who opposed the American cause in the 1770s to argue against the colonists' main complaint. This was that, since the British parliament was not constrained in the laws that it passed for the good of the American colonies—since it was not constrained in the same way that it was constrained in Britain itself—those laws represented an arbitrary interference with Americans and compromised their liberty (Laud 1776). Hobbes could argue that Leviathan did no worse than commonwealths in respect of the liberty of all its subjects, since all law compromises liberty. And Bentham and his friends could argue on the same grounds that, in regard to liberty, Americans faced no worse under the law imposed by the British parliament than those in Britain itself.

So much for the harder knocks—freedom effect of opposing freedom to non-dominination, not non-interference. But what of the easier-to-lose—freedom effect of shifting the autonomy?

The Easier-to-Lose—Freedom Effect

This effect comes of the fact that someone loses freedom, not just to the extent that another person interferes on an arbitrary basis in their choices, but to the extent that another agent has the capacity to do this. With freedom as non-dominination, a person loses freedom to the extent that they live under the thumb of another, even if that thumb is never used against them. Suppose that, under the existing law and mores, a wife may be abused on an arbitrary basis by her husband, at least in certain areas and in a certain measure. Even if her husband is loving and caring, such a wife cannot count as fully free under the construal of freedom as non-dominination. And neither can the employee who lives under the thumb of an employer, nor the member of a minority who lives under the thumb of a majority coalition, nor the debtor who lives under the thumb of a creditor, nor anyone in such a servient position.

Where the first effect of shifting the autonomy shows up particularly in the assememse of law and liberty, the second relates to the association between law and slavery. As it became a matter of common assumption after Bentham that law represents a compromise of liberty, albeit a compromise that may have for the good case become impossible to maintain that to be unfree is always, in some measure, to be enslaved (Patterson 1991): no one was prepared to say that the law makes slaves of those who live under it. But before Bentham, when freedom was opposed first and foremost to domination, the association between freedom and slavery was complete. To be unfree was to live at the mercy of another; and that was, to live under a condition of enslavement to them.

Thus, Algerno Sydeney (1990: 141) put it, 'he is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst.' Or as it was put by Richard Price (1991: 77–8) in the eighteenth century: 'individuals in private life, while held under the power of masters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is strictly true of communities as well as of individuals. There is domination, and there is unfreedom, even if no actual interference occurs.

I mentioned that the first effect of opposing freedom to domination provided an argument for the defenders of the American cause: while those in Britain were not made unfree by the laws, given that the law could not be arbitrary imposed there, those in America did not enjoy a similar status under the law. I should add that the second effect enabled them to shift the argument home. They were in a position to argue that, even though the British parliament did not interfere much in American affairs—even though it levied only a small tax—still, because it could levy whatever tax it wished, without any serious restraint on its will, it related to the American colonies as master to slave.

Joseph Priestley (1993: 146) offers a nice example of this line of argument.

Q: What is the great grievance that those people complain of? A: It is their being taxed by the parliament of Great Britain, the members of which are so far from taxing themselves, that they ease themselves at the same time. If this measure takes place, the colonists will be reduced to a state of an absolute servitude, as any people of which there is an account in history. For in the same power, by which the people of England can compel them to pay one pence, they may compel them to pay the last pence they have. There will be nothing but arbitrary imposition on the one side, and humble petition on the other.
My comments on the two main differences associated with opposing freedom as non-domination rather than as non-discrimination should serve to make the notion intelligible. It was to add three further remarks, however, in order to underline some points that are important for understanding it fully.

First, although domination is constituted by one agent's having the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in the affairs of another, some plausible empirical assumptions link it with shared awareness on the part of the individuals or groups involved in the capacity to interfere. The question of whether you are undominated is bound to be of interest to anyone. The facts that make you undominated, if indeed you are such—the facts about your comparative resources, for example, and about the degree to which you are protected by legal and other means—are bound to be of interest to all involved. Under standard assumptions as to people's productive and inferential abilities, it follows that the fact of non-domination will be a matter of common recognition among the individuals in question (Lewis 1969: 50). And that is something of the greatest significance. For it means that under standard ways of achieving it, freedom as non-domination is intimately linked with the ability to look others in the eye, without having to defer to them or fear them. Montesquieu (1986: 157) emphasizes this theme when he writes: "Democratic liberty in a citizen is that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of its security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen."

The second remark I want to make is about domination. If someone is to enjoy freedom as non-domination, it is not enough that the other people are unlikely to exercise arbitrary interference: those other people must lack the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in that person's life, not just be unlikely to interfere. Suppose also you are subject to interference on an arbitrary basis from someone who, as it happens, really likes you and is extremely unlikely to interfere. If it still remains the case that, by the ordinary standards of freedom from interference, they have a capacity to interfere or not to interfere, and this on a more or less arbitrary basis, then you are dominated in some measure by them and are thus far undominated. This is not a hard line to take, since you dearly suffer to the extent that the person has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily with you: you suffer to the extent that such interference is accessible to them as an agent, however improbable it is that they will exercise it. Their capacity for arbitrary interference means, for example, that you lack grounds for the subjective state of mind that goes with freedom as non-domination: you have reason to defer to the person in question and to look for their continued favor.

The third and last point is the most important. When Bentham and his associates came to reject the notion of freedom as non-domination, freedom as non-slavery, one theme in their reflections was that this sort of freedom did not come in degrees and so, unlike the rival conception, lent itself to "petty tyrannies and careless declamation" (Paley 1825: 309-66 Long 1977: ch. 4); John Lind (1776: 25) expressed the criticism strongly in his attack on Richard Price's talk of the American colonies as slaves. Things must be always at the maximum or minimum; there are no intermediate gradations: what is not white must be black. The third point I want to make is that this perception is mistaken. Freedom as non-domination is not an all-or-nothing matter.

The point should be obvious on a little reflection. Agents may have a more or less ready capacity to interfere. And the interference for which they have a capacity may be more or less serious, and may be available more or less without cost: say, without risk of retaliation. Thus the freedom as non-domination of those they are in a position to affect may be more or less intense; the weaker the agents, the greater the freedom of those they may affect.

Intensities, I should add, is only one dimension in which freedom as non-domination may vary. As it is more or less intense, so freedom as non-domination may also be of one or another extent: it may be available for a smaller or larger number of choices, for choices that are more or less costly, and for choices of intuitively lesser or greater significance. Even if we have attained the highest possible intensity of non-domination for people in a society, there may be room for improving the range of undominated choice that is available to them: we may make the range of choice larger, or less costly, or intuitively more significant. Even if we remove all compromising influences on freedom as non-domination, it may still be possible to remove conditioning influences as well.

Thus, freedom as non-domination may be increased in either of two broad dimensions, intensity or extent: and we must decide how those dimensions are to be weighed against one another (Petit 1997: ch. 3). Indeed, a similar problem arises with freedom as non-interference; it increases in intensity so far as interference is blocked, and increases in extent so far as the range of unobstructed choice is expanded, say, by providing people with extra resources. But I can overlook such problems of weighting here, as I shall be concerned with the promotion of these values only in the dimension of intensity. The question I address in the next section bears only on what is required for maximizing equal non-domination in the dimension of intensity.
The Significance of the Republican Ideal

Perhaps the most important figure in the demise of the republican ideal – someone more important even than Constant – is William Paley. Paley may have been the only writer in his time to recognize clearly the shift that was taking place – indeed, he argued for it. This was the shift from the received notion of freedom as non-interference, freedom as security against interference, to freedom as non-interference. He sets out his view with admirable clarity in "The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," which was first published in 1785 and was continually reprinted throughout the nineteenth century (Paley 1825).

Paley recognizes in this work that the notion of civil liberty, the one that ‘agrees with the usage of common discourse, as well as the example of many respectable writers’ (357), is that of freedom as non-domination. This idea places liberty in security, making it to consist not merely in an actual ousting from the domination of laws and actions of dominion, but in being free from the danger of having such interference exercised’ (357, original emphasis). But Paley argues against this received notion, and in favor of a Benthamite conception of freedom as non-interference, on an extraordinary basis. He argues that the ideal in question, however well-established, is excessively demanding on the state: ‘those definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which, by making that concept to consist in dominion, which is unattainable in experience, inframe expectations that can never be gratified, and disturb the public content with complaints, which no wisdom or benevolence of government can remove’ (Paley 1825: 358).

How could Paley have thought that freedom as non-domination was the received ideal of freedom and yet that it was too demanding on the state? My hunch is that for Paley, as for most progressive thinkers of the late eighteenth century, it was no longer possible to think that political citizenship and consideration could be restricted, as traditional republicans had taken it to be restricted, to property-owning men: women and servants could not be systematically and permanently excluded from concern. ‘Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’, in the slogan ascribed to Bentham by John Stuart Mill (1869: 257). Thus, whereas traditional republicans could think that everyone relevant to the state’s concern – every procreated male – might aspire to be free in the sense of not being subject to anyone’s domination, egalitarians like Paley could not say this with seeming to embrace wholly revolutionary doctrine: a doctrine that would require the upturning of relations between men and women, masters and servants. Their response was to redefine the idea of freedom – to reduce it from non-domination to non-interference – at the same time that they argued that the constituency of political concern should be expanded. What they gave with one hand, they took away with the other.

Who is the republican conception of liberty politically significant for the modern state? In a word, because it would recal the state to performing, in relation to citizens generally, the service that a republic – even a republic hidden under the form of a monarchy – was expected to perform for traditional elites. It may indeed have been impossible for someone like Paley or Bentham or Constant to envisage a state that would liberate women as well as masters, women as well as men. But this is no longer an obviously infeasible ideal, even if it is obviously surpassed. The limits on what we can envisage the state doing, and the limits on what we can imagine civil society allowing the state to do, have shifted dramatically over the last couple of centuries or so. Republicanism went underground at the time when the state began to become inclusive, thereby permitting the state to become simultaneously more and less minimalistic. It is high time that the doctrine was restored to prominence, allowing us to consider the direction that an inclusive republic – a republic dedicated to the general promotion of freedom as non-interference – would have to take.

I have tried to display the significance of the republican perspective elsewhere, examining the impact of the republican ideal on our notions of egalitarianism; on the political communities that we prescribe for the modern state; on the way we conceive of constitutional and democratic values and institutions; on the approach that we take to issues of regulation and control; and on the image we have of how the state should relate to civil society (Petti 1997). In order to illustrate the way in which the republican perspective can affect our thinking, I will concentrate here on its significance for issues of redistribution. This theme is particularly relevant, because it is at the centre of contemporary political discussions, and it also connects with the hostile reaction of Paley and others like him to the republican ideal.

Freedom as Non-Interference, and Redistribution

How far is the equal maximal distribution of freedom as non-interference consistent with inequalities in other dimensions? How far is it consistent, for example, with different levels of provision in basic goods like food and shelter, modes of transport and media of reliable communication; in basic services like medical care, legal counsel and accident insurance; in human capital of the kind associated with training and education; in social capital of the sort that consists in being able to call with confidence on others, in political capital such as office and authority
confer; and in the material capital that is necessary for production? How far is it likely to require putting inequalities in these matters right or at least alleviating their effects in particular, coercively putting them right, or coercively alleviating their effects, under state initiatives? How far is it likely to require what I shall describe, in a word, as redistribution?

The common wisdom on this question is that the maximal equal distribution of freedom as non-interference would leave a lot to be desired in regard to redistribution: it would fall short, under most conceptions, of achieving distributive justice (Rawls 1971). I think this wisdom is well placed and I wish to argue that, in this respect, freedom as non-domination represents a sharply contrasted ideal: the maximal equal distribution of such freedom requires a much more substantial commitment to redistribution.

Before coming to that argument, however, it will be useful to see why the connection between freedom as non-interference and distributive justice is so loose. Two questions arise from the viewpoint of freedom as non-interference, which are such issues of redistribution are concerned. First, how far will redistribution entail interference in people’s lives by the state? And second, how far will redistribution lower the probability of interference in other agents?

The answer to the first question is that redistribution always entails a degree of interference by the state. For even the most basic form of redistribution involves taxing some to give to others, and that in itself constitutes interference: it deprives those who are taxed of a chance in how to use their money. Besides tax, most forms of redistribution also require inspectors and other officials to oversee the operation. Thus the redistributive measures involve the creation of new possibilities of interference in people’s lives.

The answer to the first question means that the onus of proof always lies, from the perspective of freedom as non-interference, with those who counsel redistribution. Whether redistribution in any area is to be supported, then, depends on whether the answer to the second question shows clearly that the margin whereby redistribution will reduce interference in society is greater than the margin whereby it introduces interference itself. The margin of projected improvement will have to be large enough to ensure that even when we discount for the least certain nature of the projection, the argument squarely favors redistribution.

Nevertheless, it is not easy to find grounds to defend the required answer to the second question. It is always possible for the opponent to argue that, so long as we do not think of the relatively advantaged as downright malicious, we must expect them not to be generally disposed to harm the disadvantaged, and not to be generally in need of certain state aid.
justice can be pursued under a fair rule of law. Freedom as non-discrimination, then, does not introduce any presumption against redistribution of the kind associated with freedom as non-interference. If redistributive measures are used in the promotion of non-discrimination, the good at which they are directed does not have to be balanced against a violation of that very good in the process of production; the process of production need not itself represent a form of domination.

The process is not entirely innocent, of course. As we mentioned, any rule of law, and certainly any redistributive rule, is going to refract certain choices or raise the costs of pursuing them. But this way of restricting choice, this way of conditioning people’s freedom as non-discrimination, falls far short of compromising such freedom on their part. If it succeeds in reducing the extent to which the poor or the sick or the needy have their freedom compromised, then this cost in the conditioning of the freedom of people generally is well worth paying.

Here is another way of thinking about the point. Redistribution under a fair rule of law could be consistent with the republican ledgerbook as a form of conditioning of liberty on a part with the conditioning effected by factors like poverty or disability or illness or whatever. Redistribution involves moving around the factors that serve as conditioning influences on freedom; and this, without itself dominating anyone; without itself compromising anyone’s freedom as non-dominion. If that reshuffling of freedom-relevant factors can itself increase the degree of equal freedom in the society, then there is little or no question to raise about it. There is no reason to have a presumption against it.

This argument, I hasten to emphasize, is advanced under the assumption that the redistribution effected is achieved under a fair rule of law. And that assumption remains plausible only up to a certain level, and only under a certain kind, of redistribution by a state. Suppose that the redistribution allowed involves the exercise of unconstrained discretion by individual agents of the state; the discretion may arise in the way goods are taken from some, for example, or in the way goods are given to others. Or suppose that the redistribution is so extensive, or subject to such frequent adjustments, that people hardly know where they stand relative to the state. Under any such suppositions, the prospect of redistribution looks very much different from a republican point of view.

The republican tradition of thinking has always put the state under severe scrutiny, for fear that state authorities will ever become, or ever reserve, relatively arbitrary powers. In arguing that the ideal of freedom as non-discrimination is not hostile to redistribution, in particular not hostile in the manner of freedom as non-interference, I do not mean to reject that tradition. I think that, if we treasure freedom as non-dominion, then we have to be vigilant about not allowing the state certain sorts of power; we have to be careful to see that it is subject to all sorts of constitutional and other constraints. My point has been only that, provided a state can be sufficiently constrained—and that may be a very big proviso—there is nothing inherently objectionable about allowing it to use redistributive means for promoting antipoverty.

The second point that we noted about the redistributive significance of equalizing non-interference was that the question of whether any redistributive measure increased people’s freedom as non-interference remained inevitably a probabilistic matter. Perhaps we can interfere with employers to ensure that they do not interfere in certain ways with their employees. Perhaps we can interfere with husbands to ensure that they do not interfere in certain ways with their wives. But before we think of practising interference, we have to convince ourselves that some shaky arithmetic comes out right. We have to convince ourselves that there is a suitably high probability of a suitably large reduction in the practice of interference by employers and husbands. That thought may well give pause to any projects of redistribution that the ideal of freedom as non-interference is otherwise likely to sponsor.

Like the matter of the presumption against redistribution, however, the ideal of freedom as antipoverty, freedom as non-dominion, has quite a different impact here. Suppose that an employer has the capacity in some measure to interfere arbitrarily in the affairs of an employee. Employment is so scarce and the prospect of unemployment so repellent, that the employer can alter agreed conditions of work, make life much tougher for employees, or even practise some illegal interference in their affairs, with relative ease. And suppose now that we contemplate introducing a system of unemployment benefits, or a set of health and safety regulations, or an arrangement for arbitrating workplace disputes, that would improve the lot of employees. Do we have to do a range of probabilistic sums before we can be sure of the benefits of such a redistributive regime?

Assuming that the regime is consistent with a fair rule of law, and does not itself introduce an independent source of domination—provided it does not have any dominational side-effects—it should be clear that no such sums are necessary. Just the existence of reasonable unemployment benefits is bound to reduce the extent to which an employee is willing to tolerate arbitrary interference by an employer, and by the same token reduces the capacity of the employer to interfere at will and with impunity in the lives of employers. There is no uncertainty plaguing the connection. Or at least there is no uncertainty of the kind that makes the connection with freedom as non-interference so problematic.

Similar points go through on a number of fronts. The fact that people are poor or illiterate or ignorant or unable to get legal counsel or uninsured against illness or incapable of getting around—the fact that
they lack basic capabilities in any of these regards (Sen 1985) — makes them subject to a certain sort of exploitation and manipulation. Once things being equal, then, any improvement in their lot is bound to reduce the capacity of others to interfere more or less arbitrarily in their lives. And that means that, other things being equal — domination/side-effects being absent — any such improvement is bound to increase their freedom as non-domination.

The crucial difference in this second respect between the ideals of freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination is the fact that the first ideal is compromised only by actual interference, the second by the capacity for interference, in particular the capacity for arbitrary interference. It may be unclear whether a given measure will actually reduce the overall level of interference practised to the more advantageous, while it is absolutely certain that the measure will reduce their capacity for interference.

Suppose that the employer in our earlier example is actually benign, or actually committed to a smooth, productive workplace, and thus is unlikely ever to interfere in the affairs of employees. The introduction of employment benefits, or health and safety regulations, or arbitration procedures, will not significantly reduce the probabilities of interference in such a regime; that probability is already negligible. But still, the introduction of any such scheme will certainly reduce the employer’s capacity for arbitrary interference. For whether the employer interferes or not will no longer be dependent on their good grace; it will be substantially determined by factors outside the employer’s will.

Some will retort at this point that there is no reason why we should want to reduce the capacity of an employer to interfere with employees, especially given the cost of doing so, when it is certain that no interference will actually occur. But that is to shift the issue from the matter of what the ideal of freedom as non-domination would require — and, in particular, from the observation that it would require, other things being equal, that the employer is constrained to the issue of whether it is an attractive ideal. My aim here is not to argue that it is an attractive ideal (see this issue see Pettit 1987), only that it is a redistributively demanding one.

We saw earlier that freedom as non-interference may be maximized, and maximized under the constraints of more or less equal distribution, without any significant redistribution of resources being required. What we have now seen is that, in this respect, as in so many others, freedom as non-domination is quite different. The republican ideal, just in itself, may be capable of entailing the redistributive measures that many of us would think it reasonable to require of the modern state. While remaining an ideal of liberty, it may give adequate expression to the more demanding aspirations that the non-libertarians among us find compelling.

1 I am most grateful to Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Smith for helpful discussions of the material. I was enormously helped by comments received when the paper was presented to a meeting in New Orleans organised by the Murphy Institute of Political Economy, Tulane University, and the International Society for Economics and Philosophy.


3 Notice that an act of interference can be arbitrary in the procedural sense intended here — it may occur on an arbitrary basis — without being arbitrary in the substantive sense of actually going against the interests or judgments of the persons affected. An act is arbitrary, in this image, by virtue of the controls’ actions; the lack of controls, under which it materializes, not by virtue of the particular consequences to which it gives rise. The image I follow means that there is no expectation involved in speaking, as I do, either of a power of arbitrary interference or of an arbitrary power of interference. What is in question in each case is a power of interfering on an arbitrary, unchecked basis.

4 When proponents of this ideal speak of making freedom as non-interference effective, or just leaving it as a formal freedom, I assume that they often have in mind reaching or reducing the obstacles that condition the exercise of freedom as non-domination: extending the range of choice available to people. See Van Parijs 1995.

5 The extreme case of legal interference is punishment for an offence. Such punishment will always condition people’s freedom as non-domination: removing the capacity for undominated choice (capital punishment), restricting the range over which such choice may be exercised (prison), or raising the costs of making certain undominated choices (taxes). But it need not result in the person punished having their liberty constrained through the use of the arbitrary will of the arbitrator. This remark is not meant to make legal punishment seem any more tolerable, only to allude in a perhaps surprising way to the concept of freedom as non-domination.

6 Libertarians often see that they are against big government. Republicans are also against big government, but in a different sense. They object, not necessarily to government’s having redistributive rights and responsibilities, but rather to the government’s having power to an arbitrarily in the pursuit of redistributive ends; the pursuit must always be governed by a fair rule of law.