REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ANTI-AMERICANISM

WORKING GROUP CO-CHAIRS:

Tod Lindberg
Hoover Institution

Suzanne Nossel
Security and Peace Institute

Anti-Americanism has been the subject of impassioned public and political debate in recent years, both in and outside Washington. The 9/11 terror attacks on New York and Washington produced an immediate outpouring of solidarity from U.S. allies and substantial sympathy from numerous parts of the world not so closely aligned with the United States. But that affection was largely gone by the time of the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq, replaced in many minds by increased wariness of the influence of U.S. military power and suspicion about U.S. motives in the Broader Middle East and elsewhere. The difficulties of a poorly-planned reconstruction, the failure to turn up the chemical and biological weapons that had been cited as the principal justification for war, and a growing Iraqi insurgency deprived the United States of the vindication that comes from swiftly demonstrated success. In short, pro-American sentiment may have seen a spike following 9/11, but the falloff was sharp, and the likelihood of a return to pre-9/11 levels, let alone to the post-9/11 highs, seems dubious.

Meanwhile, the attacks themselves also exposed a violent anti-Americanism operating in the interstices of the international system. Violence on a massive scale, once the province of state actors, now emerged as a threat posed by non-state actors and networks aided by new technologies and communications tools. While these networks did not depend on popular support, in some quarters they attained and were benefited by it. "Why Do They Hate Us?", part of the title of an influential post-9/11 essay in *Newsweek* by Fareed Zakaria, was a question now on many minds, a subject of journalistic and scholarly interest.

The subject of anti-Americanism — the forms it takes, its causes and consequences, the extent to which it is susceptible to remedy and what costs such remedies might in turn impose — can be quite slippery. We note with no pleasure the various ways in which anti-Americanism is subject to distortion for polemical reasons. On one side — broadly speaking, the left — there is a tendency to emphasize on the supposedly great damage anti-Americanism does to U.S. interests and policy goals. On the other — broadly speaking, the right — there is an opposite tendency to dismiss anti-Americanism as inevitable but inconsequential. Meanwhile, commercial interests also may distort our perception of the phenomenon: Certain consulting firms do business helping other companies cope with anti-Americanism; the market for their services

depends upon the assumption that anti-Americanism places American companies at risk. It is no insult to their integrity or their competence as advisors to observe that the premises from which they work represent one possible answer to the question we are investigating, but not the only possible answer. Other companies have business plans based on rapid global expansion; for them, there is the question of whether they would be as prepared to acknowledge the disruption of those plans by flourishing anti-Americanism as disinterested observers.

Finally, we have the vast problem of sorting out "legitimate" criticism of the United States, its policies, its social values, and culture from anti-Americanism. Is it fair to label someone from Paris who holds certain views "anti-American" when many of those very views are amply represented among the American public.   If so, are we not then obliged to note the phenomenon of anti-Americanism at home? And then to observe that the robust tradition of dissent in the United States up to and including anti-Americanism of this sort is as American as apple pie?

Our hope with this paper is to bring clarity to the questions posed by the subject of anti-Americanism, to assess the phenomenon as best we can in terms of its real-world consequences, to consider the extent to which anti-Americanism as such or its consequences can be ameliorated by the choices of policymakers, and to make some recommendations along those lines.

The Rise of Anti-Americanism

Before assessing the impact of anti-Americanism, it is worth taking a look at the best available information on the extent, nature, and basis of opposition to the U.S. Measuring anti-Americanism is no simple task. Anti-Americanism manifests itself in the behavior of governments, in the actions of individual political, religious, and community leaders, in cultural forms like books and films, and in the attitudes of ordinary citizens. Yet quantitative measurements of anti-Americanism are available only in the form of public opinion polls. These are unable to capture nuances of viewpoint, nor do they measure the intensity of individuals' anti-American attitudes or their propensity to act

upon those views. But they do usefully document the fact that anti-Americanism has seen a marked rise over the last three years.

The best source of foreign public opinion data on attitudes toward the U.S. comes from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys conducted annually since 1999. The Pew surveys demonstrate a pronounced uptick in unfavorable opinions of the U.S. starting in 2002. In a mid-2002 survey of 38,000 people in 44 countries, Pew found U.S. favorability ratings had declined sharply since 1999-2000 in most countries for which trend data were available. The slide was significant both among America's traditional allies (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) and in predominantly Muslim countries with which the U.S. was cooperating closely in combating terrorism — Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

A year later, just after major combat operations in Iraq concluded, a follow-up survey showed that the U.S. image had plummeted, with the steepest drops recorded in Muslim countries. U.S. favorability ratings (those saying they had a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" opinion of the United States) fell below 50% in France, Germany, Spain, and Russia. In Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan favorability registered at 15% favorable or lower; just 27% of those surveyed in both Lebanon and Morocco held a positive view, and a mere 1% of Jordanians said their attitude toward the U.S. was favorable.

Favorable Opinion of the U.S.

	'99/'00 %	2002 %	2003 %	2004 %	2005 %
Canada	71	72	63	--	59
Britain	83	75	70	58	55
Netherlands	--	--	--	--	45
France	62	63	43	37	43
Germany	78	61	45	38	41
Spain	50	--	38	--	41
Poland	--	79	--	--	62
Russia	37	61	36	47	52
Indonesia	75	61	15	--	38
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23
Lebanon	--	35	27	--	42
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21
Morocco	77	--	27	27	N/A[1]
India	--	54	--	--	71
China	--	N/A	--	--	42

1999/2000 trends from Office of Research, U.S. Dept. of State; Canada from Environics. All other data from Pew Global Attitudes Project.

A survey conducted in March of 2004, a year after the Iraq invasion, showed worsening attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe, and modest improvements in Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Britain was alone among the eight countries surveyed that year to register a majority favorable view (58%, down from 70% a year earlier).

In 2005 perceptions of the United States showed some improvement, though remained negative overall. The exception was India, where favorable views of the United

States increased to 71% from just over half (54%) in 2002. Opinion in Indonesia toward the U.S. also improved markedly, from a 15% to a 38% favorable rating, but still remained much lower than in 1999, when three-fourths of Indonesians held positive views. In 2005 for the first time, Pew surveyed Chinese opinion of the U.S. A 53% majority in China held an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., with 42% viewing America favorably.

Whereas in 2002 Pew found that generational and gender distinctions had little bearing on attitudes toward the U.S., more recent surveys have shown that unfavorable views are more heavily concentrated among younger people in Western countries. Fully 62% of Spaniards under age 30 have a negative view of the U.S., compared to 39% of their elders. Trends in France, the UK and Germany are similar.

Pew surveys have also tried to measure the depth of and basis for anti-U.S. attitudes. Specifically, Pew queried whether those registering unfavorable views of the U.S. see the problem as "America in general" or "mostly Bush." While Bush and his policies may have been a spark for negative attitudes, clearly America's image problem is much bigger than its president.

What's the Problem with the U.S.?*

	Mostly Bush %	America in general %	Both (VOL) %	DK/ Ref %	
Spain	76	14	7	3	(N=374)
2003	*50*	*37*	*12*	*2*	
Germany	65	29	5	1	(N=424)
2003	*74*	*22*	*3*	*1*	
Netherlands	63	30	6	1	(N=403)
France	63	32	5	1	(N=429)
2003	*74*	*21*	*4*	***	
Pakistan	51	29	10	10	(N=730)
2003	*62*	*31*	*2*	*5*	
Britain	56	35	8	1	(N=285)
2003	*59*	*31*	*8*	*3*	
Canada	54	37	9	0	(N=188)
2003	*60*	*32*	*6*	*2*	
Lebanon	47	32	19	1	(N=572)
2003	*51*	*32*	*16*	*1*	
Turkey	41	36	17	6	(N=671)
2003	*52*	*33*	*12*	*3*	
Indonesia	43	42	0	15	(N=577)
2003	*69*	*20*	*7*	*4*	
India	35	35	14	16	(N=349)
Jordan	22	37	41	1	(N=798)
2003	*42*	*28*	*30*	***	
China	16	34	42	8	(N=1,197)
Poland	27	49	14	10	(N=236)
Russia	30	58	9	3	(N=401)
2003	*43*	*32*	*15*	*10*	

*2005 survey of those with an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.

**How Others Feel
About Your Country**

	We're disliked	We're liked
Canada	4	94
Jordan	8	84
Indonesia	11	86
India	13	83
Spain	14	80
Netherlands	15	83
China	16	68
France	19	80
Lebanon	32	55
Pakistan	31	53
Great Britain	33	56
Poland	35	51
Germany	43	51
Russia	57	32
Turkey	66	30
U.S.	69	26

The rise of anti-Americanism is not lost on Americans. In Pew's 2005 survey, 69% of the American public said their country was generally disliked around the world, by far the highest percentage of any of the other 16 countries polled in 2005.

While historically, negative views of the U.S. have not necessarily spilled over into unfavorable opinions about the American people, that may be changing. In the 2005 Pew survey, Americans are seen less favorably in 9 of the 12 countries for which there is trend data. A similar German Marshall Fund survey in 2004 showed nearly identical results.[1]

The war on terrorism has proven more problematic than beneficial for the United States in terms of perceptions abroad. In 2002, when the United States was still reeling from the 9/11 terror attacks, Europeans in the East and West were highly supportive of the war on terrorism, as were publics in Africa, and majorities in seven of eight Latin American countries. The exception was among Muslim publics. But by 2003 support

**Waning Support for
U.S.-led War on Terror**

	---- Percent Favor ----			
	2002	2003	2004	**2005**
	%	%	%	**%**
United States	89	--	81	**76**
Netherlands	--	--	--	**71**
Poland	81	--	--	**61**
Russia	73	51	73	**55**
Great Britain	69	63	63	**51**
France	75	60	50	**51**
Germany	70	60	55	**50**
Canada	68	68	--	**45**
Spain	--	63	--	**26**
Indonesia	31	23	--	**50**
Lebanon	38	30	--	**31**
Pakistan	20	16	16	**22**
Turkey	30	22	37	**17**
Jordan	13	2	12	**12**

began to wane across Europe and opposition increased among Muslim publics. In 2005, European support for U.S. efforts to fight terrorism continued to fall; in Spain support fell 37 points despite Spain's own experience with terror bombings. More Canadians opposed the war than supported it. Even in India, where the U.S. image

Marshall Fund Survey see www.transatlantictrends.org.

6

has remained quite positive in the past three years, support for the war on terrorism has fallen 13 percentage points.

Acting unilaterally and not taking other's interests into account causes publics around the globe to see the U.S. as abusing its superpower status. A European Union poll of all member publics indicated that 53% sees the United States as a threat to world peace, the same percentage that viewed North Korea and Iran as a threat.[2] Majorities in all 16 countries surveyed in 2005 said it would be better if another power rivaled U.S. military power. Americans do not agree, a 63% majority preferring a unipolar world.

Historically, America's image was synonymous with individual opportunity, hope, and a place other ethnicities could come to seek their fortune. In a 2005 Pew survey, respondents were asked to name one country they would recommend a young person go to lead a better life, and only one country, India, named the U.S. as top choice.

Overload of American culture may be one explanation for the declining favorability. A second factor may be a backlash against the economic consequences often associated with globalization, including environmental damage and population dislocations. Pew has found that because of their own mixed experience importing aspects of American democracy, publics throughout Latin America in particular are wary of American ideas about democracy. The predominantly Muslim

Spread of American Ideas and Customs			
	Good	Bad	DK/ Ref
North America	%	%	%
Canada	37	54	8
West Europe			
Great Britain	39	50	11
Italy	29	58	12
Germany	28	67	6
France	25	71	4
East Europe			
Bulgaria	36	32	33
Ukraine	35	58	7
Slovak Republic	34	60	7
Czech Republic	34	61	6
Poland	31	55	14
Russia	16	68	15
Conflict Area			
Uzbekistan	33	56	11
Lebanon	26	67	7
Jordan	13	82	5
Turkey	11	78	11
Egypt	6	84	10
Pakistan	2	81	17
Latin America			
Venezuela	44	52	4
Honduras	44	53	4
Guatemala	40	53	7
Peru	37	50	13
Brazil	30	62	8
Mexico	22	65	13
Bolivia	22	73	5
Argentina	16	73	11
Asia*			
Philippines	58	36	6
Japan	49	35	15
Vietnam	33	60	7
South Korea	30	62	8
India	24	54	22
Indonesia	20	73	7
Bangladesh	14	76	10
Africa			
Ivory Coast	69	31	0
Nigeria	64	31	6
Uganda	50	42	8
Ghana	47	40	13
South Africa	43	45	12
Kenya	40	55	5
Mali	35	61	4
Senegal	34	62	4
Angola	33	54	13
Tanzania	18	67	15
* Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2002.			

publics of Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan also report disliking American democracy.

However, this is not the case everywhere. In ten countries of Africa majorities (in some cases very strong majorities), express positive views of American ideas about democracy. And, while many Muslim countries dislike American ideas about democracy, they do believe that "western-style" could work in their countries. Democratic ideals are shared widely shared, but many are wary of imposition of democracy.

Varieties of Anti-Americanism

Underlying the regional variations reflected in the Pew and other surveys are deep differences in the nature and type of anti-American attitudes in different parts of the world and among distinct communities. In order to analyze the impact of anti-Americanism and examine potential responses to it, it is first necessary to recognize that within the rubric of anti-Americanism are a great variety of different motivations, attitudes, and criticisms of the United States.

As part of their forthcoming volume on the topic, Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein offer a series of observations on the disaggregation of anti-Americanism — as well as a succinct typology of anti-Americanisms.

Keohane and Katzenstein make a distinction between transient negative opinion of the United States on one hand, and on the other entrenched bias that forms a lens through which all U.S. conduct is viewed. They acknowledge that ephemeral views can harden into rigid bias, but they define anti-Americanism to include only systemic negative bias. They acknowledge that few studies aiming to measure anti-Americanism draw this distinction; Pew polls, for example, would capture both sides of the spectrum. As evidence of how deep-seated bias can permeate every aspect of how America is viewed, they cite a study by Andrei S. Markovits of the University of Michigan, who analyzed nearly 1,000 articles published in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Parsing stories on topics including film, theatre, and sports, Markovits noted widespread negative attitudes toward American culture, including for example American ignorance about global sports like soccer. Keohane and Katzenstein call for more studies that dig below the surface of public opinion polling results to identify deep-rooted bias against the U.S.

A second foundational point stressed by Keohane and Katzenstein is the pervasive ambivalence reflected in measures of anti-Americanism. Around the world, people and leaders are simultaneously attracted and repelled by the United States. Examples of such ambivalence include the enduring gulf between perceptions of America and of Americans, and the continuing popularity of American culture and products even in societies where levels of anti-Americanism have risen sharply.

Keohane and Katzenstein identify a variety of different types of anti-Americanism, including:

Liberal Anti-Americanism – This form of anti-Americanism is born of liberals' frustration and disillusionment with the U.S. failure to live up to its supposed ideals. Criticism of American support for dictators, both during the Cold War and more recently during the war on terror, feeds liberal anti-Americanism. Those who resent America because of its penchant for unilateralism and failure to account for the views of others likewise fall under this umbrella. Liberal anti-Americans are, relatively speaking, friendly critics. Their principal objective is not to attack or undermine the United States, but rather to expose its hypocrisy and, in doing so, influence America to be truer to its ideals.

Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism – This form of anti-Americanism operates as a kind of bulwark against superpower intrusions on national sovereignty. It manifests itself in such regions as Latin America and Asia, where national sovereignty was hard won and where American economic and political influence can be perceived as threatening. Keohane and Katzenstein also group under this category anti-American attitudes held by those — for example in Germany and China — who view their own countries as great powers and thus resent American dominance on the global stage.

Radical Anti-Americanism – Radical anti-Americans, in Keohane and Katzenstein's description, view every form of American influence as pernicious and believe that the betterment of the world depends on reining in or transforming the United States. Marxist-Leninists fit within this category, as do such states as Cuba and Korea. Anti-Americanism in this form can dovetail with anti-Western and anti-Semitic attitudes more broadly. Radical anti-Americanism may have religious motivations, such as in the Middle East or Afghanistan, or be purely secular.

Cultural Elitist Anti-Americanism – Keohane and Katzenstein locate the center of what they describe as cultural elitist anti-Americanism among French intellectuals. This group views Americans and American culture as boorish and crass. These anti-Americans take refuge in their own sense of superiority, and would not wish the U.S. to catch up to their level of cultural attainment.

Legacy Anti-Americanism – Legacy anti-Americanism is rooted in resentment over historical wrongs, such as U.S. attacks on Mexico, American intervention in Iran, and U.S. support for dictators in Southern Europe and Latin America. Such anti-Americanism gets reinforced by more recent U.S. actions that are seen as of a piece with past behavior.

One key to interpreting anti-Americanism is observing how these varieties interact with one another. Those motivated by different strains of anti-American sentiment can make common cause, for example. This occurs with some regularity at the United Nations, where the Cubans are masterful at mobilizing other countries with legacy grievances (for example Arab nations) or sovereign-national resentments (Latin American countries) toward the U.S. and forming coalitions to oppose American objectives. Other forms of interaction are harder to prove, but may well be at play. The ability of radical anti-American networks to recruit members and supporters may, in some measure, be impacted by degrees of liberal and other less extreme forms of anti-Americanism. It is possible that the level of anti-Americanism displayed in the media and in popular attitudes in Western European countries, for example, has some affect on the likelihood that residents of those countries will involve themselves actively in radical anti-American activities. In environments where anti-American attitudes – regardless of their origin – are seen as valid and legitimate, all strains of anti-Americanism may gain strength.

The Effects of anti-Americanism

While disputes over the significance and consequences of anti-Americanism are a regular feature of American political debate, some common ground has emerged. Most progressives and conservatives (with the exception of some on the far left) share the view

that the radical anti-Americanism of al Qaeda and like terrorist groups is in a class by itself. This form of anti-Americanism warrants a U.S. response geared toward the defeat of the enemy. No policy measures or outreach efforts will influence al Qaeda. This form of anti-Americanism is so hardened that it is properly viewed as unaddressable other than through a determined effort to vanquish its adherents. At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is little disagreement between progressives and conservatives that the U.S. government has no need to fret about French disdain for lowbrow American movies and novels.

Between these extremes, political disagreements flourish. Progressives, exemplified by presidential candidate Senator John Kerry during the 2004 campaign, argue that rising levels of anti-Americanism are impeding the U.S. ability to build coalitions and achieve policy objectives. Many conservatives maintain that anti-Americanism is, by and large, an unavoidable consequence of the U.S.'s superpower status and does not meaningfully hamper the U.S. ability to advance its interests. Understanding the consequences of anti-Americanism is essential to any examination of what, if anything, needs to be done to address the issue.

Those who are concerned about anti-Americanism cite an array of potential consequences: 1) that anti-Americanism may feed terrorism and violence toward the U.S. or its citizens; 2) that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. commercial interests abroad; 3) that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests by, among other things, making it more difficult to rally support for specific political or policy objectives.

Anti-Americanism and Violence

Anti-Americanism is thought to potentially fuel violence in three key ways: 1) by motivating terrorist recruits; 2) by producing populations more amenable to harboring and abetting terrorists through shelter, political support, and funding; and 3) by undermining global cooperation to counter terrorism. The focal point for examining these links is the Middle East, a region in which anti-Americanism is strong and that is the locus of the most prevalent and dangerous form of violent terrorism: jihadism.

There is at least a superficial temporal correlation between rising anti-Americanism in the Middle East in recent years and an increase in terrorist violence. According to Pew and Zogby polls, countries in the Middle East region consistently register unfavorable sentiment toward the U.S., with approval ratings starting and dipping lower than almost anywhere else in the world.[i] According to the U.S. State Department, while incidents of terrorism have declined globally since 2000, in the Middle East there have been sharp increases in both the incidence and lethality of such attacks since 1998. Yet data do not conclusively demonstrate a causal relationship between the prevalence of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and the rise in terrorist violence. The countries that Pew records as having markedly increased levels of anti-Americanism between 2002 and 2004 — Jordan and Morocco — are not terrorist hotbeds.

The increase in the number of terrorist incidents recorded in the Middle East is driven largely by the Iraqi insurgency. While most analysts say anti-Americanism plays some part in fueling Baathist insurgents, their primary goal is political: to retake control of Iraq. For foreign fighters from Syria, Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen who have no clear political place in Iraq, anti-Americanism plays a more important role in the decision to take up arms. While Islamic faith and adventurism may drive recruits to the insurgency, it is difficult to dismiss the influence of a rallying cry to drive the U.S. out of Iraq in shame.

The anti-Americanism fueling the insurgents cuts across the variations described by Keohane and Katzenstein. It is part nationalistic, insofar as its followers wish to rid Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries of U.S. interference. It also has radical dimensions, tied to the desire of some to reshape Iraq into a theocratic bulwark against American influence and a launching pad for the expansion of Islamism. Still others harbor legacy anti-Americanism rooted in the U.S.'s dealings in Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Iraq also has the seeds of liberal anti-Americanism. When the country planned to vote, staunch local objections overrode an American plan to delay direct voting. Would-be democrats in the country rejected the high-handedness of the American occupation, and decried what they regarded as U.S. meddling in local political processes. In addition to its multifaceted character, the anti-Americanism at play in the Iraqi insurgency also blends into a series of related attitudes, including Sunni wrath toward Shiites, generic hostility toward foreign and Western influence, and Islamic

fundamentalism. But the impossibility of cleanly separating the influence of anti-Americanism on the insurgency does not mean that its influence in Iraq should be discounted. There is no question that anti-Americanism plays a significant role in the U.S.'s most immediate foreign policy challenge today: the Iraqi insurgency.

Given the links drawn by everyone from Osama bin Laden to President Bush between the Iraqi insurgency and the fight against al Qaeda, it becomes clear that anti-Americanism plays at least some role in motivating those who aid and abet the Iraqi insurgency with financing, shelter, and other forms of support. The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service has characterized the insurgency as the "central battle" now being waged by al Qaeda. While the group may have originated in an effort to fight the Saudi regime, it is now principally known as America's enemy. Moreover, anti-American rhetoric and dogma have a central place in the teaching and preaching of Osama bin Laden and other radical Islamists associated with terrorism.

As to whether anti-Americanism is threatening cooperation to fight terror, the signs are less conclusive, though the uncertainty should come as no surprise. Whereas prospective terrorist fighters and their accomplices are motivated by a radical form of anti-Americanism, government officials in charge of formulating counter-terrorism policy are less likely to harbor anti-Americanism in this form. To the extent that they are anti-American, their resentment may originate in liberalism (for example in Europe), concerns over sovereignty (in Pakistan), or legacy issues (U.S. support of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines).

Signs of strong global cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts suggest that anti-Americanism has not proven a significant impediment in this area. NATO's role in Afghanistan, the U.N. Security Council's ambitious (though only partly fulfilled) counter-terrorism measures, and the cooperation the U.S. has received from governments from Sudan to Pakistan are all encouraging.

But at the same time, Pew data suggest that the fight against terrorism is unpopular around the world and that the U.S. is regarded as having exaggerated the terrorist threat. Perception of U.S. unilateralism and arrogance quickly eroded common ground — but precisely what ground? It is impossible to say whether in the absence of rising levels of anti-Americanism, anti-terror cooperation might have been more

effective. Many countries that are pivotal to the anti-terror fight themselves face a terrorist threat, such that their efforts to crack down on terror are likely motivated more by their own interests than by a sense of loyalty to the United States or even fellow-feeling toward Americans.

In sum, while anti-Americanism appears to play a significant role in the recruitment of some participants in violent terrorist movements and in the choice of others to aid and abet terrorist efforts, there is little evidence that it has concretely hampered U.S. efforts to mobilize cooperation to counter terrorism.

Economic Impact of Anti-Americanism

There is considerable debate and limited empirical evidence on whether anti-Americanism has significant effects on U.S. economic interests. The claim that rising levels of anti-Americanism undercut U.S. business abroad has several elements: attention has been called to boycotts of American products, rising security costs for U.S. companies operating overseas, the erosion of leading American brands, and to the potential for deterioration in U.S. trade relations. *Business Wee*k magazine asked the question in April 2003: "Will the enormous rise in anti-Americanism seen globally as a result of the war spill over to the business realm and cause problems for the continued development of globalization and free markets?"[3]

Businesses are concerned about anti-American backlash. The formation of advocacy group Business for Diplomatic Action was motivated primarily by concern that anti-Americanism could threaten America's commercial dominance by impeding the ability of American companies to enter new markets, by raising the costs of security, and by undermining brands.

Yet the *Business Week* question is easier to ask than to answer. Concrete evidence of serious damage to U.S. business interests as a result of anti-Americanism is limited. Boycotts of American products and businesses have been sporadic and short-lived, with their primary impact more symbolic than financial. The U.S.'s highest profile cultural exports — movies, music, and television — have shown little sign of vulnerability to

---

[3] BusinessWeek, April 21, 2003, iss. 3829, page 18.

14

politically motivated rejection. There are indications that certain well-known American franchises such as KFC have taken steps to strengthen perceptions of their ties to local cultural mores, populations, and producers in each market in which they operate, partly as a way of insulating themselves against anti-American backlash — but also perhaps simply as a matter of improved marketing strategy.

Threats to American private property and personnel working overseas have become pervasive in certain regions, especially the Middle East, and have resulted in sharply increased security costs. Although such incidents have been confined to particular countries, including most notably Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and of course Iraq, the few high-profile attacks on private sector facilities and employees in recent years have raised security concerns worldwide. If these concerns have their origins in anti-Americanism, however, their effects are more broadly felt. Not only American but also most Western companies operating in the Middle East, for example, perceive security threats that are leading them to take measures comparable to those of U.S. companies. Accordingly, the size of the competitive disadvantage faced by U.S. companies as a result of heightened security concerns may not be that significant. There is also a certain irony in that U.S. leadership in the global security industry means that increased threat perceptions have provided new economic opportunities for some American businesses.

Research does point to the possibility of consumer backlash against American brands. In February 2005, GMI released results of a poll of 20,000 consumers in 20 countries measuring opinions on American brands.[4] Nearly 20% of foreign consumers surveyed claimed to consciously avoid purchasing American brands as a way of displaying their "discontent over recent American foreign policies and military action." The greatest percentages of consumers claiming to boycott American brands were found in South Korea (45%), Greece (40%), and France (25%), all of which have demonstrated elevated levels of anti-Americanism in recent years. However, 56% of those who reported that they consider boycotting American brands also stated that their judgment of corporations that had donated to the tsunami relief effort had improved; 48% reported

---

[4] *Id.* The countries represented in the poll were Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States.

that they would consider purchasing products in the future from those brands that had provided tsunami aid.

Overall, GMI found that 35% of international consumers surveyed indicated that U.S. foreign policy was the most important factor in forming their image of America. Responses ranged from 49% in Italy to 18% in Russia.

Other polls reflect similar trends. A 2003 Roper/ASW survey found a decrease in global consumers who feel "very or somewhat close to American culture" over the last four years. The report found that American brands received higher premium ratings from those who felt closer to American culture. For example, while 46% of those who feel "very distant" to American culture reported that American brands are "better and worth paying more for," the figure went up to 59% of respondents who indicated that they feel very "close" to American culture. Roper/ASW linked these findings to the effect of anti-American sentiment over the war in Iraq and general resistance against American influence. It concluded that the data demonstrates that "American brands may be facing a less receptive global audience."[5]

There is no clear evidence that these perceptions are affecting actual consumer behavior, however. While it would be virtually impossible to strip out all other variables and isolate the affect of anti-American attitudes on actual sales or profits for specific products, marquis U.S. brands have for the most part not witnessed sales downturns even in the Middle East. Consistent with these results, most surveys have found that consumers tend to separate political opinions from purchasing habits; protesters against globalization and capitalism wear Levi's.

Moreover, to the extent that American brands are affected by these attitudes, the impact is likely to be limited to a handful of the most prominent consumer brands closely associated with the U.S. — those in the category of McDonald's and Coke. The vast majority of American brands with weaker associations are less likely to be affected.

Relatedly, of the Keohane and Katzenstein strains of anti-Americanism, none seems especially well-suited to produce a consumer backlash. Among radical anti-Americans, even anti-globalization protesters have focused more on mounting theatrical demonstrations intended to influence politics than on sustained economic campaigns.

---

[5] *Id.*

Anti-Americanism that is motivated by liberal, sovereign, or legacy concerns has as its primary focus American political rather than economic behavior. While cultural elitist anti-Americanism plays a role in, for example, French moves to expunge the use of English phrases and slogans, this has minimal economic impact.

There is some evidence that the very fact of American economic dominance in itself insulates certain U.S. businesses from anti-U.S. backlash. GMI's poll found that while Coca-Cola was widely identified as an American product, few of those who stated an intent to back away from U.S. brands said they planned to give up Coke. Global consumers seeking alternatives to Microsoft or Coke, for example, may find themselves with few viable competitive alternatives. Moreover, consumers in many parts of the world, including Central America and Europe, recognize that their own economies are highly dependent on trade with the U.S. The cliché is that when the U.S. economy sneezes, the rest of the world catches cold. Accordingly, economic self-interest may be a further buffer against economic backlash against the U.S.

The same is true when it comes to trade. Because so many countries count the U.S. among their most important trading partners, pullbacks from trade would arguably prove as painful for most American trading partners as for the U.S. itself. The U.S. has not faced a significant rise in trade-related tensions in recent years, notwithstanding rising levels of anti-Americanism. While the U.S. and Europe have faced a number of highly contentious issues. including trade in genetically modified organisms and steel tariffs, these have been resolved no less amicably than has been true in the past. During the same period the U.S. has expanded its free trade relationships, putting through agreements that have, for the most part, been highly popular in partner countries. Nor has an anti-U.S. backlash materialized in the form of merger controls or antitrust enforcement either. In the areas of trade and economic relations, the attitude of many business people and economic officials tends to be that commercial interests are, at least to them, too important to permit interference by changing political winds.

Discussions of the economic impact of anti-Americanism may also touch upon the ability of the United States to attract highly qualified foreign immigrants, such as scientists and engineers, and on the flow of tourists to the United States. But trends in

both of these areas are so heavily affected by U.S. immigration and visa policy that it is impossible to isolate the impact of anti-Americanism.

Before dismissing the economic impact of anti-Americanism as illusory, however, it is worth considering why certain corporate CEOs — the founders of Businesses for Diplomatic Action, among others — remain seriously concerned about its effects. First off, the link between anti-Americanism and terrorist violence has and may in the future have devastating economic consequences. If one believes that anti-Americanism plays a role in attracting recruits to the Iraqi insurgency, than the trillion-dollar plus costs of the protracted conflict in Iraq — and the spillover effects on the U.S. economy — cannot be decoupled from anti-Americanism. The possibility that anti-Americanism may fuel future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is another worrying wildcard for American business. Such attacks — like natural disaster or war — have the potential to disrupt operations, upend business plans, and destroy consumer confidence.

While there may be no clear evidence of negative economic consequences from anti-Americanism at the present time, the idea that persistent negative perceptions of the U.S. will erode American influence in all realms, including economic, is hard to dismiss. Moreover, certain conditions – American dominance in technology and consumer products, for example - that currently insulate U.S. economic interests from the impact of anti-Americanism aren't necessarily permanent.

Certain scenarios in which anti-Americanism demonstrates a more powerful impact than today are not hard to envisage. For example, in a climate of latent but widespread anti-Americanism, an accident or scandal involving an American company — a Bhopal-style disaster, an Enron-type debacle affecting primarily overseas operations of an American company — might trigger an outsized consumer response. Less dramatically, with China working steadily to expand its economic ties and influence in Latin America and Africa, the overweening U.S. economic influence that would today cause many anti-U.S. measures to boomerang and hurt local economies could provide less buffer over time.

Relatedly, anti-Americanism may itself play a role in some of the realignments that may gradually reduce the U.S. global economic influence. Brazil's desire to strengthen trade relationships among Mercosur is motivated at least partly by the desire

to shelter South America from overriding dependence on the U.S. The pace of China's economic outreach in recent years may have been motivated in part by the chance to take advantage of a period in which the U.S. has been distracted, its global ties strained.

So while the economic impact of anti-Americanism appears to be limited for now, American businesses take seriously the possibility that these trends could take a turn for the worse.

Political Impact of Anti-Americanism

The oft-made analogy between international relations and the realm of human behavior suggests that anti-Americanism might impede America's influence on other countries and its ability to advance its interests. If you believe that influencing people has something to do with making friends, the corollary would suggest that declining American popularity would interfere with the U.S. ability to work its will on others.

The notion that anti-Americanism could compromise U.S. political influence goes something like this: If the U.S. is unpopular, its ability to persuade others to its point of view on bilateral and multilateral issues may be compromised. While countries will always be guided primarily by their own interests, the influence the U.S. enjoys as the world's lone superpower is considerable. Countries may defer to the U.S. on issues they care about because their relationship with the United States matters more than the policy question at hand. In multilateral forums, countries are often in a position to opine and vote on matters that do not directly affect them: members of the UN Security Council vote on resolutions that may have no effect on their region. In such matters countries typically take the lead from interested allies; since the U.S.'s interests are so broad, it can play a role in lobbying on almost anything. One question is whether opposition to particular American policies — the war in Iraq, for example — can harden into an anti-Americanism that sours dealings even on matters where there is no strong policy disagreement.

It is difficult to measure how much tangible friction anti-Americanism, in itself, has created for the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. There is no question that it affects atmospherics, particularly by putting useful tools in the hands of those who are out to

oppose the United States anyway. In an environment of pervasive opposition to U.S. policies and to the U.S. administration, American diplomats in capitals around the world and at the UN and other international organizations have to spend time defending U.S. positions and actions that may have little to do with the immediate business at hand. Skepticism over the Bush administration's motives in Iraq and mistrust over flawed U.S. intelligence estimates on Iraqi WMD play into the hands of foreign counterparts who wish to call into question American purposes and viewpoints on unrelated issues. Cuban, Iranian, and Venezuelan delegates to the UN, for example, have undoubtedly found a more receptive audience in recent years for their perennial claims that the U.S. is manipulating and misleading others on a host of issues many having nothing to do with Iraq.

But the evidence of the tangible impact of this form of interference with U.S. policy interests is spotty. For example, this year, for the first time, the U.S. was forced to accept a new head for the Organization of American States who was not the candidate of its choosing. On the other hand, despite his renown as one of the leading administration proponents and architects of the Iraq War, Paul Wolfowitz won fairly ready European backing for the post of president of the World Bank.

One reason the effect of anti-Americanism on other countries' policy decisions is hard to discern is that such policy positions are inevitably driven by many factors. Keohane and Katzenstein cite a study by Judith Kelley on the International Criminal Court. Starting in 2001 the Bush Administration sought agreements with U.S. allies and aid recipients committing them not to surrender U.S. personnel to the court – a policy that was widely seen as bullying. Kelly examined the factors that led countries to accede to or resist this U.S. demand, trying to determine what role anti-Americanism played in countries' willingness to stand up to the U.S. and thwart American plans to insulate U.S. personnel from the reach of the court. She found that the primary factor contributing to resistance was not anti-Americanism, but rather countries' commitment to international law. There was no correlation between levels of popular anti-Americanism in the countries studied and their response to the U.S. demand. Other factors that may have played a role in countries' decisions on the non-surrender agreement include what consequences countries foresaw from a decision to resist the U.S. request, the degree of

popular attention to the ICC issue in the country in question, and countries' relationships with others who were either resisting or meeting the American demand.

During the 2004 election campaign, it was frequently argued, or at least implied, that the antagonism created by the Bush Administration's policies contributed to other countries' unwillingness to participate in the invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation and post-occupation military and civilian efforts. Keohane and Katzenstein address this by comparing anti-American attitudes as recorded in the Pew surveys to the list of countries included in the "Coalition of the Willing" that joined the initial military phase of the Iraq war. They note that among democracies, those that declined to join the Coalition had only slightly less favorable attitudes toward the U.S. than those that signed up for the war. The discrepancy was greater among non-democracies, but they discount the influence of anti-Americanism in these countries on the basis that in a country that is not a democracy, public opinion has no bearing on policy. They further cite October 2003 pledges of aid to Iraq from countries like Spain and Italy, with high levels of anti-American sentiment, as evidence that negative attitudes toward the U.S. did not hamper the war effort.

While pointing out that the role of anti-Americanism in the Iraq war effort is less straightforward than some have thought, Katzenstein and Keohane's analysis leaves certain questions open. They look only at the State Department's list of Coalition partners when the Iraq War began in 2003. Many of these countries' tangible contributions to the war effort were minimal. For some the choice to be included on the list of partners was an easy way to win favor with the U.S. at little cost or risk. In relation to the October 2003 donors' conference, the generosity of pledges masks the fact that while the U.S. was requesting grants to Iraq, it got mostly loans, many of which were weighted toward years in the future rather than to meeting immediate needs. An estimated 75-80% of the amounts committed at the conference came from the U.S., Japan, and the U.S.-dominated IMF and World Bank. One might also want to look at the role of anti-Americanism in the inability of the United States to recruit and retain badly needed foreign contributions of personnel for the Iraq stabilization effort throughout 2004, when conditions were deteriorating and there was heavy pressure to reduce the American face of the occupation. Instead of the additional troop contributions it requested from both NATO

and from individual countries, the U.S. faced withdrawals of allied troops from Iraq and was unable to find participants to provide security for an authorized UN presence, forcing that effort to be severely scaled back.

Keohane and Katzenstein note that anti-Americanism may inhibit policymaking by causing the U.S. to scale back on demands and requests in inhospitable environments rather than face possible rejection. While the overriding factor deterring additional troop contributions for Iraq was undoubtedly security, anti-American attitudes likely played some part in lessening the Administration's inclination to make further troop requests that would likely have been rejected, as well as in making it easier for some countries to resist a U.S. request that, under different circumstances, might have been hard to refuse. France and Germany, both with sharply increased levels of anti-Americanism, would otherwise have been two of the countries best situated militarily to have made troop contributions. It might be argued that their non-participation was driven more by their opposition to the war than by anti-Americanism per se. But from the time Saddam was toppled, both Germany and France professed a strong interest in seeing a stable Iraq emerge. Since their participation in stabilization efforts would have furthered this end, the role of residual resentment toward the U.S. cannot be written out of their disinclination to play a role. Both Germany and France have played greater roles in NATO's Afghanistan operation. To the extent that anti-Americanism influenced certain countries to remain apart from the stabilization effort, it perpetuated the distinctly American face of the occupation. This, in turn, may have fed the insurgency's ability to use anti-Americanism and American interference in Iraq as a rallying cry to recruit new troops. But this is all speculative.

Rising levels of anti-Americanism as recorded by Pew and others have coincided with some high-profile examples of anti-Americanism rearing its head in local politics around the world, sometimes interfering with the U.S. ability to elicit cooperation. A prime example is Turkey, where high levels of anti-Americanism may have played a role in the Parliament's March 2003 decision to refuse permission for American troops to use Turkish territory as a base to invade Iraq. Turkey's turning its back on the U.S. despite decades of close alliance was a slap in the face, and significantly increased the complexity and cost of the Iraq war effort. In 2003 Pew recorded just 12 percent of Turks

having a favorable view of the U.S., a decline from 30 percent during a survey one year earlier. The Turkish population was also overwhelmingly opposed to the Iraq war effort, however. Whether rising anti-Americanism was a cause or an effect of Turkish unwillingness to accede to the Bush Administration's request is thus hard to discern. And one must also note the fact that the outcome of the vote came as a surprise to most Turkish parliamentarians, some of whom apparently believed they could vote no without jeopardizing passage.

In other places political leaders have used anti-American sentiment opportunistically to advance their own political fortunes. Confronting a tough 2003 reelection bid, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder capitalized on the German public's opposition to the Iraq war effort, running as a peace candidate critical of the Bush Administration's unilateralism and adventurism and pledging that Germany would stay out of the war no matter what. Schroeder's message went out to a German public whose positive view of the United States, according to Pew, had slipped from 78% to 45% between 2002 and 2003. His opponent accused Schroeder of putting trans-Atlantic relations at risk, but despite Germany's longstanding preoccupation with maintaining a solid relationship with Washington, the public tide turned in favor of Schroeder and his anti-U.S., anti-Iraq war platform was credited by many for reversing his campaign's fortunes.

While the impact of anti-American public sentiment on policy may be confined mainly to democracies, self-interested manipulation of anti-American sentiment is not. Throughout the Arab world leaders have stoked anti-American (and anti-Israeli) attitudes as a way of deflecting dissatisfaction with local regimes. The Chinese government may likewise have played up anti-U.S., anti-Japanese, and anti-Taiwanese sentiments as a way to strengthen its hold on popular opinion and temper the political impact of China's increasingly consumerist culture. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade fit this pattern: The Chinese government chose to play up anti-American sentiment by treating it as an affront and attack rather than accepting it as an accident.

There are also signs pointing to the limits of anti-Americanism as a political force. Within domestic politics, the role of the United States will rarely if ever be the predominant factor determining political outcomes. The 2005 state election in North

Rhine-Westphalia revisited some dynamics of Schroeder's 2003 campaign, with an anti-capitalism SPD platform replacing anti-American messages. While the heated rhetoric mobilized the left, the SPD nonetheless went down to a resounding defeat in one of its strongholds. The spring 2005 French referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty was framed partly as a drive to consolidate Europe as a vehicle to confront *faire face a l'Amerique*. Its failure is testament to the fact that, next to domestic political and economic worries, anti-American attitudes will generally take a back seat. Tony Blair was reelected to a third term in 2005 despite rising levels of anti-Americanism in Britain, coupled with strong opposition to the Iraq war and to Blair's close relationship to Bush. Berlusconi has also survived rising Italian anti-Americanism, whereas the political stars of Chirac and Schroeder have both sunk.

Once the political rhetoric of a campaign season subsides, a variety of factors can temper the influence of anti-Americanism on actual policies pursued. American power and influence are themselves a major counterweight to the impact of anti-Americanism. Policies predicated on anti-Americanism may not be worth the costs they exact in terms of strained relations with the United States. In the years since his 2003 reelection bid, Schroeder has made a concerted effort to try to mend fences with the U.S., recognizing that German commercial and political interests would be harmed by protracted strain. This is particularly so for the majority of countries that rely on the United States for foreign aid, protection, and trade. As is true in the economic arena, in the political realm, too, superpower status provides a kind of insulation against anti-American backlash.

In countries that are not democracies, the direct influence of anti-Americanism on politics is logically less. In the build-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some opponents of administration policy predicted the "Arab street" would pour forth, toppling moderate or secular governments and establishing in their stead radical Islamicist and rabidly anti-American regimes. In fact, anti-American demonstrations in major Arab cities were relatively small, especially as compared to those in European capitals. Rising anti-American sentiment in the Middle East does not, for the most part, appear to have weakened moderate states. Should positive movement toward democracy take broader hold in the region, it will be important to watch whether this undercuts legacy and liberal

anti-Americanism born of resentment over long-standing support for authoritarian regimes.

This brings up a related overarching point about the relationship between anti-Americanism and radical Islamism and hostility toward modernity, an issue at the intersection of politics and terrorist violence. The discourse of anti-Americanism is a fertile source for the culture of anti-modernity. In this way, engaging in the "war of ideas" does not necessarily entail building subjective affection for the US specifically but rather promoting acceptance of key tenets of modernity, including tolerance, minority rights, gender equality, private property, and free markets. In turn, the strength of the ideas and norms associated with modernity – democracy, market economies, protection for human rights – has reverberating effects on U.S. political and economic interests throughout the world. Conservatives and progressives agree on the importance of promoting human rights, democracy and socio-economic development around the world as ways to promote peace and security, enhance U.S. relationships with other countries, and protect American security. To the extent that anti-Americanism sets back achievement of these goals, it may indirectly interfere with American foreign policy objectives writ large.

Responding to Anti-Americanism

Evidence of the practical impact of anti-Americanism is less widespread than some might expect. But nonetheless, certain findings are worrying. That anti-Americanism is influencing both new recruits to terrorism and those who provide shelter and support to them is a matter of grave concern. Though the economic effects of anti-Americanism are mostly potential at this point, the prospect that they could swell up and do real damage is serious enough to preoccupy business leaders. Given the array of challenges we face as the world's only superpower, any source of additional friction in U.S. foreign affairs is something we ought rather live without.

None of this suggests that combating anti-Americanism ought to be the governing purpose of U.S. policy. Being popular is not a primary U.S. interest, nor even inarguably an interest in its own right. But stemming the flow of terrorist recruits, protecting our

economy, and increasing our diplomatic and political influence are all vital objectives. And to the extent anti-Americanism contributes to these problems in addressable ways, there is good reason to take measures to address them.

We concern ourselves here with addressable forms of anti-Americanism: those that are significant enough to warrant a response by the U.S. government and also sufficiently tractable to be influenced through the instruments available to the U.S. government. It is important to bear in mind that certain causes of anti-Americanism may be simply unaddressable by the United States. Some anti-Americanism is a product of the unequalled position of global power and influence the United States enjoys. The United States is unlikely in the extreme to voluntarily relinquish its position; policymakers would perceive the costs of trying to do so as too high. Similarly, simply by virtue of its position of global influence and its responsibility for world order, the United States faces some issues and policy questions that do not arise for any other power except as abstract questions. Unilateral American action, which is understandably resented, is not always a product of a mere preference for acting alone. To take a specific policy of particular salience to discussion of the Broader Middle East, the United States pays a price in international opinion, especially but not exclusively in the region, for its support for Israel. Yet it is highly unlikely that U.S. support for Israel will ever decline to a degree that would satisfy those who think there is no place for a Jewish state where it is today.

Certain cases, such as the ones just discussed, may be obvious. Others will be more ambiguous. It would be a mistake for policymakers to conclude too quickly that addressing an aspect of anti-Americanism the U.S. confronts poses too high a price. But those concerned about anti-Americanism must be realistic in their expectations about the limits of U.S. action.

Recommendations

There have been a host of ambitious reports on what to do about anti-Americanism n released in recent years, though very few of their recommendations have ever been implemented and even fewer consistently so. Many of these reports have acknowledged that many forms of anti-American sentiment may be addressed only

through changes in substantive U.S. policies – for example our role in the Middle East, our support for Israel, or our treatment of detainees. They note that efforts to improve perceptions of the U.S. without dealing directly with such policy positions may have limited impact. Yet because these policies are determined on the basis of wide-ranging national interests, only one of which is their impact on anti-American sentiment, they have mostly been considered outside the scope of inquiries focused on attitudes toward the U.S. We follow the same principle here: because the ambit of this paper is limited to anti-Americanism, our recommendations are centered on measures that would help bolster perceptions of the U.S. without necessitating fundamental policy shifts. Broadly, we class these efforts under the umbrella of "public diplomacy." We do not, for example, take a position on whether immediate U.S. withdrawal of ground troops from Iraq would alleviate anti-American perceptions in the Middle East.

Focused on matters apart from policy, most reports to date on anti-Americanism have focused primarily on structures: creating new offices, positions, and coordinating committees designed to drive policy. Many of these ideas are solid and merit being implemented. We avoid restating what appears in these previous reports, focusing instead on suggesting some new ways of thinking about public diplomacy. Less important than precisely which formula is put into place is that clear responsibility for assessing and devising strategies to address anti-Americanism be assigned to an official willing to fully engage the task and invested with sufficient authority and resources to do so effectively.

In an April 2005 report, the Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office) found that the Administration had failed to create a strategic communication function and that it had no clear strategy for attacking the pervasive problem of anti-Americanism. The Administration's track record is worrisome. Since its creation shortly after 9/11, the post of Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has been vacant for more time than its been filled. The first two appointees to the positionj, former ad executive Charlotte Beers and veteran diplomat Margaret Tutwiler, remained in the job for very short periods. Until Karen Hughes' swearing in on September 9, 2005, the job had stood vacant for sixteen months. The failure to maintain sustained leadership in this arena is glaring, and the result has been inability to

concertedly counter the rise of anti-Americanism in regions throughout the world. The GAO has judged the Administration's public diplomacy efforts as largely a void. Major goals have not been met. Efforts that have been made have tended to be short-term and tactical in nature, and are scattershot rather than coordinated across agencies. The government departments that reviewed the GAO's report agreed with its conclusions.

Notwithstanding the failures in formal public diplomacy, the U.S. has recently achieved some noteworthy indirect successes in countering anti-Americanism that may offer guidance for future efforts. The most notable is the massive U.S. contribution to tsunami relief, which, according to Pew, paid off in the form of significantly improved perceptions of the United States in the affected countries. Though they have not been broad or generous enough to silence detractors, the Administration's support for combating global AIDS and poverty have helped neutralize what would otherwise have been sore points contributing to anti-American perceptions. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's ambitious travel schedule and frequent public speeches in foreign countries have been received positively and have helped to create a perception that the Administration is more willing to reach out and to listen in its second term than it was in the first.

We offer some additional proposals for consideration:

Integrating public diplomacy efforts – Public diplomacy efforts cannot be confined to designated public relations officers. Like it or not, every representative of the U.S. government is a de facto public diplomacy ambassador, including military personnel, prison guards, and military interrogators. Training in communications, culture and public diplomacy needs to be provided to every person serving the U.S. overseas or dealing with detainee populations, no matter the capacity.

Listening Tours – Representatives of major cabinet departments should meet not only with government counterparts overseas, but also with nongovernmental organizations, citizens' groups, and students. In doing so, they will not only better inform themselves, but demonstrate that the United States recognizes the need for its role and policies to be widely understood. Listening cannot be the work only of public diplomacy officials, or we will perpetuate perceptions that those who determine policy are not interested in what others have to say.

Engaging the private sector – The GAO's April 2005 report found that the Administration's efforts to engage the private sector in public diplomacy had largely failed, despite the manifest interest of corporations in preventing the rise of anti-Americanism, as manifested in the formation of groups like Business for Diplomatic Action and in the attention given to, for example, studies on the impact of anti-Americanism on brand equity.

Less PR, More Sales – PR suggests one-way broadcast communication to shape opinions and correct misperceptions. Much of the Administration's current thinking about public diplomacy — which emphasizes, for example, the need to better publicize the amounts of foreign aid that the U.S. provides to Mideast countries — has a PR focus. Though sales has a bad name in some circles, sales tactics are actually closer to what we need in that they are focused not simply on the message conveyed, but also on the reaction to it. A salesperson has not done his job unless a sale – in this case of the U.S. and its policies - - is actually made. Some key principles of sales may be usefully adapted:

Understand the customer – Effectively restoring perceptions of the U.S. will depend on understanding how the U.S. is seen by individual countries and populations. Shibley Telhami's concept of a "prism of pain" is instructive. The sovereignty and legacy-based strains of anti-Americanism grow out of people's particular historical or present day experiences. These provide a lens through which all aspects of American behavior are evaluated. Until we understand these lenses, we will be unable to reshape them. American personnel serving overseas must be thoroughly educated in the history and culture of their host populations so that they can perceive these prisms and learn how to communicate through them.

Segment focus – Sales efforts need to be targeted toward particular customer segments. The U.S. should have people assigned to interact with key populations and sub-populations — to understand their motivations, get to know their leaders, and work to influence their perceptions. In order to really know your customer base, it has to be

defined fairly narrowly. Overseas posts should have specific personnel assigned to outreach geared at various population segments – different political groups, business leaders, students, and women.

Research – Research is an essential element of the sales process. For public diplomacy research is essential to understanding your target population and measuring your progress toward influencing them. Americans understand the vital importance of survey research for domestic political purposes and need to begin to make equivalent use of it for our public diplomacy efforts. State Department polling should be used to measure which public diplomacy efforts are having the greatest payoff among particular populations, and to retool and hone efforts.

High-touch – Selling a complicated product is a "high touch" business. It cannot be conducted from within a fortified compound or by high-level officials surrounded by bodyguards. Those made responsible for public diplomacy should be required to meet face-to-face with persons in their target population as frequently as possible.   They should be required to report on these calls, and should be measured on how many contacts they are making and with what results.

Visibility – To succeed, sales efforts require marketing support. Information and positive messages about the U.S. are essential aids to public diplomacy. Since the dismantling of USIA, the U.S.'s visibility in American schools, universities libraries and public spheres around the world has declined. While many reports identify this gap as a problem, they get stuck on the conclusion that USIA cannot be brought back to life. Yet, it seems fairly clear that if 9/11 could have been anticipated, USIA would have been strengthened rather than dissolved. In retrospect, dismantling the agency was probably a mistake. But that error need not be compounded by failing to restore USIA capabilities that are badly needed today. Rather than being hamstrung by the impossibility of reviving a moribund body, policymakers should recognize that many of the functions formerly served by USIA are still badly needed and should figure out how they can be served. If this requires setting up a new department of body responsible for coordinating

exchanges, translating books, deploying speakers, and creating country-specific materials, so be it.

Incentives – An essential feature of any sales organization are the incentives offered to people who succeed in closing sales. Skills and achievements in public diplomacy should be included as a basis upon which foreign service officers and military personnel are evaluated. Those who succeed in building support for U.S. policies among constituencies abroad should be rewarded with awards, bonuses, as well as new opportunities and promotions.   Consideration for top posts in the State Department, including Ambassadorships, should be contingent upon proven skills in making America's case to foreign counterparts.   Being perceived by peers as a "good advocate" for American policies is not enough – the test is in proven ability to convince others of the merits of U.S. positions.

Focus on radical anti-Americanism – The role of radical anti-Americanism in fueling terrorist violence is the most immediate and dangerous consequence of anti-Americanism and the right place for efforts to focus. It's also the hardest problem to tackle, in that attitudes toward the U.S. are so heavily influenced by American policy toward the Middle East and by Arab regimes' own shaping of attitudes toward the U.S. as a way to further their own political objectives.   But rather than mounting a post-Sputnik style push to respond, the U.S has been slow to act on even the most obvious recommendations for how to equip ourselves to tackle extremism.

Jump-starting language training – Offer federally funded full scholarships to students committed to mastering Arabic and other strategic languages and entering government service in the State Department, the military, intelligence or elsewhere. While there has been lots of discussion of the need to promote far wider expertise in Arab languages and cultures, little progress has been made.

Incentivizing travel – Offer federally funded scholarships for semesters abroad studying in Middle East countries.

Expanding exchanges – Many papers and reports have called for this. The anecdotal evidence is overwhelming that even a brief stay in the United States can dramatically counter anti-American stereotypes.

Recruiting Muslims – Islam is the fastest growing religion in the U.S., yet there are virtually no Muslims working as part of the public diplomacy effort.

Mobilizing other countries that have an interest in defending modernity – To the extent that anti-Americanism carries over into hostility toward the modern world as a whole, the U.S. should not be alone in fighting it. The U.S. should press for its allies to join in the effort.

Viewing policies through local prisms – Policies and actions — such as those at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo — have the potential to unravel years of efforts at relationship building. All policymakers need to be educated on how the Islamic world perceives the U.S. and why. Top public diplomacy officials should have input on key policy decisions, providing insight into how actions will affect anti-Americanism and on possible steps to mitigate such affects where possible.